purple_ssh/

vault_ssh.rs

use anyhow::{Context, Result};
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};
use std::process::Command;

/// Result of a certificate signing operation.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct SignResult {
    pub cert_path: PathBuf,
}

/// Certificate validity status.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq)]
pub enum CertStatus {
    Valid {
        expires_at: i64,
        remaining_secs: i64,
        /// Total certificate validity window in seconds (to - from), used by
        /// the UI to compute proportional freshness thresholds.
        total_secs: i64,
    },
    Expired,
    Missing,
    Invalid(String),
}

/// Minimum remaining seconds before a cert needs renewal (5 minutes).
pub const RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS: i64 = 300;

/// TTL (in seconds) for the in-memory cert status cache before we re-run
/// `ssh-keygen -L` against an on-disk certificate. Distinct from
/// `RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS`: this controls how often we *re-check* a cert's
/// validity, while `RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS` is the minimum lifetime below which
/// we actually request a new signature from Vault.
pub const CERT_STATUS_CACHE_TTL_SECS: u64 = 300;

/// Shorter TTL for cached `CertStatus::Invalid` entries produced by check
/// failures (e.g. unresolvable cert path). Error entries use this backoff
/// instead of the 5-minute re-check TTL so transient errors recover quickly
/// without hammering the background check thread on every poll tick.
pub const CERT_ERROR_BACKOFF_SECS: u64 = 30;

/// Validate a Vault SSH role path. Accepts ASCII alphanumerics plus `/`, `_` and `-`.
/// Rejects empty strings and values longer than 128 chars.
pub fn is_valid_role(s: &str) -> bool {
    !s.is_empty()
        && s.len() <= 128
        && s.chars()
            .all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '/' || c == '_' || c == '-')
}

/// Validate a `VAULT_ADDR` value passed to the Vault CLI as an env var.
///
/// Intentionally minimal: reject empty, control characters and whitespace.
/// We do NOT try to parse the URL here — a typo just produces a Vault CLI
/// error, which is fine. The 512-byte ceiling prevents a pathological config
/// line from ballooning the environment block.
pub fn is_valid_vault_addr(s: &str) -> bool {
    let trimmed = s.trim();
    !trimmed.is_empty()
        && trimmed.len() <= 512
        && !trimmed.chars().any(|c| c.is_control() || c.is_whitespace())
}

/// Normalize a vault address so bare IPs and hostnames work.
/// Prepends `https://` when no scheme is present and appends `:8200`
/// (Vault's default port) when no port is specified. The default
/// scheme is `https://` because production Vault always uses TLS.
/// Dev-mode users can set `http://` explicitly.
pub fn normalize_vault_addr(s: &str) -> String {
    let trimmed = s.trim();
    // Case-insensitive scheme detection.
    let lower = trimmed.to_ascii_lowercase();
    let (with_scheme, scheme_len) = if lower.starts_with("http://") || lower.starts_with("https://")
    {
        let len = if lower.starts_with("https://") { 8 } else { 7 };
        (trimmed.to_string(), len)
    } else if trimmed.contains("://") {
        // Unknown scheme (ftp://, etc.) — return as-is, let the CLI error.
        return trimmed.to_string();
    } else {
        (format!("https://{}", trimmed), 8)
    };
    // Extract the authority (host[:port]) portion, ignoring any path/query.
    let after_scheme = &with_scheme[scheme_len..];
    let authority = after_scheme.split('/').next().unwrap_or(after_scheme);
    // IPv6 addresses use [::1]:port syntax. A colon inside brackets is not a
    // port separator.
    let has_port = if let Some(bracket_end) = authority.rfind(']') {
        authority[bracket_end..].contains(':')
    } else {
        authority.contains(':')
    };
    if has_port {
        with_scheme
    } else {
        // Insert :8200 after the authority, before any path.
        let path_start = scheme_len + authority.len();
        format!(
            "{}:8200{}",
            &with_scheme[..path_start],
            &with_scheme[path_start..]
        )
    }
}

/// Scrub a raw Vault CLI stderr for display. Drops lines containing credential-like
/// tokens (token, secret, x-vault-, cookie, authorization), joins the rest with spaces
/// and truncates to 200 chars.
pub fn scrub_vault_stderr(raw: &str) -> String {
    let filtered: String = raw
        .lines()
        .filter(|line| {
            let lower = line.to_ascii_lowercase();
            !(lower.contains("token")
                || lower.contains("secret")
                || lower.contains("x-vault-")
                || lower.contains("cookie")
                || lower.contains("authorization"))
        })
        .collect::<Vec<_>>()
        .join(" ");
    let trimmed = filtered.trim();
    if trimmed.is_empty() {
        return "Vault SSH signing failed. Check vault status and policy".to_string();
    }
    if trimmed.chars().count() > 200 {
        trimmed.chars().take(200).collect::<String>() + "..."
    } else {
        trimmed.to_string()
    }
}

/// Return the certificate path for a given alias: ~/.purple/certs/<alias>-cert.pub
pub fn cert_path_for(alias: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
    anyhow::ensure!(
        !alias.is_empty()
            && !alias.contains('/')
            && !alias.contains('\\')
            && !alias.contains(':')
            && !alias.contains('\0')
            && !alias.contains(".."),
        "Invalid alias for cert path: '{}'",
        alias
    );
    let dir = dirs::home_dir()
        .context("Could not determine home directory")?
        .join(".purple/certs");
    Ok(dir.join(format!("{}-cert.pub", alias)))
}

/// Resolve the actual certificate file path for a host.
/// Priority: CertificateFile directive > purple's default cert path.
pub fn resolve_cert_path(alias: &str, certificate_file: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
    if !certificate_file.is_empty() {
        let expanded = if let Some(rest) = certificate_file.strip_prefix("~/") {
            if let Some(home) = dirs::home_dir() {
                home.join(rest)
            } else {
                PathBuf::from(certificate_file)
            }
        } else {
            PathBuf::from(certificate_file)
        };
        Ok(expanded)
    } else {
        cert_path_for(alias)
    }
}

/// Sign an SSH public key via Vault SSH secrets engine.
/// Runs: `vault write -field=signed_key <role> public_key=@<pubkey_path>`
/// Writes the signed certificate to ~/.purple/certs/<alias>-cert.pub.
///
/// When `vault_addr` is `Some`, it is set as the `VAULT_ADDR` env var on the
/// `vault` subprocess, overriding whatever the parent shell has configured.
/// When `None`, the subprocess inherits the parent's env (current behavior).
/// This lets purple users configure Vault address at the provider or host
/// level without needing to launch purple from a pre-exported shell.
pub fn sign_certificate(
    role: &str,
    pubkey_path: &Path,
    alias: &str,
    vault_addr: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<SignResult> {
    if !pubkey_path.exists() {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "Public key not found: {}. Set IdentityFile on the host or ensure ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub exists.",
            pubkey_path.display()
        );
    }

    if !is_valid_role(role) {
        anyhow::bail!("Invalid Vault SSH role: '{}'", role);
    }

    let cert_dest = cert_path_for(alias)?;

    if let Some(parent) = cert_dest.parent() {
        std::fs::create_dir_all(parent)
            .with_context(|| format!("Failed to create {}", parent.display()))?;
    }

    // The Vault CLI receives the public key path as a UTF-8 argument. `Path::display()`
    // is lossy on non-UTF8 paths and could produce a mangled path Vault would then fail
    // to read. Require a valid UTF-8 path and fail fast with a clear message.
    let pubkey_str = pubkey_path.to_str().context(
        "public key path contains non-UTF8 bytes; vault CLI requires a valid UTF-8 path",
    )?;
    // The Vault CLI parses arguments as `key=value` KV pairs. A path containing
    // `=` would be split mid-argument and produce a cryptic parse error. The
    // check runs on the already-resolved (tilde-expanded) path because that is
    // exactly the byte sequence the CLI will see. A user with a `$HOME` path
    // that itself contains `=` will hit this early; the error message reports
    // the expanded path so they can rename the offending directory.
    if pubkey_str.contains('=') {
        anyhow::bail!(
            "Public key path '{}' contains '=' which is not supported by the Vault CLI argument format. Rename the key file or directory.",
            pubkey_str
        );
    }
    let pubkey_arg = format!("public_key=@{}", pubkey_str);
    let mut cmd = Command::new("vault");
    cmd.args(["write", "-field=signed_key", role, &pubkey_arg]);
    // Override VAULT_ADDR for this subprocess only when a value was resolved
    // from config. Otherwise leave the env untouched so `vault` keeps using
    // whatever the parent shell (or `~/.vault-token`) provides. The caller
    // (typically `resolve_vault_addr`) is expected to have validated and
    // trimmed the value already — re-checking here is cheap belt-and-braces
    // for callers that construct the `Option<&str>` manually.
    if let Some(addr) = vault_addr {
        anyhow::ensure!(
            is_valid_vault_addr(addr),
            "Invalid VAULT_ADDR '{}' for role '{}'. Check the Vault SSH Address field.",
            addr,
            role
        );
        cmd.env("VAULT_ADDR", addr);
    }
    let mut child = cmd
        .stdout(std::process::Stdio::piped())
        .stderr(std::process::Stdio::piped())
        .spawn()
        .context("Failed to run vault CLI. Is vault installed and in PATH?")?;

    // Drain both pipes on background threads to prevent pipe-buffer deadlock.
    // Without this, the vault CLI can block writing to a full stderr pipe
    // (64 KB) while we poll try_wait, causing a false timeout.
    let stdout_handle = child.stdout.take();
    let stderr_handle = child.stderr.take();
    let stdout_thread = std::thread::spawn(move || -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut buf = Vec::new();
        if let Some(mut h) = stdout_handle {
            let _ = std::io::Read::read_to_end(&mut h, &mut buf);
        }
        buf
    });
    let stderr_thread = std::thread::spawn(move || -> Vec<u8> {
        let mut buf = Vec::new();
        if let Some(mut h) = stderr_handle {
            let _ = std::io::Read::read_to_end(&mut h, &mut buf);
        }
        buf
    });

    // Wait up to 30 seconds for the vault CLI to complete. Without a timeout
    // the thread blocks indefinitely when the Vault server is unreachable
    // (e.g. wrong address, firewall, TLS handshake hanging).
    let deadline = std::time::Instant::now() + std::time::Duration::from_secs(30);
    let status = loop {
        match child.try_wait() {
            Ok(Some(s)) => break s,
            Ok(None) => {
                if std::time::Instant::now() >= deadline {
                    let _ = child.kill();
                    let _ = child.wait();
                    // The pipe-drain threads (stdout_thread, stderr_thread)
                    // are dropped without joining here. This is intentional:
                    // kill() closes the child's pipe ends, so read_to_end
                    // returns immediately and the threads self-terminate.
                    anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH timed out. Server unreachable.");
                }
                std::thread::sleep(std::time::Duration::from_millis(100));
            }
            Err(e) => {
                let _ = child.kill();
                let _ = child.wait();
                anyhow::bail!("Failed to wait for vault CLI: {}", e);
            }
        }
    };

    let stdout_bytes = stdout_thread.join().unwrap_or_default();
    let stderr_bytes = stderr_thread.join().unwrap_or_default();
    let output = std::process::Output {
        status,
        stdout: stdout_bytes,
        stderr: stderr_bytes,
    };

    if !output.status.success() {
        let stderr = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stderr);
        if stderr.contains("permission denied") || stderr.contains("403") {
            anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH permission denied. Check token and policy.");
        }
        if stderr.contains("missing client token") || stderr.contains("token expired") {
            anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH token missing or expired. Run `vault login`.");
        }
        // Check "connection refused" before "dial tcp" because Go's
        // refused-connection error contains both substrings.
        if stderr.contains("connection refused") {
            anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH connection refused.");
        }
        if stderr.contains("i/o timeout") || stderr.contains("dial tcp") {
            anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH connection timed out.");
        }
        if stderr.contains("no such host") {
            anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH host not found.");
        }
        if stderr.contains("server gave HTTP response to HTTPS client") {
            anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH server uses HTTP, not HTTPS. Set address to http://.");
        }
        if stderr.contains("certificate signed by unknown authority")
            || stderr.contains("tls:")
            || stderr.contains("x509:")
        {
            anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH TLS error. Check certificate or use http://.");
        }
        anyhow::bail!("Vault SSH failed: {}", scrub_vault_stderr(&stderr));
    }

    let signed_key = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout).trim().to_string();
    if signed_key.is_empty() {
        anyhow::bail!("Vault returned empty certificate for role '{}'", role);
    }

    crate::fs_util::atomic_write(&cert_dest, signed_key.as_bytes())
        .with_context(|| format!("Failed to write certificate to {}", cert_dest.display()))?;

    Ok(SignResult {
        cert_path: cert_dest,
    })
}

/// Check the validity of an SSH certificate file via `ssh-keygen -L`.
///
/// Timezone note: `ssh-keygen -L` outputs local civil time, which `parse_ssh_datetime`
/// converts to pseudo-epoch seconds. Rather than comparing against UTC `now` (which would
/// be wrong in non-UTC zones), we compute the TTL from the parsed from/to difference
/// (timezone-independent) and measure elapsed time since the cert file was written (UTC
/// file mtime vs UTC now). This keeps both sides in the same reference frame.
pub fn check_cert_validity(cert_path: &Path) -> CertStatus {
    if !cert_path.exists() {
        return CertStatus::Missing;
    }

    let output = match Command::new("ssh-keygen")
        .args(["-L", "-f"])
        .arg(cert_path)
        .output()
    {
        Ok(o) => o,
        Err(e) => return CertStatus::Invalid(format!("Failed to run ssh-keygen: {}", e)),
    };

    if !output.status.success() {
        return CertStatus::Invalid("ssh-keygen could not read certificate".to_string());
    }

    let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&output.stdout);

    // Handle certificates signed with no expiration ("Valid: forever").
    for line in stdout.lines() {
        let t = line.trim();
        if t == "Valid: forever" || t.starts_with("Valid: from ") && t.ends_with(" to forever") {
            return CertStatus::Valid {
                expires_at: i64::MAX,
                remaining_secs: i64::MAX,
                total_secs: i64::MAX,
            };
        }
    }

    for line in stdout.lines() {
        if let Some((from, to)) = parse_valid_line(line) {
            let ttl = to - from; // Correct regardless of timezone
            // Defensive: a cert with to < from is malformed. Treat as Invalid
            // rather than propagating a negative ttl into the cache and the
            // renewal threshold calculation.
            if ttl <= 0 {
                return CertStatus::Invalid(
                    "certificate has non-positive validity window".to_string(),
                );
            }

            // Use file modification time as the signing timestamp (UTC)
            let signed_at = match std::fs::metadata(cert_path)
                .and_then(|m| m.modified())
                .ok()
                .and_then(|t| t.duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH).ok())
            {
                Some(d) => d.as_secs() as i64,
                None => {
                    // Cannot determine file age. Treat as needing renewal.
                    return CertStatus::Expired;
                }
            };

            let now = match std::time::SystemTime::now().duration_since(std::time::UNIX_EPOCH) {
                Ok(d) => d.as_secs() as i64,
                Err(_) => {
                    return CertStatus::Invalid("system clock before unix epoch".to_string());
                }
            };

            let elapsed = now - signed_at;
            let remaining = ttl - elapsed;

            if remaining <= 0 {
                return CertStatus::Expired;
            }
            let expires_at = now + remaining;
            return CertStatus::Valid {
                expires_at,
                remaining_secs: remaining,
                total_secs: ttl,
            };
        }
    }

    CertStatus::Invalid("No Valid: line found in certificate".to_string())
}

/// Parse "Valid: from YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS to YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS" from ssh-keygen -L.
fn parse_valid_line(line: &str) -> Option<(i64, i64)> {
    let trimmed = line.trim();
    let rest = trimmed.strip_prefix("Valid:")?;
    let rest = rest.trim();
    let rest = rest.strip_prefix("from ")?;
    let (from_str, rest) = rest.split_once(" to ")?;
    let to_str = rest.trim();

    let from = parse_ssh_datetime(from_str)?;
    let to = parse_ssh_datetime(to_str)?;
    Some((from, to))
}

/// Parse YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS to Unix epoch seconds.
/// Note: ssh-keygen outputs local time. We use the same clock for comparison
/// (SystemTime::now gives wall clock), so the relative difference is correct
/// for TTL checks even though the absolute epoch may be off by the UTC offset.
fn parse_ssh_datetime(s: &str) -> Option<i64> {
    let s = s.trim();
    if s.len() < 19 {
        return None;
    }
    let year: i64 = s.get(0..4)?.parse().ok()?;
    let month: i64 = s.get(5..7)?.parse().ok()?;
    let day: i64 = s.get(8..10)?.parse().ok()?;
    let hour: i64 = s.get(11..13)?.parse().ok()?;
    let min: i64 = s.get(14..16)?.parse().ok()?;
    let sec: i64 = s.get(17..19)?.parse().ok()?;

    if s.as_bytes().get(4) != Some(&b'-')
        || s.as_bytes().get(7) != Some(&b'-')
        || s.as_bytes().get(10) != Some(&b'T')
        || s.as_bytes().get(13) != Some(&b':')
        || s.as_bytes().get(16) != Some(&b':')
    {
        return None;
    }

    if !(1..=12).contains(&month) || !(1..=31).contains(&day) {
        return None;
    }
    if !(0..=23).contains(&hour) || !(0..=59).contains(&min) || !(0..=59).contains(&sec) {
        return None;
    }

    // Civil date to Unix epoch (same algorithm as chrono/time crates).
    let mut y = year;
    let m = if month <= 2 {
        y -= 1;
        month + 9
    } else {
        month - 3
    };
    let era = if y >= 0 { y } else { y - 399 } / 400;
    let yoe = y - era * 400;
    let doy = (153 * m + 2) / 5 + day - 1;
    let doe = yoe * 365 + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100 + doy;
    let days = era * 146097 + doe - 719468;

    Some(days * 86400 + hour * 3600 + min * 60 + sec)
}

/// Check if a certificate needs renewal.
///
/// For certificates whose total validity window is shorter than
/// `RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS`, the fixed 5-minute threshold would flag a freshly
/// signed cert as needing renewal immediately, causing an infinite re-sign loop.
/// In that case we fall back to a proportional threshold (half the total).
pub fn needs_renewal(status: &CertStatus) -> bool {
    match status {
        CertStatus::Missing | CertStatus::Expired | CertStatus::Invalid(_) => true,
        CertStatus::Valid {
            remaining_secs,
            total_secs,
            ..
        } => {
            let threshold = if *total_secs > 0 && *total_secs <= RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS {
                *total_secs / 2
            } else {
                RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS
            };
            *remaining_secs < threshold
        }
    }
}

/// Ensure a valid certificate exists for a host. Signs a new one if needed.
/// Checks at the CertificateFile path (or purple's default) before signing.
pub fn ensure_cert(
    role: &str,
    pubkey_path: &Path,
    alias: &str,
    certificate_file: &str,
    vault_addr: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<PathBuf> {
    let check_path = resolve_cert_path(alias, certificate_file)?;
    let status = check_cert_validity(&check_path);

    if !needs_renewal(&status) {
        return Ok(check_path);
    }

    let result = sign_certificate(role, pubkey_path, alias, vault_addr)?;
    Ok(result.cert_path)
}

/// Resolve the public key path for signing.
/// Priority: host IdentityFile + ".pub" > ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub fallback.
/// Returns an error when the user's home directory cannot be determined. Any
/// IdentityFile pointing outside `$HOME` is rejected and falls back to the
/// default `~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub` to prevent reading arbitrary filesystem
/// locations via a crafted IdentityFile directive.
pub fn resolve_pubkey_path(identity_file: &str) -> Result<PathBuf> {
    let home = dirs::home_dir().context("Could not determine home directory")?;
    let fallback = home.join(".ssh/id_ed25519.pub");

    if identity_file.is_empty() {
        return Ok(fallback);
    }

    let expanded = if let Some(rest) = identity_file.strip_prefix("~/") {
        home.join(rest)
    } else {
        PathBuf::from(identity_file)
    };

    // A purely lexical `starts_with(&home)` check can be bypassed by a symlink inside
    // $HOME pointing to a path outside $HOME (e.g. ~/evil -> /etc). Canonicalize both
    // sides so symlinks are resolved, then compare. If the expanded path does not yet
    // exist (or canonicalize fails for any reason) we cannot safely reason about where
    // it actually points, so fall back to the default key path.
    let canonical_home = match std::fs::canonicalize(&home) {
        Ok(p) => p,
        Err(_) => return Ok(fallback),
    };
    if expanded.exists() {
        match std::fs::canonicalize(&expanded) {
            Ok(canonical) if canonical.starts_with(&canonical_home) => {}
            _ => return Ok(fallback),
        }
    } else if !expanded.starts_with(&home) {
        return Ok(fallback);
    }

    if expanded.extension().is_some_and(|ext| ext == "pub") {
        Ok(expanded)
    } else {
        let mut s = expanded.into_os_string();
        s.push(".pub");
        Ok(PathBuf::from(s))
    }
}

/// Resolve the effective vault role for a host.
/// Priority: host-level vault_ssh > provider-level vault_role > None.
pub fn resolve_vault_role(
    host_vault_ssh: Option<&str>,
    provider_name: Option<&str>,
    provider_config: &crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig,
) -> Option<String> {
    if let Some(role) = host_vault_ssh {
        if !role.is_empty() {
            return Some(role.to_string());
        }
    }

    if let Some(name) = provider_name {
        if let Some(section) = provider_config.section(name) {
            if !section.vault_role.is_empty() {
                return Some(section.vault_role.clone());
            }
        }
    }

    None
}

/// Resolve the effective Vault address for a host.
///
/// Precedence (highest wins): per-host `# purple:vault-addr` comment,
/// provider `vault_addr=` setting, else None (caller falls back to the
/// `vault` CLI's own env resolution).
///
/// Both layers are re-validated with `is_valid_vault_addr` even though the
/// parser paths (`HostBlock::vault_addr()` and `ProviderConfig::parse`)
/// already drop invalid values. This is defensive: a future caller that
/// constructs a `HostEntry` or `ProviderSection` in-memory (tests, migration
/// code, a new feature) won't be able to smuggle a malformed `VAULT_ADDR`
/// into `sign_certificate` through this resolver.
pub fn resolve_vault_addr(
    host_vault_addr: Option<&str>,
    provider_name: Option<&str>,
    provider_config: &crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig,
) -> Option<String> {
    if let Some(addr) = host_vault_addr {
        let trimmed = addr.trim();
        if !trimmed.is_empty() && is_valid_vault_addr(trimmed) {
            return Some(normalize_vault_addr(trimmed));
        }
    }

    if let Some(name) = provider_name {
        if let Some(section) = provider_config.section(name) {
            let trimmed = section.vault_addr.trim();
            if !trimmed.is_empty() && is_valid_vault_addr(trimmed) {
                return Some(normalize_vault_addr(trimmed));
            }
        }
    }

    None
}

/// Format remaining certificate time for display.
pub fn format_remaining(remaining_secs: i64) -> String {
    if remaining_secs <= 0 {
        return "expired".to_string();
    }
    let hours = remaining_secs / 3600;
    let mins = (remaining_secs % 3600) / 60;
    if hours > 0 {
        format!("{}h {}m", hours, mins)
    } else {
        format!("{}m", mins)
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// Module-wide lock shared by every test that mutates `PATH` to install
    /// a mock `ssh-keygen` or `vault` binary. Without this, parallel tests
    /// race on the process-wide environment and one test's PATH restore
    /// overwrites another's mock.
    #[cfg(unix)]
    static PATH_LOCK: std::sync::Mutex<()> = std::sync::Mutex::new(());

    #[test]
    fn cert_path_for_simple_alias() {
        let path = cert_path_for("webserver").unwrap();
        assert!(path.ends_with("certs/webserver-cert.pub"));
        assert!(path.to_string_lossy().contains(".purple/certs/"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_path_for_alias_with_prefix() {
        let path = cert_path_for("aws-prod-web01").unwrap();
        assert!(path.ends_with("certs/aws-prod-web01-cert.pub"));
    }

    /// Regression: a public key path that contains `=` would split the
    /// `public_key=@<path>` argument mid-pair when handed to the Vault CLI and
    /// produce a cryptic parse error. `sign_certificate` rejects such paths up
    /// front so the user gets a clear actionable message instead.
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_rejects_pubkey_path_with_equals() {
        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
            "purple_test_pubkey_eq_{:?}",
            std::thread::current().id()
        ));
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
        let bad = dir.join("key=foo.pub");
        std::fs::write(&bad, "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI test@test\n").unwrap();

        let result = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/test", &bad, "alias", None);
        let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
        assert!(
            err.contains('=') && err.contains("Vault CLI"),
            "expected explicit `=` rejection, got: {}",
            err
        );
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_missing_pubkey() {
        let result = sign_certificate(
            "ssh/sign/test",
            Path::new("/tmp/purple_nonexistent_key.pub"),
            "test",
            None,
        );
        assert!(result.is_err());
        let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
        assert!(err.contains("Public key not found"), "got: {}", err);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_vault_not_configured() {
        let tmpdir = std::env::temp_dir();
        let fake_key = tmpdir.join("purple_test_vault_sign_key.pub");
        std::fs::write(
            &fake_key,
            "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI test@test\n",
        )
        .unwrap();

        let result = sign_certificate("nonexistent/sign/role", &fake_key, "test-host", None);
        assert!(result.is_err());
        let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
        assert!(
            err.contains("vault") || err.contains("Vault") || err.contains("Failed"),
            "Error should mention vault: {}",
            err
        );

        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&fake_key);
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_valid_line_standard() {
        let line = "        Valid: from 2026-04-08T10:00:00 to 2026-04-09T10:00:00";
        let (from, to) = parse_valid_line(line).unwrap();
        assert!(from > 0);
        assert!(to > from);
        assert_eq!(to - from, 86400);
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_valid_line_no_match() {
        assert!(parse_valid_line("        Type: ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_valid_line_forever() {
        let line = "        Valid: from 2026-04-08T10:00:00 to forever";
        assert!(parse_valid_line(line).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_ssh_datetime_valid() {
        let epoch = parse_ssh_datetime("2026-04-08T12:00:00").unwrap();
        assert!(epoch > 1_700_000_000);
        assert!(epoch < 2_000_000_000);
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_ssh_datetime_invalid() {
        assert!(parse_ssh_datetime("not-a-date").is_none());
        assert!(parse_ssh_datetime("2026-13-08T12:00:00").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn check_cert_validity_missing() {
        let path = Path::new("/tmp/purple_test_nonexistent_cert.pub");
        assert_eq!(check_cert_validity(path), CertStatus::Missing);
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_missing() {
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Missing));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_expired() {
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Expired));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_invalid() {
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Invalid("bad".to_string())));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_valid_plenty_of_time() {
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: 3600,
            total_secs: 3600,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_valid_under_threshold() {
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: 60,
            total_secs: 3600,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_at_threshold_boundary() {
        // A freshly signed cert with remaining == threshold must NOT trigger
        // renewal. Otherwise a cert whose TTL equals the threshold (or close
        // to it) would be re-signed on every check, causing an infinite loop.
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS,
            total_secs: 3600,
        }));
        // Just under the threshold is the renewal tipping point.
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS - 1,
            total_secs: 3600,
        }));
        // Above threshold: still valid.
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS + 1,
            total_secs: 3600,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_short_ttl_freshly_signed_not_renewed() {
        // Regression: a cert with a total TTL shorter than RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS
        // must not be flagged for renewal the instant it is signed. Prior to the
        // fix this caused an infinite re-sign loop for sub-5-minute roles.
        let total = 120i64; // 2-minute role
        // Freshly signed: remaining ~= total.
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: total,
            total_secs: total,
        }));
        // Half-life: still valid under the proportional threshold (total/2 = 60).
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: 61,
            total_secs: total,
        }));
        // Under proportional threshold: renew.
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: 30,
            total_secs: total,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_total_zero_uses_fixed_threshold() {
        // total_secs == 0 is unusual (forever certs use i64::MAX) but must
        // not divide by zero or trigger the proportional path. Fall back to
        // the fixed 5-minute threshold.
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS + 1,
            total_secs: 0,
        }));
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: RENEWAL_THRESHOLD_SECS - 1,
            total_secs: 0,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_total_one_uses_proportional_threshold() {
        // total_secs == 1: proportional threshold is 1/2 == 0. With `<`
        // comparison, remaining == 0 does NOT renew, which matches the
        // "don't re-sign a cert that just expired on the client clock"
        // intent. (CertStatus::Expired is the normal path for that.)
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: 1,
            total_secs: 1,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_forever_cert_never_renews() {
        // "Valid: forever" certs use i64::MAX for both remaining and total.
        // These must never be flagged for renewal regardless of threshold.
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: i64::MAX,
            remaining_secs: i64::MAX,
            total_secs: i64::MAX,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_error_backoff_is_shorter_than_normal_ttl() {
        // The lazy cert-check loop picks a shorter TTL for Invalid entries so
        // transient check failures recover quickly without hammering the
        // background thread on every poll tick. This invariant is structural
        // — if a future change swaps the constants the lazy-check branch in
        // main.rs becomes useless. Enforced at compile time via const block.
        const _: () = assert!(CERT_ERROR_BACKOFF_SECS < CERT_STATUS_CACHE_TTL_SECS);
        const _: () = assert!(CERT_ERROR_BACKOFF_SECS >= 5);
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_negative_remaining_is_expired() {
        // Defensive: a negative remaining (clock skew) falls under the
        // normal threshold so the caller re-signs. check_cert_validity
        // actually returns Expired in this case, but needs_renewal must
        // also be correct standalone.
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: -100,
            total_secs: 3600,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn needs_renewal_short_ttl_at_exact_threshold() {
        // Boundary case: remaining == total/2 should NOT renew (uses `<`).
        let total = 200i64;
        assert!(!needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: 100,
            total_secs: total,
        }));
        assert!(needs_renewal(&CertStatus::Valid {
            expires_at: 0,
            remaining_secs: 99,
            total_secs: total,
        }));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_pubkey_from_identity_file() {
        let path = resolve_pubkey_path("~/.ssh/id_rsa").unwrap();
        let s = path.to_string_lossy();
        assert!(s.ends_with("id_rsa.pub"), "got: {}", s);
        assert!(!s.contains('~'), "tilde should be expanded: {}", s);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_pubkey_already_pub_no_double_suffix() {
        let path = resolve_pubkey_path("~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub").unwrap();
        let s = path.to_string_lossy();
        assert!(s.ends_with("id_ed25519.pub"), "got: {}", s);
        assert!(!s.ends_with(".pub.pub"), "double .pub suffix: {}", s);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_pubkey_empty_falls_back() {
        let path = resolve_pubkey_path("").unwrap();
        let s = path.to_string_lossy();
        assert!(s.ends_with("id_ed25519.pub"), "got: {}", s);
        assert!(s.contains(".ssh/"), "should be in .ssh dir: {}", s);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_pubkey_absolute_path_inside_home() {
        // An absolute path inside the user's home should be honored.
        let home = dirs::home_dir().expect("home dir");
        let abs = home.join(".ssh/deploy_key");
        let path = resolve_pubkey_path(abs.to_str().unwrap()).unwrap();
        let expected = home.join(".ssh/deploy_key.pub");
        assert_eq!(path, expected);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_host_override() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::default();
        let role = resolve_vault_role(Some("ssh/sign/admin"), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(role.as_deref(), Some("ssh/sign/admin"));
    }

    // ---- is_valid_vault_addr tests ----

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_vault_addr_accepts_typical_urls() {
        assert!(is_valid_vault_addr("http://127.0.0.1:8200"));
        assert!(is_valid_vault_addr("https://vault.example.com:8200"));
        assert!(is_valid_vault_addr("https://vault.internal/v1"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_vault_addr_rejects_empty_and_blank() {
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr(""));
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr("   "));
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr("\t"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_vault_addr_rejects_whitespace_inside() {
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr("http://host :8200"));
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr("http://host\t:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_vault_addr_rejects_control_chars() {
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr("http://host\n8200"));
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr("http://host\r8200"));
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr("http://host\x00:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_vault_addr_rejects_overlong() {
        let long = "http://".to_string() + &"a".repeat(600);
        assert!(!is_valid_vault_addr(&long));
    }

    // ---- resolve_vault_addr tests ----

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_none_when_nothing_set() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::default();
        assert!(resolve_vault_addr(None, None, &config).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_uses_host_override() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::default();
        let addr = resolve_vault_addr(Some("http://127.0.0.1:8200"), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(addr.as_deref(), Some("http://127.0.0.1:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_falls_back_to_provider() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_addr=https://vault.example:8200\n",
        );
        let addr = resolve_vault_addr(None, Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(addr.as_deref(), Some("https://vault.example:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_host_beats_provider() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_addr=https://provider:8200\n",
        );
        let addr = resolve_vault_addr(Some("http://host:8200"), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(addr.as_deref(), Some("http://host:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_empty_host_falls_through_to_provider() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_addr=https://provider:8200\n",
        );
        let addr = resolve_vault_addr(Some(""), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(addr.as_deref(), Some("https://provider:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_whitespace_host_falls_through_to_provider() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_addr=https://provider:8200\n",
        );
        let addr = resolve_vault_addr(Some("   "), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(addr.as_deref(), Some("https://provider:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_normalizes_bare_host_input() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::default();
        let addr = resolve_vault_addr(Some("192.168.1.100"), None, &config);
        assert_eq!(addr.as_deref(), Some("https://192.168.1.100:8200"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_addr_normalizes_provider_bare_addr() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_addr=vault.example\n",
        );
        let addr = resolve_vault_addr(None, Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(addr.as_deref(), Some("https://vault.example:8200"));
    }

    // ---- normalize_vault_addr tests ----

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_bare_ip() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("192.168.1.100"),
            "https://192.168.1.100:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_bare_hostname() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("vault.local"),
            "https://vault.local:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_ip_with_port() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("192.168.1.100:8200"),
            "https://192.168.1.100:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_ip_with_custom_port() {
        assert_eq!(normalize_vault_addr("10.0.0.1:443"), "https://10.0.0.1:443");
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_full_http_url() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("http://127.0.0.1:8200"),
            "http://127.0.0.1:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_full_https_url() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("https://vault.example.com:8200"),
            "https://vault.example.com:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_https_without_port() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("https://vault.example.com"),
            "https://vault.example.com:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_trims_whitespace() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("  10.0.0.1  "),
            "https://10.0.0.1:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_ipv6_bare() {
        assert_eq!(normalize_vault_addr("[::1]"), "https://[::1]:8200");
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_ipv6_with_port() {
        assert_eq!(normalize_vault_addr("[::1]:8200"), "https://[::1]:8200");
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_url_with_path_no_port() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("http://vault.host/v1"),
            "http://vault.host:8200/v1"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_trailing_slash() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("http://vault.host/"),
            "http://vault.host:8200/"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_uppercase_scheme() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("HTTP://vault.host"),
            "HTTP://vault.host:8200"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_unknown_scheme_passthrough() {
        assert_eq!(normalize_vault_addr("ftp://vault.host"), "ftp://vault.host");
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_ipv6_https_without_port() {
        assert_eq!(normalize_vault_addr("https://[::1]"), "https://[::1]:8200");
    }

    #[test]
    fn normalize_vault_addr_https_custom_port() {
        assert_eq!(
            normalize_vault_addr("https://vault.host:9200"),
            "https://vault.host:9200"
        );
    }

    // ---- end vault_addr tests ----

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_provider_fallback() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_role=ssh/sign/engineer\n",
        );
        let role = resolve_vault_role(None, Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(role.as_deref(), Some("ssh/sign/engineer"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_none_when_no_config() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::default();
        assert!(resolve_vault_role(None, None, &config).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_none_when_provider_has_no_role() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse("[aws]\ntoken=abc\n");
        assert!(resolve_vault_role(None, Some("aws"), &config).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_host_overrides_provider() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_role=ssh/sign/default\n",
        );
        let role = resolve_vault_role(Some("ssh/sign/admin"), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(role.as_deref(), Some("ssh/sign/admin"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn format_remaining_hours() {
        assert_eq!(format_remaining(7200 + 900), "2h 15m");
    }

    #[test]
    fn format_remaining_minutes_only() {
        assert_eq!(format_remaining(300), "5m");
    }

    #[test]
    fn format_remaining_expired() {
        assert_eq!(format_remaining(0), "expired");
        assert_eq!(format_remaining(-100), "expired");
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_cert_path_uses_certificate_file_when_set() {
        let path = resolve_cert_path("myhost", "~/.ssh/my-cert.pub").unwrap();
        let s = path.to_string_lossy();
        assert!(s.ends_with("my-cert.pub"), "got: {}", s);
        assert!(!s.contains('~'), "tilde should be expanded: {}", s);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_cert_path_falls_back_to_default() {
        let path = resolve_cert_path("myhost", "").unwrap();
        assert!(
            path.to_string_lossy()
                .contains(".purple/certs/myhost-cert.pub"),
            "got: {}",
            path.display()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_cert_path_absolute() {
        let path = resolve_cert_path("myhost", "/etc/ssh/certs/myhost.pub").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(path, PathBuf::from("/etc/ssh/certs/myhost.pub"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_path_for_rejects_path_traversal() {
        assert!(cert_path_for("../../tmp/evil").is_err());
        assert!(cert_path_for("foo/bar").is_err());
        assert!(cert_path_for("foo\\bar").is_err());
        assert!(cert_path_for("host:22").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_path_for_rejects_empty_alias() {
        assert!(cert_path_for("").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_rejects_role_starting_with_dash() {
        let tmpdir = std::env::temp_dir();
        let fake_key = tmpdir.join("purple_test_dash_role.pub");
        std::fs::write(
            &fake_key,
            "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI test@test\n",
        )
        .unwrap();
        let result = sign_certificate("-format=json", &fake_key, "test", None);
        assert!(result.is_err());
        assert!(
            result
                .unwrap_err()
                .to_string()
                .contains("Invalid Vault SSH role")
        );
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&fake_key);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_empty_host_falls_through_to_provider() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_role=ssh/sign/default\n",
        );
        let role = resolve_vault_role(Some(""), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(role.as_deref(), Some("ssh/sign/default"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn ensure_cert_returns_error_without_vault() {
        let tmpdir = std::env::temp_dir();
        let fake_key = tmpdir.join("purple_test_ensure_cert_key.pub");
        std::fs::write(
            &fake_key,
            "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI test@test\n",
        )
        .unwrap();

        let result = ensure_cert("ssh/sign/test", &fake_key, "ensure-test-host", "", None);
        // Should fail because vault CLI is not available
        assert!(result.is_err());
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&fake_key);
    }

    #[test]
    fn parse_ssh_datetime_rejects_zero_month_and_day() {
        assert!(parse_ssh_datetime("2026-00-08T12:00:00").is_none());
        assert!(parse_ssh_datetime("2026-04-00T12:00:00").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn format_remaining_exactly_one_hour() {
        assert_eq!(format_remaining(3600), "1h 0m");
    }

    #[test]
    fn cert_path_rejects_nul_byte() {
        assert!(cert_path_for("host\0name").is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_role_rejects_shell_metachars() {
        for bad in [
            "ssh/sign/role$x",
            "ssh/sign/role;rm",
            "ssh/sign/role|cat",
            "ssh/sign/role`id`",
            "ssh/sign/role&bg",
            "ssh/sign/role x",
            "ssh/sign/role\nx",
        ] {
            assert!(!is_valid_role(bad), "should reject {:?}", bad);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_redacts_all_marker_types() {
        let raw = "error contacting server\n\
                   x-vault-token: abcdef\n\
                   Authorization: Bearer xyz\n\
                   Cookie: session=1\n\
                   SECRET=foo\n\
                   token expired perhaps\n\
                   harmless trailing line";
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr(raw).to_ascii_lowercase();
        assert!(!out.contains("token"));
        assert!(!out.contains("x-vault-"));
        assert!(!out.contains("authorization"));
        assert!(!out.contains("cookie"));
        assert!(!out.contains("secret"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_truncation_bound() {
        let raw = "a".repeat(500);
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr(&raw);
        assert!(
            out.chars().count() <= 203,
            "len was {}",
            out.chars().count()
        );
        assert!(out.ends_with("..."));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_default_when_all_filtered() {
        let raw = "token abc\nsecret def\nauthorization ghi";
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr(raw);
        assert_eq!(
            out,
            "Vault SSH signing failed. Check vault status and policy"
        );
    }

    // TODO: resolve_pubkey_path_rejects_symlink_escape — requires mutating $HOME
    // for the current process, which races with other tests that read dirs::home_dir().
    // The canonicalize-based check is exercised manually; skipped here to keep the
    // test suite hermetic and parallel-safe.

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_role_accepts_typical_paths() {
        assert!(is_valid_role("ssh/sign/engineer"));
        assert!(is_valid_role("ssh-ca/sign/admin_role"));
        assert!(is_valid_role("a"));
        assert!(is_valid_role(&"a".repeat(128)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_role_rejects_bad_input() {
        assert!(!is_valid_role(""));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("-format=json"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("ssh/sign/role with space"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("ssh/sign/role;rm"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("ssh/sign/rôle"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role(&"a".repeat(129)));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_drops_token_lines() {
        let raw = "error occurred\nX-Vault-Token: abc123\nrole missing\n";
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr(raw);
        assert!(!out.to_lowercase().contains("token"));
        assert!(out.contains("error occurred"));
        assert!(out.contains("role missing"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_drops_secret_and_authorization() {
        let raw = "line one\nsecret=foo\nAuthorization: Bearer x\nline four\n";
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr(raw);
        assert!(!out.to_lowercase().contains("secret"));
        assert!(!out.to_lowercase().contains("authorization"));
        assert!(out.contains("line one"));
        assert!(out.contains("line four"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_empty_falls_back() {
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr("");
        assert!(out.contains("Vault SSH signing failed"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_only_filtered_falls_back() {
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr("X-Vault-Token: abc\nSecret: xyz\n");
        assert!(out.contains("Vault SSH signing failed"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn scrub_vault_stderr_truncates_long_output() {
        let raw = "x".repeat(500);
        let out = scrub_vault_stderr(&raw);
        assert!(out.ends_with("..."));
        // 200 chars + "..."
        assert_eq!(out.chars().count(), 203);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_pubkey_rejects_path_outside_home() {
        // Absolute path outside home should fall back to default in ~/.ssh
        let path = resolve_pubkey_path("/etc/passwd").unwrap();
        let s = path.to_string_lossy();
        assert!(s.ends_with("id_ed25519.pub"), "got: {}", s);
        assert!(s.contains(".ssh/"), "should be fallback: {}", s);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    fn unique_tmp_subdir(tag: &str) -> PathBuf {
        use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
        let nanos = SystemTime::now()
            .duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
            .map(|d| d.as_nanos())
            .unwrap_or(0);
        let dir = std::env::temp_dir().join(format!(
            "purple_mock_vault_{}_{}_{}",
            tag,
            std::process::id(),
            nanos
        ));
        std::fs::create_dir_all(&dir).unwrap();
        dir
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    fn with_mock_vault<F: FnOnce()>(tag: &str, stderr: &str, stdout: &str, exit_code: i32, f: F) {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
        // Use the module-wide PATH_LOCK so vault-mocking tests don't race
        // against ssh-keygen-mocking tests (both mutate the same PATH).
        let _guard = PATH_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        let dir = unique_tmp_subdir(tag);
        let script = dir.join("vault");
        let escape = |s: &str| s.replace('\\', "\\\\").replace('"', "\\\"");
        let body = format!(
            "#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s' \"{}\" >&2\nprintf '%s' \"{}\"\nexit {}\n",
            escape(stderr),
            escape(stdout),
            exit_code
        );
        std::fs::write(&script, body).unwrap();
        let mut perms = std::fs::metadata(&script).unwrap().permissions();
        perms.set_mode(0o755);
        std::fs::set_permissions(&script, perms).unwrap();

        let old_path = std::env::var("PATH").unwrap_or_default();
        let new_path = format!("{}:{}", dir.display(), old_path);
        // SAFETY: std::env::set_var is unsound in multi-threaded processes
        // (rust-lang/rust#27970). The invariant we uphold here is: all mutations
        // of PATH within this test binary happen through `with_mock_vault`, which
        // holds the process-wide `LOCK` for the full mutate/use/restore cycle.
        // No other test in this crate reads or writes PATH concurrently. If a
        // future test introduces another PATH writer, it MUST acquire this same
        // LOCK. PATH is restored before the guard is dropped.
        unsafe { std::env::set_var("PATH", &new_path) };
        let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(f));
        unsafe { std::env::set_var("PATH", &old_path) };
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
        if let Err(e) = result {
            std::panic::resume_unwind(e);
        }
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    fn write_fake_pubkey(tag: &str) -> PathBuf {
        let dir = unique_tmp_subdir(tag);
        let p = dir.join("fake.pub");
        std::fs::write(&p, "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAI test@test\n").unwrap();
        p
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_permission_denied_maps_to_friendly_error() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("perm_denied");
        let alias = "mock-perm-denied";
        with_mock_vault(
            "perm_denied",
            "Error making API request.\npermission denied",
            "",
            1,
            || {
                let result = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, None);
                let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
                assert!(err.contains("Vault SSH permission denied"), "got: {}", err);
            },
        );
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_token_expired_maps_to_friendly_error() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("tok_exp");
        let alias = "mock-tok-exp";
        with_mock_vault("tok_exp", "missing client token", "", 1, || {
            let result = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, None);
            let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
            assert!(err.contains("token missing or expired"), "got: {}", err);
        });
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_scrubs_sensitive_stderr() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("scrub");
        let alias = "mock-scrub";
        with_mock_vault(
            "scrub",
            "role not configured\nX-Vault-Token: hvs.ABCDEFG",
            "",
            1,
            || {
                let result = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, None);
                let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
                assert!(!err.contains("hvs.ABCDEFG"), "leaked token: {}", err);
                assert!(!err.contains("X-Vault-Token"), "leaked header: {}", err);
            },
        );
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_empty_stdout_errors() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("empty");
        let alias = "mock-empty";
        with_mock_vault("empty", "", "", 0, || {
            let result = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, None);
            let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
            assert!(err.contains("empty certificate"), "got: {}", err);
        });
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_generic_failure_no_stderr() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("generic");
        let alias = "mock-generic";
        with_mock_vault("generic", "", "", 1, || {
            let result = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, None);
            let err = result.unwrap_err().to_string();
            assert!(err.contains("Vault SSH failed"), "got: {}", err);
        });
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_success_writes_cert() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("success");
        let alias = "mock-success-host";
        let expected_cert = "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAFAKECERT test";
        with_mock_vault("success", "", expected_cert, 0, || {
            let result = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, None).unwrap();
            assert!(result.cert_path.exists());
            let content = std::fs::read_to_string(&result.cert_path).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(content, expected_cert);
            let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&result.cert_path);
        });
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    /// Install a mock `vault` binary that captures `$VAULT_ADDR` into a file
    /// and echoes a dummy cert on stdout. Returns the capture file path so
    /// callers can assert on the recorded value.
    #[cfg(unix)]
    fn with_env_capturing_vault<F: FnOnce(&Path)>(tag: &str, f: F) {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
        let _guard = PATH_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        let dir = unique_tmp_subdir(tag);
        let capture = dir.join("captured_addr.txt");
        let script = dir.join("vault");
        // The mock writes VAULT_ADDR to the capture file (empty if unset)
        // and prints a dummy cert to stdout so sign_certificate's
        // "signed_key empty" guard does not trip.
        let body = format!(
            "#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s' \"${{VAULT_ADDR-}}\" > {}\nprintf '%s' 'ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com AAAAMOCKCERT mock'\nexit 0\n",
            capture.display()
        );
        std::fs::write(&script, body).unwrap();
        let mut perms = std::fs::metadata(&script).unwrap().permissions();
        perms.set_mode(0o755);
        std::fs::set_permissions(&script, perms).unwrap();

        let old_path = std::env::var("PATH").unwrap_or_default();
        let old_vault_addr = std::env::var("VAULT_ADDR").ok();
        let new_path = format!("{}:{}", dir.display(), old_path);
        // SAFETY: see with_mock_vault — PATH_LOCK serializes all env mutations
        // in this test module. We clear VAULT_ADDR up front so the
        // "None = inherit parent env" test starts from a clean slate.
        unsafe {
            std::env::set_var("PATH", &new_path);
            std::env::remove_var("VAULT_ADDR");
        }
        let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(std::panic::AssertUnwindSafe(|| f(&capture)));
        unsafe {
            std::env::set_var("PATH", &old_path);
            match old_vault_addr {
                Some(v) => std::env::set_var("VAULT_ADDR", v),
                None => std::env::remove_var("VAULT_ADDR"),
            }
        }
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);
        if let Err(e) = result {
            std::panic::resume_unwind(e);
        }
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_sets_vault_addr_env_on_subprocess() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("addr_set");
        let alias = "mock-addr-set";
        with_env_capturing_vault("addr_set", |capture| {
            let res = sign_certificate(
                "ssh/sign/role",
                &key,
                alias,
                Some("http://override.example:8200"),
            );
            assert!(res.is_ok(), "sign failed: {:?}", res);
            let captured = std::fs::read_to_string(capture).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(
                captured, "http://override.example:8200",
                "subprocess did not receive the overridden VAULT_ADDR"
            );
            if let Ok(r) = res {
                let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&r.cert_path);
            }
        });
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_does_not_set_vault_addr_when_none() {
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("addr_none");
        let alias = "mock-addr-none";
        with_env_capturing_vault("addr_none", |capture| {
            // with_env_capturing_vault clears VAULT_ADDR on entry, so when
            // sign_certificate passes None the subprocess inherits an empty
            // value. Assert exactly that — no override leaked through.
            let res = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, None);
            assert!(res.is_ok(), "sign failed: {:?}", res);
            let captured = std::fs::read_to_string(capture).unwrap();
            assert!(
                captured.is_empty(),
                "subprocess saw unexpected VAULT_ADDR: {:?}",
                captured
            );
            if let Ok(r) = res {
                let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&r.cert_path);
            }
        });
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn sign_certificate_rejects_invalid_vault_addr() {
        // An invalid vault_addr (whitespace inside) must be rejected with a
        // clear error before spawning the vault CLI.
        let key = write_fake_pubkey("addr_bad");
        let alias = "mock-addr-bad";
        let res = sign_certificate("ssh/sign/role", &key, alias, Some("http://has space:8200"));
        assert!(res.is_err());
        let msg = res.unwrap_err().to_string();
        assert!(
            msg.contains("Invalid VAULT_ADDR"),
            "expected explicit rejection, got: {}",
            msg
        );
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&key);
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn check_cert_validity_handles_forever() {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
        let _guard = PATH_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        let dir = unique_tmp_subdir("forever");
        let script = dir.join("ssh-keygen");
        let body = "#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' '        Type: ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com'\nprintf '%s\\n' '        Valid: forever'\nexit 0\n";
        std::fs::write(&script, body).unwrap();
        let mut perms = std::fs::metadata(&script).unwrap().permissions();
        perms.set_mode(0o755);
        std::fs::set_permissions(&script, perms).unwrap();
        let cert = dir.join("cert.pub");
        std::fs::write(&cert, "stub").unwrap();

        let old_path = std::env::var("PATH").unwrap_or_default();
        let new_path = format!("{}:{}", dir.display(), old_path);
        // SAFETY: PATH mutation is serialized via LOCK above and restored before
        // the guard is released.
        unsafe { std::env::set_var("PATH", &new_path) };
        let status = check_cert_validity(&cert);
        unsafe { std::env::set_var("PATH", &old_path) };
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);

        match status {
            CertStatus::Valid {
                remaining_secs,
                total_secs,
                expires_at,
            } => {
                assert_eq!(remaining_secs, i64::MAX);
                assert_eq!(total_secs, i64::MAX);
                assert_eq!(expires_at, i64::MAX);
            }
            other => panic!("expected Valid(forever), got {:?}", other),
        }
    }

    #[cfg(unix)]
    #[test]
    fn check_cert_validity_rejects_non_positive_window() {
        // Regression: a malformed cert with `to < from` would produce a
        // negative total_secs that flowed into the needs_renewal threshold
        // calculation. The guard in check_cert_validity must reject it as
        // Invalid before it ever reaches the cache.
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
        let _guard = PATH_LOCK.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        let dir = unique_tmp_subdir("non_positive");
        let script = dir.join("ssh-keygen");
        // Valid window with `to` == `from`, producing ttl == 0.
        let body = "#!/bin/sh\nprintf '%s\\n' '        Valid: from 2026-01-01T00:00:00 to 2026-01-01T00:00:00'\nexit 0\n";
        std::fs::write(&script, body).unwrap();
        let mut perms = std::fs::metadata(&script).unwrap().permissions();
        perms.set_mode(0o755);
        std::fs::set_permissions(&script, perms).unwrap();
        let cert = dir.join("cert.pub");
        std::fs::write(&cert, "stub").unwrap();

        let old_path = std::env::var("PATH").unwrap_or_default();
        let new_path = format!("{}:{}", dir.display(), old_path);
        // SAFETY: see with_mock_vault for the full invariant. PATH is
        // serialized via LOCK and restored before the guard is released.
        unsafe { std::env::set_var("PATH", &new_path) };
        let status = check_cert_validity(&cert);
        unsafe { std::env::set_var("PATH", &old_path) };
        let _ = std::fs::remove_dir_all(&dir);

        match status {
            CertStatus::Invalid(msg) => {
                assert!(
                    msg.contains("non-positive"),
                    "expected non-positive window error, got: {}",
                    msg
                );
            }
            other => panic!("expected Invalid, got {:?}", other),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn is_valid_role_rejects_spaces_and_shell_metacharacters() {
        assert!(!is_valid_role(""));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("bad role"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("role;rm"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("role$(x)"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("role|cat"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("role`id`"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("role&bg"));
        assert!(!is_valid_role("role\nx"));
        // "Missing /sign/" is not structurally enforced by is_valid_role (the
        // Vault CLI validates the mount), but character rules still pass:
        assert!(is_valid_role("ssh/engineer"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_host_overrides_provider_default() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_role=ssh/sign/default\n",
        );
        let role = resolve_vault_role(Some("ssh/sign/override"), Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(role.as_deref(), Some("ssh/sign/override"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_falls_back_to_provider_when_host_empty() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::parse(
            "[aws]\ntoken=abc\nvault_role=ssh/sign/default\n",
        );
        let role = resolve_vault_role(None, Some("aws"), &config);
        assert_eq!(role.as_deref(), Some("ssh/sign/default"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_vault_role_returns_none_when_neither_set() {
        let config = crate::providers::config::ProviderConfig::default();
        assert!(resolve_vault_role(None, Some("aws"), &config).is_none());
        assert!(resolve_vault_role(None, None, &config).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn check_cert_validity_invalid_file() {
        let tmpdir = std::env::temp_dir();
        let bad_cert = tmpdir.join("purple_test_bad_cert.pub");
        std::fs::write(&bad_cert, "this is not a certificate\n").unwrap();
        let status = check_cert_validity(&bad_cert);
        assert!(
            matches!(status, CertStatus::Invalid(_)),
            "Expected Invalid, got: {:?}",
            status
        );
        let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&bad_cert);
    }
}