Expand description
Verification keys from published JWKs (RFC 7517).
Every party that checks a PIC artifact starts from a key someone published: a relying party
reading a realm’s jwks_uri, a workload verifying the checkpoint it was handed, a settlement
authority reading cnf.jwk out of a Proof of Relationship. Without this they each write the
same JWK reader, and each one is a place to get the algorithm agreement wrong.
§Algorithm agreement
A key can produce exactly one signature algorithm, and expected_algorithms_for_jwk says
which. That is what stops an artifact from choosing how it is verified: a candidate claiming
alg that its key cannot produce, or a JWK whose declared alg disagrees with its own key
material, is rejected before a signature is checked rather than after.
§What is not here
RSA. It is the shape identity providers publish, and an OAuth access token is not a PIC artifact — a deployment that exchanges one reads it with its own code, and this crate stays about the artifacts the profile defines.
The curve implementations follow the crate’s feature flags, so a build that enables none still compiles and every reader here answers “unsupported”.
Structs§
- Expected
Algorithms - The algorithms one key can produce.
- JwkVerifier
- A verifier over one published key.
Enums§
- JwkError
- Why a JWK could not become a verification key.
Functions§
- expected_
algorithms_ for_ jwk - The algorithms this JWK’s key material can produce, whatever it claims.
- public_
key_ from_ jwk - Builds a verifier from a published JWK.