omni_dev/drive/

write_gate.rs

//! Folder-scoped write-permission gate (issue #1574).
//!
//! `omni-dev`'s own local policy layer bounding `drive create`/`upload`/
//! `edit`, independent of and enforced *in addition to* whatever the OAuth
//! scope (`crate::drive::auth::DriveGrantedScopes`) would technically
//! allow. Google's Drive scopes are all-or-nothing across a user's whole
//! Drive — there is no Google-side way to say "this credential may only
//! write inside folder X" — so this module fills that gap.
//!
//! Deliberately pure: zero `DriveClient`/network dependency, mirroring
//! `crate::drive::visibility`'s contract exactly. Fetching the ancestor
//! folder chain a target lives in is `crate::drive::folder_ancestry`'s job;
//! this module only classifies an already-resolved chain.
//!
//! Named `write_gate`, not `permission(s)`, to avoid any confusion with
//! `crate::drive::permissions_api` — Google's own sharing/ACL wrapper,
//! a completely unrelated concept.
//!
//! # The algorithm
//!
//! A target (the `--parent` folder for `create`/`upload`, or a file's
//! current parent folder(s) for `edit`/`sheets write`) is identified by
//! its **ancestor chain**: `chain[0]` is the target folder itself,
//! `chain[1]` its parent, `chain[2]` its grandparent, and so on up to
//! Drive's root. [`resolve`] walks that chain looking for the closest
//! (lowest-depth) rule naming any folder in it — a non-recursive rule only
//! ever matches at depth 0, its own folder; a recursive rule matches at
//! any depth. Two tie-breaks, both security-relevant and each covered by a
//! dedicated test:
//!
//! - **Closest ancestor wins**: a rule on a subfolder overrides a broader
//!   rule on its parent — the more specific grant/restriction is assumed
//!   the more deliberate one.
//! - **Deny beats allow at equal depth**: if two rules at the same depth
//!   disagree, the safe direction wins.
//!
//! A rule may instead name a **file id** (issue #1612), which matches the
//! target itself at **depth −1** — strictly closer than depth 0, so it
//! beats every folder rule in both directions: a file `deny` overrides a
//! recursive folder `allow`, and a file `allow` overrides a folder `deny`.
//! That is the same "closest wins" principle, not an exception to it. Two
//! consequences worth stating outright:
//!
//! - Because nothing in any chain can beat a file rule, a decisive one
//!   short-circuits the ancestor walk entirely — see
//!   [`resolve_for_file`] and
//!   `crate::drive::folder_ancestry::resolve_decision_for_file_target`.
//!   This is what makes a file **shared by link or email** grantable at
//!   all: `files.get` returns only the parents the caller can see, so such
//!   a file has none, and no folder rule could ever apply to it.
//! - `combine_across_parents`' "deny wins" is a tie-break among *peers* —
//!   a target's several legacy parents, all at the same level. A file rule
//!   is not a peer, so a file `allow` still beats a denying parent.
//!
//! When no rule anywhere in the chain names `op`, [`DriveOperation::default_policy`]
//! decides it: `Read` defaults to [`Verdict::Allow`], every write operation
//! defaults to [`Verdict::Deny`]. This is where "disabled by default" for
//! writes actually lives — there is deliberately no separate enabled/
//! disabled toggle; an absent or empty rule list already means "deny
//! everywhere" via this table alone.

use std::collections::HashSet;

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

/// A Drive operation this gate can permit or refuse. Reused directly as the
/// settings-file rule shape (`crate::utils::settings::WritePermissionsSettings`)
/// — no separate wire type.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Deserialize, Serialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum DriveOperation {
    /// List/read/export/download.
    Read,
    /// Create a new file or folder.
    Create,
    /// Upload local content into a new file.
    Upload,
    /// Replace an existing file's content.
    Edit,
    /// Write cells into an existing Google Sheet via the Sheets API
    /// (issue #1589, [ADR-0073](../../docs/adrs/adr-0073.md) §3).
    ///
    /// Deliberately **not** folded into [`Self::Edit`]. Every existing
    /// `allow: ["edit"]` rule was written when `drive edit` refused every
    /// Google-native document outright, so reusing `Edit` here would
    /// retroactively upgrade those rules into cell-write permission with no
    /// config change and no re-consent — the exact silent widening this
    /// gate's default-deny posture exists to prevent.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1798 ([ADR-0081](../../docs/adrs/adr-0081.md) §5), also
    /// required (alongside [`Self::SheetsStructure`]) for `add-pivot-table`
    /// — a pivot table is created by `updateCells`, writing through the
    /// grid with a server-computed rendered extent, which is this
    /// operation's territory by construction. `delete-pivot-table` needs
    /// this operation alone.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1839 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §4), also
    /// the clipboard-style paste family — `cut-paste`/`copy-paste` with a
    /// value-only `--paste-type` (`values`/`formula`) and `paste-data`'s
    /// `values`/`formula` types — since each writes ordinary cell content
    /// into a range this crate already lets `sheets clear`/`write` reach.
    /// `cut-paste` additionally requires [`Self::SheetsStructure`] whatever
    /// `--paste-type` names, since it always clears its source's formats
    /// and merges too; `copy-paste`/`paste-data` require it alongside this
    /// operation only for `--paste-type normal`, per that variant's doc
    /// comment.
    /// Since issue #1840 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §1), also
    /// covers `auto-fill` (`autoFill`) alone: it writes ordinary cell
    /// content into a range the request names or derives, exactly what
    /// this operation already permits via `sheets clear` followed by
    /// `sheets write` of the same range. Provisional on ADR-0083 §5's
    /// live-verification rule — if a fill is found to carry the source
    /// cells' formatting, `auto-fill` moves to the two-operation
    /// composition `add-pivot-table` uses, alongside [`Self::SheetsStructure`].
    ///
    /// Since issue #1841 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §1), also
    /// required for `find-replace`. Its range, sheet and all-sheets scopes
    /// replace only cell values or formulas, already covered by `sheets
    /// write` and `sheets clear`; scope does not create a new permission
    /// boundary within a spreadsheet.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1842 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §3), also
    /// one half of `sort-range`'s gate, alongside [`Self::SheetsStructure`]
    /// — re-gated by issue #1870 after live verification found a sorted row
    /// carries its formatting, notes and data-validation rules with it (see
    /// that variant's doc comment). It shipped first on this operation
    /// alone, on a values-only reading: it permutes values within a
    /// caller-named range, which a `sheets-write` grant could already
    /// replace or clear.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1843 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §1),
    /// also one half of `text-to-columns`' gate, for the cell content the
    /// split writes — but **not** the whole of it. ADR-0083 §1 proposed
    /// this operation alone and §5 made that provisional on live
    /// verification; the live run found a split carries the source cell's
    /// formatting into the spill cells, so §5's fixed consequence
    /// applies and `text-to-columns` needs [`Self::SheetsStructure`] too,
    /// the two-operation composition `add-pivot-table` uses.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1845 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §§3, 5),
    /// also one half of `randomize-range`'s gate, alongside
    /// [`Self::SheetsStructure`], for the cell values a reorder permutes.
    /// ADR-0083 §3 proposed this operation alone and §5 made that
    /// provisional on live verification, same as `text-to-columns`; the
    /// live run found a reordered row carries its formatting, notes and
    /// data-validation rules with it, so §5's fixed consequence applies
    /// here too.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1940, also one half of `set-basic-filter --sort-by`'s
    /// gate, alongside [`Self::SheetsStructure`]: a basic filter's sort is
    /// applied by physically reordering the rows, the same permutation as
    /// `randomize-range`, so it takes the same union (see that variant's
    /// doc comment).
    ///
    /// Since issue #1844 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §1),
    /// also `trim-whitespace`: it rewrites cell content in place, which a
    /// `sheets write` of the same range could already replace outright.
    /// Unlike the reorder verbs above, it stays on this operation alone:
    /// issue #1877's live check found a trim moves no formatting, and even
    /// rebases rich-text runs to keep them on the characters that remain.
    /// Its sibling verb in that issue, `delete-duplicates`, takes
    /// [`Self::SheetsDelete`] instead — two verbs shipped together under
    /// two different operations, which is the per-verb mapping working as
    /// intended, not a special case.
    SheetsWrite,
    /// Structurally edit an existing Google Sheet via `spreadsheets.batchUpdate`
    /// (issue #1613, [ADR-0075](../../docs/adrs/adr-0075.md) §1) — adding,
    /// renaming and inserting rows or columns; since issue #1643
    /// ([ADR-0078](../../docs/adrs/adr-0078.md)), cell/border formatting,
    /// merging, auto-resize, column width/row height, data validation,
    /// `duplicateSheet`, and sheet reorder/hide. Since issue #1795
    /// ([ADR-0081](../../docs/adrs/adr-0081.md) §4), also developer-metadata
    /// management (`set-developer-metadata`/`delete-developer-metadata`),
    /// restricted to `DOCUMENT` visibility — `PROJECT`-visibility metadata,
    /// which belongs to a different OAuth client, is never reachable
    /// through this surface; since issue #1793
    /// ([ADR-0081](../../docs/adrs/adr-0081.md) §1), conditional formatting
    /// (`add-conditional-format`/`update-conditional-format`/
    /// `delete-conditional-format`); since issue #1796
    /// ([ADR-0081](../../docs/adrs/adr-0081.md) §2), also named-range
    /// add/update/delete: a named range is a label over a region, not grid
    /// data, so removing one leaves every cell's stored value and formula
    /// text untouched — even though every cell formula referencing the
    /// removed name starts evaluating to `#REF!`. That
    /// visible-but-not-destructive effect is mitigated, not by a stronger
    /// gate, but by `delete-named-range` scanning the workbook's cell
    /// formulas for the name and reporting the count and A1 locations of
    /// every reference before it deletes, in both `--dry-run` and the real
    /// run; and, since issue #1797
    /// ([ADR-0081](../../docs/adrs/adr-0081.md) §3), charts and slicers
    /// (`add-chart`/`update-chart`/`delete-chart`/`add-slicer`/
    /// `update-slicer`/`delete-slicer`) — including the two deletes, which
    /// destroy an unrecoverable embedded object rather than grid data, and
    /// so join this operation (not [`Self::SheetsDelete`]) on the same
    /// "property of the sheet, not the sheet's data" reasoning as
    /// `unmerge-cells`/`clear-data-validation`. None of that later set
    /// destroys *grid* data either, which is what earns it the same
    /// operation as the original three rather than one of its own.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1798 ([ADR-0081](../../docs/adrs/adr-0081.md) §5), also
    /// required (alongside [`Self::SheetsWrite`]) for `add-pivot-table` —
    /// the first capability in the crate resolving **two** operations
    /// together rather than one. A pivot table is also a named, persistent,
    /// structural feature of a sheet, which is why it needs this operation
    /// too and not `SheetsWrite` alone.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1832 ([ADR-0082](../../docs/adrs/adr-0082-banded-ranges.md)),
    /// also banded ranges (`add-banding`/`update-banding`/`delete-banding`)
    /// — alternating row/column colors applied to a range, the same
    /// "property of the sheet, not the sheet's data" reasoning as
    /// `unmerge-cells`/`clear-data-validation`; removing one destroys no
    /// grid data.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1833 ([ADR-0084](../../docs/adrs/adr-0084-dimension-groups.md)),
    /// also dimension groups (`add-dimension-group`/`update-dimension-group`/
    /// `delete-dimension-group`) — the collapsible +/- outline over a row
    /// or column span, the same reasoning again; removing a group destroys
    /// no grid data either.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1835 ([ADR-0085](../../docs/adrs/adr-0085.md)), also
    /// `update-sheet-properties` — frozen rows/columns, tab color,
    /// right-to-left layout, and hidden gridlines, all per-sheet view state
    /// rather than grid data.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1836 ([ADR-0086](../../docs/adrs/adr-0086-workbook-properties.md)),
    /// also `update-workbook-properties` — locale, time zone, automatic
    /// recalculation, and iterative calculation. The one capability in this
    /// variant with no *sheet* target at all, since it acts on the workbook
    /// itself; turning iterative calculation on changes what an unchanged
    /// circular-reference formula elsewhere *evaluates to* rather than
    /// touching any formula directly, the same shape of value effect
    /// ADR-0081 §2 already accepted here for named-range deletion.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1838, also `insert-range` — the exact inverse of
    /// `delete-range`'s cell-range half, inserting empty cells into a
    /// sub-rectangle and shifting the existing cells in that column/row
    /// extent right or down. It joins this operation, not
    /// [`Self::SheetsDelete`], because no cell value is discarded: every
    /// shifted cell keeps its content and the vacated cells become empty.
    /// The one asymmetry with `delete-range`: a cell pushed past the
    /// sheet's current grid extent by the shift is silently dropped by the
    /// Sheets API, so this capability can lose data at the grid edge even
    /// though it destroys none within it.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1837, also moving/resizing an existing chart or slicer
    /// (`move-chart`/`move-slicer`, `updateEmbeddedObjectPosition`) and
    /// setting or clearing a chart's border colour (`update-chart-border`,
    /// `updateEmbeddedObjectBorder`) — the same operation as the rest of
    /// this chart/slicer set (`add-chart`/`update-chart`/`delete-chart`/
    /// `add-slicer`/`update-slicer`/`delete-slicer`), since a move or a
    /// border change discards no data either.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1839 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §4), also
    /// required (alongside [`Self::SheetsWrite`]) for `cut-paste`
    /// unconditionally, and for `copy-paste`/`paste-data` when
    /// `--paste-type` is `normal` (formats and merges travel with the cell
    /// content) — plus required *alone*, no [`Self::SheetsWrite`] needed,
    /// for `copy-paste`/`paste-data`'s presentation-only `format` type,
    /// which writes nothing this crate treats as a cell value. `cut-paste`
    /// needs this operation whatever it pastes because the source is
    /// always cleared of its formats and merges too, the same "property of
    /// the sheet, not the sheet's data" removal `unmerge-cells`/
    /// `clear-data-validation` already make under this operation.
    ///
    /// Deliberately **not** folded into [`Self::SheetsWrite`], for the same
    /// reason that one is not folded into [`Self::Edit`]. Every existing
    /// `allow: ["sheets-write"]` rule was written when structural edits were
    /// impossible, so reusing it here would retroactively upgrade those rules
    /// into permission to restructure a workbook with no config change and no
    /// re-consent.
    ///
    /// The same argument binds future work: row and sheet **deletion** must
    /// not later join this variant either, or granting it today would silently
    /// become consent to destroy data tomorrow. Nor may a *permission*
    /// change — see [`Self::SheetsProtection`], carved out of this same
    /// deferred set for exactly that reason.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1843 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §§1, 5),
    /// also the second half of `text-to-columns`' gate, alongside
    /// [`Self::SheetsWrite`]. Not because the split is a structural edit
    /// in itself, but because it was measured **propagating the source
    /// cell's formatting** into spill cells that had none: a live split of
    /// a bold, pink column left every cell it wrote bold and pink. That is
    /// this operation's own subject matter, so a `sheets-write` grant
    /// alone cannot confer it.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1845 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §§3, 5),
    /// also the second half of `randomize-range`'s gate, alongside
    /// [`Self::SheetsWrite`]. Not because a reorder is a structural edit in
    /// itself, but because it was measured carrying a row's **formatting,
    /// notes and data-validation rules** with it, and rewriting the
    /// relative references of any formula moved along with it — a live
    /// probe reordering a bold, pink row with a note, a validation rule
    /// and a relative formula moved all four with the row. That is this
    /// operation's own subject matter, so a `sheets-write` grant alone
    /// cannot confer it.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1870, `sort-range` needs this operation too, alongside
    /// [`Self::SheetsWrite`] — the same live-verification finding as
    /// `randomize-range`: formatting, notes and data-validation rules
    /// travel with a reordered row, and an in-range relative formula
    /// rewrites to keep pointing at its own row. It shipped first (#1842)
    /// on `SheetsWrite` alone, before this was measured.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1940, `set-basic-filter --sort-by` resolves this
    /// operation *and* [`Self::SheetsWrite`] — every other filter verb, and
    /// `set-basic-filter` without `--sort-by`, still resolves this one
    /// alone (ADR-0081 §1). A basic filter's sort physically reorders the
    /// filtered range's rows, the same permutation `randomize-range`
    /// performs, and the reorder outlives `clear-basic-filter`; so it takes
    /// `randomize-range`'s union rather than being treated as view state.
    SheetsStructure,
    /// Destructively edit an existing Google Sheet via `spreadsheets.batchUpdate`
    /// (issue #1623, [ADR-0077](../../docs/adrs/adr-0077-sheets-deletion-via-batchupdate.md)) — deleting a
    /// sheet, a row/column range, or an arbitrary cell range.
    ///
    /// Deliberately **not** folded into [`Self::SheetsStructure`], per the
    /// binding clause on that variant: every existing `allow:
    /// ["sheets-structure"]` rule was written when deletion was impossible,
    /// so reusing it here would retroactively upgrade those rules into
    /// permission to destroy data with no config change and no re-consent.
    ///
    /// The same argument binds future work: no other operation should later
    /// join this variant without the same re-consent reasoning.
    ///
    /// Since issue #1844 ([ADR-0083](../../docs/adrs/adr-0083.md) §2),
    /// also `delete-duplicates` — the first capability to join this
    /// variant since ADR-0077 defined it, and admitted under exactly the
    /// re-consent reasoning the clause above demands: an operator who
    /// granted `sheets-delete` consented to having cells removed and
    /// shifted up within a caller-named range by this tool, and
    /// `delete-duplicates` does just that. Content outside the range
    /// stays in place. It asks for nothing beyond that.
    ///
    /// One thing about it *is* new, and is recorded here rather than
    /// buried in the verb: every other capability under this operation
    /// removes cells the caller named **by address**, whereas
    /// `delete-duplicates` removes rows the **server** selects from the
    /// data — by an equality rule that ignores letter case, formatting and
    /// formulas, and that reaches rows hidden by a filter. A
    /// `sheets-delete` grant used through this verb therefore deletes
    /// whatever that rule finds. ADR-0083 §2 accepts that as within the
    /// grant's consent (rows removed from a range this tool was told to
    /// act on) and mitigates it where it belongs — in the verb, which
    /// states the rule in both the preview and the real run rather than
    /// implying the caller chose the rows.
    SheetsDelete,
    /// Add, change or remove a protected range on an existing Google Sheet
    /// via `spreadsheets.batchUpdate` (issue #1643,
    /// [ADR-0078](../../docs/adrs/adr-0078.md)).
    ///
    /// Deliberately **not** folded into [`Self::SheetsStructure`], and the
    /// reason is different in kind from every other split on this enum: a
    /// protected range is *who may edit*, not *what the sheet contains*.
    /// `updateProtectedRange` can widen the set of editors and
    /// `deleteProtectedRange` removes a guard someone deliberately placed —
    /// both are permission changes inside the document, closer in spirit to
    /// `drive permissions` than to any cell or structural write this tool
    /// makes. Folding it into `sheets-structure` would let a grant issued
    /// for "may reformat/validate/restructure this workbook" silently
    /// double as "may also change who can edit it" — a widening in kind,
    /// not merely in scope, which is why this earns its own operation
    /// rather than joining the set `sheets-structure`'s own doc comment
    /// just absorbed.
    ///
    /// This binds future work too: nothing reachable under this operation
    /// may ever touch a *file-level* Drive permission (`drive permissions`
    /// is that surface, and stays the only one).
    SheetsProtection,
    /// Replace or append *text* in an existing Google Doc via the Docs API
    /// (issue #1615, [ADR-0076](../../docs/adrs/adr-0076.md) §2).
    ///
    /// Folded into neither [`Self::Edit`] nor [`Self::SheetsWrite`], and the
    /// argument runs in both directions. Every `allow: ["edit"]` rule was
    /// written when `drive edit` refused every Google-native document
    /// outright — which it still does. Every `allow: ["sheets-write"]` rule
    /// was written when Docs were unreachable through this tool, and that
    /// operation is *lexically* about cells, so making it govern prose would
    /// be a lie told by the config vocabulary itself.
    ///
    /// **This binds future work.** A Docs *deletion* verb must not be folded
    /// into this variant either: a grant issued today for "may replace text"
    /// must not silently become consent to remove content tomorrow. When
    /// deletion is designed it needs its own operation, or explicit
    /// re-consent. Same rule ADR-0075 §1 records for `sheets-structure`.
    /// Anchored insertion joins this operation because, like append, it only
    /// adds text. Deletion is gated separately by `DocsDelete` (ADR-0094).
    DocsWrite,
    /// Moving an individual file to Trash or restoring it (ADR-0092).
    /// Default-deny and lease-exempt: recovery is provided by Drive Trash.
    /// A future permanent delete must use separate consent, never this variant.
    Trash,
    /// Replace text on ordinary Google Slides pages (ADR-0093).
    /// Existing Edit/DocsWrite/SheetsWrite grants never authorize Slides.
    /// Object deletion must receive its own operation and explicit consent.
    SlidesWrite,
    /// Anchor-addressed document content removal. Separate from `DocsWrite`:
    /// an existing text-write grant must never silently widen to deletion.
    /// Future structural/object deletion verbs need their own explicit decision.
    DocsDelete,
    /// Anchor-addressed styling; never implied by text-write or deletion grants.
    DocsFormat,
    /// Add empty tables, rows or columns, or create or delete named-range metadata.
    /// Never authorizes the removal of document text.
    DocsStructure,
    /// Remove table rows/columns under new explicit destructive consent.
    /// Neither DocsWrite nor the anchor-only DocsDelete grant authorizes this.
    DocsTableDelete,
}

impl std::fmt::Display for DriveOperation {
    /// Matches the `#[serde(rename_all = "kebab-case")]` wire form — used
    /// by `drive permissions show`/`check`'s rendering.
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        let s = match self {
            Self::Read => "read",
            Self::Create => "create",
            Self::Upload => "upload",
            Self::Edit => "edit",
            Self::SheetsWrite => "sheets-write",
            Self::SheetsStructure => "sheets-structure",
            Self::SheetsDelete => "sheets-delete",
            Self::SheetsProtection => "sheets-protection",
            Self::DocsWrite => "docs-write",
            Self::Trash => "trash",
            Self::SlidesWrite => "slides-write",
            Self::DocsDelete => "docs-delete",
            Self::DocsFormat => "docs-format",
            Self::DocsStructure => "docs-structure",
            Self::DocsTableDelete => "docs-table-delete",
        };
        write!(f, "{s}")
    }
}

impl DriveOperation {
    /// The verdict when no configured rule names this operation anywhere in
    /// a target's ancestor chain. `Read` stays open by default (unchanged
    /// from today's behavior); every write defaults closed — the whole
    /// "disabled by default" requirement lives in this one match, not a
    /// separate on/off flag.
    pub(crate) fn default_policy(self) -> Verdict {
        match self {
            Self::Read => Verdict::Allow,
            Self::Create
            | Self::Upload
            | Self::Edit
            | Self::SheetsWrite
            | Self::SheetsStructure
            | Self::SheetsDelete
            | Self::SheetsProtection
            | Self::DocsWrite
            | Self::Trash
            | Self::SlidesWrite
            | Self::DocsStructure
            | Self::DocsTableDelete
            | Self::DocsDelete
            | Self::DocsFormat => Verdict::Deny,
        }
    }

    /// Whether an `Allow` verdict for this operation is ever backed by a
    /// Drive write lease requirement (issue #1917).
    ///
    /// `Read` never mutates anything, and `Create`/`Upload` write into a
    /// **new** file — there is no existing content for a lease to protect,
    /// and neither engine (`create.rs`, `upload.rs`) ever gates on
    /// `require_lease`; the field appears on their `LeasedWrite` values
    /// only in test fixtures. `Trash` is reversible through Drive Trash and
    /// exempt under ADR-0092, even with `require_lease: true`. Every other
    /// operation replaces or otherwise
    /// mutates a target's existing content and does gate on it via
    /// [`decided_rule_requires_lease`]. This is consulted only by
    /// `drive permissions check`'s diagnostic, to keep it from reporting a
    /// lease requirement an operation could never actually be asked to
    /// satisfy — it does not itself change what any engine enforces.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn ever_requires_lease(self) -> bool {
        match self {
            Self::Read | Self::Create | Self::Upload | Self::Trash => false,
            Self::Edit
            | Self::SheetsWrite
            | Self::SheetsStructure
            | Self::SheetsDelete
            | Self::SheetsProtection
            | Self::DocsWrite
            | Self::SlidesWrite
            | Self::DocsStructure
            | Self::DocsTableDelete
            | Self::DocsDelete
            | Self::DocsFormat => true,
        }
    }
}

/// One configured permission rule, keyed on **either** a folder id or a
/// file id — exactly one of the two, enforced when the settings file is
/// deserialized (see the private `RawPermissionRule` below).
///
/// Ids are Drive's own canonical ids, not paths — Drive objects have no
/// stable, unique path (names collide, files can have multiple legacy
/// parents), so identity is the id, exactly as the browser bridge's
/// `OriginAllowlist` matches exact origin strings rather than URL
/// patterns.
///
/// A `file_id` rule is what makes a file shared by link or email
/// grantable at all (issue #1612): `files.get` returns only the parents
/// this account can *see*, so such a file arrives with none, and no
/// folder rule could ever apply to it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(try_from = "RawPermissionRule")]
pub struct FolderPermissionRule {
    /// The Drive folder id this rule matches, for a folder rule.
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub folder_id: Option<String>,
    /// The Drive file id this rule matches, for a file rule. Matched at
    /// depth −1 against the target itself, before any ancestor walk — see
    /// [`resolve_file_rule`].
    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
    pub file_id: Option<String>,
    /// When `true`, this rule also matches every descendant of
    /// `folder_id`, not just the folder itself (depth > 0 in the ancestor
    /// chain). A non-recursive rule only ever matches at depth 0.
    /// Meaningless — and rejected — on a `file_id` rule: a file has no
    /// descendants.
    pub recursive: bool,
    /// Operations explicitly permitted at this target.
    pub allow: HashSet<DriveOperation>,
    /// Operations explicitly refused at this target.
    pub deny: HashSet<DriveOperation>,
    /// Whether a content-mutating write matching this rule requires a
    /// valid Drive write lease ([ADR-0080](../../docs/adrs/adr-0080.md)
    /// §1/§13) in addition to this gate's own verdict. Defaults to `true`;
    /// an operator sets it to `false` to relax the requirement for a
    /// specific folder, which skips **both** the backup and the Touch ID
    /// prompt (§13) — a rule that skipped only one of the two would either
    /// surprise an operator who explicitly relaxed this, or ask for
    /// consent to a guarantee it then doesn't provide. Independent of
    /// `allow`/`deny`: the lease is orthogonal to this gate, not another
    /// operation in its vocabulary.
    #[serde(default = "default_require_lease")]
    pub require_lease: bool,
}

/// The default for [`FolderPermissionRule::require_lease`] — a free
/// function because `#[serde(default)]` needs a path, not a literal, and
/// `true` is not `bool`'s own `Default`.
fn default_require_lease() -> bool {
    true
}

impl FolderPermissionRule {
    /// A folder rule naming `folder_id`.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn folder(folder_id: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            folder_id: Some(folder_id.into()),
            file_id: None,
            recursive: false,
            allow: HashSet::new(),
            deny: HashSet::new(),
            require_lease: default_require_lease(),
        }
    }

    /// A file rule naming `file_id`.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn file(file_id: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            folder_id: None,
            file_id: Some(file_id.into()),
            recursive: false,
            allow: HashSet::new(),
            deny: HashSet::new(),
            require_lease: default_require_lease(),
        }
    }

    /// Sets `recursive`, for builder-style construction in tests and
    /// callers assembling rules programmatically.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn recursive(mut self, recursive: bool) -> Self {
        self.recursive = recursive;
        self
    }

    /// Sets `require_lease`, for builder-style construction in tests and
    /// callers assembling rules programmatically.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn requiring_lease(mut self, require_lease: bool) -> Self {
        self.require_lease = require_lease;
        self
    }

    /// Sets the `allow` set.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn allowing(mut self, ops: impl IntoIterator<Item = DriveOperation>) -> Self {
        self.allow = ops.into_iter().collect();
        self
    }

    /// Sets the `deny` set.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn denying(mut self, ops: impl IntoIterator<Item = DriveOperation>) -> Self {
        self.deny = ops.into_iter().collect();
        self
    }
}

/// The wire shape [`FolderPermissionRule`] deserializes through, so that
/// "exactly one of `folder_id`/`file_id`" is a **load error** rather than a
/// rule that silently matches nothing.
///
/// This is also the backward-compatibility mechanism. An older binary
/// reading a config containing a file rule sees `folder_id` missing from a
/// required field and fails `Settings::load()` outright; `active_account_rules`
/// then degrades to an empty rule set, which denies every write. That is
/// blunt — it drops the account's credentials too — but it is the same
/// fail-closed path [ADR-0073](../../docs/adrs/adr-0073.md) §3 already
/// relies on for an unrecognised `DriveOperation`, and the alternative
/// (a second, separately-named rule list) would be *silently ignored* by
/// an older binary, dropping a file-level `deny` and letting a folder-level
/// `allow` win.
#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
struct RawPermissionRule {
    #[serde(default)]
    folder_id: Option<String>,
    #[serde(default)]
    file_id: Option<String>,
    #[serde(default)]
    recursive: bool,
    #[serde(default)]
    allow: HashSet<DriveOperation>,
    #[serde(default)]
    deny: HashSet<DriveOperation>,
    #[serde(default = "default_require_lease")]
    require_lease: bool,
}

impl TryFrom<RawPermissionRule> for FolderPermissionRule {
    type Error = String;

    fn try_from(raw: RawPermissionRule) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
        match (&raw.folder_id, &raw.file_id) {
            (None, None) => {
                return Err(
                    "a write-permission rule must set either `folder_id` or `file_id`".to_string(),
                )
            }
            (Some(_), Some(_)) => {
                return Err(
                    "a write-permission rule must set `folder_id` or `file_id`, not both \
                            — a rule keys on one target"
                        .to_string(),
                )
            }
            _ => {}
        }
        if raw.recursive && raw.file_id.is_some() {
            return Err(
                "`recursive` is meaningless on a `file_id` rule — a file has no descendants; \
                 drop it, or use `folder_id` to grant a whole subtree"
                    .to_string(),
            );
        }
        Ok(Self {
            folder_id: raw.folder_id,
            file_id: raw.file_id,
            recursive: raw.recursive,
            allow: raw.allow,
            deny: raw.deny,
            require_lease: raw.require_lease,
        })
    }
}

/// The result of resolving a single operation against a rule set.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Verdict {
    /// The operation is permitted.
    Allow,
    /// The operation is refused.
    Deny,
}

/// Which configured rule (if any) decided a [`Decision`].
///
/// `None` — the `Option` wrapping this, not a variant here — means no rule
/// matched anywhere and the bare default policy decided it instead.
/// Carried into the request log's `decided_by_folder_id`/
/// `decided_by_file_id`/`decided_by_depth` context fields so a refusal is
/// exactly as auditable as a success.
///
/// An enum rather than one struct with optional fields: a file rule has no
/// depth (it names the target itself, at depth −1) and a folder rule has no
/// file id, so "a file rule at depth 3" is a state that should not be
/// expressible at all.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
#[serde(tag = "kind", rename_all = "kebab-case")]
pub enum DecidingRule {
    /// A `folder_id` rule matched the target's ancestor chain.
    Folder {
        /// The folder id of the rule that decided the verdict.
        folder_id: String,
        /// How many levels above the target this rule's folder sits (0 =
        /// the target itself).
        depth: usize,
    },
    /// A `file_id` rule named the target itself.
    File {
        /// The file id of the rule that decided the verdict.
        file_id: String,
    },
}

impl DecidingRule {
    /// The id this rule keys on — a file id or a folder id.
    ///
    /// Deliberately *not* rendered here: the id is operator-supplied but
    /// the strings it sits beside are not, and this module stays free of
    /// the CLI layer. Every render site must therefore sanitize before the
    /// line reaches a terminal — the three CLI sites (`drive edit`,
    /// `upload`, `create`) run the id through `sanitize_for_terminal`
    /// directly; the two engine-layer `describe` functions (`sheets write`,
    /// `sheets create`) embed it raw and their CLI callers sanitize the
    /// whole rendered line instead.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn id(&self) -> &str {
        match self {
            Self::Folder { folder_id, .. } => folder_id,
            Self::File { file_id } => file_id,
        }
    }

    /// `"folder"` or `"file"` — the noun the operator-facing messages use.
    #[must_use]
    pub const fn kind_label(&self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::Folder { .. } => "folder",
            Self::File { .. } => "file",
        }
    }

    /// `" (depth 2)"` for a folder rule, `""` for a file rule.
    ///
    /// Exists so the five `describe`/`print_report` sites are one identical
    /// line — `"refused by rule on {kind} {id}{suffix}"` — and cannot drift
    /// into disagreeing about how a file rule is worded.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn depth_suffix(&self) -> String {
        match self {
            Self::Folder { depth, .. } => format!(" (depth {depth})"),
            Self::File { .. } => String::new(),
        }
    }
}

/// The outcome of [`resolve`]: whether an operation is permitted, and which
/// rule (if any) decided it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct Decision {
    /// Whether the operation is permitted.
    pub verdict: Verdict,
    /// The configured rule that decided this, or `None` when the bare
    /// default policy decided it instead.
    pub decided_by: Option<DecidingRule>,
}

/// The verdict from a rule naming `file_id` itself, or `None` when no
/// configured rule names it.
///
/// A file rule sits at **depth −1**: strictly more specific than any
/// folder rule, including one on the file's own immediate parent. That
/// is what lets a file shared by link or email — whose parents this
/// account cannot see at all — be granted, and it is also why a decisive
/// file rule short-circuits the ancestor walk entirely
/// (`crate::drive::folder_ancestry::resolve_decision_for_file_target`), sparing
/// every `files.get` the walk would have cost.
///
/// Deny still beats allow among file rules naming the same id, the same
/// fail-closed direction every other tie-break in this module takes.
#[must_use]
pub fn resolve_file_rule(
    file_id: &str,
    op: DriveOperation,
    rules: &[FolderPermissionRule],
) -> Option<Decision> {
    let mut deny_here = false;
    let mut allow_here = false;
    for rule in rules {
        if rule.file_id.as_deref() != Some(file_id) {
            continue;
        }
        deny_here |= rule.deny.contains(&op);
        allow_here |= rule.allow.contains(&op);
    }
    if !deny_here && !allow_here {
        return None;
    }
    Some(Decision {
        verdict: if deny_here {
            Verdict::Deny
        } else {
            Verdict::Allow
        },
        decided_by: Some(DecidingRule::File {
            file_id: file_id.to_string(),
        }),
    })
}

/// Resolves `op` for a **file** target: a rule naming `file_id` if one
/// exists, else [`resolve`] against the file's ancestor `chain`.
///
/// The pure counterpart of
/// `crate::drive::folder_ancestry::resolve_decision_for_file_target`. Callers
/// whose target is a *folder* (`create`/`upload`'s `--parent`) call
/// [`resolve`] directly instead — there is no file id to name, so a file
/// rule can never participate.
#[must_use]
pub fn resolve_for_file(
    file_id: &str,
    chain: &[String],
    op: DriveOperation,
    rules: &[FolderPermissionRule],
) -> Decision {
    resolve_file_rule(file_id, op, rules).unwrap_or_else(|| resolve(chain, op, rules))
}

/// Resolves whether `op` is permitted against `chain` (depth 0 = the
/// target folder itself, then parent, grandparent, ...) under `rules`. See
/// the module doc for the full algorithm and its tie-breaks.
///
/// Only `folder_id` rules participate: a `file_id` rule names a target,
/// not an ancestor, so it can never match a chain entry. See
/// [`resolve_for_file`] for a file target.
#[must_use]
pub fn resolve(chain: &[String], op: DriveOperation, rules: &[FolderPermissionRule]) -> Decision {
    let mut best: Option<(usize, Verdict)> = None;
    for (depth, folder_id) in chain.iter().enumerate() {
        let mut deny_here = false;
        let mut allow_here = false;
        for rule in rules {
            if rule.folder_id.as_deref() != Some(folder_id.as_str()) {
                continue;
            }
            if depth > 0 && !rule.recursive {
                continue;
            }
            deny_here |= rule.deny.contains(&op);
            allow_here |= rule.allow.contains(&op);
        }
        if !deny_here && !allow_here {
            continue;
        }
        let verdict = if deny_here {
            Verdict::Deny
        } else {
            Verdict::Allow
        };
        let is_closer = match best {
            Some((best_depth, _)) => depth < best_depth,
            None => true,
        };
        if is_closer {
            best = Some((depth, verdict));
        }
    }
    match best {
        Some((depth, verdict)) => Decision {
            verdict,
            decided_by: Some(DecidingRule::Folder {
                folder_id: chain[depth].clone(),
                depth,
            }),
        },
        None => Decision {
            verdict: op.default_policy(),
            decided_by: None,
        },
    }
}

/// Combines per-parent [`Decision`]s into one, for a target with more than
/// one current parent (a legacy multi-parent file — Drive no longer
/// permits creating new ones).
///
/// Deny wins across parents, the same fail-closed direction every other
/// tie-break in this module takes. Callers with a single parent (the
/// common case) can call [`resolve`] directly instead; an *orphan* target
/// (zero parents) should call `resolve(&[], op, rules)` directly too,
/// rather than calling this with zero decisions — a target's chain
/// degenerates to "only the default policy applies," not to a policy
/// about *no* chain, so `first` requires at least one decision by
/// construction.
///
/// Shared by `drive edit` (whose target's chain starts at its *current*
/// parents, unioned) and `drive permissions check` (whose target may
/// itself be a file).
#[must_use]
pub fn combine_across_parents(
    first: Decision,
    rest: impl IntoIterator<Item = Decision>,
) -> Decision {
    rest.into_iter().fold(first, |acc, next| {
        if acc.verdict == Verdict::Deny {
            acc
        } else {
            next
        }
    })
}

/// The `(folder_id, file_id, depth)` triple
/// `crate::request_log::DriveMutationOutcome`'s `decided_by_folder_id`/
/// `decided_by_file_id`/`decided_by_depth` fields expect.
///
/// A named struct rather than a tuple: three same-shaped `Option`s in a
/// row is exactly the signature a caller silently mis-orders.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct DecidedByLogFields {
    /// The deciding folder rule's id, when a folder rule decided it.
    pub folder_id: Option<String>,
    /// The deciding file rule's id, when a file rule decided it.
    pub file_id: Option<String>,
    /// The deciding folder rule's depth. Always `None` for a file rule,
    /// which matches the target itself rather than an ancestor.
    pub depth: Option<usize>,
}

/// Splits an optional [`DecidingRule`] into the log's flat fields.
///
/// Shared by `create`/`upload`/`edit`/`sheets write`'s otherwise
/// near-identical `record_attempt` functions — each still builds its own
/// `DriveMutationOutcome` (the verb-specific fields genuinely differ), but
/// this was the one piece of extraction logic that was byte-for-byte the
/// same in all of them. Kept here (rather than in `crate::request_log`,
/// which stays decoupled from any one integration's internal types) and
/// pure, matching this module's zero-I/O contract — it does not itself
/// call `crate::request_log::record_drive_mutation`.
#[must_use]
pub fn decided_by_log_fields(decided_by: Option<&DecidingRule>) -> DecidedByLogFields {
    match decided_by {
        Some(DecidingRule::Folder { folder_id, depth }) => DecidedByLogFields {
            folder_id: Some(folder_id.clone()),
            file_id: None,
            depth: Some(*depth),
        },
        Some(DecidingRule::File { file_id }) => DecidedByLogFields {
            folder_id: None,
            file_id: Some(file_id.clone()),
            depth: None,
        },
        None => DecidedByLogFields::default(),
    }
}

/// Whether the rule(s) that decided `decided_by` require a Drive write
/// lease ([ADR-0080](../../docs/adrs/adr-0080.md) §1/§13), in addition to
/// this gate's own verdict.
///
/// Deliberately a separate lookup rather than a field threaded through
/// [`resolve`]/[`resolve_file_rule`]/[`combine_across_parents`]: those are
/// well-exercised and security-critical, and `require_lease` is
/// orthogonal to the verdict they compute — a rule's lease requirement
/// never changes *whether* an operation is allowed, only whether a caller
/// must also present a valid lease before acting on an `Allow`. Re-deriving
/// it from `decided_by` against the same rule set keeps that code
/// untouched.
///
/// `decided_by: None` (the bare default policy decided it) is treated as
/// requiring a lease — moot in practice, since every write operation
/// defaults to `Deny` (`DriveOperation::default_policy`), so a `None`
/// `decided_by` never accompanies an `Allow` verdict a caller would act on.
/// When more than one configured rule matches `decided_by` itself (two
/// rules naming the same folder and depth, or the same file id), **any**
/// of them requiring a lease is enough — the same safe-direction tie-break
/// every other ambiguity in this gate resolves with.
///
/// This function only ever sees the **one** `decided_by` its caller passes
/// in — it cannot by itself account for a legacy multi-parent target,
/// where [`combine_across_parents`] keeps only the winning parent's
/// `decided_by` and discards the rest. A caller with more than one parent
/// decision in hand (`crate::drive::folder_ancestry::resolve_decision_for_parents`)
/// must call this once per parent and OR the results together *before*
/// folding the decisions, or a losing parent's own lease requirement would
/// be silently dropped along with its `decided_by`.
///
/// `op` narrows `matching` to rules that actually govern this operation
/// (`rule.allow`/`rule.deny` contains it) — without it, an unrelated rule
/// on the same folder/depth (or file id) governing a *different*
/// operation would still contribute its own `require_lease`, silently
/// overriding a same-scope rule that explicitly opted this operation out.
#[must_use]
pub fn decided_rule_requires_lease(
    decided_by: Option<&DecidingRule>,
    op: DriveOperation,
    rules: &[FolderPermissionRule],
) -> bool {
    let governs_op =
        |rule: &&FolderPermissionRule| rule.allow.contains(&op) || rule.deny.contains(&op);
    let matching: Vec<&FolderPermissionRule> = match decided_by {
        None => return true,
        Some(DecidingRule::Folder { folder_id, depth }) => rules
            .iter()
            .filter(|rule| {
                rule.folder_id.as_deref() == Some(folder_id.as_str())
                    && (*depth == 0 || rule.recursive)
            })
            .filter(governs_op)
            .collect(),
        Some(DecidingRule::File { file_id }) => rules
            .iter()
            .filter(|rule| rule.file_id.as_deref() == Some(file_id.as_str()))
            .filter(governs_op)
            .collect(),
    };
    if matching.is_empty() {
        return true;
    }
    matching.iter().any(|rule| rule.require_lease)
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[allow(clippy::unwrap_used, clippy::expect_used)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn rule(
        folder_id: &str,
        recursive: bool,
        allow: &[DriveOperation],
        deny: &[DriveOperation],
    ) -> FolderPermissionRule {
        FolderPermissionRule::folder(folder_id)
            .recursive(recursive)
            .allowing(allow.iter().copied())
            .denying(deny.iter().copied())
    }

    fn file_rule(
        file_id: &str,
        allow: &[DriveOperation],
        deny: &[DriveOperation],
    ) -> FolderPermissionRule {
        FolderPermissionRule::file(file_id)
            .allowing(allow.iter().copied())
            .denying(deny.iter().copied())
    }

    fn folder_id_of(decision: &Decision) -> &str {
        match decision.decided_by.as_ref().unwrap() {
            DecidingRule::Folder { folder_id, .. } => folder_id,
            DecidingRule::File { .. } => panic!("expected a folder rule, got a file rule"),
        }
    }

    fn chain(ids: &[&str]) -> Vec<String> {
        ids.iter().copied().map(ToString::to_string).collect()
    }

    #[test]
    fn default_policy_allows_read_with_no_rules() {
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["a"]), DriveOperation::Read, &[]);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(decision.decided_by, None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn default_policy_denies_create_upload_edit_trash_with_no_rules() {
        for op in [
            DriveOperation::Create,
            DriveOperation::Upload,
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::Trash,
        ] {
            let decision = resolve(&chain(&["a"]), op, &[]);
            assert_eq!(
                decision.verdict,
                Verdict::Deny,
                "{op:?} should default-deny"
            );
            assert_eq!(decision.decided_by, None);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn ever_requires_lease_is_false_for_read_create_upload_and_trash() {
        for op in [
            DriveOperation::Read,
            DriveOperation::Create,
            DriveOperation::Upload,
            DriveOperation::Trash,
        ] {
            assert!(
                !op.ever_requires_lease(),
                "{op:?} should never take a lease"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn ever_requires_lease_is_true_for_every_content_mutating_operation() {
        for op in [
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
            DriveOperation::SheetsStructure,
            DriveOperation::SheetsDelete,
            DriveOperation::SheetsProtection,
            DriveOperation::DocsWrite,
            DriveOperation::DocsDelete,
            DriveOperation::DocsStructure,
            DriveOperation::DocsTableDelete,
        ] {
            assert!(op.ever_requires_lease(), "{op:?} should be lease-eligible");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn trash_permission_serde_round_trip_does_not_widen_other_grants() {
        let rule: FolderPermissionRule = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({
            "folder_id": "a", "allow": ["trash"]
        }))
        .unwrap();
        assert!(rule.allow.contains(&DriveOperation::Trash));
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::Trash.to_string(), "trash");
        let serialized = serde_json::to_value(&rule).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(serialized["allow"], serde_json::json!(["trash"]));
        for op in [
            DriveOperation::Create,
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::SheetsDelete,
        ] {
            let rule = FolderPermissionRule::folder("a").allowing([op]);
            assert_eq!(
                resolve(&chain(&["a"]), DriveOperation::Trash, &[rule]).verdict,
                Verdict::Deny
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn recursive_rule_matches_deep_descendant() {
        let rules = [rule("root", true, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        let decision = resolve(
            &chain(&["child", "grandchild", "root"]),
            DriveOperation::Create,
            &rules,
        );
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(folder_id_of(&decision), "root");
    }

    #[test]
    fn non_recursive_rule_matches_own_folder_only() {
        let rules = [rule("target", false, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
    }

    #[test]
    fn non_recursive_rule_does_not_match_child() {
        let rules = [rule("parent", false, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["child", "parent"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        // Falls through to the default policy since the non-recursive rule
        // never matches at depth > 0.
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert_eq!(decision.decided_by, None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn closest_ancestor_wins_deny_over_broader_allow() {
        let rules = [
            rule("child", true, &[], &[DriveOperation::Create]),
            rule("parent", true, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[]),
        ];
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["child", "parent"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert_eq!(folder_id_of(&decision), "child");
    }

    #[test]
    fn closest_ancestor_wins_allow_over_broader_deny() {
        // The inverse case — proves "closest wins" isn't secretly "deny
        // always wins": a closer *allow* beats a farther *deny*.
        let rules = [
            rule("child", true, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[]),
            rule("parent", true, &[], &[DriveOperation::Create]),
        ];
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["child", "parent"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(folder_id_of(&decision), "child");
    }

    #[test]
    fn deny_beats_allow_at_equal_depth() {
        let rules = [
            rule("target", false, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[]),
            rule("target", false, &[], &[DriveOperation::Create]),
        ];
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
    }

    #[test]
    fn rule_on_unrelated_folder_does_not_apply() {
        let rules = [rule("unrelated", true, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        let decision = resolve(
            &chain(&["target", "parent"]),
            DriveOperation::Create,
            &rules,
        );
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert_eq!(decision.decided_by, None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn empty_chain_orphan_file_uses_default_policy_only() {
        let rules = [rule("some-folder", true, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        let decision = resolve(&[], DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert_eq!(decision.decided_by, None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn display_matches_the_serde_kebab_case_wire_form() {
        // Display is hand-written, so it can drift from the derive. Every
        // variant is asserted against a round-trip through serde rather
        // than a second hand-written literal, which would drift with it.
        for op in [
            DriveOperation::Read,
            DriveOperation::Create,
            DriveOperation::Upload,
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
            DriveOperation::SheetsStructure,
            DriveOperation::SheetsDelete,
            DriveOperation::SheetsProtection,
            DriveOperation::DocsWrite,
            DriveOperation::Trash,
            DriveOperation::DocsDelete,
            DriveOperation::DocsStructure,
            DriveOperation::DocsTableDelete,
        ] {
            let wire = serde_json::to_string(&op).unwrap();
            assert_eq!(
                format!("\"{op}\""),
                wire,
                "Display drifted from serde for {op:?}"
            );
        }
        // The pre-existing spellings are pinned literally: switching
        // `rename_all` to kebab-case must not have moved any of them.
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::Read.to_string(), "read");
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::Create.to_string(), "create");
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::Upload.to_string(), "upload");
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::Edit.to_string(), "edit");
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::SheetsWrite.to_string(), "sheets-write");
        assert_eq!(
            DriveOperation::SheetsStructure.to_string(),
            "sheets-structure"
        );
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::SheetsDelete.to_string(), "sheets-delete");
        assert_eq!(
            DriveOperation::SheetsProtection.to_string(),
            "sheets-protection"
        );
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::DocsWrite.to_string(), "docs-write");
    }

    #[test]
    fn sheets_write_defaults_to_deny_like_every_other_write() {
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["f"]), DriveOperation::SheetsWrite, &[]);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert!(decision.decided_by.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_edit_rule_does_not_grant_sheets_write() {
        // The whole reason for a separate variant: an existing
        // `allow: ["edit"]` rule must not silently gain cell-write power.
        let rules = [rule("target", true, &[DriveOperation::Edit], &[])];
        let edit = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Edit, &rules);
        let sheets = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::SheetsWrite, &rules);
        assert_eq!(edit.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(sheets.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
    }

    #[test]
    fn sheets_structure_defaults_to_deny_like_every_other_write() {
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["f"]), DriveOperation::SheetsStructure, &[]);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert!(decision.decided_by.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn slides_write_is_a_distinct_default_deny_leased_operation() {
        assert_eq!(DriveOperation::SlidesWrite.to_string(), "slides-write");
        assert!(DriveOperation::SlidesWrite.ever_requires_lease());
        assert_eq!(
            serde_json::to_string(&DriveOperation::SlidesWrite).unwrap(),
            "\"slides-write\""
        );
        assert_eq!(
            resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::SlidesWrite, &[]).verdict,
            Verdict::Deny
        );
        for granted in [
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::DocsWrite,
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
        ] {
            let rules = [rule("target", true, &[granted], &[])];
            assert_eq!(
                resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::SlidesWrite, &rules).verdict,
                Verdict::Deny
            );
        }
        let rules = [rule("target", true, &[DriveOperation::SlidesWrite], &[])];
        assert_eq!(
            resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::SlidesWrite, &rules).verdict,
            Verdict::Allow
        );
        for other in [
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::DocsWrite,
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
        ] {
            assert_eq!(
                resolve(&chain(&["target"]), other, &rules).verdict,
                Verdict::Deny
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn docs_write_defaults_to_deny_like_every_other_write() {
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["f"]), DriveOperation::DocsWrite, &[]);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert!(decision.decided_by.is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_sheets_write_rule_does_not_grant_sheets_structure() {
        // The whole reason for a second Sheets variant (issue #1613): an
        // existing `allow: ["sheets-write"]` rule was written when structural
        // edits were impossible, so it must not silently gain the power to
        // add, rename or reshape sheets.
        let rules = [rule("target", true, &[DriveOperation::SheetsWrite], &[])];
        let write = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::SheetsWrite, &rules);
        let structure = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::SheetsStructure, &rules);
        assert_eq!(write.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(structure.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
    }

    #[test]
    fn an_edit_rule_does_not_grant_sheets_structure() {
        let rules = [rule("target", true, &[DriveOperation::Edit], &[])];
        let structure = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::SheetsStructure, &rules);
        assert_eq!(structure.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
    }

    /// ADR-0076 §2 runs ADR-0073 §3's argument in **three** directions, so
    /// all are pinned: an `edit` grant predates Docs being reachable at
    /// all, and both Sheets grants are lexically about cells.
    #[test]
    fn neither_an_edit_nor_a_sheets_write_nor_a_sheets_structure_rule_grants_docs_write() {
        for granted in [
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
            DriveOperation::SheetsStructure,
        ] {
            let rules = [rule("target", true, &[granted], &[])];
            let held = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), granted, &rules);
            let docs = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::DocsWrite, &rules);
            assert_eq!(held.verdict, Verdict::Allow, "{granted:?}");
            assert_eq!(
                docs.verdict,
                Verdict::Deny,
                "an allow:[{granted}] rule must not leak into docs-write"
            );
        }
    }

    /// The converse, so the separation is not accidentally one-way: a
    /// `docs-write` grant must not confer cell writes, structural sheet
    /// edits, or raw content edits.
    #[test]
    fn a_docs_write_rule_grants_nothing_else() {
        let rules = [rule("target", true, &[DriveOperation::DocsWrite], &[])];
        assert_eq!(
            resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::DocsWrite, &rules).verdict,
            Verdict::Allow
        );
        for other in [
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
            DriveOperation::SheetsStructure,
            DriveOperation::Create,
            DriveOperation::Upload,
            DriveOperation::Trash,
        ] {
            assert_eq!(
                resolve(&chain(&["target"]), other, &rules).verdict,
                Verdict::Deny,
                "an allow:[docs-write] rule must not leak into {other}"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn operations_on_one_rule_are_independent() {
        let rules = [rule("target", false, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        let create = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        let upload = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Upload, &rules);
        assert_eq!(create.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(
            upload.verdict,
            Verdict::Deny,
            "an allow:[create] rule must not leak into upload"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn deny_list_and_allow_list_on_same_rule_apply_to_different_ops_independently() {
        let rules = [rule(
            "target",
            false,
            &[DriveOperation::Create],
            &[DriveOperation::Edit],
        )];
        let create = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        let edit = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Edit, &rules);
        let upload = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Upload, &rules);
        assert_eq!(create.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(edit.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert_eq!(
            upload.verdict,
            Verdict::Deny,
            "no rule named upload; falls to default policy"
        );
    }

    // ── combine_across_parents ────────────────────────────────────────

    fn decision(verdict: Verdict) -> Decision {
        Decision {
            verdict,
            decided_by: None,
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn combine_across_parents_single_decision_returns_it_unchanged() {
        let combined = combine_across_parents(decision(Verdict::Allow), []);
        assert_eq!(combined.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
    }

    #[test]
    fn combine_across_parents_deny_beats_allow_deny_first() {
        let combined = combine_across_parents(decision(Verdict::Deny), [decision(Verdict::Allow)]);
        assert_eq!(combined.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
    }

    #[test]
    fn combine_across_parents_deny_beats_allow_allow_first() {
        let combined = combine_across_parents(decision(Verdict::Allow), [decision(Verdict::Deny)]);
        assert_eq!(combined.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
    }

    // ── decided_by_log_fields ────────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn decided_by_log_fields_none_yields_all_none() {
        assert_eq!(decided_by_log_fields(None), DecidedByLogFields::default());
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_by_log_fields_some_extracts_folder_id_and_depth() {
        let rule = DecidingRule::Folder {
            folder_id: "folder-1".to_string(),
            depth: 2,
        };
        assert_eq!(
            decided_by_log_fields(Some(&rule)),
            DecidedByLogFields {
                folder_id: Some("folder-1".to_string()),
                file_id: None,
                depth: Some(2),
            }
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_by_log_fields_never_puts_a_file_id_in_the_folder_field() {
        // `omni-dev log --query decided_by_folder_id:X` must never start
        // matching file ids — that would silently reinterpret an existing
        // audit key.
        let rule = DecidingRule::File {
            file_id: "file-1".to_string(),
        };
        assert_eq!(
            decided_by_log_fields(Some(&rule)),
            DecidedByLogFields {
                folder_id: None,
                file_id: Some("file-1".to_string()),
                depth: None,
            }
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_rule_requires_lease_defaults_true_with_no_decided_by() {
        assert!(decided_rule_requires_lease(None, DriveOperation::Edit, &[]));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_rule_requires_lease_true_when_the_folder_rule_says_so() {
        let rules = [FolderPermissionRule::folder("f1").allowing([DriveOperation::Edit])];
        let decided_by = DecidingRule::Folder {
            folder_id: "f1".to_string(),
            depth: 0,
        };
        assert!(decided_rule_requires_lease(
            Some(&decided_by),
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            &rules
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_rule_requires_lease_false_when_the_folder_rule_opts_out() {
        let rules = [FolderPermissionRule::folder("f1")
            .allowing([DriveOperation::Edit])
            .requiring_lease(false)];
        let decided_by = DecidingRule::Folder {
            folder_id: "f1".to_string(),
            depth: 0,
        };
        assert!(!decided_rule_requires_lease(
            Some(&decided_by),
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            &rules
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_rule_requires_lease_true_when_the_file_rule_says_so() {
        let rules = [FolderPermissionRule::file("file-1").allowing([DriveOperation::Edit])];
        let decided_by = DecidingRule::File {
            file_id: "file-1".to_string(),
        };
        assert!(decided_rule_requires_lease(
            Some(&decided_by),
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            &rules
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_rule_requires_lease_any_matching_rule_opting_in_wins() {
        // Two rules on the same folder, both governing `Edit`: one opting
        // out and one not — the safe direction (any rule requiring a
        // lease is enough) wins.
        let rules = [
            FolderPermissionRule::folder("f1")
                .allowing([DriveOperation::Edit])
                .requiring_lease(false),
            FolderPermissionRule::folder("f1").allowing([DriveOperation::Edit]),
        ];
        let decided_by = DecidingRule::Folder {
            folder_id: "f1".to_string(),
            depth: 0,
        };
        assert!(decided_rule_requires_lease(
            Some(&decided_by),
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            &rules
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_rule_requires_lease_ignores_a_non_recursive_rule_on_an_ancestor() {
        // The depth-0 rule opted out; an unrelated non-recursive rule
        // naming the same folder id at a *different* depth must not be
        // consulted (mirrors `resolve`'s own recursive-match rule).
        let rules = [FolderPermissionRule::folder("f1")
            .allowing([DriveOperation::Edit])
            .requiring_lease(false)];
        let decided_by = DecidingRule::Folder {
            folder_id: "f1".to_string(),
            depth: 1,
        };
        // depth=1 with a non-recursive rule: the rule does not match at
        // this depth, so no matching rule is found and the fail-safe
        // default (true) applies.
        assert!(decided_rule_requires_lease(
            Some(&decided_by),
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            &rules
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn decided_rule_requires_lease_ignores_a_rule_for_a_different_operation() {
        // Two rules on the same folder/depth, governing different
        // operations: the `Edit` rule opts out, and an unrelated
        // `SheetsWrite` rule (which does not opt out) must not contribute
        // its own `require_lease` to the `Edit` lookup — a rule that
        // doesn't govern the operation being checked isn't "matching".
        let rules = [
            FolderPermissionRule::folder("f1")
                .allowing([DriveOperation::Edit])
                .requiring_lease(false),
            FolderPermissionRule::folder("f1").allowing([DriveOperation::SheetsWrite]),
        ];
        let decided_by = DecidingRule::Folder {
            folder_id: "f1".to_string(),
            depth: 0,
        };
        assert!(!decided_rule_requires_lease(
            Some(&decided_by),
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            &rules
        ));
    }

    #[test]
    fn combine_across_parents_all_allow_returns_allow() {
        let combined = combine_across_parents(
            decision(Verdict::Allow),
            [decision(Verdict::Allow), decision(Verdict::Allow)],
        );
        assert_eq!(combined.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
    }

    // ── file rules (issue #1612) ──────────────────────────────────────

    #[test]
    fn a_file_rule_grants_a_target_with_no_chain_at_all() {
        // The whole point of the feature: a Sheet shared by link or email
        // has no visible parent, so the chain is empty and no folder rule
        // could ever apply.
        let rules = [file_rule("shared", &[DriveOperation::SheetsWrite], &[])];
        let decision = resolve_for_file("shared", &[], DriveOperation::SheetsWrite, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(
            decision.decided_by,
            Some(DecidingRule::File {
                file_id: "shared".to_string()
            })
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn file_deny_beats_a_recursive_folder_allow() {
        let rules = [
            rule("root", true, &[DriveOperation::Edit], &[]),
            file_rule("target", &[], &[DriveOperation::Edit]),
        ];
        let decision = resolve_for_file(
            "target",
            &chain(&["parent", "root"]),
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            &rules,
        );
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert_eq!(decision.decided_by.unwrap().kind_label(), "file");
    }

    #[test]
    fn file_allow_beats_a_folder_deny_on_the_immediate_parent() {
        // The inverse direction — proves depth −1 is "closest wins", not a
        // one-way "a file rule can only restrict" rule.
        let rules = [
            rule("parent", false, &[], &[DriveOperation::SheetsWrite]),
            file_rule("target", &[DriveOperation::SheetsWrite], &[]),
        ];
        let decision = resolve_for_file(
            "target",
            &chain(&["parent"]),
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
            &rules,
        );
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
    }

    #[test]
    fn deny_beats_allow_among_file_rules_for_the_same_id() {
        let rules = [
            file_rule("target", &[DriveOperation::Edit], &[]),
            file_rule("target", &[], &[DriveOperation::Edit]),
        ];
        let decision = resolve_for_file("target", &[], DriveOperation::Edit, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_file_rule_returns_none_rather_than_the_default_policy() {
        // Must be distinguishable from "decided deny", or the caller would
        // skip the ancestor walk that could still have granted it.
        let rules = [file_rule("target", &[DriveOperation::Edit], &[])];
        assert!(resolve_file_rule("target", DriveOperation::SheetsWrite, &rules).is_none());
        assert!(resolve_file_rule("other", DriveOperation::Edit, &rules).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_file_rule_is_invisible_to_the_ancestor_walk() {
        // A `file_id` rule whose id happens to equal a folder in the chain
        // must not match it: the two id spaces are not interchangeable.
        let rules = [file_rule("target", &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        let decision = resolve(&chain(&["target"]), DriveOperation::Create, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Deny);
        assert_eq!(decision.decided_by, None);
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_folder_rule_is_invisible_to_the_file_lookup() {
        let rules = [rule("target", true, &[DriveOperation::Create], &[])];
        assert!(resolve_file_rule("target", DriveOperation::Create, &rules).is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn resolve_for_file_falls_through_to_the_chain_when_no_file_rule_matches() {
        let rules = [rule("parent", true, &[DriveOperation::Edit], &[])];
        let decision =
            resolve_for_file("target", &chain(&["parent"]), DriveOperation::Edit, &rules);
        assert_eq!(decision.verdict, Verdict::Allow);
        assert_eq!(folder_id_of(&decision), "parent");
    }

    // ── rule schema validation ────────────────────────────────────────

    fn parse_rule(json: &str) -> Result<FolderPermissionRule, serde_json::Error> {
        serde_json::from_str(json)
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_folder_rule_round_trips_byte_identically_to_the_pre_1612_shape() {
        let parsed =
            parse_rule(r#"{"folder_id":"f1","recursive":true,"allow":["create"]}"#).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(parsed.folder_id.as_deref(), Some("f1"));
        assert_eq!(parsed.file_id, None);
        assert!(parsed.recursive);
        let json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::to_value(&parsed).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(json["folder_id"], "f1");
        assert_eq!(json["recursive"], true);
        assert!(
            json.get("file_id").is_none(),
            "an absent file_id must not be serialized"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_pre_lease_rule_with_no_require_lease_key_defaults_to_requiring_one() {
        // Pins `default_require_lease`'s return value against a
        // pre-existing `settings.json` written before ADR-0080 (issue
        // #1664): every operator's already-saved rule has no
        // `require_lease` key at all, and the backward-compatibility
        // guarantee is that it is still gated by the lease, not silently
        // exempted. Nothing else in this test file asserts this — a
        // refactor that broke `default_require_lease`'s body (e.g.
        // swapping `#[serde(default = "default_require_lease")]` for a
        // bare `#[serde(default)]`) would otherwise compile and pass every
        // other test while disabling Touch ID/backup enforcement crate-wide
        // for every such rule.
        let parsed =
            parse_rule(r#"{"folder_id":"f1","recursive":true,"allow":["create"]}"#).unwrap();
        assert!(parsed.require_lease);
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_file_rule_parses_and_serializes_without_a_folder_id() {
        let parsed = parse_rule(r#"{"file_id":"x1","allow":["sheets-write"]}"#).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(parsed.file_id.as_deref(), Some("x1"));
        assert_eq!(parsed.folder_id, None);
        let json: serde_json::Value = serde_json::to_value(&parsed).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(json["file_id"], "x1");
        assert!(json.get("folder_id").is_none());
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_rule_naming_neither_target_is_a_load_error() {
        let err = parse_rule(r#"{"allow":["create"]}"#)
            .unwrap_err()
            .to_string();
        assert!(err.contains("folder_id"), "{err}");
        assert!(err.contains("file_id"), "{err}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_rule_naming_both_targets_is_a_load_error() {
        let err = parse_rule(r#"{"folder_id":"f","file_id":"x"}"#)
            .unwrap_err()
            .to_string();
        assert!(err.contains("not both"), "{err}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn recursive_true_on_a_file_rule_is_a_load_error() {
        // Silently ignoring it would let an operator believe they had
        // granted a subtree when they had granted one file.
        let err = parse_rule(r#"{"file_id":"x","recursive":true}"#)
            .unwrap_err()
            .to_string();
        assert!(err.contains("recursive"), "{err}");
    }

    #[test]
    fn recursive_false_on_a_file_rule_is_accepted() {
        // Redundant but not a misunderstanding, so it must not error.
        let parsed = parse_rule(r#"{"file_id":"x","recursive":false}"#).unwrap();
        assert!(!parsed.recursive);
    }

    #[test]
    fn deciding_rule_accessors_render_both_kinds() {
        let folder = DecidingRule::Folder {
            folder_id: "f1".to_string(),
            depth: 2,
        };
        assert_eq!(folder.id(), "f1");
        assert_eq!(folder.kind_label(), "folder");
        assert_eq!(folder.depth_suffix(), " (depth 2)");

        let file = DecidingRule::File {
            file_id: "x1".to_string(),
        };
        assert_eq!(file.id(), "x1");
        assert_eq!(file.kind_label(), "file");
        assert_eq!(file.depth_suffix(), "");
    }
    #[test]
    fn docs_format_is_default_denied_lease_eligible_and_isolated() {
        let format: DriveOperation = serde_json::from_str("\"docs-format\"").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(format, DriveOperation::DocsFormat);
        assert_eq!(format.to_string(), "docs-format");
        assert_eq!(format.default_policy(), Verdict::Deny);
        assert!(format.ever_requires_lease());
        for other in [
            DriveOperation::DocsWrite,
            DriveOperation::DocsDelete,
            DriveOperation::Edit,
            DriveOperation::SheetsWrite,
            DriveOperation::SlidesWrite,
        ] {
            assert_eq!(
                resolve(
                    &chain(&["target"]),
                    format,
                    &[rule("target", true, &[other], &[])]
                )
                .verdict,
                Verdict::Deny
            );
            assert_eq!(
                resolve(
                    &chain(&["target"]),
                    other,
                    &[rule("target", true, &[format], &[])]
                )
                .verdict,
                Verdict::Deny
            );
        }
        assert_eq!(
            resolve(
                &chain(&["target"]),
                format,
                &[rule("target", true, &[format], &[])]
            )
            .verdict,
            Verdict::Allow
        );
    }
}