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Crate omne_attest

Crate omne_attest 

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Verify an AMD SEV-SNP attestation report against AMD’s own key chain — locally, with no oracle and nothing to trust but the root you pin.

This crate is the attestation layer of Omne, a foundation-level substrate that can be built on. It is published on its own because it is useful on its own: if you rent a confidential VM from anyone, this tells you whether the thing that answered you is really a SEV-SNP enclave running the image you expected.

Two layers:

  • snp — the report itself. Parse the 1,184-byte ATTESTATION_REPORT, verify its ECDSA-P384 signature under the chip’s VCEK, verify VCEK ← ASK ← ARK against a pinned root, check the VCEK really is this chip’s key at this TCB, then apply the relying party’s policy. Every failure is a named variant of snp::Fail — you are told which leg failed, never just “invalid”.

  • claim — the attested claim: a report bound to a specific rental, a specific buyer nonce, and a specific ML-KEM-768 encapsulation key, so a buyer can send a job key to an enclave it has just verified and to nothing else. Replay of an old report is refused at the binding leg.

§What this crate does not decide

Whether to trust AMD. It pins the root you supply and reports exactly which check failed. The chip’s own signature is ECDSA-P384 and the chain is RSASSA-PSS — those are AMD’s algorithms, not ours; Omne’s own signatures are ML-DSA and the job-key exchange here is ML-KEM-768.

§Example

use omne_attest::{claim, snp};
let c = claim::AttestedClaim::decode(&bytes).ok_or("malformed claim")?;
let policy = claim::BuyerPolicy {
    measurement: expected_measurement,
    tcb_floor: snp::Tcb { boot_loader: 0, tee: 0, snp: 0, microcode: 0 },
    ark_sha256: ark_pin,
    reject_debug: true,
};
let verified = claim::verify(&c, &rental, &nonce, &policy)?;
let (ciphertext, job_key) = claim::encapsulate_job_key(&verified.ek)?;

Modules§

claim
CC-1 — the ATTESTED CLAIM (confidential-compute-2026-08-29.md §2b), in code: what a slice host inside a confidential VM returns at claim, what a buyer checks, and how the buyer’s job key reaches the enclave.
snp
AMD SEV-SNP attestation reports — parse + verify (CC-0).