offline_protocol/

config.rs

//! Protocol configuration.

use crate::constants::DEFAULT_INITIAL_TTL;
use crate::protocol::mesh_relay::{MeshRelayConfig, RELAY_QUEUE_MAX_OVERDUE};
use offline_protocol_reliability::{AckConfig, DeduplicatorConfig, RetryConfig};
use offline_protocol_router::{DorsConfig, PathConfig, RelayConfig};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

/// Overflow policy for bounded pending encrypted message queues.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum OverflowPolicy {
    /// Evict the oldest queued message to make room for the new message.
    #[default]
    DropOldest,
    /// Drop the newly received message when capacity is reached.
    DropNewest,
}

/// Configuration for inbound encrypted messages received before session readiness.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct PendingQueueConfig {
    /// Maximum number of pending encrypted messages per peer.
    pub max_pending_per_peer: usize,
    /// Maximum number of pending encrypted messages across all peers.
    pub max_pending_global: usize,
    /// Maximum total payload bytes (content plus binary content) queued per
    /// peer.
    ///
    /// Encrypted media chunks are queued whole while the sender's session is
    /// not yet ready, so the count limits alone would admit up to
    /// `max_pending_per_peer` × chunk-size bytes of ciphertext. The default
    /// (4 MB) covers the largest legitimate pre-session backlog: 2 concurrent
    /// transfers × 8 in-flight chunks × 256 KB internet chunks.
    #[serde(default = "default_max_pending_bytes_per_peer")]
    pub max_pending_bytes_per_peer: usize,
    /// Maximum total payload bytes queued across all peers. The default
    /// (32 MB) bounds worst-case queue memory on mobile devices regardless of
    /// how many peers are mid-establishment.
    #[serde(default = "default_max_pending_bytes_global")]
    pub max_pending_bytes_global: usize,
    /// Time-to-live for pending encrypted messages in milliseconds.
    pub pending_ttl_ms: u64,
    /// Overflow policy when queue limits are reached.
    pub overflow_policy: OverflowPolicy,
}

/// Default TTL for the pending-decryption queue (30 minutes, in ms).
///
/// Under the deferred-ACK model an undecryptable message is no longer ACKed on
/// receipt, so this queue is the primary recovery window before the session
/// confirms — a 2-minute window was too short for a peer whose Welcome is slow
/// to arrive/adopt. Memory stays bounded by the per-peer/global byte caps plus
/// the `DropOldest` overflow policy; a longer TTL only lets entries linger
/// within those caps, it does not raise the ceiling.
///
/// The UniFFI `PendingQueueConfig` default mirrors this value — reference this
/// constant there rather than re-hardcoding it.
pub const DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS: u64 = 1_800_000;

fn default_max_pending_bytes_per_peer() -> usize {
    4 * 1024 * 1024
}

fn default_max_pending_bytes_global() -> usize {
    32 * 1024 * 1024
}

impl Default for PendingQueueConfig {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_pending_per_peer: 64,
            max_pending_global: 4096,
            max_pending_bytes_per_peer: default_max_pending_bytes_per_peer(),
            max_pending_bytes_global: default_max_pending_bytes_global(),
            // 30 minutes; see DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS for the deferred-ACK
            // rationale and the FFI-mirror contract.
            pending_ttl_ms: DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS,
            overflow_policy: OverflowPolicy::DropOldest,
        }
    }
}

/// Encryption configuration for automatic MLS handling.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct EncryptionConfig {
    /// Whether automatic encryption is enabled.
    /// When enabled, messages are automatically encrypted/decrypted using MLS.
    pub enabled: bool,

    /// Auto-exchange key packages on peer discovery.
    /// When enabled, key packages are automatically sent when neighbors are discovered.
    pub auto_key_exchange: bool,

    /// Store pending messages when no session exists.
    /// Messages will be sent automatically after the session is established.
    pub store_pending: bool,

    /// Require encryption for messages (default: `true`).
    ///
    /// When enabled, sends fail closed if encryption cannot be applied:
    /// with MLS uninitialized every send returns [`crate::Error::EncryptFailed`],
    /// and with no confirmed session messages are queued (when
    /// `store_pending` is set) or fail with
    /// [`crate::Error::SessionNotReady`] instead of ever leaving as
    /// plaintext. Inbound plaintext content — text messages and legacy
    /// media alike — is rejected without being surfaced to the app
    /// (plaintext carries no sender authentication, so anyone could
    /// inject it under a contact's name); each rejection emits a
    /// [`crate::events::SecurityWarningCode::PlaintextReceiveRejected`]
    /// warning, once per peer. Even under the opt-out, inbound plaintext
    /// from a peer *known to run MLS* is rejected as a downgrade/forgery
    /// attempt — see `OfflineProtocol::encryption_capable_peers`. A
    /// confirmed session is not required, and deliberately so: an honest
    /// peer queues rather than downgrading while a session is pending, so
    /// cleartext from a peer we know speaks MLS is never legitimate.
    /// Peers that have shown no MLS signal stay readable, which is what
    /// makes this opt-out usable for legacy interop.
    ///
    /// Disable only for deployments that deliberately send cleartext
    /// (e.g. open broadcast/mesh bootstrap without provisioned MLS
    /// storage) — set this to `false` explicitly, or use
    /// [`EncryptionConfig::disabled`] to turn encryption off entirely.
    /// Every plaintext send then emits a
    /// [`crate::events::SecurityWarningCode::PlaintextSend`] warning
    /// (once per peer). Internal control messages (key exchange, ACKs,
    /// service discovery) are exempt and unaffected.
    pub require_encryption: bool,

    /// Bounds and eviction policy for pending inbound encrypted messages.
    pub pending_queue: PendingQueueConfig,

    /// Whether to negotiate and emit the compact MLS envelope for encrypted
    /// messages (base64 of the binary `EncryptedMessage` form instead of JSON
    /// with an integer-array ciphertext — roughly 2.7x smaller).
    ///
    /// Defaults to `true`. It only takes effect toward recipients that
    /// advertise support in their key package (`env_versions`), so a mixed
    /// fleet automatically stays on the JSON envelope. Parsing of inbound
    /// compact envelopes is always on, independent of this flag; this gates
    /// only advertising and emitting. The end-to-end sibling of
    /// [`TransportConfig::binary_wire_enabled`], with an independent kill
    /// switch because the two degrade separately.
    pub compact_envelope_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether to negotiate and seal the rich `__RICH_V1__` payload for
    /// encrypted messages: quoted-reply context, rich media metadata, and
    /// forward attribution carried *inside* the MLS ciphertext instead of on
    /// the relay-visible outer message.
    ///
    /// Defaults to `true`. It only takes effect toward recipients that
    /// advertise support in their key package (`rich_versions`); toward
    /// everyone else the rich extras are silently dropped — never sent
    /// cleartext. Parsing of inbound sealed payloads is always on,
    /// independent of this flag; this gates only advertising and sealing.
    /// Independent kill switch from
    /// [`EncryptionConfig::compact_envelope_enabled`] — the two degrade
    /// separately.
    pub rich_payload_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether to recover an inbound encrypted message that failed to decrypt,
    /// rather than silently dropping it while telling the sender it was
    /// delivered.
    ///
    /// Defaults to `true`. When enabled, an inbound encrypted DM (or media
    /// chunk) that fails to decrypt is **not delivery-ACKed** and its id is not
    /// left dedup-marked, so the sender keeps retrying instead of marking it
    /// delivered — and each resend of a DM is re-sealed against the peer's
    /// current session, so a resend can actually land. A message that stays
    /// undeliverable settles as an honest `MessageFailed` once the sender's
    /// retry budget lapses. When disabled, every decrypt failure falls back to
    /// the legacy drop-and-ACK behavior.
    ///
    /// **Only an epoch mismatch additionally triggers a re-key.** A decrypt
    /// failure *specifically* because the two sides disagree on the MLS epoch
    /// (e.g. after a fork) also starts a rate-limited `session_reset`
    /// key-package exchange to rebuild the channel. Failures that are *not* an
    /// epoch mismatch — an AEAD / authentication failure, a discarded past
    /// ratchet generation, a malformed frame — withhold the ACK but never
    /// re-key: widening the re-key trigger to cover them would turn every
    /// malformed frame into a teardown, which is an unbounded churn vector.
    /// That separation is why the two classifications stay distinct.
    ///
    /// One consequence worth planning for: `MessageDecryptionFailed` is
    /// **advisory, not terminal**, and fires once per failed *attempt* rather
    /// than once per message. Treat it as "this attempt did not decrypt", and
    /// read `MessageFailed` (or `FileReceiveFailed` for media) as the terminal
    /// signal.
    ///
    /// **The re-key trigger is unauthenticated, by construction — do not read
    /// this switch as "only genuine peers can cause a re-key".** An MLS epoch is
    /// checked during *framing* validation, which happens before any AEAD,
    /// sender-data, or signature check, and a 1:1 session slot id is derivable
    /// from two public user ids. A hand-built frame carrying a wrong epoch
    /// therefore reaches the recoverable classification with its sender still
    /// entirely unverified: any party who can inject a frame can drive a re-key,
    /// with no key material, no captured ciphertext and no session
    /// (`test_forged_frame_reaches_session_desync_without_any_key_material`
    /// builds one from scratch). This is inherent to MLS framing, not a defect,
    /// and cannot be authenticated away — the credential a sender check would
    /// compare against only exists once decrypt *succeeds*.
    ///
    /// What makes that safe is that acting on the trigger is **harmless**, not
    /// that it is trusted: the re-key is confined to the claimed sender's own
    /// session slot (so one derivable id cannot be aimed at other peers), is
    /// rate-limited to one per peer per 30 s, discards no queued message, and
    /// emits a `SESSION_REKEY_TRIGGERED` security warning so a sustained rate —
    /// injection rather than a real fork — is visible to the app. The residual
    /// is bounded re-key churn on a single pair: delivery delayed, never lost.
    /// `OfflineProtocol::schedule_session_rekey` carries the full analysis.
    pub crypto_recovery_enabled: bool,
}

impl Default for EncryptionConfig {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            enabled: true,
            auto_key_exchange: true,
            store_pending: true,
            // Fail closed by default (SEC-M3): a stock-config node must never
            // silently degrade to plaintext because MLS was left uninitialized.
            require_encryption: true,
            pending_queue: PendingQueueConfig::default(),
            compact_envelope_enabled: true,
            rich_payload_enabled: true,
            crypto_recovery_enabled: true,
        }
    }
}

impl EncryptionConfig {
    /// Creates a new encryption config with encryption disabled.
    pub fn disabled() -> Self {
        Self {
            enabled: false,
            auto_key_exchange: false,
            store_pending: false,
            require_encryption: false,
            pending_queue: PendingQueueConfig::default(),
            compact_envelope_enabled: false,
            rich_payload_enabled: false,
            crypto_recovery_enabled: false,
        }
    }
}

/// Security configuration for transport and control-message hardening.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct SecurityConfig {
    /// When `true`, control messages with no transport-level peer identity
    /// (`transport_peer_id` is `None`) are rejected. When `false` (default),
    /// missing transport identity emits a `SecurityWarning` but allows the
    /// message through (best-effort / fail-open).
    ///
    /// # Why the default (`false`) is not the weak setting it once was
    ///
    /// This flag used to carry real weight, because a forged `sender` was
    /// otherwise cheap: identities were app-chosen strings and the only thing
    /// standing behind one was a trust-on-first-use pin, so first contact with
    /// any peer was open to a man-in-the-middle and transport identity was the
    /// only independent corroboration available.
    ///
    /// Under self-certifying addressing it is not. Every security-gated control
    /// frame must now carry an Ed25519 signature — unconditionally, no longer
    /// gated on this flag — and the signing key must derive to the address in
    /// `sender`. A forged `sender` therefore requires the private key behind
    /// that address, on first contact as much as on the thousandth. Transport
    /// identity adds no authenticity on top of that; it only cross-checks a
    /// claim the signature already proved.
    ///
    /// The strict match on frames claiming direct origin (`hop_count == 0`) runs
    /// regardless of this flag, as it always has, and is unaffected.
    ///
    /// # What enabling it still does, and what it costs
    ///
    /// Exactly one thing: control frames arriving with **no** transport identity
    /// at all are rejected instead of falling through to the signature gate.
    ///
    /// That is a real cost with no matching benefit on most deployments. Nostr
    /// frames carry no transport identity by construction — the Nostr pubkey is
    /// an install signing key, not the protocol id, so attaching it would fail
    /// the strict match (see `nostr_message_received_inner`) — and relay frames
    /// that arrive without a named sender are in the same position. Turning this
    /// on rejects **every** control message on those paths, including the
    /// key-package exchange that cold contact depends on. Mesh-forwarded frames
    /// re-created by intermediate nodes legitimately lack identity too.
    ///
    /// Set to `true` only on a deployment that runs neither Nostr nor
    /// sender-less relay delivery, and wants frames without transport identity
    /// refused as a matter of policy rather than of authentication.
    pub require_transport_identity: bool,
}

/// Transport-specific configuration.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct TransportConfig {
    /// Whether BLE transport is enabled.
    pub ble_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether Wi-Fi Direct transport is enabled.
    pub wifi_direct_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether Internet transport is enabled.
    pub internet_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether Reticulum mesh transport is enabled.
    /// Defaults to `false` because Reticulum requires external infrastructure
    /// (a running Reticulum daemon or RNode hardware).
    pub reticulum_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether Nostr relay transport is enabled.
    /// Defaults to `false` because Nostr requires relay configuration
    /// and a secp256k1 keypair.
    pub nostr_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether outgoing Nostr frames are sealed into NIP-59 gift wraps.
    ///
    /// Defaults to `true`. With it off, the transport publishes the legacy
    /// kind-4 event whose content is the whole protocol envelope in cleartext —
    /// both usernames, the app id, the metadata map, the content type and a
    /// millisecond timestamp, readable by every relay, permanently. Turn it off
    /// only to interoperate with a relay that rejects kind 1059 outright.
    ///
    /// Send-side only, and never negotiated: inbound gift wraps are always
    /// unsealed and inbound legacy frames always parsed, so whatever this is
    /// set to, anything a peer sends us stays readable.
    ///
    /// It does still affect *outbound* reachability, in the one direction the
    /// receive path cannot cover. A peer on a build that predates sealing
    /// subscribes with `kinds: [4]` only, so it is never handed our kind-1059
    /// events and has no NIP-44 layer to open one with — leaving it on makes
    /// such a peer unreachable over Nostr (visibly: no ACK returns, so the
    /// send fails through the retry ladder rather than vanishing). That is the
    /// second reason to turn this off, alongside a relay that rejects
    /// kind 1059.
    pub nostr_sealing_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether this install publishes MLS key packages to the relays and
    /// resolves peers' published packages.
    ///
    /// Defaults to `true`, and takes effect only when `nostr_enabled` is on —
    /// which is itself off by default, so nothing is published unless an app
    /// deliberately turns Nostr on.
    ///
    /// Buys **cold first contact**: a peer known only by username becomes
    /// reachable over Nostr with no prior key-package exchange over some other
    /// transport, which is otherwise impossible. It also bounds the sealing
    /// downgrade that follows a peer-key eviction, since a forgotten key is
    /// re-resolved on the next send instead of waiting for a fresh exchange.
    ///
    /// **What it costs is worth stating plainly.** Publication is the first
    /// thing this SDK emits to a relay unprompted: a small set of addressable
    /// records sits at this install's routing tag and is refreshed as slots are
    /// consumed, whether or not any message is ever sent. Their *content* is
    /// sealed — a scraper filtering on the kind alone reads nothing, which
    /// matters because an MLS key package carries its owner's username in the
    /// leaf credential and cannot be stripped of it — but the existence of a
    /// record at a given tag, and the timing of its refreshes, are visible to
    /// every relay published to. Turn this off to keep the transport silent
    /// until it has traffic, at the price of cold contact.
    pub nostr_cold_contact_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether this install publishes a username discovery record and can
    /// resolve usernames to the devices claiming them.
    ///
    /// Defaults to **`false`**, unlike `nostr_cold_contact_enabled`, and gates
    /// publication and resolution together. It also *requires* cold contact:
    /// a discovery record points at an address whose key packages are what a
    /// resolver fetches next, so with cold contact off the claim resolves and
    /// then dead-ends one hop later. The two are hard-coupled in the transport
    /// rather than merely documented.
    ///
    /// Buys back **reach by username**, which the addressing migration removed:
    /// a stranger who knows only a name can find the addresses claiming it and
    /// open a session. The name is published as the app's configured `profile`,
    /// normalized to NFC and lowercase.
    ///
    /// **Default-off is the deliberate choice, and the reason is disclosure.**
    /// Publishing binds a human-readable name to an address in a public place.
    /// That is materially more than the key-package record's "an install with
    /// this tag exists": the mapping *is* the payload. The record is sealed to
    /// a key derived from the username, so a relay scraping by kind alone reads
    /// nothing, but anyone who guesses the name can compute the tag, confirm a
    /// claim exists, and read it. That is the same class of exposure a public
    /// user directory has, and it is a decision an app should make explicitly.
    ///
    /// **What the directory is not: authoritative.** Anyone may publish any
    /// claim at any name. Every record is a claim that *some key* asserts a
    /// name, and a resolution returns the whole set of claimants with their
    /// verification status. An app that silently picks the first result has
    /// converted a non-authoritative directory into an authoritative-looking
    /// one; the user must confirm out of band. See
    /// `docs/spec/username-discovery.md`.
    pub nostr_username_discovery_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether to negotiate and emit the compact binary wire codec.
    ///
    /// Defaults to `true`. It only takes effect between two peers that both
    /// advertise support (via their signed key package), so a mixed fleet
    /// automatically stays on JSON. Decoding of binary frames is always on,
    /// independent of this flag; this gates only advertising and emitting.
    pub binary_wire_enabled: bool,
}

impl Default for TransportConfig {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            ble_enabled: true,
            wifi_direct_enabled: true,
            internet_enabled: true,
            reticulum_enabled: false,
            nostr_enabled: false,
            nostr_sealing_enabled: true,
            nostr_cold_contact_enabled: true,
            nostr_username_discovery_enabled: false,
            binary_wire_enabled: true,
        }
    }
}

/// Reliability configuration combining ACK, retry, and deduplication settings.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default)]
pub struct ReliabilityConfig {
    /// ACK manager configuration.
    pub ack: AckConfig,

    /// Retry queue configuration.
    pub retry: RetryConfig,

    /// Deduplicator configuration.
    pub dedup: DeduplicatorConfig,
}

/// Configuration for group messaging.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct GroupConfig {
    /// Maximum number of members allowed in a single group.
    ///
    /// Per-member fan-out is O(N) when using mesh transports.
    /// This cap prevents unbounded groups from overwhelming the network.
    pub max_group_members: usize,

    /// Whether to attempt relay server registration for groups.
    ///
    /// When `true` (default), groups are registered with the relay server
    /// for optimized fan-out when Internet transport is available.
    /// When `false`, groups always use per-member fan-out regardless of
    /// transport.
    ///
    /// This gates *registration* only — the relay group registry is what
    /// invite links resolve against, so it stays on independently of
    /// [`Self::relay_broadcast_enabled`].
    pub relay_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether a relay-synced group may send via a single O(1) relay
    /// broadcast instead of per-member fan-out.
    ///
    /// **Default `true`, and additionally gated on the relay's advertised
    /// capabilities.** The flag alone does not select the broadcast: the
    /// path is taken only when the connected relay also advertised the
    /// `group_delivery_v3` capability in its `Authenticated` answer (v3 =
    /// the v2 settled-report contract plus an address-aware group path —
    /// members named in the identifier space the roster was registered in,
    /// so the report is comparable against the MLS roster). Against
    /// such a relay the broadcast keeps a delivery contract — the relay
    /// answers every broadcast with a *settled* per-recipient delivery
    /// report (`GroupMessageSent`) naming who took the message over a
    /// socket and who took a device push, and the SDK re-sends a per-member
    /// copy through the ordinary outbox/ACK/park ladder to every MLS roster
    /// member the report does not account for. A lost report re-sends the
    /// broadcast under the same logical message id (receiver and push dedup
    /// absorb the duplicate fan-out) a bounded number of times, then
    /// downgrades the message to full per-member fan-out. Against an older
    /// relay the capability gate fails and every send takes per-member
    /// fan-out — the fire-and-forget broadcast of the v1 relay (no presence
    /// check, no push fallback, no persistence, "sent" answered before
    /// delivery was known) is never taken, regardless of this flag.
    ///
    /// The one gap on the broadcast path: the tracker awaiting the report
    /// lives in memory only, so a process death inside the report window
    /// (up to `RELAY_BROADCAST_REPORT_TIMEOUT_SECS` per attempt) loses the
    /// backstop with it — members the relay could not reach get no
    /// per-member re-send, and nothing retries on restart. It needs both a
    /// missed member and a kill in that window, and is strictly smaller than
    /// the pre-report broadcast's exposure, but it is a real difference from
    /// per-member fan-out, whose outbox entries persist for 7 days.
    ///
    /// Set `false` to force per-member fan-out even against a v2 relay —
    /// the right choice for an app that must not lose a group message to a
    /// mid-flight process kill.
    /// Per-member fan-out (`__GRP_MLS_MSG__` as ordinary `SendMessage`
    /// frames) inherits the full DM ladder end to end — outbox + ACK +
    /// retry, relay write-ack + successor retry + offline push carrying the
    /// ciphertext, park-on-unreachable with presence-driven flush, and
    /// receiver-side deferred-ACK-after-decrypt — at the cost of O(N)
    /// uplink frames per send.
    ///
    /// O(N) fan-out does **not** risk tripping the relay's rate limiter at
    /// any group size. The platform bridge meters every relay-bound frame
    /// through a client-side token bucket (`RelayRateLimiter`: 28 capacity,
    /// 9/s refill) deliberately tighter than the relay's (30 burst, 10/s),
    /// and a frame that cannot take a token is *deferred to a later poll
    /// tick*, never dropped — so client spend stays at `28 + 9t` against a
    /// server budget of `30 + 10t` and the fan-out self-paces below it
    /// regardless of member count. Core enqueues all N frames at once; the
    /// bridge drains that queue.
    ///
    /// What large groups actually cost on the per-member path is drain
    /// latency. Frame N reaches the wire at roughly `(N - 28) / 9` seconds.
    /// Since the ACK timer starts at local *enqueue* (`handle_send_success`)
    /// and not at wire-confirm — `on_transport_send_confirmed` advances only
    /// the welcome lifecycle — past roughly 118 members the tail of a single
    /// fan-out exceeds the 10s ACK timeout and is retransmitted by the
    /// ladder before it was ever written. That is wasted duplicate frames,
    /// absorbed by receiver and push dedup via the stable outbox id, not
    /// lost messages. Presence checks, typing, and receipts draw on the same
    /// bucket and lower the threshold. This is the strongest reason to leave
    /// the broadcast enabled for large groups.
    pub relay_broadcast_enabled: bool,

    /// Whether an incoming MLS membership commit is refused when the local
    /// admin overlay does not authorize its committer.
    ///
    /// **Off by default, and turning it on is a decision about partition
    /// risk, not a hardening toggle.** Refusing a commit means declining the
    /// MLS merge: our epoch stays behind every member who did merge, and MLS
    /// has no way back — the application has to re-invite us. Enforcement is
    /// therefore fork-free only if every member reaches the *same* verdict,
    /// and the admin overlay is replicated best-effort (role changes ride
    /// unreconciled mesh notifications; a joiner gets a point-in-time
    /// snapshot). Two members whose role maps merely disagree will partition
    /// each other with no attacker involved.
    ///
    /// The check fails open on every *absent* input — no metadata, no admin
    /// role stored, an unreadable roster — so the common lag case stays
    /// harmless. It cannot detect *divergent* views, which is the residual
    /// risk that keeps this opt-in. Enable it only for a closed deployment
    /// that controls role distribution.
    ///
    /// With it off (the default), unauthorized membership changes are still
    /// applied and reported: `group_unauthorized_membership_change` fires and
    /// the roster events carry `authorized: false`. That reporting is
    /// unaffected by this flag; the flag only decides whether the commit is
    /// *also* refused.
    ///
    /// Rejection is receiver-local. The sender's message is still ACKed, so
    /// a committer gets no signal that anyone refused, and members with the
    /// flag off will apply a commit that members with it on rejected — do not
    /// enable it on part of a fleet.
    #[serde(default)]
    pub enforce_admin_commits: bool,
}

impl Default for GroupConfig {
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_group_members: 256,
            relay_enabled: true,
            relay_broadcast_enabled: true,
            enforce_admin_commits: false,
        }
    }
}

/// Main configuration for the Offline Protocol.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct ProtocolConfig {
    /// Application identifier (required).
    pub app_id: String,

    /// Local profile selector (required).
    ///
    /// Selects which stored identity this instance runs as — one namespace per
    /// `(app_id, profile)` pair — so an app hosting several accounts gives each
    /// its own value, and an app hosting one can pass a constant like
    /// `"default"`.
    ///
    /// It is **not** the device's identity. The wire identity is the
    /// self-certifying address derived from the identity key held in this
    /// profile's storage: it is minted on first start, reported by
    /// [`crate::OfflineProtocol::local_address`], and it is what gets stamped
    /// as `Message.sender`, what peers see as `NeighborDiscovered.peer_id`,
    /// and what others use as `recipient`. An app cannot choose it, because
    /// choosing it would mean claiming a key one does not hold.
    ///
    /// Under any configuration that reaches the wire the profile stays local.
    /// The one exception is the explicit
    /// [`EncryptionConfig::require_encryption`]` = false` opt-out, which lets a
    /// plaintext send go out with MLS never initialized — no address has been
    /// derived at that point, so the frame carries the profile as its sender
    /// and the send emits
    /// [`crate::events::SecurityWarningCode::PlaintextSend`]. The default
    /// (`require_encryption = true`) fails such a send closed instead. Treat
    /// the profile as private if that opt-out is in use.
    pub profile: String,

    /// Transport configuration.
    pub transport: TransportConfig,

    /// DORS (Dynamic Offline Relay Switch) configuration.
    pub dors: DorsConfig,

    /// Relay management configuration: whether this device carries traffic
    /// for other people at all, and the battery floors under which it stops.
    pub relay: RelayConfig,

    /// How this device carries traffic for other people: how far frames
    /// travel, how many neighbors each is handed to, and the ceilings that
    /// keep forwarding from crowding the radio out.
    ///
    /// Whether to forward is [`Self::relay`]'s decision; this is the shape of
    /// it once the answer is yes.
    pub mesh_relay: MeshRelayConfig,

    /// Path selection configuration.
    pub path: PathConfig,

    /// Reliability layer configuration.
    pub reliability: ReliabilityConfig,

    /// Encryption configuration for automatic MLS handling.
    pub encryption: EncryptionConfig,

    /// Initial TTL (Time-To-Live) for messages.
    pub initial_ttl: u8,

    /// Mesh group messaging configuration.
    pub group: GroupConfig,

    /// Security configuration for transport and control-message hardening.
    pub security: SecurityConfig,
}

impl ProtocolConfig {
    /// Creates a new protocol configuration.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `app_id` - Application identifier
    /// * `profile` - Local profile selector (storage namespace, never on the wire)
    pub fn new(app_id: impl Into<String>, profile: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            app_id: app_id.into(),
            profile: profile.into(),
            transport: TransportConfig::default(),
            dors: DorsConfig::default(),
            relay: RelayConfig::default(),
            mesh_relay: MeshRelayConfig::default(),
            path: PathConfig::default(),
            reliability: ReliabilityConfig::default(),
            encryption: EncryptionConfig::default(),
            initial_ttl: DEFAULT_INITIAL_TTL,
            group: GroupConfig::default(),
            security: SecurityConfig::default(),
        }
    }

    /// Creates a builder for more granular configuration.
    pub fn builder(app_id: impl Into<String>, profile: impl Into<String>) -> ProtocolConfigBuilder {
        ProtocolConfigBuilder::new(app_id, profile)
    }

    /// Validates the configuration.
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// Returns `Ok(())` if valid, `Err` with a description of the problem if invalid.
    pub fn validate(&self) -> crate::Result<()> {
        // Both become storage keys — `app_id` and `profile` are the two inputs
        // to the account namespace — so hold them to the same length cap and
        // charset ban as every other identifier rather than only rejecting the
        // empty string. Going through the core constructors keeps one policy
        // instead of a second copy that can drift. Catching this here turns a
        // later failure deep inside a storage backend into one clear
        // configuration error.
        offline_protocol_core::AppId::new(self.app_id.as_str())
            .map_err(|e| crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(e.to_string()))?;

        offline_protocol_core::UserId::new(self.profile.as_str())
            .map_err(|e| crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(e.to_string()))?;

        if self.initial_ttl == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "initial_ttl must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if !self.transport.ble_enabled
            && !self.transport.wifi_direct_enabled
            && !self.transport.internet_enabled
            && !self.transport.reticulum_enabled
            && !self.transport.nostr_enabled
        {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "At least one transport must be enabled".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.ack.default_timeout_ms == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "ack.default_timeout_ms must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.ack.max_pending_acks == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "ack.max_pending_acks must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.retry.initial_delay_ms == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "retry.initial_delay_ms must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.retry.max_delay_ms == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "retry.max_delay_ms must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.retry.initial_delay_ms > self.reliability.retry.max_delay_ms {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "retry.initial_delay_ms must be <= retry.max_delay_ms".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.retry.outbox_max_lifetime_ms == 0
            || self.reliability.retry.outbox_max_lifetime_ms > i64::MAX as u64
        {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "retry.outbox_max_lifetime_ms must be in 1..=i64::MAX".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.retry.pending_message_max_lifetime_ms == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "retry.pending_message_max_lifetime_ms must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.retry.pending_message_max_lifetime_ms > i64::MAX as u64 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "retry.pending_message_max_lifetime_ms must be <= i64::MAX".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if !self.reliability.retry.backoff_multiplier.is_finite()
            || self.reliability.retry.backoff_multiplier < 1.0
        {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "retry.backoff_multiplier must be finite and >= 1.0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        // Checked outside the Bloom guard below, and that placement is the
        // whole point: these two are the *only* dedup fields the UniFFI
        // `DedupConfig` carries, so every constraint hidden behind
        // `use_bloom_filter` is unreachable from a binding caller. A zero here
        // is not a cosmetic problem — `Deduplicator` fails safe on the Bloom
        // parameters, but nothing fails safe on these. At
        // `max_tracked_messages == 0` the HashMap branch of `mark_seen` evicts
        // on every insert, so the map holds one id and duplicate suppression is
        // effectively off; `retention_time_secs == 0` expires every entry
        // immediately for the same net result.
        //
        // What this rejects is the *degenerate* value, and that is the whole of
        // the claim: a floor of 1 is not a floor on how well duplicates are
        // suppressed. `max_tracked_messages == 1` behaves indistinguishably
        // from `0`, and a two-second retention on a link whose retry backoff is
        // longer than that suppresses nothing either. Choosing a window wide
        // enough for the deployment is the application's call — the SDK refuses
        // only the values that cannot be a choice, because nothing downstream
        // spells them as a configuration error and the failure they produce
        // (silently re-delivered messages) does not look like a config bug.
        // Raising either floor to a policy minimum is a wider behavioural break
        // and would need its own decision.
        if self.reliability.dedup.max_tracked_messages == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "reliability.dedup.max_tracked_messages must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.dedup.retention_time_secs == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "reliability.dedup.retention_time_secs must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.reliability.dedup.use_bloom_filter {
            if self.reliability.dedup.bloom_filter_bits == 0 {
                return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                    "reliability.dedup.bloom_filter_bits must be greater than 0".to_string(),
                ));
            }

            if self.reliability.dedup.bloom_hash_count == 0 {
                return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                    "reliability.dedup.bloom_hash_count must be greater than 0".to_string(),
                ));
            }

            if self.reliability.dedup.bloom_filter_count == 0 {
                return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                    "reliability.dedup.bloom_filter_count must be greater than 0".to_string(),
                ));
            }

            if self.reliability.dedup.bloom_rotation_secs == 0 {
                return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                    "reliability.dedup.bloom_rotation_secs must be greater than 0".to_string(),
                ));
            }
        }

        if self.encryption.require_encryption && !self.encryption.enabled {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "encryption.require_encryption requires encryption.enabled=true".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_per_peer == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_per_peer must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global
            < self.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_per_peer
        {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global must be >= max_pending_per_peer"
                    .to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.encryption.pending_queue.pending_ttl_ms == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "encryption.pending_queue.pending_ttl_ms must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.group.max_group_members == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "group.max_group_members must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        // A fan-out of zero is not a cheaper forward, it is a silent drop: the
        // frame has already been admitted and recorded as seen, so no copy goes
        // out and this node's suppression entry stops it arriving again by
        // another path. Same argument as `bias_min_scale` below — declining to
        // carry other people's traffic is `relay.allow_relay`'s job, and it is
        // visible. The forwarding paths clamp with `.max(1)`; rejecting zero
        // here keeps that clamp an unreachable defensive floor instead of a
        // silent rewrite of what zero means.
        if self.mesh_relay.fanout == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.fanout must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        // The same argument as fan-out, for every other dial that can reach
        // zero. Each of these reads like a conservative setting and is in fact
        // an off switch that reports nothing: the failure is total, silent, and
        // indistinguishable from a quiet neighborhood, which is what makes
        // rejecting it at construction worth more than any runtime clamp.
        //
        // A hop ceiling of zero clamps every arriving budget to nothing, so
        // `prepare_hop` refuses the frame before it is ever queued. Both
        // ceilings are checked: the dense one applies only in a crowded room,
        // so a zero there fails exactly where the mesh is most needed and
        // nowhere else — the hardest version of this bug to reproduce.
        if self.mesh_relay.max_ttl == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.max_ttl must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.mesh_relay.dense_max_ttl == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.dense_max_ttl must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        // A queue that holds nothing refuses every admission: the length is
        // always at or over capacity, and eviction has no victim to find, so
        // each frame is rejected as queue-full. Nothing is forwarded and the
        // only trace is `refused_queue_full`.
        if self.mesh_relay.queue_capacity == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.queue_capacity must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        // The rate and burst dials feed token buckets that clamp their inputs
        // with `.max(0.0)`. That clamp makes a negative or NaN value safe in
        // the arithmetic sense and catastrophic in every other: the bucket
        // simply never yields a token, so forwarding stops for good with no
        // error and no counter. NaN matters on its own because `f32::max`
        // returns the *other* operand for it, so a NaN rate silently becomes
        // zero rather than propagating anywhere visible.
        //
        // Checked as a set: they are the same failure, and naming the field in
        // the message is what makes a rejected config actionable.
        for (name, value) in [
            ("rate_per_sec", self.mesh_relay.rate_per_sec),
            ("burst", self.mesh_relay.burst),
            ("peer_rate_per_sec", self.mesh_relay.peer_rate_per_sec),
            ("peer_burst", self.mesh_relay.peer_burst),
        ] {
            if !value.is_finite() || value <= 0.0 {
                return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(format!(
                    "mesh_relay.{name} must be finite and greater than 0"
                )));
            }
        }

        // Capability bias scales forwarding effort; it must never be able to
        // scale it to nothing. Zero would make a low-battery device stop
        // forwarding by the back door, which is the partition the bias design
        // exists to avoid — refusing to relay is `relay.allow_relay`'s job.
        if !self.mesh_relay.bias_min_scale.is_finite()
            || self.mesh_relay.bias_min_scale <= 0.0
            || self.mesh_relay.bias_min_scale > 1.0
        {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.bias_min_scale must be finite and in (0.0, 1.0]".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        // An inverted jitter window is not a narrow window, it is two separate
        // failures. `jitter_for` raises the effective maximum to meet the
        // minimum, so the span collapses to a single millisecond and every
        // neighbor picks essentially the same delay — losing the spread that
        // stops a crowded room transmitting on top of itself, which is the
        // whole reason the delay exists. And because the check below reads
        // `jitter_max`, an oversized `jitter_min` would slip past the overdue
        // cut-off entirely: a ten-minute minimum with the default maximum
        // validates clean and abandons every forward.
        if self.mesh_relay.jitter_min > self.mesh_relay.jitter_max {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(format!(
                "mesh_relay.jitter_min ({}ms) must not exceed mesh_relay.jitter_max ({}ms)",
                self.mesh_relay.jitter_min.as_millis(),
                self.mesh_relay.jitter_max.as_millis(),
            )));
        }

        // A forward is abandoned rather than sent once it sits
        // `RELAY_QUEUE_MAX_OVERDUE` past its due time, so the delay tunables
        // must not be able to reach that on their own. Checked at the density
        // the jitter span is configured for; the span also grows with neighbor
        // count, which is a runtime quantity this cannot see and a documented
        // ceiling of the mesh's venue-sized target rather than a config error.
        let worst_delay = self
            .mesh_relay
            .jitter_max
            .saturating_add(self.mesh_relay.bias_max_handicap);
        if worst_delay >= RELAY_QUEUE_MAX_OVERDUE {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(format!(
                "mesh_relay.jitter_max + mesh_relay.bias_max_handicap ({}ms) must stay under \
                 the {}ms overdue cut-off, or every biased forward is abandoned instead of sent",
                worst_delay.as_millis(),
                RELAY_QUEUE_MAX_OVERDUE.as_millis(),
            )));
        }

        if self.mesh_relay.activity_window.is_zero() {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.activity_window must be greater than zero".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.mesh_relay.activity_min_forwards == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.activity_min_forwards must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        if self.mesh_relay.activity_idle_windows == 0 {
            return Err(crate::Error::InvalidConfiguration(
                "mesh_relay.activity_idle_windows must be greater than 0".to_string(),
            ));
        }

        Ok(())
    }
}

/// Builder for ProtocolConfig with a fluent API.
pub struct ProtocolConfigBuilder {
    config: ProtocolConfig,
}

impl ProtocolConfigBuilder {
    /// Creates a new builder.
    pub fn new(app_id: impl Into<String>, profile: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            config: ProtocolConfig::new(app_id, profile),
        }
    }

    /// Configures transports.
    pub fn transport(mut self, config: TransportConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.transport = config;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables BLE transport.
    pub fn ble_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.transport.ble_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables Wi-Fi Direct transport.
    pub fn wifi_direct_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.transport.wifi_direct_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables Internet transport.
    pub fn internet_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.transport.internet_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables Nostr relay transport.
    pub fn nostr_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.transport.nostr_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables sealing of outgoing Nostr frames (default on).
    pub fn nostr_sealing_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.transport.nostr_sealing_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables username discovery publication and resolution
    /// (default **off**; see
    /// [`TransportConfig::nostr_username_discovery_enabled`]).
    pub fn nostr_username_discovery_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.transport.nostr_username_discovery_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables Nostr key-package publication and peer resolution
    /// (default on; see [`TransportConfig::nostr_cold_contact_enabled`]).
    pub fn nostr_cold_contact_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.transport.nostr_cold_contact_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Configures DORS (Dynamic Offline Relay Switch).
    pub fn dors(mut self, config: DorsConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.dors = config;
        self
    }

    /// Enables online-first mode (prefer Internet when available).
    pub fn online_first(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.dors.prefer_online = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Configures relay management.
    pub fn relay(mut self, config: RelayConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.relay = config;
        self
    }

    /// Configures how traffic is carried for other people.
    pub fn mesh_relay(mut self, config: MeshRelayConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.mesh_relay = config;
        self
    }

    /// Configures path selection.
    pub fn path(mut self, config: PathConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.path = config;
        self
    }

    /// Configures reliability layer.
    pub fn reliability(mut self, config: ReliabilityConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.reliability = config;
        self
    }

    /// Sets the initial TTL for messages.
    pub fn initial_ttl(mut self, ttl: u8) -> Self {
        self.config.initial_ttl = ttl;
        self
    }

    /// Configures encryption settings.
    pub fn encryption(mut self, config: EncryptionConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.encryption = config;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables automatic encryption.
    pub fn encryption_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.encryption.enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables automatic key exchange on peer discovery.
    pub fn auto_key_exchange(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.encryption.auto_key_exchange = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables storing pending messages for later encryption.
    pub fn store_pending_messages(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.encryption.store_pending = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Enables or disables strict encryption requirement.
    pub fn require_encryption(mut self, required: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.encryption.require_encryption = required;
        self
    }

    /// Configures pending encrypted message queue bounds and overflow behavior.
    pub fn pending_queue(mut self, config: PendingQueueConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.encryption.pending_queue = config;
        self
    }

    /// Configures group messaging settings.
    pub fn group(mut self, config: GroupConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.group = config;
        self
    }

    /// Sets the maximum number of members allowed in a single group.
    pub fn max_group_members(mut self, max: usize) -> Self {
        self.config.group.max_group_members = max;
        self
    }

    /// Sets whether groups should attempt relay server registration.
    pub fn group_relay_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.group.relay_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Sets whether relay-synced groups may send via a single relay broadcast
    /// instead of per-member fan-out. See
    /// [`GroupConfig::relay_broadcast_enabled`] — on by default, but only
    /// ever taken against a relay that advertised the `group_delivery_v3`
    /// capability, whose settled, address-space delivery report gives the
    /// broadcast a per-recipient delivery contract.
    pub fn group_relay_broadcast_enabled(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.group.relay_broadcast_enabled = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Sets whether unauthorized MLS membership commits are refused rather
    /// than applied-and-reported. See
    /// [`GroupConfig::enforce_admin_commits`] — off by default, and enabling
    /// it risks permanently forking members whose admin overlay disagrees.
    pub fn group_enforce_admin_commits(mut self, enabled: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.group.enforce_admin_commits = enabled;
        self
    }

    /// Configures security settings.
    pub fn security(mut self, config: SecurityConfig) -> Self {
        self.config.security = config;
        self
    }

    /// Sets whether transport identity is required for control messages.
    pub fn require_transport_identity(mut self, required: bool) -> Self {
        self.config.security.require_transport_identity = required;
        self
    }

    /// Builds and validates the configuration.
    ///
    /// # Returns
    ///
    /// Returns `Ok(ProtocolConfig)` if valid, `Err` otherwise.
    pub fn build(self) -> crate::Result<ProtocolConfig> {
        self.config.validate()?;
        Ok(self.config)
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_config_creation() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        assert_eq!(config.app_id, "test-app");
        assert_eq!(config.profile, "user123");
        assert_eq!(config.initial_ttl, 8);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_success() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_empty_app_id() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::new("", "user123");
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_empty_user_id() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "");
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn config_validation_enforces_the_id_length_cap() {
        // An unbounded id becomes an unbounded storage key and an unbounded
        // wire field; the cap is the same one the core newtypes apply.
        let at_cap = "a".repeat(offline_protocol_core::MAX_ID_LEN);
        let over_cap = "a".repeat(offline_protocol_core::MAX_ID_LEN + 1);

        assert!(ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", &at_cap).validate().is_ok());
        assert!(ProtocolConfig::new(&at_cap, "user123").validate().is_ok());
        assert!(ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", &over_cap)
            .validate()
            .is_err());
        assert!(ProtocolConfig::new(&over_cap, "user123")
            .validate()
            .is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn config_validation_enforces_the_id_charset() {
        // Path separators and the KV namespace separator would let an id
        // escape or collide with another account's storage keys.
        for hostile in ["a/b", "a\\b", "a:b", ".", "..", "a\u{0}b", "a\nb"] {
            assert!(
                ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", hostile).validate().is_err(),
                "user_id {hostile:?} must be rejected"
            );
            assert!(
                ProtocolConfig::new(hostile, "user123").validate().is_err(),
                "app_id {hostile:?} must be rejected"
            );
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn config_validation_accepts_an_address_shaped_id() {
        // The self-certifying address format must pass the id policy: the
        // bech32m charset is plain lowercase alphanumerics.
        let address = "off1qysluvwl5922yctzd0u9gpr06gn3k7ldfvgtwgvn";
        assert!(ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", address).validate().is_ok());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_zero_ttl() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.initial_ttl = 0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_no_transports() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.transport.ble_enabled = false;
        config.transport.wifi_direct_enabled = false;
        config.transport.internet_enabled = false;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_retry_initial_delay_must_be_positive() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.reliability.retry.initial_delay_ms = 0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_retry_delay_bounds() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.reliability.retry.initial_delay_ms = 2000;
        config.reliability.retry.max_delay_ms = 1000;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_retry_backoff_multiplier_bounds() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.reliability.retry.backoff_multiplier = 0.5;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_rejects_zero_bloom_parameters() {
        let mutations: [fn(&mut DeduplicatorConfig); 4] = [
            |dedup: &mut DeduplicatorConfig| dedup.bloom_filter_bits = 0,
            |dedup: &mut DeduplicatorConfig| dedup.bloom_hash_count = 0,
            |dedup: &mut DeduplicatorConfig| dedup.bloom_filter_count = 0,
            |dedup: &mut DeduplicatorConfig| dedup.bloom_rotation_secs = 0,
        ];

        for mutate in mutations {
            let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
            config.reliability.dedup.use_bloom_filter = true;
            mutate(&mut config.reliability.dedup);
            assert!(config.validate().is_err());
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_builder() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::builder("test-app", "user123")
            .ble_enabled(true)
            .wifi_direct_enabled(false)
            .online_first(true)
            .initial_ttl(10)
            .build()
            .unwrap();

        assert_eq!(config.app_id, "test-app");
        assert!(config.transport.ble_enabled);
        assert!(!config.transport.wifi_direct_enabled);
        assert!(config.dors.prefer_online);
        assert_eq!(config.initial_ttl, 10);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_transport_config_default() {
        let transport = TransportConfig::default();
        assert!(transport.ble_enabled);
        assert!(transport.wifi_direct_enabled);
        assert!(transport.internet_enabled);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_reliability_config_default() {
        let reliability = ReliabilityConfig::default();
        assert_eq!(reliability.ack.default_timeout_ms, 10000);
        assert_eq!(reliability.retry.max_retries, 10);
        // 7 days — must match the app-layer presence-flush window and the
        // fallback values hardcoded in the RN native bridges
        // (OfflineProtocolModule.kt / OfflineProtocolModule.swift).
        assert_eq!(reliability.retry.outbox_max_lifetime_ms, 604_800_000);
        // 5 min ceiling — also mirrored by the RN bridge fallbacks.
        assert_eq!(reliability.retry.max_delay_ms, 300_000);
        assert_eq!(reliability.dedup.max_tracked_messages, 1000);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_encryption_config_default() {
        let encryption = EncryptionConfig::default();
        assert!(encryption.enabled);
        assert!(encryption.auto_key_exchange);
        assert!(encryption.store_pending);
        // SEC-M3: encryption is required by default; plaintext is an
        // explicit opt-out, never a silent fallback.
        assert!(encryption.require_encryption);
        assert_eq!(encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_per_peer, 64);
        assert_eq!(encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global, 4096);
        assert_eq!(
            encryption.pending_queue.pending_ttl_ms,
            DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS
        );
        assert_eq!(
            encryption.pending_queue.overflow_policy,
            OverflowPolicy::DropOldest
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_encryption_config_disabled() {
        let encryption = EncryptionConfig::disabled();
        assert!(!encryption.enabled);
        assert!(!encryption.auto_key_exchange);
        assert!(!encryption.store_pending);
        assert!(!encryption.require_encryption);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_builder_with_encryption() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::builder("test-app", "user123")
            .encryption_enabled(true)
            .auto_key_exchange(true)
            .store_pending_messages(false)
            .require_encryption(true)
            .pending_queue(PendingQueueConfig {
                max_pending_per_peer: 32,
                max_pending_global: 512,
                pending_ttl_ms: 30_000,
                overflow_policy: OverflowPolicy::DropNewest,
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .build()
            .unwrap();

        assert!(config.encryption.enabled);
        assert!(config.encryption.auto_key_exchange);
        assert!(!config.encryption.store_pending);
        assert!(config.encryption.require_encryption);
        assert_eq!(config.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_per_peer, 32);
        assert_eq!(config.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global, 512);
        assert_eq!(config.encryption.pending_queue.pending_ttl_ms, 30_000);
        assert_eq!(
            config.encryption.pending_queue.overflow_policy,
            OverflowPolicy::DropNewest
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_require_encryption_requires_enabled() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.encryption.enabled = false;
        config.encryption.require_encryption = true;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_pending_queue_requires_positive_limits() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_per_peer = 0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());

        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global = 0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());

        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.encryption.pending_queue.pending_ttl_ms = 0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_pending_queue_global_must_cover_per_peer() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_per_peer = 100;
        config.encryption.pending_queue.max_pending_global = 99;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_group_config_default() {
        let group = GroupConfig::default();
        assert_eq!(group.max_group_members, 256);
        // Registration and broadcast both default on. Registration must stay
        // on because invite links resolve against the relay group registry.
        // The broadcast default is safe because the flag alone never selects
        // the path: it is additionally gated on the relay advertising the
        // `group_delivery_v3` capability, whose settled, address-space
        // delivery report is what gives the broadcast a per-recipient
        // delivery contract.
        assert!(group.relay_enabled);
        assert!(group.relay_broadcast_enabled);
        // Commit enforcement must stay OFF by default. On, a member whose
        // admin overlay merely lagged would refuse a legitimate commit and
        // fork itself out of a healthy group with no attacker involved —
        // unrecoverable without an app-level re-invite. Flipping this default
        // is a fleet-wide partition decision, not a hardening tweak.
        assert!(!group.enforce_admin_commits);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_group_enforce_admin_commits_builder_opt_in() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::builder("test-app", "user123")
            .group_enforce_admin_commits(true)
            .build()
            .unwrap();
        assert!(config.group.enforce_admin_commits);
        assert!(
            config.group.relay_enabled && config.group.relay_broadcast_enabled,
            "opting into enforcement must not disturb the relay flags"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_group_relay_broadcast_builder_opt_out() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::builder("test-app", "user123")
            .group_relay_broadcast_enabled(false)
            .build()
            .unwrap();
        assert!(!config.group.relay_broadcast_enabled);
        assert!(
            config.group.relay_enabled,
            "opting out of the broadcast must not disturb registration"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_has_default_group_config() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        assert_eq!(config.group.max_group_members, 256);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_zero_max_group_members() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.group.max_group_members = 0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_positive_max_group_members() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.group.max_group_members = 1;
        assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
    }

    /// A handicap large enough to outrun the overdue cut-off must be refused.
    ///
    /// Past that point a biased forward is not late, it is *abandoned* on
    /// release — so the tunable that exists to cost redundancy would be costing
    /// delivery, silently, on exactly the devices it is meant to spare.
    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_rejects_a_handicap_past_the_overdue_cutoff() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.mesh_relay.bias_max_handicap = RELAY_QUEUE_MAX_OVERDUE;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());

        // The jitter window counts toward the same budget, so a handicap that
        // fits on its own can still be refused alongside a wide window.
        config.mesh_relay.bias_max_handicap = std::time::Duration::from_millis(400);
        config.mesh_relay.jitter_max = RELAY_QUEUE_MAX_OVERDUE;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());

        // And the defaults must sit comfortably inside it.
        let defaults = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        assert!(defaults.validate().is_ok());
    }

    /// Bias must never be configurable into an off switch.
    ///
    /// A scale of zero would stop a low-battery device forwarding by the back
    /// door, which is the partition the whole bias design exists to avoid —
    /// declining to relay is `relay.allow_relay`'s job, and it is visible.
    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_rejects_a_bias_scale_that_silences_forwarding() {
        for scale in [0.0, -0.5, 1.5, f32::NAN, f32::INFINITY] {
            let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
            config.mesh_relay.bias_min_scale = scale;
            assert!(
                config.validate().is_err(),
                "bias_min_scale of {scale} must be refused",
            );
        }

        // 1.0 is the documented way to disable bias entirely, and must stay
        // accepted.
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.mesh_relay.bias_min_scale = 1.0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
    }

    /// A fan-out of zero must be refused rather than clamped.
    ///
    /// It reads like an off switch and is not one: the frame is already
    /// admitted and recorded as seen by the time fan-out is chosen, so zero
    /// targets is a silent drop that also suppresses the copy arriving by
    /// another path. The forwarding paths clamp it to one; this keeps that
    /// clamp a defensive floor rather than a quiet reinterpretation.
    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_rejects_a_fanout_of_zero() {
        let mut config = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        config.mesh_relay.fanout = 0;
        assert!(config.validate().is_err());

        // One is a real setting — forward to a single neighbor — and must stay
        // accepted, or the check has swallowed the narrowest working fan-out.
        config.mesh_relay.fanout = 1;
        assert!(config.validate().is_ok());
    }

    /// Every hop-budget, queue and rate dial that can silently switch
    /// forwarding off must be refused, not clamped.
    ///
    /// These share one failure and it is the worst kind: the device keeps
    /// running, reports no error, and carries nothing. Each value below is the
    /// one a caller would reach for meaning "be conservative", so leaving them
    /// legal makes an off switch out of a dial nobody thinks is one.
    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_rejects_dials_that_silently_stop_forwarding() {
        // Both hop ceilings: zero clamps every arriving budget to nothing, so
        // the frame is refused before it can be queued. The dense one is
        // checked separately because it only bites in a crowded room.
        let mut zero_ttl = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        zero_ttl.mesh_relay.max_ttl = 0;
        assert!(zero_ttl.validate().is_err());

        let mut zero_dense_ttl = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        zero_dense_ttl.mesh_relay.dense_max_ttl = 0;
        assert!(zero_dense_ttl.validate().is_err());

        // A queue that holds nothing rejects every admission as queue-full.
        let mut zero_queue = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        zero_queue.mesh_relay.queue_capacity = 0;
        assert!(zero_queue.validate().is_err());

        // The token buckets clamp their inputs with `.max(0.0)`, which turns
        // each of these into a bucket that never yields a token. NaN is listed
        // on its own because `f32::max` returns the other operand for it, so it
        // arrives as zero rather than failing anywhere visible, and negatives
        // are what a bridge's own clamp hands over for validation here.
        for bad in [0.0_f32, -1.0, f32::NAN, f32::INFINITY] {
            let mut rate = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
            rate.mesh_relay.rate_per_sec = bad;
            assert!(
                rate.validate().is_err(),
                "rate_per_sec of {bad} must be refused",
            );

            let mut burst = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
            burst.mesh_relay.burst = bad;
            assert!(burst.validate().is_err(), "burst of {bad} must be refused");

            let mut peer_rate = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
            peer_rate.mesh_relay.peer_rate_per_sec = bad;
            assert!(
                peer_rate.validate().is_err(),
                "peer_rate_per_sec of {bad} must be refused",
            );

            let mut peer_burst = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
            peer_burst.mesh_relay.peer_burst = bad;
            assert!(
                peer_burst.validate().is_err(),
                "peer_burst of {bad} must be refused",
            );
        }

        // The narrowest working settings must stay accepted, or the checks have
        // swallowed real configurations along with the broken ones.
        let mut minimal = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        minimal.mesh_relay.max_ttl = 1;
        minimal.mesh_relay.dense_max_ttl = 1;
        minimal.mesh_relay.queue_capacity = 1;
        minimal.mesh_relay.rate_per_sec = 0.5;
        minimal.mesh_relay.burst = 1.0;
        minimal.mesh_relay.peer_rate_per_sec = 0.5;
        minimal.mesh_relay.peer_burst = 1.0;
        assert!(minimal.validate().is_ok());
    }

    /// An inverted jitter window must be refused.
    ///
    /// Two failures in one, which is why the equal case has to stay legal to
    /// prove the check is an ordering check and not a ban on narrow windows.
    /// `jitter_for` raises the effective maximum to meet the minimum, so the
    /// span collapses to a millisecond and neighbors stop separating in time;
    /// and since the overdue check reads `jitter_max`, an oversized minimum
    /// would otherwise validate clean and abandon every forward.
    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_rejects_an_inverted_jitter_window() {
        let mut inverted = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        inverted.mesh_relay.jitter_min = std::time::Duration::from_millis(300);
        inverted.mesh_relay.jitter_max = std::time::Duration::from_millis(200);
        assert!(inverted.validate().is_err());

        // The case the overdue check alone would have missed: a minimum past
        // the 5s cut-off, with the maximum left at its default.
        let mut oversized_min = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        oversized_min.mesh_relay.jitter_min = std::time::Duration::from_secs(600);
        assert!(oversized_min.validate().is_err());

        // Equal is a fixed delay, not an inversion, and stays accepted.
        let mut equal = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        equal.mesh_relay.jitter_min = std::time::Duration::from_millis(200);
        equal.mesh_relay.jitter_max = std::time::Duration::from_millis(200);
        assert!(equal.validate().is_ok());
    }

    /// The activity window's tunables decide whether the relay standing can be
    /// reported at all; a zero in any of them stalls or divides it.
    #[test]
    fn test_config_validation_rejects_zero_activity_tunables() {
        let mut zero_window = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        zero_window.mesh_relay.activity_window = std::time::Duration::ZERO;
        assert!(zero_window.validate().is_err());

        let mut zero_forwards = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        zero_forwards.mesh_relay.activity_min_forwards = 0;
        assert!(zero_forwards.validate().is_err());

        let mut zero_idle = ProtocolConfig::new("test-app", "user123");
        zero_idle.mesh_relay.activity_idle_windows = 0;
        assert!(zero_idle.validate().is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_builder_max_group_members() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::builder("test-app", "user123")
            .max_group_members(50)
            .build()
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(config.group.max_group_members, 50);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_builder_group_config() {
        let config = ProtocolConfig::builder("test-app", "user123")
            .group(GroupConfig {
                max_group_members: 128,
                ..Default::default()
            })
            .build()
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(config.group.max_group_members, 128);
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_config_builder_zero_max_group_members_rejected() {
        let result = ProtocolConfig::builder("test-app", "user123")
            .max_group_members(0)
            .build();
        assert!(result.is_err());
    }

    /// The RN bridges never reach [`DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS`]: each layer
    /// substitutes its own fallback when the app omits `pendingTtlMs`, and the
    /// JS layer always materializes the field before it crosses the bridge. So
    /// the Rust default is only the RN default for as long as these three
    /// literals agree with it — they silently drifted to the pre-deferred-ACK
    /// 2-minute window once already, which is the window this constant was
    /// raised to replace.
    ///
    /// The sibling guard for the ACK/retry fallbacks lives in
    /// `offline-protocol-reliability`; this one has to live here because that
    /// crate cannot depend on this one.
    #[test]
    fn rn_bridge_pending_ttl_fallbacks_match_rust_default() {
        let rn_root =
            std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../../bindings/react-native");

        // Each entry is (path, the fallback that file must contain). The
        // pattern names the field it guards, not just the literal, so deleting
        // the fallback cannot be masked by the same number appearing on some
        // other line. Matched against the source with whitespace squeezed, so a
        // line wrap between the field and its `?:`/`??` doesn't hide it.
        let expected = [
            (
                rn_root.join("src/index.ts"),
                format!("pendingTtlMs ?? {DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS}"),
            ),
            (
                rn_root.join("android/src/main/java/com/offlineprotocol/ProtocolConfigParser.kt"),
                format!(
                    "\"pending_ttl_ms\") ?: {}L",
                    format_underscored(DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS)
                ),
            ),
            (
                rn_root.join("ios/EncryptionConfigReader.swift"),
                format!(
                    "\"pending_ttl_ms\") ?? {}",
                    format_underscored(DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS)
                ),
            ),
        ];

        // The guard only applies in the repo checkout; skip when the bindings
        // tree isn't present (e.g. a vendored crate). Read every file up front
        // so a moved or renamed bridge skips the whole guard rather than
        // silently dropping the checks that come after it.
        let Some(sources) = expected
            .iter()
            .map(|(path, _)| std::fs::read_to_string(path).ok())
            .collect::<Option<Vec<_>>>()
        else {
            eprintln!("bindings tree not present, skipping RN pending-TTL drift check");
            return;
        };

        for ((path, fallback), source) in expected.iter().zip(&sources) {
            let squeezed = source.split_whitespace().collect::<Vec<_>>().join(" ");
            assert!(
                squeezed.contains(fallback.as_str()),
                "RN pending-queue TTL fallback drifted from DEFAULT_PENDING_TTL_MS: \
                 expected `{fallback}` in {}",
                path.display()
            );
        }
    }

    /// Drift guard: every public surface that documents
    /// [`EncryptionConfig::crypto_recovery_enabled`] must state that the re-key
    /// trigger is unauthenticated, and must not carry the retired claim that it
    /// re-keys only on genuine peer traffic.
    ///
    /// This is guarded because it has already drifted once. The trigger was
    /// hardened and honestly documented in-code, but that pass corrected only
    /// `session.rs` and the internal architecture notes — six integrator-facing
    /// surfaces kept promising that an injected frame could never drive a
    /// re-key, and framed the residual as replay-only, while
    /// `test_forged_frame_reaches_session_desync_without_any_key_material` in
    /// `offline-protocol-mls` proved the opposite in the same workspace. Nothing
    /// else fails when these lag: the code stays correct and the docs quietly
    /// promise a guarantee it does not make, which is the worst shape for a
    /// security claim to fail in.
    #[test]
    fn crypto_recovery_docs_state_the_unauthenticated_trigger() {
        let root = std::path::Path::new(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR")).join("../..");
        let surfaces = [
            "crates/offline-protocol/src/config.rs",
            "crates/offline-protocol-uniffi/src/offline_protocol.udl",
            "bindings/react-native/src/types.ts",
            "docs/mls-integration.md",
            "docs/configuration.md",
            "docs/api-reference.md",
        ];

        // Retired claims. Each was false for the same reason: an MLS epoch is
        // read during framing validation, before the sender is authenticated.
        // Split across `concat!` so the banned phrases never appear verbatim in
        // this file — belt-and-braces on top of the `#[cfg(test)]` truncation
        // below, so the guard survives either defense being refactored away.
        let retired = [
            concat!("never re-keys on ", "injected garbage"),
            concat!("injected garbage ", "can't drive"),
            concat!("injecting ", "garbage"),
        ];

        // The marker every surface must carry, concat-split for the inverse
        // reason: written verbatim, this needle alone would satisfy its own
        // check for config.rs no matter what the rustdoc says.
        let marker = concat!("re-key trigger is ", "unauthenticated");

        for surface in surfaces {
            let path = root.join(surface);
            let source = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
                .unwrap_or_else(|e| panic!("cannot read {}: {e}", path.display()));
            // Scan only up to the first `#[cfg(test)]` token — for config.rs,
            // the non-test source. This test necessarily names the marker (doc
            // comment, panic message), so scanning its own module would satisfy
            // the marker check for the file it lives in even after the rustdoc
            // dropped it. The other surfaces don't contain the token and pass
            // through whole.
            let scanned = source.split("#[cfg(test)]").next().unwrap_or(&source);
            // Squeezed so a line wrap inside a phrase cannot hide it, and
            // lowercased so a sentence-initial capital cannot either. Standalone
            // comment/markup continuation tokens (`///`, `//`, `*`, `>`) are
            // dropped, because these six surfaces wrap prose in four different
            // comment syntaxes and a reflow would otherwise wedge one into the
            // middle of a phrase — a guard that fails on `cargo fmt` teaches
            // people to delete it.
            let squeezed = scanned
                .split_whitespace()
                .filter(|tok| !tok.chars().all(|c| matches!(c, '/' | '*' | '>')))
                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
                .join(" ")
                .to_lowercase();

            for claim in retired {
                assert!(
                    !squeezed.contains(claim),
                    "{surface} carries the retired claim `{claim}`. The re-key \
                     trigger is reachable by anyone who can inject a frame — see \
                     test_forged_frame_reaches_session_desync_without_any_key_material"
                );
            }

            assert!(
                squeezed.contains(marker),
                "{surface} documents crypto_recovery_enabled but no longer states \
                 that the re-key trigger is unauthenticated. Say so plainly, or an \
                 integrator will read a sustained SESSION_REKEY_TRIGGERED rate as a \
                 bug rather than as the injection signal it exists to surface."
            );
        }
    }

    /// Renders `1800000` as `1_800_000`, the form Kotlin and Swift use.
    fn format_underscored(value: u64) -> String {
        let digits = value.to_string();
        let mut out = String::new();
        for (i, c) in digits.chars().enumerate() {
            if i > 0 && (digits.len() - i) % 3 == 0 {
                out.push('_');
            }
            out.push(c);
        }
        out
    }
}