Expand description
§ms-kile-fast (pre-alpha)
RFC 6113 FAST (Flexible Authentication Secure Tunneling) armor for
Kerberos AS-REQ / TGS-REQ. Wraps the inner request inside a
PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST PA-DATA element with an armor key derived from
either a machine-account TGT or (planned) an anonymous-PKINIT TGT
(RFC 8062, via ms-pkca).
STATUS: 0.1.0-dev — the KRB-FX-CF2 (RFC 6113 §5.1) primitive and its
PRF+/PRF/DK dependencies are fully wired against RFC 3961 §A test vectors
(see nfold::tests). The outer PA-FX-FAST-REQUEST envelope is emitted
with a structurally-correct DER TLV skeleton; the EncryptedData /
Checksum fields are documented placeholders (see
FastArmor::wrap_as_req). Anon-PKINIT-sourced armor keys return
Error::AnonPkinitStub until the ms-pkca network layer lands.
§What this crate is for
FAST is the pre-req for Kerberos armoring against pre-auth abuse
(AS-REP roasting, ASREQ-observer replay, weak-etype negotiation). A KDC
that requires FAST rejects any unarmored AS-REQ with
KDC_ERR_PREAUTH_FAILED / KDC_ERR_POLICY. This crate produces the
armored envelope + the derived armor key that the caller then feeds to
its Kerberos etype layer to encrypt the inner KrbFastReq.
§Etype support
Only aes256-cts-hmac-sha1-96 (etype 18) is wired — the modern Windows
default. Others are one-line additions (see prf for the pattern).
§Minimal (compile-only) example
use ms_kile_fast::{ArmorSource, FastArmor};
let armor = FastArmor::from_source(ArmorSource::MachineTgt {
ticket: vec![/* opaque TGT bytes */ 0xDE],
session_key: [0u8; 32].to_vec(), // 32-byte AES-256 session key
}).unwrap();
let inner_as_req: &[u8] = b"\x6a\x00"; // placeholder inner AS-REQ
let per_req_subkey = [1u8; 32];
let armored = armor.wrap_as_req(inner_as_req, &per_req_subkey).unwrap();
// send `armored` to the KDC …Re-exports§
pub use armor::ArmorSource;pub use armor::FastArmor;pub use error::Error;pub use error::Result;