mnemo_engine/crypto.rs
1//! Cryptography layer for Mnemo (Phase 4 of the build plan).
2//!
3//! Mnemo uses a **two-tier key hierarchy**:
4//!
5//! ```text
6//! passphrase ──Argon2id──▶ KEK (key-encryption-key)
7//! │ AES-256-GCM
8//! ▼
9//! DEK (data-encryption-key, random 256-bit)
10//! │ AES-256-GCM, per-page
11//! ▼
12//! encrypted pages on disk
13//! ```
14//!
15//! The DEK encrypts every page. The KEK only ever encrypts ("wraps") the DEK.
16//! This is what makes `rekey` cheap: changing the passphrase re-derives the KEK
17//! and re-wraps the DEK — the pages themselves never need re-encryption.
18//!
19//! Every page gets a 96-bit nonce minted at write time from a per-session
20//! random prefix plus a per-session monotonic counter (SEC-1). The random
21//! prefix is drawn fresh when a `Mnemo` handle opens the file — it never
22//! touches the disk — and the counter resets to zero in the same step.
23//! Together they make an AES-GCM nonce reuse infeasible across the sessions
24//! that could ever share one DEK, including the "two forks of the same file
25//! after a backup" case that an on-disk `write_counter`-based scheme leaks.
26
27use aes_gcm::aead::{Aead, AeadInPlace, KeyInit, Payload};
28use aes_gcm::{Aes256Gcm, Key, Nonce};
29use argon2::{Algorithm, Argon2, Params, Version};
30use zeroize::Zeroizing;
31
32use crate::error::{MnemoError, Result};
33
34/// Length of a symmetric key in bytes (256-bit).
35pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
36/// Length of an AES-GCM nonce in bytes (96-bit).
37pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = 12;
38/// Length of an AES-GCM authentication tag in bytes.
39pub const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
40/// Length of the Argon2 salt in bytes.
41pub const SALT_LEN: usize = 16;
42
43/// Argon2id cost parameters. Stored (unencrypted) in the file header so the
44/// KEK can be re-derived on open.
45#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
46pub struct KdfParams {
47 /// Memory cost in KiB.
48 pub m_cost: u32,
49 /// Time cost (number of iterations).
50 pub t_cost: u32,
51 /// Parallelism (lanes).
52 pub p_cost: u32,
53}
54
55impl KdfParams {
56 /// Sensible interactive-use defaults (~19 MiB, 2 passes).
57 pub fn secure() -> Self {
58 Self {
59 m_cost: 19_456,
60 t_cost: 2,
61 p_cost: 1,
62 }
63 }
64
65 /// PERF-1 step 7 (R-004.5): the Argon2id floor (8 KiB, one pass), for
66 /// databases unlocked by a raw random 256-bit key
67 /// (`Mnemo::create_with_key`). A uniformly random key has full entropy
68 /// already, so stretching it buys nothing; these are recorded in the
69 /// header so the normal open path runs in microseconds. **Never** use
70 /// them with a human passphrase.
71 pub fn raw_key() -> Self {
72 Self {
73 m_cost: 8,
74 t_cost: 1,
75 p_cost: 1,
76 }
77 }
78
79 /// Deliberately weak parameters — **only** for fast unit tests.
80 #[doc(hidden)]
81 pub fn fast() -> Self {
82 Self {
83 m_cost: 512,
84 t_cost: 1,
85 p_cost: 1,
86 }
87 }
88}
89
90impl Default for KdfParams {
91 fn default() -> Self {
92 Self::secure()
93 }
94}
95
96/// 12.3 (the keys note, section 1): the memory cost below which parameters
97/// are the raw-key kind. [`KdfParams::raw_key`] is below it, and
98/// [`KdfParams::fast`] sits exactly on it, so the tests' parameters stay
99/// allowed with a passphrase.
100const PASSPHRASE_FLOOR_M_COST: u32 = 512;
101
102impl KdfParams {
103 /// 12.3: the parameters a passphrase gets when a file had `self`: for
104 /// each cost, the larger of `self`'s and [`KdfParams::secure`]'s. Every
105 /// surface that rekeys to a passphrase uses it, so a passphrase never
106 /// lands on weaker parameters than a file already had, nor below
107 /// `secure()`.
108 pub fn for_passphrase(self) -> Self {
109 let s = Self::secure();
110 Self {
111 m_cost: self.m_cost.max(s.m_cost),
112 t_cost: self.t_cost.max(s.t_cost),
113 p_cost: self.p_cost.max(s.p_cost),
114 }
115 }
116
117 /// 12.3: whether these are raw-key parameters, too light for a human
118 /// passphrase ([`KdfParams::raw_key`] is; [`KdfParams::fast`] isn't).
119 /// The engine refuses a passphrase with them, and a file a passphrase
120 /// opens with them is reported.
121 pub fn below_passphrase_floor(&self) -> bool {
122 self.m_cost < PASSPHRASE_FLOOR_M_COST
123 }
124
125 /// 12.3: at or above the floor but below [`KdfParams::secure`]'s memory
126 /// cost: test-grade parameters, such as [`KdfParams::fast`].
127 pub fn is_test_grade(&self) -> bool {
128 !self.below_passphrase_floor() && self.m_cost < Self::secure().m_cost
129 }
130}
131
132/// 12.3: a rekey's hook, given the new salt before anything is written.
133pub(crate) type SaltHook<'a> = dyn FnMut(&[u8; SALT_LEN]) -> Result<()> + 'a;
134
135/// 12.3: what kind of secret a caller handed the engine. A passphrase is a
136/// person's; a key is a uniformly random 256-bit value a machine made.
137#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
138pub enum SecretKind {
139 /// A passphrase a person chose.
140 Passphrase,
141 /// A raw 256-bit key.
142 Key,
143}
144
145/// 12.3 (the keys note, section 1, rule 2): refuse a passphrase with
146/// raw-key parameters. Called where every create and rekey path meets.
147pub(crate) fn check_kdf_for(kind: SecretKind, kdf: KdfParams) -> Result<()> {
148 if kind == SecretKind::Passphrase && kdf.below_passphrase_floor() {
149 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
150 "these KDF parameters ({} KiB, {} pass) are for a raw 256-bit key, not a \
151 passphrase; use create_with_key or rekey_with_key for a key, or \
152 KdfParams::secure() for a passphrase",
153 kdf.m_cost, kdf.t_cost
154 )));
155 }
156 Ok(())
157}
158
159/// Derive the key-encryption-key (KEK) from a passphrase using Argon2id.
160pub fn derive_kek(
161 passphrase: &[u8],
162 salt: &[u8],
163 params: KdfParams,
164) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; KEY_LEN]>> {
165 let p = Params::new(params.m_cost, params.t_cost, params.p_cost, Some(KEY_LEN))
166 .map_err(|e| MnemoError::Kdf(e.to_string()))?;
167 let argon = Argon2::new(Algorithm::Argon2id, Version::V0x13, p);
168 let mut key = Zeroizing::new([0u8; KEY_LEN]);
169 argon
170 .hash_password_into(passphrase, salt, &mut key[..])
171 .map_err(|e| MnemoError::Kdf(e.to_string()))?;
172 Ok(key)
173}
174
175fn cipher(key: &[u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Aes256Gcm {
176 Aes256Gcm::new(Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(key))
177}
178
179/// PERF-2 (v0.19.0): one AES-256-GCM instance for many decrypts (a batch of
180/// pages), so the key schedule runs once, not per page. It's `Sync`, so
181/// scoped threads can share it.
182pub(crate) fn page_cipher(key: &[u8; KEY_LEN]) -> Aes256Gcm {
183 cipher(key)
184}
185
186/// PERF-2 (v0.19.0): decrypt one sealed page where it lies. `buf` holds
187/// the ciphertext and becomes the plaintext; `tag` is the 16 bytes after
188/// it. Nothing is allocated. On failure `buf` is left as it was.
189pub(crate) fn aead_decrypt_in_place(
190 cipher: &Aes256Gcm,
191 nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
192 aad: &[u8],
193 buf: &mut [u8],
194 tag: &[u8],
195) -> Result<()> {
196 cipher
197 .decrypt_in_place_detached(
198 Nonce::from_slice(nonce),
199 aad,
200 buf,
201 aes_gcm::Tag::from_slice(tag),
202 )
203 .map_err(|_| MnemoError::Crypto("authentication failed".into()))
204}
205
206/// AES-256-GCM encrypt with **Associated Authenticated Data**. The AAD is not
207/// part of the ciphertext but is bound into the authentication tag; decryption
208/// fails unless the caller supplies the same AAD. Output is
209/// `ciphertext || 16-byte tag`.
210///
211/// Pass `&[]` to encrypt without AAD — this matches the format before v6, used
212/// for wrapping the DEK and for v4/v5 page encryption. From v6 onwards, page
213/// encryption passes `page_no.to_le_bytes()` as AAD so an attacker can't
214/// transplant a valid encrypted page to a different page slot — the
215/// authentication tag binds the page image to its home page number.
216pub fn aead_encrypt(
217 key: &[u8; KEY_LEN],
218 nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
219 plaintext: &[u8],
220 aad: &[u8],
221) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
222 cipher(key)
223 .encrypt(
224 Nonce::from_slice(nonce),
225 Payload {
226 msg: plaintext,
227 aad,
228 },
229 )
230 .map_err(|e| MnemoError::Crypto(e.to_string()))
231}
232
233/// AES-256-GCM decrypt with AAD. Input must be `ciphertext || 16-byte tag`.
234/// Returns an error if authentication fails — including when the supplied
235/// AAD doesn't match what was used during encryption.
236pub fn aead_decrypt(
237 key: &[u8; KEY_LEN],
238 nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
239 ciphertext: &[u8],
240 aad: &[u8],
241) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
242 cipher(key)
243 .decrypt(
244 Nonce::from_slice(nonce),
245 Payload {
246 msg: ciphertext,
247 aad,
248 },
249 )
250 .map_err(|_| MnemoError::Crypto("authentication failed".into()))
251}
252
253/// Generate a fresh random 256-bit data-encryption-key.
254pub fn random_dek() -> Zeroizing<[u8; KEY_LEN]> {
255 use rand::RngCore;
256 let mut dek = Zeroizing::new([0u8; KEY_LEN]);
257 rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut dek[..]);
258 dek
259}
260
261/// Generate a random Argon2 salt.
262pub fn random_salt() -> [u8; SALT_LEN] {
263 use rand::RngCore;
264 let mut salt = [0u8; SALT_LEN];
265 rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut salt);
266 salt
267}
268
269/// Generate a random nonce (used for wrapping the DEK).
270pub fn random_nonce() -> [u8; NONCE_LEN] {
271 use rand::RngCore;
272 let mut n = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
273 rand::thread_rng().fill_bytes(&mut n);
274 n
275}
276
277/// Generate a random `u64`, used by the pager to pick a per-session
278/// nonce prefix. See [`session_page_nonce`] for the full construction.
279pub fn random_u64() -> u64 {
280 use rand::RngCore;
281 rand::thread_rng().next_u64()
282}
283
284/// Build a per-session page nonce (PR SEC-1, v0.5.2).
285///
286/// Structure, following NIST SP 800-38D §8.2.1 (fixed field + invocation
287/// field) for AES-GCM:
288///
289/// - **Bytes 0..8** — `session_random`: a 64-bit random value drawn
290/// fresh on every writable [`crate::Mnemo::open`] / [`crate::Mnemo::create`]
291/// (and regenerated on counter wrap). This is the "fixed field".
292/// - **Bytes 8..12** — `session_counter`: a 32-bit per-session monotonic
293/// counter that advances once per encrypted page write. This is the
294/// "invocation field".
295///
296/// `page_no` is **not** encoded in the nonce. Pages were bound to their
297/// home slot through AAD since v6 (`page_no.to_le_bytes()`), so an
298/// attacker who swapped a valid page to a different slot already failed
299/// authentication — the AAD binding stays in place and does the job the
300/// `page_no` component of the pre-SEC-1 nonce was helping with.
301///
302/// # Why not deterministic any more
303///
304/// Before v0.5.2 the nonce was `page_no as u32 || write_counter as u64`,
305/// which was unique **within a file** but not **across copies of a file**.
306/// If you copied a `.mnemo` file to another host and both the original and
307/// the copy got written to (two laptops syncing a Dropbox file; a
308/// restored older backup resuming operation), each copy's writer produced
309/// pages whose nonces collided with the other's at the same `(page_no,
310/// write_counter)` coordinates, under the same DEK (`random_dek()` only
311/// at create; `rekey` keeps it). That breaks AES-GCM's confidentiality
312/// and tamper-evidence guarantee: whoever holds both ciphertexts can
313/// recover the XOR of the plaintexts and forge pages with a valid tag.
314///
315/// A fresh random 64-bit `session_random` per writable open closes that:
316/// cross-copy collision now requires two sessions to independently draw
317/// the same 64-bit value (birthday bound ~2^32 sessions, i.e.
318/// astronomically unlikely for a human-scale user). The 32-bit
319/// `session_counter` guarantees uniqueness *within* a session; the pager
320/// regenerates `session_random` and resets the counter if it would wrap.
321///
322/// # Decrypt is unaffected
323///
324/// Each page already stores its own nonce in bytes `[0..12]` of the
325/// on-disk image (see `mnemo/src/pager.rs::read_page`). Decrypt reads the
326/// stored nonce; it never recomputes one. **No format bump — a v0.5.1
327/// file opens fine on v0.5.2 and vice versa.**
328pub fn session_page_nonce(session_random: u64, session_counter: u32) -> [u8; NONCE_LEN] {
329 let mut n = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
330 n[0..8].copy_from_slice(&session_random.to_le_bytes());
331 n[8..12].copy_from_slice(&session_counter.to_le_bytes());
332 n
333}
334
335/// Wrap (encrypt) the DEK with the KEK. The wrap uses **empty AAD** in every
336/// version, so v5 wrapped-DEK bytes on disk round-trip unchanged through a v6
337/// build — only page encryption changed in v6.
338pub fn wrap_dek(
339 kek: &[u8; KEY_LEN],
340 nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
341 dek: &[u8; KEY_LEN],
342) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
343 aead_encrypt(kek, nonce, dek, &[])
344}
345
346/// Unwrap (decrypt) the DEK with the KEK. A wrong KEK (wrong passphrase)
347/// fails authentication and is reported as [`MnemoError::WrongPassphrase`].
348pub fn unwrap_dek(
349 kek: &[u8; KEY_LEN],
350 nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
351 wrapped: &[u8],
352) -> Result<Zeroizing<[u8; KEY_LEN]>> {
353 let plain = cipher(kek)
354 .decrypt(
355 Nonce::from_slice(nonce),
356 Payload {
357 msg: wrapped,
358 aad: &[],
359 },
360 )
361 .map_err(|_| MnemoError::WrongPassphrase)?;
362 if plain.len() != KEY_LEN {
363 return Err(MnemoError::WrongPassphrase);
364 }
365 let mut dek = Zeroizing::new([0u8; KEY_LEN]);
366 dek.copy_from_slice(&plain);
367 Ok(dek)
368}