mnemo_engine/store/maintenance.rs
1//! Maintenance: export, rekey, verify, stats, and compaction (which also upgrades v8 files to v9).
2
3use super::*;
4
5impl Mnemo {
6 /// Return the KDF (Argon2id) parameters this file currently uses to
7 /// wrap its DEK. Needed by callers that want to [`rekey`] while
8 /// keeping the file's original protection level (e.g. the Python
9 /// binding's `rekey(fast=False)`, whose docstring promises exactly
10 /// that). FIX-1 R-001.5.
11 pub fn kdf_params(&self) -> KdfParams {
12 self.kdf
13 }
14
15 /// Flush any pending writes, then stream the (encrypted) file to
16 /// `dest` atomically: writes to a sibling temp file in `dest`'s
17 /// parent directory, `sync_all`s it, renames onto `dest`, and
18 /// fsyncs the parent directory on Unix so a crash never leaves a
19 /// partial export.
20 ///
21 /// Refuses when `dest` resolves to the file this handle has open
22 /// — that case would otherwise `File::create`-truncate the live
23 /// database to 0 bytes (`fs::copy` on Unix reads *after* the
24 /// `O_TRUNC`, so a naive export-to-self destroys the source).
25 /// Unix: compares `(dev, ino)` of both paths via `MetadataExt`,
26 /// catching symlinks and hard links. Windows: compares
27 /// canonicalized paths. (The rename is no second line of defense:
28 /// renaming over a file another handle holds open and locked
29 /// succeeds on Windows too, as a 2026-11-13 CI probe showed.)
30 ///
31 /// Reads the bytes from the already-open file handle, not by
32 /// `fs::copy`. On Windows that matters: `LockFileEx` locks are
33 /// mandatory, so a second handle opened by `fs::copy` would fail
34 /// while this writer still holds the lock.
35 ///
36 /// FIX-1 R-001.5 + R-002.2 part 3.
37 pub fn export_encrypted(&mut self, dest: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<()> {
38 let dest = dest.as_ref();
39
40 // Step 1 — refuse export to the open file itself. We compare
41 // by identity, not string, so symlinks and hard links to
42 // `self.path` are caught too. The check runs before any flush
43 // so a self-targeted export is a pure no-op.
44 if paths_refer_to_same_file(&self.path, dest).unwrap_or(false) {
45 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
46 "export_encrypted refuses to overwrite the open database at {}",
47 dest.display()
48 )));
49 }
50
51 // Step 2 — flush, so on-disk bytes match the live state.
52 if !self.read_only {
53 self.flush()?;
54 }
55
56 // Step 3 — stream from the open handle into a sibling temp.
57 // Using the open handle (instead of a second open on `self.path`)
58 // means a Windows mandatory lock can't block the copy.
59 let parent = dest.parent().ok_or_else(|| {
60 MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
61 "export_encrypted: dest {} has no parent directory",
62 dest.display()
63 ))
64 })?;
65 // A new file under a fresh name: `create_new` refuses anything
66 // already there, a symlink included, and a taken name gets another.
67 let (tmp, mut out) = {
68 let mut attempt = 0;
69 loop {
70 let tmp = temp_sibling(dest, "export");
71 match owner_only(OpenOptions::new().write(true).create_new(true)).open(&tmp) {
72 Ok(out) => break (tmp, out),
73 Err(e)
74 if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::AlreadyExists
75 && attempt + 1 < TEMP_NAME_ATTEMPTS =>
76 {
77 attempt += 1;
78 }
79 Err(e) => return Err(MnemoError::Io(e)),
80 }
81 }
82 };
83 // Scope the temp handle so it closes before the rename on
84 // Windows (which refuses to rename a file this process has open).
85 {
86 let src = self.pager.file_mut();
87 src.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0))?;
88 let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1 << 20]; // 1 MiB
89 loop {
90 let n = src.read(&mut buf)?;
91 if n == 0 {
92 break;
93 }
94 out.write_all(&buf[..n])?;
95 }
96 out.sync_all()?;
97 crate::bump_fsync();
98 drop(out);
99 }
100
101 // Step 4 — atomic rename onto `dest`.
102 if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, dest) {
103 // Best-effort cleanup; propagate the rename error.
104 let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
105 return Err(MnemoError::Io(e));
106 }
107
108 // Step 5 — fsync the parent directory on Unix so the rename
109 // itself is durable. On Windows directory syncs aren't
110 // supported; the rename above is atomic enough on NTFS.
111 #[cfg(unix)]
112 {
113 if let Ok(dir) = File::open(parent) {
114 let _ = dir.sync_all();
115 crate::bump_fsync();
116 }
117 }
118 #[cfg(not(unix))]
119 {
120 let _ = parent;
121 }
122
123 Ok(())
124 }
125
126 /// Change the passphrase. Cheap: re-derives the KEK and re-wraps the DEK;
127 /// the encrypted pages are never rewritten.
128 ///
129 /// **This changes the secret that opens this file from now on; anyone who
130 /// had the file and the old secret can still read it and later writes.**
131 /// The data key stays the same, so an earlier copy of the file (or of
132 /// just its header) and the old passphrase still unlock it. The old wrap
133 /// is scrubbed from this file (the previous WAL region is zeroed, and any
134 /// stale copy of the old header's key wrap is overwritten); that's
135 /// hygiene, not revocation. **To revoke, rotate:** rekey, then
136 /// [`Mnemo::compact_file`] (`mnemo rekey --rotate`), which rewrites the
137 /// file under a fresh data key. Rotation can't erase old ciphertext the storage hardware still holds: flash keeps rewritten blocks until it reuses them, and that's out of the engine's hands.
138 ///
139 /// **An error means the old secret is still in force,** for this handle
140 /// and for the file, including after later writes and a close (REKEY-1).
141 /// The one exception is when the new header's write fails and putting
142 /// the old one back fails too: the error then says so, and the file may
143 /// open with either secret.
144 ///
145 /// `Ok` means the new secret is in force. Scrubbing the old wrap
146 /// afterwards is hygiene; if part of it fails, the rekey still succeeds
147 /// and [`Mnemo::rekey_cleanup_error`] says what was left.
148 pub fn rekey(&mut self, new_passphrase: &str, kdf: KdfParams) -> Result<()> {
149 self.rekey_secret(new_passphrase.as_bytes(), kdf)
150 }
151
152 /// PERF-1 step 7: switch to (or rotate) a raw 256-bit key, recording
153 /// [`KdfParams::raw_key`] in the header. Like [`Mnemo::rekey`], only the
154 /// wrapped DEK changes; pages aren't rewritten, and it doesn't revoke
155 /// the old key (see [`Mnemo::rekey`]).
156 ///
157 /// Errors and the cleanup report work as in [`Mnemo::rekey`].
158 pub fn rekey_with_key(&mut self, new_key: &[u8; crypto::KEY_LEN]) -> Result<()> {
159 self.rekey_secret(new_key, KdfParams::raw_key())
160 }
161
162 pub(super) fn rekey_secret(&mut self, secret: &[u8], kdf: KdfParams) -> Result<()> {
163 if self.shared {
164 // RB-007.2: the shared handle would keep the old secret, and
165 // fail at the next compaction or recovery.
166 return Err(MnemoError::Unsupported(
167 "inside a shared-mode window, change the passphrase with SharedMnemo::rekey, \
168 which also updates the secret the handle keeps. Nothing was changed"
169 .into(),
170 ));
171 }
172 self.rekey_unchecked(secret, kdf)
173 }
174
175 /// The rekey itself; [`SharedMnemo::rekey`] calls it in its window.
176 pub(super) fn rekey_unchecked(&mut self, secret: &[u8], kdf: KdfParams) -> Result<()> {
177 if self.read_only {
178 return Err(MnemoError::ReadOnly);
179 }
180 self.rekey_cleanup = None;
181 self.flush()?;
182 // v0.14.0 step 1: `flush` checks only when it has something to
183 // write; the rekey writes either way.
184 self.ensure_not_replaced()?;
185 let new_salt = crypto::random_salt();
186 let new_kek = crypto::derive_kek(secret, &new_salt, kdf)?;
187 let new_nonce = crypto::random_nonce();
188 let wrapped = crypto::wrap_dek(&new_kek, &new_nonce, self.pager.dek())?;
189 if wrapped.len() != WRAPPED_DEK_LEN {
190 return Err(MnemoError::Crypto("unexpected wrapped DEK length".into()));
191 }
192 let mut wrapped_dek = [0u8; WRAPPED_DEK_LEN];
193 wrapped_dek.copy_from_slice(&wrapped);
194
195 // SEC-2: the old header's key wrap (salt, DEK nonce, wrapped DEK, as
196 // laid out at header bytes 86..162), to scrub once the new header
197 // is committed.
198 let mut old_wrap =
199 Vec::with_capacity(crypto::SALT_LEN + crypto::NONCE_LEN + WRAPPED_DEK_LEN);
200 old_wrap.extend_from_slice(&self.header.salt);
201 old_wrap.extend_from_slice(&self.header.dek_nonce);
202 old_wrap.extend_from_slice(&self.header.wrapped_dek);
203
204 // REKEY-1 (RB-004.2): until the new page 0 is on disk, a failure puts
205 // these back, so an `Err` means "still the old secret".
206 let before = self.header.clone();
207 let before_kdf = self.kdf;
208
209 self.header.salt = new_salt;
210 self.header.dek_nonce = new_nonce;
211 self.header.wrapped_dek = wrapped_dek;
212 self.header.m_cost = kdf.m_cost;
213 self.header.t_cost = kdf.t_cost;
214 self.header.p_cost = kdf.p_cost;
215 self.kdf = kdf;
216
217 // DUR-1 (R-002.1): WAL-log the new page 0 before touching it.
218 // Allocate a fresh WAL region at the tail so that a crash during
219 // the rekey leaves either the old region (old passphrase works)
220 // or the new region (new passphrase works) fully committed —
221 // overwriting the existing region would risk destroying both.
222 let old_wal_start = self.header.wal_start;
223 let new_pages = self.header.wal_pages;
224 let new_start = self.header.next_page;
225 self.header.next_page += new_pages;
226 self.header.wal_start = new_start;
227 self.header.wal_pages = new_pages;
228 self.header.wal_seq += 1;
229
230 // The steps of `relocate_header_through_wal`, apart, so a failure
231 // can be told from one before page 0 and one after it.
232 self.header.write_counter = self.pager.write_counter;
233 let mut page = self.header.to_page();
234 if let Err(e) = self.header.apply_seal(&mut page, self.pager.dek()) {
235 return Err(self.undo_rekey(before, before_kdf, None, false, e));
236 }
237 let frames = vec![(0u64, page.to_vec())];
238 let txn_id = self.header.wal_seq;
239 if let Err(e) = wal::commit(self.pager.file_mut(), new_start, new_pages, txn_id, &frames) {
240 let region = Some((new_start, new_pages));
241 return Err(self.undo_rekey(before, before_kdf, region, false, e));
242 }
243 if let Err(e) = self
244 .pager
245 .write_raw(0, &page)
246 .and_then(|_| self.pager.sync())
247 {
248 let region = Some((new_start, new_pages));
249 return Err(self.undo_rekey(before, before_kdf, region, true, e));
250 }
251
252 // The new page 0 is on disk: the new secret is in force, and nothing
253 // below fails the rekey. SEC-2 (RB-001.30): zero the old region's
254 // first frame header (so no scan reads it as a WAL), then all of it
255 // (its frames hold page-0 images with the old wrap), then any other
256 // stale copy of the old wrap in the file (an earlier, grown or
257 // relocated region). Each step runs even if the one before failed.
258 // Hygiene only: a copy of the file taken before the rekey still
259 // opens with the old secret (see `rekey`).
260 let mut left = Vec::new();
261 if let Err(e) = wal::invalidate_region(self.pager.file_mut(), old_wal_start) {
262 left.push(format!("clearing the old WAL region's first frame: {e}"));
263 }
264 if let Err(e) = wal::scrub_region(self.pager.file_mut(), old_wal_start, new_pages) {
265 left.push(format!("zeroing the old WAL region: {e}"));
266 }
267 if let Err(e) = scrub_bytes(self.pager.file_mut(), &old_wrap) {
268 left.push(format!("overwriting other copies of the old key wrap: {e}"));
269 }
270 self.rekey_cleanup = (!left.is_empty()).then(|| left.join("; "));
271 // FMT-9 (a): the old region is freed by the next commit (see
272 // `ensure_wal_capacity`).
273 self.release_pages(old_wal_start, new_pages);
274 Ok(())
275 }
276
277 /// REKEY-1: a rekey failed before its new page 0 was on disk. Put the
278 /// header and the KDF back, so the handle (and every later write) uses
279 /// the old secret. Then, best effort: zero the new WAL region, whose
280 /// commit wraps the data key under the new secret, so a later
281 /// torn-header scan can't find it; and, if page 0 may have been
282 /// written, write the old one back.
283 fn undo_rekey(
284 &mut self,
285 before: crate::format::Header,
286 before_kdf: KdfParams,
287 new_region: Option<(u64, u64)>,
288 page0_written: bool,
289 err: MnemoError,
290 ) -> MnemoError {
291 self.header = before;
292 self.kdf = before_kdf;
293 // RB-005.2: a failed zeroing is reported, not dropped. The old
294 // secret is still in force either way; what's left is a committed
295 // copy of the new key wrap in the region past the file's end,
296 // which a torn-header scan could use with the new secret until a
297 // compaction clears it (a later write over those pages also does).
298 let scrub_failed = new_region.and_then(|(start, pages)| {
299 wal::scrub_region(self.pager.file_mut(), start, pages).err()
300 });
301 let with_scrub_note = |err: MnemoError| match &scrub_failed {
302 None => err,
303 Some(e) => MnemoError::Io(std::io::Error::other(format!(
304 "{err}; the old secret is still in force, but zeroing the new key wrap's \
305 copy failed ({e}), so a copy may be left in the file until `mnemo compact` \
306 clears it (a later write over those pages also does)"
307 ))),
308 };
309 if !page0_written {
310 return with_scrub_note(err);
311 }
312 self.header.write_counter = self.pager.write_counter;
313 let mut page = self.header.to_page();
314 let put_back = self
315 .header
316 .apply_seal(&mut page, self.pager.dek())
317 .and_then(|_| self.pager.write_raw(0, &page))
318 .and_then(|_| self.pager.sync());
319 match put_back {
320 Ok(()) => with_scrub_note(err),
321 // `mnemo rekey` looks for "may open with either secret" to leave
322 // out its "the passphrase was not changed": keep the phrase.
323 Err(again) => MnemoError::Io(std::io::Error::other(format!(
324 "rekey failed writing the new header ({err}), and the old header \
325 couldn't be written back ({again}): the file may open with either \
326 secret; close it without writing and try both"
327 ))),
328 }
329 }
330
331 /// REKEY-1 (RB-004.2): after a successful [`Mnemo::rekey`] or
332 /// [`Mnemo::rekey_with_key`], what couldn't be scrubbed of the old key
333 /// wrap, or `None` if it all was. The rekey took effect either way; what
334 /// is left is plaintext key-wrap bytes the old secret could still use, so
335 /// to be sure, rotate (`compact_file`) as [`Mnemo::rekey`] describes.
336 /// Each rekey resets it.
337 pub fn rekey_cleanup_error(&self) -> Option<&str> {
338 self.rekey_cleanup.as_deref()
339 }
340
341 /// SEC-2 (RB-001.30): write a copy of this database at `dest` under a
342 /// **fresh data key**, protected by `passphrase` through `kdf`. It goes
343 /// through the compaction path (live memories, the result cache and
344 /// the index, no history), so the copy shares no key material with
345 /// this file: neither this file's passphrase nor its data key opens
346 /// it, and its passphrase opens nothing here. This file is flushed
347 /// first (unless read-only) and is otherwise unchanged; `dest` must not
348 /// exist. The copy is v9.
349 pub fn export_rekeyed(
350 &mut self,
351 dest: impl AsRef<Path>,
352 passphrase: &str,
353 kdf: KdfParams,
354 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
355 self.export_rekeyed_secret(dest.as_ref(), passphrase.as_bytes(), kdf)
356 }
357
358 /// [`Mnemo::export_rekeyed`] protected by a raw 256-bit key (no KDF).
359 pub fn export_rekeyed_with_key(
360 &mut self,
361 dest: impl AsRef<Path>,
362 key: &[u8; crypto::KEY_LEN],
363 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
364 self.export_rekeyed_secret(dest.as_ref(), key, KdfParams::raw_key())
365 }
366
367 pub(super) fn export_rekeyed_secret(
368 &mut self,
369 dest: &Path,
370 secret: &[u8],
371 kdf: KdfParams,
372 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
373 if paths_refer_to_same_file(&self.path, dest).unwrap_or(false) {
374 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
375 "export_rekeyed refuses to overwrite the open database at {}",
376 dest.display()
377 )));
378 }
379 if dest.exists() {
380 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
381 "{} already exists",
382 dest.display()
383 )));
384 }
385 if !self.read_only {
386 self.flush()?;
387 }
388 let config = MnemoConfig {
389 dimensions: self.dimensions,
390 kdf,
391 store_float_vectors: self.float_vectors(),
392 ..Default::default()
393 };
394 let (tmp, mut new) = create_temp(dest, "export", secret, config)?;
395 let result = (|| {
396 let report = self.copy_live_into(&mut new)?;
397 new.flush()?;
398 drop(new);
399 std::fs::rename(&tmp, dest)?;
400 Ok(report)
401 })();
402 if result.is_err() {
403 let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
404 }
405 result
406 }
407
408 /// The compaction copy: every live, unexpired memory and cache entry of
409 /// `self` into `new` (a freshly created file), and the index if `self`
410 /// has one. Counts as [`CompactReport`].
411 pub(super) fn copy_live_into(&mut self, new: &mut Mnemo) -> Result<CompactReport> {
412 // FMT-9e: compaction rewrites everything, so it compresses every
413 // thread turn, recent or not.
414 new.turn_compress_after = 0;
415 // ANN-1.1: compaction is "re-tune for the current size" by
416 // default. Pass IndexConfig::default() so partitions,
417 // subspaces, n_probe and n_rerank are all re-derived from the
418 // compacted vector count. Previously we froze the pre-compact
419 // (n_probe, n_rerank), which left the new index on stale
420 // numbers for the smaller post-compact corpus.
421 let want_index = self.has_index();
422 let now = memory::now_secs();
423 let all = self.memories()?;
424 let before = all.len();
425 let mut after = 0;
426 let mut zero_vector_manifests = 0;
427 let mut zero_vector_memories = 0;
428 for mut m in all {
429 if m.is_expired(now) {
430 continue;
431 }
432 // A file from before the zero-vector rule (Phase 3 PR 10a) can
433 // hold all-zero vectors. A legacy onboarding or manifest memory
434 // gets the sentinel unit vector a current manifest has, so it
435 // behaves like a new one; any other is carried unchanged.
436 if embed::is_zero_vector(&m.vector) {
437 if crud::is_onboarding(&m) || is_manifest(&m) {
438 m.vector = Memory::scaffold_manifest(self.dimensions).vector;
439 zero_vector_manifests += 1;
440 } else {
441 zero_vector_memories += 1;
442 }
443 }
444 // The engine's own copy: `_mnemo.*` keys come through as they
445 // are, and the write-time zero-vector check doesn't apply.
446 new.put_existing(m)?;
447 after += 1;
448 }
449 if want_index && after > 0 {
450 new.build_index_with(IndexConfig::default())?;
451 }
452
453 // Count + copy cache entries. We walk `self.cache_dir` by index
454 // so each hop reads the directory's live `accessed_at` /
455 // `access_count` directly rather than going through
456 // `cache_get` (which would also treat read-only semantics,
457 // tombstones, etc. — we want the raw, authoritative values).
458 let mut cache_before = 0usize;
459 let mut cache_after = 0usize;
460 let positions: Vec<usize> = (0..self.cache_dir.len()).collect();
461 for pos in positions {
462 let (keep, reserved) = {
463 let e = &self.cache_dir[pos];
464 (
465 !e.deleted && !e.is_expired(now),
466 embed::is_reserved_namespace(&e.namespace),
467 )
468 };
469 if keep {
470 // EMBED-ID-1: the engine's own entries (the embedder
471 // identity) are copied but not counted.
472 new.copy_cache_entry_from(self, pos)?;
473 if !reserved {
474 cache_before += 1;
475 cache_after += 1;
476 }
477 }
478 }
479 Ok(CompactReport {
480 before,
481 after,
482 cache_before,
483 cache_after,
484 zero_vector_manifests,
485 zero_vector_memories,
486 })
487 }
488
489 /// Decrypt and validate every live record. Returns the count verified
490 /// across memories **and** cache entries (FIX-1 R-001.1: now that the
491 /// cache survives compaction, `verify()` has to walk it too — the
492 /// pre-FIX-1 implementation only checked `self.catalog`, so a
493 /// corrupted cache record went unnoticed).
494 pub fn verify(&mut self) -> Result<usize> {
495 Ok(self.verify_report()?.records)
496 }
497
498 /// [`Mnemo::verify`], also counting the memories whose vector is all
499 /// zeros. A file written before the zero-vector rule (Phase 3 PR 10a)
500 /// can hold them; they decode fine but score 0.0 on every vector query.
501 /// `mnemo verify` warns about them, and compaction carries them
502 /// (giving a legacy manifest the sentinel vector).
503 pub fn verify_report(&mut self) -> Result<VerifyReport> {
504 let entries: Vec<CatalogEntry> = self
505 .catalog
506 .iter()
507 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
508 .cloned()
509 .collect();
510 let mut n = entries.len();
511 let mut zero_vector_memories = 0;
512 for e in &entries {
513 let bytes = self.read_record(e)?;
514 let m: Memory = self.decode_memory(&bytes)?;
515 // FMT-9b: and the row's vector column entry.
516 let zero = if e.v9.is_some() {
517 let (h, _) = self.column_entry(e)?;
518 if h.len() != self.dimensions {
519 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(
520 "vector entry has the wrong width".into(),
521 ));
522 }
523 // fp16 +0.0 and -0.0.
524 !h.is_empty() && h.iter().all(|b| b & 0x7fff == 0)
525 } else {
526 embed::is_zero_vector(&m.vector)
527 };
528 if zero {
529 zero_vector_memories += 1;
530 }
531 }
532
533 // Also decode every live cache entry. Tombstoned entries are
534 // skipped — their pages are orphan ciphertext awaiting
535 // `compact_file`, same as deleted memories. Expired entries
536 // are *still* on disk until compaction, so we verify them too.
537 let cache_positions: Vec<(u64, u32, u32, u64, bool)> = self
538 .cache_dir
539 .iter()
540 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
541 .map(|e| {
542 let reserved = embed::is_reserved_namespace(&e.namespace);
543 (e.start_page, e.page_count, e.len, e.gen, reserved)
544 })
545 .collect();
546 for (start_page, page_count, len, gen, reserved) in cache_positions {
547 let buf = self.read_record_run(start_page, page_count, len, gen)?;
548 let _c: CacheEntry = rmp_serde::from_slice(&buf)
549 .map_err(|err| MnemoError::Serialize(err.to_string()))?;
550 // EMBED-ID-1: the engine's own entries are checked, not counted.
551 if !reserved {
552 n += 1;
553 }
554 }
555 // FMT-9 (a): no free run may overlap a page the committed state
556 // references (records, cache entries, control runs, the WAL).
557 if self.is_v9() {
558 self.check_free_list_disjoint()?;
559 }
560 Ok(VerifyReport {
561 records: n,
562 zero_vector_memories,
563 })
564 }
565
566 /// FMT-9 (a): fail if the free list (or a pending free) overlaps any
567 /// page the current state references.
568 pub(super) fn check_free_list_disjoint(&self) -> Result<()> {
569 let h = &self.header;
570 let mut live: Vec<(u64, u64, &str)> = vec![
571 (h.wal_start, h.wal_pages, "WAL region"),
572 (h.catalog_start, h.catalog_pages, "catalog run"),
573 (h.index_start, h.index_pages, "index run"),
574 (h.manifest_start, h.manifest_pages, "manifest run"),
575 (h.cache_start, h.cache_pages, "cache directory run"),
576 (h.free.start, h.free.pages, "free-list run"),
577 (h.keys.start, h.keys.pages, "key-slot run"),
578 ];
579 live.extend(
580 self.catalog
581 .iter()
582 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
583 .map(|e| (e.start_page, e.page_count as u64, "record")),
584 );
585 live.extend(
586 self.cache_dir
587 .iter()
588 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
589 .map(|e| (e.start_page, e.page_count as u64, "cache entry")),
590 );
591 live.extend(self.col.page_rows.keys().map(|&p| (p, 1, "vector page")));
592 live.extend(
593 self.delta_chain
594 .iter()
595 .map(|r| (r.start, r.pages, "catalog delta run")),
596 );
597 live.extend(
598 self.index_chain
599 .iter()
600 .map(|r| (r.start, r.pages, "index delta run")),
601 );
602 live.push((
603 self.header.bm25.start,
604 self.header.bm25.pages,
605 "BM25 manifest",
606 ));
607 live.extend(
608 self.bm25
609 .manifest
610 .segments
611 .iter()
612 .map(|t| (t.0, t.1, "BM25 segment")),
613 );
614 for (p, c, what) in live {
615 if c == 0 {
616 continue;
617 }
618 if self.free.overlaps(p, c) {
619 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
620 "free list overlaps a live {what} at page {p} (+{c})"
621 )));
622 }
623 if self
624 .pending_free
625 .iter()
626 .any(|&(q, n)| q < p + c && p < q + n)
627 {
628 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
629 "a pending free overlaps a live {what} at page {p} (+{c})"
630 )));
631 }
632 }
633 Ok(())
634 }
635
636 /// The statistics that need no record decrypts and no index load
637 /// (v0.12.2, RB-002.3): counts, sizes, the format, whether an index
638 /// exists, the recall mode and the bytes the vector column needs. The
639 /// first [`Mnemo::stats`] on a handle decrypts every record (for its
640 /// agent list) and loads a persisted index; this is what a phone app
641 /// polling the recall mode should call.
642 pub fn stats_summary(&self) -> StatsSummary {
643 let deleted = self.catalog.iter().filter(|e| e.deleted).count();
644 let v9 = self.is_v9();
645 let column = if v9 {
646 (self.scored_rows() * crate::veccol::entry_len(self.dimensions)) as u64
647 } else {
648 0
649 };
650 let recall_mode = if self.has_index() {
651 RecallMode::Indexed
652 } else if v9 && column <= self.vector_cache_budget as u64 {
653 RecallMode::ExactResident
654 } else {
655 RecallMode::ExactPaged
656 };
657 let rp = self.restore_points();
658 StatsSummary {
659 memories: self.len(),
660 deleted,
661 dimensions: self.dimensions,
662 file_bytes: self.header.next_page * PAGE_SIZE as u64,
663 format_version: self.header.version,
664 wal_pages: self.header.wal_pages,
665 has_index: self.has_index(),
666 recall_mode,
667 vector_column_bytes: column,
668 snapshots_retained: rp.retained,
669 oldest_restorable_at: rp.oldest_at,
670 snapshot_pinned_bytes: rp.pinned_bytes,
671 }
672 }
673
674 /// Summary statistics for the open database. The first call on a
675 /// handle decrypts every record (to list the agents) and loads a
676 /// persisted index; [`Mnemo::stats_summary`] does neither.
677 pub fn stats(&mut self) -> Result<Stats> {
678 let deleted = self.catalog.iter().filter(|e| e.deleted).count();
679 // FIX-1 R-001.8 part 2: build the agent set lazily on first
680 // call per handle, then maintain in `put` / invalidate in
681 // `delete`. Pre-FIX-1 every `stats()` call decrypted every
682 // live memory (O(N) AES-GCM decrypts just to list a usually-
683 // tiny set of distinct agent IDs). On a 1M-memory database
684 // this was in the multi-second range on hardware AES.
685 if self.agent_set.is_none() {
686 let built: std::collections::BTreeSet<String> =
687 self.memories()?.into_iter().map(|m| m.agent_id).collect();
688 self.agent_set = Some(built);
689 }
690 let agents: Vec<String> = self
691 .agent_set
692 .as_ref()
693 .expect("agent_set just filled above")
694 .iter()
695 .cloned()
696 .collect();
697 let file_bytes = self.header.next_page * PAGE_SIZE as u64;
698 let recall_mode = self.recall_mode()?;
699 let rp = self.restore_points();
700 Ok(Stats {
701 memories: self.len(),
702 deleted,
703 dimensions: self.dimensions,
704 file_bytes,
705 agents,
706 encrypted: self.header.flags & FLAG_ENCRYPTED != 0,
707 created_at: self.header.created_at,
708 index: {
709 self.ensure_ann()?;
710 self.ann.as_ref().map(|a| a.info())
711 },
712 wal_pages: self.header.wal_pages,
713 fsyncs_last_flush: self.fsyncs_last_flush,
714 format_version: self.header.version,
715 recall_mode,
716 snapshots_retained: rp.retained,
717 oldest_restorable_at: rp.oldest_at,
718 snapshot_pinned_bytes: rp.pinned_bytes,
719 })
720 }
721
722 /// Rewrite the file, dropping tombstoned and expired memories and
723 /// reclaiming stale pages left by updates. Done out-of-place via a temp
724 /// file and an atomic rename.
725 ///
726 /// FIX-1 R-001.1 + R-002.2 part 2: the result cache now survives
727 /// compaction. Every live, non-expired directory entry is copied
728 /// into the new file verbatim — `created_at`, `ttl_secs`,
729 /// `cost_hint_ms`, `key_preview`, `size_bytes`, `content_type`,
730 /// `vector` and `model` come from the record body; `accessed_at`
731 /// and `access_count` come from the *directory* (the record body
732 /// only holds the insert-time snapshot — the directory is the
733 /// source of truth for the live counts, as of v5's recall trick).
734 /// Tombstoned and TTL-expired entries are dropped. Pre-FIX-1
735 /// compaction kept only the memory catalog and silently emptied
736 /// the cache; the Planner's interim README caveat (c417d2e) called
737 /// that out — this PR removes the surprise.
738 ///
739 /// The output is always v9, so this is also how a v4–v8 file is
740 /// converted: the only read-write open that accepts one (the v8
741 /// sunset, v0.13). It keeps every live memory.
742 pub fn compact_file(path: &str, passphrase: &str) -> Result<CompactReport> {
743 Self::compact_file_secret(
744 path,
745 passphrase.as_bytes(),
746 0,
747 &crate::SharedOptions::default(),
748 )
749 }
750
751 /// PERF-1 step 7: [`Mnemo::compact_file`] for a raw-key database.
752 pub fn compact_file_with_key(path: &str, key: &[u8; crypto::KEY_LEN]) -> Result<CompactReport> {
753 Self::compact_file_secret(path, key, 0, &crate::SharedOptions::default())
754 }
755
756 /// [`Mnemo::compact_file`] with the lock layer's options: how long to
757 /// wait for the file's lock (`opts.deadline`; `compact_file` waits 10 s),
758 /// a cancel, and `allow_network_fs`. `mnemo compact --wait` uses it.
759 pub fn compact_file_waiting(
760 path: &str,
761 passphrase: &str,
762 opts: crate::SharedOptions,
763 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
764 Self::compact_file_secret(path, passphrase.as_bytes(), 0, &opts)
765 }
766
767 /// [`Mnemo::compact_file_waiting`] for a raw-key database.
768 pub fn compact_file_waiting_with_key(
769 path: &str,
770 key: &[u8; crypto::KEY_LEN],
771 opts: crate::SharedOptions,
772 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
773 Self::compact_file_secret(path, key, 0, &opts)
774 }
775
776 pub(super) fn compact_file_secret(
777 path: &str,
778 secret: &[u8],
779 format_version: u16,
780 opts: &crate::SharedOptions,
781 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
782 // RB-007.3: compact the file the path names, through any symlink,
783 // and rename over that file, so a link stays a link and every path
784 // to the brain names the new file.
785 let real = std::fs::canonicalize(path)?;
786 // The one read-write open that takes a v4–v8 file (the v8 sunset).
787 // RB-007.4: through the lock layer, so shared handles' busy reads
788 // can't keep it out, and a shared caller that times out reads
789 // "compact" in the lock-info note.
790 let old = Mnemo::open_exclusive_secret(&real, secret, "compact", opts, true)?;
791 // RB-007.8 item 8: with the exclusive lock held no compaction of
792 // this file is running, so temp files left by dead ones can go.
793 remove_dead_compaction_temps(&real);
794 let dims = old.dimensions;
795 let kdf = old.kdf;
796 let config = MnemoConfig {
797 dimensions: dims,
798 kdf,
799 // FMT-9f: compaction writes v9 (upgrading a v8 file),
800 // unless `compact_file_to` asked for v8. A v9 file that
801 // keeps float vectors keeps them.
802 format_version,
803 store_float_vectors: old.float_vectors(),
804 ..Default::default()
805 };
806 // v0.14.0 step 1: a new file under a name no other compaction shares.
807 let (tmp, new) = create_temp(&real, "compact", secret, config)?;
808 // Created owner-only; it keeps the old file's mode.
809 if let Err(e) = copy_mode(old.pager.file(), new.pager.file()) {
810 drop(new);
811 let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
812 return Err(e);
813 }
814 // `compact_into` releases the old file's lock only after the rename.
815 let result = Self::compact_into(old, new, &real, &tmp);
816 if result.is_err() {
817 let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
818 }
819 result
820 }
821
822 /// Write the compacted copy of `old` to `tmp`, then rename it over
823 /// `path`, all while `old` holds the old file's exclusive lock.
824 ///
825 /// v0.14.0 step 1 (12.4's design note, "Gaps in today's code"): the lock
826 /// used to be released before the rename. A process that opened the
827 /// path in that window locked the old file and wrote to it, and the
828 /// rename then replaced it, losing those writes. Holding the lock
829 /// through the rename and the directory sync means a process either
830 /// waits on the old file's lock (and then finds, by `open_with_lock`'s
831 /// identity check, that the path names the new file) or opens the new
832 /// file.
833 ///
834 /// **Windows and the toolchain.** Renaming over a file another handle
835 /// holds open and locked works on Linux and macOS with every toolchain,
836 /// and on Windows when the engine is built with Rust 1.85 or later,
837 /// whose `std::fs::rename` uses POSIX semantics. Built with 1.75 to 1.84
838 /// (the MSRV is 1.75), Windows refuses it with "Access is denied" (os
839 /// error 5) while the old file is open, so the rename is retried once
840 /// after the old handle is closed, as before v0.14.0. That leaves the
841 /// old window open for those builds; each commit's identity check
842 /// (`ensure_not_replaced`) then turns nearly every write that would have
843 /// been lost into `Replaced`. (Probed on CI, 2026-11-13: 1.75 to 1.84
844 /// refuse, 1.85 to 1.100 succeed; the released binaries are built with
845 /// stable.)
846 fn compact_into(
847 mut old: Mnemo,
848 mut new: Mnemo,
849 path: &Path,
850 tmp: &Path,
851 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
852 let report = old.copy_live_into(&mut new)?;
853
854 new.flush()?;
855 // The new file is closed before the rename: Windows won't rename a
856 // file this process still has open.
857 drop(new);
858
859 match std::fs::rename(tmp, path) {
860 Ok(()) => {}
861 #[cfg(windows)]
862 Err(e) if e.kind() == std::io::ErrorKind::PermissionDenied => {
863 // A toolchain before 1.85: see above.
864 drop(old);
865 std::fs::rename(tmp, path)?;
866 return Ok(report);
867 }
868 Err(e) => return Err(MnemoError::Io(e)),
869 }
870 // Make the rename durable before the old file's lock goes.
871 #[cfg(unix)]
872 if let Some(parent) = path.parent() {
873 let parent = if parent.as_os_str().is_empty() {
874 Path::new(".")
875 } else {
876 parent
877 };
878 if let Ok(dir) = File::open(parent) {
879 let _ = dir.sync_all();
880 crate::bump_fsync();
881 }
882 }
883 // Only now does the old file's lock go.
884 drop(old);
885 Ok(report)
886 }
887
888 /// Copy one live cache entry from `old` at directory position
889 /// `pos` into `self` (a freshly-created compaction target).
890 /// Decrypts the old record body, substitutes the old *directory*'s
891 /// `accessed_at` + `access_count` (the record body's copies are
892 /// stale as of v5's directory-only hit path), re-encodes, writes
893 /// a fresh record run, and pushes a matching directory entry.
894 ///
895 /// Caller is expected to have already filtered out tombstoned /
896 /// expired entries and to call this on a read-write handle.
897 pub(crate) fn copy_cache_entry_from(&mut self, old: &mut Mnemo, pos: usize) -> Result<()> {
898 if self.read_only {
899 return Err(MnemoError::ReadOnly);
900 }
901 // Snapshot the directory fields we need, so the borrow on
902 // `old.cache_dir` ends before we touch `old.pager`.
903 let (start_page, page_count, len, dir_accessed_at, dir_access_count, old_gen) = {
904 let e = &old.cache_dir[pos];
905 (
906 e.start_page,
907 e.page_count,
908 e.len,
909 e.accessed_at,
910 e.access_count,
911 e.gen,
912 )
913 };
914
915 // Read + decrypt the old record body.
916 let buf = old.read_record_run(start_page, page_count, len, old_gen)?;
917 let mut entry: CacheEntry =
918 rmp_serde::from_slice(&buf).map_err(|e| MnemoError::Serialize(e.to_string()))?;
919
920 // Overwrite the stale body copies with the directory's live
921 // values before persisting. Everything else — `created_at`,
922 // `ttl_secs`, `cost_hint_ms`, `key_preview`, `size_bytes`,
923 // `content_type`, `value`, `vector`, `model` — stays as the
924 // body already recorded it.
925 entry.accessed_at = dir_accessed_at;
926 entry.access_count = dir_access_count;
927
928 let bytes =
929 rmp_serde::to_vec(&entry).map_err(|err| MnemoError::Serialize(err.to_string()))?;
930 let (new_start_page, new_page_count, gen) = self.write_record(&bytes)?;
931
932 let dir_entry = CacheDirectoryEntry {
933 namespace: entry.namespace.clone(),
934 key_hash: entry.key_hash,
935 start_page: new_start_page,
936 page_count: new_page_count,
937 len: bytes.len() as u32,
938 deleted: false,
939 accessed_at: dir_accessed_at,
940 access_count: dir_access_count,
941 size_bytes: entry.size_bytes,
942 ttl_secs: entry.ttl_secs,
943 created_at: entry.created_at,
944 vector: entry.vector.clone(),
945 model: entry.model.clone(),
946 gen,
947 };
948 let new_pos = self.cache_dir.len();
949 self.cache_idx
950 .insert(&entry.namespace, entry.key_hash, new_pos);
951 self.cache_dir.push(dir_entry);
952 self.dirty_cache = true;
953 Ok(())
954 }
955}
956
957/// SEC-2 (RB-001.30): overwrite every occurrence of `needle` in the file
958/// with zeros, then sync. Rekey uses it for stale copies of the old header's
959/// key wrap: they're plaintext (page 0 is sealed, not encrypted) and can sit
960/// in WAL regions that were grown, relocated or freed. Every other page is
961/// AES-GCM ciphertext, where a 76-byte random match doesn't happen.
962pub(super) fn scrub_bytes(file: &mut std::fs::File, needle: &[u8]) -> Result<usize> {
963 if needle.is_empty() {
964 return Ok(0);
965 }
966 let len = file.seek(SeekFrom::End(0))?;
967 let chunk = 1 << 20;
968 let overlap = needle.len() - 1;
969 let mut hits: Vec<u64> = Vec::new();
970 let mut buf = vec![0u8; chunk + overlap];
971 let mut pos: u64 = 0;
972 while pos < len {
973 let want = (chunk as u64 + overlap as u64).min(len - pos) as usize;
974 file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(pos))?;
975 file.read_exact(&mut buf[..want])?;
976 let mut i = 0;
977 while i + needle.len() <= want {
978 if buf[i..i + needle.len()] == *needle {
979 hits.push(pos + i as u64);
980 i += needle.len();
981 } else {
982 i += 1;
983 }
984 }
985 pos += chunk as u64;
986 }
987 hits.dedup();
988 let zeros = vec![0u8; needle.len()];
989 for off in &hits {
990 file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(*off))?;
991 file.write_all(&zeros)?;
992 }
993 if !hits.is_empty() {
994 file.sync_all()?;
995 crate::bump_fsync();
996 }
997 Ok(hits.len())
998}
999
1000/// RB-007.8 item 8: remove the temp files that compactions of `brain` left
1001/// when their process died: in `brain`'s directory, regular files named
1002/// exactly `<brain's name>.compact-<pid>-<n>-<8 hex digits>.tmp` (the
1003/// pattern [`temp_sibling`] makes) whose pid isn't this process and no
1004/// longer runs, and, on Unix, that this user owns: in a shared directory
1005/// another user's file of the same name is left alone. Nothing else is
1006/// touched. Best effort; returns how many went.
1007///
1008/// Call it only with `brain`'s exclusive lock held: a live compaction holds
1009/// that lock for as long as its temp file exists. Off Unix no process
1010/// check is available, so nothing is removed.
1011pub(crate) fn remove_dead_compaction_temps(brain: &Path) -> usize {
1012 let (Some(dir), Some(name)) = (brain.parent(), brain.file_name()) else {
1013 return 0;
1014 };
1015 let prefix = format!("{}.compact-", name.to_string_lossy());
1016 let Ok(entries) = std::fs::read_dir(dir) else {
1017 return 0;
1018 };
1019 let mut removed = 0;
1020 for entry in entries.flatten() {
1021 let file_name = entry.file_name();
1022 let Some(pid) = file_name.to_str().and_then(|n| dead_temp_pid(n, &prefix)) else {
1023 continue;
1024 };
1025 if pid == std::process::id() || crate::shared::pid_alive(pid) {
1026 continue;
1027 }
1028 let path = entry.path();
1029 let Ok(meta) = std::fs::symlink_metadata(&path) else {
1030 continue;
1031 };
1032 if !meta.file_type().is_file() || !owned_by_us(&meta) {
1033 continue;
1034 }
1035 if std::fs::remove_file(&path).is_ok() {
1036 removed += 1;
1037 }
1038 }
1039 removed
1040}
1041
1042/// Whether this process's user owns the file (Unix). Elsewhere, true: the
1043/// caller removes nothing off Unix anyway.
1044#[cfg(unix)]
1045fn owned_by_us(meta: &std::fs::Metadata) -> bool {
1046 use std::os::unix::fs::MetadataExt;
1047 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "failpoints"))]
1048 if let Some(uid) = crate::__failpoints::euid_override() {
1049 return meta.uid() == uid;
1050 }
1051 meta.uid() == rustix::process::geteuid().as_raw()
1052}
1053
1054#[cfg(not(unix))]
1055fn owned_by_us(_meta: &std::fs::Metadata) -> bool {
1056 true
1057}
1058
1059/// The pid in a compaction temp name `<prefix><pid>-<n>-<8 hex>.tmp`, if the
1060/// name is exactly that.
1061fn dead_temp_pid(name: &str, prefix: &str) -> Option<u32> {
1062 let rest = name.strip_prefix(prefix)?.strip_suffix(".tmp")?;
1063 let mut parts = rest.split('-');
1064 let (pid, n, nanos) = (parts.next()?, parts.next()?, parts.next()?);
1065 let digits = |s: &str| !s.is_empty() && s.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_digit());
1066 let hex8 = nanos.len() == 8 && nanos.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit());
1067 if parts.next().is_some() || !digits(pid) || !digits(n) || !hex8 {
1068 return None;
1069 }
1070 pid.parse().ok()
1071}
1072
1073/// A new, locked temp file next to `dest` (`Create::New`, so nothing already
1074/// at the name, a symlink included, is ever written through), under a fresh
1075/// name for each attempt while names are taken. RB-006.10.
1076fn create_temp(
1077 dest: &Path,
1078 what: &str,
1079 secret: &[u8],
1080 config: MnemoConfig,
1081) -> Result<(PathBuf, Mnemo)> {
1082 let mut attempt = 0;
1083 loop {
1084 let tmp = temp_sibling(dest, what);
1085 match Mnemo::create_secret_new(&tmp, secret, config) {
1086 Ok(new) => return Ok((tmp, new)),
1087 Err(e) if is_name_taken(&e) && attempt + 1 < TEMP_NAME_ATTEMPTS => attempt += 1,
1088 Err(e) => return Err(e),
1089 }
1090 }
1091}