mnemo_engine/store/maintenance.rs
1//! Maintenance: export, rekey, verify, stats, and compaction (which also upgrades v8 files to v9).
2
3use super::*;
4
5impl Mnemo {
6 /// Return the KDF (Argon2id) parameters this file currently uses to
7 /// wrap its DEK. Needed by callers that want to [`rekey`] while
8 /// keeping the file's original protection level (e.g. the Python
9 /// binding's `rekey(fast=False)`, whose docstring promises exactly
10 /// that). FIX-1 R-001.5.
11 pub fn kdf_params(&self) -> KdfParams {
12 self.kdf
13 }
14
15 /// Flush any pending writes, then stream the (encrypted) file to
16 /// `dest` atomically: writes to a sibling temp file in `dest`'s
17 /// parent directory, `sync_all`s it, renames onto `dest`, and
18 /// fsyncs the parent directory on Unix so a crash never leaves a
19 /// partial export.
20 ///
21 /// Refuses when `dest` resolves to the file this handle has open
22 /// — that case would otherwise `File::create`-truncate the live
23 /// database to 0 bytes (`fs::copy` on Unix reads *after* the
24 /// `O_TRUNC`, so a naive export-to-self destroys the source).
25 /// Unix: compares `(dev, ino)` of both paths via `MetadataExt`,
26 /// catching symlinks and hard links. Windows: compares
27 /// canonicalized paths; a rename onto an open file also fails on
28 /// Windows because of the mandatory lock the handle holds, so the
29 /// rename step is a second line of defense.
30 ///
31 /// Reads the bytes from the already-open file handle, not by
32 /// `fs::copy`. On Windows that matters: `LockFileEx` locks are
33 /// mandatory, so a second handle opened by `fs::copy` would fail
34 /// while this writer still holds the lock.
35 ///
36 /// FIX-1 R-001.5 + R-002.2 part 3.
37 pub fn export_encrypted(&mut self, dest: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<()> {
38 let dest = dest.as_ref();
39
40 // Step 1 — refuse export to the open file itself. We compare
41 // by identity, not string, so symlinks and hard links to
42 // `self.path` are caught too. The check runs before any flush
43 // so a self-targeted export is a pure no-op.
44 if paths_refer_to_same_file(&self.path, dest).unwrap_or(false) {
45 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
46 "export_encrypted refuses to overwrite the open database at {}",
47 dest.display()
48 )));
49 }
50
51 // Step 2 — flush, so on-disk bytes match the live state.
52 if !self.read_only {
53 self.flush()?;
54 }
55
56 // Step 3 — stream from the open handle into a sibling temp.
57 // Using the open handle (instead of a second open on `self.path`)
58 // means a Windows mandatory lock can't block the copy.
59 let parent = dest.parent().ok_or_else(|| {
60 MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
61 "export_encrypted: dest {} has no parent directory",
62 dest.display()
63 ))
64 })?;
65 let tmp = temp_sibling(dest);
66 // Scope the temp handle so it closes before the rename on
67 // Windows (which refuses to rename over an open file).
68 {
69 let src = self.pager.file_mut();
70 src.seek(SeekFrom::Start(0))?;
71 let mut out = OpenOptions::new()
72 .write(true)
73 .create(true)
74 .truncate(true)
75 .open(&tmp)?;
76 let mut buf = vec![0u8; 1 << 20]; // 1 MiB
77 loop {
78 let n = src.read(&mut buf)?;
79 if n == 0 {
80 break;
81 }
82 out.write_all(&buf[..n])?;
83 }
84 out.sync_all()?;
85 crate::bump_fsync();
86 }
87
88 // Step 4 — atomic rename onto `dest`.
89 if let Err(e) = std::fs::rename(&tmp, dest) {
90 // Best-effort cleanup; propagate the rename error.
91 let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
92 return Err(MnemoError::Io(e));
93 }
94
95 // Step 5 — fsync the parent directory on Unix so the rename
96 // itself is durable. On Windows directory syncs aren't
97 // supported; the rename above is atomic enough on NTFS.
98 #[cfg(unix)]
99 {
100 if let Ok(dir) = File::open(parent) {
101 let _ = dir.sync_all();
102 crate::bump_fsync();
103 }
104 }
105 #[cfg(not(unix))]
106 {
107 let _ = parent;
108 }
109
110 Ok(())
111 }
112
113 /// Change the passphrase. Cheap: re-derives the KEK and re-wraps the DEK;
114 /// the encrypted pages are never rewritten.
115 ///
116 /// **This changes the secret that opens this file from now on; anyone who
117 /// had the file and the old secret can still read it and later writes.**
118 /// The data key stays the same, so an earlier copy of the file (or of
119 /// just its header) and the old passphrase still unlock it. The old wrap
120 /// is scrubbed from this file (the previous WAL region is zeroed, and any
121 /// stale copy of the old header's key wrap is overwritten); that's
122 /// hygiene, not revocation. **To revoke, rotate:** rekey, then
123 /// [`Mnemo::compact_file`] (`mnemo rekey --rotate`), which rewrites the
124 /// file under a fresh data key. Rotation can't erase old ciphertext the storage hardware still holds: flash keeps rewritten blocks until it reuses them, and that's out of the engine's hands.
125 ///
126 /// **An error means the old secret is still in force,** for this handle
127 /// and for the file, including after later writes and a close (REKEY-1).
128 /// The one exception is when the new header's write fails and putting
129 /// the old one back fails too: the error then says so, and the file may
130 /// open with either secret.
131 ///
132 /// `Ok` means the new secret is in force. Scrubbing the old wrap
133 /// afterwards is hygiene; if part of it fails, the rekey still succeeds
134 /// and [`Mnemo::rekey_cleanup_error`] says what was left.
135 pub fn rekey(&mut self, new_passphrase: &str, kdf: KdfParams) -> Result<()> {
136 self.rekey_secret(new_passphrase.as_bytes(), kdf)
137 }
138
139 /// PERF-1 step 7: switch to (or rotate) a raw 256-bit key, recording
140 /// [`KdfParams::raw_key`] in the header. Like [`Mnemo::rekey`], only the
141 /// wrapped DEK changes; pages aren't rewritten, and it doesn't revoke
142 /// the old key (see [`Mnemo::rekey`]).
143 ///
144 /// Errors and the cleanup report work as in [`Mnemo::rekey`].
145 pub fn rekey_with_key(&mut self, new_key: &[u8; crypto::KEY_LEN]) -> Result<()> {
146 self.rekey_secret(new_key, KdfParams::raw_key())
147 }
148
149 pub(super) fn rekey_secret(&mut self, secret: &[u8], kdf: KdfParams) -> Result<()> {
150 if self.read_only {
151 return Err(MnemoError::ReadOnly);
152 }
153 self.rekey_cleanup = None;
154 self.flush()?;
155 let new_salt = crypto::random_salt();
156 let new_kek = crypto::derive_kek(secret, &new_salt, kdf)?;
157 let new_nonce = crypto::random_nonce();
158 let wrapped = crypto::wrap_dek(&new_kek, &new_nonce, self.pager.dek())?;
159 if wrapped.len() != WRAPPED_DEK_LEN {
160 return Err(MnemoError::Crypto("unexpected wrapped DEK length".into()));
161 }
162 let mut wrapped_dek = [0u8; WRAPPED_DEK_LEN];
163 wrapped_dek.copy_from_slice(&wrapped);
164
165 // SEC-2: the old header's key wrap (salt, DEK nonce, wrapped DEK, as
166 // laid out at header bytes 86..162), to scrub once the new header
167 // is committed.
168 let mut old_wrap =
169 Vec::with_capacity(crypto::SALT_LEN + crypto::NONCE_LEN + WRAPPED_DEK_LEN);
170 old_wrap.extend_from_slice(&self.header.salt);
171 old_wrap.extend_from_slice(&self.header.dek_nonce);
172 old_wrap.extend_from_slice(&self.header.wrapped_dek);
173
174 // REKEY-1 (RB-004.2): until the new page 0 is on disk, a failure puts
175 // these back, so an `Err` means "still the old secret".
176 let before = self.header.clone();
177 let before_kdf = self.kdf;
178
179 self.header.salt = new_salt;
180 self.header.dek_nonce = new_nonce;
181 self.header.wrapped_dek = wrapped_dek;
182 self.header.m_cost = kdf.m_cost;
183 self.header.t_cost = kdf.t_cost;
184 self.header.p_cost = kdf.p_cost;
185 self.kdf = kdf;
186
187 // DUR-1 (R-002.1): WAL-log the new page 0 before touching it.
188 // Allocate a fresh WAL region at the tail so that a crash during
189 // the rekey leaves either the old region (old passphrase works)
190 // or the new region (new passphrase works) fully committed —
191 // overwriting the existing region would risk destroying both.
192 let old_wal_start = self.header.wal_start;
193 let new_pages = self.header.wal_pages;
194 let new_start = self.header.next_page;
195 self.header.next_page += new_pages;
196 self.header.wal_start = new_start;
197 self.header.wal_pages = new_pages;
198 self.header.wal_seq += 1;
199
200 // The steps of `relocate_header_through_wal`, apart, so a failure
201 // can be told from one before page 0 and one after it.
202 self.header.write_counter = self.pager.write_counter;
203 let mut page = self.header.to_page();
204 if let Err(e) = self.header.apply_seal(&mut page, self.pager.dek()) {
205 return Err(self.undo_rekey(before, before_kdf, None, false, e));
206 }
207 let frames = vec![(0u64, page.to_vec())];
208 let txn_id = self.header.wal_seq;
209 if let Err(e) = wal::commit(self.pager.file_mut(), new_start, new_pages, txn_id, &frames) {
210 let region = Some((new_start, new_pages));
211 return Err(self.undo_rekey(before, before_kdf, region, false, e));
212 }
213 if let Err(e) = self
214 .pager
215 .write_raw(0, &page)
216 .and_then(|_| self.pager.sync())
217 {
218 let region = Some((new_start, new_pages));
219 return Err(self.undo_rekey(before, before_kdf, region, true, e));
220 }
221
222 // The new page 0 is on disk: the new secret is in force, and nothing
223 // below fails the rekey. SEC-2 (RB-001.30): zero the old region's
224 // first frame header (so no scan reads it as a WAL), then all of it
225 // (its frames hold page-0 images with the old wrap), then any other
226 // stale copy of the old wrap in the file (an earlier, grown or
227 // relocated region). Each step runs even if the one before failed.
228 // Hygiene only: a copy of the file taken before the rekey still
229 // opens with the old secret (see `rekey`).
230 let mut left = Vec::new();
231 if let Err(e) = wal::invalidate_region(self.pager.file_mut(), old_wal_start) {
232 left.push(format!("clearing the old WAL region's first frame: {e}"));
233 }
234 if let Err(e) = wal::scrub_region(self.pager.file_mut(), old_wal_start, new_pages) {
235 left.push(format!("zeroing the old WAL region: {e}"));
236 }
237 if let Err(e) = scrub_bytes(self.pager.file_mut(), &old_wrap) {
238 left.push(format!("overwriting other copies of the old key wrap: {e}"));
239 }
240 self.rekey_cleanup = (!left.is_empty()).then(|| left.join("; "));
241 // FMT-9 (a): the old region is freed by the next commit (see
242 // `ensure_wal_capacity`).
243 self.release_pages(old_wal_start, new_pages);
244 Ok(())
245 }
246
247 /// REKEY-1: a rekey failed before its new page 0 was on disk. Put the
248 /// header and the KDF back, so the handle (and every later write) uses
249 /// the old secret. Then, best effort: zero the new WAL region, whose
250 /// commit wraps the data key under the new secret, so a later
251 /// torn-header scan can't find it; and, if page 0 may have been
252 /// written, write the old one back.
253 fn undo_rekey(
254 &mut self,
255 before: crate::format::Header,
256 before_kdf: KdfParams,
257 new_region: Option<(u64, u64)>,
258 page0_written: bool,
259 err: MnemoError,
260 ) -> MnemoError {
261 self.header = before;
262 self.kdf = before_kdf;
263 if let Some((start, pages)) = new_region {
264 let _ = wal::scrub_region(self.pager.file_mut(), start, pages);
265 }
266 if !page0_written {
267 return err;
268 }
269 self.header.write_counter = self.pager.write_counter;
270 let mut page = self.header.to_page();
271 let put_back = self
272 .header
273 .apply_seal(&mut page, self.pager.dek())
274 .and_then(|_| self.pager.write_raw(0, &page))
275 .and_then(|_| self.pager.sync());
276 match put_back {
277 Ok(()) => err,
278 // `mnemo rekey` looks for "may open with either secret" to leave
279 // out its "the passphrase was not changed": keep the phrase.
280 Err(again) => MnemoError::Io(std::io::Error::other(format!(
281 "rekey failed writing the new header ({err}), and the old header \
282 couldn't be written back ({again}): the file may open with either \
283 secret; close it without writing and try both"
284 ))),
285 }
286 }
287
288 /// REKEY-1 (RB-004.2): after a successful [`Mnemo::rekey`] or
289 /// [`Mnemo::rekey_with_key`], what couldn't be scrubbed of the old key
290 /// wrap, or `None` if it all was. The rekey took effect either way; what
291 /// is left is plaintext key-wrap bytes the old secret could still use, so
292 /// to be sure, rotate (`compact_file`) as [`Mnemo::rekey`] describes.
293 /// Each rekey resets it.
294 pub fn rekey_cleanup_error(&self) -> Option<&str> {
295 self.rekey_cleanup.as_deref()
296 }
297
298 /// SEC-2 (RB-001.30): write a copy of this database at `dest` under a
299 /// **fresh data key**, protected by `passphrase` through `kdf`. It goes
300 /// through the compaction path (live memories, the result cache and
301 /// the index, no history), so the copy shares no key material with
302 /// this file: neither this file's passphrase nor its data key opens
303 /// it, and its passphrase opens nothing here. This file is flushed
304 /// first (unless read-only) and is otherwise unchanged; `dest` must not
305 /// exist. The copy is v9.
306 pub fn export_rekeyed(
307 &mut self,
308 dest: impl AsRef<Path>,
309 passphrase: &str,
310 kdf: KdfParams,
311 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
312 self.export_rekeyed_secret(dest.as_ref(), passphrase.as_bytes(), kdf)
313 }
314
315 /// [`Mnemo::export_rekeyed`] protected by a raw 256-bit key (no KDF).
316 pub fn export_rekeyed_with_key(
317 &mut self,
318 dest: impl AsRef<Path>,
319 key: &[u8; crypto::KEY_LEN],
320 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
321 self.export_rekeyed_secret(dest.as_ref(), key, KdfParams::raw_key())
322 }
323
324 pub(super) fn export_rekeyed_secret(
325 &mut self,
326 dest: &Path,
327 secret: &[u8],
328 kdf: KdfParams,
329 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
330 if paths_refer_to_same_file(&self.path, dest).unwrap_or(false) {
331 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
332 "export_rekeyed refuses to overwrite the open database at {}",
333 dest.display()
334 )));
335 }
336 if dest.exists() {
337 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
338 "{} already exists",
339 dest.display()
340 )));
341 }
342 if !self.read_only {
343 self.flush()?;
344 }
345 let mut name = dest.file_name().unwrap_or_default().to_os_string();
346 name.push(".export-tmp");
347 let tmp = dest.with_file_name(name);
348 let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
349 let result = (|| {
350 let mut new = Mnemo::create_secret(
351 &tmp,
352 secret,
353 MnemoConfig {
354 dimensions: self.dimensions,
355 kdf,
356 store_float_vectors: self.float_vectors(),
357 ..Default::default()
358 },
359 )?;
360 let report = self.copy_live_into(&mut new)?;
361 new.flush()?;
362 drop(new);
363 std::fs::rename(&tmp, dest)?;
364 Ok(report)
365 })();
366 if result.is_err() {
367 let _ = std::fs::remove_file(&tmp);
368 }
369 result
370 }
371
372 /// The compaction copy: every live, unexpired memory and cache entry of
373 /// `self` into `new` (a freshly created file), and the index if `self`
374 /// has one. Counts as [`CompactReport`].
375 pub(super) fn copy_live_into(&mut self, new: &mut Mnemo) -> Result<CompactReport> {
376 // FMT-9e: compaction rewrites everything, so it compresses every
377 // thread turn, recent or not.
378 new.turn_compress_after = 0;
379 // ANN-1.1: compaction is "re-tune for the current size" by
380 // default. Pass IndexConfig::default() so partitions,
381 // subspaces, n_probe and n_rerank are all re-derived from the
382 // compacted vector count. Previously we froze the pre-compact
383 // (n_probe, n_rerank), which left the new index on stale
384 // numbers for the smaller post-compact corpus.
385 let want_index = self.has_index();
386 let now = memory::now_secs();
387 let all = self.memories()?;
388 let before = all.len();
389 let mut after = 0;
390 let mut zero_vector_manifests = 0;
391 let mut zero_vector_memories = 0;
392 for mut m in all {
393 if m.is_expired(now) {
394 continue;
395 }
396 // A file from before the zero-vector rule (Phase 3 PR 10a) can
397 // hold all-zero vectors. A legacy onboarding or manifest memory
398 // gets the sentinel unit vector a current manifest has, so it
399 // behaves like a new one; any other is carried unchanged.
400 if embed::is_zero_vector(&m.vector) {
401 if crud::is_onboarding(&m) || is_manifest(&m) {
402 m.vector = Memory::scaffold_manifest(self.dimensions).vector;
403 zero_vector_manifests += 1;
404 } else {
405 zero_vector_memories += 1;
406 }
407 }
408 // The engine's own copy: `_mnemo.*` keys come through as they
409 // are, and the write-time zero-vector check doesn't apply.
410 new.put_existing(m)?;
411 after += 1;
412 }
413 if want_index && after > 0 {
414 new.build_index_with(IndexConfig::default())?;
415 }
416
417 // Count + copy cache entries. We walk `self.cache_dir` by index
418 // so each hop reads the directory's live `accessed_at` /
419 // `access_count` directly rather than going through
420 // `cache_get` (which would also treat read-only semantics,
421 // tombstones, etc. — we want the raw, authoritative values).
422 let mut cache_before = 0usize;
423 let mut cache_after = 0usize;
424 let positions: Vec<usize> = (0..self.cache_dir.len()).collect();
425 for pos in positions {
426 let (keep, reserved) = {
427 let e = &self.cache_dir[pos];
428 (
429 !e.deleted && !e.is_expired(now),
430 embed::is_reserved_namespace(&e.namespace),
431 )
432 };
433 if keep {
434 // EMBED-ID-1: the engine's own entries (the embedder
435 // identity) are copied but not counted.
436 new.copy_cache_entry_from(self, pos)?;
437 if !reserved {
438 cache_before += 1;
439 cache_after += 1;
440 }
441 }
442 }
443 Ok(CompactReport {
444 before,
445 after,
446 cache_before,
447 cache_after,
448 zero_vector_manifests,
449 zero_vector_memories,
450 })
451 }
452
453 /// Decrypt and validate every live record. Returns the count verified
454 /// across memories **and** cache entries (FIX-1 R-001.1: now that the
455 /// cache survives compaction, `verify()` has to walk it too — the
456 /// pre-FIX-1 implementation only checked `self.catalog`, so a
457 /// corrupted cache record went unnoticed).
458 pub fn verify(&mut self) -> Result<usize> {
459 Ok(self.verify_report()?.records)
460 }
461
462 /// [`Mnemo::verify`], also counting the memories whose vector is all
463 /// zeros. A file written before the zero-vector rule (Phase 3 PR 10a)
464 /// can hold them; they decode fine but score 0.0 on every vector query.
465 /// `mnemo verify` warns about them, and compaction carries them
466 /// (giving a legacy manifest the sentinel vector).
467 pub fn verify_report(&mut self) -> Result<VerifyReport> {
468 let entries: Vec<CatalogEntry> = self
469 .catalog
470 .iter()
471 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
472 .cloned()
473 .collect();
474 let mut n = entries.len();
475 let mut zero_vector_memories = 0;
476 for e in &entries {
477 let bytes = self.read_record(e)?;
478 let m: Memory = self.decode_memory(&bytes)?;
479 // FMT-9b: and the row's vector column entry.
480 let zero = if e.v9.is_some() {
481 let (h, _) = self.column_entry(e)?;
482 if h.len() != self.dimensions {
483 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(
484 "vector entry has the wrong width".into(),
485 ));
486 }
487 // fp16 +0.0 and -0.0.
488 !h.is_empty() && h.iter().all(|b| b & 0x7fff == 0)
489 } else {
490 embed::is_zero_vector(&m.vector)
491 };
492 if zero {
493 zero_vector_memories += 1;
494 }
495 }
496
497 // Also decode every live cache entry. Tombstoned entries are
498 // skipped — their pages are orphan ciphertext awaiting
499 // `compact_file`, same as deleted memories. Expired entries
500 // are *still* on disk until compaction, so we verify them too.
501 let cache_positions: Vec<(u64, u32, u32, u64, bool)> = self
502 .cache_dir
503 .iter()
504 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
505 .map(|e| {
506 let reserved = embed::is_reserved_namespace(&e.namespace);
507 (e.start_page, e.page_count, e.len, e.gen, reserved)
508 })
509 .collect();
510 for (start_page, page_count, len, gen, reserved) in cache_positions {
511 let buf = self.read_record_run(start_page, page_count, len, gen)?;
512 let _c: CacheEntry = rmp_serde::from_slice(&buf)
513 .map_err(|err| MnemoError::Serialize(err.to_string()))?;
514 // EMBED-ID-1: the engine's own entries are checked, not counted.
515 if !reserved {
516 n += 1;
517 }
518 }
519 // FMT-9 (a): no free run may overlap a page the committed state
520 // references (records, cache entries, control runs, the WAL).
521 if self.is_v9() {
522 self.check_free_list_disjoint()?;
523 }
524 Ok(VerifyReport {
525 records: n,
526 zero_vector_memories,
527 })
528 }
529
530 /// FMT-9 (a): fail if the free list (or a pending free) overlaps any
531 /// page the current state references.
532 pub(super) fn check_free_list_disjoint(&self) -> Result<()> {
533 let h = &self.header;
534 let mut live: Vec<(u64, u64, &str)> = vec![
535 (h.wal_start, h.wal_pages, "WAL region"),
536 (h.catalog_start, h.catalog_pages, "catalog run"),
537 (h.index_start, h.index_pages, "index run"),
538 (h.manifest_start, h.manifest_pages, "manifest run"),
539 (h.cache_start, h.cache_pages, "cache directory run"),
540 (h.free.start, h.free.pages, "free-list run"),
541 (h.keys.start, h.keys.pages, "key-slot run"),
542 ];
543 live.extend(
544 self.catalog
545 .iter()
546 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
547 .map(|e| (e.start_page, e.page_count as u64, "record")),
548 );
549 live.extend(
550 self.cache_dir
551 .iter()
552 .filter(|e| !e.deleted)
553 .map(|e| (e.start_page, e.page_count as u64, "cache entry")),
554 );
555 live.extend(self.col.page_rows.keys().map(|&p| (p, 1, "vector page")));
556 live.extend(
557 self.delta_chain
558 .iter()
559 .map(|r| (r.start, r.pages, "catalog delta run")),
560 );
561 live.extend(
562 self.index_chain
563 .iter()
564 .map(|r| (r.start, r.pages, "index delta run")),
565 );
566 live.push((
567 self.header.bm25.start,
568 self.header.bm25.pages,
569 "BM25 manifest",
570 ));
571 live.extend(
572 self.bm25
573 .manifest
574 .segments
575 .iter()
576 .map(|t| (t.0, t.1, "BM25 segment")),
577 );
578 for (p, c, what) in live {
579 if c == 0 {
580 continue;
581 }
582 if self.free.overlaps(p, c) {
583 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
584 "free list overlaps a live {what} at page {p} (+{c})"
585 )));
586 }
587 if self
588 .pending_free
589 .iter()
590 .any(|&(q, n)| q < p + c && p < q + n)
591 {
592 return Err(MnemoError::Invalid(format!(
593 "a pending free overlaps a live {what} at page {p} (+{c})"
594 )));
595 }
596 }
597 Ok(())
598 }
599
600 /// The statistics that need no record decrypts and no index load
601 /// (v0.12.2, RB-002.3): counts, sizes, the format, whether an index
602 /// exists, the recall mode and the bytes the vector column needs. The
603 /// first [`Mnemo::stats`] on a handle decrypts every record (for its
604 /// agent list) and loads a persisted index; this is what a phone app
605 /// polling the recall mode should call.
606 pub fn stats_summary(&self) -> StatsSummary {
607 let deleted = self.catalog.iter().filter(|e| e.deleted).count();
608 let v9 = self.is_v9();
609 let column = if v9 {
610 (self.scored_rows() * crate::veccol::entry_len(self.dimensions)) as u64
611 } else {
612 0
613 };
614 let recall_mode = if self.has_index() {
615 RecallMode::Indexed
616 } else if v9 && column <= self.vector_cache_budget as u64 {
617 RecallMode::ExactResident
618 } else {
619 RecallMode::ExactPaged
620 };
621 let rp = self.restore_points();
622 StatsSummary {
623 memories: self.len(),
624 deleted,
625 dimensions: self.dimensions,
626 file_bytes: self.header.next_page * PAGE_SIZE as u64,
627 format_version: self.header.version,
628 wal_pages: self.header.wal_pages,
629 has_index: self.has_index(),
630 recall_mode,
631 vector_column_bytes: column,
632 snapshots_retained: rp.retained,
633 oldest_restorable_at: rp.oldest_at,
634 snapshot_pinned_bytes: rp.pinned_bytes,
635 }
636 }
637
638 /// Summary statistics for the open database. The first call on a
639 /// handle decrypts every record (to list the agents) and loads a
640 /// persisted index; [`Mnemo::stats_summary`] does neither.
641 pub fn stats(&mut self) -> Result<Stats> {
642 let deleted = self.catalog.iter().filter(|e| e.deleted).count();
643 // FIX-1 R-001.8 part 2: build the agent set lazily on first
644 // call per handle, then maintain in `put` / invalidate in
645 // `delete`. Pre-FIX-1 every `stats()` call decrypted every
646 // live memory (O(N) AES-GCM decrypts just to list a usually-
647 // tiny set of distinct agent IDs). On a 1M-memory database
648 // this was in the multi-second range on hardware AES.
649 if self.agent_set.is_none() {
650 let built: std::collections::BTreeSet<String> =
651 self.memories()?.into_iter().map(|m| m.agent_id).collect();
652 self.agent_set = Some(built);
653 }
654 let agents: Vec<String> = self
655 .agent_set
656 .as_ref()
657 .expect("agent_set just filled above")
658 .iter()
659 .cloned()
660 .collect();
661 let file_bytes = self.header.next_page * PAGE_SIZE as u64;
662 let recall_mode = self.recall_mode()?;
663 let rp = self.restore_points();
664 Ok(Stats {
665 memories: self.len(),
666 deleted,
667 dimensions: self.dimensions,
668 file_bytes,
669 agents,
670 encrypted: self.header.flags & FLAG_ENCRYPTED != 0,
671 created_at: self.header.created_at,
672 index: {
673 self.ensure_ann()?;
674 self.ann.as_ref().map(|a| a.info())
675 },
676 wal_pages: self.header.wal_pages,
677 fsyncs_last_flush: self.fsyncs_last_flush,
678 format_version: self.header.version,
679 recall_mode,
680 snapshots_retained: rp.retained,
681 oldest_restorable_at: rp.oldest_at,
682 snapshot_pinned_bytes: rp.pinned_bytes,
683 })
684 }
685
686 /// Rewrite the file, dropping tombstoned and expired memories and
687 /// reclaiming stale pages left by updates. Done out-of-place via a temp
688 /// file and an atomic rename.
689 ///
690 /// FIX-1 R-001.1 + R-002.2 part 2: the result cache now survives
691 /// compaction. Every live, non-expired directory entry is copied
692 /// into the new file verbatim — `created_at`, `ttl_secs`,
693 /// `cost_hint_ms`, `key_preview`, `size_bytes`, `content_type`,
694 /// `vector` and `model` come from the record body; `accessed_at`
695 /// and `access_count` come from the *directory* (the record body
696 /// only holds the insert-time snapshot — the directory is the
697 /// source of truth for the live counts, as of v5's recall trick).
698 /// Tombstoned and TTL-expired entries are dropped. Pre-FIX-1
699 /// compaction kept only the memory catalog and silently emptied
700 /// the cache; the Planner's interim README caveat (c417d2e) called
701 /// that out — this PR removes the surprise.
702 ///
703 /// The output is always v9, so this is also how a v4–v8 file is
704 /// converted: the only read-write open that accepts one (the v8
705 /// sunset, v0.13). It keeps every live memory.
706 pub fn compact_file(path: &str, passphrase: &str) -> Result<CompactReport> {
707 Self::compact_file_secret(path, passphrase.as_bytes(), 0)
708 }
709
710 /// PERF-1 step 7: [`Mnemo::compact_file`] for a raw-key database.
711 pub fn compact_file_with_key(path: &str, key: &[u8; crypto::KEY_LEN]) -> Result<CompactReport> {
712 Self::compact_file_secret(path, key, 0)
713 }
714
715 pub(super) fn compact_file_secret(
716 path: &str,
717 secret: &[u8],
718 format_version: u16,
719 ) -> Result<CompactReport> {
720 // The one read-write open that takes a v4–v8 file (the v8 sunset).
721 let mut old = Mnemo::open_secret_with(path, secret, true)?;
722 let dims = old.dimensions;
723 let kdf = old.kdf;
724 let tmp = format!("{path}.compact-tmp");
725
726 let mut new = Mnemo::create_secret(
727 &tmp,
728 secret,
729 MnemoConfig {
730 dimensions: dims,
731 kdf,
732 // FMT-9f: compaction writes v9 (upgrading a v8 file),
733 // unless `compact_file_to` asked for v8. A v9 file that
734 // keeps float vectors keeps them.
735 format_version,
736 store_float_vectors: old.float_vectors(),
737 ..Default::default()
738 },
739 )?;
740 let report = old.copy_live_into(&mut new)?;
741
742 new.flush()?;
743 drop(new);
744 drop(old);
745
746 std::fs::rename(&tmp, path)?;
747 Ok(report)
748 }
749
750 /// Copy one live cache entry from `old` at directory position
751 /// `pos` into `self` (a freshly-created compaction target).
752 /// Decrypts the old record body, substitutes the old *directory*'s
753 /// `accessed_at` + `access_count` (the record body's copies are
754 /// stale as of v5's directory-only hit path), re-encodes, writes
755 /// a fresh record run, and pushes a matching directory entry.
756 ///
757 /// Caller is expected to have already filtered out tombstoned /
758 /// expired entries and to call this on a read-write handle.
759 pub(crate) fn copy_cache_entry_from(&mut self, old: &mut Mnemo, pos: usize) -> Result<()> {
760 if self.read_only {
761 return Err(MnemoError::ReadOnly);
762 }
763 // Snapshot the directory fields we need, so the borrow on
764 // `old.cache_dir` ends before we touch `old.pager`.
765 let (start_page, page_count, len, dir_accessed_at, dir_access_count, old_gen) = {
766 let e = &old.cache_dir[pos];
767 (
768 e.start_page,
769 e.page_count,
770 e.len,
771 e.accessed_at,
772 e.access_count,
773 e.gen,
774 )
775 };
776
777 // Read + decrypt the old record body.
778 let buf = old.read_record_run(start_page, page_count, len, old_gen)?;
779 let mut entry: CacheEntry =
780 rmp_serde::from_slice(&buf).map_err(|e| MnemoError::Serialize(e.to_string()))?;
781
782 // Overwrite the stale body copies with the directory's live
783 // values before persisting. Everything else — `created_at`,
784 // `ttl_secs`, `cost_hint_ms`, `key_preview`, `size_bytes`,
785 // `content_type`, `value`, `vector`, `model` — stays as the
786 // body already recorded it.
787 entry.accessed_at = dir_accessed_at;
788 entry.access_count = dir_access_count;
789
790 let bytes =
791 rmp_serde::to_vec(&entry).map_err(|err| MnemoError::Serialize(err.to_string()))?;
792 let (new_start_page, new_page_count, gen) = self.write_record(&bytes)?;
793
794 let dir_entry = CacheDirectoryEntry {
795 namespace: entry.namespace.clone(),
796 key_hash: entry.key_hash,
797 start_page: new_start_page,
798 page_count: new_page_count,
799 len: bytes.len() as u32,
800 deleted: false,
801 accessed_at: dir_accessed_at,
802 access_count: dir_access_count,
803 size_bytes: entry.size_bytes,
804 ttl_secs: entry.ttl_secs,
805 created_at: entry.created_at,
806 vector: entry.vector.clone(),
807 model: entry.model.clone(),
808 gen,
809 };
810 let new_pos = self.cache_dir.len();
811 self.cache_idx
812 .insert(&entry.namespace, entry.key_hash, new_pos);
813 self.cache_dir.push(dir_entry);
814 self.dirty_cache = true;
815 Ok(())
816 }
817}
818
819/// SEC-2 (RB-001.30): overwrite every occurrence of `needle` in the file
820/// with zeros, then sync. Rekey uses it for stale copies of the old header's
821/// key wrap: they're plaintext (page 0 is sealed, not encrypted) and can sit
822/// in WAL regions that were grown, relocated or freed. Every other page is
823/// AES-GCM ciphertext, where a 76-byte random match doesn't happen.
824pub(super) fn scrub_bytes(file: &mut std::fs::File, needle: &[u8]) -> Result<usize> {
825 if needle.is_empty() {
826 return Ok(0);
827 }
828 let len = file.seek(SeekFrom::End(0))?;
829 let chunk = 1 << 20;
830 let overlap = needle.len() - 1;
831 let mut hits: Vec<u64> = Vec::new();
832 let mut buf = vec![0u8; chunk + overlap];
833 let mut pos: u64 = 0;
834 while pos < len {
835 let want = (chunk as u64 + overlap as u64).min(len - pos) as usize;
836 file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(pos))?;
837 file.read_exact(&mut buf[..want])?;
838 let mut i = 0;
839 while i + needle.len() <= want {
840 if buf[i..i + needle.len()] == *needle {
841 hits.push(pos + i as u64);
842 i += needle.len();
843 } else {
844 i += 1;
845 }
846 }
847 pos += chunk as u64;
848 }
849 hits.dedup();
850 let zeros = vec![0u8; needle.len()];
851 for off in &hits {
852 file.seek(SeekFrom::Start(*off))?;
853 file.write_all(&zeros)?;
854 }
855 if !hits.is_empty() {
856 file.sync_all()?;
857 crate::bump_fsync();
858 }
859 Ok(hits.len())
860}