miden_core/mast/untrusted.rs
1use alloc::vec::Vec;
2use core::panic::Location;
3
4use super::{AdviceMap, MastForest, MastForestError, serialization};
5use crate::serde::{BudgetedReader, ByteReader, DeserializationError, SliceReader};
6
7/// A [`MastForest`] deserialized from untrusted input that has not yet been validated.
8///
9/// This type wraps a serialized-backed, decoded MAST representation that has not had its node
10/// hashes verified. Before using the forest, callers must call [`validate()`](Self::validate) to
11/// materialize and verify structural integrity and node hashes.
12///
13/// # Usage
14///
15/// ```ignore
16/// // Deserialize from untrusted bytes
17/// let untrusted = UntrustedMastForest::read_from_bytes(&bytes)?;
18///
19/// // Validate structure and hashes
20/// let forest = untrusted.validate()?;
21///
22/// // Now safe to use
23/// let root = forest.procedure_roots()[0];
24/// ```
25///
26/// # Security
27///
28/// This type exists to provide type-level safety for untrusted deserialization. The validation
29/// performed by [`validate()`](Self::validate) includes:
30///
31/// 1. **Structural validation**: Checks that basic block batch invariants are satisfied.
32/// 2. **Topological ordering**: Verifies that all node references point to nodes that appear
33/// earlier in the forest (no forward references).
34/// 3. **Hash recomputation**: Recomputes the digest for every node and verifies it matches the
35/// stored digest.
36#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
37pub struct UntrustedMastForest {
38 pub(super) bytes: Vec<u8>,
39 pub(super) layout: serialization::ForestLayout,
40 pub(super) advice_map: AdviceMap,
41 pub(super) remaining_allocation_budget: Option<usize>,
42}
43
44/// Options for reading an [`UntrustedMastForest`] from bytes.
45#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
46pub struct UntrustedMastForestReadOptions {
47 wire_byte_budget: Option<usize>,
48 validation_allocation_budget: Option<usize>,
49}
50
51impl UntrustedMastForestReadOptions {
52 /// Creates options that use the default untrusted budgets.
53 pub fn new() -> Self {
54 Self::default()
55 }
56
57 /// Sets the maximum number of serialized bytes consumed while parsing wire data.
58 pub fn with_wire_byte_budget(mut self, budget: usize) -> Self {
59 self.wire_byte_budget = Some(budget);
60 self
61 }
62
63 #[cfg(test)]
64 pub(crate) fn with_validation_allocation_budget(mut self, budget: usize) -> Self {
65 self.validation_allocation_budget = Some(budget);
66 self
67 }
68
69 fn wire_byte_budget(self, bytes_len: usize) -> usize {
70 self.wire_byte_budget.unwrap_or(bytes_len)
71 }
72
73 fn validation_allocation_budget(self, wire_byte_budget: usize) -> usize {
74 self.validation_allocation_budget
75 .unwrap_or_else(|| serialization::default_untrusted_allocation_budget(wire_byte_budget))
76 }
77}
78
79impl UntrustedMastForest {
80 /// Deserializes an [`UntrustedMastForest`] from a byte reader.
81 ///
82 /// Note: This method does not apply budgeting. For untrusted bytes, prefer
83 /// [`read_from_bytes`](Self::read_from_bytes) or
84 /// [`read_from_bytes_with_options`](Self::read_from_bytes_with_options).
85 #[track_caller]
86 pub fn read_from_reader<R: ByteReader>(source: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DeserializationError> {
87 let caller = Location::caller();
88 serialization::read_untrusted_with_flags_and_caller(source, caller)
89 .map(|(forest, _flags)| forest)
90 }
91
92 /// Validates the forest by checking structural invariants and recomputing all node hashes.
93 ///
94 /// This method performs a complete validation of the deserialized forest:
95 ///
96 /// 1. If wire node hashes are present, recomputes all non-external node hashes and requires
97 /// them to match the serialized digests.
98 /// 2. If the payload is hashless, uses the digests rebuilt during materialization.
99 /// 3. Validates structural invariants and topological ordering.
100 ///
101 /// # Returns
102 ///
103 /// - `Ok(MastForest)` if validation succeeds
104 /// - `Err(MastForestError)` with details about the first validation failure
105 ///
106 /// # Errors
107 ///
108 /// Returns an error if:
109 /// - Deferred materialization from serialized form fails ([`MastForestError::Deserialization`])
110 /// - Any basic block has invalid batch structure ([`MastForestError::InvalidBatchPadding`])
111 /// - Any node references a child that appears later in the forest
112 /// ([`MastForestError::ForwardReference`])
113 /// - Any non-external wire digest does not match the recomputed digest
114 /// ([`MastForestError::HashMismatch`])
115 /// - Any node's digest cannot be recomputed because structural validation fails first
116 ///
117 /// Security convention:
118 /// - Hashless payloads rebuild non-external digests from structure during materialization.
119 /// - If wire node hashes are present, validation recomputes them and requires them to match.
120 /// - External node digests are marshaled as opaque values and are not semantically resolved
121 /// here.
122 pub fn validate(self) -> Result<MastForest, MastForestError> {
123 let is_hashless = self.layout.is_hashless();
124 let forest = self.into_materialized().map_err(MastForestError::Deserialization)?;
125
126 // Step 1: Validate over-specified wire hashes instead of silently rewriting them.
127 if !is_hashless {
128 forest.validate_node_hashes()?;
129 }
130
131 // Step 2: Validate the recomputed forest.
132 forest.validate()?;
133
134 Ok(forest)
135 }
136
137 /// Deserializes an [`UntrustedMastForest`] from bytes.
138 ///
139 /// This method uses a [`BudgetedReader`] plus a bounded validation-allocation budget derived
140 /// from the input size to protect against denial-of-service attacks from malicious input.
141 /// The default validation budget includes room for the retained serialized copy used by the
142 /// deferred-validation path, in addition to hashless helper allocations. Concretely,
143 /// the default is `bytes.len()` for parsing and `bytes.len() * 7` for validation allocations.
144 /// That `* 7` factor is a coarse convenience bound, not an exact peak-memory formula.
145 ///
146 /// For an explicit wire parsing limit, use
147 /// [`read_from_bytes_with_options`](Self::read_from_bytes_with_options).
148 ///
149 /// # Example
150 ///
151 /// ```ignore
152 /// // Read from untrusted source
153 /// let untrusted = UntrustedMastForest::read_from_bytes(&bytes)?;
154 ///
155 /// // Validate before use
156 /// let forest = untrusted.validate()?;
157 /// ```
158 #[track_caller]
159 pub fn read_from_bytes(bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<Self, DeserializationError> {
160 Self::read_from_bytes_with_options(bytes, UntrustedMastForestReadOptions::default())
161 }
162
163 /// Deserializes an [`UntrustedMastForest`] from bytes with explicit options.
164 ///
165 /// The wire byte budget limits wire-driven parsing and collection pre-sizing. The validation
166 /// helper-allocation budget is derived from that wire budget and caps tracked hashless helper
167 /// allocations such as digest slot tables and rebuilt digest tables.
168 #[track_caller]
169 pub fn read_from_bytes_with_options(
170 bytes: &[u8],
171 options: UntrustedMastForestReadOptions,
172 ) -> Result<Self, DeserializationError> {
173 let caller = Location::caller();
174 let wire_byte_budget = options.wire_byte_budget(bytes.len());
175 let mut reader = BudgetedReader::new(SliceReader::new(bytes), wire_byte_budget);
176 let (forest, _flags) =
177 serialization::read_untrusted_with_flags_allocation_budget_and_caller(
178 &mut reader,
179 options.validation_allocation_budget(wire_byte_budget),
180 caller,
181 )?;
182 if reader.has_more_bytes() {
183 return Err(DeserializationError::InvalidValue(
184 "extra bytes after MastForest payload".into(),
185 ));
186 }
187 Ok(forest)
188 }
189}