microvms_app/control/artifact.rs
1// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
2//! The build artifact: a zip of the daemon binary, a Dockerfile, and — when the caller
3//! passes [`ProjectFiles`] — the project's dependency files.
4//!
5//! What `CreateMicrovmImage`'s `codeArtifact.uri` points at (`sandbox.py:523`
6//! `build_artifact`). Two entries always, both carrying a measured constraint, plus an
7//! ecosystem-named manifest/lockfile pair when the image bakes an environment layer (#74).
8//!
9//! # The execute bit has to be in the zip entry
10//!
11//! A build that copies a non-executable binary produces an image whose `CMD` fails, and
12//! the failure surfaces as a **run-hook timeout** — which says nothing about permissions,
13//! and sends the reader to look at the daemon's startup path instead of at the archive.
14//! So the `agentd` entry sets mode `0o755` explicitly rather than inheriting whatever the
15//! host file had.
16//!
17//! # The agent token is never in here (TRAP-5's other half)
18//!
19//! The artifact becomes a **shared image snapshot**: every MicroVM launched from the image
20//! sees the same bytes. A per-VM secret in there is a per-VM secret shared with every VM.
21//! So the token travels through `runHookPayload` at launch instead, and this function has
22//! no parameter that could carry one — see [`crate::control::microvm`]. The test at the
23//! bottom of this file scans the produced zip's raw bytes for a token value to prove the
24//! path stays closed, which is a byte scan rather than an API review because the leak
25//! would be a *value* appearing somewhere, not a parameter being declared.
26
27use std::io::Write as _;
28use std::time::Duration;
29
30use crate::error::{Error, ErrorKind};
31
32/// The Dockerfile entry's name, which the build looks for by convention.
33const DOCKERFILE_ENTRY: &str = "Dockerfile";
34
35/// The daemon entry's name, matching the `CMD ["/agentd"]` the Dockerfile sets.
36const AGENTD_ENTRY: &str = "agentd";
37
38/// The mode the daemon entry carries.
39///
40/// See the module docs: a non-executable binary here becomes a run-hook timeout later.
41const AGENTD_MODE: u32 = 0o755;
42
43/// An ecosystem whose dependency files may enter the build artifact (#74).
44///
45/// The variant fixes **both entry names**. That is the TRAP-5 half of the design: the
46/// artifact is a shared image snapshot, so what may enter it is an allowlist of
47/// dependency-defining files, not a caller-named list — there is no field anywhere in this
48/// module a caller could put `.env` or a credentials file's name into. The byte-scan test
49/// at the bottom of this file covers the entries this type admits.
50#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
51pub enum Ecosystem {
52 /// Python under uv: `pyproject.toml` + `uv.lock`.
53 Uv,
54 /// Node under npm: `package.json` + `package-lock.json`.
55 Npm,
56 /// Rust under cargo: `Cargo.toml` + `Cargo.lock`.
57 Cargo,
58}
59
60impl Ecosystem {
61 /// Every ecosystem, in detection order.
62 pub const ALL: [Self; 3] = [Self::Uv, Self::Npm, Self::Cargo];
63
64 /// The manifest's file name, which is also its zip entry name.
65 pub fn manifest_name(self) -> &'static str {
66 match self {
67 Self::Uv => "pyproject.toml",
68 Self::Npm => "package.json",
69 Self::Cargo => "Cargo.toml",
70 }
71 }
72
73 /// The lockfile's file name, which is also its zip entry name — and the file the
74 /// environment layer is keyed on (#74).
75 pub fn lockfile_name(self) -> &'static str {
76 match self {
77 Self::Uv => "uv.lock",
78 Self::Npm => "package-lock.json",
79 Self::Cargo => "Cargo.lock",
80 }
81 }
82
83 /// The whole `RUN` line that installs the environment layer: toolchain bootstrap on
84 /// the managed al2023 base, then the lockfile-faithful install.
85 ///
86 /// # The install commands are the lockfile-faithful spellings
87 ///
88 /// `uv sync --locked`, `npm ci`, and `cargo fetch --locked` each **refuse** a lockfile
89 /// that disagrees with its manifest rather than quietly re-resolving — which is what
90 /// keeps the baked layer the thing the content hash says it is. `uv sync` without
91 /// `--locked`, `npm install`, or a bare `cargo fetch` would install *something* and
92 /// the hash would then name an environment the build did not produce.
93 ///
94 /// # The bootstrap packages are measured, the full build is not yet
95 ///
96 /// The managed base is al2023-minimal and ships no toolchain, so each line installs
97 /// its own. Package names and the binaries they land were verified against the
98 /// Amazon Linux 2023 repos (2026-08-31): `python3.12-pip` puts `pip3.12` on PATH,
99 /// `nodejs22-npm` puts `npm` and `node` on PATH, `cargo` puts `cargo` on PATH.
100 /// `install_weak_deps=0` keeps the layer minimal. A full in-guest build of each line
101 /// is the live-conformance scenario #74's acceptance defers to — see the issue.
102 ///
103 /// Cargo is the one that needs a stub: `cargo fetch` refuses a package with no
104 /// targets, so the line creates an empty `src/main.rs` first. The working tree synced
105 /// at launch lands over it.
106 pub fn install_run_line(self) -> &'static str {
107 match self {
108 Self::Uv => {
109 "RUN dnf -y --setopt=install_weak_deps=0 install python3.12 python3.12-pip \
110 && dnf clean all && pip3.12 install --no-cache-dir uv && uv sync --locked"
111 }
112 Self::Npm => {
113 "RUN dnf -y --setopt=install_weak_deps=0 install nodejs22-npm \
114 && dnf clean all && npm ci"
115 }
116 Self::Cargo => {
117 "RUN dnf -y --setopt=install_weak_deps=0 install cargo \
118 && dnf clean all && mkdir -p src && touch src/main.rs \
119 && cargo fetch --locked"
120 }
121 }
122 }
123}
124
125/// A project's dependency files: the lockfile plus the manifest that owns it.
126///
127/// Bytes rather than paths, for the reason [`build_artifact`]'s `binary` is bytes: the
128/// caller owns the read, and this module keeps no filesystem behaviour to stub in a test.
129/// The entry names come from [`Ecosystem`], never from the caller — see the type's docs
130/// for why that is a TRAP-5 property rather than a convenience.
131#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
132pub struct ProjectFiles {
133 /// Which ecosystem's pair this is, fixing both entry names.
134 pub ecosystem: Ecosystem,
135 /// The manifest's bytes (`pyproject.toml`, `package.json`, `Cargo.toml`).
136 pub manifest: Vec<u8>,
137 /// The lockfile's bytes (`uv.lock`, `package-lock.json`, `Cargo.lock`).
138 pub lockfile: Vec<u8>,
139}
140
141/// Zips `binary` with `dockerfile` — and, when given, the project's dependency files —
142/// into the bytes `codeArtifact.uri` will point at.
143///
144/// `binary` is the daemon's bytes rather than a path, so the caller owns the read and this
145/// function has no filesystem behaviour to stub in a test. `project` adds exactly two more
146/// entries, named by its [`Ecosystem`], at the archive root beside the Dockerfile — which
147/// is the build context root, so a `COPY pyproject.toml uv.lock …` in the Dockerfile finds
148/// them.
149pub fn build_artifact(
150 binary: &[u8],
151 dockerfile: &str,
152 project: Option<&ProjectFiles>,
153) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
154 build_artifact_with_context(binary, dockerfile, project, None)
155}
156
157/// The mode every non-executable artifact entry carries.
158const FILE_MODE: u32 = 0o644;
159
160/// [`build_artifact`] plus a build context: the context's files at their relative paths
161/// beside the Dockerfile, which is the build context root, so the Dockerfile's `COPY` lines
162/// find them (IMAGE-7).
163///
164/// # One set of inputs, one object
165///
166/// Every entry carries the DOS epoch (1980-01-01) as its date and a fixed mode — `0o755` for
167/// the daemon and for context files with an execute bit, `0o644` for everything else — under
168/// Unix as the host system, and the entries are written in a fixed order: `Dockerfile`, `agentd`, the project pair, then
169/// the context sorted by name. So equal inputs produce byte-identical archives on any host
170/// at any time, and a content-addressed S3 key holds one object rather than whichever
171/// upload landed last. (Byte identity across `zip` crate versions is not promised; the image
172/// name hashes the inputs, not these bytes, for exactly that reason — see
173/// [`artifact_content_hash`].)
174///
175/// Refuses a `binary` that isn't an aarch64 ELF, empty included (#257): every artifact
176/// carries the daemon as its `CMD`, and a build finds the wrong one only as a run-hook
177/// timeout. Refuses a context entry that repeats a project file's name, since one archive
178/// cannot hold two entries of one name.
179pub fn build_artifact_with_context(
180 binary: &[u8],
181 dockerfile: &str,
182 project: Option<&ProjectFiles>,
183 context: Option<&super::context::BuildContext>,
184) -> Result<Vec<u8>, Error> {
185 use zip::write::{SimpleFileOptions, ZipWriter};
186
187 microvms_domain::provision::require_aarch64(binary)?;
188 if let (Some(project), Some(context)) = (project, context)
189 && let Some(entry) = context.entries().iter().find(|entry| {
190 entry.name == project.ecosystem.manifest_name()
191 || entry.name == project.ecosystem.lockfile_name()
192 })
193 {
194 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
195 "the build context has {:?} at its root, which the project files already carry; drop one of the two.",
196 entry.name
197 )));
198 }
199
200 let mut writer = ZipWriter::new(std::io::Cursor::new(Vec::new()));
201 // Unix as every entry's host system: left unset, zip records the host the build runs on,
202 // MS-DOS on Windows, where a reader that follows the record reads these modes as DOS
203 // attributes (zip 9 gives `0o664`, so the daemon loses its execute bit) and the bytes
204 // differ from a Linux or macOS build of the same inputs.
205 let options = |mode: u32| {
206 SimpleFileOptions::default()
207 .compression_method(zip::CompressionMethod::Deflated)
208 .last_modified_time(zip::DateTime::default())
209 .system(zip::System::Unix)
210 .unix_permissions(mode)
211 };
212
213 let mut write_entry = |name: &str, bytes: &[u8], mode: u32| {
214 writer
215 .start_file(name, options(mode))
216 .and_then(|()| writer.write_all(bytes).map_err(Into::into))
217 .map_err(|error| {
218 Error::new(
219 ErrorKind::Unexpected,
220 format!("could not add {name} to the build artifact: {error}"),
221 )
222 })
223 };
224
225 write_entry(DOCKERFILE_ENTRY, dockerfile.as_bytes(), FILE_MODE)?;
226 write_entry(AGENTD_ENTRY, binary, AGENTD_MODE)?;
227 if let Some(project) = project {
228 write_entry(
229 project.ecosystem.manifest_name(),
230 &project.manifest,
231 FILE_MODE,
232 )?;
233 write_entry(
234 project.ecosystem.lockfile_name(),
235 &project.lockfile,
236 FILE_MODE,
237 )?;
238 }
239 if let Some(context) = context {
240 for entry in context.entries() {
241 write_entry(&entry.name, &entry.bytes, entry.mode)?;
242 }
243 }
244
245 let bytes = writer
246 .finish()
247 .map_err(|error| {
248 Error::new(
249 ErrorKind::Unexpected,
250 format!("could not finish the build artifact: {error}"),
251 )
252 })?
253 .into_inner();
254 Ok(bytes)
255}
256
257/// The sha256 of the artifact's inputs, as lowercase hex.
258///
259/// # What is hashed, and why not the zip
260///
261/// The **inputs** — the daemon binary's bytes, the Dockerfile text, and the project
262/// files when the artifact carries them — rather than the bytes [`build_artifact`]
263/// produces. The zip is a container: its byte identity depends on the `zip` crate's
264/// version, its compression level, and its header defaults, so an upgraded dependency
265/// would silently change every image name and orphan every reuse. The inputs are what a
266/// build actually consumes, and two builds with equal inputs produce interchangeable
267/// images — which is the property content-addressed reuse rests on.
268///
269/// Each input is length-prefixed before hashing, so `(binary="ab", dockerfile="c")` and
270/// `(binary="a", dockerfile="bc")` are different hashes rather than one concatenation.
271/// A project file contributes its entry **name and bytes**, both length-prefixed, so the
272/// same bytes under a different ecosystem — `Cargo.lock` and `package-lock.json` holding
273/// identical text — are different identities too.
274///
275/// # `None` is the historical digest, deliberately
276///
277/// With no project files the digest stream is byte-identical to what this function
278/// produced before #74, so every projectless image name in every account survives the
279/// change — the alternative orphans exactly the reuse this hash exists to serve. The
280/// pinned vector in the tests is what holds that fixed. This is #74's key: two projects
281/// with identical lockfiles share an image, and a lockfile edit is a new name and a
282/// fresh build.
283pub fn artifact_content_hash(
284 binary: &[u8],
285 dockerfile: &str,
286 project: Option<&ProjectFiles>,
287) -> String {
288 artifact_content_hash_with_context(binary, dockerfile, project, None)
289}
290
291/// The tag that opens the build context's part of the digest stream.
292///
293/// A project file contributes a fixed file name, so no project entry can begin with this
294/// tag's length and bytes: the two sections cannot be confused for each other.
295const CONTEXT_TAG: &[u8] = b"microvms-build-context/1";
296
297/// [`artifact_content_hash`] extended with a build context (IMAGE-6).
298///
299/// With no context, or an empty one, the stream is byte-for-byte the one
300/// `artifact_content_hash` hashed before #221 — an empty context adds no entry, so it is the
301/// same artifact — and the pinned vector in the tests holds that fixed, so no `build --reuse`
302/// or `AgentVm` image name moves. A non-empty context appends [`CONTEXT_TAG`], the entry
303/// count, and each entry's name, mode, and bytes, the name and bytes length-prefixed. The
304/// entries are sorted by name ([`super::context::BuildContext`]), so the order a filesystem
305/// listed them in is not part of the identity; the mode is, because `COPY` keeps it.
306pub fn artifact_content_hash_with_context(
307 binary: &[u8],
308 dockerfile: &str,
309 project: Option<&ProjectFiles>,
310 context: Option<&super::context::BuildContext>,
311) -> String {
312 use sha2::{Digest as _, Sha256};
313
314 let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
315 hasher.update((binary.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
316 hasher.update(binary);
317 hasher.update((dockerfile.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
318 hasher.update(dockerfile.as_bytes());
319 if let Some(project) = project {
320 for (name, bytes) in [
321 (project.ecosystem.manifest_name(), &project.manifest),
322 (project.ecosystem.lockfile_name(), &project.lockfile),
323 ] {
324 hasher.update((name.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
325 hasher.update(name.as_bytes());
326 hasher.update((bytes.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
327 hasher.update(bytes);
328 }
329 }
330 if let Some(context) = context.filter(|context| !context.entries().is_empty()) {
331 hasher.update((CONTEXT_TAG.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
332 hasher.update(CONTEXT_TAG);
333 hasher.update((context.entries().len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
334 for entry in context.entries() {
335 hasher.update((entry.name.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
336 hasher.update(entry.name.as_bytes());
337 hasher.update(entry.mode.to_be_bytes());
338 hasher.update((entry.bytes.len() as u64).to_be_bytes());
339 hasher.update(&entry.bytes);
340 }
341 }
342 const_hex::encode(hasher.finalize())
343}
344
345/// A base image: the platform ARN, the Dockerfile `FROM` that pairs with it, and whether
346/// it declares a `WORKDIR`.
347///
348/// All three together because the first two **must** agree and used to be able to
349/// disagree: the Python client's `DEFAULT_BASE_IMAGE` named the managed base for
350/// `baseImageArn` while `default_dockerfile` hardcoded an unrelated registry literal in
351/// its `FROM`, so changing either left the other pointing somewhere else
352/// (`sandbox.py:410-444`). Pairing them means a caller selects one thing and both fields
353/// follow.
354#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
355pub struct BaseImage {
356 /// Goes into `baseImageArn` — the platform's managed base, not a registry ref.
357 pub name: String,
358 /// Goes into the Dockerfile `FROM` — the registry ref measured alongside `name`.
359 pub docker_ref: String,
360 /// What `docker inspect` reports for `WorkingDir`. Empty means it declares none.
361 ///
362 /// A field rather than a lookup because a caller with a purpose-built image is the
363 /// only one who can say what their image declares, and this client cannot read it
364 /// without pulling the manifest.
365 pub working_dir: String,
366}
367
368impl BaseImage {
369 /// The managed base every `docs/PLATFORM.md` measurement from 2026-08-06 onward used,
370 /// paired with the registry ref those same builds used as `FROM`.
371 ///
372 /// `working_dir` is empty, and that is measured rather than assumed:
373 /// `al2023-minimal`, `python:3.12-slim`, and `node:20-slim` all leave `WorkingDir`
374 /// empty (2026-08-05), which is what makes [`require_workdir`] necessary.
375 pub fn al2023() -> Self {
376 Self {
377 name: "al2023-1".to_string(),
378 docker_ref: "public.ecr.aws/amazonlinux/amazonlinux:2023-minimal".to_string(),
379 working_dir: String::new(),
380 }
381 }
382
383 /// The base image a task Dockerfile pairs with: the managed base's `name` (so
384 /// `baseImageArn` is unchanged) and the Dockerfile's own first `FROM` as `docker_ref`
385 /// (IMAGE-4).
386 ///
387 /// # The pairing the other way round
388 ///
389 /// [`require_matching_from`] refuses a Dockerfile whose first `FROM` is not the base's
390 /// `docker_ref`. That is the right guard where this client derives the Dockerfile from
391 /// the base; a task Dockerfile chooses its own `FROM`, so the pairing has to run from the
392 /// Dockerfile to the base, and every harness wrote the same inversion by hand (#220).
393 /// Here the ref is taken whole — `--platform` and `AS` decoration dropped by
394 /// [`dockerfile_from_ref`], a digest pin kept — so the guard's comparison is the ref
395 /// against itself and it passes by construction.
396 ///
397 /// `working_dir` is empty: this cannot read the `FROM` image's `WorkingDir` without
398 /// pulling its manifest, and empty is what every measured public base declares (see
399 /// [`BaseImage::al2023`]). A task that relies on one sets `WORKDIR`, which
400 /// [`require_workdir`] reads from the Dockerfile.
401 ///
402 /// Refuses a Dockerfile with no `FROM`: there is no ref to take.
403 pub fn from_dockerfile(dockerfile: &str) -> Result<Self, Error> {
404 match dockerfile_from_ref(dockerfile) {
405 Some(docker_ref) => Ok(Self {
406 docker_ref: docker_ref.to_string(),
407 ..Self::al2023()
408 }),
409 None => Err(Error::invalid_arg(
410 "the Dockerfile has no FROM, so there is no image reference to pair the \
411 managed base with. Derive the base from the Dockerfile the task builds \
412 from."
413 .to_string(),
414 )),
415 }
416 }
417
418 /// The `baseImageArn` for this base in `region`.
419 ///
420 /// # `microvm-image:<name>`, with a colon, and it is not just the managed base
421 ///
422 /// This was the only place in the repo building the colon form; the fakes and the
423 /// encoding test all used `microvm-image/<name>`, so the repo held two beliefs about the
424 /// shape of the identifier every image call takes. The model's `TaggableResource` pattern
425 /// admits only `(capacity-provider|network-connector|microvm-image):[a-zA-Z0-9-_]+`, and
426 /// a live read settled it: `ListMicrovmImages` in us-east-1 returns
427 /// `arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:<account>:microvm-image:coding-agents-on-bedrock` for a
428 /// customer image, and `GetMicrovmImage` accepts exactly that (measured 2026-08-15).
429 ///
430 /// So the colon is right for **both** the managed base and a customer image; there is no
431 /// two-form rule, and this comment used to imply there was. The slash form fails as
432 /// `AccessDeniedException` rather than as a validation error, because IAM evaluates the
433 /// malformed ARN as a resource with no matching policy — a permissions message for a
434 /// resource that exists.
435 pub fn arn(&self, region: &crate::region::Region) -> String {
436 format!(
437 "arn:aws:lambda:{}:aws:microvm-image:{}",
438 region.as_str(),
439 self.name
440 )
441 }
442}
443
444impl Default for BaseImage {
445 fn default() -> Self {
446 Self::al2023()
447 }
448}
449
450/// Where the environment layer lives when the caller named no workdir of their own.
451///
452/// A constant rather than `/` because the install commands resolve everything against the
453/// current directory — `uv sync` writes `.venv` beside the manifest, `npm ci` writes
454/// `node_modules` — and the working tree synced at launch has to land in the same place
455/// for the layer to be *its* environment.
456pub const DEFAULT_PROJECT_WORKDIR: &str = "/project";
457
458/// A Dockerfile that makes the daemon the container `CMD`.
459///
460/// `ENTRYPOINT []` plus `CMD ["/agentd"]` is the deployment invariant the trust boundary
461/// rests on: it is what guarantees no task workload runs before the platform's run hook
462/// lands. It is also what makes an omitted `cwd` inherit the image `WORKDIR`, since the
463/// daemon's own cwd is the image's.
464///
465/// The `FROM` is derived from `base` rather than written here, so it cannot disagree with
466/// the `baseImageArn` the create call sends.
467///
468/// `project` bakes the environment layer (#74): the manifest+lockfile pair is copied into
469/// the working directory — `workdir` when given, [`DEFAULT_PROJECT_WORKDIR`] otherwise —
470/// and the ecosystem's [`Ecosystem::install_run_line`] installs from the lockfile. Without
471/// it the derived Dockerfile installs nothing, which was the measured state this closes:
472/// every launch then pays dependency installation inside the guest, the 31–48% of launch
473/// time `docs/STRATEGY.md` attributes to environment init.
474///
475/// The invariant is *unenforced*: a base image that starts its own background process
476/// before bootstrap breaks it, and enforcing that belongs to whoever builds the image
477/// (`docs/PROTOCOL.md`, "Trust boundary").
478pub fn default_dockerfile(
479 port: u16,
480 workdir: Option<&str>,
481 base: &BaseImage,
482 project: Option<Ecosystem>,
483) -> String {
484 format!(
485 "FROM {}\n{}",
486 base.docker_ref,
487 agentd_stanza(port, workdir, project)
488 )
489}
490
491/// The agentd stanza: every line [`default_dockerfile`] writes after its `FROM`, and every
492/// line [`wrap_dockerfile`] appends to a task Dockerfile (IMAGE-1).
493///
494/// # One source, and why it is this function rather than a constant
495///
496/// Two copies of these lines drift: a harness that carried the stanza as a string literal
497/// of its own (#220) had to track every change here by hand, and the day one side gained a
498/// line the other did not, the image a task built and the image the default build produced
499/// stopped agreeing about how the daemon starts. So both callers render this one function,
500/// and `wrapping_a_bare_from_is_the_default_dockerfile_minus_nothing` holds them equal:
501/// `wrap_dockerfile("FROM x\n")` is the default Dockerfile for a base whose ref is `x`.
502///
503/// The text is byte-for-byte what `default_dockerfile` emitted before the split, which is
504/// what keeps every content-addressed image name (`build --reuse`, `AgentVm::image_name`)
505/// derived from the default Dockerfile valid: the name hashes the Dockerfile text.
506fn agentd_stanza(port: u16, workdir: Option<&str>, project: Option<Ecosystem>) -> String {
507 let mut lines = vec![
508 "COPY agentd /agentd".to_string(),
509 "RUN chmod 0755 /agentd".to_string(),
510 ];
511 let workdir = match (workdir.filter(|dir| !dir.is_empty()), project) {
512 (Some(dir), _) => Some(dir),
513 // The layer needs a directory to live in even when the caller named none.
514 (None, Some(_)) => Some(DEFAULT_PROJECT_WORKDIR),
515 (None, None) => None,
516 };
517 if let Some(workdir) = workdir {
518 lines.push(format!("RUN mkdir -p {workdir}"));
519 lines.push(format!("WORKDIR {workdir}"));
520 }
521 if let Some(ecosystem) = project {
522 // Relative destination, resolving against the WORKDIR set above — the same
523 // directory the install command runs in.
524 lines.push(format!(
525 "COPY {} {} ./",
526 ecosystem.manifest_name(),
527 ecosystem.lockfile_name(),
528 ));
529 lines.push(ecosystem.install_run_line().to_string());
530 }
531 lines.extend([
532 format!("ENV AGENTD_PORT={port}"),
533 "ENV AGENTD_LOG=info".to_string(),
534 format!("EXPOSE {port}"),
535 "ENTRYPOINT []".to_string(),
536 r#"CMD ["/agentd"]"#.to_string(),
537 String::new(),
538 ]);
539 lines.join("\n")
540}
541
542/// What [`wrap_dockerfile`] needs besides the task text.
543#[derive(Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
544pub struct WrapOptions {
545 /// The agent port the stanza's `ENV AGENTD_PORT` and `EXPOSE` name. It must be the port
546 /// the create call sends as `hooks.port` — [`ControlPlane::port`](super::ControlPlane::port)
547 /// — which [`require_matching_agentd_port`] checks at the create call.
548 pub port: u16,
549 /// A working directory for the stanza to create and set, exactly as
550 /// [`default_dockerfile`] writes one. One absolute path; `Some("")` reads as `None`, the
551 /// same way the default generator reads it.
552 pub workdir: Option<String>,
553 /// The caller relies on the image `WORKDIR` — an exec with no `cwd` runs there — so one
554 /// must be declared: by the task Dockerfile or by [`WrapOptions::workdir`]. Off by
555 /// default, because a task with no `WORKDIR` runs its commands in `/` under Docker too,
556 /// and a harness reproducing that has nothing to refuse.
557 pub inherit_workdir: bool,
558}
559
560impl Default for WrapOptions {
561 fn default() -> Self {
562 Self {
563 port: super::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
564 workdir: None,
565 inherit_workdir: false,
566 }
567 }
568}
569
570/// A task Dockerfile with the agentd stanza appended: the one call a harness needs to go
571/// from the Dockerfile a task brings to one this client can build (#220).
572///
573/// The result is the task text verbatim, a newline if it lacked one, `USER root` when the
574/// task's last `USER` is anyone else, and then [`default_dockerfile`]'s stanza for
575/// `opts.port` and `opts.workdir` — the same function, so the two cannot drift (IMAGE-1).
576/// The stanza's `ENTRYPOINT []` and `CMD ["/agentd"]` are the result's last instructions,
577/// so whatever entrypoint, command, or port the task set, the daemon is the container's
578/// process and listens where the hooks are called (IMAGE-2). Pair it with
579/// [`BaseImage::from_dockerfile`] for the create call's `FROM` guard (IMAGE-4).
580///
581/// # `USER root`, only when the task changed user
582///
583/// The daemon demotes each exec to the user it names, which takes root; a task that ends on
584/// `USER app` would otherwise start the daemon as `app`. The line is written only when the
585/// last `USER` is not root, so a task that never changes user wraps to exactly the default
586/// stanza — writing it unconditionally would make the default Dockerfile and the wrap of a
587/// bare `FROM` two different texts (`crates/model/src/wrap.rs`, `AlwaysUserRoot`).
588///
589/// # What is refused, and why each is a refusal (IMAGE-3)
590///
591/// Each is a Dockerfile the build would accept and the guest would then fail on, one build
592/// cycle later and naming none of the cause:
593///
594/// * **No `FROM`.** Nothing to append to, and no base to derive.
595/// * **An unfinished last instruction.** A trailing line continuation — in the escape
596/// character the `# escape=` directive selects, across the blank and comment lines Docker
597/// skips inside one — joins the stanza's `COPY agentd /agentd` into the task's last
598/// instruction; an unterminated heredoc swallows the whole stanza as its body. Either way
599/// the image has no daemon and the build fails as a run-hook timeout.
600/// * **A keepalive at or over the client's stream idle timeout**, for the reason
601/// [`require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout`] gives.
602/// * **A port of 0, or a workdir that is not one absolute path.** A relative `WORKDIR`
603/// resolves against whatever the task left, whitespace splits `RUN mkdir -p` into several
604/// directories, and a line break writes an instruction the caller never saw.
605/// * **`inherit_workdir` with no `WORKDIR` anywhere**, for the reason [`require_workdir`]
606/// gives.
607///
608/// The scan reads instructions the way the Dockerfile parser does for these questions —
609/// escape directive, continuations, comments, heredoc bodies — and no further: it finds a
610/// Dockerfile that cannot take the stanza, it does not validate one.
611pub fn wrap_dockerfile(task: &str, opts: &WrapOptions) -> Result<String, Error> {
612 let scan = validate_wrap(task, opts)?;
613 let workdir = opts.workdir.as_deref().filter(|dir| !dir.is_empty());
614 let stanza = agentd_stanza(opts.port, workdir, None);
615 let mut wrapped = String::with_capacity(task.len() + stanza.len() + 16);
616 wrapped.push_str(task);
617 if !task.ends_with('\n') {
618 wrapped.push('\n');
619 }
620 if scan
621 .last_user
622 .as_deref()
623 .is_some_and(|user| !is_root_user(user))
624 {
625 wrapped.push_str("USER root\n");
626 }
627 wrapped.push_str(&stanza);
628 Ok(wrapped)
629}
630
631/// Preserve the final Dockerfile USER as the default identity for workload execs.
632///
633/// This is opt-in: [`wrap_dockerfile`] retains its historical root-default behavior.
634/// The builder, not the client, resolves final-stage inheritance, USER variables,
635/// names and numeric ids. A build-only agentd invocation records its effective uid
636/// and primary gid, then the stanza restores root and seals that record. No workload
637/// starts before readiness, and the daemon remains the image's CMD.
638///
639/// An explicit `AGENTD_DEFAULT_USER` in the image overrides the captured identity,
640/// including an empty value (which refuses implicit-user execs). A request's `user`
641/// overrides either default; its `group` overrides the default primary gid. The
642/// captured ids are fixed at build time; passwd identity variables are still
643/// resolved per request. Supplementary groups follow the daemon's existing policy
644/// and are cleared. The builder must support `COPY --chmod`.
645pub fn wrap_dockerfile_preserving_user(task: &str, opts: &WrapOptions) -> Result<String, Error> {
646 validate_wrap(task, opts)?;
647 let workdir = opts.workdir.as_deref().filter(|dir| !dir.is_empty());
648 let stanza = agentd_stanza(opts.port, workdir, None);
649 let mut wrapped = String::with_capacity(task.len() + stanza.len() + 256);
650 wrapped.push_str(task);
651 if !task.ends_with('\n') {
652 wrapped.push('\n');
653 }
654 // Reuse the required context asset as a writable placeholder. This works even
655 // for a numeric USER with no writable directory or shell in the final image.
656 wrapped.push_str(concat!(
657 "COPY --chmod=0755 agentd /agentd\n",
658 "COPY --chmod=0666 agentd /agentd-image-user.json\n",
659 "RUN [\"/agentd\", \"--capture-image-user\"]\n",
660 "USER 0:0\n",
661 "RUN [\"/agentd\", \"--seal-image-user\"]\n",
662 "ENV AGENTD_PRESERVE_IMAGE_USER=1\n",
663 ));
664 wrapped.push_str(&stanza);
665 Ok(wrapped)
666}
667
668fn validate_wrap(task: &str, opts: &WrapOptions) -> Result<Instructions, Error> {
669 if dockerfile_from_ref(task).is_none() {
670 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(
671 "the task Dockerfile has no FROM, so there is no image to append the agentd \
672 stanza to and no base image to pair with it. Wrap the Dockerfile the task \
673 builds from, or pass `FROM <image>` for a task that names only an image."
674 .to_string(),
675 ));
676 }
677 let scan = Instructions::scan(task);
678 if let Some(terminator) = scan.open_heredoc {
679 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
680 "the task Dockerfile ends inside a heredoc that is never terminated (no line \
681 {terminator:?} closes it), so every line appended after it — the whole agentd \
682 stanza — would become the heredoc's body. The image would build with no daemon \
683 in it and fail as a run-hook timeout. Terminate the heredoc."
684 )));
685 }
686 if scan.continued {
687 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
688 "the task Dockerfile's last instruction ends with a line continuation ({:?}), so \
689 the first line appended after it — the agentd stanza's `COPY agentd /agentd` — \
690 would be joined into that instruction instead of running. The image would build \
691 with no daemon in it and fail as a run-hook timeout. Finish the instruction, or \
692 drop the trailing {:?}.",
693 scan.escape, scan.escape,
694 )));
695 }
696 require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout(crate::session::exec::DEFAULT_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT, task)?;
697 super::require_valid_port("port", opts.port)?;
698 let workdir = opts.workdir.as_deref().filter(|dir| !dir.is_empty());
699 if let Some(dir) = workdir
700 && (!dir.starts_with('/') || dir.chars().any(|c| c.is_whitespace() || c.is_control()))
701 {
702 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
703 "the workdir {dir:?} is not one absolute path. The stanza writes it as \
704 `RUN mkdir -p {dir}` and `WORKDIR {dir}`: a relative path resolves against \
705 whatever WORKDIR the task left, whitespace splits the mkdir into several \
706 directories, and a line break writes an instruction nobody reviewed. Pass an \
707 absolute path such as /workspace."
708 )));
709 }
710 if opts.inherit_workdir && workdir.is_none() && !dockerfile_declares_workdir(task) {
711 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(
712 "inherit_workdir was requested but the task Dockerfile sets no WORKDIR and no \
713 workdir option was given, so there is nothing to inherit: every exec with no cwd \
714 would run in `/`, and every relative path in it would resolve there. Pass a \
715 workdir, or set WORKDIR in the task Dockerfile."
716 .to_string(),
717 ));
718 }
719
720 Ok(scan)
721}
722
723/// Whether a `USER` value names root: `root` or `0`, with no group or a root group.
724///
725/// Anything else is not root, including a value built from a variable — the scan cannot
726/// expand `${TASK_USER}`, and restoring root for a value that turns out to be root costs one
727/// redundant line.
728fn is_root_user(value: &str) -> bool {
729 let is_root = |part: &str| part == "root" || part == "0";
730 match value.split_once(':') {
731 Some((user, group)) => is_root(user) && is_root(group),
732 None => is_root(value),
733 }
734}
735
736/// Whether any line of `dockerfile` is a `WORKDIR` with an argument.
737fn dockerfile_declares_workdir(dockerfile: &str) -> bool {
738 dockerfile.lines().any(|line| {
739 let mut words = line.split_whitespace();
740 words
741 .next()
742 .is_some_and(|first| first.eq_ignore_ascii_case("WORKDIR"))
743 && words.next().is_some()
744 })
745}
746
747/// What [`wrap_dockerfile`] needs to know about how a Dockerfile's instructions end.
748struct Instructions {
749 /// The escape character: `\` unless an `# escape=` directive chose a backtick.
750 escape: char,
751 /// The text ends inside a line continuation.
752 continued: bool,
753 /// The terminator of a heredoc the text never closes.
754 open_heredoc: Option<String>,
755 /// The value of the last `USER` instruction.
756 last_user: Option<String>,
757}
758
759impl Instructions {
760 /// Reads the parser directives, then every logical instruction: continuation lines
761 /// joined, blank and comment lines skipped (inside a continuation too, as the parser
762 /// does), heredoc bodies consumed up to their terminators.
763 fn scan(dockerfile: &str) -> Self {
764 let escape = escape_directive(dockerfile);
765 let mut heredocs: std::collections::VecDeque<(String, bool)> = Default::default();
766 let mut pending = String::new();
767 let mut continued = false;
768 let mut last_user = None;
769 for line in dockerfile.lines() {
770 if let Some((terminator, strip_tabs)) = heredocs.front() {
771 let candidate = if *strip_tabs {
772 line.trim_start_matches('\t')
773 } else {
774 line
775 };
776 if candidate.trim_end_matches('\r') == terminator {
777 heredocs.pop_front();
778 }
779 continue;
780 }
781 let trimmed = line.trim();
782 if trimmed.is_empty() || trimmed.starts_with('#') {
783 continue;
784 }
785 let body = line.trim_end();
786 if let Some(joined) = body.strip_suffix(escape) {
787 pending.push_str(joined);
788 pending.push(' ');
789 continued = true;
790 continue;
791 }
792 continued = false;
793 pending.push_str(body);
794 let instruction = std::mem::take(&mut pending);
795 let mut words = instruction.split_whitespace();
796 let Some(keyword) = words.next() else {
797 continue;
798 };
799 if keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case("USER") {
800 last_user = words.next().map(str::to_string);
801 } else if ["RUN", "COPY", "ADD"]
802 .iter()
803 .any(|name| keyword.eq_ignore_ascii_case(name))
804 {
805 heredocs.extend(words.filter_map(heredoc_marker));
806 }
807 }
808 Self {
809 escape,
810 continued,
811 open_heredoc: heredocs.pop_front().map(|(terminator, _)| terminator),
812 last_user,
813 }
814 }
815}
816
817/// The escape character a Dockerfile's `# escape=` parser directive selects, or `\`.
818///
819/// Directives are only read at the very top: the first line that is not one — an
820/// instruction, a blank line, or an ordinary comment — ends them.
821fn escape_directive(dockerfile: &str) -> char {
822 for line in dockerfile.lines() {
823 let Some(directive) = line.trim().strip_prefix('#') else {
824 break;
825 };
826 let Some((key, value)) = directive.split_once('=') else {
827 break;
828 };
829 let key = key.trim().to_ascii_lowercase();
830 if key == "escape" {
831 return match value.trim() {
832 "`" => '`',
833 _ => '\\',
834 };
835 }
836 if !["syntax", "check"].contains(&key.as_str()) {
837 break;
838 }
839 }
840 '\\'
841}
842
843/// The terminator a heredoc marker word opens, and whether it strips leading tabs (`<<-`).
844///
845/// `<<EOF`, `<<-EOF`, `<<"EOF"`, `<<'EOF'`; not the here-string `<<<`, and not a bare `<<`.
846fn heredoc_marker(word: &str) -> Option<(String, bool)> {
847 let rest = word.strip_prefix("<<")?;
848 if rest.starts_with('<') {
849 return None;
850 }
851 let (rest, strip_tabs) = match rest.strip_prefix('-') {
852 Some(rest) => (rest, true),
853 None => (rest, false),
854 };
855 let name = rest
856 .strip_prefix('"')
857 .and_then(|name| name.strip_suffix('"'))
858 .or_else(|| {
859 rest.strip_prefix('\'')
860 .and_then(|name| name.strip_suffix('\''))
861 })
862 .unwrap_or(rest);
863 let valid = name
864 .chars()
865 .next()
866 .is_some_and(|first| first.is_ascii_alphabetic() || first == '_')
867 && name.chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || c == '_');
868 valid.then(|| (name.to_string(), strip_tabs))
869}
870
871/// The image ref in a Dockerfile's first `FROM`, or `None` when it has none.
872///
873/// Deliberately loose on whitespace and case, and it ignores `--platform=` and `AS name`
874/// decoration, because the check exists to catch a base that disagrees rather than to
875/// validate Dockerfile syntax.
876///
877/// Split-and-scan rather than a regex: the pattern is "first token after FROM on a line
878/// whose first word is FROM", which `split_whitespace` states more directly than a
879/// pattern string would. (`regex-lite` is available if this ever grows.)
880pub fn dockerfile_from_ref(dockerfile: &str) -> Option<&str> {
881 for line in dockerfile.lines() {
882 let mut words = line.split_whitespace();
883 let Some(first) = words.next() else { continue };
884 if !first.eq_ignore_ascii_case("FROM") {
885 continue;
886 }
887 // Skip flag decoration such as `--platform=linux/arm64`.
888 return words.find(|word| !word.starts_with("--"));
889 }
890 None
891}
892
893/// Rejects working-directory inheritance when nothing declares one.
894///
895/// Measured 2026-08-05: `al2023-minimal`, `python:3.12-slim`, and `node:20-slim` all leave
896/// `WorkingDir` empty, so "inherit the image WORKDIR" inherits `/` and every relative path
897/// in the caller's commands resolves somewhere they did not mean.
898///
899/// Rejected rather than warned because the symptom appears in the **guest, one build cycle
900/// later**, as commands running in the wrong directory rather than as anything about
901/// `WORKDIR`.
902pub fn require_workdir(base: &BaseImage, dockerfile: Option<&str>) -> Result<(), Error> {
903 if !base.working_dir.is_empty() {
904 return Ok(());
905 }
906 let declares_workdir = dockerfile.is_some_and(|text| {
907 text.lines().any(|line| {
908 let mut words = line.split_whitespace();
909 words
910 .next()
911 .is_some_and(|first| first.eq_ignore_ascii_case("WORKDIR"))
912 && words.next().is_some()
913 })
914 });
915 if declares_workdir {
916 return Ok(());
917 }
918 Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
919 "inherit_workdir was requested but base image {:?} declares no WorkingDir and the \
920 Dockerfile sets none. Most public ARM64 base images leave it empty \
921 (docs/PLATFORM.md, 'Most public ARM64 base images have no WORKDIR'), so there is \
922 nothing to inherit and every relative path would resolve against `/`. Pass a workdir \
923 to default_dockerfile, or set WORKDIR in your own Dockerfile.",
924 base.name
925 )))
926}
927
928/// The port in a Dockerfile's last `ENV AGENTD_PORT=`, or `None` when it sets none.
929///
930/// Last rather than first: a later `ENV` of the same name wins at build time, so the last
931/// one is what the daemon reads. Accepts `ENV AGENTD_PORT=9000` and the legacy
932/// `ENV AGENTD_PORT 9000` spelling, since both set the variable and a guard that only
933/// understands one form passes the file it cannot parse.
934///
935/// Split-and-scan for the same reason [`dockerfile_from_ref`] is: `split_whitespace`
936/// states the pattern more directly than a regex string would here.
937pub fn dockerfile_agentd_port(dockerfile: &str) -> Option<u16> {
938 let mut found = None;
939 for line in dockerfile.lines() {
940 let mut words = line.split_whitespace();
941 let Some(first) = words.next() else { continue };
942 if !first.eq_ignore_ascii_case("ENV") {
943 continue;
944 }
945 let Some(assignment) = words.next() else {
946 continue;
947 };
948 let value = match assignment.split_once('=') {
949 Some(("AGENTD_PORT", value)) => value,
950 Some(_) => continue,
951 // `ENV AGENTD_PORT 9000`: the value is the next word.
952 None if assignment == "AGENTD_PORT" => match words.next() {
953 Some(value) => value,
954 None => continue,
955 },
956 None => continue,
957 };
958 // An unparseable value is not this guard's business: the daemon keeps its default
959 // for one (`crates/agentd/src/config.rs:118`), so there is no disagreement to report.
960 if let Ok(port) = value.parse() {
961 found = Some(port);
962 }
963 }
964 found
965}
966
967/// Rejects a Dockerfile whose `AGENTD_PORT` disagrees with the port the create call sends
968/// as `hooks.port`.
969///
970/// The two are set independently — `hooks.port` comes from `ControlPlane::port`, the
971/// variable from the caller's own Dockerfile — and the platform calls its build-time
972/// `ready`/`validate` hooks on the port in the create call. A guest listening elsewhere
973/// answers nothing, so the build fails.
974///
975/// Rejected rather than warned because the failure points away from its cause: the docker
976/// build succeeds, the log group holds a clean build *and* the daemon's own "agentd
977/// listening" line, and the image still lands in `CREATE_FAILED`. Neither
978/// `GetMicrovmImage` nor the build log names the port — only
979/// `GetMicrovmImageVersion`'s `hooks.port` does, compared by hand against the Dockerfile.
980///
981/// A Dockerfile that sets no `AGENTD_PORT` is checked against
982/// [`DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT`](crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT) rather than passed, because
983/// silence is not neutral: `Config::from_env` keeps its own default for an unset variable
984/// (`crates/agentd/src/config.rs:118`, default `crates/agentd/src/config.rs:84`), so the guest listens on
985/// 9000 whether or not the Dockerfile mentions a port. Against a client that changed its
986/// port, the absent variable produces exactly the measured failure — and produces it for a
987/// caller who never typed a port anywhere, which is the harder version to diagnose.
988pub fn require_matching_agentd_port(port: u16, dockerfile: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
989 // An unparseable value lands here too, and belongs here: the daemon warns and keeps the
990 // same default (`crates/agentd/src/config.rs:174-179`), so both spellings of "the Dockerfile
991 // named no usable port" have the same consequence in the guest.
992 let Some(found) = dockerfile_agentd_port(dockerfile) else {
993 if port == super::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT {
994 return Ok(());
995 }
996 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
997 "this client sends hooks.port={port} but the Dockerfile sets no usable \
998 AGENTD_PORT, so the daemon will listen on its own default of {default}. These \
999 must agree: the platform calls the build-time ready/validate hooks on the port \
1000 in the create call, and a daemon listening on {default} answers none of them — \
1001 the docker build succeeds, the daemon logs that it is listening, and the image \
1002 still fails with CREATE_FAILED naming no port. Add ENV AGENTD_PORT={port} to \
1003 the Dockerfile, or build it with default_dockerfile, which derives the value \
1004 from the same port.",
1005 default = super::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
1006 )));
1007 };
1008 if found == port {
1009 return Ok(());
1010 }
1011 Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
1012 "the Dockerfile sets ENV AGENTD_PORT={found} but this client sends hooks.port={port}. \
1013 These must agree: the platform calls the build-time ready/validate hooks on the port \
1014 in the create call, and a daemon listening on {found} answers none of them — the \
1015 docker build succeeds, the daemon logs that it is listening, and the image still \
1016 fails with CREATE_FAILED naming no port. Set ENV AGENTD_PORT={port} in the \
1017 Dockerfile, or build it with default_dockerfile, which derives the value from the \
1018 same port."
1019 )))
1020}
1021
1022/// The seconds in a Dockerfile's last `ENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS=`, or `None` when it
1023/// sets none.
1024///
1025/// Same shape and same reasoning as [`dockerfile_agentd_port`]: last assignment wins, both
1026/// `ENV` spellings, and an unparseable value reads as absent because the daemon warns and
1027/// keeps its default for one (`crates/agentd/src/config.rs:174-179`).
1028pub fn dockerfile_env_u64(dockerfile: &str, key: &str) -> Option<u64> {
1029 let mut found = None;
1030 for line in dockerfile.lines() {
1031 let mut words = line.split_whitespace();
1032 let Some(first) = words.next() else { continue };
1033 if !first.eq_ignore_ascii_case("ENV") {
1034 continue;
1035 }
1036 let Some(assignment) = words.next() else {
1037 continue;
1038 };
1039 let value = match assignment.split_once('=') {
1040 Some((name, value)) if name == key => value,
1041 Some(_) => continue,
1042 None if assignment == key => match words.next() {
1043 Some(value) => value,
1044 None => continue,
1045 },
1046 None => continue,
1047 };
1048 if let Ok(parsed) = value.parse() {
1049 found = Some(parsed);
1050 }
1051 }
1052 found
1053}
1054
1055/// Rejects a Dockerfile whose `AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS` is not shorter than the client's
1056/// stream idle timeout.
1057///
1058/// The fourth pair of this shape, found by sweeping for the other three. The daemon's SSE
1059/// keepalive interval and the client's tolerance for silence are set in different
1060/// repositories of truth — the interval in the caller's Dockerfile
1061/// (`crates/agentd/src/config.rs:139`, default 15s at `:95`), the tolerance in
1062/// [`DEFAULT_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT`](crate::session::exec::DEFAULT_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT),
1063/// which is 60s *because* it is four times that 15. Raise the interval past the tolerance
1064/// and every attached stream treats a healthy connection as dead, reconnects
1065/// `max_reconnects` times, and fails.
1066///
1067/// The failure names both numbers and misattributes one of them: the client reports that the
1068/// stream "went silent for 60s, longer than the keepalive interval"
1069/// (`crates/microvms-edges/src/session/http.rs:223-227`), where 60 is its own timeout and the
1070/// keepalive interval is the number it does not know. So a reader is told the keepalive was
1071/// exceeded by a message that prints the wrong value for it, one build cycle after the
1072/// Dockerfile that caused it.
1073///
1074/// Equality is refused, not just excess: an interval exactly equal to the timeout races.
1075pub fn require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout(
1076 idle_timeout: Duration,
1077 dockerfile: &str,
1078) -> Result<(), Error> {
1079 let Some(secs) = dockerfile_env_u64(dockerfile, "AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS") else {
1080 // Absent is safe here, unlike the port: the daemon's default of 15s is already
1081 // under every idle timeout this client will use, and a client that shortens its
1082 // timeout below 15s is not something a Dockerfile can be blamed for.
1083 return Ok(());
1084 };
1085 if secs < idle_timeout.as_secs() {
1086 return Ok(());
1087 }
1088 Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
1089 "the Dockerfile sets ENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS={secs} but this client treats a \
1090 stream as dead after {timeout}s of silence. The keepalive must be shorter: the \
1091 daemon sends nothing between events except that keepalive, so an interval of \
1092 {secs}s makes a healthy stream look dead, and every attach reconnects until it \
1093 gives up. The error it raises then reports the client's own {timeout}s as though it \
1094 were the keepalive interval, so it names neither the Dockerfile nor {secs}. Leave \
1095 the variable unset for the daemon's 15s default, or keep it under {timeout}.",
1096 timeout = idle_timeout.as_secs(),
1097 )))
1098}
1099
1100/// The value of a Dockerfile's last `ENTRYPOINT`, or `None` when it sets none.
1101///
1102/// Last rather than first for the reason [`dockerfile_agentd_port`] gives: a later
1103/// instruction of the same name wins at build time, so the last one is what the container
1104/// runs. The value is the raw rest of the line — this scan finds a disagreement, it does
1105/// not parse Dockerfile syntax.
1106pub fn dockerfile_entrypoint(dockerfile: &str) -> Option<&str> {
1107 last_instruction_value(dockerfile, "ENTRYPOINT")
1108}
1109
1110/// The value of a Dockerfile's last `CMD`, or `None` when it sets none.
1111pub fn dockerfile_cmd(dockerfile: &str) -> Option<&str> {
1112 last_instruction_value(dockerfile, "CMD")
1113}
1114
1115/// The rest of the last line whose first word is `keyword`, trimmed, or `None`.
1116fn last_instruction_value<'a>(dockerfile: &'a str, keyword: &str) -> Option<&'a str> {
1117 let mut found = None;
1118 for line in dockerfile.lines() {
1119 let trimmed = line.trim_start();
1120 let Some(first) = trimmed.split_whitespace().next() else {
1121 continue;
1122 };
1123 if first.eq_ignore_ascii_case(keyword) {
1124 found = Some(trimmed[first.len()..].trim());
1125 }
1126 }
1127 found
1128}
1129
1130/// Whether an instruction value is the empty exec form — `[]`, with any spacing.
1131fn is_empty_exec_form(value: &str) -> bool {
1132 let mut meaningful = value.chars().filter(|c| !c.is_whitespace());
1133 meaningful.next() == Some('[') && meaningful.next() == Some(']') && meaningful.next().is_none()
1134}
1135
1136/// Rejects a Dockerfile whose image would never run the daemon: no `CMD`, or an
1137/// `ENTRYPOINT` that swallows it.
1138///
1139/// The artifact unconditionally carries the daemon as entry `agentd` ([`build_artifact`]),
1140/// and the deployment invariant is `ENTRYPOINT []` plus `CMD ["/agentd"]` — see
1141/// [`default_dockerfile`]. A caller Dockerfile with no `CMD` runs the base's own default
1142/// instead, and a non-empty `ENTRYPOINT` turns any `CMD` into that entrypoint's arguments
1143/// rather than the process. Either way the daemon never starts, the build-time
1144/// `ready`/`validate` hooks go unanswered, and the image lands in `CREATE_FAILED` — or the
1145/// launch dies as a run-hook timeout — with nothing naming `CMD`, `ENTRYPOINT`, or the
1146/// artifact entry.
1147///
1148/// Weak-form on purpose: it does **not** check that the `CMD` names a path anything was
1149/// copied to. That would be Dockerfile interpretation rather than agreement checking, and
1150/// the two mistakes people actually make are the two refused here. The unenforceable half —
1151/// a base image that starts its own background process before bootstrap — stays with
1152/// whoever builds the image (`docs/PROTOCOL.md`, "Trust boundary").
1153pub fn require_daemon_cmd(dockerfile: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
1154 if let Some(entrypoint) = dockerfile_entrypoint(dockerfile)
1155 && !is_empty_exec_form(entrypoint)
1156 {
1157 return Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
1158 "the Dockerfile sets ENTRYPOINT {entrypoint}, which makes any CMD its arguments \
1159 rather than the container's process — so the daemon this client uploads never \
1160 starts. The build succeeds anyway: the ready/validate hooks just go unanswered \
1161 and the image fails as CREATE_FAILED, or the launch dies as a run-hook timeout, \
1162 and neither symptom names ENTRYPOINT. Set `ENTRYPOINT []` alongside \
1163 `CMD [\"/agentd\"]`, or build with default_dockerfile, which sets both."
1164 )));
1165 }
1166 match dockerfile_cmd(dockerfile) {
1167 Some(cmd) if !cmd.is_empty() && !is_empty_exec_form(cmd) => Ok(()),
1168 _ => Err(Error::invalid_arg(
1169 "the Dockerfile has no CMD, so the container runs the base image's default \
1170 process and the daemon this client uploads never starts. The build succeeds \
1171 anyway: the ready/validate hooks just go unanswered and the image fails as \
1172 CREATE_FAILED, or the launch dies as a run-hook timeout, and neither symptom \
1173 names CMD. Add `ENTRYPOINT []` and `CMD [\"/agentd\"]`, or build with \
1174 default_dockerfile, which sets both."
1175 .to_string(),
1176 )),
1177 }
1178}
1179
1180/// Rejects a caller Dockerfile that never mentions the lockfile the request carries.
1181///
1182/// The project files enter the artifact unconditionally once the request holds them, so a
1183/// custom Dockerfile that ignores them builds cleanly and produces an image with **no
1184/// environment layer** — and the symptom appears at launch, as every dependency
1185/// installing inside the guest, with nothing anywhere naming the `COPY` that was never
1186/// written. That is the silent-degradation shape: the caller asked for the layer, paid
1187/// the build, and got an image indistinguishable from one that never asked.
1188///
1189/// Weak-form on purpose, like [`require_daemon_cmd`]: a substring test for the lockfile's
1190/// name rather than parsing `COPY` syntax, because the check exists to catch a Dockerfile
1191/// that plainly ignores the files, not to validate how it consumes them.
1192pub fn require_project_install(project: &ProjectFiles, dockerfile: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
1193 let lockfile = project.ecosystem.lockfile_name();
1194 if dockerfile.contains(lockfile) {
1195 return Ok(());
1196 }
1197 Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
1198 "the request carries project files ({lockfile} and {manifest}) but the Dockerfile \
1199 never mentions {lockfile}, so the image would bake no environment layer: the build \
1200 succeeds, and every launch still installs dependencies inside the guest with \
1201 nothing naming the COPY that was never written. Copy the pair and install from \
1202 the lockfile ({install}), or build with default_dockerfile, which derives both \
1203 lines — or drop the project files if the layer is not wanted.",
1204 manifest = project.ecosystem.manifest_name(),
1205 install = match project.ecosystem {
1206 Ecosystem::Uv => "uv sync --locked",
1207 Ecosystem::Npm => "npm ci",
1208 Ecosystem::Cargo => "cargo fetch --locked",
1209 },
1210 )))
1211}
1212
1213/// Rejects a Dockerfile whose `FROM` is not the selected base image.
1214///
1215/// The build runs the Dockerfile *on top of* the base named in `baseImageArn`, so the two
1216/// disagreeing produces an image built from something other than the platform base whose
1217/// behaviour every `docs/PLATFORM.md` measurement describes — and nothing in the result
1218/// says so.
1219pub fn require_matching_from(base: &BaseImage, dockerfile: &str) -> Result<(), Error> {
1220 let Some(found) = dockerfile_from_ref(dockerfile) else {
1221 // No FROM at all is not this check's business: the build will say so, and a
1222 // Dockerfile validator is not what this is.
1223 return Ok(());
1224 };
1225 if found == base.docker_ref {
1226 return Ok(());
1227 }
1228 // The digest-pinned spelling of the same ref: `<docker_ref>@sha256:<64 hex>`. A digest
1229 // names one specific manifest of the ref this check already accepts, so it is a stricter
1230 // statement of agreement rather than a disagreement — a supply-chain-conscious caller
1231 // pins exactly this way, and refusing it would force them to un-pin to pass. The tag
1232 // must still be present and identical: `alpine@sha256:...` against a docker_ref of
1233 // `alpine:3` is a different claim and stays refused.
1234 if let Some(digest) = found
1235 .strip_prefix(base.docker_ref.as_str())
1236 .and_then(|rest| rest.strip_prefix("@sha256:"))
1237 && digest.len() == 64
1238 && digest.bytes().all(|b| b.is_ascii_hexdigit())
1239 {
1240 return Ok(());
1241 }
1242 Err(Error::invalid_arg(format!(
1243 "the Dockerfile's FROM is {found:?} but base image {:?} pairs with {:?}. These must \
1244 agree: baseImageArn and the FROM select the same base, and a mismatch builds against \
1245 a base none of the measured platform behaviour applies to. Use default_dockerfile \
1246 with this base, or pass a BaseImage whose docker_ref matches.",
1247 base.name, base.docker_ref
1248 )))
1249}
1250
1251#[cfg(test)]
1252mod tests {
1253 use super::*;
1254 use crate::testing::aarch64_daemon;
1255
1256 const DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT_FOR_TESTS: u16 = crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT;
1257
1258 /// The archive holds exactly the two entries the build expects, named as the build
1259 /// looks for them.
1260 #[test]
1261 fn the_artifact_holds_a_dockerfile_and_the_daemon() {
1262 let bytes =
1263 build_artifact(&aarch64_daemon(b"fake daemon"), "FROM scratch\n", None).expect("zips");
1264 let mut archive =
1265 zip::ZipArchive::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes)).expect("a readable zip");
1266
1267 let mut names: Vec<String> = (0..archive.len())
1268 .map(|index| {
1269 archive
1270 .by_index(index)
1271 .expect("entry")
1272 .name()
1273 .expect("a name")
1274 .into_owned()
1275 })
1276 .collect();
1277 names.sort();
1278 assert_eq!(names, ["Dockerfile", "agentd"]);
1279 }
1280
1281 /// **BIND-20 where the daemon enters an artifact (#257).** An x86_64 ELF, a script and no bytes
1282 /// at all are each refused as a precondition naming what the bytes are, so the bindings'
1283 /// two-step path (`build_artifact`, then the caller's own upload) never uploads one.
1284 ///
1285 /// **Falsification**: drop the `require_aarch64` call from `build_artifact_with_context`
1286 /// and all three zip.
1287 #[test]
1288 fn an_artifact_refuses_a_daemon_that_is_not_an_aarch64_elf() {
1289 for (binary, why) in [
1290 (crate::testing::elf_daemon(0x3E, b"x86"), "ELF machine 0x3e"),
1291 (b"#!/bin/sh\n".to_vec(), "not an ELF binary"),
1292 (Vec::new(), "not an ELF binary"),
1293 ] {
1294 let error = build_artifact(&binary, "FROM scratch\n", None).expect_err(why);
1295 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::Precondition, "{error}");
1296 assert!(error.to_string().contains(why), "{error}");
1297 }
1298 }
1299
1300 /// The daemon entry carries mode 0755, and the Dockerfile entry does not have to.
1301 ///
1302 /// Read back out of the archive rather than asserted on the constant, because the
1303 /// constant being right and the zip entry carrying it are two different facts — and it
1304 /// is the second one that turns into a run-hook timeout.
1305 ///
1306 /// The permission bits are masked out of the returned mode: `zip` reports the whole
1307 /// Unix mode, so the entry reads as `0o100755` — `S_IFREG | 0o755`. Comparing the
1308 /// unmasked value against `0o755` fails while the archive is perfectly correct, which
1309 /// is a test that would have sent someone to debug the writer.
1310 #[test]
1311 fn the_daemon_entry_carries_the_execute_bit() {
1312 let bytes =
1313 build_artifact(&aarch64_daemon(b"binary"), "FROM scratch\n", None).expect("zips");
1314 let mut archive =
1315 zip::ZipArchive::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes)).expect("a readable zip");
1316 let mode = archive
1317 .by_name("agentd")
1318 .expect("the daemon entry")
1319 .unix_mode()
1320 .expect("a mode was recorded");
1321 assert_eq!(
1322 mode & 0o777,
1323 AGENTD_MODE,
1324 "a non-executable binary surfaces as a run-hook timeout, not a permission error \
1325 (mode was {mode:o})"
1326 );
1327 assert!(
1328 mode & 0o111 != 0,
1329 "the execute bit is the whole point: {mode:o}"
1330 );
1331 }
1332
1333 /// The bytes round-trip. A zip that holds a truncated or re-encoded binary produces an
1334 /// image whose CMD fails for a reason no message names.
1335 #[test]
1336 fn the_daemon_bytes_survive_the_round_trip() {
1337 use std::io::Read as _;
1338
1339 // Deliberately includes a NUL and a high byte, which is what a real ELF has and
1340 // what a text-mode write would mangle.
1341 let binary = aarch64_daemon(&(0u8..=255).cycle().take(4096).collect::<Vec<u8>>());
1342 let bytes = build_artifact(&binary, "FROM scratch\n", None).expect("zips");
1343 let mut archive =
1344 zip::ZipArchive::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes)).expect("a readable zip");
1345 let mut read = Vec::new();
1346 archive
1347 .by_name("agentd")
1348 .expect("entry")
1349 .read_to_end(&mut read)
1350 .expect("reads");
1351 assert_eq!(read, binary);
1352 }
1353
1354 /// **AC-2-3, the byte-scan guard.** The agent token must not appear anywhere in the
1355 /// artifact's raw bytes — including the project-file entries #74 added.
1356 ///
1357 /// A byte scan rather than an API review, because the leak this guards against is a
1358 /// *value* turning up somewhere — in the Dockerfile as an `ENV`, in a baked config
1359 /// file, in a stray argument — not a parameter being declared. Scanning the compressed
1360 /// bytes and the decompressed entries both, since deflate would hide a literal from a
1361 /// naive scan of the archive. The artifact under scan carries a full project-file
1362 /// pair, and the entry count is asserted so the scan cannot silently sweep fewer
1363 /// members than the artifact holds.
1364 ///
1365 /// **Falsification** — add the token to the Dockerfile (`ENV AGENT_TOKEN=…`, the
1366 /// plausible mistake) and the decompressed scan fails. Re-run for the #74 members
1367 /// (2026-08-31): append the token to the lockfile entry inside `build_artifact` and
1368 /// the per-entry scan fails naming `uv.lock`; it was restored.
1369 #[test]
1370 fn the_artifact_never_carries_the_agent_token() {
1371 use std::io::Read as _;
1372
1373 let token = "s3cr3t-agent-token-do-not-bake-me";
1374 let dockerfile = default_dockerfile(9000, Some("/opt/work"), &BaseImage::al2023(), None);
1375 assert!(
1376 !dockerfile.contains(token),
1377 "the default Dockerfile must not mention a token"
1378 );
1379
1380 let project = ProjectFiles {
1381 ecosystem: Ecosystem::Uv,
1382 manifest: b"[project]\nname = \"demo\"\n".to_vec(),
1383 lockfile: b"version = 1\n".to_vec(),
1384 };
1385 let bytes =
1386 build_artifact(&aarch64_daemon(b"binary"), &dockerfile, Some(&project)).expect("zips");
1387 assert!(
1388 !bytes
1389 .windows(token.len())
1390 .any(|window| window == token.as_bytes()),
1391 "the token appears in the artifact's raw bytes"
1392 );
1393
1394 let mut archive =
1395 zip::ZipArchive::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes)).expect("a readable zip");
1396 assert_eq!(
1397 archive.len(),
1398 4,
1399 "the scan below must sweep every member this artifact can hold"
1400 );
1401 for index in 0..archive.len() {
1402 let mut entry = archive.by_index(index).expect("entry");
1403 let name = entry.name().expect("a name").into_owned();
1404 let mut content = Vec::new();
1405 entry.read_to_end(&mut content).expect("reads");
1406 assert!(
1407 !content
1408 .windows(token.len())
1409 .any(|window| window == token.as_bytes()),
1410 "the token appears inside {name} — the image snapshot is shared by every VM \
1411 launched from it, so a token here is a token shared with every VM"
1412 );
1413 }
1414 }
1415
1416 /// **#74, the build-context half.** A project's manifest and lockfile enter the
1417 /// archive under their ecosystem's fixed names, at the root beside the Dockerfile —
1418 /// the build context root, where the generated `COPY` finds them — and their bytes
1419 /// survive the round trip.
1420 #[test]
1421 fn project_files_enter_the_artifact_under_their_ecosystem_names() {
1422 use std::io::Read as _;
1423
1424 for (ecosystem, manifest_name, lockfile_name) in [
1425 (Ecosystem::Uv, "pyproject.toml", "uv.lock"),
1426 (Ecosystem::Npm, "package.json", "package-lock.json"),
1427 (Ecosystem::Cargo, "Cargo.toml", "Cargo.lock"),
1428 ] {
1429 let project = ProjectFiles {
1430 ecosystem,
1431 manifest: b"manifest-bytes".to_vec(),
1432 lockfile: b"lockfile-bytes".to_vec(),
1433 };
1434 let bytes =
1435 build_artifact(&aarch64_daemon(b"binary"), "FROM scratch\n", Some(&project))
1436 .expect("zips");
1437 let mut archive =
1438 zip::ZipArchive::new(std::io::Cursor::new(bytes)).expect("a readable zip");
1439
1440 let mut names: Vec<String> = (0..archive.len())
1441 .map(|index| {
1442 archive
1443 .by_index(index)
1444 .expect("entry")
1445 .name()
1446 .expect("a name")
1447 .into_owned()
1448 })
1449 .collect();
1450 names.sort();
1451 let mut expected = vec![
1452 "Dockerfile".to_string(),
1453 "agentd".to_string(),
1454 manifest_name.to_string(),
1455 lockfile_name.to_string(),
1456 ];
1457 expected.sort();
1458 assert_eq!(names, expected, "{ecosystem:?}");
1459
1460 let mut lockfile = Vec::new();
1461 archive
1462 .by_name(lockfile_name)
1463 .expect("the lockfile entry")
1464 .read_to_end(&mut lockfile)
1465 .expect("reads");
1466 assert_eq!(lockfile, b"lockfile-bytes", "{ecosystem:?}");
1467 }
1468 }
1469
1470 /// **#74's TRAP-5 design guard, the compile surface.** [`ProjectFiles`] has no field
1471 /// that could carry an entry *name* — the names come from the [`Ecosystem`] variant —
1472 /// so a caller cannot put `.env` or a credentials file into the shared snapshot
1473 /// through this type. Asserted by destructuring, the same shape as TRAP-1's
1474 /// `no_request_type_carries_a_caller_supplied_client_token`: a `name`/`path` field
1475 /// added later fails to compile this test.
1476 #[test]
1477 fn project_files_carry_no_caller_named_entry() {
1478 let ProjectFiles {
1479 ecosystem: _,
1480 manifest: _,
1481 lockfile: _,
1482 } = ProjectFiles {
1483 ecosystem: Ecosystem::Npm,
1484 manifest: Vec::new(),
1485 lockfile: Vec::new(),
1486 };
1487 }
1488
1489 /// The content hash is a pure function of the two inputs: equal inputs agree, either
1490 /// input changing changes it, and the boundary between the two inputs is part of the
1491 /// identity.
1492 ///
1493 /// The boundary case is the one worth spelling out: without length prefixes,
1494 /// `("ab", "c")` and `("a", "bc")` hash the same concatenation — and a Dockerfile
1495 /// edit could then collide with a binary edit, serving a stale image for changed
1496 /// inputs, which is the exact hazard the hash exists to close.
1497 #[test]
1498 fn the_content_hash_follows_the_inputs_and_only_the_inputs() {
1499 let hash = artifact_content_hash(b"binary-bytes", "FROM scratch\n", None);
1500 assert_eq!(
1501 hash,
1502 artifact_content_hash(b"binary-bytes", "FROM scratch\n", None)
1503 );
1504 assert_eq!(hash.len(), 64, "sha256 as lowercase hex");
1505 assert!(
1506 hash.chars()
1507 .all(|c| c.is_ascii_hexdigit() && !c.is_ascii_uppercase())
1508 );
1509
1510 assert_ne!(
1511 hash,
1512 artifact_content_hash(b"other-bytes", "FROM scratch\n", None)
1513 );
1514 assert_ne!(
1515 hash,
1516 artifact_content_hash(b"binary-bytes", "FROM scratch\nRUN true\n", None)
1517 );
1518 assert_ne!(
1519 artifact_content_hash(b"ab", "c", None),
1520 artifact_content_hash(b"a", "bc", None),
1521 "the input boundary is part of the identity"
1522 );
1523
1524 // The projectless digest is pinned to the exact value this function produced
1525 // before #74. Every image name `build --reuse` ever derived embeds this digest's
1526 // first twelve characters, so changing the no-project stream silently orphans
1527 // every existing reuse — the module docs call that hazard out for the zip's own
1528 // bytes, and it applies to the algorithm the same way. Recomputed independently
1529 // (Python hashlib, 2026-08-31) rather than pasted from this function's output.
1530 assert_eq!(
1531 hash, "90a0ef925a4696b0c0f142241b2c714e63f40071d0d02951e26cb2a1d8bb24fc",
1532 "the no-project digest must stay what it was before #74"
1533 );
1534 }
1535
1536 /// **#74 step 3, the key.** The project files are part of the artifact identity:
1537 /// identical pairs agree, a lockfile edit is a new identity (and so a fresh image
1538 /// name and a fresh build), and the entry names count — the same bytes under a
1539 /// different ecosystem are a different identity, because the Dockerfile that consumes
1540 /// them installs a different environment.
1541 ///
1542 /// **Falsification** — run 2026-08-31 and again 2026-09-02: the lockfile's
1543 /// `hasher.update` lines were dropped from `artifact_content_hash` and the
1544 /// lockfile-edit assertion went red (two different lockfiles, one hash — the
1545 /// stale-reuse hazard verbatim); restored.
1546 #[test]
1547 fn the_content_hash_keys_on_the_lockfile() {
1548 let project = |ecosystem, lockfile: &[u8]| ProjectFiles {
1549 ecosystem,
1550 manifest: b"[project]".to_vec(),
1551 lockfile: lockfile.to_vec(),
1552 };
1553 let hash = artifact_content_hash(
1554 b"binary",
1555 "FROM scratch\n",
1556 Some(&project(Ecosystem::Uv, b"version = 1")),
1557 );
1558 assert_eq!(
1559 hash,
1560 artifact_content_hash(
1561 b"binary",
1562 "FROM scratch\n",
1563 Some(&project(Ecosystem::Uv, b"version = 1")),
1564 ),
1565 "identical dependency files share an image"
1566 );
1567 assert_ne!(
1568 hash,
1569 artifact_content_hash(
1570 b"binary",
1571 "FROM scratch\n",
1572 Some(&project(Ecosystem::Uv, b"version = 2")),
1573 ),
1574 "a lockfile edit is a new image name and a fresh build"
1575 );
1576 assert_ne!(
1577 hash,
1578 artifact_content_hash(b"binary", "FROM scratch\n", None),
1579 "carrying a layer is a different identity from carrying none"
1580 );
1581 assert_ne!(
1582 artifact_content_hash(
1583 b"binary",
1584 "FROM scratch\n",
1585 Some(&project(Ecosystem::Npm, b"version = 1")),
1586 ),
1587 hash,
1588 "the entry names count: the same bytes under another ecosystem install a \
1589 different environment"
1590 );
1591 }
1592
1593 /// The Dockerfile's `FROM` comes from the base image, so the two cannot disagree.
1594 #[test]
1595 fn the_default_dockerfile_derives_its_from_from_the_base_image() {
1596 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
1597 let dockerfile = default_dockerfile(9000, None, &base, None);
1598 assert_eq!(
1599 dockerfile_from_ref(&dockerfile),
1600 Some(base.docker_ref.as_str())
1601 );
1602 assert!(dockerfile.contains(r#"CMD ["/agentd"]"#));
1603 assert!(
1604 dockerfile.contains("ENTRYPOINT []"),
1605 "the trust boundary rests on this line"
1606 );
1607 assert!(dockerfile.contains("ENV AGENTD_PORT=9000"));
1608 }
1609
1610 /// A workdir is written as both a `mkdir` and a `WORKDIR`, and is absent when none was
1611 /// asked for. An empty string counts as none, since that is what an unset value looks
1612 /// like coming from a CLI flag.
1613 #[test]
1614 fn a_workdir_is_created_and_set_or_absent_entirely() {
1615 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
1616 let with = default_dockerfile(9000, Some("/opt/baked-workdir"), &base, None);
1617 assert!(with.contains("RUN mkdir -p /opt/baked-workdir"));
1618 assert!(with.contains("WORKDIR /opt/baked-workdir"));
1619
1620 for none in [None, Some("")] {
1621 let without = default_dockerfile(9000, none, &base, None);
1622 assert!(!without.contains("WORKDIR"), "{without}");
1623 }
1624 }
1625
1626 /// **#74 step 2, the install.** A project Dockerfile copies the ecosystem's pair into
1627 /// the working directory and installs from the lockfile with the lockfile-faithful
1628 /// spelling — `uv sync --locked`, `npm ci`, `cargo fetch --locked` — where the
1629 /// projectless Dockerfile installs nothing (the measured pre-#74 state).
1630 ///
1631 /// **Falsification** — run 2026-08-31: the `COPY` line was dropped from
1632 /// `default_dockerfile` and the copies-its-pair assertion went red for all three
1633 /// ecosystems; restored.
1634 #[test]
1635 fn a_project_dockerfile_installs_from_the_lockfile_it_can_see() {
1636 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
1637 for (ecosystem, install) in [
1638 (Ecosystem::Uv, "uv sync --locked"),
1639 (Ecosystem::Npm, "npm ci"),
1640 (Ecosystem::Cargo, "cargo fetch --locked"),
1641 ] {
1642 let dockerfile = default_dockerfile(9000, None, &base, Some(ecosystem));
1643 assert!(
1644 dockerfile.contains(&format!(
1645 "COPY {} {} ./",
1646 ecosystem.manifest_name(),
1647 ecosystem.lockfile_name(),
1648 )),
1649 "copies its pair: {dockerfile}"
1650 );
1651 assert!(dockerfile.contains(install), "{dockerfile}");
1652 // The layer needs a directory even when the caller named none, because the
1653 // install resolves everything against the current directory.
1654 assert!(
1655 dockerfile.contains(&format!("WORKDIR {DEFAULT_PROJECT_WORKDIR}")),
1656 "{dockerfile}"
1657 );
1658
1659 // A caller-named workdir is where the layer lives instead.
1660 let placed = default_dockerfile(9000, Some("/srv/app"), &base, Some(ecosystem));
1661 assert!(placed.contains("WORKDIR /srv/app"), "{placed}");
1662 assert!(!placed.contains(DEFAULT_PROJECT_WORKDIR), "{placed}");
1663 }
1664
1665 let without = default_dockerfile(9000, None, &base, None);
1666 for install in ["uv sync", "npm ci", "cargo fetch", "COPY pyproject"] {
1667 assert!(!without.contains(install), "{without}");
1668 }
1669 }
1670
1671 /// The project Dockerfile passes every guard the plain one does: the `FROM` matches
1672 /// its base, the port agrees, the daemon stays the `CMD`, and the pair it copies
1673 /// satisfies [`require_project_install`]. A derived Dockerfile that failed its own
1674 /// preflight would refuse every `--project` build at the door.
1675 #[test]
1676 fn the_project_dockerfile_passes_its_own_guards() {
1677 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
1678 for ecosystem in Ecosystem::ALL {
1679 let dockerfile = default_dockerfile(9000, None, &base, Some(ecosystem));
1680 require_matching_from(&base, &dockerfile).expect("its FROM is its base");
1681 require_matching_agentd_port(9000, &dockerfile).expect("its port agrees");
1682 require_daemon_cmd(&dockerfile).expect("the daemon is still the CMD");
1683 let project = ProjectFiles {
1684 ecosystem,
1685 manifest: Vec::new(),
1686 lockfile: Vec::new(),
1687 };
1688 require_project_install(&project, &dockerfile)
1689 .expect("it copies the pair it was derived for");
1690 }
1691 }
1692
1693 /// **#74's silent-degradation guard.** A caller Dockerfile that never mentions the
1694 /// lockfile bakes no environment layer while building cleanly — the symptom is every
1695 /// launch still installing dependencies, with nothing naming the missing `COPY` — so
1696 /// it is refused up front, naming the lockfile, the install command, and both ways
1697 /// out.
1698 ///
1699 /// **Falsification** — run 2026-08-31: the `contains` check was inverted and both
1700 /// halves went red (the ignoring Dockerfile passed, the copying one was refused);
1701 /// restored.
1702 #[test]
1703 fn a_dockerfile_that_ignores_the_project_files_is_refused() {
1704 let project = ProjectFiles {
1705 ecosystem: Ecosystem::Npm,
1706 manifest: b"{}".to_vec(),
1707 lockfile: b"{}".to_vec(),
1708 };
1709 let error = require_project_install(
1710 &project,
1711 "FROM public.ecr.aws/amazonlinux/amazonlinux:2023-minimal\n\
1712 COPY agentd /agentd\n\
1713 ENTRYPOINT []\nCMD [\"/agentd\"]\n",
1714 )
1715 .expect_err("no mention of the lockfile bakes no layer");
1716 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
1717 let message = error.to_string();
1718 assert!(message.contains("package-lock.json"), "{message}");
1719 assert!(message.contains("npm ci"), "{message}");
1720 assert!(message.contains("no environment layer"), "{message}");
1721
1722 require_project_install(
1723 &project,
1724 "FROM x\nCOPY package.json package-lock.json ./\nRUN npm ci\nCMD [\"/agentd\"]\n",
1725 )
1726 .expect("a Dockerfile that copies the pair agrees");
1727 }
1728
1729 /// `FROM` parsing tolerates the decoration a real Dockerfile carries: lowercase,
1730 /// leading whitespace, a `--platform` flag, and an `AS` alias.
1731 #[test]
1732 fn the_from_parser_ignores_decoration_rather_than_validating_syntax() {
1733 assert_eq!(dockerfile_from_ref("FROM alpine\n"), Some("alpine"));
1734 assert_eq!(dockerfile_from_ref(" from alpine:3\n"), Some("alpine:3"));
1735 assert_eq!(
1736 dockerfile_from_ref("FROM --platform=linux/arm64 alpine AS build\n"),
1737 Some("alpine")
1738 );
1739 assert_eq!(dockerfile_from_ref("RUN echo from nowhere\n"), None);
1740 assert_eq!(dockerfile_from_ref(""), None);
1741 }
1742
1743 /// A `FROM` that disagrees with the base image is refused, and the message names both
1744 /// refs — the one found and the one expected — because "these must agree" without both
1745 /// values leaves the caller to guess which to change.
1746 #[test]
1747 fn a_dockerfile_from_that_disagrees_with_the_base_is_refused() {
1748 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
1749 let error = require_matching_from(&base, "FROM ubuntu:24.04\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n")
1750 .expect_err("ubuntu is not the managed base");
1751 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
1752 let message = error.to_string();
1753 assert!(message.contains("ubuntu:24.04"), "{message}");
1754 assert!(message.contains(&base.docker_ref), "{message}");
1755 assert!(
1756 message.contains("none of the measured platform behaviour applies"),
1757 "{message}"
1758 );
1759
1760 require_matching_from(&base, &default_dockerfile(9000, None, &base, None))
1761 .expect("the derived Dockerfile agrees with its own base");
1762 }
1763
1764 /// A digest-pinned `FROM` of the agreeing ref passes: it names one specific manifest of
1765 /// the base this check already accepts, which is the spelling a supply-chain-conscious
1766 /// caller uses. The boundary cases stay refused — a digest on a *different* ref is still
1767 /// a disagreement, and a malformed digest is not a digest.
1768 #[test]
1769 fn a_digest_pinned_from_of_the_agreeing_ref_passes() {
1770 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
1771 let digest = "c439fb4994ea7ca529233d6256446d3f8b7b4efb58956073e015303a170011de";
1772 let pinned = format!(
1773 "FROM {}@sha256:{digest}\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n",
1774 base.docker_ref
1775 );
1776 require_matching_from(&base, &pinned).expect("a digest pin of the same ref agrees");
1777
1778 require_matching_from(&base, &format!("FROM ubuntu:24.04@sha256:{digest}\n"))
1779 .expect_err("a digest does not launder a different ref");
1780 require_matching_from(&base, &format!("FROM {}@sha256:abc123\n", base.docker_ref))
1781 .expect_err("a 6-character digest is not a digest");
1782 require_matching_from(
1783 &base,
1784 &format!("FROM {}@sha256:{}\n", base.docker_ref, "g".repeat(64)),
1785 )
1786 .expect_err("64 non-hex characters are not a digest");
1787 }
1788
1789 /// A Dockerfile with no `FROM` is not this check's business: the build will say so, and
1790 /// refusing here would be a Dockerfile validator rather than an agreement check.
1791 #[test]
1792 fn a_dockerfile_with_no_from_is_left_to_the_build() {
1793 require_matching_from(&BaseImage::al2023(), "COPY agentd /agentd\n")
1794 .expect("no FROM is not a disagreement");
1795 }
1796
1797 /// The measured case, reproduced from the Dockerfile that spent it: a hand-written
1798 /// guest Dockerfile carrying `ENV AGENTD_PORT=8080` — the plausible port, and the wrong
1799 /// one — against a client sending `hooks.port=9000`. The build succeeds, the daemon logs
1800 /// `agentd listening`, and the image lands in `CREATE_FAILED` naming no port.
1801 #[test]
1802 fn a_dockerfile_port_that_disagrees_with_the_hook_port_is_refused() {
1803 let error = require_matching_agentd_port(
1804 crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
1805 "FROM public.ecr.aws/amazonlinux/amazonlinux:2023-minimal\n\
1806 COPY agentd /agentd\n\
1807 ENV AGENTD_PORT=8080\n\
1808 EXPOSE 8080\n\
1809 CMD [\"/agentd\"]\n",
1810 )
1811 .expect_err("8080 is not the port the create call sends");
1812 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
1813 let message = error.to_string();
1814 assert!(message.contains("8080"), "{message}");
1815 assert!(message.contains("9000"), "{message}");
1816 // The remedy is what a reader acts on, and the diagnostic's value is naming the
1817 // symptom that points away from the cause.
1818 assert!(message.contains("CREATE_FAILED"), "{message}");
1819 assert!(message.contains("ready/validate"), "{message}");
1820
1821 require_matching_agentd_port(
1822 crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
1823 &default_dockerfile(
1824 crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
1825 Some("/work"),
1826 &BaseImage::al2023(),
1827 None,
1828 ),
1829 )
1830 .expect("the derived Dockerfile agrees with the port it was derived from");
1831 }
1832
1833 /// Both `ENV` spellings set the variable, so a guard reading only `KEY=VALUE` would pass
1834 /// the legacy form it could not parse. The last assignment wins, as it does at build
1835 /// time.
1836 #[test]
1837 fn the_port_scan_reads_both_env_spellings_and_takes_the_last() {
1838 assert_eq!(dockerfile_agentd_port("ENV AGENTD_PORT=9000\n"), Some(9000));
1839 assert_eq!(dockerfile_agentd_port("ENV AGENTD_PORT 8080\n"), Some(8080));
1840 assert_eq!(dockerfile_agentd_port("env agentd_port=7000\n"), None);
1841 assert_eq!(
1842 dockerfile_agentd_port("ENV AGENTD_PORT=8080\nENV AGENTD_PORT=9000\n"),
1843 Some(9000),
1844 );
1845 assert_eq!(dockerfile_agentd_port("ENV AGENTD_LOG=info\n"), None);
1846 // Neither a missing variable nor an unparseable one is a disagreement: the daemon
1847 // keeps its own default for both (`crates/agentd/src/config.rs:118`).
1848 assert_eq!(
1849 dockerfile_agentd_port("FROM x\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n"),
1850 None
1851 );
1852 assert_eq!(dockerfile_agentd_port("ENV AGENTD_PORT=nine\n"), None);
1853 require_matching_agentd_port(
1854 crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
1855 "FROM x\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n",
1856 )
1857 .expect("no variable agrees with the default, which is what the daemon will use");
1858 }
1859
1860 /// The other half of the pair, and the harder one to diagnose: a Dockerfile that names
1861 /// no port at all against a client that moved off the default. Silence is not neutral —
1862 /// `Config::from_env` keeps `9000` for an unset variable — so the guest listens on 9000
1863 /// while the hooks are dialled on the client's port, which is the measured failure with
1864 /// nothing in the Dockerfile to point at.
1865 #[test]
1866 fn a_dockerfile_naming_no_port_is_refused_when_the_client_moved_off_the_default() {
1867 let error = require_matching_agentd_port(
1868 8080,
1869 "FROM public.ecr.aws/amazonlinux/amazonlinux:2023-minimal\n\
1870 COPY agentd /agentd\n\
1871 CMD [\"/agentd\"]\n",
1872 )
1873 .expect_err("a silent Dockerfile leaves the daemon on 9000, not on 8080");
1874 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
1875 let message = error.to_string();
1876 assert!(message.contains("8080"), "{message}");
1877 assert!(
1878 message.contains(&crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT.to_string()),
1879 "the daemon's default is the value the reader has to learn: {message}"
1880 );
1881 assert!(message.contains("CREATE_FAILED"), "{message}");
1882 assert!(message.contains("ready/validate"), "{message}");
1883
1884 // An unparseable value has the same consequence in the guest as no value, so it is
1885 // refused for the same reason rather than passed as "not this guard's business".
1886 require_matching_agentd_port(8080, "FROM x\nENV AGENTD_PORT=nine\n")
1887 .expect_err("a value the daemon cannot parse leaves it on its own default");
1888
1889 // The default-port client is the common case and stays silent: the Dockerfile that
1890 // says nothing and the client that changed nothing already agree.
1891 require_matching_agentd_port(
1892 crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
1893 "FROM x\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n",
1894 )
1895 .expect("silence agrees with the default");
1896 }
1897
1898 /// The fourth pair of the `FROM`/`WORKDIR`/`AGENTD_PORT` shape, found by sweeping for
1899 /// the others: a keepalive interval the client's silence tolerance is shorter than. The
1900 /// resulting error prints the client's own timeout as though it were the keepalive, so
1901 /// the number a reader would search for never appears.
1902 #[test]
1903 fn a_keepalive_at_or_over_the_client_idle_timeout_is_refused() {
1904 let timeout = crate::session::exec::DEFAULT_STREAM_IDLE_TIMEOUT;
1905 assert_eq!(timeout.as_secs(), 60, "the guard's arithmetic assumes this");
1906
1907 let error =
1908 require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout(timeout, "ENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS=90\n")
1909 .expect_err("90s of scheduled silence exceeds a 60s tolerance");
1910 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
1911 let message = error.to_string();
1912 assert!(message.contains("90"), "{message}");
1913 assert!(message.contains("60"), "{message}");
1914
1915 // Equality races rather than passing: the timeout fires on the same tick the
1916 // keepalive is due.
1917 require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout(timeout, "ENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS=60\n")
1918 .expect_err("an interval equal to the tolerance is a race, not a margin");
1919
1920 require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout(timeout, "ENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS 30\n")
1921 .expect("30s leaves a margin, in the legacy spelling");
1922 // The daemon's own default is 15s, so silence is safe for this pair.
1923 require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout(timeout, "FROM x\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n")
1924 .expect("an unset keepalive leaves the daemon at 15s");
1925 require_keepalive_under_idle_timeout(
1926 timeout,
1927 &default_dockerfile(
1928 crate::control::DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT,
1929 Some("/work"),
1930 &BaseImage::al2023(),
1931 None,
1932 ),
1933 )
1934 .expect("the derived Dockerfile sets no keepalive");
1935 }
1936
1937 /// **Issue #46, both refusable halves.** A Dockerfile with no `CMD` builds an image
1938 /// that runs the base's default process; a non-empty `ENTRYPOINT` turns the `CMD` into
1939 /// its arguments. Either way the daemon the artifact carries never starts, and the
1940 /// failure surfaces as `CREATE_FAILED` or a run-hook timeout naming neither
1941 /// instruction — so the message must name both the instruction and that symptom.
1942 #[test]
1943 fn a_dockerfile_that_never_runs_the_daemon_is_refused_naming_the_symptom() {
1944 // No CMD at all: the base's default applies, which is not /agentd.
1945 let error = require_daemon_cmd(
1946 "FROM public.ecr.aws/amazonlinux/amazonlinux:2023-minimal\n\
1947 COPY agentd /agentd\n\
1948 ENV AGENTD_PORT=9000\n",
1949 )
1950 .expect_err("no CMD means the daemon never starts");
1951 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
1952 let message = error.to_string();
1953 assert!(message.contains("no CMD"), "{message}");
1954 assert!(message.contains("run-hook timeout"), "{message}");
1955 assert!(message.contains("CREATE_FAILED"), "{message}");
1956
1957 // A non-empty ENTRYPOINT swallows the CMD as its arguments.
1958 let error = require_daemon_cmd(
1959 "FROM public.ecr.aws/amazonlinux/amazonlinux:2023-minimal\n\
1960 COPY agentd /agentd\n\
1961 ENTRYPOINT [\"/bin/sh\", \"-c\"]\n\
1962 CMD [\"/agentd\"]\n",
1963 )
1964 .expect_err("a non-empty ENTRYPOINT makes CMD its arguments");
1965 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
1966 let message = error.to_string();
1967 assert!(message.contains("ENTRYPOINT"), "{message}");
1968 assert!(message.contains("run-hook timeout"), "{message}");
1969
1970 // An empty CMD is the same absence in different spelling.
1971 require_daemon_cmd("FROM x\nCMD []\n").expect_err("CMD [] runs nothing");
1972 }
1973
1974 /// The shapes that must pass: the deployment invariant itself, in exec and spaced
1975 /// spellings, and the invariant's `ENTRYPOINT []` with any interior whitespace. The
1976 /// derived Dockerfile passes its own guard, which is what keeps the default path
1977 /// unaffected.
1978 #[test]
1979 fn the_deployment_invariant_passes_the_daemon_cmd_guard() {
1980 require_daemon_cmd(&default_dockerfile(
1981 9000,
1982 Some("/work"),
1983 &BaseImage::al2023(),
1984 None,
1985 ))
1986 .expect("the derived Dockerfile is the invariant");
1987 require_daemon_cmd("FROM x\nENTRYPOINT []\nCMD [\"/agentd\"]\n").expect("the invariant");
1988 require_daemon_cmd("FROM x\nENTRYPOINT [ ]\nCMD [\"/agentd\"]\n")
1989 .expect("interior whitespace is still the empty exec form");
1990 require_daemon_cmd("FROM x\ncmd [\"/agentd\"]\n").expect("case-insensitive, no ENTRYPOINT");
1991 // Last instruction wins, as at build time: a later empty ENTRYPOINT un-swallows.
1992 require_daemon_cmd("FROM x\nENTRYPOINT [\"/bin/sh\"]\nENTRYPOINT []\nCMD [\"/agentd\"]\n")
1993 .expect("the last ENTRYPOINT is the one the build uses");
1994 // And the reverse ordering is refused for the same reason.
1995 require_daemon_cmd("FROM x\nENTRYPOINT []\nENTRYPOINT [\"/bin/sh\"]\nCMD [\"/agentd\"]\n")
1996 .expect_err("the last ENTRYPOINT is non-empty");
1997 }
1998
1999 /// Workdir inheritance is refused when neither the base nor the Dockerfile declares
2000 /// one, and the message says where the symptom would have appeared — in the guest, a
2001 /// build cycle later.
2002 #[test]
2003 fn inheriting_a_workdir_nothing_declares_is_refused() {
2004 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
2005 assert!(base.working_dir.is_empty(), "the measured case");
2006
2007 let error = require_workdir(&base, None).expect_err("nothing declares a workdir");
2008 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
2009 let message = error.to_string();
2010 assert!(message.contains("no WorkingDir"), "{message}");
2011 assert!(message.contains("nothing to inherit"), "{message}");
2012 assert!(message.contains("docs/PLATFORM.md"), "{message}");
2013 }
2014
2015 /// It is accepted when *either* side declares one — the Dockerfile's `WORKDIR` or the
2016 /// base image's own `working_dir`. Both directions, because a check that only read the
2017 /// Dockerfile would refuse a caller on a purpose-built image that declares one.
2018 #[test]
2019 fn either_the_dockerfile_or_the_base_may_supply_the_workdir() {
2020 let base = BaseImage::al2023();
2021 require_workdir(&base, Some("FROM x\nWORKDIR /srv\n"))
2022 .expect("the Dockerfile declares one");
2023
2024 let purpose_built = BaseImage {
2025 working_dir: "/app".to_string(),
2026 ..BaseImage::al2023()
2027 };
2028 require_workdir(&purpose_built, None).expect("the base image declares one");
2029 }
2030
2031 /// A bare `WORKDIR` with no argument does not count as declaring one. It is the shape a
2032 /// truncated edit leaves behind, and treating it as a declaration would pass the guard
2033 /// on a Dockerfile that sets nothing.
2034 #[test]
2035 fn a_workdir_with_no_argument_does_not_count_as_a_declaration() {
2036 let error = require_workdir(&BaseImage::al2023(), Some("FROM x\nWORKDIR\n"))
2037 .expect_err("WORKDIR with no path declares nothing");
2038 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
2039 }
2040
2041 /// **IMAGE-1, the acceptance test #220 names.** Wrapping a bare `FROM` produces exactly the
2042 /// default Dockerfile for that base, so the stanza has one source: the default generator's
2043 /// output minus its `FROM` line is what a wrap appends. Checked with and without a workdir,
2044 /// and on a non-default port, because each of those is a branch of the one stanza.
2045 #[test]
2046 fn wrapping_a_bare_from_is_the_default_dockerfile_minus_nothing() {
2047 for (port, workdir) in [
2048 (DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT_FOR_TESTS, None),
2049 (DEFAULT_AGENT_PORT_FOR_TESTS, Some("/srv/task")),
2050 (8080, None),
2051 ] {
2052 let base = BaseImage {
2053 docker_ref: "x".to_string(),
2054 ..BaseImage::al2023()
2055 };
2056 let default = default_dockerfile(port, workdir, &base, None);
2057 let opts = WrapOptions {
2058 port,
2059 workdir: workdir.map(str::to_string),
2060 ..WrapOptions::default()
2061 };
2062 assert_eq!(
2063 wrap_dockerfile("FROM x\n", &opts).expect("a bare FROM wraps"),
2064 default,
2065 "IMAGE-1: port {port} workdir {workdir:?}"
2066 );
2067 let (from, stanza) = default.split_once('\n').expect("lines");
2068 assert_eq!(from, "FROM x");
2069 assert!(stanza.ends_with("CMD [\"/agentd\"]\n"), "{stanza}");
2070 }
2071 }
2072
2073 /// **IMAGE-2.** Whatever the task set — its own entrypoint, command, port, user — the
2074 /// wrapped result ends on the bootstrap invariant with the client's port, and a task that
2075 /// ends on another user has `USER root` restored ahead of the stanza. A task that ends on
2076 /// root, or never changes user, gets no extra line, which is what keeps IMAGE-1's equality.
2077 #[test]
2078 fn a_wrapped_task_ends_on_the_invariant_with_root_restored_when_needed() {
2079 let task = "FROM python:3.12-slim\nWORKDIR /app\nENV AGENTD_PORT=8080\n\
2080 ENTRYPOINT [\"/bin/sh\", \"-c\"]\nCMD [\"python\", \"serve.py\"]\nUSER app\n";
2081 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile(task, &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps");
2082 let added = wrapped
2083 .strip_prefix(task)
2084 .expect("the task text is kept verbatim");
2085 assert!(
2086 added.starts_with("USER root\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n"),
2087 "{added}"
2088 );
2089 assert_eq!(dockerfile_entrypoint(&wrapped), Some("[]"));
2090 assert_eq!(dockerfile_cmd(&wrapped), Some(r#"["/agentd"]"#));
2091 assert_eq!(dockerfile_agentd_port(&wrapped), Some(9000));
2092 require_daemon_cmd(&wrapped).expect("the daemon is the CMD");
2093 require_matching_agentd_port(9000, &wrapped).expect("the stanza's port wins");
2094
2095 for (last_user, restored) in [
2096 ("USER root", false),
2097 ("USER 0", false),
2098 ("USER root:root", false),
2099 ("USER 0:0", false),
2100 ("user app", true),
2101 ("USER 1000:1000", true),
2102 ("USER root:staff", true),
2103 ("USER ${TASK_USER}", true),
2104 ] {
2105 let task = format!("FROM x\n{last_user}\n");
2106 let added = wrap_dockerfile(&task, &WrapOptions::default())
2107 .expect("wraps")
2108 .strip_prefix(task.as_str())
2109 .expect("verbatim")
2110 .to_string();
2111 assert_eq!(
2112 added.starts_with("USER root\n"),
2113 restored,
2114 "IMAGE-2: {last_user:?}: {added}"
2115 );
2116 }
2117
2118 // Only the last USER counts, as at build time.
2119 let task = "FROM x\nUSER app\nUSER root\n";
2120 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile(task, &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps");
2121 let added = wrapped.strip_prefix(task).expect("verbatim");
2122 assert!(added.starts_with("COPY agentd /agentd\n"), "{added}");
2123 }
2124
2125 /// **IMAGE-2, the newline.** A task file without a trailing newline gets one before the
2126 /// stanza, in either line ending, so the stanza's first line is its own instruction.
2127 #[test]
2128 fn a_task_without_a_trailing_newline_is_normalized() {
2129 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile("FROM x", &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps");
2130 assert!(
2131 wrapped.starts_with("FROM x\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n"),
2132 "{wrapped}"
2133 );
2134 let wrapped =
2135 wrap_dockerfile("FROM x\r\nRUN true", &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps");
2136 assert!(
2137 wrapped.starts_with("FROM x\r\nRUN true\nCOPY agentd /agentd\n"),
2138 "{wrapped}"
2139 );
2140 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile("FROM x\r\n", &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps");
2141 assert!(wrapped.starts_with("FROM x\r\nCOPY agentd"), "{wrapped}");
2142 }
2143
2144 /// IMAGE-2: the builder executes capture with the final USER before restoring
2145 /// root for sealing and daemon startup, regardless of how the task chose it.
2146 #[test]
2147 fn preserving_user_captures_before_root_and_keeps_the_daemon_as_cmd() {
2148 for task in [
2149 "FROM x\nUSER app\n",
2150 "FROM x\nUSER 4242:4343\n",
2151 "FROM x AS builder\nUSER ignored\nFROM y\n",
2152 "FROM x AS base\nUSER app\nFROM base\n",
2153 "FROM x\nARG who=app\nUSER ${who}\n",
2154 "FROM x\nENV AGENTD_DEFAULT_USER=root\nUSER app\n",
2155 ] {
2156 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile_preserving_user(task, &WrapOptions::default()).unwrap();
2157 assert!(wrapped.starts_with(task));
2158 let tail = &wrapped[task.len()..];
2159 assert!(tail.find("--capture-image-user").unwrap() < tail.find("USER 0:0").unwrap());
2160 assert!(tail.find("USER 0:0").unwrap() < tail.find("--seal-image-user").unwrap());
2161 assert!(tail.contains("ENV AGENTD_PRESERVE_IMAGE_USER=1"));
2162 assert!(tail.ends_with("ENTRYPOINT []\nCMD [\"/agentd\"]\n"));
2163 assert!(!tail.contains("AGENTD_DEFAULT_USER="));
2164 }
2165 for invalid in ["USER app\n", "FROM x\nRUN echo \\"] {
2166 assert!(wrap_dockerfile_preserving_user(invalid, &WrapOptions::default()).is_err());
2167 }
2168 }
2169
2170 /// **IMAGE-2.** The capture stanza starts on its own line, whether the task already
2171 /// ends with a newline or needs one, and preserves either existing line ending.
2172 #[test]
2173 fn preserving_user_normalizes_the_task_boundary() {
2174 for (task, prefix) in [
2175 (
2176 "FROM x\nUSER app",
2177 "FROM x\nUSER app\nCOPY --chmod=0755 agentd /agentd\n",
2178 ),
2179 (
2180 "FROM x\nUSER app\n",
2181 "FROM x\nUSER app\nCOPY --chmod=0755 agentd /agentd\n",
2182 ),
2183 (
2184 "FROM x\r\nUSER app\r\n",
2185 "FROM x\r\nUSER app\r\nCOPY --chmod=0755 agentd /agentd\n",
2186 ),
2187 ] {
2188 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile_preserving_user(task, &WrapOptions::default())
2189 .expect("the task wraps");
2190 assert!(wrapped.starts_with(prefix), "{wrapped:?}");
2191 }
2192 }
2193
2194 /// **IMAGE-1.** Preserving the image user still honors the wrapper's workdir option;
2195 /// an empty option leaves the image's workdir alone, like an omitted option.
2196 #[test]
2197 fn preserving_user_keeps_the_requested_workdir() {
2198 for (workdir, expected) in [
2199 (None, vec![]),
2200 (Some(""), vec![]),
2201 (Some("/srv/task"), vec!["/srv/task"]),
2202 ] {
2203 let opts = WrapOptions {
2204 workdir: workdir.map(str::to_string),
2205 ..WrapOptions::default()
2206 };
2207 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile_preserving_user("FROM x\nUSER app\n", &opts)
2208 .expect("the task wraps");
2209 let declared: Vec<_> = wrapped
2210 .lines()
2211 .filter_map(|line| line.strip_prefix("WORKDIR "))
2212 .collect();
2213 assert_eq!(declared, expected, "{wrapped}");
2214 if workdir == Some("/srv/task") {
2215 assert!(wrapped.contains("RUN mkdir -p /srv/task\n"), "{wrapped}");
2216 }
2217 }
2218 }
2219
2220 /// **IMAGE-3.** Each refusal on its own, against an otherwise wrappable task, names its
2221 /// cause: no `FROM`, a trailing continuation (in the default and a custom escape
2222 /// character, across blank and comment lines, in either line ending), an open heredoc, a
2223 /// keepalive the client cannot tolerate, a bad workdir or port, and inheriting a workdir
2224 /// nothing declares.
2225 #[test]
2226 fn a_task_the_stanza_cannot_follow_is_refused_naming_the_cause() {
2227 let refused = |task: &str, opts: WrapOptions, cause: &str| {
2228 let error = wrap_dockerfile(task, &opts).expect_err(cause);
2229 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg, "{error}");
2230 let message = error.to_string();
2231 assert!(message.contains(cause), "IMAGE-3 {cause:?}: {message}");
2232 };
2233 let none = WrapOptions::default;
2234 refused("RUN echo hello\n", none(), "no FROM");
2235 refused("", none(), "no FROM");
2236 refused("FROM\n", none(), "no FROM");
2237 refused(
2238 "FROM x\nRUN apt-get update && \\\n",
2239 none(),
2240 "line continuation",
2241 );
2242 refused("FROM x\nRUN a \\ \n", none(), "line continuation");
2243 refused("FROM x\nRUN a \\\r\n", none(), "line continuation");
2244 refused(
2245 "FROM x\nRUN a \\\n\n# comment\n",
2246 none(),
2247 "line continuation",
2248 );
2249 refused("# escape=`\nFROM x\nRUN a `\n", none(), "line continuation");
2250 refused("FROM x\nRUN <<EOF\necho never closed\n", none(), "heredoc");
2251 refused("FROM x\nRUN <<-\"END\"\necho x\n", none(), "heredoc");
2252 refused("FROM x\nCOPY <<A <<B /dst/\na\nA\nb\n", none(), "heredoc");
2253 refused(
2254 "FROM x\nENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS=90\n",
2255 none(),
2256 "AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS=90",
2257 );
2258 for workdir in ["relative/dir", "/srv\nRUN evil", "/my dir", "/tab\there"] {
2259 refused(
2260 "FROM x\n",
2261 WrapOptions {
2262 workdir: Some(workdir.to_string()),
2263 ..none()
2264 },
2265 "absolute path",
2266 );
2267 }
2268 refused("FROM x\n", WrapOptions { port: 0, ..none() }, "port");
2269 refused(
2270 "FROM x\n",
2271 WrapOptions {
2272 inherit_workdir: true,
2273 ..none()
2274 },
2275 "nothing to inherit",
2276 );
2277 }
2278
2279 /// **IMAGE-3, the other side.** What looks like a refusal but is not: a backslash under a
2280 /// backtick escape, a continuation that was finished, a closed heredoc (including a `<<-`
2281 /// terminator indented with tabs), a here-string, an escaped keepalive under the timeout,
2282 /// and inheriting a workdir the task or the options declare.
2283 #[test]
2284 fn a_finished_task_is_wrapped_even_when_it_looks_unfinished() {
2285 let none = WrapOptions::default;
2286 for task in [
2287 "# escape=`\nFROM x\nRUN a \\\n",
2288 "FROM x\nRUN a \\\n && b\n",
2289 "FROM x\nRUN <<EOF\necho closed\nEOF\n",
2290 "FROM x\nRUN <<-EOF\n\techo closed\n\tEOF\n",
2291 "FROM x\nCOPY <<A <<B /dst/\na\nA\nb\nB\n",
2292 "FROM x\nRUN cat <<< word\n",
2293 "FROM x\n# a trailing comment \\\n",
2294 "FROM x\nENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS=30\n",
2295 ] {
2296 wrap_dockerfile(task, &none())
2297 .unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{task:?} was refused: {error}"));
2298 }
2299 wrap_dockerfile(
2300 "FROM x\nWORKDIR /app\n",
2301 &WrapOptions {
2302 inherit_workdir: true,
2303 ..none()
2304 },
2305 )
2306 .expect("the task declares one");
2307 wrap_dockerfile(
2308 "FROM x\n",
2309 &WrapOptions {
2310 inherit_workdir: true,
2311 workdir: Some("/srv".to_string()),
2312 ..none()
2313 },
2314 )
2315 .expect("the options declare one");
2316 wrap_dockerfile(
2317 "FROM x\n",
2318 &WrapOptions {
2319 workdir: Some(String::new()),
2320 ..none()
2321 },
2322 )
2323 .expect("an empty workdir is none, as default_dockerfile reads it");
2324 }
2325
2326 /// **IMAGE-4.** A derived base takes its ref from the first `FROM`, keeps the managed
2327 /// base's name (so `baseImageArn` is unchanged) and an empty working dir, and pairs with
2328 /// the Dockerfile it came from under the `FROM` guard — digest pins included, since the
2329 /// ref is taken whole. A Dockerfile with no `FROM` has nothing to derive.
2330 #[test]
2331 fn a_base_derived_from_a_dockerfile_pairs_with_it_by_construction() {
2332 let digest = "c439fb4994ea7ca529233d6256446d3f8b7b4efb58956073e015303a170011de";
2333 for (task, docker_ref) in [
2334 ("FROM python:3.12-slim\n", "python:3.12-slim".to_string()),
2335 (
2336 "FROM --platform=linux/arm64 golang:1.23 AS build\nFROM python:3.12-slim\n",
2337 "golang:1.23".to_string(),
2338 ),
2339 (
2340 &*format!("FROM ubuntu:24.04@sha256:{digest}\n"),
2341 format!("ubuntu:24.04@sha256:{digest}"),
2342 ),
2343 ] {
2344 let base = BaseImage::from_dockerfile(task).expect("a FROM");
2345 assert_eq!(base.docker_ref, docker_ref);
2346 assert_eq!(
2347 base.name,
2348 BaseImage::al2023().name,
2349 "IMAGE-4 keeps the managed base"
2350 );
2351 assert_eq!(base.working_dir, "");
2352 let wrapped = wrap_dockerfile(task, &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps");
2353 require_matching_from(&base, &wrapped).expect("IMAGE-4: the pair agrees");
2354 assert_eq!(BaseImage::from_dockerfile(&wrapped).expect("a FROM"), base);
2355 }
2356 // The inversion #220 removes: under the managed base, a task on another base is
2357 // refused.
2358 require_matching_from(
2359 &BaseImage::al2023(),
2360 &wrap_dockerfile("FROM python:3.12-slim\n", &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps"),
2361 )
2362 .expect_err("the managed base does not pair with python:3.12-slim");
2363
2364 let error = BaseImage::from_dockerfile("RUN echo hello\n").expect_err("no FROM");
2365 assert_eq!(error.kind(), ErrorKind::InvalidArg);
2366 assert!(error.to_string().contains("no FROM"), "{error}");
2367 }
2368
2369 /// **The table `crates/model/src/wrap.rs` specifies**, rendered as real Dockerfile text: every
2370 /// task and option combination the model enumerates, and the refusal (or the `USER root`
2371 /// verdict) the model's `specified` gives it. The model crate cannot be a dependency here
2372 /// (this crate is published and the model isn't), so the table is restated as `expected`
2373 /// below, and `crates/model-conformance/tests/tables.rs` drives this function over the model's rows.
2374 #[test]
2375 fn wrap_agrees_with_the_model_table() {
2376 #[derive(Debug)]
2377 enum Expect {
2378 Refused(&'static str),
2379 Wrapped { user_root: bool },
2380 }
2381 let digest = "c439fb4994ea7ca529233d6256446d3f8b7b4efb58956073e015303a170011de";
2382 let managed = BaseImage::al2023().docker_ref;
2383 let froms = [
2384 None,
2385 Some(managed.clone()),
2386 Some(format!("{managed}@sha256:{digest}")),
2387 Some("python:3.12-slim".to_string()),
2388 ];
2389 let mut checked = 0;
2390 for from in &froms {
2391 for tail in 0..3 {
2392 for user in 0..3 {
2393 for declares_workdir in [false, true] {
2394 for keepalive_too_long in [false, true] {
2395 for workdir in 0..3 {
2396 for inherit_workdir in [false, true] {
2397 let mut text = String::new();
2398 match from {
2399 Some(from) => text.push_str(&format!("FROM {from}\n")),
2400 None => text.push_str("RUN echo no base\n"),
2401 }
2402 if declares_workdir {
2403 text.push_str("WORKDIR /app\n");
2404 }
2405 if keepalive_too_long {
2406 text.push_str("ENV AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS=60\n");
2407 }
2408 match user {
2409 1 => text.push_str("USER root\n"),
2410 2 => text.push_str("USER app\n"),
2411 _ => {}
2412 }
2413 match tail {
2414 1 => text.push_str("RUN make \\\n"),
2415 2 => text.push_str("RUN <<EOF\necho open\n"),
2416 _ => {}
2417 }
2418 let opts = WrapOptions {
2419 workdir: match workdir {
2420 1 => Some("/srv".to_string()),
2421 2 => Some("srv".to_string()),
2422 _ => None,
2423 },
2424 inherit_workdir,
2425 ..WrapOptions::default()
2426 };
2427 let expected = if from.is_none() {
2428 Expect::Refused("no FROM")
2429 } else if tail != 0 {
2430 Expect::Refused(if tail == 1 {
2431 "line continuation"
2432 } else {
2433 "heredoc"
2434 })
2435 } else if keepalive_too_long {
2436 Expect::Refused("AGENTD_SSE_KEEPALIVE_SECS")
2437 } else if workdir == 2 {
2438 Expect::Refused("absolute path")
2439 } else if inherit_workdir && !declares_workdir && workdir == 0 {
2440 Expect::Refused("nothing to inherit")
2441 } else {
2442 Expect::Wrapped {
2443 user_root: user == 2,
2444 }
2445 };
2446 let got = wrap_dockerfile(&text, &opts);
2447 match (&expected, &got) {
2448 (Expect::Refused(cause), Err(error)) => assert!(
2449 error.to_string().contains(cause),
2450 "{expected:?} for {text:?} {opts:?}: {error}"
2451 ),
2452 (Expect::Wrapped { user_root }, Ok(out)) => assert_eq!(
2453 out.strip_prefix(text.as_str())
2454 .expect("verbatim")
2455 .starts_with("USER root\n"),
2456 *user_root,
2457 "{text:?} {opts:?}"
2458 ),
2459 _ => panic!(
2460 "{expected:?} for {text:?} {opts:?}, got {got:?}"
2461 ),
2462 }
2463 checked += 1;
2464 }
2465 }
2466 }
2467 }
2468 }
2469 }
2470 }
2471 assert_eq!(
2472 checked,
2473 4 * 3 * 3 * 2 * 2 * 3 * 2,
2474 "every combination the model has"
2475 );
2476 }
2477
2478 fn context_of(entries: &[(&str, u32, &[u8])]) -> crate::control::context::BuildContext {
2479 crate::control::context::BuildContext::from_entries(
2480 entries
2481 .iter()
2482 .map(
2483 |(name, mode, bytes)| crate::control::context::ContextEntry {
2484 name: (*name).to_string(),
2485 mode: *mode,
2486 bytes: bytes.to_vec(),
2487 },
2488 )
2489 .collect(),
2490 )
2491 .expect("valid entries")
2492 }
2493
2494 /// **IMAGE-6, the pin.** A request with no build context — `None`, or an empty one — hashes
2495 /// to exactly what `artifact_content_hash` produced before #221, so no `build --reuse` or
2496 /// `AgentVm` image name moves. The vector is the one pinned for #74, recomputed
2497 /// independently with Python's hashlib then.
2498 #[test]
2499 fn a_request_without_a_context_keeps_its_digest() {
2500 let pinned = "90a0ef925a4696b0c0f142241b2c714e63f40071d0d02951e26cb2a1d8bb24fc";
2501 assert_eq!(
2502 artifact_content_hash_with_context(b"binary-bytes", "FROM scratch\n", None, None),
2503 pinned,
2504 "IMAGE-6: the no-context digest is the pre-#221 digest"
2505 );
2506 let empty = crate::control::context::BuildContext::default();
2507 assert_eq!(
2508 artifact_content_hash_with_context(
2509 b"binary-bytes",
2510 "FROM scratch\n",
2511 None,
2512 Some(&empty)
2513 ),
2514 pinned,
2515 "an empty context carries no extra entries, so it is the same artifact"
2516 );
2517 assert_eq!(
2518 artifact_content_hash(b"binary-bytes", "FROM scratch\n", None),
2519 pinned
2520 );
2521 }
2522
2523 /// **IMAGE-6, the extension.** Each entry's name, mode, and bytes are part of the
2524 /// identity; the order entries were read in is not, because a context is sorted by name.
2525 #[test]
2526 fn the_context_hash_follows_every_entry_and_not_their_order() {
2527 let hash = |context: &crate::control::context::BuildContext| {
2528 artifact_content_hash_with_context(b"bin", "FROM x\n", None, Some(context))
2529 };
2530 let base = hash(&context_of(&[
2531 ("a.txt", 0o644, b"a"),
2532 ("b.txt", 0o644, b"b"),
2533 ]));
2534 assert_ne!(
2535 base,
2536 artifact_content_hash_with_context(b"bin", "FROM x\n", None, None),
2537 "IMAGE-6: a context is part of the identity"
2538 );
2539 assert_eq!(
2540 base,
2541 hash(&context_of(&[
2542 ("b.txt", 0o644, b"b"),
2543 ("a.txt", 0o644, b"a")
2544 ])),
2545 "the read order is not"
2546 );
2547 for (changed, what) in [
2548 (
2549 context_of(&[("a.txt", 0o644, b"A"), ("b.txt", 0o644, b"b")]),
2550 "bytes",
2551 ),
2552 (
2553 context_of(&[("a.txt", 0o755, b"a"), ("b.txt", 0o644, b"b")]),
2554 "mode",
2555 ),
2556 (
2557 context_of(&[("c.txt", 0o644, b"a"), ("b.txt", 0o644, b"b")]),
2558 "name",
2559 ),
2560 (context_of(&[("a.txt", 0o644, b"ab")]), "boundary"),
2561 ] {
2562 assert_ne!(base, hash(&changed), "IMAGE-6: the entry {what} counts");
2563 }
2564 }
2565
2566 /// **IMAGE-7, the zip.** Equal inputs make byte-identical artifacts, so equal inputs are
2567 /// one S3 object: every entry carries the DOS epoch as its date and a fixed mode, the
2568 /// context entries sit beside the Dockerfile at the root, and the Dockerfile entry is the
2569 /// one passed in. The same build a second apart, which needs a real sleep this crate
2570 /// can't make, is `crates/microvms-core/tests/artifact_across_seconds.rs`.
2571 #[test]
2572 fn the_artifact_is_deterministic_with_fixed_dates_and_modes() {
2573 use std::io::Read as _;
2574
2575 let context = context_of(&[("app/run.sh", 0o755, b"#!/bin/sh\n"), ("data", 0o644, b"d")]);
2576 let build = || {
2577 build_artifact_with_context(
2578 &aarch64_daemon(b"daemon"),
2579 "FROM x\n",
2580 None,
2581 Some(&context),
2582 )
2583 .expect("zips")
2584 };
2585 let first = build();
2586 assert_eq!(first, build(), "IMAGE-7: equal inputs, identical bytes");
2587
2588 let mut archive = zip::ZipArchive::new(std::io::Cursor::new(first)).expect("a zip");
2589 let mut names = Vec::new();
2590 for index in 0..archive.len() {
2591 let entry = archive.by_index(index).expect("entry");
2592 let name = entry.name().expect("a name").into_owned();
2593 let modified = entry.last_modified().expect("a date");
2594 assert_eq!(
2595 (modified.year(), modified.month(), modified.day()),
2596 (1980, 1, 1),
2597 "IMAGE-7: {name} carries a fixed date"
2598 );
2599 let mode = entry.unix_mode().expect("a mode") & 0o777;
2600 let expected = match name.as_str() {
2601 "agentd" | "app/run.sh" => 0o755,
2602 _ => 0o644,
2603 };
2604 assert_eq!(mode, expected, "IMAGE-7: {name} mode {mode:o}");
2605 names.push(name);
2606 }
2607 assert_eq!(names, ["Dockerfile", "agentd", "app/run.sh", "data"]);
2608 let mut dockerfile = String::new();
2609 archive
2610 .by_name("Dockerfile")
2611 .expect("entry")
2612 .read_to_string(&mut dockerfile)
2613 .expect("reads");
2614 assert_eq!(dockerfile, "FROM x\n");
2615 }
2616
2617 /// **IMAGE-7, the host system.** Every entry's central-directory header records Unix (3)
2618 /// as the system that made it, whatever host builds the artifact. zip records the running
2619 /// host otherwise, MS-DOS (0) on Windows, and that one byte made a Windows build differ
2620 /// from a Linux build of the same inputs and let a reader that follows it take the
2621 /// entries' modes for DOS attributes.
2622 ///
2623 /// **Falsification**: set `.system(zip::System::Dos)`, the Windows default, in
2624 /// `build_artifact_with_context`'s options, and every host byte reads 0.
2625 #[test]
2626 fn every_artifact_entry_records_unix_as_its_host_system() {
2627 let context = context_of(&[("app/run.sh", 0o755, b"#!/bin/sh\n")]);
2628 let bytes = build_artifact_with_context(
2629 &aarch64_daemon(b"daemon"),
2630 "FROM x\n",
2631 None,
2632 Some(&context),
2633 )
2634 .expect("zips");
2635 assert_eq!(
2636 central_directory_hosts(&bytes),
2637 [3, 3, 3],
2638 "IMAGE-7: every entry's host system is Unix"
2639 );
2640 }
2641
2642 /// The host-system byte of each central-directory header, in order (APPNOTE 4.3.12 and
2643 /// 4.4.2: the high byte of "version made by"). The artifact carries no archive comment, so
2644 /// its end record is the last 22 bytes: the entry count at +10, the directory's offset at
2645 /// +16.
2646 fn central_directory_hosts(bytes: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
2647 let u16_at = |at: usize| usize::from(u16::from_le_bytes([bytes[at], bytes[at + 1]]));
2648 let end = bytes.len() - 22;
2649 assert_eq!(&bytes[end..end + 4], b"PK\x05\x06", "the end record");
2650 let offset = bytes[end + 16..end + 20].try_into().expect("four bytes");
2651 let mut at = usize::try_from(u32::from_le_bytes(offset)).expect("fits");
2652 (0..u16_at(end + 10))
2653 .map(|_| {
2654 assert_eq!(
2655 &bytes[at..at + 4],
2656 b"PK\x01\x02",
2657 "a central-directory header"
2658 );
2659 let host = bytes[at + 5];
2660 at += 46 + u16_at(at + 28) + u16_at(at + 30) + u16_at(at + 32);
2661 host
2662 })
2663 .collect()
2664 }
2665
2666 /// **IMAGE-7, the byte scan extended.** The agent token has no path into a context either:
2667 /// the artifact built from a context is scanned the way AC-2-3 scans the plain one.
2668 #[test]
2669 fn a_context_artifact_never_carries_the_agent_token() {
2670 let token = "s3cr3t-agent-token-do-not-bake-me";
2671 let context = context_of(&[("app/main.py", 0o644, b"print('hi')\n")]);
2672 let bytes = build_artifact_with_context(
2673 &aarch64_daemon(b"binary"),
2674 &wrap_dockerfile("FROM x\n", &WrapOptions::default()).expect("wraps"),
2675 None,
2676 Some(&context),
2677 )
2678 .expect("zips");
2679 assert!(
2680 !bytes
2681 .windows(token.len())
2682 .any(|window| window == token.as_bytes())
2683 );
2684 }
2685
2686 /// The base image ARN, for the region it is requested in.
2687 ///
2688 /// `microvm-image:` with a **colon**, which is the spelling for a managed base *and* for
2689 /// a customer image alike — measured 2026-08-15 against real ARNs in us-east-1, and the
2690 /// only form the model's `TaggableResource` pattern admits. The docs above this function
2691 /// carry the measurement.
2692 ///
2693 /// **Falsification** — change the separator to `/` and both assertions go red. That was
2694 /// the state twelve fakes and the transport encoding test were in, which is why this
2695 /// test now asserts the separator explicitly rather than only the region.
2696 #[test]
2697 fn the_base_image_arn_names_the_request_region_with_a_colon_separator() {
2698 assert_eq!(
2699 BaseImage::al2023().arn(&crate::region::Region::UsEast1),
2700 "arn:aws:lambda:us-east-1:aws:microvm-image:al2023-1"
2701 );
2702 assert_eq!(
2703 BaseImage::al2023().arn(&crate::region::Region::ApNortheast1),
2704 "arn:aws:lambda:ap-northeast-1:aws:microvm-image:al2023-1"
2705 );
2706 assert!(
2707 !BaseImage::al2023()
2708 .arn(&crate::region::Region::UsEast1)
2709 .contains("microvm-image/"),
2710 "the slash form answers AccessDeniedException, not a validation error"
2711 );
2712 }
2713}