mcpmesh_local_api/protocol.rs
1//! mcpmesh-local/1 protocol types. Shared vocabulary between the daemon
2//! and its clients (porcelain, connect proxy, later the host shell). Wire framing
3//! is the family NDJSON codec — carried by the caller, not defined here.
4//!
5//! Request/response asymmetry: requests are one typed, closed enum (`Request`);
6//! responses are per-method typed structs deserialized from the JSON-RPC `result`
7//! Value — `Status` → [`StatusResult`], `RegisterService` → an ack, `OpenSession` →
8//! no JSON-RPC result at all: the socket STOPS being JSON-RPC and becomes a raw
9//! byte pipe.
10//!
11//! Additive-only: new fields (capabilities on `Hello`, groups/user_id on
12//! `PeerInfo`, device on `OpenSession`) MUST land as
13//! `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
14use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
15
16/// The first exchange on any `*-local/N` socket (the family's hello convention).
17#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
18pub struct Hello {
19 pub api: String, // "mcpmesh-local/1"
20 pub api_version: String, // "MAJOR.MINOR" of the protocol surface (see API_MINOR)
21 /// The protocol-compatibility MINOR as an integer, for a trivial machine comparison
22 /// (`api_minor >= N`) without string parsing. Distinct from `stack_version` (the crate
23 /// release train). Additive: an older daemon omits it and it defaults to 0.
24 #[serde(default)]
25 pub api_minor: u32,
26 pub stack_version: String,
27}
28
29/// The kind of backend answering a service — the two valid values, enforced at the
30/// type level and kept in lockstep with `BackendSpec`'s variants. Status reports the
31/// kind only, never the command/path (no transport vocabulary).
32#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
33#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
34pub enum BackendKind {
35 Run,
36 Socket,
37}
38
39/// A registered service as reported by `status` (no transport vocabulary).
40#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
41pub struct ServiceInfo {
42 pub name: String,
43 pub allow: Vec<String>, // STABLE principals (b64u:/eid:) or roster names (#38) — never nicknames
44 /// The HUMAN rendering of `allow`, index-aligned: each principal resolved to its peer's
45 /// display nickname by the daemon (which owns the store); an unresolvable stable
46 /// principal renders as a neutral placeholder — porcelain must show THESE, never raw
47 /// ids (surface discipline). Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
48 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
49 pub allow_display: Vec<String>,
50 pub backend: BackendKind, // "run" | "socket" (kind only, never the command/path)
51 /// True if this registration is ephemeral (#36): in-memory only, tied to the registering
52 /// control connection's lifetime, absent from config, gone on restart. Additive — an older
53 /// daemon omits it and it reads as `false` (the persistent default).
54 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
55 pub ephemeral: bool,
56}
57
58/// A known peer as reported by `status` (nickname only — never the EndpointId).
59#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
60pub struct PeerInfo {
61 pub name: String,
62 pub services: Vec<String>,
63 /// The peer's PROVEN self-sovereign `user_id` (`b64u:<user_pk>`) if it presented a verified
64 /// device->user binding at pairing (roster peers carry it too), else `None` (nickname-only). This
65 /// is a surface-clean identity (an opaque user id, NOT an EndpointId). Additive:
66 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]` so older payloads round-trip.
67 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
68 pub user_id: Option<String>,
69 /// The peer's stable DEVICE principal `eid:<hex>` (#41) — the SAME rendering the socket
70 /// backend injects into `_meta["mcpmesh/peer"]` and that appears in `[services.*].allow`.
71 /// Always present for a real peer (`Option` only for additive round-trip). Distinct from
72 /// `user_id` (the person-level `b64u:`, present only when the peer proved a binding): a
73 /// nickname is not unique, so an embedder keys caller-scoped decisions (dial the caller
74 /// back, "the requester's own data") on THIS, the authenticated endpoint. Machine-surface
75 /// authz vocabulary (like the allow lists) — human porcelain still shows the nickname.
76 /// Additive: `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]`.
77 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
78 pub principal: Option<String>,
79}
80
81/// Advisory reachability of a paired peer (pairing-mode liveness). Surface-clean:
82/// a nickname + a bool + latency/age NUMBERS — never an endpoint-id, key, or transport path.
83#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
84pub struct PeerReachability {
85 pub name: String, // the peer's nickname
86 pub reachable: bool, // result of the last probe (false if never probed)
87 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
88 pub rtt_ms: Option<u64>, // last measured round-trip, if reachable
89 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
90 pub age_secs: Option<u64>, // None = never probed (consumer shows "checking…")
91 /// The peer's OPTIONAL app metadata (#40) — the same opaque ≤256B blob #39 exposes via
92 /// presence, here carried on the pairing-mode `mcpmesh/ping/1` probe pong so PAIRED peers
93 /// (which have no presence gossip) see it too. Empty when the peer set none. Advisory
94 /// display data; never an authz input. Near-real-time when `status` is read (the probe
95 /// cache has a ~20s TTL), not a steady push. Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
96 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
97 pub meta: String,
98}
99
100/// Roster-mode status. Surface-clean roster VOCABULARY only: org_id, serial, a plain
101/// state word, and the pinned org-root FINGERPRINT in short words — never raw keys/EndpointIds/serials-
102/// as-transport-vocab. Absent in a pure-pairing daemon.
103#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
104pub struct RosterStatus {
105 pub org_id: String,
106 pub serial: u64,
107 pub state: String, // "pending" | "approved" | "degraded" | "stopped"
108 pub org_root_fingerprint: String, // short-word form
109}
110
111/// One reachable roster peer device as reported by `status` (the advisory presence read).
112/// ADVISORY — this is a display convenience, never an authorization surface. Surface-clean:
113/// FLAT vocabulary ONLY — a `user_id`, a human `device_label`, its `role` word, and an `online`
114/// boolean. It carries NO EndpointId / pubkey / hash / ALPN or any transport vocabulary.
115#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
116pub struct PresencePeer {
117 pub user_id: String,
118 pub device_label: String,
119 pub role: String, // "primary" | "mirror" (roster vocabulary)
120 /// Whether the device has a live presence heartbeat (advisory — absence never blocks a dial).
121 pub online: bool,
122 /// The device's OPTIONAL embedder-set app metadata (#39) — an opaque ≤256B blob carried
123 /// (signed) on its presence heartbeat, empty when the device set none. Advisory display
124 /// data; never an authz input. Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
125 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
126 pub meta: String,
127}
128
129/// One recently completed INVITER-side pairing, surfaced by `status` so the inviter's human can
130/// read the short authentication code (SAS) and compare it with the redeemer's out-of-band —
131/// the pairing ceremony is "both humans compare the code": the redeemer sees it in its
132/// [`PairResult`]; this is the inviter's porcelain surface for the same words. DISPLAY-ONLY
133/// ceremony state: held in-memory by the daemon (a small ring), lost on restart, NEVER an
134/// authorization input or trust data. Surface-clean: a nickname + the SAS wordlist words +
135/// an epoch — never an EndpointId.
136#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
137pub struct RecentPairing {
138 /// The peer's nickname as stored by the inviter (its local name for the redeemer).
139 pub peer_nickname: String,
140 /// The display-only SAS words (e.g. `"tango-fig-cabbage"`) — the same code the redeemer's
141 /// `PairResult.sas_code` carried. Never checked programmatically.
142 pub sas_code: String,
143 /// When the pairing completed (epoch seconds) — the porcelain renders a friendly age.
144 pub paired_at_epoch: u64,
145}
146
147#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
148pub struct StatusResult {
149 pub stack_version: String,
150 pub services: Vec<ServiceInfo>,
151 pub peers: Vec<PeerInfo>,
152 /// Roster-mode status, absent in a pure-pairing daemon. Additive:
153 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so a daemon/client without it round-trips.
154 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
155 pub roster: Option<RosterStatus>,
156 /// The reachable roster peer devices (the advisory presence read), each with an `online`
157 /// flag. Empty in a pure-pairing daemon / when no roster is installed. Additive:
158 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]` so an older payload round-trips.
159 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
160 pub presence: Vec<PresencePeer>,
161 /// THIS daemon's own self-sovereign `user_id` (`b64u:<user_pk>`), if it has a user key (auto-
162 /// minted at boot; shared by pairing AND roster mode). Lets the operator see + share their stable
163 /// identity that multiple devices resolve to. `None` only when no user key exists. Additive:
164 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]` so an older payload round-trips.
165 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
166 pub self_user_id: Option<String>,
167 /// Recent INVITER-side pairing completions, newest first (display-only pairing-ceremony aids —
168 /// see [`RecentPairing`]; in-memory on the daemon, cleared by a restart). Empty on a daemon
169 /// that has accepted no pairing since it started. Additive:
170 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]` so an older payload round-trips.
171 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
172 pub recent_pairings: Vec<RecentPairing>,
173 /// Advisory reachability of paired peers, from the on-demand probe cache. Empty until the
174 /// first probe completes. Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
175 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
176 pub reachability: Vec<PeerReachability>,
177 /// This node's EFFECTIVE self-nickname — what a freshly minted invite would present
178 /// (config `[identity].nickname`, else the hostname, else a fingerprint; live-updated by
179 /// `set_nickname`, #37). Empty only in mesh-less control-only mode. Additive: default +
180 /// skip-if-empty so an older payload round-trips.
181 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
182 pub self_nickname: String,
183}
184
185/// Params of [`Request::RegisterService`]: the `[services.*]` entry to write/update.
186#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
187#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
188pub struct RegisterServiceParams {
189 pub name: String,
190 pub backend: BackendSpec,
191 pub allow: Vec<String>,
192 /// When true (#36), the registration is EPHEMERAL: kept in daemon memory only, never written
193 /// to the on-disk config, and automatically unregistered when the control connection that
194 /// registered it closes (and gone on daemon restart). For an embedder that serves a
195 /// `socket` backend from a fresh path each run, this removes the need to derive a stable
196 /// socket path solely to keep a persisted registration valid, and the stale-registration
197 /// accumulation that comes with no unregister. Default false = the persistent behavior.
198 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
199 pub ephemeral: bool,
200}
201
202/// Params of [`Request::Invite`]: the services the minted invite grants. Rejects unknown
203/// fields (so `{service: "kb"}` — a singular typo — is a loud error, not a silently
204/// grants-nothing invite), and the daemon additionally rejects an empty/absent `services`
205/// list (an invite that grants nothing is useless — #34).
206#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
207#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
208pub struct InviteParams {
209 #[serde(default)]
210 pub services: Vec<String>,
211 /// An OPAQUE, caller-chosen label carried through to the redeemer in the `pair` result (#31).
212 /// mcpmesh never interprets it (not a nickname, never resolved or authorized) — a per-pairing
213 /// metadata slot for the embedder (e.g. its own URN). Capped at the daemon; omit for none.
214 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
215 pub app_label: Option<String>,
216}
217
218/// Params of [`Request::Pair`]: the copyable `mcpmesh-invite:` line. Defaultable — an
219/// absent field reads as an empty line, which simply fails to decode (a clean pair error).
220#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
221#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
222pub struct PairParams {
223 #[serde(default)]
224 pub invite_line: String,
225}
226
227/// Params of [`Request::PeerRemove`]: the nickname to unpair.
228#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
229#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
230pub struct PeerRemoveParams {
231 pub nickname: String,
232}
233
234/// Params of [`Request::PeerRename`]: the contact to rename — every device sharing `user_id`
235/// when given, else the single provisional `nickname` entry — and the new nickname `to`.
236#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
237#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
238pub struct PeerRenameParams {
239 #[serde(default)]
240 pub user_id: Option<String>,
241 #[serde(default)]
242 pub nickname: Option<String>,
243 pub to: String,
244}
245
246/// Params of [`Request::PeerAdd`] (reserved/internal — see the variant): a raw `endpoint_id`
247/// (iroh base32) plus the nickname and service allow list to install it under.
248#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
249#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
250pub struct PeerAddParams {
251 pub nickname: String,
252 pub endpoint_id: String,
253 #[serde(default)]
254 pub allow: Vec<String>,
255}
256
257/// Params of [`Request::OpenSession`]: the `peer/service` target to dial. Both fields are
258/// defaultable — an empty target simply fails the dial (a clean `-32055` error).
259#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
260#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
261pub struct OpenSessionParams {
262 #[serde(default)]
263 pub peer: String,
264 #[serde(default)]
265 pub service: String,
266}
267
268/// Params of [`Request::RosterInstall`]: the LOCAL roster file `path`, plus the org-root pin
269/// on FIRST install (`b64u:`; omit once pinned — config carries it).
270#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
271#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
272pub struct RosterInstallParams {
273 pub path: String,
274 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
275 pub org_root_pk: Option<String>,
276}
277
278/// Params of [`Request::OrgJoin`]: the `[identity]` pin. `user_key` is a LOCAL path — the key
279/// never crosses the API.
280#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
281#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
282pub struct OrgJoinParams {
283 pub org_id: String,
284 pub org_root_pk: String,
285 pub user_id: String,
286 pub user_key: String,
287}
288
289/// Params of [`Request::SetAppMetadata`]: this node's opaque app-metadata blob (#39). The
290/// daemon NEVER interprets it — the embedder structures its own bytes (a version string,
291/// small JSON, …). Capped at 256 bytes; `""` clears it. Roster-mode only (it rides the
292/// signed presence heartbeat); a pure-pairing daemon accepts + stores it but never gossips it.
293#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
294#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
295pub struct SetAppMetadataParams {
296 pub metadata: String,
297}
298
299/// Params of [`Request::SetNickname`]: this node's new self-nickname (#37). Display-only
300/// semantics: it names this node in FUTURE invites/presentations; peers keep the nickname
301/// they stored at pairing time until a re-invite.
302#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
303#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
304pub struct SetNicknameParams {
305 pub nickname: String,
306}
307
308/// Params of [`Request::SetRosterUrl`]: the HTTPS roster URL to pin.
309#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
310#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
311pub struct SetRosterUrlParams {
312 pub url: String,
313}
314
315/// Params of [`Request::BlobPublish`]: the scope to publish into and the LOCAL file to add.
316#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
317#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
318pub struct BlobPublishParams {
319 pub scope: String,
320 pub path: String,
321}
322
323/// Params of [`Request::BlobGrant`]: the scope and the flat-namespace principal to grant it to.
324#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
325#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
326pub struct BlobGrantParams {
327 pub scope: String,
328 pub principal: String,
329}
330
331/// Params of [`Request::BlobFetch`]: the `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket and the LOCAL export path.
332#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
333#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
334pub struct BlobFetchParams {
335 pub ticket: String,
336 pub dest_path: String,
337}
338
339/// Control-API requests. Serialized as `{ "method": "...", "params": {...} }`
340/// (JSON-RPC-shaped; the id/jsonrpc envelope is added by the transport layer).
341///
342/// Each param-carrying variant wraps its named `*Params` struct — the ONE wire truth for that
343/// method's params, shared by clients (which serialize whole `Request`s) and the daemon (which
344/// deserializes `params` into the same struct after its method-string dispatch). Adjacent
345/// tagging serializes a newtype variant's content as the struct's fields, so the wire shape is
346/// identical to inline variant bodies.
347///
348/// **Servers dispatch on the `method` string and deserialize `params` per-method** — tolerating
349/// omitted / null / empty-object params for parameterless methods — rather than deserializing a
350/// whole message into `Request` (adjacent tagging rejects `params:{}` for unit variants).
351/// This keeps the wire tolerant for third-party clients (the versioned, additive-only surface).
352/// Use [`method_of`] to extract the tag, then match + deserialize `params` per-method.
353#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
354#[serde(tag = "method", content = "params", rename_all = "snake_case")]
355pub enum Request {
356 /// Register/update a `[services.*]` entry idempotently.
357 RegisterService(RegisterServiceParams),
358 Status,
359 /// Mint a one-time pairing invite granting `services`. The daemon
360 /// answers an [`InviteResult`] carrying the copyable `mcpmesh-invite:` line. Tag
361 /// `"invite"` (snake_case). `method_of` needs no per-variant arm — it reads the
362 /// `method` string generically; the tag comes from `rename_all`.
363 Invite(InviteParams),
364 /// Redeem a pairing invite. The daemon dials the inviter named by
365 /// `invite_line` on `mcpmesh/pair/1`, proves the secret, writes the mutual
366 /// (dial-back) `PeerEntry`, and answers a [`PairResult`]. Tag `"pair"`
367 /// (snake_case); `method_of` reads the `method` string generically.
368 ///
369 /// `PeerEntry` — the durable allowlist row — lives in the daemon crate.
370 Pair(PairParams),
371 /// Remove a paired peer by nickname (`mcpmesh pair --remove`). The daemon drops the
372 /// peer's `PeerEntry` (identity) AND revokes its access by stripping its stable principals from every
373 /// `[services.*].allow` (authorization) — the inverse of the pairing grant. Idempotent: a
374 /// nickname with no entry / no allow membership is a clean no-op. Live in-flight sessions are
375 /// NOT severed here: existing sessions run to completion; the peer only loses the
376 /// ability to establish NEW authorized sessions. Tag `"peer_remove"` (snake_case);
377 /// `method_of` reads the `method` string generically (no per-variant arm).
378 ///
379 /// `PeerEntry` — the durable allowlist row — lives in the daemon crate.
380 PeerRemove(PeerRemoveParams),
381 /// Rename a contact's nickname (nickname) authoritatively. Renames the
382 /// PERSON — every `PeerEntry` sharing `user_id` when given (one op for all their devices), else the
383 /// single `nickname` entry (a provisional, no-`user_id` contact) — to `to`, AND rewrites the old
384 /// nickname → `to` in every `[services.*].allow` so grants follow the rename. Refuses (error frame)
385 /// when `to` is empty or already names/grants a DIFFERENT identity — the same collision guard the
386 /// pairing rendezvous uses, so a rename can't inherit another peer's access. Tag `"peer_rename"`;
387 /// host-privileged like the other pair ops.
388 PeerRename(PeerRenameParams),
389 /// RESERVED / INTERNAL (`docs/local-protocol.md` "Reserved / internal methods"): install a
390 /// peer directly from a raw `endpoint_id` — the trust-population stand-in for pairing behind
391 /// `mcpmesh internal peer add`. A deliberate, documented exception to the surface discipline
392 /// (raw endpoint identifiers otherwise never cross this socket); NOT part of the stable
393 /// vocabulary — do not build on it. Tag `"peer_add"`.
394 PeerAdd(PeerAddParams),
395 /// Open a mesh session to `peer/service`; the daemon dials and pipes.
396 /// Distinct from the proxy's job: this returns a session the client streams.
397 /// Named `open_session` rather than `connect` to avoid colliding
398 /// with the `connect` porcelain.
399 OpenSession(OpenSessionParams),
400 /// Install a signed roster from a local file (the manual `internal roster install` path).
401 /// `path` is a LOCAL file the same-uid daemon reads (the daemon runs as the caller's own
402 /// uid, so passing a path rather than the bytes crosses no trust boundary). `org_root_pk`
403 /// pins the org root on FIRST install (`b64u:`); omit it
404 /// once pinned (config carries it). Tag `"roster_install"`.
405 RosterInstall(RosterInstallParams),
406 /// Pin the org root on a JOINER — WITHOUT a roster (the joiner has none yet; its poll loop
407 /// fetches the first one). Records `[identity]` org_id / org_root_pk / user_id / user_key.
408 /// `user_key` is a LOCAL path
409 /// (the key never crosses the API). Tag `"org_join"`.
410 OrgJoin(OrgJoinParams),
411 /// Pin the HTTPS roster URL (`[roster].url`) in config. Written by `org create
412 /// --roster-url` (the operator keeps it current) AND by `join` when the org invite carries one —
413 /// so the joiner's poll loop bootstraps its FIRST roster. The daemon writes it under
414 /// `reload_lock` (single-writer), then the poll loop picks it up on the next daemon start. Tag
415 /// `"set_roster_url"`.
416 SetRosterUrl(SetRosterUrlParams),
417 /// Rename this node LIVE (#37): validate + upsert `[identity].nickname` through the
418 /// daemon's own serialized config-write path (no lost-update window against a
419 /// concurrent grant/registration) and update the in-memory name future invites
420 /// present — no restart. Ack result. Tag `"set_nickname"` (snake_case).
421 SetNickname(SetNicknameParams),
422 /// Set this node's opaque app-metadata blob (#39): validated (≤256B) and folded, signed,
423 /// into each outgoing presence heartbeat, so paired roster peers see it in their `status`
424 /// presence — no per-peer session. Ack result. Tag `"set_app_metadata"`. In-memory (lost
425 /// on restart; the embedder re-sets on startup).
426 SetAppMetadata(SetAppMetadataParams),
427 /// Publish a LOCAL file INTO a scope: the daemon adds the bytes to its gated
428 /// app-blob store and records the hash in `scope`. `path` is a local file the same-uid daemon
429 /// reads. Answers a [`BlobPublishResult`] carrying the `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket + hash.
430 /// Tag `"blob_publish"`.
431 BlobPublish(BlobPublishParams),
432 /// Grant a scope to a principal — any flat-namespace entry: a group name, a user_id, or a
433 /// nickname (the shared `principal_set` expansion). Tag
434 /// `"blob_grant"`.
435 BlobGrant(BlobGrantParams),
436 /// List the daemon's blob scopes (name → hashes + grants). Tag `"blob_list"`.
437 BlobList,
438 /// Fetch a `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket THROUGH the daemon (BLAKE3-verified streaming) and export the
439 /// verified blob to `dest_path` (a local file the same-uid daemon writes). Answers a
440 /// [`BlobFetchResult`] with the verified hash + byte length. Tag `"blob_fetch"`.
441 BlobFetch(BlobFetchParams),
442 /// Summarize this node's LOCAL audit log into per-peer / per-service SESSION counts
443 /// (local-only — the daemon reads its OWN audit dir, nothing is transmitted). The host Mesh surface
444 /// renders these as "who serves me / whom I serve / session counts". Parameterless (like `Status`);
445 /// the server dispatches on the `method` string. Tag `"audit_summary"` (snake_case);
446 /// `method_of` reads the `method` string generically (no per-variant arm).
447 AuditSummary,
448 /// Open a live event stream (pairing liveness & health telemetry). Like `open_session`, the
449 /// connection STOPS being request/response after this call and becomes a one-way push stream
450 /// of `StreamFrame`s. Parameterless. Tag `"subscribe"`.
451 Subscribe,
452}
453
454/// Result of [`Request::OrgJoin`] — the pinned org id echoed back (surface-clean; the fingerprint is
455/// computed porcelain-side from the invite's org_root_pk). Additive-only.
456#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
457pub struct OrgJoinResult {
458 pub org_id: String,
459}
460
461/// Result of a [`Request::RosterInstall`] request (the manual install path): the installed roster's
462/// org id + serial (roster-status vocabulary the confirmation line is permitted to render) plus how
463/// many live sessions the install severed. Surface-clean: NO keys / EndpointIds / paths.
464///
465/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as
466/// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
467#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
468pub struct RosterInstallResult {
469 pub org_id: String,
470 pub serial: u64,
471 /// How many live sessions were severed, for the porcelain's confirmation line.
472 #[serde(default)]
473 pub severed: u32,
474}
475
476/// Result of [`Request::BlobPublish`]: the copyable `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket + the blob's blake3 hash.
477/// A ticket/hash here is blob-reference vocabulary (NOT a transport-vocab leak — the same
478/// carve-out as the pairing invite line). Additive-only.
479#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
480pub struct BlobPublishResult {
481 pub ticket: String,
482 pub hash: String, // bare blake3 hex
483}
484
485/// One scope in a [`BlobScopeList`]: its name + the hashes it contains + the principals it
486/// grants. Flat vocabulary ONLY — no EndpointId/pubkey/ALPN. Additive-only.
487#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
488pub struct ScopeInfo {
489 pub name: String,
490 pub hashes: Vec<String>,
491 pub grants: Vec<String>,
492}
493
494/// Result of [`Request::BlobList`]: the daemon's scopes. Additive-only.
495#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
496pub struct BlobScopeList {
497 pub scopes: Vec<ScopeInfo>,
498}
499
500/// Result of [`Request::BlobFetch`]: the verified hash + byte length written to `dest_path`.
501/// Additive-only.
502#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
503pub struct BlobFetchResult {
504 pub hash: String,
505 pub bytes_len: u64,
506}
507
508/// Result of [`Request::AuditSummary`]: LOCAL per-peer / per-service session counts
509/// aggregated from this node's OWN audit log — NEVER transmitted (local-only). Surface-clean:
510/// peer names are nicknames / user_ids (NEVER EndpointIds), service names are the registered
511/// service names (NEVER transport vocabulary). A "session" is one `SessionOpen` record. `per_peer` /
512/// `per_service` are sorted ascending by name (deterministic). Tuples mirror kb's
513/// `InsightResponse::per_peer_contribution` — `["bob", 2]` on the wire.
514///
515/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as
516/// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
517#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
518pub struct AuditSummaryResult {
519 /// Sessions opened per peer (nickname). A session with no attributed peer is NOT counted here (no
520 /// peer to attribute) but IS in `total_sessions`.
521 pub per_peer: Vec<(String, u64)>,
522 /// Sessions opened per registered service name.
523 pub per_service: Vec<(String, u64)>,
524 /// Total sessions opened (every `SessionOpen` record, including peer-less ones).
525 #[serde(default)]
526 pub total_sessions: u64,
527}
528
529/// Result of an [`Request::Invite`] request: the copyable `mcpmesh-invite:` artifact
530/// (the ONE pairing artifact deliberately carved out of the
531/// transport-vocabulary blocklist, so this is NOT a transport-vocab leak) plus its
532/// absolute expiry in epoch seconds (≤ now + 24h).
533///
534/// `invite` returns BEFORE any redemption, so the SAS — which is derived from the redeemer's
535/// endpoint id, unknown until they redeem — cannot appear here. The inviter reads its side of
536/// the SAS from [`StatusResult::recent_pairings`] once a redemption completes (a `trust`/`pair`
537/// frame on the live [`StreamFrame`] stream signals that moment). See the "embedding the pairing
538/// ceremony" note in `docs/local-protocol.md` (#35).
539///
540/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]`
541/// so older payloads still deserialize.
542#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
543pub struct InviteResult {
544 /// The `mcpmesh-invite:<base32>` line, copied out-of-band to the redeemer.
545 pub invite_line: String,
546 /// When the invite expires (epoch seconds); the daemon burns it at redemption or expiry.
547 pub expires_at_epoch: u64,
548}
549
550/// Result of a [`Request::Pair`] request: the inviter's suggested nickname (the
551/// redeemer's local name for the new peer) plus the display-only short authentication
552/// code (SAS) — a few words the human reads aloud to a second channel to
553/// catch a whole-invite forgery / address-swap MITM. The SAS is a pairing-ceremony
554/// artifact (like the invite line), NOT a transport-vocabulary leak.
555///
556/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as
557/// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
558#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
559pub struct PairResult {
560 /// The inviter's suggested nickname (from the invite) — the redeemer's local name for it.
561 pub peer_nickname: String,
562 /// The display-only short authentication code (e.g. `"tango-fig-42"`), shown on both
563 /// sides for the out-of-band human check. Never sent on the wire, never checked
564 /// programmatically.
565 pub sas_code: String,
566 /// The services this pairing granted the redeemer — each mountable as `<peer>/<service>`.
567 /// Populated from the invite (`invite.services`) by the redeemer-side `redeem_invite`, so
568 /// the porcelain can print the "You can mount: alice/notes" line without re-decoding the
569 /// invite. Additive: `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so a `PairResult`
570 /// minted by an older daemon (which omits `services`) still deserializes — to an empty list.
571 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
572 pub services: Vec<String>,
573 /// The opaque `app_label` the inviter attached at `invite` time (#31), echoed verbatim — or
574 /// absent if none was set. mcpmesh never interprets it; the embedder does. Additive.
575 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
576 pub app_label: Option<String>,
577 /// The inviter's proven self-sovereign `user_id` (`b64u:<user_pk>`), when it presented a
578 /// device→user binding at pairing (#30). This is the STABLE, portable identity the redeemer
579 /// can align with its own — and the same value it may later pass to `open_session` to dial
580 /// this peer by identity rather than by local nickname. `None` if the inviter presented no
581 /// binding (a legacy/keyless peer). Additive.
582 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
583 pub peer_user_id: Option<String>,
584}
585
586/// The event class of an [`AuditRecord`] (the four audit event classes). An additive discriminant on
587/// top of the base record schema: it removes no field and makes the JSONL self-describing so
588/// a consumer can filter by class without guessing from which optional fields are present.
589#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
590#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
591pub enum AuditKind {
592 /// A mesh session opened (a backend was selected for an authenticated peer).
593 /// (A `session_open` with `status:"error"` is a synthesized FAILED-dial marker — no backend
594 /// was reached; it records an attempted-and-failed reach for the telemetry stream.)
595 SessionOpen,
596 /// A mesh session closed (the backend returned / the session tore down).
597 SessionClose,
598 /// One proxied MCP request line (method + tool NAME + args_hash). NEVER carries raw arguments.
599 Request,
600 /// A peer fetched a blob from this node's gated provider (peer + hash + allow/deny).
601 BlobFetch,
602 /// A trust mutation (pair, unpair, roster install/swap, revoke).
603 Trust,
604}
605
606/// One audit record — the union of the event classes, and the `record` payload of a
607/// [`StreamFrame::Event`]. ONE schema for the on-disk JSONL log and the live stream. Every field
608/// beyond `ts`/`kind` is optional and elided when absent (`skip_serializing_if`), so each class
609/// serializes to just its relevant keys (a session record has no `method`; a trust record has no
610/// `bytes_out`).
611///
612/// PRIVACY: the proxied-request record carries `method` + `tool` (NAME only) +
613/// `args_hash` (`"blake3:<hex>"`), and NEVER the raw arguments, the request/response content, or
614/// any tool-output bytes — only a `bytes_out` COUNT and a `status`.
615#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
616pub struct AuditRecord {
617 /// RFC3339 UTC with millisecond precision, e.g. `"2026-07-03T14:02:11.480Z"`. The `YYYY-MM`
618 /// prefix also selects the monthly file (the rotation boundary), so it is always present.
619 pub ts: String,
620 pub kind: AuditKind,
621 /// The gate-resolved authenticated peer (attributed by the endpoint_id-keyed trust gate). Absent on
622 /// local-only events with no remote peer (a manual roster install).
623 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
624 pub peer: Option<String>,
625 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
626 pub service: Option<String>,
627 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
628 pub method: Option<String>,
629 /// The tool NAME only (never its arguments or output) — e.g. `"read_file"` for a `tools/call`.
630 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
631 pub tool: Option<String>,
632 /// `"blake3:<hex>"` of the request arguments. The raw arguments are NEVER stored.
633 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
634 pub args_hash: Option<String>,
635 /// Byte COUNT of the response sent back to the peer — a count, never the content.
636 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
637 pub bytes_out: Option<u64>,
638 /// `"ok"` / `"error"` (proxied request) or `"ok"` / `"denied"` (blob fetch).
639 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
640 pub status: Option<String>,
641 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
642 pub latency_ms: Option<u64>,
643 /// Trust-event verb: `"pair"` / `"unpair"` / `"roster_install"` / `"revoke"` (kind == Trust).
644 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
645 pub event: Option<String>,
646 /// A reference, NEVER content: a blob hash (`BlobFetch`) or a trust-event target such as a
647 /// nickname or `org/serial` (`Trust`).
648 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
649 pub target: Option<String>,
650}
651
652impl AuditRecord {
653 fn base(ts: String, kind: AuditKind) -> Self {
654 Self {
655 ts,
656 kind,
657 peer: None,
658 service: None,
659 method: None,
660 tool: None,
661 args_hash: None,
662 bytes_out: None,
663 status: None,
664 latency_ms: None,
665 event: None,
666 target: None,
667 }
668 }
669
670 pub fn session_open(ts: String, peer: Option<String>, service: String) -> Self {
671 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::SessionOpen);
672 r.peer = peer;
673 r.service = Some(service);
674 r
675 }
676
677 /// Set the record's `status` (`"ok"`/`"error"`/`"denied"`), returning `self` for chaining.
678 /// Marks a synthesized failure record — e.g. the `session_open` for a FAILED dial, which
679 /// reaches no backend and so is never audited by the far side's session guard — without a
680 /// dedicated constructor. DRY: reuses the existing optional `status` field.
681 pub fn with_status(mut self, status: &str) -> Self {
682 self.status = Some(status.into());
683 self
684 }
685
686 pub fn session_close(ts: String, peer: Option<String>, service: String) -> Self {
687 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::SessionClose);
688 r.peer = peer;
689 r.service = Some(service);
690 r
691 }
692
693 /// A completed (request→response correlated) proxied line: method + tool NAME + args_hash, plus
694 /// the response's `bytes_out` COUNT, `status`, and `latency_ms`. PRIVACY: `args_hash` is a digest;
695 /// no raw arguments, request/response content, or tool-output bytes are ever passed in.
696 #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
697 pub fn proxied_request(
698 ts: String,
699 peer: Option<String>,
700 service: String,
701 method: String,
702 tool: Option<String>,
703 args_hash: String,
704 bytes_out: u64,
705 status: String,
706 latency_ms: u64,
707 ) -> Self {
708 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::Request);
709 r.peer = peer;
710 r.service = Some(service);
711 r.method = Some(method);
712 r.tool = tool;
713 r.args_hash = Some(args_hash);
714 r.bytes_out = Some(bytes_out);
715 r.status = Some(status);
716 r.latency_ms = Some(latency_ms);
717 r
718 }
719
720 /// A proxied NOTIFICATION line (no `id`, so no response correlates): method + tool + args_hash,
721 /// no `bytes_out`/`status`/`latency_ms`. The line is still recorded — every proxied request is audited.
722 pub fn proxied_notification(
723 ts: String,
724 peer: Option<String>,
725 service: String,
726 method: String,
727 tool: Option<String>,
728 args_hash: String,
729 ) -> Self {
730 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::Request);
731 r.peer = peer;
732 r.service = Some(service);
733 r.method = Some(method);
734 r.tool = tool;
735 r.args_hash = Some(args_hash);
736 r
737 }
738
739 pub fn blob_fetch(ts: String, peer: Option<String>, hash: String, status: String) -> Self {
740 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::BlobFetch);
741 r.peer = peer;
742 r.target = Some(hash);
743 r.status = Some(status);
744 r
745 }
746
747 pub fn trust(ts: String, event: String, target: Option<String>) -> Self {
748 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::Trust);
749 r.event = Some(event);
750 r.target = target;
751 r
752 }
753}
754
755/// One live mesh session, in a [`StreamFrame::Snapshot`]. Surface-clean: `peer` is the
756/// user_id-or-nickname the audit records carry, never an endpoint-id. `opened_at` is epoch seconds.
757#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
758pub struct ActiveSession {
759 pub peer: String,
760 pub service: String,
761 pub opened_at: i64,
762}
763
764/// One frame of the [`Request::Subscribe`] stream (pairing liveness & health telemetry). Tagged on
765/// `type` (snake_case), so a frame is `{"type":"snapshot",...}` / `{"type":"event",...}` /
766/// `{"type":"lagged",...}`. `Event.record` is the [`AuditRecord`] verbatim, so the stream and the
767/// on-disk log carry ONE schema. The daemon serializes these; an embedding consumer deserializes
768/// them (see `docs/local-protocol.md` "Live event stream").
769#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
770#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
771pub enum StreamFrame {
772 /// The FIRST frame: a point-in-time picture of the mesh (open sessions + paired-peer
773 /// reachability) so a fresh subscriber renders immediately without replaying history.
774 Snapshot {
775 active_sessions: Vec<ActiveSession>,
776 reachability: Vec<PeerReachability>,
777 },
778 /// A live audit event (session open/close, request, blob fetch, trust) — the tap on the hub.
779 /// Boxed so this (much larger) variant does not bloat every frame; serde delegates through the
780 /// `Box`, so the wire shape is the record's fields verbatim.
781 Event { record: Box<AuditRecord> },
782 /// The subscriber fell `dropped` records behind the broadcast ring; the stream continues (a
783 /// fresh reconnect would re-`Snapshot`). Never drops the subscriber — lag is reported, never fatal.
784 Lagged { dropped: u64 },
785}
786
787/// Extract the `method` tag from a raw request value without deserializing the whole
788/// message. The daemon's dispatcher uses this: match on the method string, then deserialize
789/// `params` per-method — which tolerates omitted / null / `{}` params for parameterless
790/// methods (adjacent tagging rejects `params:{}` on unit variants).
791pub fn method_of(v: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<&str> {
792 v.get("method").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
793}
794
795/// How a service is answered. Mirrors the config `[services.*]` *kinds*;
796/// Config→BackendSpec is a hand-written match, not a serde passthrough.
797#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
798#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
799pub enum BackendSpec {
800 Run { cmd: Vec<String> },
801 Socket { path: String },
802}
803
804pub const API_NAME: &str = "mcpmesh-local/1";
805/// The protocol-compatibility version as `"MAJOR.MINOR"`, distinct from the crate/stack version.
806///
807/// - **MAJOR** matches the `/N` in [`API_NAME`] and changes only on a breaking wire change (the
808/// transport already rejects a mismatched `api`, so an equality check on that is redundant).
809/// - **MINOR** ([`API_MINOR`]) increments on EVERY surface change within a major — additive fields,
810/// new methods, or a strictness change like params validation — bumped in the same change that
811/// makes it. A client can guard with `api_minor >= N` for a feature it needs, or refuse a daemon
812/// older than a minor it requires. It never resets except on a MAJOR bump.
813pub const API_VERSION: &str = "1.6";
814/// The integer MINOR of [`API_VERSION`] — see there. Bumped from 0 to 1 when params validation
815/// became strict (#34); to 2 with the `set_nickname` verb + `StatusResult.self_nickname` (#37);
816/// to 3 when `allow`/grant strings became STABLE principals — `b64u:`/`eid:`/roster names,
817/// never nicknames (#38); to 4 with the `set_app_metadata` verb + `PresencePeer.meta` (#39);
818/// to 5 with `PeerReachability.meta` — pairing-mode app metadata on the probe pong (#40);
819/// to 6 with `PeerInfo.principal` — the peer's eid: device principal on `status` (#41).
820pub const API_MINOR: u32 = 6;
821
822#[cfg(test)]
823mod tests {
824 use super::*;
825
826 #[test]
827 fn peer_reachability_serde_is_additive() {
828 let r = PeerReachability {
829 name: "bob".into(),
830 reachable: true,
831 rtt_ms: Some(42),
832 age_secs: Some(3),
833 meta: String::new(),
834 };
835 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
836 assert_eq!(v["name"], "bob");
837 assert_eq!(v["reachable"], true);
838 assert_eq!(v["rtt_ms"], 42);
839 assert_eq!(v["age_secs"], 3);
840 // Never-probed peer: optionals elided, not null.
841 let unknown = PeerReachability {
842 name: "carol".into(),
843 reachable: false,
844 rtt_ms: None,
845 age_secs: None,
846 meta: String::new(),
847 };
848 let uv = serde_json::to_value(&unknown).unwrap();
849 assert!(uv.get("rtt_ms").is_none() && uv.get("age_secs").is_none());
850 // An older StatusResult (no reachability field) still deserializes.
851 let old = serde_json::json!({"stack_version":"0.1.0","services":[],"peers":[]});
852 let s: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
853 assert!(s.reachability.is_empty());
854 }
855
856 #[test]
857 fn subscribe_method_tag_resolves() {
858 let req = serde_json::to_value(Request::Subscribe).unwrap();
859 assert_eq!(method_of(&req), Some("subscribe"));
860 }
861
862 // --- #34: params structs reject unknown fields (the `{service: "kb"}` silent-accept bug) ---
863
864 #[test]
865 fn invite_params_reject_singular_service_typo() {
866 // The reported bug: `{"service":"kb"}` (singular) used to deserialize to
867 // InviteParams { services: [] } and mint a grants-nothing invite that looked
868 // successful. With deny_unknown_fields the typo is a loud parse error instead.
869 let err = serde_json::from_value::<InviteParams>(serde_json::json!({"service": "kb"}));
870 assert!(
871 err.is_err(),
872 "an unknown `service` key must be rejected, not silently ignored"
873 );
874 // The correct plural shape still parses.
875 let ok: InviteParams =
876 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"services": ["kb"]})).unwrap();
877 assert_eq!(ok.services, vec!["kb".to_string()]);
878 }
879
880 #[test]
881 fn open_session_params_reject_unknown_field() {
882 let err = serde_json::from_value::<OpenSessionParams>(
883 serde_json::json!({"peer": "a", "service": "b", "nonsense": 1}),
884 );
885 assert!(err.is_err(), "unknown params keys must be rejected");
886 }
887
888 #[test]
889 fn set_app_metadata_request_carries_the_method_tag() {
890 let r = Request::SetAppMetadata(SetAppMetadataParams {
891 metadata: "v=1.2.3".into(),
892 });
893 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
894 assert_eq!(v["method"], "set_app_metadata");
895 assert_eq!(v["params"]["metadata"], "v=1.2.3");
896 assert_eq!(method_of(&v), Some("set_app_metadata"));
897 }
898
899 #[test]
900 fn set_app_metadata_params_reject_unknown_field() {
901 let err = serde_json::from_value::<SetAppMetadataParams>(
902 serde_json::json!({"metadata": "x", "nonsense": 1}),
903 );
904 assert!(err.is_err(), "unknown params keys must be rejected");
905 }
906
907 /// `PresencePeer.meta` is additive — an older payload (no meta) still deserializes, and an
908 /// empty meta does not serialize.
909 #[test]
910 fn peer_info_principal_is_additive() {
911 // An older payload (no principal) still deserializes; empty does not serialize.
912 let old = serde_json::json!({"name": "bob", "services": ["notes"]});
913 let p: PeerInfo = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
914 assert_eq!(p.principal, None);
915 assert!(serde_json::to_value(&p).unwrap().get("principal").is_none());
916 // A bound peer carries BOTH the person user_id AND the device principal (#41).
917 let full = PeerInfo {
918 name: "bob".into(),
919 services: vec!["notes".into()],
920 user_id: Some("b64u:BOB".into()),
921 principal: Some("eid:0707".into()),
922 };
923 let back: PeerInfo = serde_json::from_value(serde_json::to_value(&full).unwrap()).unwrap();
924 assert_eq!(back.user_id.as_deref(), Some("b64u:BOB"));
925 assert_eq!(back.principal.as_deref(), Some("eid:0707"));
926 }
927
928 #[test]
929 fn peer_reachability_meta_is_additive() {
930 // An older payload (no meta) still deserializes; an empty meta does not serialize.
931 let old = serde_json::json!({"name": "bob", "reachable": true});
932 let r: PeerReachability = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
933 assert_eq!(r.meta, "");
934 assert!(serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap().get("meta").is_none());
935 // A set value round-trips.
936 let with = PeerReachability {
937 name: "bob".into(),
938 reachable: true,
939 rtt_ms: Some(12),
940 age_secs: Some(3),
941 meta: "v=1.2.3".into(),
942 };
943 let back: PeerReachability =
944 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::to_value(&with).unwrap()).unwrap();
945 assert_eq!(back.meta, "v=1.2.3");
946 }
947
948 #[test]
949 fn presence_peer_meta_is_additive() {
950 let old = serde_json::json!({
951 "user_id": "b64u:A", "device_label": "laptop", "role": "primary", "online": true
952 });
953 let p: PresencePeer = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
954 assert_eq!(p.meta, "");
955 assert!(serde_json::to_value(&p).unwrap().get("meta").is_none());
956 }
957
958 #[test]
959 fn set_nickname_request_carries_the_method_tag() {
960 let r = Request::SetNickname(SetNicknameParams {
961 nickname: "workbench".into(),
962 });
963 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
964 assert_eq!(v["method"], "set_nickname");
965 assert_eq!(v["params"]["nickname"], "workbench");
966 assert_eq!(method_of(&v), Some("set_nickname"));
967 }
968
969 #[test]
970 fn set_nickname_params_reject_unknown_field() {
971 let err = serde_json::from_value::<SetNicknameParams>(
972 serde_json::json!({"nickname": "x", "nonsense": 1}),
973 );
974 assert!(err.is_err(), "unknown params keys must be rejected");
975 }
976
977 /// An OLDER daemon's status payload (no `self_nickname`) must still deserialize —
978 /// the additive-only contract — and an empty name must not serialize at all.
979 #[test]
980 fn status_self_nickname_is_additive() {
981 let old = serde_json::json!({
982 "stack_version": "0.7.0", "services": [], "peers": []
983 });
984 let s: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
985 assert_eq!(s.self_nickname, "");
986 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
987 assert!(v.get("self_nickname").is_none(), "empty name is skipped");
988 }
989
990 #[test]
991 fn api_minor_is_present_and_monotonic_from_hello() {
992 // #34 part 2: a machine-comparable protocol-compat minor, distinct from the
993 // crate/stack version, additive on the Hello frame.
994 let h = Hello {
995 api: API_NAME.into(),
996 api_version: API_VERSION.into(),
997 api_minor: API_MINOR,
998 stack_version: "9.9.9".into(),
999 };
1000 let v = serde_json::to_value(&h).unwrap();
1001 assert_eq!(v["api_minor"], API_MINOR);
1002 // An OLD Hello without api_minor still deserializes (additive contract).
1003 let old = serde_json::json!({
1004 "api": API_NAME, "api_version": "1.0", "stack_version": "0.4.0"
1005 });
1006 let back: Hello = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
1007 assert_eq!(back.api_minor, 0, "absent api_minor defaults to 0");
1008 }
1009
1010 #[test]
1011 fn hello_result_roundtrips() {
1012 let h = Hello {
1013 api: "mcpmesh-local/1".into(),
1014 api_version: "1.0".into(),
1015 api_minor: 0,
1016 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
1017 };
1018 let v = serde_json::to_value(&h).unwrap();
1019 assert_eq!(v["api"], "mcpmesh-local/1");
1020 let back: Hello = serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap();
1021 assert_eq!(back, h);
1022 }
1023
1024 #[test]
1025 fn request_tagged_by_method() {
1026 let r = Request::Status;
1027 assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap()["method"], "status");
1028 let r = Request::OpenSession(OpenSessionParams {
1029 peer: "alice".into(),
1030 service: "notes".into(),
1031 });
1032 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1033 assert_eq!(v["method"], "open_session");
1034 assert_eq!(v["params"]["peer"], "alice");
1035 }
1036
1037 #[test]
1038 fn parameterless_method_tolerates_params_forms() {
1039 // Omitted and null params deserialize straight into the unit variant.
1040 let omitted: Request =
1041 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"method": "status"})).unwrap();
1042 assert_eq!(omitted, Request::Status);
1043 let null: Request =
1044 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"method": "status", "params": null}))
1045 .unwrap();
1046 assert_eq!(null, Request::Status);
1047
1048 // Known limitation: adjacent tagging rejects `params:{}` for a unit variant, so
1049 // the server MUST dispatch on the method string rather than deserialize the whole
1050 // message into `Request`. This is the pattern the daemon's dispatcher uses.
1051 let empty = serde_json::json!({"method": "status", "params": {}});
1052 assert!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(empty.clone()).is_err());
1053 match method_of(&empty) {
1054 Some("status") => {} // dispatcher resolves Status via the method string
1055 other => panic!("method_of failed to resolve status: {other:?}"),
1056 }
1057 }
1058
1059 #[test]
1060 fn backend_spec_roundtrips() {
1061 let run = BackendSpec::Run {
1062 cmd: vec!["notes-mcp".into(), "--stdio".into()],
1063 };
1064 let v = serde_json::to_value(&run).unwrap();
1065 assert_eq!(v["run"]["cmd"][0], "notes-mcp");
1066 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BackendSpec>(v).unwrap(), run);
1067
1068 let sock = BackendSpec::Socket {
1069 path: "/run/notes.sock".into(),
1070 };
1071 let v = serde_json::to_value(&sock).unwrap();
1072 assert_eq!(v["socket"]["path"], "/run/notes.sock");
1073 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BackendSpec>(v).unwrap(), sock);
1074 }
1075
1076 #[test]
1077 fn register_service_wire_shape() {
1078 let r = Request::RegisterService(RegisterServiceParams {
1079 name: "notes".into(),
1080 backend: BackendSpec::Run {
1081 cmd: vec!["notes-mcp".into()],
1082 },
1083 allow: vec!["alice".into()],
1084 ephemeral: false,
1085 });
1086 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1087 assert_eq!(
1088 v,
1089 serde_json::json!({
1090 "method": "register_service",
1091 "params": {
1092 "name": "notes",
1093 "backend": {"run": {"cmd": ["notes-mcp"]}},
1094 "allow": ["alice"],
1095 }
1096 })
1097 );
1098 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1099 }
1100
1101 #[test]
1102 fn invite_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1103 // Request::Invite → `{ "method": "invite", "params": { "services": [...] } }`.
1104 let r = Request::Invite(InviteParams {
1105 services: vec!["notes".into(), "kb".into()],
1106 app_label: None,
1107 });
1108 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1109 assert_eq!(v["method"], "invite");
1110 assert_eq!(v["params"]["services"][0], "notes");
1111 assert_eq!(v["params"]["services"][1], "kb");
1112 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1113 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1114 assert_eq!(
1115 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "invite", "params": {"services": []}})),
1116 Some("invite")
1117 );
1118
1119 // InviteResult carries the copyable line + expiry (surface #2 pairing artifact).
1120 let res = InviteResult {
1121 invite_line: "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF".into(),
1122 expires_at_epoch: 1_800_000_000,
1123 };
1124 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1125 assert_eq!(v["invite_line"], "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF");
1126 assert_eq!(v["expires_at_epoch"], 1_800_000_000u64);
1127 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<InviteResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1128 }
1129
1130 #[test]
1131 fn pair_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1132 // Request::Pair → `{ "method": "pair", "params": { "invite_line": "..." } }`.
1133 let r = Request::Pair(PairParams {
1134 invite_line: "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF".into(),
1135 });
1136 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1137 assert_eq!(v["method"], "pair");
1138 assert_eq!(v["params"]["invite_line"], "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF");
1139 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1140 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1141 assert_eq!(
1142 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "pair", "params": {"invite_line": "x"}})),
1143 Some("pair")
1144 );
1145
1146 // PairResult carries the inviter's suggested nickname + the display-only SAS words +
1147 // the granted services (the porcelain renders each as `<peer>/<service>`).
1148 let res = PairResult {
1149 peer_nickname: "alice".into(),
1150 sas_code: "tango-fig-cabbage".into(),
1151 services: vec!["notes".into(), "kb".into()],
1152 app_label: None,
1153 peer_user_id: None,
1154 };
1155 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1156 assert_eq!(v["peer_nickname"], "alice");
1157 assert_eq!(v["sas_code"], "tango-fig-cabbage");
1158 assert_eq!(v["services"][0], "notes");
1159 assert_eq!(v["services"][1], "kb");
1160 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<PairResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1161
1162 // Additive-only: a PairResult minted by an older daemon (no `services` key) still
1163 // deserializes — the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with an empty list.
1164 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({
1165 "peer_nickname": "alice",
1166 "sas_code": "tango-fig-cabbage",
1167 });
1168 let back: PairResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1169 assert_eq!(back.peer_nickname, "alice");
1170 assert!(back.services.is_empty());
1171 }
1172
1173 #[test]
1174 fn roster_install_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1175 // Request::RosterInstall → `{ "method": "roster_install", "params": { "path": ...,
1176 // "org_root_pk": ... } }`. The optional pk is present on the first-install shape.
1177 let r = Request::RosterInstall(RosterInstallParams {
1178 path: "/tmp/roster.json".into(),
1179 org_root_pk: Some("b64u:AAAA".into()),
1180 });
1181 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1182 assert_eq!(v["method"], "roster_install");
1183 assert_eq!(v["params"]["path"], "/tmp/roster.json");
1184 assert_eq!(v["params"]["org_root_pk"], "b64u:AAAA");
1185 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1186 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1187 assert_eq!(
1188 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "roster_install", "params": {"path": "/x"}})),
1189 Some("roster_install")
1190 );
1191
1192 // When the pk is omitted (a subsequent install using the pinned value), it is
1193 // `skip_serializing_if`-dropped from the wire and deserializes back to `None`.
1194 let omit = Request::RosterInstall(RosterInstallParams {
1195 path: "/tmp/roster.json".into(),
1196 org_root_pk: None,
1197 });
1198 let v = serde_json::to_value(&omit).unwrap();
1199 assert!(
1200 v["params"].get("org_root_pk").is_none(),
1201 "an omitted org_root_pk must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1202 );
1203 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), omit);
1204
1205 // RosterInstallResult carries org_id + serial + severed count (roster-status vocabulary).
1206 let res = RosterInstallResult {
1207 org_id: "acme".into(),
1208 serial: 42,
1209 severed: 1,
1210 };
1211 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1212 assert_eq!(v["org_id"], "acme");
1213 assert_eq!(v["serial"], 42u64);
1214 assert_eq!(v["severed"], 1u32);
1215 assert_eq!(
1216 serde_json::from_value::<RosterInstallResult>(v).unwrap(),
1217 res
1218 );
1219
1220 // Additive-only: a result minted by an older daemon (no `severed` key) still
1221 // deserializes — the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with 0.
1222 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({ "org_id": "acme", "serial": 7 });
1223 let back: RosterInstallResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1224 assert_eq!(back.serial, 7);
1225 assert_eq!(back.severed, 0);
1226 }
1227
1228 #[test]
1229 fn org_join_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1230 // Request::OrgJoin → `{ "method": "org_join", "params": { org_id, org_root_pk, user_id,
1231 // user_key } }`. `user_key` is a LOCAL path string (the key never crosses the API).
1232 let r = Request::OrgJoin(OrgJoinParams {
1233 org_id: "acme".into(),
1234 org_root_pk: "b64u:AAAA".into(),
1235 user_id: "alice".into(),
1236 user_key: "/home/alice/.config/mcpmesh/user.key".into(),
1237 });
1238 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1239 assert_eq!(v["method"], "org_join");
1240 assert_eq!(v["params"]["org_id"], "acme");
1241 assert_eq!(v["params"]["org_root_pk"], "b64u:AAAA");
1242 assert_eq!(v["params"]["user_id"], "alice");
1243 assert_eq!(
1244 v["params"]["user_key"],
1245 "/home/alice/.config/mcpmesh/user.key"
1246 );
1247 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1248 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1249 assert_eq!(
1250 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "org_join", "params": {"org_id": "x"}})),
1251 Some("org_join")
1252 );
1253
1254 // OrgJoinResult echoes the pinned org id (surface-clean; the fingerprint is porcelain-side).
1255 let res = OrgJoinResult {
1256 org_id: "acme".into(),
1257 };
1258 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1259 assert_eq!(v["org_id"], "acme");
1260 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<OrgJoinResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1261 }
1262
1263 #[test]
1264 fn set_roster_url_request_roundtrip() {
1265 // Request::SetRosterUrl → `{ "method": "set_roster_url", "params": { "url": "..." } }`.
1266 let r = Request::SetRosterUrl(SetRosterUrlParams {
1267 url: "https://intranet.acme.com/roster.json".into(),
1268 });
1269 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1270 assert_eq!(v["method"], "set_roster_url");
1271 assert_eq!(v["params"]["url"], "https://intranet.acme.com/roster.json");
1272 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1273 assert_eq!(
1274 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "set_roster_url", "params": {"url": "x"}})),
1275 Some("set_roster_url")
1276 );
1277 }
1278
1279 #[test]
1280 fn peer_remove_request_roundtrip() {
1281 // Request::PeerRemove → `{ "method": "peer_remove", "params": { "nickname": "..." } }`.
1282 let r = Request::PeerRemove(PeerRemoveParams {
1283 nickname: "bob".into(),
1284 });
1285 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1286 assert_eq!(v["method"], "peer_remove");
1287 assert_eq!(v["params"]["nickname"], "bob");
1288 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1289 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1290 assert_eq!(
1291 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "peer_remove", "params": {"nickname": "bob"}})),
1292 Some("peer_remove")
1293 );
1294 }
1295
1296 /// The reserved/internal `peer_add` rides the SAME typed vocabulary as every other method —
1297 /// `{ "method": "peer_add", "params": { nickname, endpoint_id, allow } }` — with `allow`
1298 /// defaulting to empty when absent.
1299 #[test]
1300 fn peer_add_request_roundtrip() {
1301 let r = Request::PeerAdd(PeerAddParams {
1302 nickname: "bob".into(),
1303 endpoint_id: "96246d3f".into(),
1304 allow: vec!["notes".into()],
1305 });
1306 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1307 assert_eq!(v["method"], "peer_add");
1308 assert_eq!(v["params"]["nickname"], "bob");
1309 assert_eq!(v["params"]["endpoint_id"], "96246d3f");
1310 assert_eq!(v["params"]["allow"][0], "notes");
1311 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1312 // An absent allow list deserializes to empty (the server-side tolerance).
1313 let p: PeerAddParams =
1314 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"nickname": "bob", "endpoint_id": "x"}))
1315 .unwrap();
1316 assert!(p.allow.is_empty());
1317 }
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn peer_rename_request_roundtrip() {
1321 // By user_id (renames all of a person's devices in one op).
1322 let r = Request::PeerRename(PeerRenameParams {
1323 user_id: Some("b64u:BOB".into()),
1324 nickname: None,
1325 to: "Bobby".into(),
1326 });
1327 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1328 assert_eq!(v["method"], "peer_rename");
1329 assert_eq!(v["params"]["user_id"], "b64u:BOB");
1330 assert_eq!(v["params"]["to"], "Bobby");
1331 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1332 // A provisional contact is renamed by nickname; omitted user_id defaults to None.
1333 assert_eq!(
1334 method_of(
1335 &serde_json::json!({"method": "peer_rename", "params": {"nickname": "carol", "to": "Carol"}})
1336 ),
1337 Some("peer_rename")
1338 );
1339 }
1340
1341 #[test]
1342 fn status_result_roundtrips() {
1343 // Pure-pairing daemon: `roster` is None — absent from the wire (skip_serializing_if) and an
1344 // older payload with no `roster` key still deserializes to None (serde default).
1345 let s = StatusResult {
1346 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
1347 services: vec![ServiceInfo {
1348 name: "notes".into(),
1349 allow: vec!["alice".into()],
1350 allow_display: vec![],
1351 backend: BackendKind::Run,
1352 ephemeral: false,
1353 }],
1354 peers: vec![PeerInfo {
1355 name: "alice".into(),
1356 services: vec!["notes".into()],
1357 // A paired peer that proved a self-sovereign user_id at pairing (surface-clean id).
1358 user_id: Some("b64u:alicepk".into()),
1359 principal: None,
1360 }],
1361 roster: None,
1362 presence: vec![],
1363 self_user_id: Some("b64u:selfpk".into()),
1364 recent_pairings: vec![],
1365 reachability: vec![],
1366 self_nickname: String::new(),
1367 };
1368 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
1369 assert_eq!(v["services"][0]["backend"], "run");
1370 // The additive identity fields ride the wire when present.
1371 assert_eq!(v["peers"][0]["user_id"], "b64u:alicepk");
1372 assert_eq!(v["self_user_id"], "b64u:selfpk");
1373 assert!(
1374 v.get("roster").is_none(),
1375 "an absent roster must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1376 );
1377 assert!(
1378 v.get("presence").is_none(),
1379 "an empty presence must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1380 );
1381 assert!(
1382 v.get("recent_pairings").is_none(),
1383 "an empty recent_pairings must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1384 );
1385 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StatusResult>(v).unwrap(), s);
1386
1387 // A payload minted by an older daemon (no `roster`/`presence`/identity keys) still
1388 // deserializes — the identity fields default to None / a nickname-only peer.
1389 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({
1390 "stack_version": "0.1.0",
1391 "services": [],
1392 "peers": [{ "name": "bob", "services": [] }],
1393 });
1394 let back: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1395 assert!(back.roster.is_none());
1396 assert!(back.presence.is_empty());
1397 assert!(back.self_user_id.is_none());
1398 assert!(back.peers[0].user_id.is_none());
1399 assert!(back.recent_pairings.is_empty());
1400
1401 // Roster daemon: a Some(RosterStatus) + an advisory presence list round-trip. `presence`
1402 // carries FLAT vocabulary only (user_id/device_label/role/online) — no EndpointId/key.
1403 let s = StatusResult {
1404 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
1405 services: vec![],
1406 peers: vec![],
1407 roster: Some(RosterStatus {
1408 org_id: "acme".into(),
1409 serial: 42,
1410 state: "approved".into(),
1411 org_root_fingerprint: "tango-fig-cabbage-anchor".into(),
1412 }),
1413 presence: vec![
1414 PresencePeer {
1415 user_id: "alice".into(),
1416 device_label: "laptop".into(),
1417 role: "primary".into(),
1418 online: true,
1419 meta: String::new(),
1420 },
1421 PresencePeer {
1422 user_id: "alice".into(),
1423 device_label: "desktop".into(),
1424 role: "mirror".into(),
1425 online: false,
1426 meta: String::new(),
1427 },
1428 ],
1429 self_user_id: None,
1430 recent_pairings: vec![],
1431 reachability: vec![],
1432 self_nickname: String::new(),
1433 };
1434 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
1435 assert_eq!(v["roster"]["org_id"], "acme");
1436 assert_eq!(v["roster"]["serial"], 42u64);
1437 assert_eq!(v["roster"]["state"], "approved");
1438 assert_eq!(
1439 v["roster"]["org_root_fingerprint"],
1440 "tango-fig-cabbage-anchor"
1441 );
1442 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["user_id"], "alice");
1443 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["device_label"], "laptop");
1444 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["role"], "primary");
1445 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["online"], true);
1446 assert_eq!(v["presence"][1]["online"], false);
1447 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StatusResult>(v).unwrap(), s);
1448 }
1449
1450 /// The `recent_pairings` status field is ADDITIVE: a populated list round-trips with
1451 /// the flat `{peer_nickname, sas_code, paired_at_epoch}` shape (nickname + SAS words + epoch —
1452 /// never an EndpointId), an empty list is dropped from the wire, and a payload minted by an
1453 /// older daemon (no key at all) still deserializes to empty.
1454 #[test]
1455 fn recent_pairings_are_additive_on_status() {
1456 let s = StatusResult {
1457 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
1458 services: vec![],
1459 peers: vec![],
1460 roster: None,
1461 presence: vec![],
1462 self_user_id: None,
1463 recent_pairings: vec![RecentPairing {
1464 peer_nickname: "bob".into(),
1465 sas_code: "tango-fig-cabbage".into(),
1466 paired_at_epoch: 1_800_000_000,
1467 }],
1468 reachability: vec![],
1469 self_nickname: String::new(),
1470 };
1471 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
1472 assert_eq!(v["recent_pairings"][0]["peer_nickname"], "bob");
1473 assert_eq!(v["recent_pairings"][0]["sas_code"], "tango-fig-cabbage");
1474 assert_eq!(v["recent_pairings"][0]["paired_at_epoch"], 1_800_000_000u64);
1475 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StatusResult>(v).unwrap(), s);
1476
1477 // A payload minted by an OLDER daemon (no `recent_pairings` key) still deserializes —
1478 // the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with an empty list.
1479 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({
1480 "stack_version": "0.1.0",
1481 "services": [],
1482 "peers": [],
1483 });
1484 let back: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1485 assert!(back.recent_pairings.is_empty());
1486 }
1487
1488 #[test]
1489 fn blob_requests_and_results_roundtrip() {
1490 // BlobPublish → { method, params: { scope, path } }.
1491 let r = Request::BlobPublish(BlobPublishParams {
1492 scope: "docs".into(),
1493 path: "/tmp/a.bin".into(),
1494 });
1495 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1496 assert_eq!(v["method"], "blob_publish");
1497 assert_eq!(v["params"]["scope"], "docs");
1498 assert_eq!(v["params"]["path"], "/tmp/a.bin");
1499 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1500
1501 // BlobGrant → { method, params: { scope, principal } }.
1502 let r = Request::BlobGrant(BlobGrantParams {
1503 scope: "docs".into(),
1504 principal: "alice".into(),
1505 });
1506 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1507 assert_eq!(v["method"], "blob_grant");
1508 assert_eq!(v["params"]["principal"], "alice");
1509 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1510
1511 // BlobList is parameterless (method_of resolves it).
1512 assert_eq!(
1513 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "blob_list"})),
1514 Some("blob_list")
1515 );
1516
1517 // BlobFetch → { method, params: { ticket, dest_path } }.
1518 let r = Request::BlobFetch(BlobFetchParams {
1519 ticket: "blobAAA".into(),
1520 dest_path: "/tmp/out.bin".into(),
1521 });
1522 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1523 assert_eq!(v["method"], "blob_fetch");
1524 assert_eq!(v["params"]["ticket"], "blobAAA");
1525 assert_eq!(v["params"]["dest_path"], "/tmp/out.bin");
1526 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1527
1528 // BlobPublishResult carries the ticket + hash (blob-reference vocabulary).
1529 let res = BlobPublishResult {
1530 ticket: "blobAAA".into(),
1531 hash: "ab".repeat(32),
1532 };
1533 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1534 assert_eq!(v["ticket"], "blobAAA");
1535 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BlobPublishResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1536
1537 // BlobScopeList carries flat (name, hashes, grants) — no EndpointId/key leakage.
1538 let res = BlobScopeList {
1539 scopes: vec![ScopeInfo {
1540 name: "docs".into(),
1541 hashes: vec!["ab".repeat(32)],
1542 grants: vec!["alice".into()],
1543 }],
1544 };
1545 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1546 assert_eq!(v["scopes"][0]["name"], "docs");
1547 assert_eq!(v["scopes"][0]["grants"][0], "alice");
1548 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BlobScopeList>(v).unwrap(), res);
1549
1550 // BlobFetchResult carries the verified hash + byte length.
1551 let res = BlobFetchResult {
1552 hash: "ab".repeat(32),
1553 bytes_len: 4194304,
1554 };
1555 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1556 assert_eq!(v["bytes_len"], 4194304u64);
1557 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BlobFetchResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1558 }
1559
1560 /// The three `subscribe` frame shapes round-trip with the documented `type`-tagged wire form
1561 /// (docs/local-protocol.md "Live event stream"): `snapshot` carries the flat session/reachability
1562 /// lists, `event` delegates through the `Box` so the record's fields sit VERBATIM under
1563 /// `record` (one schema with the JSONL log), and `lagged` carries the dropped count.
1564 #[test]
1565 fn stream_frames_roundtrip_with_the_documented_tags() {
1566 let snap = StreamFrame::Snapshot {
1567 active_sessions: vec![ActiveSession {
1568 peer: "bob".into(),
1569 service: "notes".into(),
1570 opened_at: 1_751_760_000,
1571 }],
1572 reachability: vec![PeerReachability {
1573 name: "bob".into(),
1574 reachable: true,
1575 rtt_ms: Some(42),
1576 age_secs: Some(3),
1577 meta: String::new(),
1578 }],
1579 };
1580 let v = serde_json::to_value(&snap).unwrap();
1581 assert_eq!(v["type"], "snapshot");
1582 assert_eq!(v["active_sessions"][0]["peer"], "bob");
1583 assert_eq!(v["active_sessions"][0]["opened_at"], 1_751_760_000i64);
1584 assert_eq!(v["reachability"][0]["name"], "bob");
1585 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(v).unwrap(), snap);
1586
1587 let event = StreamFrame::Event {
1588 record: Box::new(AuditRecord::session_open(
1589 "2026-07-03T14:02:11.480Z".into(),
1590 Some("bob".into()),
1591 "notes".into(),
1592 )),
1593 };
1594 let v = serde_json::to_value(&event).unwrap();
1595 assert_eq!(v["type"], "event");
1596 // The record's fields ride verbatim under `record` — no Box indirection on the wire.
1597 assert_eq!(v["record"]["kind"], "session_open");
1598 assert_eq!(v["record"]["peer"], "bob");
1599 assert_eq!(v["record"]["service"], "notes");
1600 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(v).unwrap(), event);
1601
1602 let lagged = StreamFrame::Lagged { dropped: 12 };
1603 let v = serde_json::to_value(&lagged).unwrap();
1604 assert_eq!(v, serde_json::json!({ "type": "lagged", "dropped": 12 }));
1605 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(v).unwrap(), lagged);
1606 }
1607
1608 /// A frame minted by a NEWER daemon (an unknown `type`) fails to deserialize rather than
1609 /// mis-parsing — the typed stream surface is closed; a forward-compatible consumer reads the
1610 /// raw `Value` stream instead (`ControlClient::open_stream`).
1611 #[test]
1612 fn unknown_stream_frame_type_is_rejected() {
1613 let future = serde_json::json!({ "type": "future_kind", "x": 1 });
1614 assert!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(future).is_err());
1615 }
1616
1617 #[test]
1618 fn audit_summary_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1619 // Request::AuditSummary is parameterless → `{ "method": "audit_summary" }`. Like Status, it
1620 // tolerates omitted/null params; the server dispatches on the method string (method_of).
1621 let r = Request::AuditSummary;
1622 assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap()["method"], "audit_summary");
1623 assert_eq!(
1624 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "audit_summary"})),
1625 Some("audit_summary")
1626 );
1627
1628 // AuditSummaryResult carries LOCAL per-peer / per-service session counts (nicknames + service
1629 // names only — never endpoints/transport terms) + a total. Tuples mirror kb's
1630 // InsightResponse.per_peer_contribution: `["bob", 2]` on the wire.
1631 let res = AuditSummaryResult {
1632 per_peer: vec![("alice".into(), 1), ("bob".into(), 2)],
1633 per_service: vec![("kb".into(), 1), ("notes".into(), 3)],
1634 total_sessions: 4,
1635 };
1636 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1637 assert_eq!(v["per_peer"][1][0], "bob");
1638 assert_eq!(v["per_peer"][1][1], 2u64);
1639 assert_eq!(v["per_service"][1][0], "notes");
1640 assert_eq!(v["total_sessions"], 4u64);
1641 assert_eq!(
1642 serde_json::from_value::<AuditSummaryResult>(v).unwrap(),
1643 res
1644 );
1645
1646 // Additive-only: a result minted by an older daemon (no `total_sessions` key) still
1647 // deserializes — the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with 0.
1648 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({ "per_peer": [], "per_service": [] });
1649 let back: AuditSummaryResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1650 assert_eq!(back.total_sessions, 0);
1651 assert!(back.per_peer.is_empty());
1652 }
1653}