mcpmesh_local_api/protocol.rs
1//! mcpmesh-local/1 protocol types. Shared vocabulary between the daemon
2//! and its clients (porcelain, connect proxy, later the host shell). Wire framing
3//! is the family NDJSON codec — carried by the caller, not defined here.
4//!
5//! Request/response asymmetry: requests are one typed, closed enum (`Request`);
6//! responses are per-method typed structs deserialized from the JSON-RPC `result`
7//! Value — `Status` → [`StatusResult`], `RegisterService` → an ack, `OpenSession` →
8//! no JSON-RPC result at all: the socket STOPS being JSON-RPC and becomes a raw
9//! byte pipe.
10//!
11//! Additive-only: new fields (capabilities on `Hello`, groups/user_id on
12//! `PeerInfo`, device on `OpenSession`) MUST land as
13//! `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
14use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
15
16/// The first exchange on any `*-local/N` socket (the family's hello convention).
17#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
18pub struct Hello {
19 pub api: String, // "mcpmesh-local/1"
20 pub api_version: String, // "MAJOR.MINOR" of the protocol surface (see API_MINOR)
21 /// The protocol-compatibility MINOR as an integer, for a trivial machine comparison
22 /// (`api_minor >= N`) without string parsing. Distinct from `stack_version` (the crate
23 /// release train). Additive: an older daemon omits it and it defaults to 0.
24 #[serde(default)]
25 pub api_minor: u32,
26 pub stack_version: String,
27}
28
29/// The kind of backend answering a service — the two valid values, enforced at the
30/// type level and kept in lockstep with `BackendSpec`'s variants. Status reports the
31/// kind only, never the command/path (no transport vocabulary).
32#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
33#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
34pub enum BackendKind {
35 Run,
36 Socket,
37}
38
39/// A registered service as reported by `status` (no transport vocabulary).
40#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
41pub struct ServiceInfo {
42 pub name: String,
43 pub allow: Vec<String>, // STABLE principals (b64u:/eid:) or roster names (#38) — never nicknames
44 /// The HUMAN rendering of `allow`, index-aligned: each principal resolved to its peer's
45 /// display nickname by the daemon (which owns the store); an unresolvable stable
46 /// principal renders as a neutral placeholder — porcelain must show THESE, never raw
47 /// ids (surface discipline). Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
48 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
49 pub allow_display: Vec<String>,
50 pub backend: BackendKind, // "run" | "socket" (kind only, never the command/path)
51 /// True if this registration is ephemeral (#36): in-memory only, tied to the registering
52 /// control connection's lifetime, absent from config, gone on restart. Additive — an older
53 /// daemon omits it and it reads as `false` (the persistent default).
54 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
55 pub ephemeral: bool,
56}
57
58/// A known peer as reported by `status` (nickname only — never the EndpointId).
59#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
60pub struct PeerInfo {
61 pub name: String,
62 pub services: Vec<String>,
63 /// The peer's PROVEN self-sovereign `user_id` (`b64u:<user_pk>`) if it presented a verified
64 /// device->user binding at pairing (roster peers carry it too), else `None` (nickname-only). This
65 /// is a surface-clean identity (an opaque user id, NOT an EndpointId). Additive:
66 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]` so older payloads round-trip.
67 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
68 pub user_id: Option<String>,
69}
70
71/// Advisory reachability of a paired peer (pairing-mode liveness). Surface-clean:
72/// a nickname + a bool + latency/age NUMBERS — never an endpoint-id, key, or transport path.
73#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
74pub struct PeerReachability {
75 pub name: String, // the peer's nickname
76 pub reachable: bool, // result of the last probe (false if never probed)
77 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
78 pub rtt_ms: Option<u64>, // last measured round-trip, if reachable
79 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
80 pub age_secs: Option<u64>, // None = never probed (consumer shows "checking…")
81 /// The peer's OPTIONAL app metadata (#40) — the same opaque ≤256B blob #39 exposes via
82 /// presence, here carried on the pairing-mode `mcpmesh/ping/1` probe pong so PAIRED peers
83 /// (which have no presence gossip) see it too. Empty when the peer set none. Advisory
84 /// display data; never an authz input. Near-real-time when `status` is read (the probe
85 /// cache has a ~20s TTL), not a steady push. Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
86 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
87 pub meta: String,
88}
89
90/// Roster-mode status. Surface-clean roster VOCABULARY only: org_id, serial, a plain
91/// state word, and the pinned org-root FINGERPRINT in short words — never raw keys/EndpointIds/serials-
92/// as-transport-vocab. Absent in a pure-pairing daemon.
93#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
94pub struct RosterStatus {
95 pub org_id: String,
96 pub serial: u64,
97 pub state: String, // "pending" | "approved" | "degraded" | "stopped"
98 pub org_root_fingerprint: String, // short-word form
99}
100
101/// One reachable roster peer device as reported by `status` (the advisory presence read).
102/// ADVISORY — this is a display convenience, never an authorization surface. Surface-clean:
103/// FLAT vocabulary ONLY — a `user_id`, a human `device_label`, its `role` word, and an `online`
104/// boolean. It carries NO EndpointId / pubkey / hash / ALPN or any transport vocabulary.
105#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
106pub struct PresencePeer {
107 pub user_id: String,
108 pub device_label: String,
109 pub role: String, // "primary" | "mirror" (roster vocabulary)
110 /// Whether the device has a live presence heartbeat (advisory — absence never blocks a dial).
111 pub online: bool,
112 /// The device's OPTIONAL embedder-set app metadata (#39) — an opaque ≤256B blob carried
113 /// (signed) on its presence heartbeat, empty when the device set none. Advisory display
114 /// data; never an authz input. Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
115 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
116 pub meta: String,
117}
118
119/// One recently completed INVITER-side pairing, surfaced by `status` so the inviter's human can
120/// read the short authentication code (SAS) and compare it with the redeemer's out-of-band —
121/// the pairing ceremony is "both humans compare the code": the redeemer sees it in its
122/// [`PairResult`]; this is the inviter's porcelain surface for the same words. DISPLAY-ONLY
123/// ceremony state: held in-memory by the daemon (a small ring), lost on restart, NEVER an
124/// authorization input or trust data. Surface-clean: a nickname + the SAS wordlist words +
125/// an epoch — never an EndpointId.
126#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
127pub struct RecentPairing {
128 /// The peer's nickname as stored by the inviter (its local name for the redeemer).
129 pub peer_nickname: String,
130 /// The display-only SAS words (e.g. `"tango-fig-cabbage"`) — the same code the redeemer's
131 /// `PairResult.sas_code` carried. Never checked programmatically.
132 pub sas_code: String,
133 /// When the pairing completed (epoch seconds) — the porcelain renders a friendly age.
134 pub paired_at_epoch: u64,
135}
136
137#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
138pub struct StatusResult {
139 pub stack_version: String,
140 pub services: Vec<ServiceInfo>,
141 pub peers: Vec<PeerInfo>,
142 /// Roster-mode status, absent in a pure-pairing daemon. Additive:
143 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so a daemon/client without it round-trips.
144 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
145 pub roster: Option<RosterStatus>,
146 /// The reachable roster peer devices (the advisory presence read), each with an `online`
147 /// flag. Empty in a pure-pairing daemon / when no roster is installed. Additive:
148 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]` so an older payload round-trips.
149 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
150 pub presence: Vec<PresencePeer>,
151 /// THIS daemon's own self-sovereign `user_id` (`b64u:<user_pk>`), if it has a user key (auto-
152 /// minted at boot; shared by pairing AND roster mode). Lets the operator see + share their stable
153 /// identity that multiple devices resolve to. `None` only when no user key exists. Additive:
154 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]` so an older payload round-trips.
155 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
156 pub self_user_id: Option<String>,
157 /// Recent INVITER-side pairing completions, newest first (display-only pairing-ceremony aids —
158 /// see [`RecentPairing`]; in-memory on the daemon, cleared by a restart). Empty on a daemon
159 /// that has accepted no pairing since it started. Additive:
160 /// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]` so an older payload round-trips.
161 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
162 pub recent_pairings: Vec<RecentPairing>,
163 /// Advisory reachability of paired peers, from the on-demand probe cache. Empty until the
164 /// first probe completes. Additive: default + skip-if-empty.
165 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
166 pub reachability: Vec<PeerReachability>,
167 /// This node's EFFECTIVE self-nickname — what a freshly minted invite would present
168 /// (config `[identity].nickname`, else the hostname, else a fingerprint; live-updated by
169 /// `set_nickname`, #37). Empty only in mesh-less control-only mode. Additive: default +
170 /// skip-if-empty so an older payload round-trips.
171 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "String::is_empty")]
172 pub self_nickname: String,
173}
174
175/// Params of [`Request::RegisterService`]: the `[services.*]` entry to write/update.
176#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
177#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
178pub struct RegisterServiceParams {
179 pub name: String,
180 pub backend: BackendSpec,
181 pub allow: Vec<String>,
182 /// When true (#36), the registration is EPHEMERAL: kept in daemon memory only, never written
183 /// to the on-disk config, and automatically unregistered when the control connection that
184 /// registered it closes (and gone on daemon restart). For an embedder that serves a
185 /// `socket` backend from a fresh path each run, this removes the need to derive a stable
186 /// socket path solely to keep a persisted registration valid, and the stale-registration
187 /// accumulation that comes with no unregister. Default false = the persistent behavior.
188 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "std::ops::Not::not")]
189 pub ephemeral: bool,
190}
191
192/// Params of [`Request::Invite`]: the services the minted invite grants. Rejects unknown
193/// fields (so `{service: "kb"}` — a singular typo — is a loud error, not a silently
194/// grants-nothing invite), and the daemon additionally rejects an empty/absent `services`
195/// list (an invite that grants nothing is useless — #34).
196#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
197#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
198pub struct InviteParams {
199 #[serde(default)]
200 pub services: Vec<String>,
201 /// An OPAQUE, caller-chosen label carried through to the redeemer in the `pair` result (#31).
202 /// mcpmesh never interprets it (not a nickname, never resolved or authorized) — a per-pairing
203 /// metadata slot for the embedder (e.g. its own URN). Capped at the daemon; omit for none.
204 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
205 pub app_label: Option<String>,
206}
207
208/// Params of [`Request::Pair`]: the copyable `mcpmesh-invite:` line. Defaultable — an
209/// absent field reads as an empty line, which simply fails to decode (a clean pair error).
210#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
211#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
212pub struct PairParams {
213 #[serde(default)]
214 pub invite_line: String,
215}
216
217/// Params of [`Request::PeerRemove`]: the nickname to unpair.
218#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
219#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
220pub struct PeerRemoveParams {
221 pub nickname: String,
222}
223
224/// Params of [`Request::PeerRename`]: the contact to rename — every device sharing `user_id`
225/// when given, else the single provisional `nickname` entry — and the new nickname `to`.
226#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
227#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
228pub struct PeerRenameParams {
229 #[serde(default)]
230 pub user_id: Option<String>,
231 #[serde(default)]
232 pub nickname: Option<String>,
233 pub to: String,
234}
235
236/// Params of [`Request::PeerAdd`] (reserved/internal — see the variant): a raw `endpoint_id`
237/// (iroh base32) plus the nickname and service allow list to install it under.
238#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
239#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
240pub struct PeerAddParams {
241 pub nickname: String,
242 pub endpoint_id: String,
243 #[serde(default)]
244 pub allow: Vec<String>,
245}
246
247/// Params of [`Request::OpenSession`]: the `peer/service` target to dial. Both fields are
248/// defaultable — an empty target simply fails the dial (a clean `-32055` error).
249#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
250#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
251pub struct OpenSessionParams {
252 #[serde(default)]
253 pub peer: String,
254 #[serde(default)]
255 pub service: String,
256}
257
258/// Params of [`Request::RosterInstall`]: the LOCAL roster file `path`, plus the org-root pin
259/// on FIRST install (`b64u:`; omit once pinned — config carries it).
260#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
261#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
262pub struct RosterInstallParams {
263 pub path: String,
264 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
265 pub org_root_pk: Option<String>,
266}
267
268/// Params of [`Request::OrgJoin`]: the `[identity]` pin. `user_key` is a LOCAL path — the key
269/// never crosses the API.
270#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
271#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
272pub struct OrgJoinParams {
273 pub org_id: String,
274 pub org_root_pk: String,
275 pub user_id: String,
276 pub user_key: String,
277}
278
279/// Params of [`Request::SetAppMetadata`]: this node's opaque app-metadata blob (#39). The
280/// daemon NEVER interprets it — the embedder structures its own bytes (a version string,
281/// small JSON, …). Capped at 256 bytes; `""` clears it. Roster-mode only (it rides the
282/// signed presence heartbeat); a pure-pairing daemon accepts + stores it but never gossips it.
283#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
284#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
285pub struct SetAppMetadataParams {
286 pub metadata: String,
287}
288
289/// Params of [`Request::SetNickname`]: this node's new self-nickname (#37). Display-only
290/// semantics: it names this node in FUTURE invites/presentations; peers keep the nickname
291/// they stored at pairing time until a re-invite.
292#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
293#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
294pub struct SetNicknameParams {
295 pub nickname: String,
296}
297
298/// Params of [`Request::SetRosterUrl`]: the HTTPS roster URL to pin.
299#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
300#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
301pub struct SetRosterUrlParams {
302 pub url: String,
303}
304
305/// Params of [`Request::BlobPublish`]: the scope to publish into and the LOCAL file to add.
306#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
307#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
308pub struct BlobPublishParams {
309 pub scope: String,
310 pub path: String,
311}
312
313/// Params of [`Request::BlobGrant`]: the scope and the flat-namespace principal to grant it to.
314#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
315#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
316pub struct BlobGrantParams {
317 pub scope: String,
318 pub principal: String,
319}
320
321/// Params of [`Request::BlobFetch`]: the `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket and the LOCAL export path.
322#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
323#[serde(deny_unknown_fields)]
324pub struct BlobFetchParams {
325 pub ticket: String,
326 pub dest_path: String,
327}
328
329/// Control-API requests. Serialized as `{ "method": "...", "params": {...} }`
330/// (JSON-RPC-shaped; the id/jsonrpc envelope is added by the transport layer).
331///
332/// Each param-carrying variant wraps its named `*Params` struct — the ONE wire truth for that
333/// method's params, shared by clients (which serialize whole `Request`s) and the daemon (which
334/// deserializes `params` into the same struct after its method-string dispatch). Adjacent
335/// tagging serializes a newtype variant's content as the struct's fields, so the wire shape is
336/// identical to inline variant bodies.
337///
338/// **Servers dispatch on the `method` string and deserialize `params` per-method** — tolerating
339/// omitted / null / empty-object params for parameterless methods — rather than deserializing a
340/// whole message into `Request` (adjacent tagging rejects `params:{}` for unit variants).
341/// This keeps the wire tolerant for third-party clients (the versioned, additive-only surface).
342/// Use [`method_of`] to extract the tag, then match + deserialize `params` per-method.
343#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
344#[serde(tag = "method", content = "params", rename_all = "snake_case")]
345pub enum Request {
346 /// Register/update a `[services.*]` entry idempotently.
347 RegisterService(RegisterServiceParams),
348 Status,
349 /// Mint a one-time pairing invite granting `services`. The daemon
350 /// answers an [`InviteResult`] carrying the copyable `mcpmesh-invite:` line. Tag
351 /// `"invite"` (snake_case). `method_of` needs no per-variant arm — it reads the
352 /// `method` string generically; the tag comes from `rename_all`.
353 Invite(InviteParams),
354 /// Redeem a pairing invite. The daemon dials the inviter named by
355 /// `invite_line` on `mcpmesh/pair/1`, proves the secret, writes the mutual
356 /// (dial-back) `PeerEntry`, and answers a [`PairResult`]. Tag `"pair"`
357 /// (snake_case); `method_of` reads the `method` string generically.
358 ///
359 /// `PeerEntry` — the durable allowlist row — lives in the daemon crate.
360 Pair(PairParams),
361 /// Remove a paired peer by nickname (`mcpmesh pair --remove`). The daemon drops the
362 /// peer's `PeerEntry` (identity) AND revokes its access by stripping its stable principals from every
363 /// `[services.*].allow` (authorization) — the inverse of the pairing grant. Idempotent: a
364 /// nickname with no entry / no allow membership is a clean no-op. Live in-flight sessions are
365 /// NOT severed here: existing sessions run to completion; the peer only loses the
366 /// ability to establish NEW authorized sessions. Tag `"peer_remove"` (snake_case);
367 /// `method_of` reads the `method` string generically (no per-variant arm).
368 ///
369 /// `PeerEntry` — the durable allowlist row — lives in the daemon crate.
370 PeerRemove(PeerRemoveParams),
371 /// Rename a contact's nickname (nickname) authoritatively. Renames the
372 /// PERSON — every `PeerEntry` sharing `user_id` when given (one op for all their devices), else the
373 /// single `nickname` entry (a provisional, no-`user_id` contact) — to `to`, AND rewrites the old
374 /// nickname → `to` in every `[services.*].allow` so grants follow the rename. Refuses (error frame)
375 /// when `to` is empty or already names/grants a DIFFERENT identity — the same collision guard the
376 /// pairing rendezvous uses, so a rename can't inherit another peer's access. Tag `"peer_rename"`;
377 /// host-privileged like the other pair ops.
378 PeerRename(PeerRenameParams),
379 /// RESERVED / INTERNAL (`docs/local-protocol.md` "Reserved / internal methods"): install a
380 /// peer directly from a raw `endpoint_id` — the trust-population stand-in for pairing behind
381 /// `mcpmesh internal peer add`. A deliberate, documented exception to the surface discipline
382 /// (raw endpoint identifiers otherwise never cross this socket); NOT part of the stable
383 /// vocabulary — do not build on it. Tag `"peer_add"`.
384 PeerAdd(PeerAddParams),
385 /// Open a mesh session to `peer/service`; the daemon dials and pipes.
386 /// Distinct from the proxy's job: this returns a session the client streams.
387 /// Named `open_session` rather than `connect` to avoid colliding
388 /// with the `connect` porcelain.
389 OpenSession(OpenSessionParams),
390 /// Install a signed roster from a local file (the manual `internal roster install` path).
391 /// `path` is a LOCAL file the same-uid daemon reads (the daemon runs as the caller's own
392 /// uid, so passing a path rather than the bytes crosses no trust boundary). `org_root_pk`
393 /// pins the org root on FIRST install (`b64u:`); omit it
394 /// once pinned (config carries it). Tag `"roster_install"`.
395 RosterInstall(RosterInstallParams),
396 /// Pin the org root on a JOINER — WITHOUT a roster (the joiner has none yet; its poll loop
397 /// fetches the first one). Records `[identity]` org_id / org_root_pk / user_id / user_key.
398 /// `user_key` is a LOCAL path
399 /// (the key never crosses the API). Tag `"org_join"`.
400 OrgJoin(OrgJoinParams),
401 /// Pin the HTTPS roster URL (`[roster].url`) in config. Written by `org create
402 /// --roster-url` (the operator keeps it current) AND by `join` when the org invite carries one —
403 /// so the joiner's poll loop bootstraps its FIRST roster. The daemon writes it under
404 /// `reload_lock` (single-writer), then the poll loop picks it up on the next daemon start. Tag
405 /// `"set_roster_url"`.
406 SetRosterUrl(SetRosterUrlParams),
407 /// Rename this node LIVE (#37): validate + upsert `[identity].nickname` through the
408 /// daemon's own serialized config-write path (no lost-update window against a
409 /// concurrent grant/registration) and update the in-memory name future invites
410 /// present — no restart. Ack result. Tag `"set_nickname"` (snake_case).
411 SetNickname(SetNicknameParams),
412 /// Set this node's opaque app-metadata blob (#39): validated (≤256B) and folded, signed,
413 /// into each outgoing presence heartbeat, so paired roster peers see it in their `status`
414 /// presence — no per-peer session. Ack result. Tag `"set_app_metadata"`. In-memory (lost
415 /// on restart; the embedder re-sets on startup).
416 SetAppMetadata(SetAppMetadataParams),
417 /// Publish a LOCAL file INTO a scope: the daemon adds the bytes to its gated
418 /// app-blob store and records the hash in `scope`. `path` is a local file the same-uid daemon
419 /// reads. Answers a [`BlobPublishResult`] carrying the `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket + hash.
420 /// Tag `"blob_publish"`.
421 BlobPublish(BlobPublishParams),
422 /// Grant a scope to a principal — any flat-namespace entry: a group name, a user_id, or a
423 /// nickname (the shared `principal_set` expansion). Tag
424 /// `"blob_grant"`.
425 BlobGrant(BlobGrantParams),
426 /// List the daemon's blob scopes (name → hashes + grants). Tag `"blob_list"`.
427 BlobList,
428 /// Fetch a `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket THROUGH the daemon (BLAKE3-verified streaming) and export the
429 /// verified blob to `dest_path` (a local file the same-uid daemon writes). Answers a
430 /// [`BlobFetchResult`] with the verified hash + byte length. Tag `"blob_fetch"`.
431 BlobFetch(BlobFetchParams),
432 /// Summarize this node's LOCAL audit log into per-peer / per-service SESSION counts
433 /// (local-only — the daemon reads its OWN audit dir, nothing is transmitted). The host Mesh surface
434 /// renders these as "who serves me / whom I serve / session counts". Parameterless (like `Status`);
435 /// the server dispatches on the `method` string. Tag `"audit_summary"` (snake_case);
436 /// `method_of` reads the `method` string generically (no per-variant arm).
437 AuditSummary,
438 /// Open a live event stream (pairing liveness & health telemetry). Like `open_session`, the
439 /// connection STOPS being request/response after this call and becomes a one-way push stream
440 /// of `StreamFrame`s. Parameterless. Tag `"subscribe"`.
441 Subscribe,
442}
443
444/// Result of [`Request::OrgJoin`] — the pinned org id echoed back (surface-clean; the fingerprint is
445/// computed porcelain-side from the invite's org_root_pk). Additive-only.
446#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
447pub struct OrgJoinResult {
448 pub org_id: String,
449}
450
451/// Result of a [`Request::RosterInstall`] request (the manual install path): the installed roster's
452/// org id + serial (roster-status vocabulary the confirmation line is permitted to render) plus how
453/// many live sessions the install severed. Surface-clean: NO keys / EndpointIds / paths.
454///
455/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as
456/// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
457#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
458pub struct RosterInstallResult {
459 pub org_id: String,
460 pub serial: u64,
461 /// How many live sessions were severed, for the porcelain's confirmation line.
462 #[serde(default)]
463 pub severed: u32,
464}
465
466/// Result of [`Request::BlobPublish`]: the copyable `mcpmesh/blob/1` ticket + the blob's blake3 hash.
467/// A ticket/hash here is blob-reference vocabulary (NOT a transport-vocab leak — the same
468/// carve-out as the pairing invite line). Additive-only.
469#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
470pub struct BlobPublishResult {
471 pub ticket: String,
472 pub hash: String, // bare blake3 hex
473}
474
475/// One scope in a [`BlobScopeList`]: its name + the hashes it contains + the principals it
476/// grants. Flat vocabulary ONLY — no EndpointId/pubkey/ALPN. Additive-only.
477#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
478pub struct ScopeInfo {
479 pub name: String,
480 pub hashes: Vec<String>,
481 pub grants: Vec<String>,
482}
483
484/// Result of [`Request::BlobList`]: the daemon's scopes. Additive-only.
485#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
486pub struct BlobScopeList {
487 pub scopes: Vec<ScopeInfo>,
488}
489
490/// Result of [`Request::BlobFetch`]: the verified hash + byte length written to `dest_path`.
491/// Additive-only.
492#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
493pub struct BlobFetchResult {
494 pub hash: String,
495 pub bytes_len: u64,
496}
497
498/// Result of [`Request::AuditSummary`]: LOCAL per-peer / per-service session counts
499/// aggregated from this node's OWN audit log — NEVER transmitted (local-only). Surface-clean:
500/// peer names are nicknames / user_ids (NEVER EndpointIds), service names are the registered
501/// service names (NEVER transport vocabulary). A "session" is one `SessionOpen` record. `per_peer` /
502/// `per_service` are sorted ascending by name (deterministic). Tuples mirror kb's
503/// `InsightResponse::per_peer_contribution` — `["bob", 2]` on the wire.
504///
505/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as
506/// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
507#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
508pub struct AuditSummaryResult {
509 /// Sessions opened per peer (nickname). A session with no attributed peer is NOT counted here (no
510 /// peer to attribute) but IS in `total_sessions`.
511 pub per_peer: Vec<(String, u64)>,
512 /// Sessions opened per registered service name.
513 pub per_service: Vec<(String, u64)>,
514 /// Total sessions opened (every `SessionOpen` record, including peer-less ones).
515 #[serde(default)]
516 pub total_sessions: u64,
517}
518
519/// Result of an [`Request::Invite`] request: the copyable `mcpmesh-invite:` artifact
520/// (the ONE pairing artifact deliberately carved out of the
521/// transport-vocabulary blocklist, so this is NOT a transport-vocab leak) plus its
522/// absolute expiry in epoch seconds (≤ now + 24h).
523///
524/// `invite` returns BEFORE any redemption, so the SAS — which is derived from the redeemer's
525/// endpoint id, unknown until they redeem — cannot appear here. The inviter reads its side of
526/// the SAS from [`StatusResult::recent_pairings`] once a redemption completes (a `trust`/`pair`
527/// frame on the live [`StreamFrame`] stream signals that moment). See the "embedding the pairing
528/// ceremony" note in `docs/local-protocol.md` (#35).
529///
530/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]`
531/// so older payloads still deserialize.
532#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
533pub struct InviteResult {
534 /// The `mcpmesh-invite:<base32>` line, copied out-of-band to the redeemer.
535 pub invite_line: String,
536 /// When the invite expires (epoch seconds); the daemon burns it at redemption or expiry.
537 pub expires_at_epoch: u64,
538}
539
540/// Result of a [`Request::Pair`] request: the inviter's suggested nickname (the
541/// redeemer's local name for the new peer) plus the display-only short authentication
542/// code (SAS) — a few words the human reads aloud to a second channel to
543/// catch a whole-invite forgery / address-swap MITM. The SAS is a pairing-ceremony
544/// artifact (like the invite line), NOT a transport-vocabulary leak.
545///
546/// Additive-only: any future field MUST land as
547/// `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so older payloads still deserialize.
548#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
549pub struct PairResult {
550 /// The inviter's suggested nickname (from the invite) — the redeemer's local name for it.
551 pub peer_nickname: String,
552 /// The display-only short authentication code (e.g. `"tango-fig-42"`), shown on both
553 /// sides for the out-of-band human check. Never sent on the wire, never checked
554 /// programmatically.
555 pub sas_code: String,
556 /// The services this pairing granted the redeemer — each mountable as `<peer>/<service>`.
557 /// Populated from the invite (`invite.services`) by the redeemer-side `redeem_invite`, so
558 /// the porcelain can print the "You can mount: alice/notes" line without re-decoding the
559 /// invite. Additive: `#[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = ...)]` so a `PairResult`
560 /// minted by an older daemon (which omits `services`) still deserializes — to an empty list.
561 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Vec::is_empty")]
562 pub services: Vec<String>,
563 /// The opaque `app_label` the inviter attached at `invite` time (#31), echoed verbatim — or
564 /// absent if none was set. mcpmesh never interprets it; the embedder does. Additive.
565 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
566 pub app_label: Option<String>,
567 /// The inviter's proven self-sovereign `user_id` (`b64u:<user_pk>`), when it presented a
568 /// device→user binding at pairing (#30). This is the STABLE, portable identity the redeemer
569 /// can align with its own — and the same value it may later pass to `open_session` to dial
570 /// this peer by identity rather than by local nickname. `None` if the inviter presented no
571 /// binding (a legacy/keyless peer). Additive.
572 #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
573 pub peer_user_id: Option<String>,
574}
575
576/// The event class of an [`AuditRecord`] (the four audit event classes). An additive discriminant on
577/// top of the base record schema: it removes no field and makes the JSONL self-describing so
578/// a consumer can filter by class without guessing from which optional fields are present.
579#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
580#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
581pub enum AuditKind {
582 /// A mesh session opened (a backend was selected for an authenticated peer).
583 /// (A `session_open` with `status:"error"` is a synthesized FAILED-dial marker — no backend
584 /// was reached; it records an attempted-and-failed reach for the telemetry stream.)
585 SessionOpen,
586 /// A mesh session closed (the backend returned / the session tore down).
587 SessionClose,
588 /// One proxied MCP request line (method + tool NAME + args_hash). NEVER carries raw arguments.
589 Request,
590 /// A peer fetched a blob from this node's gated provider (peer + hash + allow/deny).
591 BlobFetch,
592 /// A trust mutation (pair, unpair, roster install/swap, revoke).
593 Trust,
594}
595
596/// One audit record — the union of the event classes, and the `record` payload of a
597/// [`StreamFrame::Event`]. ONE schema for the on-disk JSONL log and the live stream. Every field
598/// beyond `ts`/`kind` is optional and elided when absent (`skip_serializing_if`), so each class
599/// serializes to just its relevant keys (a session record has no `method`; a trust record has no
600/// `bytes_out`).
601///
602/// PRIVACY: the proxied-request record carries `method` + `tool` (NAME only) +
603/// `args_hash` (`"blake3:<hex>"`), and NEVER the raw arguments, the request/response content, or
604/// any tool-output bytes — only a `bytes_out` COUNT and a `status`.
605#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
606pub struct AuditRecord {
607 /// RFC3339 UTC with millisecond precision, e.g. `"2026-07-03T14:02:11.480Z"`. The `YYYY-MM`
608 /// prefix also selects the monthly file (the rotation boundary), so it is always present.
609 pub ts: String,
610 pub kind: AuditKind,
611 /// The gate-resolved authenticated peer (attributed by the endpoint_id-keyed trust gate). Absent on
612 /// local-only events with no remote peer (a manual roster install).
613 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
614 pub peer: Option<String>,
615 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
616 pub service: Option<String>,
617 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
618 pub method: Option<String>,
619 /// The tool NAME only (never its arguments or output) — e.g. `"read_file"` for a `tools/call`.
620 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
621 pub tool: Option<String>,
622 /// `"blake3:<hex>"` of the request arguments. The raw arguments are NEVER stored.
623 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
624 pub args_hash: Option<String>,
625 /// Byte COUNT of the response sent back to the peer — a count, never the content.
626 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
627 pub bytes_out: Option<u64>,
628 /// `"ok"` / `"error"` (proxied request) or `"ok"` / `"denied"` (blob fetch).
629 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
630 pub status: Option<String>,
631 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
632 pub latency_ms: Option<u64>,
633 /// Trust-event verb: `"pair"` / `"unpair"` / `"roster_install"` / `"revoke"` (kind == Trust).
634 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
635 pub event: Option<String>,
636 /// A reference, NEVER content: a blob hash (`BlobFetch`) or a trust-event target such as a
637 /// nickname or `org/serial` (`Trust`).
638 #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
639 pub target: Option<String>,
640}
641
642impl AuditRecord {
643 fn base(ts: String, kind: AuditKind) -> Self {
644 Self {
645 ts,
646 kind,
647 peer: None,
648 service: None,
649 method: None,
650 tool: None,
651 args_hash: None,
652 bytes_out: None,
653 status: None,
654 latency_ms: None,
655 event: None,
656 target: None,
657 }
658 }
659
660 pub fn session_open(ts: String, peer: Option<String>, service: String) -> Self {
661 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::SessionOpen);
662 r.peer = peer;
663 r.service = Some(service);
664 r
665 }
666
667 /// Set the record's `status` (`"ok"`/`"error"`/`"denied"`), returning `self` for chaining.
668 /// Marks a synthesized failure record — e.g. the `session_open` for a FAILED dial, which
669 /// reaches no backend and so is never audited by the far side's session guard — without a
670 /// dedicated constructor. DRY: reuses the existing optional `status` field.
671 pub fn with_status(mut self, status: &str) -> Self {
672 self.status = Some(status.into());
673 self
674 }
675
676 pub fn session_close(ts: String, peer: Option<String>, service: String) -> Self {
677 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::SessionClose);
678 r.peer = peer;
679 r.service = Some(service);
680 r
681 }
682
683 /// A completed (request→response correlated) proxied line: method + tool NAME + args_hash, plus
684 /// the response's `bytes_out` COUNT, `status`, and `latency_ms`. PRIVACY: `args_hash` is a digest;
685 /// no raw arguments, request/response content, or tool-output bytes are ever passed in.
686 #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)]
687 pub fn proxied_request(
688 ts: String,
689 peer: Option<String>,
690 service: String,
691 method: String,
692 tool: Option<String>,
693 args_hash: String,
694 bytes_out: u64,
695 status: String,
696 latency_ms: u64,
697 ) -> Self {
698 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::Request);
699 r.peer = peer;
700 r.service = Some(service);
701 r.method = Some(method);
702 r.tool = tool;
703 r.args_hash = Some(args_hash);
704 r.bytes_out = Some(bytes_out);
705 r.status = Some(status);
706 r.latency_ms = Some(latency_ms);
707 r
708 }
709
710 /// A proxied NOTIFICATION line (no `id`, so no response correlates): method + tool + args_hash,
711 /// no `bytes_out`/`status`/`latency_ms`. The line is still recorded — every proxied request is audited.
712 pub fn proxied_notification(
713 ts: String,
714 peer: Option<String>,
715 service: String,
716 method: String,
717 tool: Option<String>,
718 args_hash: String,
719 ) -> Self {
720 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::Request);
721 r.peer = peer;
722 r.service = Some(service);
723 r.method = Some(method);
724 r.tool = tool;
725 r.args_hash = Some(args_hash);
726 r
727 }
728
729 pub fn blob_fetch(ts: String, peer: Option<String>, hash: String, status: String) -> Self {
730 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::BlobFetch);
731 r.peer = peer;
732 r.target = Some(hash);
733 r.status = Some(status);
734 r
735 }
736
737 pub fn trust(ts: String, event: String, target: Option<String>) -> Self {
738 let mut r = Self::base(ts, AuditKind::Trust);
739 r.event = Some(event);
740 r.target = target;
741 r
742 }
743}
744
745/// One live mesh session, in a [`StreamFrame::Snapshot`]. Surface-clean: `peer` is the
746/// user_id-or-nickname the audit records carry, never an endpoint-id. `opened_at` is epoch seconds.
747#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
748pub struct ActiveSession {
749 pub peer: String,
750 pub service: String,
751 pub opened_at: i64,
752}
753
754/// One frame of the [`Request::Subscribe`] stream (pairing liveness & health telemetry). Tagged on
755/// `type` (snake_case), so a frame is `{"type":"snapshot",...}` / `{"type":"event",...}` /
756/// `{"type":"lagged",...}`. `Event.record` is the [`AuditRecord`] verbatim, so the stream and the
757/// on-disk log carry ONE schema. The daemon serializes these; an embedding consumer deserializes
758/// them (see `docs/local-protocol.md` "Live event stream").
759#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
760#[serde(tag = "type", rename_all = "snake_case")]
761pub enum StreamFrame {
762 /// The FIRST frame: a point-in-time picture of the mesh (open sessions + paired-peer
763 /// reachability) so a fresh subscriber renders immediately without replaying history.
764 Snapshot {
765 active_sessions: Vec<ActiveSession>,
766 reachability: Vec<PeerReachability>,
767 },
768 /// A live audit event (session open/close, request, blob fetch, trust) — the tap on the hub.
769 /// Boxed so this (much larger) variant does not bloat every frame; serde delegates through the
770 /// `Box`, so the wire shape is the record's fields verbatim.
771 Event { record: Box<AuditRecord> },
772 /// The subscriber fell `dropped` records behind the broadcast ring; the stream continues (a
773 /// fresh reconnect would re-`Snapshot`). Never drops the subscriber — lag is reported, never fatal.
774 Lagged { dropped: u64 },
775}
776
777/// Extract the `method` tag from a raw request value without deserializing the whole
778/// message. The daemon's dispatcher uses this: match on the method string, then deserialize
779/// `params` per-method — which tolerates omitted / null / `{}` params for parameterless
780/// methods (adjacent tagging rejects `params:{}` on unit variants).
781pub fn method_of(v: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<&str> {
782 v.get("method").and_then(serde_json::Value::as_str)
783}
784
785/// How a service is answered. Mirrors the config `[services.*]` *kinds*;
786/// Config→BackendSpec is a hand-written match, not a serde passthrough.
787#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
788#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
789pub enum BackendSpec {
790 Run { cmd: Vec<String> },
791 Socket { path: String },
792}
793
794pub const API_NAME: &str = "mcpmesh-local/1";
795/// The protocol-compatibility version as `"MAJOR.MINOR"`, distinct from the crate/stack version.
796///
797/// - **MAJOR** matches the `/N` in [`API_NAME`] and changes only on a breaking wire change (the
798/// transport already rejects a mismatched `api`, so an equality check on that is redundant).
799/// - **MINOR** ([`API_MINOR`]) increments on EVERY surface change within a major — additive fields,
800/// new methods, or a strictness change like params validation — bumped in the same change that
801/// makes it. A client can guard with `api_minor >= N` for a feature it needs, or refuse a daemon
802/// older than a minor it requires. It never resets except on a MAJOR bump.
803pub const API_VERSION: &str = "1.5";
804/// The integer MINOR of [`API_VERSION`] — see there. Bumped from 0 to 1 when params validation
805/// became strict (#34); to 2 with the `set_nickname` verb + `StatusResult.self_nickname` (#37);
806/// to 3 when `allow`/grant strings became STABLE principals — `b64u:`/`eid:`/roster names,
807/// never nicknames (#38); to 4 with the `set_app_metadata` verb + `PresencePeer.meta` (#39);
808/// to 5 with `PeerReachability.meta` — pairing-mode app metadata on the probe pong (#40).
809pub const API_MINOR: u32 = 5;
810
811#[cfg(test)]
812mod tests {
813 use super::*;
814
815 #[test]
816 fn peer_reachability_serde_is_additive() {
817 let r = PeerReachability {
818 name: "bob".into(),
819 reachable: true,
820 rtt_ms: Some(42),
821 age_secs: Some(3),
822 meta: String::new(),
823 };
824 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
825 assert_eq!(v["name"], "bob");
826 assert_eq!(v["reachable"], true);
827 assert_eq!(v["rtt_ms"], 42);
828 assert_eq!(v["age_secs"], 3);
829 // Never-probed peer: optionals elided, not null.
830 let unknown = PeerReachability {
831 name: "carol".into(),
832 reachable: false,
833 rtt_ms: None,
834 age_secs: None,
835 meta: String::new(),
836 };
837 let uv = serde_json::to_value(&unknown).unwrap();
838 assert!(uv.get("rtt_ms").is_none() && uv.get("age_secs").is_none());
839 // An older StatusResult (no reachability field) still deserializes.
840 let old = serde_json::json!({"stack_version":"0.1.0","services":[],"peers":[]});
841 let s: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
842 assert!(s.reachability.is_empty());
843 }
844
845 #[test]
846 fn subscribe_method_tag_resolves() {
847 let req = serde_json::to_value(Request::Subscribe).unwrap();
848 assert_eq!(method_of(&req), Some("subscribe"));
849 }
850
851 // --- #34: params structs reject unknown fields (the `{service: "kb"}` silent-accept bug) ---
852
853 #[test]
854 fn invite_params_reject_singular_service_typo() {
855 // The reported bug: `{"service":"kb"}` (singular) used to deserialize to
856 // InviteParams { services: [] } and mint a grants-nothing invite that looked
857 // successful. With deny_unknown_fields the typo is a loud parse error instead.
858 let err = serde_json::from_value::<InviteParams>(serde_json::json!({"service": "kb"}));
859 assert!(
860 err.is_err(),
861 "an unknown `service` key must be rejected, not silently ignored"
862 );
863 // The correct plural shape still parses.
864 let ok: InviteParams =
865 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"services": ["kb"]})).unwrap();
866 assert_eq!(ok.services, vec!["kb".to_string()]);
867 }
868
869 #[test]
870 fn open_session_params_reject_unknown_field() {
871 let err = serde_json::from_value::<OpenSessionParams>(
872 serde_json::json!({"peer": "a", "service": "b", "nonsense": 1}),
873 );
874 assert!(err.is_err(), "unknown params keys must be rejected");
875 }
876
877 #[test]
878 fn set_app_metadata_request_carries_the_method_tag() {
879 let r = Request::SetAppMetadata(SetAppMetadataParams {
880 metadata: "v=1.2.3".into(),
881 });
882 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
883 assert_eq!(v["method"], "set_app_metadata");
884 assert_eq!(v["params"]["metadata"], "v=1.2.3");
885 assert_eq!(method_of(&v), Some("set_app_metadata"));
886 }
887
888 #[test]
889 fn set_app_metadata_params_reject_unknown_field() {
890 let err = serde_json::from_value::<SetAppMetadataParams>(
891 serde_json::json!({"metadata": "x", "nonsense": 1}),
892 );
893 assert!(err.is_err(), "unknown params keys must be rejected");
894 }
895
896 /// `PresencePeer.meta` is additive — an older payload (no meta) still deserializes, and an
897 /// empty meta does not serialize.
898 #[test]
899 fn peer_reachability_meta_is_additive() {
900 // An older payload (no meta) still deserializes; an empty meta does not serialize.
901 let old = serde_json::json!({"name": "bob", "reachable": true});
902 let r: PeerReachability = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
903 assert_eq!(r.meta, "");
904 assert!(serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap().get("meta").is_none());
905 // A set value round-trips.
906 let with = PeerReachability {
907 name: "bob".into(),
908 reachable: true,
909 rtt_ms: Some(12),
910 age_secs: Some(3),
911 meta: "v=1.2.3".into(),
912 };
913 let back: PeerReachability =
914 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::to_value(&with).unwrap()).unwrap();
915 assert_eq!(back.meta, "v=1.2.3");
916 }
917
918 #[test]
919 fn presence_peer_meta_is_additive() {
920 let old = serde_json::json!({
921 "user_id": "b64u:A", "device_label": "laptop", "role": "primary", "online": true
922 });
923 let p: PresencePeer = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
924 assert_eq!(p.meta, "");
925 assert!(serde_json::to_value(&p).unwrap().get("meta").is_none());
926 }
927
928 #[test]
929 fn set_nickname_request_carries_the_method_tag() {
930 let r = Request::SetNickname(SetNicknameParams {
931 nickname: "workbench".into(),
932 });
933 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
934 assert_eq!(v["method"], "set_nickname");
935 assert_eq!(v["params"]["nickname"], "workbench");
936 assert_eq!(method_of(&v), Some("set_nickname"));
937 }
938
939 #[test]
940 fn set_nickname_params_reject_unknown_field() {
941 let err = serde_json::from_value::<SetNicknameParams>(
942 serde_json::json!({"nickname": "x", "nonsense": 1}),
943 );
944 assert!(err.is_err(), "unknown params keys must be rejected");
945 }
946
947 /// An OLDER daemon's status payload (no `self_nickname`) must still deserialize —
948 /// the additive-only contract — and an empty name must not serialize at all.
949 #[test]
950 fn status_self_nickname_is_additive() {
951 let old = serde_json::json!({
952 "stack_version": "0.7.0", "services": [], "peers": []
953 });
954 let s: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
955 assert_eq!(s.self_nickname, "");
956 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
957 assert!(v.get("self_nickname").is_none(), "empty name is skipped");
958 }
959
960 #[test]
961 fn api_minor_is_present_and_monotonic_from_hello() {
962 // #34 part 2: a machine-comparable protocol-compat minor, distinct from the
963 // crate/stack version, additive on the Hello frame.
964 let h = Hello {
965 api: API_NAME.into(),
966 api_version: API_VERSION.into(),
967 api_minor: API_MINOR,
968 stack_version: "9.9.9".into(),
969 };
970 let v = serde_json::to_value(&h).unwrap();
971 assert_eq!(v["api_minor"], API_MINOR);
972 // An OLD Hello without api_minor still deserializes (additive contract).
973 let old = serde_json::json!({
974 "api": API_NAME, "api_version": "1.0", "stack_version": "0.4.0"
975 });
976 let back: Hello = serde_json::from_value(old).unwrap();
977 assert_eq!(back.api_minor, 0, "absent api_minor defaults to 0");
978 }
979
980 #[test]
981 fn hello_result_roundtrips() {
982 let h = Hello {
983 api: "mcpmesh-local/1".into(),
984 api_version: "1.0".into(),
985 api_minor: 0,
986 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
987 };
988 let v = serde_json::to_value(&h).unwrap();
989 assert_eq!(v["api"], "mcpmesh-local/1");
990 let back: Hello = serde_json::from_value(v).unwrap();
991 assert_eq!(back, h);
992 }
993
994 #[test]
995 fn request_tagged_by_method() {
996 let r = Request::Status;
997 assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap()["method"], "status");
998 let r = Request::OpenSession(OpenSessionParams {
999 peer: "alice".into(),
1000 service: "notes".into(),
1001 });
1002 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1003 assert_eq!(v["method"], "open_session");
1004 assert_eq!(v["params"]["peer"], "alice");
1005 }
1006
1007 #[test]
1008 fn parameterless_method_tolerates_params_forms() {
1009 // Omitted and null params deserialize straight into the unit variant.
1010 let omitted: Request =
1011 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"method": "status"})).unwrap();
1012 assert_eq!(omitted, Request::Status);
1013 let null: Request =
1014 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"method": "status", "params": null}))
1015 .unwrap();
1016 assert_eq!(null, Request::Status);
1017
1018 // Known limitation: adjacent tagging rejects `params:{}` for a unit variant, so
1019 // the server MUST dispatch on the method string rather than deserialize the whole
1020 // message into `Request`. This is the pattern the daemon's dispatcher uses.
1021 let empty = serde_json::json!({"method": "status", "params": {}});
1022 assert!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(empty.clone()).is_err());
1023 match method_of(&empty) {
1024 Some("status") => {} // dispatcher resolves Status via the method string
1025 other => panic!("method_of failed to resolve status: {other:?}"),
1026 }
1027 }
1028
1029 #[test]
1030 fn backend_spec_roundtrips() {
1031 let run = BackendSpec::Run {
1032 cmd: vec!["notes-mcp".into(), "--stdio".into()],
1033 };
1034 let v = serde_json::to_value(&run).unwrap();
1035 assert_eq!(v["run"]["cmd"][0], "notes-mcp");
1036 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BackendSpec>(v).unwrap(), run);
1037
1038 let sock = BackendSpec::Socket {
1039 path: "/run/notes.sock".into(),
1040 };
1041 let v = serde_json::to_value(&sock).unwrap();
1042 assert_eq!(v["socket"]["path"], "/run/notes.sock");
1043 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BackendSpec>(v).unwrap(), sock);
1044 }
1045
1046 #[test]
1047 fn register_service_wire_shape() {
1048 let r = Request::RegisterService(RegisterServiceParams {
1049 name: "notes".into(),
1050 backend: BackendSpec::Run {
1051 cmd: vec!["notes-mcp".into()],
1052 },
1053 allow: vec!["alice".into()],
1054 ephemeral: false,
1055 });
1056 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1057 assert_eq!(
1058 v,
1059 serde_json::json!({
1060 "method": "register_service",
1061 "params": {
1062 "name": "notes",
1063 "backend": {"run": {"cmd": ["notes-mcp"]}},
1064 "allow": ["alice"],
1065 }
1066 })
1067 );
1068 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1069 }
1070
1071 #[test]
1072 fn invite_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1073 // Request::Invite → `{ "method": "invite", "params": { "services": [...] } }`.
1074 let r = Request::Invite(InviteParams {
1075 services: vec!["notes".into(), "kb".into()],
1076 app_label: None,
1077 });
1078 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1079 assert_eq!(v["method"], "invite");
1080 assert_eq!(v["params"]["services"][0], "notes");
1081 assert_eq!(v["params"]["services"][1], "kb");
1082 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1083 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1084 assert_eq!(
1085 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "invite", "params": {"services": []}})),
1086 Some("invite")
1087 );
1088
1089 // InviteResult carries the copyable line + expiry (surface #2 pairing artifact).
1090 let res = InviteResult {
1091 invite_line: "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF".into(),
1092 expires_at_epoch: 1_800_000_000,
1093 };
1094 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1095 assert_eq!(v["invite_line"], "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF");
1096 assert_eq!(v["expires_at_epoch"], 1_800_000_000u64);
1097 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<InviteResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1098 }
1099
1100 #[test]
1101 fn pair_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1102 // Request::Pair → `{ "method": "pair", "params": { "invite_line": "..." } }`.
1103 let r = Request::Pair(PairParams {
1104 invite_line: "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF".into(),
1105 });
1106 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1107 assert_eq!(v["method"], "pair");
1108 assert_eq!(v["params"]["invite_line"], "mcpmesh-invite:ABCDEF");
1109 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1110 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1111 assert_eq!(
1112 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "pair", "params": {"invite_line": "x"}})),
1113 Some("pair")
1114 );
1115
1116 // PairResult carries the inviter's suggested nickname + the display-only SAS words +
1117 // the granted services (the porcelain renders each as `<peer>/<service>`).
1118 let res = PairResult {
1119 peer_nickname: "alice".into(),
1120 sas_code: "tango-fig-cabbage".into(),
1121 services: vec!["notes".into(), "kb".into()],
1122 app_label: None,
1123 peer_user_id: None,
1124 };
1125 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1126 assert_eq!(v["peer_nickname"], "alice");
1127 assert_eq!(v["sas_code"], "tango-fig-cabbage");
1128 assert_eq!(v["services"][0], "notes");
1129 assert_eq!(v["services"][1], "kb");
1130 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<PairResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1131
1132 // Additive-only: a PairResult minted by an older daemon (no `services` key) still
1133 // deserializes — the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with an empty list.
1134 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({
1135 "peer_nickname": "alice",
1136 "sas_code": "tango-fig-cabbage",
1137 });
1138 let back: PairResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1139 assert_eq!(back.peer_nickname, "alice");
1140 assert!(back.services.is_empty());
1141 }
1142
1143 #[test]
1144 fn roster_install_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1145 // Request::RosterInstall → `{ "method": "roster_install", "params": { "path": ...,
1146 // "org_root_pk": ... } }`. The optional pk is present on the first-install shape.
1147 let r = Request::RosterInstall(RosterInstallParams {
1148 path: "/tmp/roster.json".into(),
1149 org_root_pk: Some("b64u:AAAA".into()),
1150 });
1151 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1152 assert_eq!(v["method"], "roster_install");
1153 assert_eq!(v["params"]["path"], "/tmp/roster.json");
1154 assert_eq!(v["params"]["org_root_pk"], "b64u:AAAA");
1155 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1156 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1157 assert_eq!(
1158 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "roster_install", "params": {"path": "/x"}})),
1159 Some("roster_install")
1160 );
1161
1162 // When the pk is omitted (a subsequent install using the pinned value), it is
1163 // `skip_serializing_if`-dropped from the wire and deserializes back to `None`.
1164 let omit = Request::RosterInstall(RosterInstallParams {
1165 path: "/tmp/roster.json".into(),
1166 org_root_pk: None,
1167 });
1168 let v = serde_json::to_value(&omit).unwrap();
1169 assert!(
1170 v["params"].get("org_root_pk").is_none(),
1171 "an omitted org_root_pk must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1172 );
1173 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), omit);
1174
1175 // RosterInstallResult carries org_id + serial + severed count (roster-status vocabulary).
1176 let res = RosterInstallResult {
1177 org_id: "acme".into(),
1178 serial: 42,
1179 severed: 1,
1180 };
1181 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1182 assert_eq!(v["org_id"], "acme");
1183 assert_eq!(v["serial"], 42u64);
1184 assert_eq!(v["severed"], 1u32);
1185 assert_eq!(
1186 serde_json::from_value::<RosterInstallResult>(v).unwrap(),
1187 res
1188 );
1189
1190 // Additive-only: a result minted by an older daemon (no `severed` key) still
1191 // deserializes — the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with 0.
1192 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({ "org_id": "acme", "serial": 7 });
1193 let back: RosterInstallResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1194 assert_eq!(back.serial, 7);
1195 assert_eq!(back.severed, 0);
1196 }
1197
1198 #[test]
1199 fn org_join_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1200 // Request::OrgJoin → `{ "method": "org_join", "params": { org_id, org_root_pk, user_id,
1201 // user_key } }`. `user_key` is a LOCAL path string (the key never crosses the API).
1202 let r = Request::OrgJoin(OrgJoinParams {
1203 org_id: "acme".into(),
1204 org_root_pk: "b64u:AAAA".into(),
1205 user_id: "alice".into(),
1206 user_key: "/home/alice/.config/mcpmesh/user.key".into(),
1207 });
1208 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1209 assert_eq!(v["method"], "org_join");
1210 assert_eq!(v["params"]["org_id"], "acme");
1211 assert_eq!(v["params"]["org_root_pk"], "b64u:AAAA");
1212 assert_eq!(v["params"]["user_id"], "alice");
1213 assert_eq!(
1214 v["params"]["user_key"],
1215 "/home/alice/.config/mcpmesh/user.key"
1216 );
1217 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1218 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1219 assert_eq!(
1220 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "org_join", "params": {"org_id": "x"}})),
1221 Some("org_join")
1222 );
1223
1224 // OrgJoinResult echoes the pinned org id (surface-clean; the fingerprint is porcelain-side).
1225 let res = OrgJoinResult {
1226 org_id: "acme".into(),
1227 };
1228 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1229 assert_eq!(v["org_id"], "acme");
1230 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<OrgJoinResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1231 }
1232
1233 #[test]
1234 fn set_roster_url_request_roundtrip() {
1235 // Request::SetRosterUrl → `{ "method": "set_roster_url", "params": { "url": "..." } }`.
1236 let r = Request::SetRosterUrl(SetRosterUrlParams {
1237 url: "https://intranet.acme.com/roster.json".into(),
1238 });
1239 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1240 assert_eq!(v["method"], "set_roster_url");
1241 assert_eq!(v["params"]["url"], "https://intranet.acme.com/roster.json");
1242 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1243 assert_eq!(
1244 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "set_roster_url", "params": {"url": "x"}})),
1245 Some("set_roster_url")
1246 );
1247 }
1248
1249 #[test]
1250 fn peer_remove_request_roundtrip() {
1251 // Request::PeerRemove → `{ "method": "peer_remove", "params": { "nickname": "..." } }`.
1252 let r = Request::PeerRemove(PeerRemoveParams {
1253 nickname: "bob".into(),
1254 });
1255 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1256 assert_eq!(v["method"], "peer_remove");
1257 assert_eq!(v["params"]["nickname"], "bob");
1258 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1259 // method_of resolves the tag generically (no per-variant arm).
1260 assert_eq!(
1261 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "peer_remove", "params": {"nickname": "bob"}})),
1262 Some("peer_remove")
1263 );
1264 }
1265
1266 /// The reserved/internal `peer_add` rides the SAME typed vocabulary as every other method —
1267 /// `{ "method": "peer_add", "params": { nickname, endpoint_id, allow } }` — with `allow`
1268 /// defaulting to empty when absent.
1269 #[test]
1270 fn peer_add_request_roundtrip() {
1271 let r = Request::PeerAdd(PeerAddParams {
1272 nickname: "bob".into(),
1273 endpoint_id: "96246d3f".into(),
1274 allow: vec!["notes".into()],
1275 });
1276 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1277 assert_eq!(v["method"], "peer_add");
1278 assert_eq!(v["params"]["nickname"], "bob");
1279 assert_eq!(v["params"]["endpoint_id"], "96246d3f");
1280 assert_eq!(v["params"]["allow"][0], "notes");
1281 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1282 // An absent allow list deserializes to empty (the server-side tolerance).
1283 let p: PeerAddParams =
1284 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::json!({"nickname": "bob", "endpoint_id": "x"}))
1285 .unwrap();
1286 assert!(p.allow.is_empty());
1287 }
1288
1289 #[test]
1290 fn peer_rename_request_roundtrip() {
1291 // By user_id (renames all of a person's devices in one op).
1292 let r = Request::PeerRename(PeerRenameParams {
1293 user_id: Some("b64u:BOB".into()),
1294 nickname: None,
1295 to: "Bobby".into(),
1296 });
1297 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1298 assert_eq!(v["method"], "peer_rename");
1299 assert_eq!(v["params"]["user_id"], "b64u:BOB");
1300 assert_eq!(v["params"]["to"], "Bobby");
1301 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1302 // A provisional contact is renamed by nickname; omitted user_id defaults to None.
1303 assert_eq!(
1304 method_of(
1305 &serde_json::json!({"method": "peer_rename", "params": {"nickname": "carol", "to": "Carol"}})
1306 ),
1307 Some("peer_rename")
1308 );
1309 }
1310
1311 #[test]
1312 fn status_result_roundtrips() {
1313 // Pure-pairing daemon: `roster` is None — absent from the wire (skip_serializing_if) and an
1314 // older payload with no `roster` key still deserializes to None (serde default).
1315 let s = StatusResult {
1316 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
1317 services: vec![ServiceInfo {
1318 name: "notes".into(),
1319 allow: vec!["alice".into()],
1320 allow_display: vec![],
1321 backend: BackendKind::Run,
1322 ephemeral: false,
1323 }],
1324 peers: vec![PeerInfo {
1325 name: "alice".into(),
1326 services: vec!["notes".into()],
1327 // A paired peer that proved a self-sovereign user_id at pairing (surface-clean id).
1328 user_id: Some("b64u:alicepk".into()),
1329 }],
1330 roster: None,
1331 presence: vec![],
1332 self_user_id: Some("b64u:selfpk".into()),
1333 recent_pairings: vec![],
1334 reachability: vec![],
1335 self_nickname: String::new(),
1336 };
1337 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
1338 assert_eq!(v["services"][0]["backend"], "run");
1339 // The additive identity fields ride the wire when present.
1340 assert_eq!(v["peers"][0]["user_id"], "b64u:alicepk");
1341 assert_eq!(v["self_user_id"], "b64u:selfpk");
1342 assert!(
1343 v.get("roster").is_none(),
1344 "an absent roster must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1345 );
1346 assert!(
1347 v.get("presence").is_none(),
1348 "an empty presence must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1349 );
1350 assert!(
1351 v.get("recent_pairings").is_none(),
1352 "an empty recent_pairings must not appear on the wire: {v}"
1353 );
1354 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StatusResult>(v).unwrap(), s);
1355
1356 // A payload minted by an older daemon (no `roster`/`presence`/identity keys) still
1357 // deserializes — the identity fields default to None / a nickname-only peer.
1358 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({
1359 "stack_version": "0.1.0",
1360 "services": [],
1361 "peers": [{ "name": "bob", "services": [] }],
1362 });
1363 let back: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1364 assert!(back.roster.is_none());
1365 assert!(back.presence.is_empty());
1366 assert!(back.self_user_id.is_none());
1367 assert!(back.peers[0].user_id.is_none());
1368 assert!(back.recent_pairings.is_empty());
1369
1370 // Roster daemon: a Some(RosterStatus) + an advisory presence list round-trip. `presence`
1371 // carries FLAT vocabulary only (user_id/device_label/role/online) — no EndpointId/key.
1372 let s = StatusResult {
1373 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
1374 services: vec![],
1375 peers: vec![],
1376 roster: Some(RosterStatus {
1377 org_id: "acme".into(),
1378 serial: 42,
1379 state: "approved".into(),
1380 org_root_fingerprint: "tango-fig-cabbage-anchor".into(),
1381 }),
1382 presence: vec![
1383 PresencePeer {
1384 user_id: "alice".into(),
1385 device_label: "laptop".into(),
1386 role: "primary".into(),
1387 online: true,
1388 meta: String::new(),
1389 },
1390 PresencePeer {
1391 user_id: "alice".into(),
1392 device_label: "desktop".into(),
1393 role: "mirror".into(),
1394 online: false,
1395 meta: String::new(),
1396 },
1397 ],
1398 self_user_id: None,
1399 recent_pairings: vec![],
1400 reachability: vec![],
1401 self_nickname: String::new(),
1402 };
1403 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
1404 assert_eq!(v["roster"]["org_id"], "acme");
1405 assert_eq!(v["roster"]["serial"], 42u64);
1406 assert_eq!(v["roster"]["state"], "approved");
1407 assert_eq!(
1408 v["roster"]["org_root_fingerprint"],
1409 "tango-fig-cabbage-anchor"
1410 );
1411 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["user_id"], "alice");
1412 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["device_label"], "laptop");
1413 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["role"], "primary");
1414 assert_eq!(v["presence"][0]["online"], true);
1415 assert_eq!(v["presence"][1]["online"], false);
1416 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StatusResult>(v).unwrap(), s);
1417 }
1418
1419 /// The `recent_pairings` status field is ADDITIVE: a populated list round-trips with
1420 /// the flat `{peer_nickname, sas_code, paired_at_epoch}` shape (nickname + SAS words + epoch —
1421 /// never an EndpointId), an empty list is dropped from the wire, and a payload minted by an
1422 /// older daemon (no key at all) still deserializes to empty.
1423 #[test]
1424 fn recent_pairings_are_additive_on_status() {
1425 let s = StatusResult {
1426 stack_version: "0.1.0".into(),
1427 services: vec![],
1428 peers: vec![],
1429 roster: None,
1430 presence: vec![],
1431 self_user_id: None,
1432 recent_pairings: vec![RecentPairing {
1433 peer_nickname: "bob".into(),
1434 sas_code: "tango-fig-cabbage".into(),
1435 paired_at_epoch: 1_800_000_000,
1436 }],
1437 reachability: vec![],
1438 self_nickname: String::new(),
1439 };
1440 let v = serde_json::to_value(&s).unwrap();
1441 assert_eq!(v["recent_pairings"][0]["peer_nickname"], "bob");
1442 assert_eq!(v["recent_pairings"][0]["sas_code"], "tango-fig-cabbage");
1443 assert_eq!(v["recent_pairings"][0]["paired_at_epoch"], 1_800_000_000u64);
1444 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StatusResult>(v).unwrap(), s);
1445
1446 // A payload minted by an OLDER daemon (no `recent_pairings` key) still deserializes —
1447 // the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with an empty list.
1448 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({
1449 "stack_version": "0.1.0",
1450 "services": [],
1451 "peers": [],
1452 });
1453 let back: StatusResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1454 assert!(back.recent_pairings.is_empty());
1455 }
1456
1457 #[test]
1458 fn blob_requests_and_results_roundtrip() {
1459 // BlobPublish → { method, params: { scope, path } }.
1460 let r = Request::BlobPublish(BlobPublishParams {
1461 scope: "docs".into(),
1462 path: "/tmp/a.bin".into(),
1463 });
1464 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1465 assert_eq!(v["method"], "blob_publish");
1466 assert_eq!(v["params"]["scope"], "docs");
1467 assert_eq!(v["params"]["path"], "/tmp/a.bin");
1468 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1469
1470 // BlobGrant → { method, params: { scope, principal } }.
1471 let r = Request::BlobGrant(BlobGrantParams {
1472 scope: "docs".into(),
1473 principal: "alice".into(),
1474 });
1475 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1476 assert_eq!(v["method"], "blob_grant");
1477 assert_eq!(v["params"]["principal"], "alice");
1478 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1479
1480 // BlobList is parameterless (method_of resolves it).
1481 assert_eq!(
1482 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "blob_list"})),
1483 Some("blob_list")
1484 );
1485
1486 // BlobFetch → { method, params: { ticket, dest_path } }.
1487 let r = Request::BlobFetch(BlobFetchParams {
1488 ticket: "blobAAA".into(),
1489 dest_path: "/tmp/out.bin".into(),
1490 });
1491 let v = serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap();
1492 assert_eq!(v["method"], "blob_fetch");
1493 assert_eq!(v["params"]["ticket"], "blobAAA");
1494 assert_eq!(v["params"]["dest_path"], "/tmp/out.bin");
1495 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<Request>(v).unwrap(), r);
1496
1497 // BlobPublishResult carries the ticket + hash (blob-reference vocabulary).
1498 let res = BlobPublishResult {
1499 ticket: "blobAAA".into(),
1500 hash: "ab".repeat(32),
1501 };
1502 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1503 assert_eq!(v["ticket"], "blobAAA");
1504 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BlobPublishResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1505
1506 // BlobScopeList carries flat (name, hashes, grants) — no EndpointId/key leakage.
1507 let res = BlobScopeList {
1508 scopes: vec![ScopeInfo {
1509 name: "docs".into(),
1510 hashes: vec!["ab".repeat(32)],
1511 grants: vec!["alice".into()],
1512 }],
1513 };
1514 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1515 assert_eq!(v["scopes"][0]["name"], "docs");
1516 assert_eq!(v["scopes"][0]["grants"][0], "alice");
1517 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BlobScopeList>(v).unwrap(), res);
1518
1519 // BlobFetchResult carries the verified hash + byte length.
1520 let res = BlobFetchResult {
1521 hash: "ab".repeat(32),
1522 bytes_len: 4194304,
1523 };
1524 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1525 assert_eq!(v["bytes_len"], 4194304u64);
1526 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<BlobFetchResult>(v).unwrap(), res);
1527 }
1528
1529 /// The three `subscribe` frame shapes round-trip with the documented `type`-tagged wire form
1530 /// (docs/local-protocol.md "Live event stream"): `snapshot` carries the flat session/reachability
1531 /// lists, `event` delegates through the `Box` so the record's fields sit VERBATIM under
1532 /// `record` (one schema with the JSONL log), and `lagged` carries the dropped count.
1533 #[test]
1534 fn stream_frames_roundtrip_with_the_documented_tags() {
1535 let snap = StreamFrame::Snapshot {
1536 active_sessions: vec![ActiveSession {
1537 peer: "bob".into(),
1538 service: "notes".into(),
1539 opened_at: 1_751_760_000,
1540 }],
1541 reachability: vec![PeerReachability {
1542 name: "bob".into(),
1543 reachable: true,
1544 rtt_ms: Some(42),
1545 age_secs: Some(3),
1546 meta: String::new(),
1547 }],
1548 };
1549 let v = serde_json::to_value(&snap).unwrap();
1550 assert_eq!(v["type"], "snapshot");
1551 assert_eq!(v["active_sessions"][0]["peer"], "bob");
1552 assert_eq!(v["active_sessions"][0]["opened_at"], 1_751_760_000i64);
1553 assert_eq!(v["reachability"][0]["name"], "bob");
1554 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(v).unwrap(), snap);
1555
1556 let event = StreamFrame::Event {
1557 record: Box::new(AuditRecord::session_open(
1558 "2026-07-03T14:02:11.480Z".into(),
1559 Some("bob".into()),
1560 "notes".into(),
1561 )),
1562 };
1563 let v = serde_json::to_value(&event).unwrap();
1564 assert_eq!(v["type"], "event");
1565 // The record's fields ride verbatim under `record` — no Box indirection on the wire.
1566 assert_eq!(v["record"]["kind"], "session_open");
1567 assert_eq!(v["record"]["peer"], "bob");
1568 assert_eq!(v["record"]["service"], "notes");
1569 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(v).unwrap(), event);
1570
1571 let lagged = StreamFrame::Lagged { dropped: 12 };
1572 let v = serde_json::to_value(&lagged).unwrap();
1573 assert_eq!(v, serde_json::json!({ "type": "lagged", "dropped": 12 }));
1574 assert_eq!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(v).unwrap(), lagged);
1575 }
1576
1577 /// A frame minted by a NEWER daemon (an unknown `type`) fails to deserialize rather than
1578 /// mis-parsing — the typed stream surface is closed; a forward-compatible consumer reads the
1579 /// raw `Value` stream instead (`ControlClient::open_stream`).
1580 #[test]
1581 fn unknown_stream_frame_type_is_rejected() {
1582 let future = serde_json::json!({ "type": "future_kind", "x": 1 });
1583 assert!(serde_json::from_value::<StreamFrame>(future).is_err());
1584 }
1585
1586 #[test]
1587 fn audit_summary_request_and_result_roundtrip() {
1588 // Request::AuditSummary is parameterless → `{ "method": "audit_summary" }`. Like Status, it
1589 // tolerates omitted/null params; the server dispatches on the method string (method_of).
1590 let r = Request::AuditSummary;
1591 assert_eq!(serde_json::to_value(&r).unwrap()["method"], "audit_summary");
1592 assert_eq!(
1593 method_of(&serde_json::json!({"method": "audit_summary"})),
1594 Some("audit_summary")
1595 );
1596
1597 // AuditSummaryResult carries LOCAL per-peer / per-service session counts (nicknames + service
1598 // names only — never endpoints/transport terms) + a total. Tuples mirror kb's
1599 // InsightResponse.per_peer_contribution: `["bob", 2]` on the wire.
1600 let res = AuditSummaryResult {
1601 per_peer: vec![("alice".into(), 1), ("bob".into(), 2)],
1602 per_service: vec![("kb".into(), 1), ("notes".into(), 3)],
1603 total_sessions: 4,
1604 };
1605 let v = serde_json::to_value(&res).unwrap();
1606 assert_eq!(v["per_peer"][1][0], "bob");
1607 assert_eq!(v["per_peer"][1][1], 2u64);
1608 assert_eq!(v["per_service"][1][0], "notes");
1609 assert_eq!(v["total_sessions"], 4u64);
1610 assert_eq!(
1611 serde_json::from_value::<AuditSummaryResult>(v).unwrap(),
1612 res
1613 );
1614
1615 // Additive-only: a result minted by an older daemon (no `total_sessions` key) still
1616 // deserializes — the `#[serde(default)]` fills it with 0.
1617 let old_shape = serde_json::json!({ "per_peer": [], "per_service": [] });
1618 let back: AuditSummaryResult = serde_json::from_value(old_shape).unwrap();
1619 assert_eq!(back.total_sessions, 0);
1620 assert!(back.per_peer.is_empty());
1621 }
1622}