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lfsx_server/storage/
s3.rs

1pub(crate) mod collect;
2pub(crate) mod keyspace;
3pub(crate) mod multipart;
4pub(crate) mod probe;
5pub(crate) mod refs;
6pub(crate) mod sizes;
7pub(crate) mod usage;
8
9use std::time::Duration;
10
11use axum::body::Bytes;
12use futures_util::Stream;
13
14use base64::Engine;
15
16use crate::error::Error;
17use crate::namespace::Namespace;
18use crate::oid::Oid;
19use crate::storage::Reclaimed;
20
21pub(crate) use keyspace::S3Keys;
22pub use keyspace::{Keyspace, Presigned};
23
24// Enough to hide the round trips a bucket charges for without becoming a burst
25// the store answers with 503, and the same figure the batch endpoint settled on
26// for the same reason.
27const SIZES_AT_ONCE: usize = 16;
28
29pub struct S3Config {
30    pub endpoint: String,
31    pub bucket: String,
32    pub region: String,
33    pub access_key: String,
34    pub secret_key: String,
35    pub path_style: bool,
36    // How long a signature is good for. It is the same number the batch
37    // response advertises as `expires_in`, because a client told it has half an
38    // hour and handed a URL that dies in five minutes will fail a resume it had
39    // every reason to expect to work.
40    pub lifetime: Duration,
41}
42
43// The same layout as the local store, for the same reasons. The bytes live once
44// under a key derived from their digest, and a repository that holds them owns
45// an empty marker beside it, the object store's answer to a hard link. It is
46// what keeps two projects sharing an asset pack from paying twice, and what
47// stops a repository reading an object it never pushed: the marker is the proof
48// of possession, and it is the only thing the permission check consults.
49//
50// Everything below is object semantics. What it takes to talk to the store at
51// all (signing, retrying, listing, the client) is the keyspace underneath.
52#[derive(Clone)]
53pub struct S3Store {
54    keys: Keyspace,
55    redirect: bool,
56}
57
58impl S3Store {
59    pub fn new(keys: Keyspace, redirect: bool) -> Self {
60        Self { keys, redirect }
61    }
62
63    fn content_key(oid: &Oid) -> String {
64        let (first, second) = oid.fanout();
65        format!(".content/{first}/{second}/{oid}")
66    }
67
68    // Where a client uploads to when the bytes never pass through this server.
69    // Per repository on purpose: the shared content key would take bytes from
70    // anyone allowed to write, and then nothing distinguishes a repository that
71    // uploaded an object from one that merely knew its digest. A key only this
72    // repository was handed a signature for is the proof of possession that the
73    // marker stands for everywhere else.
74    fn incoming_key(ns: &Namespace, oid: &Oid) -> String {
75        let (first, second) = oid.fanout();
76        format!(
77            ".incoming/{}/{}/{first}/{second}/{oid}",
78            ns.org(),
79            ns.repo()
80        )
81    }
82
83    fn marker_key(ns: &Namespace, oid: &Oid) -> String {
84        let (first, second) = oid.fanout();
85        format!("{}/{}/{first}/{second}/{oid}", ns.org(), ns.repo())
86    }
87
88    fn own_prefix(ns: &Namespace) -> String {
89        format!("{}/{}/", ns.org(), ns.repo())
90    }
91
92    pub async fn reachable(&self) -> Result<(), Error> {
93        self.keys.reachable().await
94    }
95
96    pub async fn exists(&self, ns: &Namespace, oid: &Oid) -> bool {
97        self.keys.head(&Self::marker_key(ns, oid)).await.is_ok()
98    }
99
100    pub async fn size_of(&self, oid: &Oid) -> Result<u64, Error> {
101        self.keys.head(&Self::content_key(oid)).await
102    }
103
104    // A download is streamed through this server rather than redirected, so the
105    // features that live in the byte path (the counters, the ranges, and the
106    // compression that will follow) keep working. The pre-signed redirect is a
107    // separate mode for operators who would rather spend the object store's
108    // bandwidth than their own.
109    pub async fn read(
110        &self,
111        oid: &Oid,
112        start: u64,
113        length: u64,
114    ) -> Result<impl Stream<Item = Result<Bytes, reqwest::Error>> + use<>, Error> {
115        self.keys
116            .get_range(&Self::content_key(oid), start, length)
117            .await
118    }
119
120    // A URL the client fetches from the bucket directly, so the bytes never
121    // cross this server. Whether the caller is entitled to them has already been
122    // settled by the marker before this is called: the signature is scoped to
123    // one content key and expires, and it grants nothing the batch response was
124    // not about to grant anyway.
125    pub fn presigned_download(&self, oid: &Oid) -> Option<String> {
126        if !self.redirect {
127            return None;
128        }
129
130        self.keys.signed_download(&Self::content_key(oid))
131    }
132
133    // A URL the client PUTs the object to, and the headers it has to send with
134    // it. The digest is bound into the signature, so the store refuses anything
135    // that does not hash to the object it was signed for: a client with this URL
136    // cannot put arbitrary bytes anywhere, which is what makes handing one out
137    // safe at all.
138    //
139    // None above the single-request ceiling, and that is not a refusal: the
140    // object falls back to coming through this server, which sends it in parts.
141    // A client cannot do the same, because the `basic` transfer adapter every
142    // git-lfs speaks does one PUT to one href and has nowhere to put a second.
143    // So the ceiling multipart removes for the streamed path is real and
144    // permanent for this one, and the only question is whether the client learns
145    // it now or after uploading five gigabytes.
146    //
147    // It also keeps `adopt` honest: `CopyObject` stops at the same 5 GiB, and
148    // nothing can reach `.incoming/` above it while this holds.
149    pub fn presigned_upload(&self, ns: &Namespace, oid: &Oid, size: u64) -> Option<Presigned> {
150        if !self.redirect || size > multipart::SINGLE_PUT_CEILING {
151            return None;
152        }
153
154        let digest =
155            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(hex::decode(oid.as_str()).ok()?);
156
157        self.keys
158            .signed_upload(&Self::incoming_key(ns, oid), &digest)
159    }
160
161    // How big the object a client uploaded actually is, which is the first thing
162    // this server learns about it: nothing measured the bytes on the way past.
163    pub async fn uploaded_size(&self, ns: &Namespace, oid: &Oid) -> Result<u64, Error> {
164        self.keys.head(&Self::incoming_key(ns, oid)).await
165    }
166
167    // Take an upload that landed under this repository's own key into the shared
168    // keyspace. The bytes are already known to hash to the oid, because the store
169    // refused everything else.
170    pub async fn adopt(&self, ns: &Namespace, oid: &Oid, size: u64) -> Result<(), Error> {
171        let incoming = Self::incoming_key(ns, oid);
172        let content = Self::content_key(oid);
173
174        // First, before anything here so much as looks at the content.
175        //
176        // The marker is the claim and the ref is the index of it, so a crash
177        // between the two has to leave a ref nobody claims rather than a claim
178        // nothing indexes: the first leaks an object, the second lets a later
179        // sweep free bytes this repository holds.
180        //
181        // Writing it up here rather than beside the marker costs nothing and buys
182        // the race below. A sweep asks the index one last time before deleting
183        // bytes, so a claim recorded before this repository even checked whether
184        // the content exists is a claim that sweep will see.
185        refs::write(&self.keys, ns, oid).await?;
186
187        // Already there means another repository pushed the same object, and the
188        // bytes are identical by construction.
189        if self.keys.head(&content).await.is_err() {
190            self.keys.copy(&incoming, &content).await?;
191        }
192
193        self.keys
194            .put(&Self::marker_key(ns, oid), Vec::new())
195            .await?;
196
197        sizes::write(&self.keys, ns, oid, size).await?;
198
199        // Leaving it would pay for the object twice. A failure here is not worth
200        // failing the push over: the object is adopted, and what is left is a key
201        // the operator can see.
202        if let Err(error) = self.keys.delete(&incoming).await {
203            tracing::warn!(%error, key = incoming, "an adopted upload could not be cleaned up");
204        }
205
206        Ok(())
207    }
208
209    // The upload has already been streamed to a staging file, hashed and checked
210    // against everything the server enforces, so that file is what goes up,
211    // streamed from disk rather than read into memory, because an object here is
212    // measured in gigabytes and the whole storage layer is built on holding at
213    // most a few megabytes of one at a time.
214    //
215    // The bytes go up once, keyed by their digest, and the marker records that
216    // this repository holds them. Content that is already there is skipped: the
217    // key would receive the same bytes it already has.
218    pub async fn store(
219        &self,
220        ns: &Namespace,
221        oid: &Oid,
222        staged: &std::path::Path,
223    ) -> Result<(), Error> {
224        // Before the content is even looked at, for the reason `adopt` gives:
225        // this is what a sweep re-reads before deleting bytes, so a claim
226        // recorded here cannot be missed by one that is already deciding.
227        refs::write(&self.keys, ns, oid).await?;
228
229        // Read here rather than inside the branch below, because the size index
230        // wants it whether or not these bytes are the ones that go up: an object
231        // another repository pushed first is still this repository's to account
232        // for.
233        let length = tokio::fs::metadata(staged).await?.len();
234
235        if self.keys.head(&Self::content_key(oid)).await.is_err() {
236            self.keys.put_file(&Self::content_key(oid), staged).await?;
237        }
238
239        self.keys
240            .put(&Self::marker_key(ns, oid), Vec::new())
241            .await?;
242
243        sizes::write(&self.keys, ns, oid, length).await
244    }
245
246    // What an interrupted upload leaves behind. A client can negotiate, PUT the
247    // object, and never report it: the bytes sit under its own upload key and
248    // nothing else will ever look at them. The local path has had a reclaimer for
249    // this since the beginning, and a bucket had none, so the cost was unbounded
250    // over time and invisible.
251    pub async fn reclaim_incoming(&self, older_than: Duration) -> Result<Reclaimed, Error> {
252        let mut reclaimed = Reclaimed::default();
253
254        // `.probe/` too. A startup probe draws a key nothing else uses so that no
255        // run can read another's leftovers, which means a run that dies before
256        // cleaning up leaves one behind rather than overwriting it. They are
257        // empty or nearly so, and this is already the sweep for writes nobody
258        // will ever come back for.
259        for prefix in [".incoming/", ".probe/"] {
260            for entry in self.keys.entries(prefix).await? {
261                // A slow client on a bad connection is not an abandoned one.
262                if entry.age().is_none_or(|age| age < older_than) {
263                    continue;
264                }
265
266                if self.keys.delete(&entry.key).await.is_ok() {
267                    reclaimed.files += 1;
268                    reclaimed.bytes += entry.size;
269                }
270            }
271        }
272
273        Ok(reclaimed)
274    }
275}
276
277#[cfg(test)]
278pub(crate) mod tests;