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leviath_cli/lint/
mod.rs

1//! Blueprint lint: the checks [`Blueprint::validate`] deliberately does not make.
2//!
3//! `Blueprint::validate` answers "is this manifest structurally coherent" - the
4//! layout fits, the graph resolves, fan-out wiring points at real stages. It
5//! says nothing about the fields whose *absence* quietly changes what a run
6//! does, and those are what actually bite:
7//!
8//! - a stage with no `[stages.<name>.model]` table parses fine, because the
9//!   parser substitutes a default, and then runs on whatever the user's default
10//!   provider happens to be
11//! - an agent-level `[model]` block is never read at all, so the author's model
12//!   choice is discarded silently
13//! - a typo in `available_tools` matches nothing, and the stage just advertises
14//!   one tool fewer - the model is told the tool does not exist
15//! - an autonomous stage granting `ask_user_text` parks in `WaitingInput` the
16//!   first time it asks, with nobody there to answer
17//!
18//! Each of those is invisible on inspection and shows up hours later as a stuck
19//! run. This module names them at author time instead.
20//!
21//! Questions about what the author *declared* ("is there a `mode` key?") are
22//! answered from the manifest text, not from the parsed [`Blueprint`]: by then
23//! the parser has already filled in its defaults, and asking the struct cannot
24//! tell "wrote `autonomous`" apart from "wrote nothing".
25//!
26//! [`Blueprint::validate`]: leviath_core::Blueprint::validate
27
28use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
29use std::path::Path;
30
31use leviath_core::Blueprint;
32use leviath_core::blueprint::StageMode;
33use leviath_runtime::dynamic_interaction::BLOCKING_INTERACTION_TOOLS;
34use leviath_tools::canonical_tool_name;
35use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
36
37/// How much a finding matters. Only [`LintSeverity::Error`] fails
38/// `lev validate`; warnings are printed and the command still exits zero
39/// (unless `--deny-warnings` is passed); notes never fail anything.
40///
41/// Declared worst-first so sorting by it groups the report.
42#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Serialize, Deserialize)]
43#[serde(rename_all = "lowercase")]
44pub enum LintSeverity {
45    /// The manifest says something that cannot be what the author meant - a
46    /// tool name matching nothing, a permission for a tool the stage never
47    /// granted.
48    Error,
49    /// The manifest leaves a decision to a default the author may not know
50    /// about.
51    Warning,
52    /// Nothing is wrong; the blueprint is doing something worth knowing before
53    /// you run it, like reaching outside its workdir or running a shell command
54    /// at spawn. A note must never fail a build, so `--deny-warnings` skips it.
55    Note,
56}
57
58impl LintSeverity {
59    /// Fixed-width label for the report, so the messages line up.
60    pub fn label(self) -> &'static str {
61        match self {
62            Self::Error => "ERR ",
63            Self::Warning => "WARN",
64            Self::Note => "NOTE",
65        }
66    }
67}
68
69/// One thing worth telling the author about.
70///
71/// Serialize only: `code` is a `&'static str` pointing at a literal in this
72/// file, which no deserializer can produce.
73#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
74pub struct LintFinding {
75    /// How much this matters, and therefore whether it fails the check.
76    pub severity: LintSeverity,
77    /// Stable slug (`"unknown-tool"`), so a finding can be referenced in an
78    /// issue or grepped for in daemon logs without quoting prose.
79    pub code: &'static str,
80    /// The stage it belongs to, when it belongs to one.
81    pub stage: Option<String>,
82    /// What is wrong.
83    pub message: String,
84    /// What to do about it. Rendered on its own indented line.
85    pub fix: Option<String>,
86}
87
88impl LintFinding {
89    fn new(severity: LintSeverity, code: &'static str, message: String) -> Self {
90        Self {
91            severity,
92            code,
93            stage: None,
94            message,
95            fix: None,
96        }
97    }
98
99    fn in_stage(mut self, stage: &str) -> Self {
100        self.stage = Some(stage.to_string());
101        self
102    }
103
104    fn with_fix(mut self, fix: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
105        self.fix = Some(fix.into());
106        self
107    }
108
109    /// Whether this finding should fail the command.
110    pub fn is_error(&self) -> bool {
111        self.severity == LintSeverity::Error
112    }
113
114    /// One-line rendering for a log record: `stage 'x': message`.
115    pub fn one_line(&self) -> String {
116        match &self.stage {
117            Some(stage) => format!("stage '{stage}': {}", self.message),
118            None => self.message.clone(),
119        }
120    }
121}
122
123/// Facts about the machine the blueprint will run on, which the manifest alone
124/// cannot supply.
125///
126/// Every field is "unknown" when empty/`None`, and an unknown field skips its
127/// check entirely rather than guessing. A linter that cannot see the installed
128/// MCP servers must not claim their tools do not exist.
129#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone)]
130pub struct LintEnv {
131    /// Every tool name a manifest may legally write: canonical built-ins, their
132    /// aliases, the sub-agent tools, this agent's own `tools/*.rhai`, and any
133    /// MCP tools already resolved. Empty skips the unknown-tool check.
134    pub known_tools: HashSet<String>,
135
136    /// `(provider, model)` rows for providers whose catalog is closed enough to
137    /// check against. A provider with no row here is not checked at all, which
138    /// is what keeps open catalogs (Ollama, OpenRouter, script providers) from
139    /// producing noise.
140    pub known_models: Vec<(String, String)>,
141
142    /// The providers the blueprint names that this install can actually reach,
143    /// as answered by `ProviderRegistry::has`. `None` means nobody asked, so
144    /// the check is skipped. Resolution lives with the caller because script
145    /// providers are loaded on demand and cannot be enumerated up front.
146    pub available_providers: Option<HashSet<String>>,
147
148    /// Which of the blueprint's `[read_paths]` this install's config grants.
149    /// `None` means nobody asked (the daemon's offline lint), in which case the
150    /// check only says that a declaration needs granting. `Some(Err(..))` is a
151    /// grant list of the user's own that will not compile.
152    pub read_paths: Option<Result<crate::read_path_report::GrantReport, String>>,
153
154    /// Whether this install's config honours the blueprint's own
155    /// `[safe_commands]`. `None` means nobody asked (the daemon's offline
156    /// lint), in which case the check only says the declaration needs granting.
157    ///
158    /// A bool rather than a report: unlike read paths, where *which* entries are
159    /// granted is the interesting part, a safe-commands block is honoured whole
160    /// or not at all.
161    pub safe_commands_granted: Option<bool>,
162}
163
164impl LintEnv {
165    /// Everything that can be known without touching the user's config: the
166    /// built-in tools (aliases included), the sub-agent tools, the script tools
167    /// in `agent_dir/tools` and the global tools directory, and the model
168    /// catalogs this build ships.
169    ///
170    /// This is what the daemon lints against at spawn. It deliberately leaves
171    /// `available_providers` unset: the daemon already fails a spawn outright
172    /// when no listed provider is registered, so re-deriving that here would
173    /// cost a registry build per agent to say something the spawn will say
174    /// louder a moment later.
175    pub fn offline(agent_dir: &Path) -> Self {
176        // The four discovery rules live in `tool_inventory` rather than here,
177        // because `GET /api/tools` has to answer the same question and two
178        // copies of "where does a tool come from" would not have stayed equal.
179        // The lint wants only the names; the endpoint wants the sources too.
180        let known_tools =
181            crate::tool_inventory::ToolInventory::discover(Some(agent_dir), None).names();
182
183        Self {
184            known_tools,
185            known_models: crate::commands::models::closed_catalog_models(),
186            available_providers: None,
187            read_paths: None,
188            safe_commands_granted: None,
189        }
190    }
191
192    /// Add the answer to "can this install reach the providers the blueprint
193    /// names", asked of the same registry the runtime resolves stages against
194    /// so a script provider counts exactly when it would really load.
195    pub fn with_providers(mut self, blueprint: &Blueprint, config: &crate::config::Config) -> Self {
196        let registry = crate::commands::run::build_provider_registry_from_config(config);
197        self.available_providers = Some(
198            blueprint
199                .stages
200                .iter()
201                .flat_map(|s| s.model.models.iter())
202                .map(|e| e.provider.clone())
203                .filter(|p| registry.as_ref().is_ok_and(|r| r.has(p)))
204                .collect(),
205        );
206        self
207    }
208
209    /// Add the answer to "does this install's config grant what the blueprint
210    /// declares under `[read_paths]`", per entry.
211    ///
212    /// Separate from [`Self::with_providers`] because it needs a workdir:
213    /// relative entries resolve against the one a run would use, which for a
214    /// command run outside a run is the directory it was invoked from.
215    pub fn with_read_paths(
216        mut self,
217        blueprint: &Blueprint,
218        config: &crate::config::Config,
219        workdir: &Path,
220    ) -> Self {
221        self.read_paths = crate::read_path_report::build(blueprint, config, workdir);
222        // Asked here rather than in its own builder: both answers come from the
223        // same config, and a caller that has one always has the other.
224        self.safe_commands_granted = Some(
225            config.security.allow_blueprint_safe_commands
226                || config
227                    .agent_safe_commands
228                    .get(&blueprint.name)
229                    .is_some_and(|a| a.allow_blueprint),
230        );
231        self
232    }
233}
234
235/// Lint `blueprint`, which was parsed from `content`.
236///
237/// The two arguments describe the same manifest: `blueprint` for what the
238/// engine will do with it, `content` for what the author actually wrote.
239pub fn lint_manifest(content: &str, blueprint: &Blueprint, env: &LintEnv) -> Vec<LintFinding> {
240    let declared = Declared::from_text(content);
241    let mut findings = Vec::new();
242
243    if declared.agent_model_block {
244        findings.push(
245            LintFinding::new(
246                LintSeverity::Warning,
247                "agent-model-block-ignored",
248                "the top-level [model] block is not read by anything: model \
249                 selection is per stage"
250                    .to_string(),
251            )
252            .with_fix("move it into each [stages.<name>.model] that needs it"),
253        );
254    }
255
256    findings.extend(lint_dropped_seeds(&declared, blueprint));
257    findings.extend(lint_command_seeds(blueprint));
258    findings.extend(lint_read_paths(blueprint, env));
259    findings.extend(lint_safe_commands(blueprint, env));
260    findings.extend(lint_held_checkpoints(blueprint));
261    findings.extend(lint_graph(blueprint));
262    findings.extend(lint_output_reachable(blueprint));
263    findings.extend(lint_dead_end_possible(blueprint));
264    findings.extend(lint_compacted_deliverables(blueprint));
265
266    let agent_permissions = blueprint.agent_tool_permissions();
267
268    for stage in &blueprint.stages {
269        let keys = declared.stage(&stage.name);
270        findings.extend(lint_declarations(stage, keys));
271        findings.extend(lint_tools(stage, env));
272        findings.extend(lint_blocking_tools(stage));
273        findings.extend(lint_tool_policies(stage, &agent_permissions));
274        findings.extend(lint_models(stage, env));
275        findings.extend(lint_output_stage(stage));
276    }
277
278    // Worst first, stable within a severity so the order a check ran in is the
279    // order its findings read in.
280    findings.sort_by_key(|f| f.severity);
281    findings
282}
283
284/// A region wrote a `seed` the parser could not read, so it has none.
285///
286/// `parse_region_seed` returns `None` for a seed table with no recognized key
287/// and for a seed that is neither a string nor a table, and the region then
288/// simply starts empty. That is deliberate - an unknown key is not worth
289/// rejecting a whole manifest over - but it is invisible, and a one-character
290/// typo (`caller_input` for `caller`) reads exactly like a working blueprint
291/// until an agent answers a question it was never given. This is the check that
292/// says so.
293fn lint_dropped_seeds(declared: &Declared, blueprint: &Blueprint) -> Vec<LintFinding> {
294    declared
295        .seeded_regions
296        .iter()
297        .filter(|name| {
298            blueprint
299                .context_layout
300                .get_region(name)
301                .is_some_and(|r| r.seed.is_none())
302        })
303        .map(|name| {
304            LintFinding::new(
305                LintSeverity::Warning,
306                "region-seed-not-understood",
307                format!(
308                    "region '{name}' declares a seed that isn't one of the \
309                     recognized forms, so it is ignored and the region starts empty"
310                ),
311            )
312            .with_fix(
313                "use a string (the caller input key), or one of \
314                 { caller = }, { literal = }, { files = }, { glob = }, \
315                 { rhai = }, { command = }",
316            )
317        })
318        .collect()
319}
320
321// ─── Declared keys ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
322
323/// Which optional keys the manifest text actually writes, per stage, plus the
324/// one agent-level block that is silently discarded.
325#[derive(Debug, Default)]
326struct Declared {
327    /// A top-level `[model]` table exists. Nothing reads it.
328    agent_model_block: bool,
329    /// Regions whose text writes a `seed` key, whatever its shape. Compared
330    /// against the parsed seed to catch the ones the parser threw away.
331    seeded_regions: Vec<String>,
332    /// Per stage name, the keys that stage wrote.
333    stages: HashMap<String, StageKeys>,
334    /// The manifest text could not be re-read. Every key is then reported as
335    /// declared, so an unreadable manifest produces no declaration warnings
336    /// rather than a full set of false ones.
337    opaque: bool,
338}
339
340#[derive(Debug, Default, Clone, Copy)]
341struct StageKeys {
342    mode: bool,
343    model: bool,
344}
345
346impl Declared {
347    fn from_text(content: &str) -> Self {
348        // `toml::from_str` and not `str::parse`: the latter deserializes a bare
349        // TOML *value*, not a document, and rejects every real manifest.
350        let Ok(root) = toml::from_str::<toml::Table>(content) else {
351            return Self {
352                opaque: true,
353                ..Self::default()
354            };
355        };
356        let agent_model_block = root.get("model").is_some_and(toml::Value::is_table);
357        // Both region spellings - inline `name = { seed = ... }` under
358        // `[context.regions]` and a `[context.regions.name]` section - land here
359        // as the same nested table, so one path covers both.
360        let seeded_regions = root
361            .get("context")
362            .and_then(toml::Value::as_table)
363            .and_then(|c| c.get("regions"))
364            .and_then(toml::Value::as_table)
365            .map(|regions| {
366                regions
367                    .iter()
368                    .filter(|(_, body)| body.get("seed").is_some())
369                    .map(|(name, _)| name.clone())
370                    .collect()
371            })
372            .unwrap_or_default();
373        let stages = root
374            .get("stages")
375            .and_then(toml::Value::as_table)
376            .map(|t| {
377                t.iter()
378                    .map(|(name, body)| {
379                        (
380                            name.clone(),
381                            StageKeys {
382                                mode: body.get("mode").is_some(),
383                                model: body.get("model").is_some(),
384                            },
385                        )
386                    })
387                    .collect()
388            })
389            .unwrap_or_default();
390        Self {
391            agent_model_block,
392            seeded_regions,
393            stages,
394            opaque: false,
395        }
396    }
397
398    /// What `stage` declared. An unreadable manifest, or a stage the text has
399    /// no entry for, reports everything as declared so nothing is warned about.
400    fn stage(&self, stage: &str) -> StageKeys {
401        if self.opaque {
402            return StageKeys {
403                mode: true,
404                model: true,
405            };
406        }
407        self.stages.get(stage).copied().unwrap_or(StageKeys {
408            mode: true,
409            model: true,
410        })
411    }
412}
413
414// ─── Checks ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
415
416// The checks themselves, one module per question they answer. Imported rather
417// than re-exported: `lint_manifest` is the only caller and the only entry point
418// anyone outside this module needs, so the individual checks stay internal.
419mod checks;
420use checks::*;
421mod security;
422use security::*;
423
424#[cfg(test)]
425mod tests;