kinship_proto/

packet.rs

//! The outer packet: header, AEAD envelope and size limits.
//!
//! Encrypted layout (all integers big-endian):
//!
//! ```text
//!  0..2   magic "kn"
//!  2      version
//!  3      flags: bit 0 encrypted, bit 1 stream frame, rest reserved (zero)
//!  4..8   key_id, first 4 bytes of BLAKE3(key)
//!  8..32  nonce, 24 bytes from the caller: kinship-core puts its cluster time first
//!  32..n  ciphertext of the inner payload
//!  n..+16 Poly1305 tag
//! ```
//!
//! The AEAD associated data is the 32 header bytes followed by the cluster label. Plaintext
//! mode, for tests only, replaces `key_id` and `nonce` with the first 8 bytes of
//! BLAKE3(label), giving a 12-byte header and no tag.

use chacha20poly1305::{AeadInOut, KeyInit, XChaCha20Poly1305};
use ctutils::CtEq;
use zeroize::{Zeroize, Zeroizing};

use crate::error::{ConfigError, DecodeError, EncodeError, KeyError, KeyringError};
use crate::limits::Limits;
use crate::message::{Message, Payload, put_payload};
use crate::wire::{Count, Sink};

/// Wire format version spoken by this build.
pub const WIRE_VERSION: u8 = 1;

/// First two bytes of every packet: "kn".
pub const MAGIC: [u8; 2] = *b"kn";

/// Longest cluster label in bytes. The label is part of the AEAD associated data, which is
/// assembled on the stack.
pub const MAX_LABEL_LEN: usize = 255;

/// Header size of an encrypted packet.
pub const ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN: usize = 32;
/// Header size of a plaintext packet.
pub const PLAINTEXT_HEADER_LEN: usize = 12;
/// Size of the Poly1305 tag.
pub const TAG_LEN: usize = 16;
/// Size of the XChaCha20 nonce.
pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = 24;
/// Per-packet cost of encryption: header plus tag.
pub const ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD: usize = ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN + TAG_LEN;

const FLAG_ENCRYPTED: u8 = 0b01;
const FLAG_STREAM: u8 = 0b10;
const FLAGS_RESERVED: u8 = !(FLAG_ENCRYPTED | FLAG_STREAM);

/// Whether a packet travels as a UDP datagram or inside a TCP stream frame.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum PacketKind {
    Datagram,
    Stream,
}

/// A 32-byte XChaCha20-Poly1305 key. Zeroized on drop and never printed.
///
/// The bytes live on the heap, so moving a key, or growing a list of keys, moves a pointer and
/// leaves no copy of the bytes behind. Keys compare in constant time.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct Key(Box<[u8; 32]>);

impl PartialEq for Key {
    /// Looks at every byte whatever it finds, so the time taken does not tell where two keys
    /// differ.
    fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
        self.0.ct_eq(&*other.0).to_bool()
    }
}

impl Eq for Key {}

impl Key {
    pub const LEN: usize = 32;

    /// A key holding `bytes`. Copies the caller still holds are the caller's to zeroize.
    pub fn from_bytes(mut bytes: [u8; 32]) -> Self {
        let key = Self(Box::new(bytes));
        bytes.zeroize();
        key
    }

    /// Returns `None` unless `bytes` is exactly 32 bytes long.
    pub fn from_slice(bytes: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
        if bytes.len() != Self::LEN {
            return None;
        }
        let mut key = Self(Box::new([0; 32]));
        key.0.copy_from_slice(bytes);
        Some(key)
    }

    /// A key written as standard base64, with or without `=` padding, as `kinship keygen`
    /// prints it. Surrounding whitespace is ignored.
    pub fn from_base64(text: &str) -> Result<Self, KeyError> {
        let text = text.trim();
        let digits = text.trim_end_matches('=');
        if text.len() - digits.len() > 2 {
            return Err(KeyError::NotBase64);
        }
        // Decoded in place, and zeroized on drop if it is not a key after all.
        let mut key = Self(Box::new([0; 32]));
        let mut len = 0;
        let mut acc = 0u32;
        let mut bits = 0;
        let mut result = Ok(());
        for c in digits.bytes() {
            let v = match c {
                b'A'..=b'Z' => c - b'A',
                b'a'..=b'z' => c - b'a' + 26,
                b'0'..=b'9' => c - b'0' + 52,
                b'+' => 62,
                b'/' => 63,
                _ => {
                    result = Err(KeyError::NotBase64);
                    break;
                }
            };
            acc = (acc << 6) | u32::from(v);
            bits += 6;
            if bits >= 8 {
                bits -= 8;
                if len == Self::LEN {
                    result = Err(KeyError::WrongLength);
                    break;
                }
                key.0[len] = (acc >> bits) as u8;
                len += 1;
                acc &= (1 << bits) - 1;
            }
        }
        // Leftover bits must be the zero padding of the last group.
        if result.is_ok() && (bits >= 6 || acc != 0) {
            result = Err(KeyError::NotBase64);
        }
        if result.is_ok() && len != Self::LEN {
            result = Err(KeyError::WrongLength);
        }
        acc.zeroize();
        result.map(|()| key)
    }

    /// The key as padded standard base64, the form [`from_base64`](Self::from_base64) reads and
    /// `kinship keygen` prints. The text is the secret itself: never log it. It is zeroized when
    /// dropped, and written into its final allocation, so no copy is left behind.
    pub fn to_base64(&self) -> Zeroizing<String> {
        const DIGITS: &[u8; 64] =
            b"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/";
        let mut out = Zeroizing::new(String::with_capacity(44));
        for chunk in self.0.chunks(3) {
            let b = [
                chunk[0],
                *chunk.get(1).unwrap_or(&0),
                *chunk.get(2).unwrap_or(&0),
            ];
            let mut group = u32::from_be_bytes([0, b[0], b[1], b[2]]);
            for i in 0..4 {
                if i <= chunk.len() {
                    out.push(DIGITS[(group >> 18) as usize & 63] as char);
                } else {
                    out.push('=');
                }
                group <<= 6;
            }
            group.zeroize();
        }
        out
    }

    /// First 4 bytes of BLAKE3(key), big-endian. Sent in the clear to pick the right key.
    pub fn id(&self) -> u32 {
        let hash = blake3::hash(&self.0[..]);
        let b = hash.as_bytes();
        u32::from_be_bytes([b[0], b[1], b[2], b[3]])
    }

    /// [`id`](Self::id) as a [`KeyId`], which prints as 8 hex characters.
    pub fn key_id(&self) -> KeyId {
        KeyId(self.id())
    }
}

/// The public id of a [`Key`]: safe to log, and printed as 8 hex characters.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Hash)]
pub struct KeyId(u32);

impl KeyId {
    pub const fn from_raw(raw: u32) -> Self {
        Self(raw)
    }

    pub const fn to_raw(self) -> u32 {
        self.0
    }
}

impl core::fmt::Display for KeyId {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
        write!(f, "{:08x}", self.0)
    }
}

impl core::fmt::Debug for KeyId {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
        write!(f, "KeyId({:08x})", self.0)
    }
}

impl Drop for Key {
    fn drop(&mut self) {
        self.0.zeroize();
    }
}

impl core::fmt::Debug for Key {
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut core::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> core::fmt::Result {
        write!(f, "Key({:08x})", self.id())
    }
}

enum Security {
    Plaintext,
    Encrypted(Keys),
}

/// The context BLAKE3 derives the dummy key in; see [`Keys::dummy`].
const DUMMY_KEY_CONTEXT: &str = "kinship 2026-10-08 key for packets with an unknown key id";

/// The installed keys, with what is worked out from them once whenever they change rather than
/// for every packet.
struct Keys {
    /// The first seals; every key opens.
    keys: Vec<Key>,
    /// The id of each key in `keys`.
    ids: Vec<u32>,
    /// Checks the tag of a packet whose key id no installed key has, so that refusing it costs
    /// the one tag verification that a packet with an installed key's id and a bad tag costs.
    /// Derived from the sealing key, so only a holder of that key could seal a packet it opens.
    dummy: Key,
}

impl Keys {
    /// `keys` must not be empty.
    fn new(keys: Vec<Key>) -> Self {
        let (ids, dummy) = Self::derive(&keys);
        Self { keys, ids, dummy }
    }

    /// Works out the ids and the dummy key again; call after every change to `keys`.
    fn changed(&mut self) {
        (self.ids, self.dummy) = Self::derive(&self.keys);
    }

    /// The ids of `keys`, and the dummy key derived from the first of them.
    fn derive(keys: &[Key]) -> (Vec<u32>, Key) {
        let ids = keys.iter().map(Key::id).collect();
        let mut dummy = blake3::derive_key(DUMMY_KEY_CONTEXT, &keys[0].0[..]);
        let key = Key::from_bytes(dummy);
        dummy.zeroize();
        (ids, key)
    }
}

/// Encodes and decodes packets for one cluster.
///
/// The codec owns the cluster label, the size limits and the keys. It performs no I/O, reads no
/// clock and draws no randomness: the caller supplies the nonce for each sealed packet.
pub struct Codec {
    label: Vec<u8>,
    label_hash: [u8; 8],
    limits: Limits,
    security: Security,
}

impl Codec {
    /// A codec that encrypts with `keys[0]` and accepts any key in `keys`.
    pub fn encrypted(label: &[u8], limits: Limits, keys: Vec<Key>) -> Result<Self, ConfigError> {
        if keys.is_empty() {
            return Err(ConfigError::NoKeys);
        }
        Self::new(label, limits, Security::Encrypted(Keys::new(keys)))
    }

    /// A codec that sends and accepts unauthenticated, unencrypted packets. This is the
    /// `insecure_plaintext` mode and exists for tests, the simulator and loopback use.
    pub fn insecure_plaintext(label: &[u8], limits: Limits) -> Result<Self, ConfigError> {
        Self::new(label, limits, Security::Plaintext)
    }

    fn new(label: &[u8], limits: Limits, security: Security) -> Result<Self, ConfigError> {
        if label.len() > MAX_LABEL_LEN {
            return Err(ConfigError::LabelTooLong);
        }
        let hash = blake3::hash(label);
        let mut label_hash = [0u8; 8];
        label_hash.copy_from_slice(&hash.as_bytes()[..8]);
        let codec = Self {
            label: label.to_vec(),
            label_hash,
            limits,
            security,
        };
        // The smallest packet holds a count, one message type and one length byte.
        let floor = codec.overhead() + 3;
        if limits.udp_max_payload < floor || limits.max_stream_frame < floor {
            return Err(ConfigError::LimitTooSmall);
        }
        Ok(codec)
    }

    /// Replaces the installed keys; `keys[0]` becomes the sealing key.
    pub fn set_keys(&mut self, keys: Vec<Key>) -> Result<(), ConfigError> {
        if keys.is_empty() {
            return Err(ConfigError::NoKeys);
        }
        self.security = Security::Encrypted(Keys::new(keys));
        Ok(())
    }

    pub fn is_encrypted(&self) -> bool {
        matches!(self.security, Security::Encrypted(_))
    }

    pub fn limits(&self) -> &Limits {
        &self.limits
    }

    /// Ids of the installed keys, sealing key first. Empty in plaintext mode.
    pub fn key_ids(&self) -> Vec<KeyId> {
        match &self.security {
            Security::Plaintext => Vec::new(),
            Security::Encrypted(keys) => keys.ids.iter().map(|&id| KeyId(id)).collect(),
        }
    }

    /// What the first [`HeaderCheck::LEN`] bytes of a packet must hold for this codec, with
    /// the keys installed now.
    pub fn header_check(&self) -> HeaderCheck {
        let mut label = [0; 4];
        label.copy_from_slice(&self.label_hash[..4]);
        HeaderCheck {
            key_ids: match &self.security {
                Security::Plaintext => None,
                Security::Encrypted(keys) => Some(keys.ids.clone()),
            },
            label,
        }
    }

    /// Adds `key` to the keys that open packets, after the existing ones. Does nothing if it is
    /// already installed.
    pub fn install_key(&mut self, key: Key) -> Result<(), KeyringError> {
        let keys = self.keys_mut()?;
        if !keys.keys.contains(&key) {
            keys.keys.push(key);
            keys.changed();
        }
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Makes the installed `key` the one that seals; the others keep their order and still open.
    pub fn use_key(&mut self, key: &Key) -> Result<(), KeyringError> {
        let keys = self.keys_mut()?;
        let at = keys
            .keys
            .iter()
            .position(|k| k == key)
            .ok_or(KeyringError::NotInstalled)?;
        keys.keys[..=at].rotate_right(1);
        keys.changed();
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Drops `key`. Refuses the only key and the sealing key; a key that is not installed is
    /// already gone, so that succeeds.
    pub fn remove_key(&mut self, key: &Key) -> Result<(), KeyringError> {
        let keys = self.keys_mut()?;
        match keys.keys.iter().position(|k| k == key) {
            None => Ok(()),
            Some(_) if keys.keys.len() == 1 => Err(KeyringError::LastKey),
            Some(0) => Err(KeyringError::InUse),
            Some(at) => {
                keys.keys.remove(at);
                keys.changed();
                Ok(())
            }
        }
    }

    fn keys_mut(&mut self) -> Result<&mut Keys, KeyringError> {
        match &mut self.security {
            Security::Plaintext => Err(KeyringError::Plaintext),
            Security::Encrypted(keys) => Ok(keys),
        }
    }

    /// Bytes a packet adds around its inner payload.
    pub fn overhead(&self) -> usize {
        match self.security {
            Security::Plaintext => PLAINTEXT_HEADER_LEN,
            Security::Encrypted(_) => ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD,
        }
    }

    /// Most inner-payload bytes (count included) that fit one packet of this kind.
    pub fn max_payload_len(&self, kind: PacketKind) -> usize {
        self.limit(kind) - self.overhead()
    }

    fn limit(&self, kind: PacketKind) -> usize {
        match kind {
            PacketKind::Datagram => self.limits.udp_max_payload,
            PacketKind::Stream => self.limits.max_stream_frame,
        }
    }

    /// Seals `msgs` into one packet appended to `out`.
    ///
    /// `nonce` must be 24 fresh random bytes for every call; it is ignored in plaintext mode.
    /// On error `out` is left as it was. For [`PacketKind::Stream`] the result has no length
    /// prefix; see [`seal_stream_frame`](Self::seal_stream_frame).
    pub fn seal(
        &self,
        kind: PacketKind,
        msgs: &[Message<'_>],
        nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
        out: &mut Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<(), EncodeError> {
        if msgs.is_empty() {
            return Err(EncodeError::Empty);
        }
        for m in msgs {
            m.validate(&self.limits)?;
        }
        let mut payload = Count::default();
        put_payload(&mut payload, msgs);
        self.seal_with(kind, nonce, payload.0, out, |out| put_payload(out, msgs))
    }

    /// Like [`seal`](Self::seal) for a TCP stream: prefixes the packet with its `u32`
    /// big-endian length.
    pub fn seal_stream_frame(
        &self,
        msgs: &[Message<'_>],
        nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
        out: &mut Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<(), EncodeError> {
        let start = out.len();
        out.put(&[0; 4]);
        if let Err(e) = self.seal(PacketKind::Stream, msgs, nonce, out) {
            out.truncate(start);
            return Err(e);
        }
        let len = (out.len() - start - 4) as u32;
        out[start..start + 4].copy_from_slice(&len.to_be_bytes());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Seals arbitrary bytes as the inner payload, without checking that they parse. For tests
    /// and fuzzing of the receive path only.
    #[doc(hidden)]
    pub fn seal_raw(
        &self,
        kind: PacketKind,
        inner: &[u8],
        nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
        out: &mut Vec<u8>,
    ) -> Result<(), EncodeError> {
        self.seal_with(kind, nonce, inner.len(), out, |out| out.put(inner))
    }

    fn seal_with(
        &self,
        kind: PacketKind,
        nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
        payload_len: usize,
        out: &mut Vec<u8>,
        write_payload: impl FnOnce(&mut Vec<u8>),
    ) -> Result<(), EncodeError> {
        if payload_len > self.max_payload_len(kind) {
            return Err(EncodeError::TooLarge);
        }
        let start = out.len();
        let mut flags = if kind == PacketKind::Stream {
            FLAG_STREAM
        } else {
            0
        };
        out.put(&MAGIC);
        out.put_u8(WIRE_VERSION);
        match &self.security {
            Security::Plaintext => {
                out.put_u8(flags);
                out.put(&self.label_hash);
                write_payload(out);
            }
            Security::Encrypted(keys) => {
                let key = &keys.keys[0];
                flags |= FLAG_ENCRYPTED;
                out.put_u8(flags);
                out.put(&keys.ids[0].to_be_bytes());
                out.put(nonce);
                write_payload(out);
                let aad = Aad::new(&out[start..start + ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN], &self.label);
                let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new((&*key.0).into());
                let body = &mut out[start + ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN..];
                let tag = cipher
                    .encrypt_inout_detached(nonce.into(), aad.as_slice(), (&mut *body).into())
                    // The only failure is a body past the cipher's 256 GiB limit.
                    .map_err(|_| EncodeError::TooLarge);
                match tag {
                    Ok(tag) => out.put(tag.as_slice()),
                    Err(e) => {
                        out.truncate(start);
                        return Err(e);
                    }
                }
            }
        }
        debug_assert_eq!(out.len() - start, payload_len + self.overhead());
        Ok(())
    }

    /// Authenticates, decrypts in place and parses one packet.
    ///
    /// The size limit, magic, version, flags, packet kind and key id are all checked before any
    /// cryptography runs, so unauthenticated traffic costs one tag verification per installed
    /// key with the packet's key id, or, when no key has it, one with a dummy key, so that the
    /// time taken does not tell which ids are installed. The returned payload borrows the decrypted bytes of `buf`; on success the
    /// ciphertext has been overwritten with plaintext, on failure `buf` is unchanged.
    pub fn open<'a>(
        &self,
        kind: PacketKind,
        buf: &'a mut [u8],
    ) -> Result<Payload<'a>, DecodeError> {
        if buf.len() > self.limit(kind) {
            return Err(DecodeError::TooLarge);
        }
        let encrypted = check_start(kind, buf)?;
        let range = match (&self.security, encrypted) {
            (Security::Plaintext, false) => {
                let hash = buf
                    .get(4..PLAINTEXT_HEADER_LEN)
                    .ok_or(DecodeError::Truncated)?;
                if hash != self.label_hash {
                    return Err(DecodeError::WrongCluster);
                }
                PLAINTEXT_HEADER_LEN..buf.len()
            }
            (Security::Encrypted(keys), true) => {
                if buf.len() < ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD {
                    return Err(DecodeError::Truncated);
                }
                let key_id = u32::from_be_bytes([buf[4], buf[5], buf[6], buf[7]]);
                let nonce: [u8; NONCE_LEN] = buf[8..ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN]
                    .try_into()
                    .map_err(|_| DecodeError::Truncated)?;
                let aad = Aad::new(&buf[..ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN], &self.label);
                let tag_at = buf.len() - TAG_LEN;
                let tag: [u8; TAG_LEN] = buf[tag_at..]
                    .try_into()
                    .map_err(|_| DecodeError::Truncated)?;
                let body = &mut buf[ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN..tag_at];
                let mut matched = false;
                let mut opened = false;
                let installed = keys.keys.iter().zip(&keys.ids);
                for (key, _) in installed.filter(|&(_, &id)| id == key_id) {
                    matched = true;
                    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new((&*key.0).into());
                    if cipher
                        .decrypt_inout_detached(
                            (&nonce).into(),
                            aad.as_slice(),
                            (&mut *body).into(),
                            (&tag).into(),
                        )
                        .is_ok()
                    {
                        opened = true;
                        break;
                    }
                }
                if !matched {
                    // One tag verification all the same, so that refusing a packet whose key
                    // id no key has takes as long as refusing one with an installed key's id and
                    // a bad tag, and the time does not tell which ids are installed. Should the
                    // tag pass, which only a holder of the sealing key could arrange, the packet
                    // is refused anyway.
                    let cipher = XChaCha20Poly1305::new((&*keys.dummy.0).into());
                    let _ = cipher.decrypt_inout_detached(
                        (&nonce).into(),
                        aad.as_slice(),
                        (&mut *body).into(),
                        (&tag).into(),
                    );
                    return Err(DecodeError::UnknownKey(key_id));
                }
                if !opened {
                    return Err(DecodeError::AuthFailed);
                }
                ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN..tag_at
            }
            _ => return Err(DecodeError::EncryptionMismatch),
        };
        Payload::parse(&buf[range], &self.limits)
    }
}

/// Checks the magic, version and flags that start every packet, and that the packet is of
/// `kind`. Returns whether it is encrypted.
fn check_start(kind: PacketKind, buf: &[u8]) -> Result<bool, DecodeError> {
    let [m0, m1, version, flags, ..] = *buf else {
        return Err(DecodeError::Truncated);
    };
    if [m0, m1] != MAGIC {
        return Err(DecodeError::BadMagic);
    }
    if version == 0 || version > WIRE_VERSION {
        return Err(DecodeError::UnsupportedVersion(version));
    }
    if flags & FLAGS_RESERVED != 0 {
        return Err(DecodeError::ReservedFlags);
    }
    if (flags & FLAG_STREAM != 0) != (kind == PacketKind::Stream) {
        return Err(DecodeError::WrongPacketKind);
    }
    Ok(flags & FLAG_ENCRYPTED != 0)
}

/// What the first [`LEN`](Self::LEN) bytes of a packet must hold for one [`Codec`]: magic,
/// version, flags, and an installed key's id, or in plaintext mode the start of the cluster
/// label's hash. These are the checks [`Codec::open`] makes before any cryptography that need
/// nothing past the key id.
///
/// A driver uses it to drop a TCP connection that does not start like a frame for this node
/// before the rest of the frame arrives. It is a copy: take a new one from
/// [`Codec::header_check`] whenever the keys change. Like the header itself, passing it proves
/// nothing about the sender: key ids are sent in the clear.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct HeaderCheck {
    /// Ids of the installed keys; `None` in plaintext mode.
    key_ids: Option<Vec<u32>>,
    /// The first bytes of BLAKE3(label), which a plaintext header carries after its flags.
    label: [u8; 4],
}

impl HeaderCheck {
    /// Bytes checked: magic, version, flags and key id.
    pub const LEN: usize = 8;

    /// Checks the first [`LEN`](Self::LEN) bytes of a packet of `kind`. Fewer bytes fail as
    /// [`DecodeError::Truncated`]; bytes past them are ignored.
    pub fn check(&self, kind: PacketKind, head: &[u8]) -> Result<(), DecodeError> {
        let head = head.get(..Self::LEN).ok_or(DecodeError::Truncated)?;
        let encrypted = check_start(kind, head)?;
        let id = [head[4], head[5], head[6], head[7]];
        match &self.key_ids {
            None if encrypted => Err(DecodeError::EncryptionMismatch),
            None if id != self.label => Err(DecodeError::WrongCluster),
            Some(_) if !encrypted => Err(DecodeError::EncryptionMismatch),
            Some(ids) if !ids.contains(&u32::from_be_bytes(id)) => {
                Err(DecodeError::UnknownKey(u32::from_be_bytes(id)))
            }
            _ => Ok(()),
        }
    }
}

/// The nonce in the header of a sealed packet, read without authenticating anything.
///
/// `None` unless `buf` starts like an encrypted packet of either kind and is long enough to
/// hold a header and a tag. The receiver may use it to drop a packet cheaply before opening it,
/// but nothing read here is authentic until [`Codec::open`] succeeds.
pub fn sealed_nonce(buf: &[u8]) -> Option<[u8; NONCE_LEN]> {
    if buf.len() < ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD || buf[..2] != MAGIC || buf[3] & FLAG_ENCRYPTED == 0 {
        return None;
    }
    buf[8..ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN].try_into().ok()
}

/// The AEAD associated data: header bytes then label, on the stack.
struct Aad {
    buf: [u8; ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN + MAX_LABEL_LEN],
    len: usize,
}

impl Aad {
    fn new(header: &[u8], label: &[u8]) -> Self {
        let mut buf = [0u8; ENCRYPTED_HEADER_LEN + MAX_LABEL_LEN];
        let len = header.len() + label.len();
        buf[..header.len()].copy_from_slice(header);
        buf[header.len()..len].copy_from_slice(label);
        Self { buf, len }
    }

    fn as_slice(&self) -> &[u8] {
        &self.buf[..self.len]
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn key(n: u8) -> Key {
        Key::from_bytes([n; 32])
    }

    fn keys(c: &Codec) -> &Keys {
        match &c.security {
            Security::Encrypted(keys) => keys,
            Security::Plaintext => unreachable!("an encrypting codec"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn keys_are_equal_only_when_every_byte_is() {
        let a = key(7);
        assert!(a == key(7));
        for at in [0, 1, 16, 31] {
            let mut bytes = [7; 32];
            bytes[at] ^= 0x80;
            assert!(a != Key::from_bytes(bytes), "byte {at}");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn key_bytes_stay_where_they_are_when_keys_move() {
        let first = key(1);
        let at = first.0.as_ptr();
        let mut keys = vec![first];
        // Growing the list moves its keys more than once.
        keys.extend((2..40).map(key));
        let moved = keys.swap_remove(0);
        assert_eq!(moved.0.as_ptr(), at);
        let text: Zeroizing<String> = moved.to_base64();
        assert_eq!(
            text.capacity(),
            text.len(),
            "written into its final allocation"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn ids_and_the_dummy_key_follow_every_change_of_keys() {
        let mut c = Codec::encrypted(b"c", Limits::default(), vec![key(1)]).unwrap();
        let first = keys(&c).dummy.clone();
        assert_eq!(keys(&c).ids, [key(1).id()]);
        c.install_key(key(2)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(keys(&c).ids, [key(1).id(), key(2).id()]);
        assert!(keys(&c).dummy == first, "the sealing key did not change");
        c.use_key(&key(2)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(keys(&c).ids, [key(2).id(), key(1).id()]);
        assert!(keys(&c).dummy != first, "derived from the new sealing key");
        c.remove_key(&key(1)).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(keys(&c).ids, [key(2).id()]);
        c.set_keys(vec![key(3)]).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(keys(&c).ids, [key(3).id()]);
        assert_eq!(c.key_ids(), [key(3).key_id()]);
    }

    #[test]
    fn a_packet_with_an_unknown_key_id_is_refused_even_when_the_dummy_key_opens_it() {
        let c = Codec::encrypted(b"c", Limits::default(), vec![key(1)]).unwrap();
        let dummy = keys(&c).dummy.clone();
        let forger = Codec::encrypted(b"c", Limits::default(), vec![dummy]).unwrap();
        let mut pkt = Vec::new();
        let ack = Message::Ack { seq: 1 };
        forger
            .seal(PacketKind::Datagram, &[ack], &[0; 24], &mut pkt)
            .unwrap();
        let id = keys(&forger).ids[0];
        assert!(!keys(&c).ids.contains(&id));
        let opened = c.open(PacketKind::Datagram, &mut pkt).map(drop);
        assert_eq!(opened, Err(DecodeError::UnknownKey(id)));
    }
}