jmap_server/helpers.rs
1//! Shared helper utilities for JMAP method handlers.
2
3use std::borrow::Cow;
4use std::collections::{BTreeMap, BTreeSet};
5
6pub use jmap_types::json_type_name;
7use jmap_types::{GetObject, Id, JmapError, SetObject, UTCDate};
8
9use crate::backend::{JmapBackend, SetError, SetErrorType};
10use crate::handlers::server_fail_value_from_backend;
11use serde_json::{Map, Value};
12
13/// Serialize any [`serde::Serialize`] type to a [`serde_json::Value`],
14/// mapping serialization errors to [`JmapError::server_fail`].
15///
16/// Used by every `*-server` handler to project a typed domain object
17/// (e.g. `Email`, `Mailbox`, `Chat`) into the wire-format `list` /
18/// `created` payload.
19///
20/// # Errors
21///
22/// Returns [`JmapError::server_fail`], carrying the serde message, if
23/// `val`'s `Serialize` impl fails or produces a map with non-string keys.
24pub fn serialize_value<T: serde::Serialize>(val: T) -> Result<serde_json::Value, JmapError> {
25 serde_json::to_value(val).map_err(|e| JmapError::server_fail(e.to_string()))
26}
27
28/// Convert a slice of [`Id`]s to a JSON `notFound` value.
29///
30/// RFC 8620 §5.1 specifies `notFound` as `Id[]` — always an array, never
31/// `null`. Returns an empty array when all requested ids were found.
32///
33/// Equivalent to `serde_json::to_value(ids)` but threads through
34/// `Value::Array` directly so the call site is infallible (bd:JMAP-wlip.28).
35pub fn not_found_json(ids: &[Id]) -> Value {
36 Value::Array(
37 ids.iter()
38 .map(|id| Value::String(id.as_ref().to_owned()))
39 .collect(),
40 )
41}
42
43/// Extract an optional, deserializable argument from a method-arguments
44/// envelope (bd:JMAP-wlip.32).
45///
46/// Looks up `name` in `args`, removing it. The result is:
47///
48/// - `Ok(None)` if the key is absent OR is present with `Value::Null`
49/// (RFC 8620 §3.3 treats absent and explicit-null the same for
50/// optional fields).
51/// - `Ok(Some(value))` if the key is present and the value
52/// deserializes successfully into `T`.
53/// - `Err(invalid_arguments_with(name))` if the value is present but
54/// fails to deserialize. The error message is built by the caller-
55/// supplied `invalid_arguments_with` so the resulting `JmapError`
56/// carries a domain-specific description ("ids must be an Id
57/// array", "filter must be a Filter object", etc.).
58///
59/// Collapses six near-identical
60/// `match args.remove(...).unwrap_or(Value::Null) { Value::Null => None,
61/// v => Some(serde_json::from_value(v)...) }` blocks in `handlers.rs`
62/// into one-liners.
63///
64/// # Interaction with `ResultReference` resolution (bd:JMAP-jfia.15)
65///
66/// [`crate::parse::resolve_args`] replaces a `#key` with the value
67/// produced by walking the JSON Pointer path against a prior
68/// response. RFC 6901 §4 makes no distinction between "key absent"
69/// and "key present with `null`", so the resolved value CAN be
70/// `Value::Null`. This function then treats that resolved-null
71/// identically to "key was not sent". The behaviour is
72/// RFC-compliant — both are "optional argument not provided" — but
73/// the asymmetry between an explicit `null` argument and a
74/// `#key`-resolved `null` argument may surprise a handler author
75/// who expects "I asked for the value via a `ResultReference`, so it
76/// must have been there". If a handler needs to distinguish
77/// resolved-null from unsent, it has to read the raw `args` map
78/// before calling this helper.
79///
80/// # Errors
81///
82/// Returns the error built by `invalid_arguments_with` if the argument is
83/// present and not `null` but does not deserialize as `T`.
84pub fn optional_arg<T>(
85 args: &mut Map<String, Value>,
86 name: &str,
87 invalid_arguments_with: impl FnOnce() -> JmapError,
88) -> Result<Option<T>, JmapError>
89where
90 T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned,
91{
92 match args.remove(name).unwrap_or(Value::Null) {
93 Value::Null => Ok(None),
94 v => Ok(Some(
95 serde_json::from_value(v).map_err(|_| invalid_arguments_with())?,
96 )),
97 }
98}
99
100/// Remove and decode the optional `filter` argument of a hand-written
101/// `/query` or `/queryChanges` handler (RFC 8620 §5.5).
102///
103/// Absent or `null` yields `None`. A value that is not a JSON object is
104/// not a filter at all and yields `invalidArguments`. An object that does
105/// not decode as `T` yields `unsupportedFilter` ("The "filter" is
106/// syntactically valid, but the server cannot process it") with the serde
107/// message as its description. With `deny_unknown_fields` on the filter
108/// types, that covers an unknown or misspelt condition property at any
109/// depth and an operator tree sent to an object whose filter is a bare
110/// condition.
111///
112/// # Errors
113///
114/// - `invalidArguments` if `filter` is present, not `null`, and not a JSON
115/// object.
116/// - `unsupportedFilter`, with the serde message as its description, if
117/// it is an object that does not decode as `T`.
118pub fn filter_arg<T>(args: &mut Map<String, Value>) -> Result<Option<T>, JmapError>
119where
120 T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned,
121{
122 match args.remove("filter").unwrap_or(Value::Null) {
123 Value::Null => Ok(None),
124 v @ Value::Object(_) => serde_json::from_value(v).map(Some).map_err(|e| {
125 let mut err = JmapError::unsupported_filter();
126 err.description = Some(format!("filter: {e}"));
127 err
128 }),
129 v => Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
130 "filter: expected an object, got {}",
131 json_type_name(&v)
132 ))),
133 }
134}
135
136/// Read an optional boolean argument from a method-arguments envelope without
137/// removing it (bd:JMAP-ic0j.39).
138///
139/// Returns `default` if `key` is absent, if the value is not a boolean, or if
140/// the value is `Value::Null`. This is the canonical workspace helper for
141/// JMAP's "permissive parsing" convention on optional boolean controls
142/// (RFC 8620 §3.6.1 — unknown / non-typed values coerce to the spec default).
143///
144/// Use [`take_bool_arg`] if the caller wants to consume the entry as part of
145/// a "walk the args map removing as we go" pattern.
146///
147/// Collapses ~50 near-identical
148/// `args.get(K).and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(default)` blocks across
149/// the extension-server family into single-line calls.
150pub fn bool_arg(args: &Map<String, Value>, key: &str, default: bool) -> bool {
151 args.get(key).and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(default)
152}
153
154/// Read an optional boolean argument from a method-arguments envelope,
155/// removing it from the map (bd:JMAP-ic0j.39).
156///
157/// Returns `default` if `key` is absent, if the value is not a boolean, or if
158/// the value is `Value::Null`. Mirrors the semantics of [`bool_arg`] but
159/// consumes the entry from `args`. Matches the canonical mail-server
160/// "remove-as-we-go" parsing pattern.
161pub fn take_bool_arg(args: &mut Map<String, Value>, key: &str, default: bool) -> bool {
162 args.remove(key)
163 .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
164 .unwrap_or(default)
165}
166
167/// Extract `accountId` from a JMAP method arguments envelope and return both
168/// the extracted [`Id`] and the remaining argument map.
169///
170/// The caller passes the full `args: Value` from the method invocation by
171/// value; this function destructures it once, so handlers do not have to
172/// repeat the `let Value::Object(mut args) = args else { ... }` pattern after
173/// every call.
174///
175/// # Errors
176///
177/// Returns `invalidArguments` with:
178///
179/// - `"arguments must be an object containing accountId"` when `args` is
180/// not a JSON object.
181/// - `"accountId is required"` when the field is missing or not a string.
182/// - `"accountId is not a valid Id: <reason>"` when the field is a string
183/// but does not satisfy the RFC 8620 §1.2 Id grammar
184/// (`Id::new_validated`). Catches empty strings, strings longer than
185/// 255 bytes, and strings containing characters outside the SAFE-CHAR
186/// set (`%x21 / %x23-7E` — visible ASCII excluding `"`).
187/// bd:JMAP-wlip.5 closed the previous silent-pass-through behaviour
188/// where a malformed accountId reached the backend's `account_exists`
189/// call and surfaced as either `notFound` or a storage-layer parse
190/// error, depending on the backend.
191pub fn extract_account_id(args: Value) -> Result<(Id, Map<String, Value>), JmapError> {
192 let Value::Object(mut args) = args else {
193 return Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(
194 "arguments must be an object containing accountId",
195 ));
196 };
197 // Remove (not get) the accountId entry so the returned args map no
198 // longer carries it (bd:JMAP-jfia.9). This matches optional_arg's
199 // remove-and-consume semantics and prevents downstream handlers
200 // from re-parsing the validated id or seeing it as an unexpected
201 // residual key.
202 let raw = args
203 .remove("accountId")
204 .ok_or_else(|| JmapError::invalid_arguments("accountId is required"))?;
205 let s = raw
206 .as_str()
207 .ok_or_else(|| JmapError::invalid_arguments("accountId is required"))?;
208 let id = Id::new_validated(s)
209 .map_err(|e| JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!("accountId is not a valid Id: {e}")))?;
210 Ok((id, args))
211}
212
213/// Parse the optional `maxChanges` argument of `/changes` and
214/// `/queryChanges`. RFC 8620 §5.2: "If supplied by the client, the value
215/// MUST be a positive integer greater than 0. If a value outside of this
216/// range is given, the server MUST reject the call with an
217/// "invalidArguments" error." §5.6 gives no range of its own, so the same
218/// rule applies to `/queryChanges`.
219///
220/// Pass the raw argument as taken from the args map (`args.get(..)` or
221/// `args.remove(..).as_ref()`). Absent or `null` yields `Ok(None)`.
222///
223/// # Errors
224///
225/// Returns `invalidArguments` (`"maxChanges must be a positive integer"`)
226/// for `0`, negative numbers, non-integers, and non-number values.
227pub fn parse_max_changes(value: Option<&Value>) -> Result<Option<u64>, JmapError> {
228 match value {
229 None | Some(Value::Null) => Ok(None),
230 Some(v) => {
231 v.as_u64().filter(|&n| n > 0).map(Some).ok_or_else(|| {
232 JmapError::invalid_arguments("maxChanges must be a positive integer")
233 })
234 }
235 }
236}
237
238/// Return the current UTC instant as an [`UTCDate`] (RFC 3339,
239/// millisecond precision, format `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.mmmZ`, or
240/// `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ` when the milliseconds are zero because
241/// RFC 8620 §1.4 says the "time-secfrac" "MUST always be omitted if
242/// zero"). For years `0000..=9999` the value passes
243/// [`UTCDate::new_validated`].
244///
245/// Uses `std::time::SystemTime` so no external dependency is needed.
246///
247/// Returns a typed [`UTCDate`] rather than a `String` (bd:JMAP-wlip.20)
248/// so callers do not need to wrap the result in
249/// `UTCDate::from(now_utc_string().as_str())`. The function name is
250/// retained for back-compat across the workspace's many call sites.
251///
252/// Pre-epoch handling: `SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)`
253/// fails on clocks drifted before the epoch. The function uses
254/// `Err::duration()` to recover the magnitude and negates the seconds
255/// before formatting; the result is a correct RFC 3339 timestamp
256/// anywhere from the BCE proleptic Gregorian range up to
257/// `1970-01-01T00:00:00Z`. The `rem_euclid` / `div_euclid` math at
258/// the format step handles arbitrarily-large negative offsets, not
259/// only sub-day drifts. Pre-epoch correctness is best-effort —
260/// `SystemTime` is non-monotonic and the JMAP spec does not require
261/// pre-epoch timestamps. (bd:JMAP-wlip.11 corrected the previous
262/// docstring's incorrect "1969-12-31T… through 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z"
263/// range claim.)
264///
265/// Clock-overflow handling: on a corrupted clock (system clock
266/// reporting a Duration whose `as_secs()` exceeds `i64::MAX`,
267/// `civil_from_days` reporting a year outside `i32`, or any other
268/// `SystemTime` failure mode), this function **panics**. The
269/// previous sentinel-string behaviour (`UTCDate::from("clock-out-of-range")`)
270/// was an idiom-grade defect (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): the sentinel was not a
271/// valid wire-format timestamp, had no in-band signal to distinguish
272/// it from a real value, and could silently propagate into JSON
273/// responses, audit logs, and database rows.
274///
275/// Callers that need to handle clock failure without panicking MUST
276/// use [`now_utc_string_checked`], which returns `Option<UTCDate>`.
277/// Long-running daemons, schedulers, and persistence layers SHOULD
278/// prefer the checked variant; one-shot tools and request handlers
279/// MAY accept the panic since clock corruption is unrecoverable and
280/// the dispatcher's `task::spawn` isolation already converts the
281/// panic into a `serverFail` invocation rather than crashing the
282/// process.
283///
284/// # Panics
285///
286/// Panics if `SystemTime::now()` cannot be expressed as an RFC 3339
287/// timestamp — the same conditions under which
288/// [`now_utc_string_checked`] returns `None`.
289pub fn now_utc_string() -> UTCDate {
290 now_utc_string_checked().expect("system clock returned an out-of-range value (bd:JMAP-jfia.30)")
291}
292
293/// Return the current UTC instant as an [`UTCDate`] in the same
294/// format as [`now_utc_string`], or `None` if the system clock cannot be expressed as an RFC 3339
295/// timestamp.
296///
297/// Added in bd:JMAP-jfia.30 to replace the previous sentinel-string
298/// failure mode of [`now_utc_string`] with a typed `Option` shape.
299/// Callers that want to react to a clock fault (audit-log
300/// timestamps, last-seen markers, retention sweeps) SHOULD use this
301/// variant; callers for whom a panic at the first sign of clock
302/// corruption is acceptable MAY use [`now_utc_string`] directly.
303///
304/// Returns `None` when:
305/// - `SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).as_secs()`
306/// exceeds `i64::MAX` (only reachable on a corrupted clock —
307/// approx ±292 billion years from epoch).
308/// - The negation of a pre-epoch duration overflows `i64`
309/// (unreachable on a `try_from`-validated input but checked
310/// defensively).
311/// - `civil_from_days` reports a year outside `i32`
312/// (bd:JMAP-jfia.2 — between the i32-year boundary and the
313/// `i64::MAX`-seconds cap).
314///
315/// # Why `Option<UTCDate>` and not `Result<UTCDate, ClockError>` (bd:JMAP-jfia.38)
316///
317/// The three failure modes are all "corrupted clock" — each one is
318/// physically unreachable on a sane host (years 5.7M-to-292B,
319/// `try_from`-impossible negation, `i32`-overflowing year). A caller
320/// that wants to branch on which physical mechanism fired would be
321/// branching on states that don't happen. The shapes the workspace
322/// uses elsewhere for typed-variant-per-mode (`SetError`,
323/// `BackendChangesError`, `BackendSetError`, `MergePatchError`) all
324/// carry failure modes that DO occur in normal operation —
325/// `notFound`, `tooManyChanges`, `invalidPatch`, `depthExceeded`.
326/// The clock-corruption modes are different in kind. Erasing the
327/// discriminator here trades a hypothetical observability win for a
328/// cleaner contract: "the clock is unusable for RFC 3339, abandon
329/// timestamping." A future need for per-mode telemetry can be added
330/// non-breakingly as a parallel helper (e.g. `now_utc_string_diagnose
331/// -> Result<UTCDate, ClockError>`) without disturbing this shape.
332pub fn now_utc_string_checked() -> Option<UTCDate> {
333 use std::time::SystemTime;
334
335 let (secs, millis) = signed_seconds_since_epoch(SystemTime::now())?;
336 utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs, millis)
337}
338
339/// Format `secs` seconds plus `millis` milliseconds since the Unix epoch
340/// in the [`now_utc_string`] format, or `None` if the year does not fit
341/// in `i32`.
342fn utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs: i64, millis: u32) -> Option<UTCDate> {
343 let time_of_day = secs.rem_euclid(86400);
344 let (h, m, s) = (
345 time_of_day / 3600,
346 time_of_day % 3600 / 60,
347 time_of_day % 60,
348 );
349 let (year, month, day) = civil_from_days(secs.div_euclid(86400))?;
350
351 // RFC 8620 §1.4: a zero time-secfrac MUST be omitted.
352 let frac = if millis == 0 {
353 String::new()
354 } else {
355 format!(".{millis:03}")
356 };
357 Some(UTCDate::from(format!(
358 "{year:04}-{month:02}-{day:02}T{h:02}:{m:02}:{s:02}{frac}Z"
359 )))
360}
361
362/// Convert a [`SystemTime`](std::time::SystemTime) into `(signed_seconds_since_epoch, millis)`,
363/// returning `None` when the system clock cannot be expressed as an
364/// `i64` second count.
365///
366/// Extracted from [`now_utc_string_checked`] in bd:JMAP-jfia.11 to
367/// flatten the previous three-level nested match
368/// (`duration_since` → `try_from` → `checked_neg`) into one
369/// linear function the reader can scan top-to-bottom. The
370/// `.checked_neg()` branch is unreachable on a `try_from`-validated
371/// input (its output is `[0, i64::MAX]` so negation cannot underflow)
372/// but is kept for defence in depth — the failure path stays total.
373pub(crate) fn signed_seconds_since_epoch(now: std::time::SystemTime) -> Option<(i64, u32)> {
374 use std::time::UNIX_EPOCH;
375 match now.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) {
376 Ok(d) => {
377 let s = i64::try_from(d.as_secs()).ok()?;
378 Some((s, d.subsec_millis()))
379 }
380 Err(e) => {
381 // Pre-epoch clock: the instant is -d. Floor it to whole
382 // milliseconds (as truncation does post-epoch), then split
383 // it so `millis` counts forward from the floored second:
384 // -1.2 s is (-2, 800), not (-1, 200) (bd:JMAP-yt1w.46).
385 let d = e.duration();
386 let s = i64::try_from(d.as_secs()).ok()?;
387 match d.subsec_nanos() {
388 0 => Some((s.checked_neg()?, 0)),
389 nanos => Some((
390 s.checked_add(1)?.checked_neg()?,
391 (1_000_000_000 - nanos) / 1_000_000,
392 )),
393 }
394 }
395 }
396}
397
398/// Format `secs` seconds since the Unix epoch as a seconds-precision
399/// [`UTCDate`] (`YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ`, RFC 8620 §1.4), or `None` if the
400/// year falls outside `0000..=9999`, which that four-digit form cannot
401/// express.
402///
403/// This is the inverse of [`UTCDate::to_epoch_seconds`], which truncates
404/// the milliseconds that [`now_utc_string`] may add.
405pub fn utc_date_from_epoch_seconds(secs: i64) -> Option<UTCDate> {
406 let time_of_day = secs.rem_euclid(86400);
407 let (h, m, s) = (
408 time_of_day / 3600,
409 time_of_day % 3600 / 60,
410 time_of_day % 60,
411 );
412 let (year, month, day) = civil_from_days(secs.div_euclid(86400))?;
413 if !(0..=9999).contains(&year) {
414 return None;
415 }
416 Some(UTCDate::from(format!(
417 "{year:04}-{month:02}-{day:02}T{h:02}:{m:02}:{s:02}Z"
418 )))
419}
420
421/// Convert a count of days since the Unix epoch (1970-01-01) to a proleptic
422/// Gregorian (year, month, day) triple, or `None` if the resulting year
423/// does not fit in `i32`.
424///
425/// Algorithm by Howard Hinnant (public domain):
426/// <https://howardhinnant.github.io/date_algorithms.html>
427///
428/// The year-narrowing cast is fallible because the algorithm's intermediate
429/// `y` value is bounded by `i64::MAX / 146_097 ≈ ±6.3e13`, only a subset
430/// of which fits in `i32` (~±2.1e9 years). For a sane `SystemTime`-derived
431/// input we stay well inside `i32::MIN..=i32::MAX`, but the outer
432/// `now_utc_string` only rejects `u64` seconds exceeding `i64::MAX`
433/// (bd:JMAP-wlip.27 sentinel) — inputs between the i32-year boundary
434/// (~5.7e6 years from epoch) and that sentinel reach this function and
435/// previously panicked the dispatcher worker (bd:JMAP-jfia.2). Returning
436/// `None` lets the caller fall through to its own sentinel rather than
437/// taking down the task.
438///
439/// Month and day cannot fail: the algorithm's modular structure pins them
440/// to `[1, 12]` and `[1, 31]` respectively, narrow casts handled with
441/// `try_from(...).expect(...)` documenting the invariant.
442fn civil_from_days(z: i64) -> Option<(i32, u8, u8)> {
443 let z = z + 719_468;
444 let era: i64 = if z >= 0 { z } else { z - 146_096 } / 146_097;
445 let doe = z - era * 146_097; // [0, 146096]
446 let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36524 - doe / 146096) / 365; // [0, 399]
447 let y = yoe + era * 400;
448 let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100); // [0, 365]
449 let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153; // [0, 11]
450 let d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1; // [1, 31]
451 let mo = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 }; // [1, 12]
452 let yr = if mo <= 2 { y + 1 } else { y };
453 Some((
454 i32::try_from(yr).ok()?,
455 u8::try_from(mo).expect("month bounded by algorithm to [1, 12]"),
456 u8::try_from(d).expect("day bounded by algorithm to [1, 31]"),
457 ))
458}
459
460/// Maximum recursion depth for [`json_merge_patch`] application.
461///
462/// Beyond this depth [`json_merge_patch`] returns
463/// [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] without applying any further levels.
464/// Mitigates stack-exhaustion denial of service from adversarial `PatchObject` values
465/// (bd:JMAP-sc1b.97). 32 levels comfortably exceeds any legitimate JMAP
466/// `/set update` shape — the deepest standard JMAP `/set update` shape
467/// (Email with nested `bodyStructure`) tops out around 6 levels, so the
468/// cap fires only on adversarial input.
469///
470/// Crate-private (bd:JMAP-wlip.4): consumers see the cap-exceeded
471/// behaviour via [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`], not by reading the
472/// constant directly. The crate reserves the right to tighten the
473/// value (e.g. 32 → 16) without a major-version bump because the
474/// contract is "the function may return `DepthExceeded`", not "the cap
475/// is exactly N".
476pub(crate) const MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH: usize = 32;
477
478/// Error returned by [`json_merge_patch`] when a patch cannot be applied.
479///
480/// Marked `#[non_exhaustive]` so future RFC 7396 failure modes (e.g. a
481/// size cap in addition to the depth cap) can be added without an API
482/// break.
483#[non_exhaustive]
484#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
485pub enum MergePatchError {
486 /// The patch nests deeper than the crate's `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`
487 /// DoS-guard cap.
488 ///
489 /// Callers SHOULD map this to
490 /// [`SetError`] with
491 /// [`SetErrorType::InvalidPatch`]
492 /// and MUST discard any partially-mutated `target` rather than
493 /// persisting it — see the contract on [`json_merge_patch`].
494 ///
495 /// # Why no `reached` / `max` payload (bd:JMAP-jfia.39)
496 ///
497 /// The variant is intentionally unit-shaped. The cap value is
498 /// available in the `Display` impl (which interpolates
499 /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`) for log-line and user-message use.
500 /// A typed payload `{ reached: usize, max: usize }` was
501 /// considered and rejected for now because (a) no current
502 /// consumer in the workspace destructures the reached depth or
503 /// the cap programmatically — all 6 call sites map to
504 /// `SetErrorType::InvalidPatch` with a generic description; and
505 /// (b) changing a unit variant to a struct variant is a breaking
506 /// pattern-match change even on a `#[non_exhaustive]` enum (the
507 /// existing `if let Err(MergePatchError::DepthExceeded)` pattern
508 /// would stop compiling). If a future consumer needs
509 /// programmatic access to the depth, the additive evolution is
510 /// to add a new variant alongside (e.g.
511 /// `DepthExceededDetail { reached: usize, max: usize }`) and
512 /// emit the new variant from `json_merge_patch`. The unit
513 /// variant would then become unreachable but remain valid
514 /// pattern syntax for any pinned-version consumer.
515 DepthExceeded,
516}
517
518impl std::fmt::Display for MergePatchError {
519 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
520 match self {
521 Self::DepthExceeded => write!(
522 f,
523 "merge patch nesting exceeds {MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH} levels"
524 ),
525 }
526 }
527}
528
529impl std::error::Error for MergePatchError {}
530
531/// Apply a JSON Merge Patch (RFC 7396) to `target` in-place.
532///
533/// Used by every `*-server` backend's `update_object` implementation
534/// to merge a sparse `/set update` patch into the stored serialized
535/// object. Extracted from per-crate copies in bd:JMAP-sc1b.103 — keep
536/// edits here so all five reference backends stay byte-identical.
537///
538/// # Errors
539///
540/// Returns [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] when the patch nests
541/// deeper than the crate's internal `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard
542/// cap (added in bd:JMAP-sc1b.97, made non-silent in bd:JMAP-wlip.1).
543/// The exact value is intentionally not exposed; consumers see the
544/// behaviour via the typed error rather than reading the constant.
545/// Below the cap the behaviour is exactly RFC 7396 and the call always
546/// returns `Ok(())`.
547///
548/// # Partial-mutation contract
549///
550/// On `Err(DepthExceeded)`, `target` may have been mutated up to the
551/// level where the cap fired — RFC 7396 merging is applied recursively
552/// in place and the function does not roll back on error. Callers MUST
553/// discard `target` rather than persist it. The standard pattern in
554/// every `*-server` `update_object` impl is to operate on a `.clone()`
555/// of the stored value and only `insert(...)` it back on `Ok(())`; that
556/// pattern is naturally safe because the stored value is left untouched
557/// on error.
558pub fn json_merge_patch(target: &mut Value, patch: Value) -> Result<(), MergePatchError> {
559 json_merge_patch_inner(target, patch, 0)
560}
561
562fn json_merge_patch_inner(
563 target: &mut Value,
564 patch: Value,
565 depth: usize,
566) -> Result<(), MergePatchError> {
567 if depth > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH {
568 return Err(MergePatchError::DepthExceeded);
569 }
570 match patch {
571 Value::Object(patch_map) => {
572 // Per RFC 7396 §2: "If the target value is not a JSON object,
573 // the resulting value will be the merge patch." We therefore
574 // reset a non-Object target to an empty Object before merging
575 // — this is reachable when a Patch creates a nested field that
576 // is absent from the target (the parent recursion frame inserted
577 // Value::Null as a placeholder).
578 if !target.is_object() {
579 *target = Value::Object(Map::new());
580 }
581 let target_map = target
582 .as_object_mut()
583 .expect("target was just set to Value::Object above");
584 for (key, patch_val) in patch_map {
585 if patch_val.is_null() {
586 target_map.remove(&key);
587 } else {
588 let entry = target_map.entry(key).or_insert(Value::Null);
589 json_merge_patch_inner(entry, patch_val, depth + 1)?;
590 }
591 }
592 }
593 other => *target = other,
594 }
595 Ok(())
596}
597
598/// Error returned by [`apply_jmap_patch`] and [`apply_patch_object`] when
599/// a `PatchObject` cannot be applied.
600///
601/// Every variant is an RFC 8620 §5.3 violation for which "the update
602/// MUST be rejected with an "invalidPatch" error". Callers SHOULD map
603/// any variant to [`SetError`] with
604/// [`SetErrorType::InvalidPatch`];
605/// the `Display` form is suitable as its description.
606///
607/// Marked `#[non_exhaustive]` so further §5.3 checks can be added
608/// without an API break.
609#[non_exhaustive]
610#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
611pub enum PatchPathError {
612 /// A part before the last does not exist on the patched object.
613 ParentMissing,
614 /// A part before the last names an array, so the pointer would
615 /// reference inside an array.
616 InsideArray,
617 /// A part before the last names a value that is neither an object nor
618 /// an array (string, number, boolean or null), which has no members.
619 ParentNotObject,
620 /// A `~` in the path is not followed by `0` or `1`, so the path is
621 /// not a valid RFC 6901 JSON Pointer.
622 InvalidEscape,
623 /// The pointer of one patch is a prefix of the pointer of another in
624 /// the same `PatchObject` (e.g. `"alerts/1/offset"` and `"alerts"`).
625 PrefixConflict,
626 /// The path's segment count plus the value's object/array nesting
627 /// exceeds the crate's `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard cap.
628 ///
629 /// Not an RFC 8620 §5.3 rule: it is this crate's server limit
630 /// (RFC 8620 §3.6.1 lets a server reject requests that exceed its
631 /// limits), so repeated path patches cannot grow a stored value's
632 /// depth without bound. It is still reported as invalidPatch.
633 DepthExceeded,
634 /// A part before the last is a Binary value inside a `metadata` or
635 /// `privateMetadata` namespace value: draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-05
636 /// §3.2, "a path that traverses an array or a Binary value (Section
637 /// 2.1.1) is rejected with an "invalidPatch" [`SetError`]".
638 InsideBinary,
639}
640
641impl std::fmt::Display for PatchPathError {
642 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
643 match self {
644 Self::ParentMissing => f.write_str("patch path parent does not exist"),
645 Self::InsideArray => f.write_str("patch path references inside an array"),
646 Self::ParentNotObject => f.write_str("patch path parent is not an object"),
647 Self::InvalidEscape => f.write_str("patch path has a '~' not followed by '0' or '1'"),
648 Self::PrefixConflict => {
649 f.write_str("patch has a path that is a prefix of another path")
650 }
651 Self::DepthExceeded => {
652 write!(f, "patch nesting exceeds {MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH} levels")
653 }
654 Self::InsideBinary => {
655 f.write_str("patch path references inside a metadata Binary value")
656 }
657 }
658 }
659}
660
661impl std::error::Error for PatchPathError {}
662
663/// Apply one RFC 8620 §5.3 `PatchObject` entry (`path` → `value`) to
664/// `target` in-place.
665///
666/// `path` is a `PatchObject` key: an RFC 6901 JSON Pointer with the
667/// implicit leading `/` omitted (e.g. `"mailboxIds/abc123"`). Each
668/// `/`-separated reference token is decoded per RFC 6901 §4 (`~1` → `/`,
669/// then `~0` → `~`). Every token before the last must name an existing
670/// object member; the last token names the member to set. A `null`
671/// `value` removes that member (a no-op when it is absent); any other
672/// value inserts or replaces it.
673///
674/// Extracted from per-crate copies in bd:JMAP-j6ab. Extension servers
675/// MUST call this rather than reimplement it.
676///
677/// Empty tokens are legal: RFC 6901 §3 allows a zero-length
678/// `reference-token`, and its §5 example evaluates `"/"` to the member
679/// named `""`. The RFC 8620 §5.3 "null sets the property default" rule
680/// is type-specific and left to the caller. The rule that no two pointers
681/// in one `PatchObject` may be prefixes of each other is checked by
682/// [`apply_patch_object`].
683///
684/// # Errors
685///
686/// Returns [`PatchPathError`] when a part before the last does not exist
687/// ([`ParentMissing`](PatchPathError::ParentMissing)), is an array
688/// ([`InsideArray`](PatchPathError::InsideArray)) or is another
689/// non-object value ([`ParentNotObject`](PatchPathError::ParentNotObject))
690/// or is a Binary value below a `metadata/<namespace>` or
691/// `privateMetadata/<namespace>` prefix
692/// ([`InsideBinary`](PatchPathError::InsideBinary); an object with
693/// `"@type": "Binary"`, draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-05 §2.1.1),
694/// when `path` contains an invalid escape
695/// ([`InvalidEscape`](PatchPathError::InvalidEscape)), or when the
696/// number of `/`-separated segments in `path` plus the object/array
697/// nesting of `value` (a scalar nests 0 levels) exceeds the crate's
698/// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard cap
699/// ([`DepthExceeded`](PatchPathError::DepthExceeded)).
700///
701/// # Mutation contract
702///
703/// A single call is all-or-nothing: on `Err`, `target` is unchanged.
704/// A `PatchObject` has several entries, and an error on a later entry
705/// does not undo earlier ones, so callers applying a whole `PatchObject`
706/// MUST use [`apply_patch_object`].
707pub fn apply_jmap_patch(
708 target: &mut Map<String, Value>,
709 path: &str,
710 value: Value,
711) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
712 let segments = path.split('/').count();
713 if segments > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH
714 || nests_deeper_than(&value, MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - segments)
715 {
716 return Err(PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
717 }
718 let (parents, leaf) = match path.rsplit_once('/') {
719 Some((parents, leaf)) => (Some(parents), leaf),
720 None => (None, path),
721 };
722 let leaf = decode_pointer_token(leaf)?;
723 let in_metadata = matches!(path.split('/').next(), Some("metadata" | "privateMetadata"));
724 let mut parent = target;
725 for (i, token) in parents.into_iter().flat_map(|p| p.split('/')).enumerate() {
726 parent = match parent.get_mut(decode_pointer_token(token)?.as_ref()) {
727 // Token 0 is the property and token 1 the namespace; a Binary
728 // is an object within the namespace value.
729 Some(Value::Object(map))
730 if in_metadata
731 && i >= 2
732 && map.get("@type").and_then(Value::as_str) == Some("Binary") =>
733 {
734 return Err(PatchPathError::InsideBinary);
735 }
736 Some(Value::Object(map)) => map,
737 Some(Value::Array(_)) => return Err(PatchPathError::InsideArray),
738 Some(_) => return Err(PatchPathError::ParentNotObject),
739 None => return Err(PatchPathError::ParentMissing),
740 };
741 }
742 if value.is_null() {
743 parent.remove(leaf.as_ref());
744 } else {
745 parent.insert(leaf.into_owned(), value);
746 }
747 Ok(())
748}
749
750/// Check the RFC 8620 §5.3 `PatchObject` errors that `patch` alone
751/// determines, without the object it applies to.
752///
753/// A server whose spec orders these before other checks calls this
754/// first; draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-05 §3.2 says "Patch errors that can
755/// be determined from the request alone (for example, two paths where
756/// one is a prefix of the other) MUST be reported with "invalidPatch"
757/// before rule 1 is evaluated". [`apply_patch_object`] runs the same
758/// check, so calling both is redundant but harmless.
759///
760/// # Errors
761///
762/// Returns [`PatchPathError::InvalidEscape`] for a key with a `~` not
763/// followed by `0` or `1`, [`PatchPathError::DepthExceeded`] for an
764/// entry over the `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` cap, and
765/// [`PatchPathError::PrefixConflict`] when the decoded pointer of one key
766/// is a whole-segment prefix of another (`"alerts"` and
767/// `"alerts/1/offset"` conflict; `"alert"` and `"alerts/x"` do not).
768pub fn check_patch_paths(patch: &Map<String, Value>) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
769 let mut pointers = patch
770 .iter()
771 .map(|(k, v)| {
772 let segments = k
773 .split('/')
774 .map(decode_pointer_token)
775 .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
776 if segments.len() > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH
777 || nests_deeper_than(v, MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - segments.len())
778 {
779 return Err(PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
780 }
781 Ok(segments)
782 })
783 .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
784 // Sorted, a pointer that prefixes any other also prefixes its successor.
785 pointers.sort_unstable();
786 if pointers.windows(2).any(|w| w[1].starts_with(&w[0])) {
787 return Err(PatchPathError::PrefixConflict);
788 }
789 Ok(())
790}
791
792/// Apply a whole RFC 8620 §5.3 `PatchObject` to `target`.
793///
794/// Each entry is applied with [`apply_jmap_patch`]. The value at each
795/// pointer is set as given: a top-level key such as `"name"` replaces that
796/// property wholesale, with no nested merge of object values (RFC 8620
797/// §5.3: "The value to set for this property").
798///
799/// # Errors
800///
801/// Returns any error [`check_patch_paths`] returns for `patch`, and
802/// otherwise any error [`apply_jmap_patch`] returns for an entry.
803///
804/// # Mutation contract
805///
806/// All-or-nothing: on `Err`, `target` is unchanged.
807pub fn apply_patch_object(
808 target: &mut Map<String, Value>,
809 patch: &Map<String, Value>,
810) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
811 check_patch_paths(patch)?;
812 let mut patched = target.clone();
813 for (path, value) in patch {
814 apply_jmap_patch(&mut patched, path, value.clone())?;
815 }
816 *target = patched;
817 Ok(())
818}
819
820/// Whether `value` nests objects or arrays more than `limit` levels deep
821/// (a scalar nests 0 levels). Recursion is bounded by `limit`, not by the
822/// input.
823fn nests_deeper_than(value: &Value, limit: usize) -> bool {
824 match value {
825 Value::Object(map) => limit == 0 || map.values().any(|v| nests_deeper_than(v, limit - 1)),
826 Value::Array(items) => limit == 0 || items.iter().any(|v| nests_deeper_than(v, limit - 1)),
827 _ => false,
828 }
829}
830
831/// Decode one RFC 6901 reference token: `~1` → `/`, then `~0` → `~`
832/// (RFC 6901 §4 order, so `~01` becomes `~1`, not `/`).
833pub(crate) fn decode_pointer_token(token: &str) -> Result<Cow<'_, str>, PatchPathError> {
834 if !token.contains('~') {
835 return Ok(Cow::Borrowed(token));
836 }
837 let escapes_valid = token
838 .match_indices('~')
839 .all(|(i, _)| matches!(token.as_bytes().get(i + 1), Some(b'0' | b'1')));
840 if !escapes_valid {
841 return Err(PatchPathError::InvalidEscape);
842 }
843 Ok(Cow::Owned(token.replace("~1", "/").replace("~0", "~")))
844}
845
846/// Resolve a request-side `position` argument (RFC 8620 §5.5) into a
847/// 0-based start index suitable for slicing the full ordered result
848/// list (bd:JMAP-qz9v.48).
849///
850/// `position` is the signed offset from the `/query` request. The
851/// foundation handler at [`handle_query`](crate::handle_query) parses it
852/// via [`serde_json::Value::as_i64`], so the value reaching the
853/// backend is any `i64` (including `i64::MIN`). Non-negative values
854/// are absolute offsets from the start of the result list; negative
855/// values are end-relative offsets per RFC 8620 §5.5 ("`-1` represents
856/// the last entry, `-2` the second to last, and so on").
857///
858/// Returns a `usize` clamped to `[0, total]`. The clamp at the high
859/// end matches the slice-safety property: `all_ids[start..]` is
860/// guaranteed not to panic regardless of the input `position`.
861///
862/// # Edge cases this helper exists to centralize
863///
864/// 1. `position == 0` → `0`.
865/// 2. `position > total` → `total` (yields an empty page, matching
866/// the RFC's silent-clamp semantics — `/query` does not error on
867/// out-of-range positions).
868/// 3. `position == i64::MIN` → handled via [`i64::saturating_neg`],
869/// which returns `i64::MAX` rather than overflowing. The resulting
870/// `usize::MAX`-magnitude offset is then absorbed by
871/// [`usize::saturating_sub`].
872/// 4. `position` exceeding `usize::MAX` on a 32-bit target (`i64`
873/// values above `2^32 - 1`) → clamped to `total` rather than
874/// truncated. The previous workspace idiom (`position as usize`)
875/// silently wrapped the high bits on 32-bit, returning a small
876/// `start` index that did not match the caller's intent.
877///
878/// # Why this lives in the foundation
879///
880/// The pattern is identical across every extension server's `/query`
881/// backend impl. Centralizing it eliminates the per-crate
882/// `(position as usize)` / `(position.saturating_neg() as usize)`
883/// idiom that `clippy::pedantic` flags as `cast_possible_truncation` +
884/// `cast_sign_loss`, and prevents future siblings from re-introducing
885/// the strictly-worse `(-position) as usize` variant (which panics on
886/// `i64::MIN` in debug builds and wraps in release).
887///
888/// # Example
889///
890/// ```
891/// use jmap_server::resolve_query_offset;
892///
893/// // Absolute offset.
894/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 100), 0);
895/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(25, 100), 25);
896///
897/// // End-relative offset.
898/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 100), 99);
899/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-100, 100), 0);
900///
901/// // Out-of-range clamps to total.
902/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1_000, 100), 100);
903/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1_000, 100), 0);
904///
905/// // i64::MIN does not overflow.
906/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 100), 0);
907/// ```
908#[must_use]
909pub fn resolve_query_offset(position: i64, total: usize) -> usize {
910 if position >= 0 {
911 // `i64 >= 0` → fits in `u64`. `usize::try_from` returns the
912 // value on 64-bit targets and `Err` on 32-bit targets only
913 // when the magnitude exceeds `usize::MAX`; saturating to
914 // `usize::MAX` is then clamped to `total` by `.min`.
915 usize::try_from(position).unwrap_or(usize::MAX).min(total)
916 } else {
917 // `saturating_neg` maps `i64::MIN` to `i64::MAX` instead of
918 // overflowing. Every other negative `i64` negates exactly.
919 let neg = usize::try_from(position.saturating_neg()).unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
920 total.saturating_sub(neg)
921 }
922}
923
924/// Convert an RFC 8620 `limit` / `maxChanges` argument (`UnsignedInt|null`)
925/// to a `usize` item count for [`Iterator::take`] (bd:JMAP-pgj7).
926///
927/// RFC 8620 §5.5: "The maximum number of results to return. If null, no
928/// limit presumed." `None` therefore maps to `usize::MAX`. A `Some(n)`
929/// larger than `usize::MAX` (only possible on 32-bit targets) saturates
930/// to `usize::MAX` instead of truncating, which is the same "take
931/// everything" outcome, since no in-memory list can exceed `usize::MAX`.
932///
933/// This replaces the per-crate `n as usize` idiom, which silently drops
934/// the high bits on 32-bit targets (a `limit` of `2^32` became `0`).
935///
936/// # Example
937///
938/// ```
939/// use jmap_server::limit_or_max;
940///
941/// assert_eq!(limit_or_max(None), usize::MAX);
942/// assert_eq!(limit_or_max(Some(0)), 0);
943/// assert_eq!(limit_or_max(Some(25)), 25);
944/// ```
945#[must_use]
946pub fn limit_or_max(limit: Option<u64>) -> usize {
947 limit.map_or(usize::MAX, |n| usize::try_from(n).unwrap_or(usize::MAX))
948}
949
950/// Parse the RFC 8620 §5.5 `/query` arguments `anchor` (`Id|null`) and
951/// `anchorOffset` (`Int`, default `0`) from `args`.
952///
953/// # Errors
954///
955/// `invalidArguments` when `anchor` is neither a string nor `null`, is a
956/// string that is not an RFC 8620 §1.2 Id, or `anchorOffset` is neither an
957/// integer nor `null`.
958pub fn query_anchor_args(args: &Map<String, Value>) -> Result<(Option<Id>, i64), JmapError> {
959 let anchor = match args.get("anchor") {
960 None | Some(Value::Null) => None,
961 Some(Value::String(s)) => Some(
962 Id::new_validated(s.as_str())
963 .map_err(|e| JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!("anchor: {e}")))?,
964 ),
965 Some(v) => {
966 return Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
967 "anchor: expected an Id string or null, got {}",
968 json_type_name(v)
969 )));
970 }
971 };
972 let anchor_offset = match args.get("anchorOffset") {
973 None | Some(Value::Null) => 0,
974 Some(v) => v.as_i64().ok_or_else(|| {
975 JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
976 "anchorOffset: expected an integer, got {}",
977 json_type_name(v)
978 ))
979 })?,
980 };
981 Ok((anchor, anchor_offset))
982}
983
984/// Start index of a `/query` page within the filtered, sorted `ids`
985/// (RFC 8620 §5.5), for [`JmapReads::query_objects`] implementations.
986///
987/// With an `anchor`, `position` is ignored and the start is the
988/// anchor's index plus `anchor_offset`, clamped to `0..=ids.len()`.
989/// Without one, `anchor_offset` is ignored and the start is
990/// [`resolve_query_offset`]`(position, ids.len())`.
991///
992/// # Errors
993///
994/// [`JmapError::anchor_not_found`] when `anchor` is not in `ids`.
995///
996/// [`JmapReads::query_objects`]: crate::JmapReads::query_objects
997pub fn resolve_query_start(
998 ids: &[Id],
999 position: i64,
1000 anchor: Option<&Id>,
1001 anchor_offset: i64,
1002) -> Result<usize, JmapError> {
1003 let Some(anchor) = anchor else {
1004 return Ok(resolve_query_offset(position, ids.len()));
1005 };
1006 let index = ids
1007 .iter()
1008 .position(|id| id == anchor)
1009 .ok_or_else(JmapError::anchor_not_found)?;
1010 let start = i64::try_from(index)
1011 .unwrap_or(i64::MAX)
1012 .saturating_add(anchor_offset)
1013 .max(0);
1014 Ok(resolve_query_offset(start, ids.len()))
1015}
1016
1017/// Enforce RFC 8620 §5.3 `maxObjectsInSet` cap at the top of a `/set`
1018/// handler (bd:JMAP-ayoz.41.1).
1019///
1020/// Counts entries in the wire `create` (object), `update` (object), and
1021/// `destroy` (array) arguments. Returns the method-level error
1022/// [`JmapError::request_too_large`] (wire `type: "requestTooLarge"`,
1023/// `description: "maxObjectsInSet"`) when the sum exceeds `max`. Per
1024/// RFC 8620 §5.3 it is returned instead of the `Foo/set` response, so
1025/// the dispatcher emits an `error` invocation and later method calls
1026/// in the same request still run (bd:JMAP-yt1w.30).
1027///
1028/// Call at the top of every `handle_*_set` after the `account_exists`
1029/// gate and before any per-entry processing. A request carrying
1030/// megabytes of `/set` ops is rejected before the handler touches the
1031/// storage layer:
1032///
1033/// ```ignore
1034/// let (account_id, args) = extract_account_id(args)?;
1035/// if !backend.account_exists(caller, &account_id).await
1036/// .map_err(|e| server_fail_from_backend(&e))?
1037/// {
1038/// return Err(JmapError::account_not_found());
1039/// }
1040/// jmap_server::helpers::enforce_max_objects_in_set(
1041/// &args,
1042/// backend.max_objects_in_set(caller, &account_id),
1043/// )?;
1044/// ```
1045///
1046/// # Why this lives in the foundation
1047///
1048/// `maxObjectsInSet` is a RFC 8620 §5.3 base-protocol cap, not an
1049/// extension concept. Every `jmap-*-server` extension's `handle_*_set`
1050/// needs the same check; the helper is the single source of truth so a
1051/// future revision (different error shape, additional counting rule,
1052/// alternate semantics for non-object `create` / `update`) lands in one
1053/// place instead of being propagated through 28 handler sites.
1054///
1055/// # Counting rules
1056///
1057/// - `create` is counted as `args["create"].as_object()?.len()` —
1058/// missing key, `null`, or non-object types count as 0.
1059/// - `update` is counted the same way (RFC 8620 §5.3 `update` is
1060/// `Id[PatchObject]`).
1061/// - `destroy` is counted as `args["destroy"].as_array()?.len()` —
1062/// missing key, `null`, or non-array types count as 0.
1063///
1064/// Wire-shape validation of the individual `create` / `update` /
1065/// `destroy` arguments belongs to the per-handler argument parsing,
1066/// not to this cap-enforcement helper. A non-object `create` survives
1067/// the cap check (counts as 0) and is rejected by the handler's
1068/// downstream `args.remove("create")` match arm. Conversely, a
1069/// well-formed but over-limit `create` is rejected here before the
1070/// handler runs.
1071///
1072/// # Errors
1073///
1074/// Returns `JmapError::request_too_large()` with description
1075/// `"maxObjectsInSet"` when the sum exceeds `max` (RFC 8620 §5.3).
1076pub fn enforce_max_objects_in_set(args: &Map<String, Value>, max: u64) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1077 let create_count = args
1078 .get("create")
1079 .and_then(|v| v.as_object())
1080 .map_or(0u64, |m| m.len() as u64);
1081 let update_count = args
1082 .get("update")
1083 .and_then(|v| v.as_object())
1084 .map_or(0u64, |m| m.len() as u64);
1085 let destroy_count = args
1086 .get("destroy")
1087 .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
1088 .map_or(0u64, |a| a.len() as u64);
1089 // u64 saturation: each count is bounded by serde_json's body parse
1090 // (Map::len / Vec::len are usize; on 64-bit targets usize == u64,
1091 // on 32-bit targets usize < u64). The sum cannot exceed
1092 // 3 * u32::MAX even on 32-bit hosts, well within u64 range.
1093 let count = create_count
1094 .saturating_add(update_count)
1095 .saturating_add(destroy_count);
1096 if count > max {
1097 let mut err = JmapError::request_too_large();
1098 err.description = Some("maxObjectsInSet".into());
1099 return Err(err);
1100 }
1101 Ok(())
1102}
1103
1104/// Enforce RFC 8620 §5.1 `maxObjectsInGet` at the top of a `/get`
1105/// handler (bd:JMAP-yt1w.31).
1106///
1107/// Counts the entries in the wire `ids` argument. Returns the
1108/// method-level error [`JmapError::request_too_large`] (wire
1109/// `type: "requestTooLarge"`, `description: "maxObjectsInGet"`) when the
1110/// count exceeds `max`. Per RFC 8620 §5.1 it is returned instead of the
1111/// `Foo/get` response.
1112///
1113/// Call after the `account_exists` gate and before parsing `ids`:
1114///
1115/// ```ignore
1116/// jmap_server::helpers::enforce_max_objects_in_get(
1117/// &args,
1118/// backend.max_objects_in_get(caller, &account_id),
1119/// )?;
1120/// ```
1121///
1122/// # Counting rules
1123///
1124/// `ids` is counted as `args["ids"].as_array()?.len()`. A missing key,
1125/// `null` (fetch all), or a non-array value counts as 0: RFC 8620 §5.1
1126/// bounds "the number of ids requested by the client", and a null `ids`
1127/// requests none. Bounding a fetch-all by the number of records is the
1128/// backend's job, since only it knows how many records exist. Wire-shape
1129/// validation of `ids` belongs to the handler's argument parsing.
1130///
1131/// # Errors
1132///
1133/// Returns `JmapError::request_too_large()` with description
1134/// `"maxObjectsInGet"` when the count exceeds `max` (RFC 8620 §5.1).
1135pub fn enforce_max_objects_in_get(args: &Map<String, Value>, max: u64) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1136 let count = args
1137 .get("ids")
1138 .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
1139 .map_or(0u64, |a| a.len() as u64);
1140 if count > max {
1141 let mut err = JmapError::request_too_large();
1142 err.description = Some("maxObjectsInGet".into());
1143 return Err(err);
1144 }
1145 Ok(())
1146}
1147
1148/// Reject a `/set` create object that carries a DID-bearing property, or
1149/// an update `PatchObject` that changes one (draft-atwood-jmap-did-00
1150/// §The `did` Property).
1151///
1152/// `entry` is one value from the `create` or `update` argument and
1153/// `did_properties` names the data type's DID-bearing properties, which the
1154/// consuming specification defines. `current` is `None` for a create and
1155/// the stored object for an update.
1156///
1157/// "Clients omit DID-bearing properties when creating objects, as
1158/// {{RFC8620}} Section 1.1 requires for server-set properties; an update
1159/// can include one only with its current value ({{RFC8620}} Section 5.3).
1160/// Servers MUST reject a create that includes a DID-bearing property, or an
1161/// update that changes one, with a [`SetError`] of type `invalidProperties`"
1162/// (draft-atwood-jmap-did-00 L247). So a create that names the property is
1163/// rejected whatever the value, even `null`. An update key equal to the
1164/// property name passes when its value equals the stored value, where an
1165/// absent stored property counts as `null`, the value's other type. A
1166/// `PatchObject` key is a path, and a key whose first segment is the property
1167/// name but has further segments always changes it, so it is rejected.
1168/// Keeping the value unchanged on the server side, including across a DID
1169/// migration, is the backend's job.
1170///
1171/// Returns `None` when `entry` is acceptable. Otherwise returns an
1172/// `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] whose `properties` lists every rejected
1173/// DID-bearing property, in `did_properties` order.
1174#[must_use]
1175pub fn reject_did_bearing_properties(
1176 entry: &Map<String, Value>,
1177 did_properties: &[&str],
1178 current: Option<&Map<String, Value>>,
1179) -> Option<SetError> {
1180 // ponytail: compares the raw first segment, without RFC 6901 `~0`/`~1`
1181 // decoding. That is exact for property names with no `~` or `/`, which
1182 // covers every DID-bearing name in the drafts.
1183 let rejected: Vec<&str> = did_properties
1184 .iter()
1185 .copied()
1186 .filter(|prop| {
1187 entry.iter().any(|(k, v)| {
1188 k.split('/').next() == Some(*prop)
1189 && !(k == prop
1190 && current
1191 .is_some_and(|stored| stored.get(*prop).unwrap_or(&Value::Null) == v))
1192 })
1193 })
1194 .collect();
1195 (!rejected.is_empty())
1196 .then(|| SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties).with_properties(rejected))
1197}
1198
1199/// Reject a `/set` create that carries a server-set property of `O`.
1200///
1201/// RFC 8620 §1.1: for a "server-set" property, "The client MUST NOT send
1202/// this property when creating a new object of this type."; RFC 8620 §5.3
1203/// makes such a record `invalidProperties`.
1204///
1205/// A `null` value asserts nothing and is treated as absent.
1206///
1207/// Returns `None` when `create` carries none of [`SetObject::SERVER_SET`]
1208/// with a non-null value. Otherwise returns an `invalidProperties`
1209/// [`SetError`] whose `properties` lists each one carried, in `SERVER_SET`
1210/// order.
1211#[must_use]
1212pub fn reject_server_set<O: SetObject>(create: &Map<String, Value>) -> Option<SetError> {
1213 let rejected: Vec<&str> = O::SERVER_SET
1214 .iter()
1215 .copied()
1216 .filter(|prop| create.get(*prop).is_some_and(|v| !v.is_null()))
1217 .collect();
1218 (!rejected.is_empty())
1219 .then(|| SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties).with_properties(rejected))
1220}
1221
1222/// Reject a `/set` update patch that names a server-set or immutable
1223/// property of `O`.
1224///
1225/// A patch key names a property when it equals the property name or starts
1226/// with `"<name>/"`, a JSON Pointer inside it (RFC 8620 §5.3). Changing a
1227/// [`SetObject::SERVER_SET`] property is `invalidProperties` (RFC 8620
1228/// §5.3), and a [`SetObject::IMMUTABLE`] value "MUST NOT change after the
1229/// object is created" (RFC 8620 §1.1).
1230///
1231/// `current` is the stored object, when the handler has it. RFC 8620 §5.3:
1232/// "Any server-set properties MAY be included in the patch if their value is
1233/// identical to the current server value", so a key that names the whole
1234/// property with its stored value passes. A key with further segments always
1235/// changes the property and is rejected.
1236///
1237/// Returns `None` when the patch names none. Otherwise returns an
1238/// `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] whose `properties` lists each property
1239/// named, `SERVER_SET` first, then `IMMUTABLE`, each in list order.
1240///
1241/// ponytail: compares the raw first segment, without RFC 6901 `~0`/`~1`
1242/// decoding, which is exact for property names with no `~` or `/`. With
1243/// `current` `None` an unchanged value is rejected too; a handler that can
1244/// fetch the stored object passes it.
1245#[must_use]
1246pub fn reject_read_only_patch<O: SetObject>(
1247 patch: &Map<String, Value>,
1248 current: Option<&Map<String, Value>>,
1249) -> Option<SetError> {
1250 let rejected: Vec<&str> = O::SERVER_SET
1251 .iter()
1252 .chain(O::IMMUTABLE)
1253 .copied()
1254 .filter(|prop| {
1255 patch.iter().any(|(k, v)| {
1256 k.split('/').next() == Some(*prop)
1257 && !(k == prop
1258 && current
1259 .is_some_and(|stored| stored.get(*prop).unwrap_or(&Value::Null) == v))
1260 })
1261 })
1262 .collect();
1263 (!rejected.is_empty())
1264 .then(|| SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties).with_properties(rejected))
1265}
1266
1267/// Whether patch key `key` names a [`SetObject::SERVER_SET`] or
1268/// [`SetObject::IMMUTABLE`] property of `O`: its first JSON Pointer segment
1269/// is the property name (RFC 8620 §5.3).
1270fn names_read_only<O: SetObject>(key: &str) -> bool {
1271 let prop = key.split('/').next().unwrap_or(key);
1272 O::SERVER_SET.contains(&prop) || O::IMMUTABLE.contains(&prop)
1273}
1274
1275/// Reject a `/set` update `patch` that changes a server-set or immutable
1276/// property of `O`, then drop the keys that repeat the stored value.
1277///
1278/// Runs [`reject_read_only_patch`] with `current`, the stored object. When
1279/// that passes, every key naming such a property holds its stored value
1280/// (RFC 8620 §5.3) and is removed, leaving only the client changes. An
1281/// empty result is a no-op update.
1282///
1283/// # Errors
1284///
1285/// The `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] from [`reject_read_only_patch`].
1286pub fn strip_read_only_patch<O: SetObject>(
1287 patch: &mut Map<String, Value>,
1288 current: Option<&Map<String, Value>>,
1289) -> Result<(), Box<SetError>> {
1290 if let Some(err) = reject_read_only_patch::<O>(patch, current) {
1291 return Err(Box::new(err));
1292 }
1293 patch.retain(|k, _| !names_read_only::<O>(k));
1294 Ok(())
1295}
1296
1297/// Check a `/set` update `patch` of the stored object `id` against the
1298/// server-set and immutable properties of `O`, and report a no-op.
1299///
1300/// RFC 8620 §5.3: "Any server-set properties MAY be included in the patch
1301/// if their value is identical to the current server value (before
1302/// applying the patches to the object). Otherwise, the update MUST be
1303/// rejected with an "invalidProperties" [`SetError`]." The stored object is
1304/// fetched only when the patch names such a property or is empty; then
1305/// [`strip_read_only_patch`] rejects a changed value and drops the
1306/// identical ones, leaving only the client changes for the handler's own
1307/// checks.
1308///
1309/// Returns `Ok(true)` when nothing is left to apply, for a literal `{}` or
1310/// a patch of identical server-set values: the update succeeds as a no-op,
1311/// with no write, `updated` mapping `id` to `null`, and the state unchanged.
1312/// A missing object is `notFound`, whether the patch is empty or names a
1313/// read-only key: existence is checked before shape, so a caller learns
1314/// nothing about the properties of an object it cannot see.
1315///
1316/// # Errors
1317///
1318/// The `notUpdated` value: `notFound` for a missing object, the
1319/// `invalidProperties` [`SetError`], or `serverFail` when the fetch fails.
1320pub async fn check_read_only_patch<B, O>(
1321 backend: &B,
1322 caller: &B::CallerCtx,
1323 account_id: &Id,
1324 id: &Id,
1325 patch: &mut Map<String, Value>,
1326) -> Result<bool, Value>
1327where
1328 B: JmapBackend,
1329 O: GetObject + SetObject + serde::Serialize + Send + Sync,
1330{
1331 if !patch.is_empty() && !patch.keys().any(|k| names_read_only::<O>(k)) {
1332 return Ok(false);
1333 }
1334 let (found, _) = backend
1335 .get_objects::<O>(caller, account_id, Some(std::slice::from_ref(id)), None)
1336 .await
1337 .map_err(|e| server_fail_value_from_backend(&e))?;
1338 let current = match found.first().map(serde_json::to_value).transpose() {
1339 Ok(Some(Value::Object(m))) => m,
1340 Ok(Some(_)) => {
1341 return Err(server_fail_value_from_backend(
1342 "stored object is not a JSON object",
1343 ));
1344 }
1345 Ok(None) => return Err(Value::from(&SetError::new(SetErrorType::NotFound))),
1346 Err(e) => return Err(server_fail_value_from_backend(&e)),
1347 };
1348 strip_read_only_patch::<O>(patch, Some(¤t)).map_err(|e| Value::from(&*e))?;
1349 Ok(patch.is_empty())
1350}
1351
1352/// Whether a client may change `prop` of `O` in a `/set` update: it is in
1353/// [`SetObject::CLIENT_SETTABLE`] and not in [`SetObject::IMMUTABLE`].
1354///
1355/// For a handler whose spec lists the update keys it supports, so that any
1356/// other property is rejected rather than checked against the read-only
1357/// lists.
1358#[must_use]
1359pub fn is_client_updatable<O: SetObject>(prop: &str) -> bool {
1360 O::CLIENT_SETTABLE.contains(&prop) && !O::IMMUTABLE.contains(&prop)
1361}
1362
1363/// Resolve an Id-typed value that may be a creation-id reference
1364/// (RFC 8620 §5.3).
1365///
1366/// A value starting with `#` names a record created earlier in the same
1367/// request; it resolves to that record's server-assigned id from
1368/// `created_ids` (pass [`crate::CallContext::created_ids`]). Any other
1369/// value is a literal id and is returned as is. `None` means a `#`
1370/// reference with no matching creation; the caller rejects the
1371/// create/update, typically with an `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] naming
1372/// the property.
1373///
1374/// References to creates in the *same* `/set` call are not in
1375/// `created_ids` yet; the handler orders and resolves those itself
1376/// (RFC 8620 §5.3).
1377pub fn resolve_creation_ref(
1378 raw: &str,
1379 created_ids: &std::collections::BTreeMap<Id, Id>,
1380) -> Option<Id> {
1381 match raw.strip_prefix('#') {
1382 Some(creation_id) => created_ids.get(&Id::from(creation_id)).cloned(),
1383 None => Some(Id::from(raw)),
1384 }
1385}
1386
1387/// A blobId-typed value with a `#creationId` reference (RFC 8620 §5.3)
1388/// replaced by the id an earlier method call of the request created, such
1389/// as a blob from `Blob/upload`, `Blob/set` or `Blob/convert`
1390/// (draft-ietf-jmap-blobext-03 §8, "later method calls").
1391///
1392/// `created_ids` is the request's creation id map
1393/// ([`crate::CallContext::created_ids`]). A literal, or a reference that
1394/// matches no earlier creation, comes back unchanged, so the method's own
1395/// blobId check rejects an unknown reference exactly as it rejects any
1396/// other value that is not an Id.
1397#[must_use]
1398pub fn resolve_blob_ref<'a>(raw: &'a str, created_ids: &BTreeMap<Id, Id>) -> Cow<'a, str> {
1399 if raw.starts_with('#')
1400 && let Some(id) = resolve_creation_ref(raw, created_ids)
1401 {
1402 return Cow::Owned(id.as_ref().to_owned());
1403 }
1404 Cow::Borrowed(raw)
1405}
1406
1407/// Check that every blobId under one of `keys` in a `/set` create object or
1408/// update patch is an Id (RFC 8620 §1.2), at any depth: a key such as
1409/// `"blobId"`, or a patch path whose last segment is one (such as
1410/// `"media/p/blobId"`). `null` passes; the type decides whether it is
1411/// allowed.
1412///
1413/// Returns an `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] naming the top-level property
1414/// that holds the first malformed value (such as `"media"` for a Media
1415/// object's `blobId`, RFC 9610 §2), or `None`. Whether the blob exists is
1416/// for the backend to check.
1417///
1418/// Run it after [`resolve_blob_refs`], so a `#creationId` naming an
1419/// earlier creation has become an Id and an unknown one is rejected here.
1420#[must_use]
1421pub fn check_blob_ids(obj: &Map<String, Value>, keys: &[&str]) -> Option<SetError> {
1422 fn bad(value: &Value, keys: &[&str]) -> bool {
1423 match value {
1424 Value::Object(map) => map.iter().any(|(key, v)| {
1425 let last = key.rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or(key);
1426 if keys.contains(&last) && !v.is_object() && !v.is_array() {
1427 match v {
1428 Value::Null => false,
1429 Value::String(s) => Id::new_validated(s.as_str()).is_err(),
1430 _ => true,
1431 }
1432 } else {
1433 bad(v, keys)
1434 }
1435 }),
1436 Value::Array(items) => items.iter().any(|v| bad(v, keys)),
1437 _ => false,
1438 }
1439 }
1440 obj.iter()
1441 .find(|(key, v)| {
1442 bad(
1443 &Value::Object(Map::from_iter([((*key).clone(), (*v).clone())])),
1444 keys,
1445 )
1446 })
1447 .map(|(key, _)| {
1448 let top = key.split('/').next().unwrap_or(key);
1449 SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties)
1450 .with_properties([top])
1451 .with_description("a blobId is not an Id (RFC 8620 §1.2)")
1452 })
1453}
1454
1455/// Rewrite the `update` keys and `destroy` entries of `/set` arguments that
1456/// are `#creationId` references (RFC 8620 §5.3) to the ids they name.
1457///
1458/// RFC 8620 §5.3 has a server order a call's creates "before their creation
1459/// ids are referenced by another create/update/destroy in the same call",
1460/// so an update or destroy may name a record created earlier in the
1461/// request by its creation id. A reference resolves first against
1462/// `created`, the call's own `created` map so far (creation id → object
1463/// with an `id`), then against `created_ids`, the request's map
1464/// ([`crate::CallContext::created_ids`]). A reference that names a create
1465/// still in `args`'s own `create` map, and not yet in `created`, is left
1466/// for the pass after the create phase: this call's create wins over an
1467/// earlier call's use of the same creation id. An unknown reference is
1468/// left as sent, so the handler rejects it as it rejects any other id that
1469/// is not an Id; responses then key a resolved entry by the real id.
1470///
1471/// [`Dispatcher::dispatch`](crate::Dispatcher::dispatch) runs it on every
1472/// `*/set` call before the handler, with an empty `created`, so earlier
1473/// calls' creations always resolve. A handler calls it again after its
1474/// create phase with the call's `created`, before updates and destroys
1475/// run, for references to its own creates.
1476pub fn resolve_set_id_refs(
1477 args: &mut Map<String, Value>,
1478 created_ids: &BTreeMap<Id, Id>,
1479 created: &Map<String, Value>,
1480) {
1481 let pending: BTreeSet<String> = match args.get("create") {
1482 Some(Value::Object(create)) => create
1483 .keys()
1484 .filter(|k| !created.contains_key(*k))
1485 .cloned()
1486 .collect(),
1487 _ => BTreeSet::new(),
1488 };
1489 let resolve = |raw: &str| -> Option<String> {
1490 let cid = raw.strip_prefix('#')?;
1491 if pending.contains(cid) {
1492 return None;
1493 }
1494 created
1495 .get(cid)
1496 .and_then(|obj| obj.get("id"))
1497 .and_then(Value::as_str)
1498 .map(str::to_owned)
1499 .or_else(|| {
1500 created_ids
1501 .get(&Id::from(cid))
1502 .map(|id| id.as_ref().to_owned())
1503 })
1504 };
1505 if let Some(Value::Object(update)) = args.get_mut("update")
1506 && update.keys().any(|k| resolve(k).is_some())
1507 {
1508 *update = std::mem::take(update)
1509 .into_iter()
1510 .map(|(k, v)| (resolve(&k).unwrap_or(k), v))
1511 .collect();
1512 }
1513 if let Some(Value::Array(destroy)) = args.get_mut("destroy") {
1514 for v in destroy {
1515 if let Value::String(raw) = v
1516 && let Some(id) = resolve(raw)
1517 {
1518 *raw = id;
1519 }
1520 }
1521 }
1522}
1523
1524/// Rewrite every blobId reference in a `/set` create object or update
1525/// patch through [`resolve_blob_ref`], before the handler parses it.
1526///
1527/// A string is rewritten when its object key is one of `keys` (such as
1528/// `"blobId"`), or a patch path whose last segment is one (such as
1529/// `"media/m1/blobId"`), at any depth. `blobIds`-style arrays are not
1530/// walked. Unknown references and literals are left for the handler's
1531/// own validation.
1532///
1533/// Pass the request's map, not one a handler grows with its own creates:
1534/// a blob is created by an earlier call, never by a create of this one.
1535pub fn resolve_blob_refs(value: &mut Value, keys: &[&str], created_ids: &BTreeMap<Id, Id>) {
1536 match value {
1537 Value::Object(map) => {
1538 for (key, v) in map.iter_mut() {
1539 let last = key.rsplit('/').next().unwrap_or(key);
1540 if let Value::String(raw) = v
1541 && keys.contains(&last)
1542 {
1543 if let Cow::Owned(id) = resolve_blob_ref(raw, created_ids) {
1544 *raw = id;
1545 }
1546 } else {
1547 resolve_blob_refs(v, keys, created_ids);
1548 }
1549 }
1550 }
1551 Value::Array(items) => {
1552 for v in items {
1553 resolve_blob_refs(v, keys, created_ids);
1554 }
1555 }
1556 _ => {}
1557 }
1558}
1559
1560/// The `id` a `/set` create handler fills in before parsing the create
1561/// object into its typed struct, whose `id` is required.
1562///
1563/// The builder passed to the backend overwrites it with the minted id, so
1564/// it never reaches storage or the wire. It must still satisfy RFC 8620
1565/// §1.2 (at least 1 octet, URL-safe base64 alphabet) because deserializing
1566/// an [`Id`] validates it.
1567pub const CREATE_ID_PLACEHOLDER: &str = "pending";
1568
1569/// Parse a client-supplied id: a `/set` `update` key, a `destroy` element
1570/// or an Id-typed property value.
1571///
1572/// RFC 8620 §1.2: an Id "MUST be at least 1 and a maximum of 255 octets in
1573/// size, and it MUST only contain characters from the 'URL and Filename
1574/// Safe' base64 alphabet". [`Id::from`] does not check this, so every
1575/// handler routes wire ids through here instead.
1576///
1577/// # Errors
1578///
1579/// A boxed `invalidProperties` [`SetError`] naming `property` (`"id"` for an
1580/// `update` key or `destroy` element) whose description says why the
1581/// value is not an Id. The caller records it in `notCreated`,
1582/// `notUpdated` or `notDestroyed` for that entry.
1583pub fn parse_wire_id(raw: &str, property: &str) -> Result<Id, Box<SetError>> {
1584 Id::new_validated(raw).map_err(|e| {
1585 Box::new(
1586 SetError::new(SetErrorType::InvalidProperties)
1587 .with_properties([property])
1588 .with_description(e.to_string()),
1589 )
1590 })
1591}
1592
1593/// `true` if `using` includes `urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata`
1594/// (draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-05 §3: the extensions "apply to requests
1595/// whose using includes urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata").
1596pub fn uses_metadata(using: &[String]) -> bool {
1597 using
1598 .iter()
1599 .any(|u| u == jmap_metadata_types::JMAP_METADATA_URI)
1600}
1601
1602/// draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-05 §3: the §3.6 filter conditions extend
1603/// `Foo/query` only for "requests whose using includes
1604/// urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata". Without it a metadata leaf anywhere in
1605/// `filter`, as `is_metadata` judges a condition, is `unsupportedFilter`
1606/// (RFC 8620 §5.5: "The filter is syntactically valid, but the server
1607/// cannot process it"). `Foo/query` and `Foo/queryChanges` handlers call
1608/// it once the filter is decoded.
1609///
1610/// # Errors
1611///
1612/// `unsupportedFilter` as above.
1613pub fn reject_metadata_filter_without_capability<T>(
1614 filter: Option<&jmap_types::Filter<T>>,
1615 is_metadata: fn(&T) -> bool,
1616 using: &[String],
1617) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1618 fn any_leaf<T>(f: &jmap_types::Filter<T>, is_metadata: fn(&T) -> bool) -> bool {
1619 match f {
1620 jmap_types::Filter::Condition(c) => is_metadata(c),
1621 jmap_types::Filter::Operator(op) => {
1622 op.conditions.iter().any(|f| any_leaf(f, is_metadata))
1623 }
1624 _ => false,
1625 }
1626 }
1627 if uses_metadata(using) || !filter.is_some_and(|f| any_leaf(f, is_metadata)) {
1628 return Ok(());
1629 }
1630 let mut err = JmapError::unsupported_filter();
1631 err.description = Some(
1632 "metadata filter conditions require urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata in using".to_owned(),
1633 );
1634 Err(err)
1635}
1636
1637/// [`reject_metadata_filter_without_capability`] on the undecoded
1638/// `filter` argument of a `Foo/query` or `Foo/queryChanges` request, for
1639/// handlers that pass `args` on to [`handle_query`](crate::handle_query)
1640/// or [`handle_query_changes`](crate::handle_query_changes) and so never
1641/// hold the decoded filter. A `filter` that does not decode is left for
1642/// that handler to report.
1643///
1644/// # Errors
1645///
1646/// `unsupportedFilter` for a -05 §3.6 condition without
1647/// `urn:ietf:params:jmap:metadata` in `using` (-05 §3).
1648pub fn reject_metadata_filter_arg<T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned>(
1649 args: &Value,
1650 is_metadata: fn(&T) -> bool,
1651 using: &[String],
1652) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
1653 if uses_metadata(using) {
1654 return Ok(());
1655 }
1656 let Some(raw) = args.get("filter").filter(|v| !v.is_null()) else {
1657 return Ok(());
1658 };
1659 match serde_json::from_value::<jmap_types::Filter<T>>(raw.clone()) {
1660 Ok(filter) => reject_metadata_filter_without_capability(Some(&filter), is_metadata, using),
1661 Err(_) => Ok(()),
1662 }
1663}
1664
1665/// Which part of one metadata property a `Foo/get` returns.
1666#[derive(Debug, Default)]
1667enum Selection {
1668 /// Not returned.
1669 #[default]
1670 Omit,
1671 /// The whole stored object.
1672 All,
1673 /// Only these namespaces (-05 §3.1 subselectors, combined by union).
1674 Namespaces(BTreeSet<String>),
1675}
1676
1677impl Selection {
1678 fn add_namespace(&mut self, ns: &str) {
1679 match self {
1680 Self::All => {}
1681 Self::Omit => *self = Self::Namespaces(BTreeSet::from([ns.to_owned()])),
1682 Self::Namespaces(set) => {
1683 set.insert(ns.to_owned());
1684 }
1685 }
1686 }
1687
1688 /// The value to return for a property stored as `stored`; absent and
1689 /// `null` are `{}` (-05 §2: "When returned, its value MUST be an
1690 /// object ({} when no metadata is set), never null").
1691 fn select(&self, stored: Option<&Value>) -> Option<Value> {
1692 let stored = stored.and_then(Value::as_object);
1693 match self {
1694 Self::Omit => None,
1695 Self::All => Some(Value::Object(stored.cloned().unwrap_or_default())),
1696 Self::Namespaces(set) => Some(Value::Object(
1697 stored
1698 .into_iter()
1699 .flatten()
1700 .filter(|(k, _)| set.contains(k.as_str()))
1701 .map(|(k, v)| (k.clone(), v.clone()))
1702 .collect(),
1703 )),
1704 }
1705 }
1706}
1707
1708/// How a `Foo/get` handler returns `metadata` and `privateMetadata`
1709/// (draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-05 §2 and §3.1).
1710///
1711/// Build one per request with [`MetadataProjection::new`], then call
1712/// [`MetadataProjection::apply`] on every returned object.
1713#[derive(Debug, Default)]
1714pub struct MetadataProjection {
1715 metadata: Selection,
1716 private_metadata: Selection,
1717}
1718
1719impl MetadataProjection {
1720 /// Build the projection for one `Foo/get` request.
1721 ///
1722 /// `properties` is the request's `properties` (`None` for the default
1723 /// list), `default_includes` is `false` for `Email/get`, whose
1724 /// "default property list ... is unchanged" (-05 §3.1), and `true` for
1725 /// every other type; `info` is the type's `DataTypeMetadataInfo`
1726 /// ([`JmapAccounts::metadata_info`](crate::JmapAccounts::metadata_info)),
1727 /// `None` when the type is not listed and so "does not gain the
1728 /// metadata or privateMetadata properties" (-05 §1.2.1). The rules:
1729 ///
1730 /// - Default list: both properties with the capability in `using`
1731 /// ("the server MUST include metadata and, where supportsPrivate is
1732 /// true, privateMetadata"), neither without it ("not default
1733 /// properties of Foo/get") (-05 §3, §3.1).
1734 /// - A root name returns the whole property, with or without the
1735 /// capability ("still returned when requested by name").
1736 /// - With the capability, `metadata/<namespace>` and
1737 /// `privateMetadata/<namespace>` return only the stored namespaces
1738 /// named; several combine by union and a root entry supersedes them.
1739 /// A namespace with no stored data is left out, which covers "A
1740 /// subselector naming a namespace that is not supported ... MUST be
1741 /// silently omitted ... unless the object has data stored under that
1742 /// namespace". Without the capability these entries are ignored like
1743 /// any other unknown property.
1744 /// - `privateMetadata` is never returned when `supportsPrivate` is
1745 /// false (-05 §2: "this property MUST NOT be returned").
1746 ///
1747 /// # Errors
1748 ///
1749 /// `invalidArguments` for an entry that begins with `metadata/` or
1750 /// `privateMetadata/` and is not followed by a namespace identifier
1751 /// (-05 §3.1: "Any other properties entry beginning with metadata/ or
1752 /// privateMetadata/ MUST be rejected with an "invalidArguments"
1753 /// method-level error").
1754 pub fn new(
1755 properties: Option<&[String]>,
1756 default_includes: bool,
1757 using: &[String],
1758 info: Option<&jmap_metadata_types::DataTypeMetadataInfo>,
1759 ) -> Result<Self, JmapError> {
1760 let Some(info) = info else {
1761 return Ok(Self::default());
1762 };
1763 let uses = uses_metadata(using);
1764 let mut projection = Self::default();
1765 match properties {
1766 None if uses && default_includes => {
1767 projection.metadata = Selection::All;
1768 projection.private_metadata = Selection::All;
1769 }
1770 None => {}
1771 Some(props) => {
1772 for p in props {
1773 let (root, ns) = p
1774 .split_once('/')
1775 .map_or((p.as_str(), None), |(r, n)| (r, Some(n)));
1776 let sel = match root {
1777 "metadata" => &mut projection.metadata,
1778 "privateMetadata" => &mut projection.private_metadata,
1779 _ => continue,
1780 };
1781 match ns {
1782 None => *sel = Selection::All,
1783 Some(_) if !uses => {}
1784 // A subselector names one namespace: nothing below
1785 // it ("metadata/<namespace>/<key>" is an error).
1786 // is_valid_namespace alone accepts '/' in a domain
1787 // label.
1788 Some(ns)
1789 if !ns.contains('/') && jmap_metadata_types::is_valid_namespace(ns) =>
1790 {
1791 sel.add_namespace(ns);
1792 }
1793 Some(_) => {
1794 return Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!(
1795 "properties: {p:?} is not a metadata subselector"
1796 )));
1797 }
1798 }
1799 }
1800 }
1801 }
1802 if !info.supports_private {
1803 projection.private_metadata = Selection::Omit;
1804 }
1805 Ok(projection)
1806 }
1807
1808 /// Set or remove `metadata` and `privateMetadata` on the response
1809 /// object `target` from the stored object `source`.
1810 pub fn apply(&self, source: &Value, target: &mut Value) {
1811 let Value::Object(target) = target else {
1812 return;
1813 };
1814 for (root, sel) in [
1815 ("metadata", &self.metadata),
1816 ("privateMetadata", &self.private_metadata),
1817 ] {
1818 match sel.select(source.get(root)) {
1819 Some(v) => {
1820 target.insert(root.to_owned(), v);
1821 }
1822 None => {
1823 target.remove(root);
1824 }
1825 }
1826 }
1827 }
1828}
1829
1830/// The values of an RFC 8620 §5.3 `PatchObject` placed at their JSON Pointer
1831/// paths in an empty object, so checks written for a whole object can see
1832/// what a patch writes: `{"links/l1/uri": "x"}` becomes
1833/// `{"links": {"l1": {"uri": "x"}}}`. Paths are split on `/` and unescaped
1834/// (RFC 6901 `~1`, `~0`); a path that runs through a value already placed
1835/// as a non-object is skipped. `null` values (removals) are skipped.
1836///
1837/// ```rust
1838/// use serde_json::json;
1839///
1840/// let patch = json!({ "links/l1/uri": "x", "name": null, "media": { "m": { "uri": "y" } } });
1841/// let placed = jmap_server::patch_values_as_object(patch.as_object().unwrap());
1842/// assert_eq!(placed, *json!({ "links": { "l1": { "uri": "x" } }, "media": { "m": { "uri": "y" } } }).as_object().unwrap());
1843/// ```
1844pub fn patch_values_as_object(patch: &Map<String, Value>) -> Map<String, Value> {
1845 let mut out = Map::new();
1846 'paths: for (path, value) in patch {
1847 if value.is_null() {
1848 continue;
1849 }
1850 let segments: Vec<String> = path
1851 .split('/')
1852 .map(|s| s.replace("~1", "/").replace("~0", "~"))
1853 .collect();
1854 let Some((last, parents)) = segments.split_last() else {
1855 continue;
1856 };
1857 let mut target = &mut out;
1858 for seg in parents {
1859 let entry = target
1860 .entry(seg.clone())
1861 .or_insert_with(|| Value::Object(Map::new()));
1862 match entry {
1863 Value::Object(m) => target = m,
1864 _ => continue 'paths,
1865 }
1866 }
1867 target.insert(last.clone(), value.clone());
1868 }
1869 out
1870}
1871
1872#[cfg(test)]
1873mod tests {
1874 use super::{
1875 MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH, MergePatchError, PatchPathError, apply_jmap_patch,
1876 apply_patch_object, check_blob_ids, civil_from_days, enforce_max_objects_in_set,
1877 extract_account_id, filter_arg, is_client_updatable, json_merge_patch, json_type_name,
1878 limit_or_max, now_utc_string, parse_max_changes, parse_wire_id, query_anchor_args,
1879 reject_did_bearing_properties, reject_read_only_patch, reject_server_set, resolve_blob_ref,
1880 resolve_blob_refs, resolve_creation_ref, resolve_query_offset, resolve_query_start,
1881 resolve_set_id_refs, signed_seconds_since_epoch, utc_date_from_epoch_millis,
1882 utc_date_from_epoch_seconds,
1883 };
1884 use jmap_types::{Id, PushSubscription, UTCDate};
1885 use serde_json::json;
1886
1887 fn props(e: Option<crate::backend::SetError>) -> Option<Vec<String>> {
1888 e.map(|e| {
1889 serde_json::from_value(serde_json::to_value(e).unwrap()["properties"].clone()).unwrap()
1890 })
1891 }
1892
1893 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §7.2, `id` is "(immutable; server-set)" and the
1894 /// other properties are client-sent. RFC 8620 §1.1: "The client MUST
1895 /// NOT send this property when creating". A null `id` is treated as
1896 /// absent.
1897 #[test]
1898 fn reject_server_set_names_server_set_create_properties() {
1899 let ok = json!({"id": null, "deviceClientId": "d", "url": "https://x.example/"});
1900 assert_eq!(
1901 props(reject_server_set::<PushSubscription>(
1902 ok.as_object().unwrap()
1903 )),
1904 None
1905 );
1906 let bad = json!({"id": "p1", "deviceClientId": "d"});
1907 assert_eq!(
1908 props(reject_server_set::<PushSubscription>(
1909 bad.as_object().unwrap()
1910 )),
1911 Some(vec!["id".to_owned()])
1912 );
1913 }
1914
1915 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §7.2, `id` is server-set, `deviceClientId`, `url`
1916 /// and `keys` are "(immutable)", `expires` and `types` carry no
1917 /// attribute. `keys/auth` points inside `keys`; `urlX` is another name.
1918 #[test]
1919 fn reject_read_only_patch_names_server_set_and_immutable_keys() {
1920 let ok = json!({"expires": null, "types": ["Email"], "urlX": 1});
1921 assert_eq!(
1922 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1923 ok.as_object().unwrap(),
1924 None
1925 )),
1926 None
1927 );
1928 let bad = json!({"keys/auth": "a", "id": "p2", "url": "https://y.example/"});
1929 assert_eq!(
1930 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1931 bad.as_object().unwrap(),
1932 None
1933 )),
1934 Some(vec!["id".to_owned(), "url".to_owned(), "keys".to_owned()])
1935 );
1936 }
1937
1938 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §7.2: `id` is "(immutable; server-set)",
1939 /// `deviceClientId` is "(immutable)", `expires` carries no attribute;
1940 /// `nope` is not a PushSubscription property.
1941 #[test]
1942 fn is_client_updatable_excludes_server_set_immutable_and_unknown() {
1943 assert!(is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("expires"));
1944 assert!(!is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("id"));
1945 assert!(!is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("deviceClientId"));
1946 assert!(!is_client_updatable::<PushSubscription>("nope"));
1947 }
1948
1949 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3, "Any server-set properties MAY be included in
1950 /// the patch if their value is identical to the current server value
1951 /// ... Otherwise, the update MUST be rejected with an
1952 /// "invalidProperties" SetError." `keys/auth` points inside `keys`, so
1953 /// it changes it even when the leaf value matches.
1954 #[test]
1955 fn reject_read_only_patch_allows_unchanged_whole_values() {
1956 let stored = json!({"id": "p1", "url": "https://x.example/", "keys": {"auth": "a"}});
1957 let stored = stored.as_object().unwrap();
1958 let same = json!({"id": "p1", "url": "https://x.example/"});
1959 assert_eq!(
1960 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1961 same.as_object().unwrap(),
1962 Some(stored)
1963 )),
1964 None
1965 );
1966 let changed = json!({"id": "p1", "url": "https://y.example/", "keys/auth": "a"});
1967 assert_eq!(
1968 props(reject_read_only_patch::<PushSubscription>(
1969 changed.as_object().unwrap(),
1970 Some(stored)
1971 )),
1972 Some(vec!["url".to_owned(), "keys".to_owned()])
1973 );
1974 }
1975
1976 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "the client refers to the new record
1977 /// using its creation id prefixed with a '#'"; the RFC 8620 §5.3
1978 /// example request sets `"subTodoIds": [ "#k15" ]` after creating
1979 /// `k15`. A bare value is an ordinary id.
1980 #[test]
1981 fn resolve_creation_ref_maps_hash_refs_and_passes_literals() {
1982 let created = std::collections::BTreeMap::from([(Id::from("k15"), Id::from("T15"))]);
1983 assert_eq!(
1984 resolve_creation_ref("#k15", &created),
1985 Some(Id::from("T15"))
1986 );
1987 assert_eq!(resolve_creation_ref("k15", &created), Some(Id::from("k15")));
1988 assert_eq!(resolve_creation_ref("#k16", &created), None);
1989 }
1990
1991 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 (a `#` reference resolves to the id created
1992 /// earlier in the request); draft-ietf-jmap-blobext-03 §8 (a blob
1993 /// created earlier is named that way). Unknown references pass through.
1994 #[test]
1995 fn resolve_blob_ref_resolves_known_refs_only() {
1996 let created = std::collections::BTreeMap::from([(Id::from("b1"), Id::from("G1"))]);
1997 assert_eq!(resolve_blob_ref("#b1", &created), "G1");
1998 assert_eq!(resolve_blob_ref("#b2", &created), "#b2");
1999 assert_eq!(resolve_blob_ref("b1", &created), "b1");
2000 }
2001
2002 /// RFC 9610 §2 Media `blobId` (nested in a map), a patch path ending in
2003 /// `blobId`, a list of parts, and other keys left alone.
2004 #[test]
2005 fn resolve_blob_refs_walks_nested_values_and_patch_paths() {
2006 let created = std::collections::BTreeMap::from([(Id::from("b1"), Id::from("G1"))]);
2007 let mut v = serde_json::json!({
2008 "media": {"m1": {"blobId": "#b1", "uri": "#b1"}},
2009 "media/m2/blobId": "#b1",
2010 "parts": [{"blobId": "#b1"}, {"blobId": "#nope"}],
2011 "iconBlobId": "#b1",
2012 "parentId": "#b1"
2013 });
2014 resolve_blob_refs(&mut v, &["blobId", "iconBlobId"], &created);
2015 assert_eq!(
2016 v,
2017 serde_json::json!({
2018 "media": {"m1": {"blobId": "G1", "uri": "#b1"}},
2019 "media/m2/blobId": "G1",
2020 "parts": [{"blobId": "G1"}, {"blobId": "#nope"}],
2021 "iconBlobId": "G1",
2022 "parentId": "#b1"
2023 })
2024 );
2025 }
2026
2027 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — creates happen "before their creation ids
2028 /// are referenced by another create/update/destroy in the same call",
2029 /// so update keys and destroy ids may be creation ids, from this call
2030 /// or an earlier one. Unknown references and literals stay as sent.
2031 #[test]
2032 fn resolve_set_id_refs_rewrites_update_keys_and_destroy_ids() {
2033 let earlier = std::collections::BTreeMap::from([(Id::from("e"), Id::from("E1"))]);
2034 let created = serde_json::json!({"c": {"id": "C1"}});
2035 let mut args = serde_json::json!({
2036 "update": {"#e": {"a": 1}, "#c": {"b": 2}, "#nope": {}, "lit": {}},
2037 "destroy": ["#e", "#c", "#nope", "lit"]
2038 });
2039 resolve_set_id_refs(
2040 args.as_object_mut().expect("object"),
2041 &earlier,
2042 created.as_object().expect("object"),
2043 );
2044 assert_eq!(
2045 args,
2046 serde_json::json!({
2047 "update": {"E1": {"a": 1}, "C1": {"b": 2}, "#nope": {}, "lit": {}},
2048 "destroy": ["E1", "C1", "#nope", "lit"]
2049 })
2050 );
2051 }
2052
2053 /// RFC 9610 §2 Media `blobId: Id`; RFC 8620 §1.2 Id syntax. A
2054 /// malformed value names the top-level property, whether nested, a
2055 /// patch path, or a whole replaced object; `null` and valid Ids pass.
2056 #[test]
2057 fn check_blob_ids_names_the_top_level_property() {
2058 let check = |v: serde_json::Value| {
2059 check_blob_ids(v.as_object().expect("object"), &["blobId"])
2060 .map(|e| serde_json::Value::from(&e)["properties"].clone())
2061 };
2062 assert_eq!(
2063 check(serde_json::json!({"media": {"p": {"blobId": "G1"}}})),
2064 None
2065 );
2066 assert_eq!(
2067 check(serde_json::json!({"media": {"p": {"blobId": null}}})),
2068 None
2069 );
2070 assert_eq!(
2071 check(serde_json::json!({"name": "x", "media": {"p": {"blobId": "#nope"}}})),
2072 Some(serde_json::json!(["media"]))
2073 );
2074 assert_eq!(
2075 check(serde_json::json!({"media/p/blobId": 7})),
2076 Some(serde_json::json!(["media"]))
2077 );
2078 assert_eq!(
2079 check(serde_json::json!({"locations/r": {"links": {"m": {"blobId": "a b"}}}})),
2080 Some(serde_json::json!(["locations"]))
2081 );
2082 }
2083
2084 /// A creation id this call is about to create shadows an earlier
2085 /// call's: before the create phase it stays as sent.
2086 #[test]
2087 fn resolve_set_id_refs_leaves_this_calls_pending_creates() {
2088 let earlier = std::collections::BTreeMap::from([(Id::from("x"), Id::from("OLD"))]);
2089 let mut args = serde_json::json!({
2090 "create": {"x": {}},
2091 "update": {"#x": {}},
2092 "destroy": ["#x"]
2093 });
2094 let map = args.as_object_mut().expect("object");
2095 resolve_set_id_refs(map, &earlier, &serde_json::Map::new());
2096 assert_eq!(map["update"], serde_json::json!({"#x": {}}));
2097 assert_eq!(map["destroy"], serde_json::json!(["#x"]));
2098 let created = serde_json::json!({"x": {"id": "NEW"}});
2099 resolve_set_id_refs(map, &earlier, created.as_object().expect("object"));
2100 assert_eq!(map["update"], serde_json::json!({"NEW": {}}));
2101 assert_eq!(map["destroy"], serde_json::json!(["NEW"]));
2102 }
2103
2104 /// RFC 8620 §1.2: 1 to 255 octets from `A-Za-z0-9`, `-` and `_`.
2105 #[test]
2106 fn parse_wire_id_enforces_rfc8620_id_syntax() {
2107 assert_eq!(parse_wire_id("aZ09-_", "id"), Ok(Id::from("aZ09-_")));
2108 assert!(parse_wire_id(&"a".repeat(255), "id").is_ok());
2109 for bad in [
2110 "",
2111 "has space",
2112 "line\nbreak",
2113 "#c1",
2114 "a=",
2115 &"a".repeat(256),
2116 ] {
2117 let err = parse_wire_id(bad, "mailboxId").unwrap_err();
2118 assert_eq!(
2119 serde_json::to_value(&err).unwrap()["type"],
2120 "invalidProperties",
2121 "{bad:?}"
2122 );
2123 assert_eq!(
2124 err.properties.as_deref(),
2125 Some(&["mailboxId".to_owned()][..])
2126 );
2127 }
2128 }
2129
2130 #[test]
2131 fn query_anchor_args_rejects_non_id_anchor() {
2132 let args = serde_json::json!({ "anchor": "not an id" });
2133 let err = query_anchor_args(args.as_object().unwrap()).unwrap_err();
2134 assert_eq!(
2135 err.error_type,
2136 jmap_types::MethodErrorType::InvalidArguments
2137 );
2138 let args = serde_json::json!({ "anchor": "m1", "anchorOffset": -1 });
2139 assert_eq!(
2140 query_anchor_args(args.as_object().unwrap()).unwrap(),
2141 (Some(Id::from("m1")), -1)
2142 );
2143 }
2144
2145 #[derive(Debug, serde::Deserialize)]
2146 #[serde(rename_all = "camelCase", deny_unknown_fields)]
2147 struct NameCond {
2148 name: Option<String>,
2149 }
2150
2151 // draft-atwood-jmap-did-00 L247 (jmap-chat-spec 6bcd9d8): "Clients omit
2152 // DID-bearing properties when creating objects, as {{RFC8620}} Section
2153 // 1.1 requires for server-set properties; an update can include one only
2154 // with its current value ({{RFC8620}} Section 5.3). Servers MUST reject a
2155 // create that includes a DID-bearing property, or an update that changes
2156 // one, with a SetError of type `invalidProperties`, listing the
2157 // DID-bearing property name in the `properties` array."
2158 fn did_entry(v: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> {
2159 v.as_object().cloned().expect("object")
2160 }
2161
2162 fn invalid_did() -> serde_json::Value {
2163 json!({ "type": "invalidProperties", "properties": ["did"] })
2164 }
2165
2166 #[test]
2167 fn did_create_with_did_property_is_invalid_properties() {
2168 let entry = did_entry(json!({
2169 "name": "x",
2170 "did": "did:key:z6MkhaXgBZDvotDkL5257faiztiGiC2QtKLGpbnnEGta2doK"
2171 }));
2172 let err = reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], None).expect("L247: MUST reject");
2173 assert_eq!(
2174 serde_json::to_value(&err).expect("serialize"),
2175 invalid_did()
2176 );
2177 }
2178
2179 #[test]
2180 fn did_create_with_null_did_is_still_rejected() {
2181 // L247: "a create that includes a DID-bearing property"; null is included.
2182 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "did": null }));
2183 assert!(reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], None).is_some());
2184 }
2185
2186 #[test]
2187 fn did_lists_every_did_bearing_property_named() {
2188 // L247 rejects each included DID-bearing property. The two names
2189 // here are arbitrary DID-bearing names the caller declares; the
2190 // `properties` array follows `did_properties` order, not key order.
2191 let entry = did_entry(json!({
2192 "ownerDid": "did:web:example.com",
2193 "did": "did:web:example.org"
2194 }));
2195 let err = reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did", "ownerDid"], None)
2196 .expect("L247: MUST reject");
2197 assert_eq!(
2198 err.properties,
2199 Some(vec!["did".to_owned(), "ownerDid".to_owned()])
2200 );
2201 }
2202
2203 #[test]
2204 fn did_update_with_current_value_passes() {
2205 // L247: "an update can include one only with its current value".
2206 let stored = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a", "did": "did:web:example.com" }));
2207 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "name": "y", "did": "did:web:example.com" }));
2208 assert_eq!(
2209 reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], Some(&stored)),
2210 None
2211 );
2212
2213 let stored_null = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a", "did": null }));
2214 let entry_null = did_entry(json!({ "did": null }));
2215 assert_eq!(
2216 reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry_null, &["did"], Some(&stored_null)),
2217 None
2218 );
2219 }
2220
2221 #[test]
2222 fn did_update_with_null_over_absent_did_passes() {
2223 // L247: "an update can include one only with its current value".
2224 // RFC 8620 §5.3: "null ... to remove it (or reset it to its
2225 // default value)", so an absent property's current value is null.
2226 let stored = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a" }));
2227 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "did": null }));
2228 assert_eq!(
2229 reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], Some(&stored)),
2230 None
2231 );
2232 }
2233
2234 #[test]
2235 fn did_update_that_changes_did_is_rejected() {
2236 // L247: "Servers MUST reject ... an update that changes one". A
2237 // different value, null over a stored DID, and a path under the
2238 // property ("did/x", RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject path) all change it.
2239 let stored = did_entry(json!({ "id": "a", "did": "did:web:example.com" }));
2240 for entry in [
2241 did_entry(json!({ "did": "did:web:example.org" })),
2242 did_entry(json!({ "did": null })),
2243 did_entry(json!({ "did/x": 1 })),
2244 ] {
2245 let err = reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], Some(&stored))
2246 .expect("L247: update that changes one");
2247 assert_eq!(
2248 serde_json::to_value(&err).expect("serialize"),
2249 invalid_did()
2250 );
2251 }
2252 }
2253
2254 #[test]
2255 fn did_entry_without_did_bearing_property_passes() {
2256 // A property whose name merely starts with "did" is not "did".
2257 let entry = did_entry(json!({ "name": "x", "didx": 1, "keywords/did": true }));
2258 assert_eq!(reject_did_bearing_properties(&entry, &["did"], None), None);
2259 }
2260
2261 fn filter_of(v: serde_json::Value) -> Result<Option<NameCond>, jmap_types::JmapError> {
2262 let mut args = json!({ "filter": v }).as_object().cloned().expect("object");
2263 filter_arg::<NameCond>(&mut args)
2264 }
2265
2266 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.5 — "unsupportedFilter: The "filter" is
2267 /// syntactically valid, but the server cannot process it"; RFC 8620
2268 /// §3.6.2 — invalidArguments for an argument of the wrong type.
2269 /// Hand-written JSON inputs.
2270 #[test]
2271 fn filter_arg_maps_object_and_non_object_failures() {
2272 assert!(filter_of(json!(null)).expect("null").is_none());
2273 let cond = filter_of(json!({ "name": "x" })).expect("known key");
2274 assert_eq!(cond.and_then(|c| c.name).as_deref(), Some("x"));
2275 let err = filter_of(json!({ "label": "x" })).expect_err("unknown key");
2276 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "unsupportedFilter");
2277 assert!(
2278 err.description
2279 .as_deref()
2280 .is_some_and(|d| d.contains("label")),
2281 "{err:?}"
2282 );
2283 let err = filter_of(json!(42)).expect_err("scalar");
2284 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
2285 }
2286
2287 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-wlip.5): a malformed accountId — empty string,
2288 /// containing forbidden ASCII characters, or exceeding 255 bytes —
2289 /// MUST surface as `invalidArguments`, not silently pass through to
2290 /// the backend's `account_exists` call.
2291 ///
2292 /// Test vectors hand-built from RFC 8620 §1.2's Id grammar
2293 /// (SAFE-CHAR = `%x21 / %x23-7E`).
2294 #[test]
2295 fn extract_account_id_rejects_malformed_id() {
2296 // Empty string.
2297 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "" }))
2298 .expect_err("empty accountId must fail validation");
2299 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
2300
2301 // Contains a space (0x20 — outside SAFE-CHAR's 0x21+ lower bound).
2302 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "my account" }))
2303 .expect_err("space in accountId must fail validation");
2304 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
2305
2306 // Contains a DQUOTE (0x22 — explicitly excluded by SAFE-CHAR).
2307 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "a\"b" }))
2308 .expect_err("DQUOTE in accountId must fail validation");
2309 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
2310
2311 // 256 bytes — exceeds the 255 cap.
2312 let long: String = "a".repeat(256);
2313 let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": long }))
2314 .expect_err("over-long accountId must fail validation");
2315 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments");
2316 }
2317
2318 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-wlip.5): a well-formed accountId passes
2319 /// validation and is returned intact. Positive control paired with
2320 /// the rejection test above.
2321 ///
2322 /// Also pins (bd:JMAP-jfia.9): the returned args map MUST NOT
2323 /// contain accountId. The helper consumes the field rather than
2324 /// leaving it as a residual key for downstream handlers to
2325 /// re-parse or surface as "unexpected key".
2326 #[test]
2327 fn extract_account_id_accepts_well_formed_id() {
2328 let (id, rest) = extract_account_id(json!({
2329 "accountId": "u123-abc_DEF",
2330 "ids": ["e1", "e2"]
2331 }))
2332 .expect("well-formed accountId must pass validation");
2333 assert_eq!(id.as_ref(), "u123-abc_DEF");
2334 // Remaining args still contain the unrelated keys.
2335 assert!(rest.contains_key("ids"));
2336 // accountId MUST have been removed from the args map
2337 // (bd:JMAP-jfia.9). matches optional_arg's consume semantics.
2338 assert!(
2339 !rest.contains_key("accountId"),
2340 "accountId must be removed from args after extraction"
2341 );
2342 }
2343
2344 /// Test vectors derived independently with Python's `datetime.date` module.
2345 /// `days` is the count of days since 1970-01-01.
2346 #[test]
2347 fn civil_from_days_known_dates() {
2348 let cases: &[(i64, (i32, u8, u8))] = &[
2349 (0, (1970, 1, 1)), // Unix epoch
2350 (365, (1971, 1, 1)), // one year later (1970 is not a leap year)
2351 (10957, (2000, 1, 1)), // Y2K
2352 (11016, (2000, 2, 29)), // leap day in a century-divisible leap year
2353 (11017, (2000, 3, 1)), // day after the leap day (era boundary in algorithm)
2354 (19358, (2023, 1, 1)), // a recent non-leap year start
2355 (19722, (2023, 12, 31)), // end of 2023
2356 (19782, (2024, 2, 29)), // leap day in 2024
2357 (19783, (2024, 3, 1)), // day after 2024 leap day
2358 ];
2359
2360 for &(days, expected) in cases {
2361 assert_eq!(
2362 civil_from_days(days),
2363 Some(expected),
2364 "civil_from_days({days}) mismatch"
2365 );
2366 }
2367 }
2368
2369 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.2): civil_from_days MUST return None rather
2370 /// than panic on inputs whose computed year overflows i32. The
2371 /// Hinnant algorithm's intermediate `y = yoe + era * 400` value is
2372 /// bounded by `i64::MAX / 146_097 ≈ ±6.3e13`, only a thin slice of
2373 /// which fits in i32. The outer `now_utc_string_checked`
2374 /// u64→i64 sentinel only catches u64 seconds exceeding `i64::MAX`,
2375 /// so corrupted-clock inputs between the i32-year boundary and
2376 /// i64::MAX reach this function. A panic here would surface as
2377 /// serverFail under dispatcher task::spawn isolation — degraded,
2378 /// but a contract violation versus the function's "fallible
2379 /// without panicking" contract.
2380 ///
2381 /// Test vectors: the maximum days-from-epoch derived from
2382 /// i64::MAX seconds (the regime that reaches civil_from_days
2383 /// after passing the outer u64→i64 sentinel), and the symmetric
2384 /// negative case. These years are deep enough into the i64
2385 /// algorithm range to definitely overflow i32. Plus a
2386 /// non-overflowing positive control just below the threshold to
2387 /// prove the boundary check fires only when warranted.
2388 #[test]
2389 fn civil_from_days_returns_none_on_year_overflow() {
2390 // i64::MAX / 86400 ≈ 1.07e14 days → year ≈ 2.92e11, well past i32::MAX (~2.15e9).
2391 let max_days = i64::MAX / 86400;
2392 assert_eq!(
2393 civil_from_days(max_days),
2394 None,
2395 "i64::MAX / 86400 days must overflow i32 year"
2396 );
2397
2398 // i64::MIN / 86400 ≈ -1.07e14 days — symmetric negative case.
2399 let min_days = i64::MIN / 86400;
2400 assert_eq!(
2401 civil_from_days(min_days),
2402 None,
2403 "i64::MIN / 86400 days must overflow i32 year"
2404 );
2405
2406 // Positive control: a far-future but i32-fitting year should
2407 // still succeed. Year ~58_798_075 (from 10 * i32::MAX days)
2408 // fits in i32 with room to spare, so this MUST return Some.
2409 let year_58m_days = 10_i64 * i64::from(i32::MAX);
2410 let result = civil_from_days(year_58m_days);
2411 assert!(
2412 result.is_some(),
2413 "i32-fitting year must return Some; got {result:?}"
2414 );
2415 }
2416
2417 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): now_utc_string_checked MUST return
2418 /// `Some(UTCDate)` on a sane clock (every host the test runs on
2419 /// in practice). The civil_from_days_returns_none_on_year_overflow
2420 /// test above pins the underlying None-on-corrupted-clock
2421 /// behaviour at the algorithm level; this test pins the
2422 /// happy-path contract: a sane clock yields the typed wire format,
2423 /// not a sentinel string.
2424 #[test]
2425 fn now_utc_string_checked_returns_some_on_sane_clock() {
2426 use super::now_utc_string_checked;
2427 let dt = now_utc_string_checked().expect(
2428 "test host clock must be reasonable enough for now_utc_string_checked to succeed",
2429 );
2430 let s: &str = dt.as_ref();
2431 assert!(
2432 UTCDate::new_validated(s).is_ok(),
2433 "must be an RFC 8620 §1.4 UTCDate: {s:?}"
2434 );
2435 }
2436
2437 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): now_utc_string (the panicking variant)
2438 /// MUST agree with now_utc_string_checked on a sane clock — i.e.
2439 /// the .expect() in now_utc_string does not introduce a wire-format
2440 /// discrepancy versus the Option-returning variant.
2441 #[test]
2442 fn now_utc_string_matches_checked_variant_on_sane_clock() {
2443 use super::now_utc_string_checked;
2444 let panicky = now_utc_string();
2445 let checked = now_utc_string_checked().expect("test host clock must be reasonable");
2446 // Both calls observe SystemTime::now() at slightly different
2447 // instants; the seconds part can differ if the test runs across
2448 // a second boundary. Compare the prefix up to the seconds
2449 // resolution.
2450 let panicky_s: &str = panicky.as_ref();
2451 let checked_s: &str = checked.as_ref();
2452 // Compare the date portion only (YYYY-MM-DD, 10 chars).
2453 assert_eq!(
2454 &panicky_s[..10],
2455 &checked_s[..10],
2456 "date portions must match: panicky={panicky_s:?} checked={checked_s:?}"
2457 );
2458 }
2459
2460 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @<secs> +%FT%TZ` (coreutils), plus the
2461 /// RFC 8620 §7.2.3 example expiry (rfc8620.txt:3879) and the RFC 8620
2462 /// §1.4 example date. -62167219200 is 0000-01-01T00:00:00Z; one second
2463 /// earlier is year -1, which the four-digit form cannot express.
2464 #[test]
2465 fn utc_date_from_epoch_seconds_known_values() {
2466 for (secs, expected) in [
2467 (0, Some("1970-01-01T00:00:00Z")),
2468 (-1, Some("1969-12-31T23:59:59Z")),
2469 (1_414_649_520, Some("2014-10-30T06:12:00Z")),
2470 (1_531_448_069, Some("2018-07-13T02:14:29Z")),
2471 (253_402_300_799, Some("9999-12-31T23:59:59Z")),
2472 (253_402_300_800, None),
2473 (-62_167_219_200, Some("0000-01-01T00:00:00Z")),
2474 (-62_167_219_201, None),
2475 ] {
2476 assert_eq!(
2477 utc_date_from_epoch_seconds(secs)
2478 .as_ref()
2479 .map(AsRef::as_ref),
2480 expected,
2481 "secs = {secs}"
2482 );
2483 }
2484 }
2485
2486 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @1414649520 +%FT%TZ` gives
2487 /// 2014-10-30T06:12:00Z (also the RFC 8620 §1.4 example). RFC 8620
2488 /// §1.4: "the "time-secfrac" MUST always be omitted if zero"
2489 /// (rfc8620.txt:346-347), so zero millis yield the 20-char form.
2490 #[test]
2491 fn utc_date_from_epoch_millis_omits_zero_secfrac() {
2492 for (millis, expected) in [
2493 (0, "2014-10-30T06:12:00Z"),
2494 (1, "2014-10-30T06:12:00.001Z"),
2495 (120, "2014-10-30T06:12:00.120Z"),
2496 (999, "2014-10-30T06:12:00.999Z"),
2497 ] {
2498 let d = utc_date_from_epoch_millis(1_414_649_520, millis).unwrap();
2499 assert_eq!(d.as_ref(), expected, "millis = {millis}");
2500 assert!(UTCDate::new_validated(expected).is_ok(), "{expected}");
2501 }
2502 }
2503
2504 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @<secs> +%FT%TZ` (coreutils). Pre-epoch
2505 /// seconds must take the time of day from the floored day, not from
2506 /// truncating division (bd:JMAP-yt1w.40: -1 used to yield 00:00:59).
2507 #[test]
2508 fn utc_date_from_epoch_millis_pre_epoch_time_of_day() {
2509 for (secs, expected) in [
2510 (-1, "1969-12-31T23:59:59Z"),
2511 (-61, "1969-12-31T23:58:59Z"),
2512 (-3601, "1969-12-31T22:59:59Z"),
2513 (-86401, "1969-12-30T23:59:59Z"),
2514 (-90061, "1969-12-30T22:58:59Z"),
2515 ] {
2516 let d = utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs, 0).unwrap();
2517 assert_eq!(d.as_ref(), expected, "secs = {secs}");
2518 }
2519 }
2520
2521 /// Oracle: GNU `date -u -d @<secs> +%FT%T.%3NZ` (coreutils), which
2522 /// floors to the millisecond. Pre-epoch sub-second clocks used to
2523 /// format as -s + millis instead of -s - millis (bd:JMAP-yt1w.46).
2524 #[test]
2525 fn signed_seconds_since_epoch_pre_epoch_subsec() {
2526 use std::time::{Duration, UNIX_EPOCH};
2527 for (before, expected) in [
2528 (Duration::from_millis(1200), "1969-12-31T23:59:58.800Z"),
2529 (Duration::from_millis(500), "1969-12-31T23:59:59.500Z"),
2530 (Duration::from_micros(1_200_500), "1969-12-31T23:59:58.799Z"),
2531 (
2532 Duration::from_millis(86_400_001),
2533 "1969-12-30T23:59:59.999Z",
2534 ),
2535 (Duration::from_secs(1), "1969-12-31T23:59:59Z"),
2536 ] {
2537 let (secs, millis) = signed_seconds_since_epoch(UNIX_EPOCH - before).unwrap();
2538 let d = utc_date_from_epoch_millis(secs, millis).unwrap();
2539 assert_eq!(d.as_ref(), expected, "before = {before:?}");
2540 }
2541 }
2542
2543 #[test]
2544 fn now_utc_string_format() {
2545 // bd:JMAP-wlip.20 — return type is UTCDate; AsRef<str> gives
2546 // the underlying wire-format string for shape assertions.
2547 let dt = now_utc_string();
2548 let s: &str = dt.as_ref();
2549 // YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.mmmZ (24 chars), or YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ
2550 // (20 chars) when the milliseconds are zero (RFC 8620 §1.4).
2551 assert!(s.len() == 24 || s.len() == 20, "unexpected length: {s}");
2552 assert!(s.ends_with('Z'), "must end with Z: {s}");
2553 assert_eq!(&s[4..5], "-", "missing year-month separator: {s}");
2554 assert_eq!(&s[7..8], "-", "missing month-day separator: {s}");
2555 assert_eq!(&s[10..11], "T", "missing date-time separator: {s}");
2556 assert_eq!(&s[13..14], ":", "missing hour-minute separator: {s}");
2557 assert_eq!(&s[16..17], ":", "missing minute-second separator: {s}");
2558 if s.len() == 24 {
2559 assert_eq!(&s[19..20], ".", "missing decimal point before millis: {s}");
2560 assert!(
2561 s[20..23].chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()),
2562 "milliseconds must be 3 digits: {s}"
2563 );
2564 }
2565 assert!(
2566 s.starts_with("20"),
2567 "year should start with 20 in 21st century: {s}"
2568 );
2569 }
2570
2571 // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
2572 // json_merge_patch (RFC 7396)
2573 //
2574 // Test oracles are hand-built JSON values derived from RFC 7396 §2 and §3
2575 // examples, plus the regression case from bd:JMAP-sc1b.87. No oracle is
2576 // computed by the function under test (test-integrity rule from
2577 // workspace AGENTS.md).
2578 // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
2579
2580 /// Oracle: bd:JMAP-sc1b.97 — a 1000-deep merge patch must NOT crash
2581 /// via stack overflow. The depth cap returns
2582 /// [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] beyond [`MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`]
2583 /// rather than recursing further.
2584 ///
2585 /// The test does not use the function as its own oracle: the input
2586 /// is hand-built (a 1000-deep `{ "a": { "a": ... { "a": {} } } }`
2587 /// chain where every level is Object, matching the structural
2588 /// shape of a real PatchObject — the documented latent panic from
2589 /// bd:JMAP-sc1b.87 only fires on non-Object leaves, which a typed
2590 /// PatchObject cannot produce). The assertion checks that the
2591 /// call completes without panicking AND that it surfaces the
2592 /// depth-exceeded error rather than silently succeeding (the
2593 /// pre-bd:JMAP-wlip.1 silent-truncation bug).
2594 #[test]
2595 fn json_merge_patch_does_not_stack_overflow() {
2596 const DEPTH: usize = 1000;
2597 let mut target = serde_json::json!({});
2598 for _ in 0..DEPTH {
2599 target = serde_json::json!({ "a": target });
2600 }
2601 let mut patch = serde_json::json!({});
2602 for _ in 0..DEPTH {
2603 patch = serde_json::json!({ "a": patch });
2604 }
2605 let err = json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch)
2606 .expect_err("deep patch must surface DepthExceeded, not silently truncate");
2607 assert_eq!(
2608 err,
2609 MergePatchError::DepthExceeded,
2610 "deep patch must return MergePatchError::DepthExceeded"
2611 );
2612 }
2613
2614 /// Oracle: bd:JMAP-wlip.1 — a patch at exactly [`MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`]
2615 /// levels (the deepest legal patch) MUST apply successfully. The cap
2616 /// fires only when the patch tries to recurse one level beyond. The
2617 /// expected target shape is hand-built level-by-level from the same
2618 /// counter the patch uses, so the oracle is independent of the
2619 /// recursion under test.
2620 #[test]
2621 fn json_merge_patch_at_exact_cap_applies() {
2622 // Build a patch nested exactly MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH levels deep.
2623 // Outermost level is depth=1; innermost leaf-Object is at depth
2624 // MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH. The first depth-cap check fires at
2625 // depth == MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH + 1, so this is the deepest
2626 // patch that still applies.
2627 let mut patch = serde_json::json!({ "leaf": "value" });
2628 for _ in 0..(MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - 1) {
2629 patch = serde_json::json!({ "a": patch });
2630 }
2631 let mut target = serde_json::json!({});
2632 json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("patch at the cap must apply");
2633 // Walk the resulting target down its 'a' chain to verify the
2634 // leaf field landed.
2635 let mut cursor = ⌖
2636 for _ in 0..(MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - 1) {
2637 cursor = cursor.get("a").expect("each level must have 'a'");
2638 }
2639 assert_eq!(
2640 cursor.get("leaf"),
2641 Some(&serde_json::Value::String("value".to_owned())),
2642 "the leaf field at exactly MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH must be applied"
2643 );
2644 }
2645
2646 /// Oracle: a shallow merge patch under the cap still applies
2647 /// normally. Positive control paired with the stack-overflow test
2648 /// above to prove the depth cap only fires at the boundary, not on
2649 /// every call.
2650 #[test]
2651 fn json_merge_patch_shallow_applies_normally() {
2652 let mut target = serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 2 } });
2653 let patch = serde_json::json!({ "b": { "c": 99, "d": 7 }, "e": null });
2654 json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("shallow patch must succeed");
2655 assert_eq!(
2656 target,
2657 serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 99, "d": 7 } }),
2658 "RFC 7396 merge semantics broken at shallow depth"
2659 );
2660 }
2661
2662 /// Regression: a Patch that adds a nested Object to a previously-
2663 /// absent field used to panic with `expect("merge patch target
2664 /// must be an object")` because the parent recursion frame
2665 /// inserted Value::Null as the placeholder, then recursed into
2666 /// Null with an Object patch.
2667 ///
2668 /// Per RFC 7396 §2 the correct behaviour is to reset the non-Object
2669 /// target to an empty Object and merge into it. Oracle is hand-
2670 /// derived from RFC 7396 §2's pseudocode:
2671 /// `Target[Name] = MergePatch(Target[Name], Value)` where
2672 /// MergePatch resets a non-Object target to `{}`.
2673 #[test]
2674 fn json_merge_patch_adds_nested_object_to_absent_field() {
2675 let mut target = serde_json::json!({ "a": 1 });
2676 let patch = serde_json::json!({ "b": { "c": 2 } });
2677 json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("nested-add patch must succeed");
2678 assert_eq!(
2679 target,
2680 serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 2 } }),
2681 "patch must add the nested object at the previously-absent field"
2682 );
2683 }
2684
2685 /// Oracle: [`MergePatchError`] implements [`std::error::Error`] and
2686 /// has a stable Display form referencing the cap value. Pinning the
2687 /// Display string keeps the error message stable across refactors;
2688 /// the cap value is interpolated from the public constant so this
2689 /// test does not need updating if the cap changes.
2690 #[test]
2691 fn merge_patch_error_display() {
2692 let err = MergePatchError::DepthExceeded;
2693 let s = err.to_string();
2694 assert!(
2695 s.contains(&MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH.to_string()),
2696 "Display must mention the cap value; got {s:?}"
2697 );
2698 assert!(
2699 s.contains("merge patch"),
2700 "Display must identify the error source; got {s:?}"
2701 );
2702 }
2703
2704 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2705 // apply_jmap_patch (RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject paths, RFC 6901)
2706 //
2707 // Oracles are hand-built JSON values derived from the quoted RFC
2708 // text; the function under test is never its own oracle.
2709 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2710
2711 /// Build a `Map` from a JSON object literal.
2712 fn obj(v: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> {
2713 match v {
2714 serde_json::Value::Object(m) => m,
2715 other => panic!("fixture must be a JSON object, got {other}"),
2716 }
2717 }
2718
2719 /// Apply `path` → `value` to `before` and assert it fails with `want`
2720 /// and leaves the object unchanged.
2721 fn assert_patch_rejected(
2722 before: serde_json::Value,
2723 path: &str,
2724 value: serde_json::Value,
2725 want: PatchPathError,
2726 ) {
2727 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
2728 let err = apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, path, value).expect_err("patch must be rejected");
2729 assert_eq!(err, want, "wrong error for path {path:?}");
2730 assert_eq!(
2731 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2732 before,
2733 "rejected patch {path:?} must leave the object unchanged"
2734 );
2735 }
2736
2737 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "Anything else: The value to set for this
2738 /// property (this may be a replacement or addition to the object
2739 /// being patched)."
2740 #[test]
2741 fn apply_jmap_patch_non_null_adds_or_replaces() {
2742 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": 1 }));
2743 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a", json!(2)).expect("replace");
2744 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "b", json!("x")).expect("add");
2745 assert_eq!(
2746 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2747 json!({ "a": 2, "b": "x" })
2748 );
2749 }
2750
2751 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "If null, ... remove the property from the
2752 /// patched object. If the key is not present in the parent, this a
2753 /// no-op."
2754 #[test]
2755 fn apply_jmap_patch_null_removes_and_absent_is_noop() {
2756 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": 1, "m": { "k": true } }));
2757 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("remove");
2758 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m/k", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("nested remove");
2759 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m/absent", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("no-op");
2760 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), json!({ "m": {} }));
2761 }
2762
2763 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "The keys are a path in JSON Pointer
2764 /// format [RFC6901], with an implicit leading "/"". `mailboxIds/abc`
2765 /// sets member `abc` of the existing `mailboxIds` object and leaves
2766 /// its siblings alone.
2767 #[test]
2768 fn apply_jmap_patch_nested_path_sets_member_of_existing_object() {
2769 let mut target = obj(json!({ "mailboxIds": { "inbox": true }, "x": { "y": { "z": 1 } } }));
2770 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "mailboxIds/abc", json!(true)).expect("set");
2771 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "x/y/w", json!(2)).expect("deep set");
2772 assert_eq!(
2773 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2774 json!({ "mailboxIds": { "inbox": true, "abc": true }, "x": { "y": { "z": 1, "w": 2 } } })
2775 );
2776 }
2777
2778 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "All parts prior to the last (i.e., the
2779 /// value after the final slash) MUST already exist on the object
2780 /// being patched." A missing parent is rejected, never created, for
2781 /// both non-null and null values.
2782 #[test]
2783 fn apply_jmap_patch_missing_parent_is_rejected() {
2784 let before = json!({ "a": { "b": {} } });
2785 for value in [json!("v"), serde_json::Value::Null] {
2786 assert_patch_rejected(
2787 before.clone(),
2788 "x/y",
2789 value.clone(),
2790 PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
2791 );
2792 assert_patch_rejected(
2793 before.clone(),
2794 "a/c/d",
2795 value,
2796 PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
2797 );
2798 }
2799 }
2800
2801 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "All parts prior to the last ... MUST
2802 /// already exist on the object being patched." A string, number,
2803 /// boolean or null has no members, so a part beneath one does not
2804 /// exist; the existing value must not be clobbered.
2805 #[test]
2806 fn apply_jmap_patch_non_object_parent_is_rejected() {
2807 let before = json!({ "s": "text", "n": 42, "b": true, "z": null });
2808 for parent in ["s", "n", "b", "z"] {
2809 assert_patch_rejected(
2810 before.clone(),
2811 &format!("{parent}/sub"),
2812 json!("would-clobber"),
2813 PatchPathError::ParentNotObject,
2814 );
2815 }
2816 }
2817
2818 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "The pointer MUST NOT reference inside an
2819 /// array (i.e., you MUST NOT insert/delete from an array; the array
2820 /// MUST be replaced in its entirety instead)." Applies to numeric
2821 /// tokens and to paths that would descend through an array element.
2822 #[test]
2823 fn apply_jmap_patch_inside_array_is_rejected() {
2824 let before = json!({ "list": ["a", { "k": 1 }] });
2825 assert_patch_rejected(
2826 before.clone(),
2827 "list/0",
2828 json!("x"),
2829 PatchPathError::InsideArray,
2830 );
2831 assert_patch_rejected(
2832 before.clone(),
2833 "list/1/k",
2834 json!(2),
2835 PatchPathError::InsideArray,
2836 );
2837 assert_patch_rejected(
2838 before,
2839 "list/0",
2840 serde_json::Value::Null,
2841 PatchPathError::InsideArray,
2842 );
2843 }
2844
2845 /// Oracle: draft-ietf-jmap-metadata-05 §3.2 — "a path that traverses
2846 /// an array or a Binary value (Section 2.1.1) is rejected with an
2847 /// "invalidPatch" SetError"; §2.1.1 — "a patch path ... cannot address
2848 /// its members". Fixture is the §2.1.1 example. The Binary itself can
2849 /// still be replaced or removed, since the path then ends at it.
2850 #[test]
2851 fn apply_jmap_patch_through_metadata_binary_is_rejected() {
2852 let before = json!({ "metadata": { "acme.example.com": {
2853 "label": "draft copy",
2854 "thumbprint": {
2855 "@type": "Binary",
2856 "base64": "VEVYVHR0eHQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA="
2857 }
2858 } } });
2859 for (path, value) in [
2860 ("metadata/acme.example.com/thumbprint/base64", json!("AA==")),
2861 (
2862 "metadata/acme.example.com/thumbprint/base64",
2863 serde_json::Value::Null,
2864 ),
2865 ("metadata/acme.example.com/thumbprint/x", json!(1)),
2866 ] {
2867 assert_patch_rejected(before.clone(), path, value, PatchPathError::InsideBinary);
2868 }
2869 let private = json!({ "privateMetadata": { "x.example": {
2870 "b": { "@type": "Binary", "base64": "" }
2871 } } });
2872 assert_patch_rejected(
2873 private,
2874 "privateMetadata/x.example/b/base64",
2875 json!("Zg=="),
2876 PatchPathError::InsideBinary,
2877 );
2878
2879 let mut target = obj(before);
2880 let bin = json!({ "@type": "Binary", "base64": "Zg==" });
2881 apply_jmap_patch(
2882 &mut target,
2883 "metadata/acme.example.com/thumbprint",
2884 bin.clone(),
2885 )
2886 .expect("replace whole Binary");
2887 assert_eq!(target["metadata"]["acme.example.com"]["thumbprint"], bin);
2888 }
2889
2890 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — a path through an existing object is
2891 /// allowed. -05 §2.1.1 defines a Binary only "within a namespace
2892 /// value", so an `@type: "Binary"` object elsewhere is an ordinary
2893 /// object.
2894 #[test]
2895 fn apply_jmap_patch_binary_outside_metadata_is_ordinary() {
2896 let mut target = obj(json!({ "other": { "x": { "@type": "Binary", "base64": "" } } }));
2897 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "other/x/base64", json!("Zg==")).expect("plain object");
2898 assert_eq!(target["other"]["x"]["base64"], json!("Zg=="));
2899 }
2900
2901 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "the array MUST be replaced in its entirety
2902 /// instead": setting the array-valued property itself is allowed.
2903 #[test]
2904 fn apply_jmap_patch_replaces_whole_array() {
2905 let mut target = obj(json!({ "list": ["a"] }));
2906 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "list", json!(["b", "c"])).expect("replace array");
2907 assert_eq!(
2908 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2909 json!({ "list": ["b", "c"] })
2910 );
2911 }
2912
2913 /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §4 — "first transforming any occurrence of the
2914 /// sequence '~1' to '/', and then transforming any occurrence of the
2915 /// sequence '~0' to '~' ... (the string '~01' correctly becomes '~1'
2916 /// after transformation)." Decoding is per token, after splitting on
2917 /// `/`, so `a~1b/c` addresses member `c` of member `a/b`.
2918 #[test]
2919 fn apply_jmap_patch_decodes_rfc6901_escapes() {
2920 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a/b": {}, "m~n": {} }));
2921 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "foo~1bar", json!(1)).expect("~1");
2922 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "foo~0bar", json!(2)).expect("~0");
2923 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "~01", json!(3)).expect("~01");
2924 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a~1b/c", json!(4)).expect("escaped parent");
2925 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m~0n/~1", json!(5)).expect("escaped parent and leaf");
2926 assert_eq!(
2927 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2928 json!({
2929 "foo/bar": 1,
2930 "foo~bar": 2,
2931 "~1": 3,
2932 "a/b": { "c": 4 },
2933 "m~n": { "/": 5 }
2934 })
2935 );
2936 }
2937
2938 /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §3 — `escaped = "~" ( "0" / "1" )` and "It is an
2939 /// error condition if a JSON Pointer value does not conform to this
2940 /// syntax". RFC 8620 §5.3 requires keys in JSON Pointer format, so a
2941 /// malformed escape in any token is rejected.
2942 #[test]
2943 fn apply_jmap_patch_invalid_escape_is_rejected() {
2944 let before = json!({ "a": {} });
2945 for path in ["~2", "x~", "a/~", "~x/b", "a/b~"] {
2946 assert_patch_rejected(
2947 before.clone(),
2948 path,
2949 json!(1),
2950 PatchPathError::InvalidEscape,
2951 );
2952 }
2953 }
2954
2955 /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §3 — `reference-token = *( unescaped / escaped )`
2956 /// permits an empty token, and the §5 example evaluates `"/"` to the
2957 /// member named `""` (`"" : 0`). The PatchObject key `""` is the
2958 /// pointer `"/"`; `"a/"` is the pointer `"/a/"`.
2959 #[test]
2960 fn apply_jmap_patch_empty_token_names_empty_member() {
2961 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": {} }));
2962 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "", json!(0)).expect("empty top-level token");
2963 apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a/", json!(1)).expect("empty nested token");
2964 assert_eq!(
2965 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
2966 json!({ "": 0, "a": { "": 1 } })
2967 );
2968 }
2969
2970 /// Oracle: an empty token is an ordinary member name, so a missing
2971 /// empty-named parent is rejected like any other missing parent
2972 /// (RFC 8620 §5.3 "All parts prior to the last ... MUST already
2973 /// exist").
2974 #[test]
2975 fn apply_jmap_patch_missing_empty_parent_is_rejected() {
2976 assert_patch_rejected(
2977 json!({ "a": {} }),
2978 "a//b",
2979 json!(1),
2980 PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
2981 );
2982 }
2983
2984 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2985 // apply_patch_object (RFC 8620 §5.3 whole PatchObject)
2986 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
2987
2988 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "There MUST NOT be two patches in the
2989 /// PatchObject where the pointer of one is the prefix of the pointer
2990 /// of the other, e.g., "alerts/1/offset" and "alerts""; on violation
2991 /// "the update MUST be rejected with an "invalidPatch" error".
2992 #[test]
2993 fn apply_patch_object_prefix_conflict_is_rejected() {
2994 let before = json!({ "alerts": { "1": { "offset": 0 } } });
2995 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
2996 let patch = obj(json!({ "alerts/1/offset": 5, "alerts": {} }));
2997 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
2998 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::PrefixConflict);
2999 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
3000 }
3001
3002 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 forbids only a pointer that is "the prefix of
3003 /// the pointer of the other"; JSON Pointers are compared by reference
3004 /// token (RFC 6901 §3), so "alert" is not a prefix of "alerts/x".
3005 #[test]
3006 fn apply_patch_object_near_prefix_is_accepted() {
3007 let mut target = obj(json!({ "alerts": {} }));
3008 let patch = obj(json!({ "alert": 1, "alerts/x": 2 }));
3009 apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect("no prefix conflict");
3010 assert_eq!(
3011 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
3012 json!({ "alert": 1, "alerts": { "x": 2 } })
3013 );
3014 }
3015
3016 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "if there is any violation, the update MUST
3017 /// be rejected"; the valid entry "a" must not be applied either.
3018 #[test]
3019 fn apply_patch_object_partial_failure_leaves_target_unchanged() {
3020 let before = json!({ "a": 1 });
3021 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
3022 let patch = obj(json!({ "a": 2, "m/k": 1 }));
3023 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
3024 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::ParentMissing);
3025 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
3026 }
3027
3028 /// A value nesting `levels` objects deep (`0` is the scalar `1`).
3029 fn nested(levels: usize) -> serde_json::Value {
3030 (0..levels).fold(json!(1), |inner, _| json!({ "k": inner }))
3031 }
3032
3033 /// Oracle: this crate's DoS guard, not an RFC 8620 §5.3 rule (RFC 8620
3034 /// §3.6.1 lets a server reject requests beyond its limits). Path
3035 /// segments plus value nesting may not exceed `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`
3036 /// (32): 3 + 30 = 33 is rejected before any entry is applied.
3037 #[test]
3038 fn apply_patch_object_path_plus_value_over_depth_cap_is_rejected() {
3039 let before = json!({ "x": 1, "a": { "b": {} } });
3040 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
3041 let patch = obj(json!({ "x": 2, "a/b/c": nested(30) }));
3042 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
3043 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
3044 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
3045 }
3046
3047 /// Oracle: the crate's DoS guard rejects only depth beyond
3048 /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`; exactly 3 segments + 29 levels = 32 applies.
3049 #[test]
3050 fn apply_patch_object_path_plus_value_at_depth_cap_applies() {
3051 let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": { "b": {} } }));
3052 let patch = obj(json!({ "a/b/c": nested(29) }));
3053 apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect("at the cap must apply");
3054 assert_eq!(
3055 serde_json::Value::Object(target),
3056 json!({ "a": { "b": { "c": nested(29) } } })
3057 );
3058 }
3059
3060 /// Oracle: the crate's DoS guard; a key of 33 segments exceeds
3061 /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` even with a scalar value.
3062 #[test]
3063 fn apply_patch_object_path_over_depth_cap_is_rejected() {
3064 let before = json!({ "a": {} });
3065 let mut target = obj(before.clone());
3066 let path = format!("a{}", "/k".repeat(32));
3067 let patch = obj(json!({ path: 1 }));
3068 let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
3069 assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
3070 assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
3071 }
3072
3073 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
3074 // enforce_max_objects_in_set (bd:JMAP-ayoz.41.1) — RFC 8620 §5.3
3075 //
3076 // Oracles for all tests below are hand-built JmapError comparisons
3077 // and hand-built JSON args; the helper itself is never the oracle.
3078 // ------------------------------------------------------------------
3079
3080 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): an empty `/set` args envelope (no
3081 /// `create` / `update` / `destroy` keys) MUST pass any positive cap.
3082 #[test]
3083 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_empty_args_is_ok() {
3084 let args = json!({}).as_object().unwrap().clone();
3085 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 500).expect("empty args must be under any positive cap");
3086 }
3087
3088 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): at the exact boundary count == max, the
3089 /// helper MUST return Ok. The cap is enforced as strictly-greater
3090 /// (`count > max`), not greater-or-equal.
3091 #[test]
3092 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_at_limit_is_ok() {
3093 // 5 + 5 + 5 = 15 entries against max=15 must pass.
3094 let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
3095 let mut update = serde_json::Map::new();
3096 let mut destroy = Vec::new();
3097 for i in 0..5 {
3098 create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
3099 update.insert(format!("u{i}"), json!({}));
3100 destroy.push(json!(format!("d{i}")));
3101 }
3102 let args = json!({
3103 "create": create,
3104 "update": update,
3105 "destroy": destroy,
3106 })
3107 .as_object()
3108 .unwrap()
3109 .clone();
3110 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 15).expect("exact-boundary count must be allowed");
3111 }
3112
3113 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3, bd:JMAP-yt1w.30): one entry over the cap
3114 /// MUST return the method error "requestTooLarge" — "The total number
3115 /// of objects to create, update, or destroy exceeds the maximum number
3116 /// the server is willing to process in a single method call." — with
3117 /// description "maxObjectsInSet". The wire shape is verified by
3118 /// hand-building the expected JmapError independently of the helper.
3119 #[test]
3120 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_over_limit_returns_limit_error() {
3121 // 5 + 5 + 6 = 16 entries against max=15 must fail.
3122 let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
3123 let mut update = serde_json::Map::new();
3124 let mut destroy = Vec::new();
3125 for i in 0..5 {
3126 create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
3127 update.insert(format!("u{i}"), json!({}));
3128 }
3129 for i in 0..6 {
3130 destroy.push(json!(format!("d{i}")));
3131 }
3132 let args = json!({
3133 "create": create,
3134 "update": update,
3135 "destroy": destroy,
3136 })
3137 .as_object()
3138 .unwrap()
3139 .clone();
3140 let err = enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 15)
3141 .expect_err("16-entry args against max=15 must fail");
3142 // Independent oracle — hand-built JmapError, not derived from
3143 // the function under test.
3144 let expected = jmap_types::JmapError::request_too_large();
3145 assert_eq!(
3146 err.error_type.to_string(),
3147 expected.error_type.to_string(),
3148 "type must be \"requestTooLarge\""
3149 );
3150 assert_eq!(
3151 err.description.as_deref(),
3152 Some("maxObjectsInSet"),
3153 "description must name the exceeded cap"
3154 );
3155 }
3156
3157 /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-yt1w.30): RFC 8620 §5.3 (rfc8620.txt L2166-2170):
3158 /// "The following additional errors may be returned instead of the
3159 /// "Foo/set" response: "requestTooLarge": The total number of objects
3160 /// to create, update, or destroy exceeds the maximum number the server
3161 /// is willing to process in a single method call." Exceeding
3162 /// maxObjectsInSet is therefore the method-level error
3163 /// `requestTooLarge`, not the request-level `limit` error.
3164 #[test]
3165 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_over_limit_returns_request_too_large() {
3166 let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
3167 for i in 0..3 {
3168 create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
3169 }
3170 let args = json!({
3171 "create": create,
3172 "destroy": ["d0"],
3173 })
3174 .as_object()
3175 .unwrap()
3176 .clone();
3177 let err =
3178 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 3).expect_err("4-entry args against max=3 must fail");
3179 assert_eq!(
3180 err.error_type.to_string(),
3181 "requestTooLarge",
3182 "RFC 8620 §5.3: over-cap /set must yield method error requestTooLarge"
3183 );
3184 }
3185
3186 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): a non-object `create` argument (e.g.
3187 /// `null` or a string) counts as 0 — wire-shape validation belongs
3188 /// to the per-handler argument parsing, not this cap helper. The
3189 /// handler will reject the malformed `create` downstream; this
3190 /// helper only counts well-formed entries.
3191 #[test]
3192 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_ignores_non_object_create() {
3193 let args = json!({
3194 "create": null,
3195 "update": null,
3196 "destroy": ["id1"],
3197 })
3198 .as_object()
3199 .unwrap()
3200 .clone();
3201 // Only the 1 destroy entry counts.
3202 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 1).expect("non-object create/update count as 0");
3203 }
3204
3205 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): a non-array `destroy` argument counts
3206 /// as 0. Same rationale as the create/update test above.
3207 #[test]
3208 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_ignores_non_array_destroy() {
3209 let args = json!({
3210 "create": { "c0": {} },
3211 "destroy": "not-an-array",
3212 })
3213 .as_object()
3214 .unwrap()
3215 .clone();
3216 // Only the 1 create entry counts.
3217 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 1).expect("non-array destroy counts as 0");
3218 }
3219
3220 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): the cap counts the SUM of all three
3221 /// sources. A request whose individual create/update/destroy
3222 /// counts are each below the cap can still trip the cap when
3223 /// summed.
3224 #[test]
3225 fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_sums_all_three() {
3226 // 3 + 3 + 3 = 9; against max=5, must fail because the SUM > max
3227 // even though each individual count <= max.
3228 let args = json!({
3229 "create": { "c0": {}, "c1": {}, "c2": {} },
3230 "update": { "u0": {}, "u1": {}, "u2": {} },
3231 "destroy": ["d0", "d1", "d2"],
3232 })
3233 .as_object()
3234 .unwrap()
3235 .clone();
3236 let err =
3237 enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 5).expect_err("sum-of-all-three must trip the cap");
3238 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "requestTooLarge");
3239 assert_eq!(err.description.as_deref(), Some("maxObjectsInSet"));
3240 }
3241
3242 /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.5 + bd:JMAP-qz9v.48): `position` is a signed
3243 /// offset where non-negative is absolute and negative is
3244 /// end-relative. All hand-computed values below come from reading
3245 /// the spec text, NOT from the implementation under test.
3246 #[test]
3247 fn resolve_query_offset_absolute() {
3248 // Non-negative position: absolute offset, clamped at total.
3249 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 100), 0);
3250 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1, 100), 1);
3251 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(50, 100), 50);
3252 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(99, 100), 99);
3253 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(100, 100), 100);
3254 // Past-the-end → clamped to total (RFC 8620 §5.5 silent-clamp).
3255 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(101, 100), 100);
3256 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(10_000, 100), 100);
3257 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 100), 100);
3258 }
3259
3260 #[test]
3261 fn resolve_query_offset_end_relative() {
3262 // RFC 8620 §5.5: "-1 represents the last entry, -2 the second
3263 // to last". Implemented as `total - |position|`, saturating at
3264 // 0 from below.
3265 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 100), 99);
3266 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-2, 100), 98);
3267 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-99, 100), 1);
3268 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-100, 100), 0);
3269 // Past-the-start → clamped to 0.
3270 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-101, 100), 0);
3271 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-10_000, 100), 0);
3272 }
3273
3274 /// Oracle: with total=0 (empty result list), every position
3275 /// resolves to 0 (the only valid index, and a no-op slice).
3276 #[test]
3277 fn resolve_query_offset_empty_total() {
3278 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 0), 0);
3279 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1, 0), 0);
3280 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 0), 0);
3281 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 0), 0);
3282 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 0), 0);
3283 }
3284
3285 /// Oracle: `i64::MIN` would overflow `-position` (the previous
3286 /// workspace idiom at mail-server `memory/mod.rs:980`) but
3287 /// `saturating_neg` returns `i64::MAX`. The resulting end-relative
3288 /// offset of `i64::MAX` is well past any realistic `total`, so for
3289 /// any realistic total the result is 0.
3290 ///
3291 /// For the synthetic case `total == usize::MAX`, the offset stays
3292 /// within the saturation range and the result is
3293 /// `usize::MAX - i64::MAX`, which on a 64-bit target is exactly
3294 /// `0x8000_0000_0000_0000`. The point of the regression guard is
3295 /// that the call does NOT panic (which it would under the prior
3296 /// `(-position) as usize` idiom in debug builds).
3297 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.5 `limit` -- "If null, no limit presumed" --
3298 /// so `None` is unbounded; `Some(n)` is exactly `n` items.
3299 #[test]
3300 fn limit_or_max_follows_rfc8620_limit_semantics() {
3301 let items = [1u8, 2, 3, 4, 5];
3302 assert_eq!(items.iter().take(limit_or_max(None)).count(), 5);
3303 assert_eq!(items.iter().take(limit_or_max(Some(0))).count(), 0);
3304 assert_eq!(items.iter().take(limit_or_max(Some(2))).count(), 2);
3305 // u64::MAX never truncates to a small count: on 64-bit it is
3306 // exactly usize::MAX, on 32-bit it saturates to usize::MAX.
3307 assert_eq!(limit_or_max(Some(u64::MAX)), usize::MAX);
3308 }
3309
3310 #[test]
3311 fn resolve_query_offset_i64_min_does_not_overflow() {
3312 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 1), 0);
3313 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 100), 0);
3314 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, i64::MAX as usize), 0);
3315 // Synthetic upper bound: the answer is computable but not 0.
3316 // What matters is no overflow / no panic, and start <= total.
3317 let start = resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, usize::MAX);
3318 assert_eq!(start, usize::MAX - (i64::MAX as usize));
3319 // And `i64::MAX` on the positive side is also handled.
3320 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 0), 0);
3321 assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 1), 1);
3322 }
3323
3324 /// Oracle: the bead's specific concern was that `position as usize`
3325 /// truncates on 32-bit targets. On 64-bit (this test host) the
3326 /// `i64`-to-`usize` conversion is lossless within `[0, i64::MAX]`,
3327 /// so the truncation cannot be directly demonstrated; what we CAN
3328 /// verify is that the helper uses `usize::try_from` semantics, so
3329 /// a value above `i64::MAX` (only reachable here via direct cast
3330 /// from an unsigned constant) clamps to `total` rather than
3331 /// wrapping. The `i64::MIN` case in the prior test is the real
3332 /// regression guard.
3333 #[test]
3334 fn resolve_query_offset_truncation_resistant() {
3335 // The slice-safety property: `total..=total` is always a valid
3336 // start index for `slice[start..]` (yields empty slice). The
3337 // helper MUST return a value in `0..=total`.
3338 for &pos in &[i64::MIN, -1_000_000, -1, 0, 1, 1_000_000, i64::MAX] {
3339 for &total in &[0usize, 1, 100, 10_000] {
3340 let start = resolve_query_offset(pos, total);
3341 assert!(
3342 start <= total,
3343 "resolve_query_offset({pos}, {total}) = {start} violates start <= total"
3344 );
3345 }
3346 }
3347 }
3348 /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.5 (https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8620.txt):
3349 /// "If found, the "anchorOffset" is then added to its index. If the
3350 /// resulting index is now negative, it is clamped to 0. ... If the
3351 /// anchor is not found, the call is rejected with an "anchorNotFound"
3352 /// error. If an "anchor" is specified, any position argument supplied
3353 /// by the client MUST be ignored. If no "anchor" is supplied, any
3354 /// "anchorOffset" argument MUST be ignored."
3355 ///
3356 /// `ids` is `[a, b, c, d]`, so anchor `c` is index 2.
3357 #[test]
3358 fn resolve_query_start_follows_rfc8620_anchor_rules() {
3359 let ids: Vec<jmap_types::Id> = ["a", "b", "c", "d"].map(jmap_types::Id::from).to_vec();
3360 let c = jmap_types::Id::from("c");
3361 let start = |position, anchor, offset| resolve_query_start(&ids, position, anchor, offset);
3362 assert_eq!(start(0, Some(&c), 1), Ok(3));
3363 assert_eq!(start(0, Some(&c), -1), Ok(1));
3364 assert_eq!(start(0, Some(&c), -5), Ok(0));
3365 assert_eq!(start(3, Some(&c), 0), Ok(2));
3366 assert_eq!(start(1, None, 2), Ok(1));
3367 let missing = jmap_types::Id::from("z");
3368 assert_eq!(
3369 start(0, Some(&missing), 0).map_err(|e| e.error_type.to_string()),
3370 Err("anchorNotFound".to_owned())
3371 );
3372 }
3373
3374 /// RFC 8620 §5.2: "the value MUST be a positive integer greater than
3375 /// 0. If a value outside of this range is given, the server MUST
3376 /// reject the call with an "invalidArguments" error." The argument is
3377 /// `UnsignedInt|null`, so absent and `null` mean "not given".
3378 #[test]
3379 fn parse_max_changes_follows_rfc8620_5_2() {
3380 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(None).ok(), Some(None));
3381 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(Some(&json!(null))).ok(), Some(None));
3382 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(Some(&json!(1))).ok(), Some(Some(1)));
3383 assert_eq!(parse_max_changes(Some(&json!(50))).ok(), Some(Some(50)));
3384 for bad in [json!(0), json!(-1), json!(1.5), json!("5"), json!(true)] {
3385 assert_eq!(
3386 parse_max_changes(Some(&bad)).map_err(|e| e.error_type.to_string()),
3387 Err("invalidArguments".to_owned()),
3388 "maxChanges = {bad} must be rejected"
3389 );
3390 }
3391 }
3392
3393 /// Oracle: the six JSON value kinds of RFC 8259 §3 ("object, array,
3394 /// number, string ... false, null, true"), with `true`/`false` named
3395 /// "boolean", written out by hand.
3396 #[test]
3397 fn json_type_name_names_each_json_kind() {
3398 let cases = [
3399 (json!(null), "null"),
3400 (json!(true), "boolean"),
3401 (json!(false), "boolean"),
3402 (json!(-1.5), "number"),
3403 (json!("CANARY-zegc"), "string"),
3404 (json!([1, 2]), "array"),
3405 (json!({ "note": "CANARY-zegc" }), "object"),
3406 ];
3407 for (value, want) in cases {
3408 assert_eq!(json_type_name(&value), want, "{value}");
3409 }
3410 }
3411
3412 /// RFC 8620 §5.5 types `anchor` as "Id|null" and `anchorOffset` as
3413 /// "Int"; wrong types are `invalidArguments` (§3.6.2). The description
3414 /// names only the JSON type and never echoes the client value
3415 /// (§3.6.1: "unstructured English text"; bd JMAP-zegc).
3416 #[test]
3417 fn query_anchor_args_does_not_echo_wrongly_typed_value() {
3418 for (name, args) in [
3419 ("anchor", json!({ "anchor": { "note": "CANARY-zegc" } })),
3420 (
3421 "anchorOffset",
3422 json!({ "anchorOffset": { "note": "CANARY-zegc" } }),
3423 ),
3424 ] {
3425 let err = query_anchor_args(args.as_object().expect("object"))
3426 .expect_err("wrongly typed argument must be rejected");
3427 assert_eq!(err.error_type.to_string(), "invalidArguments", "{name}");
3428 let desc = err.description.as_deref().unwrap_or_default();
3429 assert!(desc.starts_with(name), "{desc}");
3430 assert!(desc.contains("got object"), "{desc}");
3431 assert!(!desc.contains("CANARY"), "{desc}");
3432 }
3433 }
3434}