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jmap_server/
helpers.rs

1//! Shared helper utilities for JMAP method handlers.
2
3use std::borrow::Cow;
4
5use jmap_types::{Id, JmapError, UTCDate};
6use serde_json::{Map, Value};
7
8/// Serialize any [`serde::Serialize`] type to a [`serde_json::Value`],
9/// mapping serialization errors to [`JmapError::server_fail`].
10///
11/// Used by every `*-server` handler to project a typed domain object
12/// (e.g. `Email`, `Mailbox`, `Chat`) into the wire-format `list` /
13/// `created` payload.
14pub fn serialize_value<T: serde::Serialize>(val: T) -> Result<serde_json::Value, JmapError> {
15    serde_json::to_value(val).map_err(|e| JmapError::server_fail(e.to_string()))
16}
17
18/// Deprecated alias for [`serialize_value`] (bd:JMAP-wlip.21).
19///
20/// The opaque 3-letter name was hard to read in consumer code
21/// (`let v = ser(x)?;` left readers grepping three crates to learn
22/// what `ser` did) and collided with the common local-variable name
23/// `ser`. Use [`serialize_value`] instead. This alias is preserved
24/// for one release as a deprecation runway; it will be removed in
25/// the next major.
26// bd:JMAP-jfia.6 — the `since` field was previously set to "0.1.3"
27// while the crate version was still 0.1.2, which rendered as
28// "deprecated in the FUTURE" in cargo doc / docs.rs. Drop `since`
29// until the release that ships the renaming actually goes out; the
30// version-pinned form will be reintroduced when 0.1.3 is published.
31#[deprecated(note = "renamed to serialize_value (bd:JMAP-wlip.21)")]
32pub fn ser<T: serde::Serialize>(val: T) -> Result<serde_json::Value, JmapError> {
33    serialize_value(val)
34}
35
36/// Convert a slice of [`Id`]s to a JSON `notFound` value.
37///
38/// RFC 8620 §5.1 specifies `notFound` as `Id[]` — always an array, never
39/// `null`. Returns an empty array when all requested ids were found.
40///
41/// Equivalent to `serde_json::to_value(ids)` but threads through
42/// `Value::Array` directly so the call site is infallible (bd:JMAP-wlip.28).
43pub fn not_found_json(ids: &[Id]) -> Value {
44    Value::Array(
45        ids.iter()
46            .map(|id| Value::String(id.as_ref().to_owned()))
47            .collect(),
48    )
49}
50
51/// Extract an optional, deserializable argument from a method-arguments
52/// envelope (bd:JMAP-wlip.32).
53///
54/// Looks up `name` in `args`, removing it. The result is:
55///
56/// - `Ok(None)` if the key is absent OR is present with `Value::Null`
57///   (RFC 8620 §3.3 treats absent and explicit-null the same for
58///   optional fields).
59/// - `Ok(Some(value))` if the key is present and the value
60///   deserializes successfully into `T`.
61/// - `Err(invalid_arguments_with(name))` if the value is present but
62///   fails to deserialize. The error message is built by the caller-
63///   supplied `invalid_arguments_with` so the resulting `JmapError`
64///   carries a domain-specific description ("ids must be an Id
65///   array", "filter must be a Filter object", etc.).
66///
67/// Collapses six near-identical
68/// `match args.remove(...).unwrap_or(Value::Null) { Value::Null => None,
69/// v => Some(serde_json::from_value(v)...) }` blocks in `handlers.rs`
70/// into one-liners.
71///
72/// # Interaction with `ResultReference` resolution (bd:JMAP-jfia.15)
73///
74/// [`crate::parse::resolve_args`] replaces a `#key` with the value
75/// produced by walking the JSON Pointer path against a prior
76/// response. RFC 6901 §4 makes no distinction between "key absent"
77/// and "key present with `null`", so the resolved value CAN be
78/// `Value::Null`. This function then treats that resolved-null
79/// identically to "key was not sent". The behaviour is
80/// RFC-compliant — both are "optional argument not provided" — but
81/// the asymmetry between an explicit `null` argument and a
82/// `#key`-resolved `null` argument may surprise a handler author
83/// who expects "I asked for the value via a ResultReference, so it
84/// must have been there". If a handler needs to distinguish
85/// resolved-null from unsent, it has to read the raw `args` map
86/// before calling this helper.
87pub fn optional_arg<T>(
88    args: &mut Map<String, Value>,
89    name: &str,
90    invalid_arguments_with: impl FnOnce() -> JmapError,
91) -> Result<Option<T>, JmapError>
92where
93    T: serde::de::DeserializeOwned,
94{
95    match args.remove(name).unwrap_or(Value::Null) {
96        Value::Null => Ok(None),
97        v => Ok(Some(
98            serde_json::from_value(v).map_err(|_| invalid_arguments_with())?,
99        )),
100    }
101}
102
103/// Read an optional boolean argument from a method-arguments envelope without
104/// removing it (bd:JMAP-ic0j.39).
105///
106/// Returns `default` if `key` is absent, if the value is not a boolean, or if
107/// the value is `Value::Null`. This is the canonical workspace helper for
108/// JMAP's "permissive parsing" convention on optional boolean controls
109/// (RFC 8620 §3.6.1 — unknown / non-typed values coerce to the spec default).
110///
111/// Use [`take_bool_arg`] if the caller wants to consume the entry as part of
112/// a "walk the args map removing as we go" pattern.
113///
114/// Collapses ~50 near-identical
115/// `args.get(K).and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(default)` blocks across
116/// the extension-server family into single-line calls.
117pub fn bool_arg(args: &Map<String, Value>, key: &str, default: bool) -> bool {
118    args.get(key).and_then(|v| v.as_bool()).unwrap_or(default)
119}
120
121/// Read an optional boolean argument from a method-arguments envelope,
122/// removing it from the map (bd:JMAP-ic0j.39).
123///
124/// Returns `default` if `key` is absent, if the value is not a boolean, or if
125/// the value is `Value::Null`. Mirrors the semantics of [`bool_arg`] but
126/// consumes the entry from `args`. Matches the canonical mail-server
127/// "remove-as-we-go" parsing pattern.
128pub fn take_bool_arg(args: &mut Map<String, Value>, key: &str, default: bool) -> bool {
129    args.remove(key)
130        .and_then(|v| v.as_bool())
131        .unwrap_or(default)
132}
133
134/// Extract `accountId` from a JMAP method arguments envelope and return both
135/// the extracted [`Id`] and the remaining argument map.
136///
137/// The caller passes the full `args: Value` from the method invocation by
138/// value; this function destructures it once, so handlers do not have to
139/// repeat the `let Value::Object(mut args) = args else { ... }` pattern after
140/// every call.
141///
142/// # Errors
143///
144/// Returns `invalidArguments` with:
145///
146/// - `"arguments must be an object containing accountId"` when `args` is
147///   not a JSON object.
148/// - `"accountId is required"` when the field is missing or not a string.
149/// - `"accountId is not a valid Id: <reason>"` when the field is a string
150///   but does not satisfy the RFC 8620 §1.2 Id grammar
151///   (`Id::new_validated`). Catches empty strings, strings longer than
152///   255 bytes, and strings containing characters outside the SAFE-CHAR
153///   set (`%x21 / %x23-7E` — visible ASCII excluding `"`).
154///   bd:JMAP-wlip.5 closed the previous silent-pass-through behaviour
155///   where a malformed accountId reached the backend's `account_exists`
156///   call and surfaced as either `notFound` or a storage-layer parse
157///   error, depending on the backend.
158pub fn extract_account_id(args: Value) -> Result<(Id, Map<String, Value>), JmapError> {
159    let Value::Object(mut args) = args else {
160        return Err(JmapError::invalid_arguments(
161            "arguments must be an object containing accountId",
162        ));
163    };
164    // Remove (not get) the accountId entry so the returned args map no
165    // longer carries it (bd:JMAP-jfia.9). This matches optional_arg's
166    // remove-and-consume semantics and prevents downstream handlers
167    // from re-parsing the validated id or seeing it as an unexpected
168    // residual key.
169    let raw = args
170        .remove("accountId")
171        .ok_or_else(|| JmapError::invalid_arguments("accountId is required"))?;
172    let s = raw
173        .as_str()
174        .ok_or_else(|| JmapError::invalid_arguments("accountId is required"))?;
175    let id = Id::new_validated(s)
176        .map_err(|e| JmapError::invalid_arguments(format!("accountId is not a valid Id: {e}")))?;
177    Ok((id, args))
178}
179
180/// Return the current UTC instant as an [`UTCDate`] (RFC 3339,
181/// millisecond precision, format `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.mmmZ`).
182///
183/// Uses `std::time::SystemTime` so no external dependency is needed.
184///
185/// Returns a typed [`UTCDate`] rather than a `String` (bd:JMAP-wlip.20)
186/// so callers do not need to wrap the result in
187/// `UTCDate::from(now_utc_string().as_str())`. The function name is
188/// retained for back-compat across the workspace's many call sites.
189///
190/// The string the [`UTCDate`] wraps does not pass
191/// [`UTCDate::new_validated`] because that validator requires exactly
192/// the 20-char `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SSZ` form (no millis) and this helper
193/// emits the 24-char form with millis. The workspace convention is to
194/// use the 24-char form on the wire — consumers wanting strict
195/// validation should construct their own `UTCDate::new_validated` value
196/// from a `chrono`-formatted source.
197///
198/// Pre-epoch handling: `SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)`
199/// fails on clocks drifted before the epoch. The function uses
200/// `Err::duration()` to recover the magnitude and negates the seconds
201/// before formatting; the result is a correct RFC 3339 timestamp
202/// anywhere from the BCE proleptic Gregorian range up to
203/// `1970-01-01T00:00:00.000Z`. The rem_euclid / div_euclid math at
204/// the format step handles arbitrarily-large negative offsets, not
205/// only sub-day drifts. Pre-epoch correctness is best-effort —
206/// `SystemTime` is non-monotonic and the JMAP spec does not require
207/// pre-epoch timestamps. (bd:JMAP-wlip.11 corrected the previous
208/// docstring's incorrect "1969-12-31T… through 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z"
209/// range claim.)
210///
211/// Clock-overflow handling: on a corrupted clock (system clock
212/// reporting a Duration whose `as_secs()` exceeds `i64::MAX`,
213/// `civil_from_days` reporting a year outside `i32`, or any other
214/// `SystemTime` failure mode), this function **panics**. The
215/// previous sentinel-string behaviour (`UTCDate::from("clock-out-of-range")`)
216/// was an idiom-grade defect (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): the sentinel was not a
217/// valid wire-format timestamp, had no in-band signal to distinguish
218/// it from a real value, and could silently propagate into JSON
219/// responses, audit logs, and database rows.
220///
221/// Callers that need to handle clock failure without panicking MUST
222/// use [`now_utc_string_checked`], which returns `Option<UTCDate>`.
223/// Long-running daemons, schedulers, and persistence layers SHOULD
224/// prefer the checked variant; one-shot tools and request handlers
225/// MAY accept the panic since clock corruption is unrecoverable and
226/// the dispatcher's `task::spawn` isolation already converts the
227/// panic into a `serverFail` invocation rather than crashing the
228/// process.
229///
230/// # Panics
231///
232/// Panics if `SystemTime::now()` cannot be expressed as an RFC 3339
233/// timestamp — the same conditions under which
234/// [`now_utc_string_checked`] returns `None`.
235pub fn now_utc_string() -> UTCDate {
236    now_utc_string_checked().expect("system clock returned an out-of-range value (bd:JMAP-jfia.30)")
237}
238
239/// Return the current UTC instant as an [`UTCDate`] (RFC 3339,
240/// millisecond precision, format `YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.mmmZ`), or
241/// `None` if the system clock cannot be expressed as an RFC 3339
242/// timestamp.
243///
244/// Added in bd:JMAP-jfia.30 to replace the previous sentinel-string
245/// failure mode of [`now_utc_string`] with a typed `Option` shape.
246/// Callers that want to react to a clock fault (audit-log
247/// timestamps, last-seen markers, retention sweeps) SHOULD use this
248/// variant; callers for whom a panic at the first sign of clock
249/// corruption is acceptable MAY use [`now_utc_string`] directly.
250///
251/// Returns `None` when:
252/// - `SystemTime::now().duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH).as_secs()`
253///   exceeds `i64::MAX` (only reachable on a corrupted clock —
254///   approx ±292 billion years from epoch).
255/// - The negation of a pre-epoch duration overflows `i64`
256///   (unreachable on a `try_from`-validated input but checked
257///   defensively).
258/// - `civil_from_days` reports a year outside `i32`
259///   (bd:JMAP-jfia.2 — between the i32-year boundary and the
260///   i64::MAX-secs cap).
261///
262/// # Why `Option<UTCDate>` and not `Result<UTCDate, ClockError>` (bd:JMAP-jfia.38)
263///
264/// The three failure modes are all "corrupted clock" — each one is
265/// physically unreachable on a sane host (years 5.7M-to-292B,
266/// `try_from`-impossible negation, `i32`-overflowing year). A caller
267/// that wants to branch on which physical mechanism fired would be
268/// branching on states that don't happen. The shapes the workspace
269/// uses elsewhere for typed-variant-per-mode (`SetError`,
270/// `BackendChangesError`, `BackendSetError`, `MergePatchError`) all
271/// carry failure modes that DO occur in normal operation —
272/// `notFound`, `tooManyChanges`, `invalidPatch`, `depthExceeded`.
273/// The clock-corruption modes are different in kind. Erasing the
274/// discriminator here trades a hypothetical observability win for a
275/// cleaner contract: "the clock is unusable for RFC 3339, abandon
276/// timestamping." A future need for per-mode telemetry can be added
277/// non-breakingly as a parallel helper (e.g. `now_utc_string_diagnose
278/// -> Result<UTCDate, ClockError>`) without disturbing this shape.
279pub fn now_utc_string_checked() -> Option<UTCDate> {
280    use std::time::SystemTime;
281
282    let (secs, millis) = signed_seconds_since_epoch(SystemTime::now())?;
283
284    let s = secs.rem_euclid(60);
285    let m = (secs / 60).rem_euclid(60);
286    let h = (secs / 3600).rem_euclid(24);
287    let days = secs.div_euclid(86400);
288    let (year, month, day) = civil_from_days(days)?;
289
290    Some(UTCDate::from(format!(
291        "{year:04}-{month:02}-{day:02}T{h:02}:{m:02}:{s:02}.{millis:03}Z"
292    )))
293}
294
295/// Convert a [`SystemTime`] into `(signed_seconds_since_epoch, millis)`,
296/// returning `None` when the system clock cannot be expressed as an
297/// `i64` second count.
298///
299/// Extracted from [`now_utc_string_checked`] in bd:JMAP-jfia.11 to
300/// flatten the previous three-level nested match
301/// (`duration_since` → `try_from` → `checked_neg`) into one
302/// linear function the reader can scan top-to-bottom. The
303/// `.checked_neg()` branch is unreachable on a `try_from`-validated
304/// input (its output is `[0, i64::MAX]` so negation cannot underflow)
305/// but is kept for defence in depth — the failure path stays total.
306fn signed_seconds_since_epoch(now: std::time::SystemTime) -> Option<(i64, u32)> {
307    use std::time::UNIX_EPOCH;
308    match now.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH) {
309        Ok(d) => {
310            let s = i64::try_from(d.as_secs()).ok()?;
311            Some((s, d.subsec_millis()))
312        }
313        Err(e) => {
314            // Pre-epoch clock — negate after the fallible widen so we
315            // can return a real (negative) epoch offset rather than
316            // silently snapping to 1970-01-01T00:00:00Z.
317            let d = e.duration();
318            let s = i64::try_from(d.as_secs()).ok()?;
319            let neg = s.checked_neg()?;
320            Some((neg, d.subsec_millis()))
321        }
322    }
323}
324
325/// Convert a count of days since the Unix epoch (1970-01-01) to a proleptic
326/// Gregorian (year, month, day) triple, or `None` if the resulting year
327/// does not fit in `i32`.
328///
329/// Algorithm by Howard Hinnant (public domain):
330/// <https://howardhinnant.github.io/date_algorithms.html>
331///
332/// The year-narrowing cast is fallible because the algorithm's intermediate
333/// `y` value is bounded by `i64::MAX / 146_097 ≈ ±6.3e13`, only a subset
334/// of which fits in `i32` (~±2.1e9 years). For a sane `SystemTime`-derived
335/// input we stay well inside `i32::MIN..=i32::MAX`, but the outer
336/// `now_utc_string` only rejects `u64` seconds exceeding `i64::MAX`
337/// (bd:JMAP-wlip.27 sentinel) — inputs between the i32-year boundary
338/// (~5.7e6 years from epoch) and that sentinel reach this function and
339/// previously panicked the dispatcher worker (bd:JMAP-jfia.2). Returning
340/// `None` lets the caller fall through to its own sentinel rather than
341/// taking down the task.
342///
343/// Month and day cannot fail: the algorithm's modular structure pins them
344/// to `[1, 12]` and `[1, 31]` respectively, narrow casts handled with
345/// `try_from(...).expect(...)` documenting the invariant.
346fn civil_from_days(z: i64) -> Option<(i32, u8, u8)> {
347    let z = z + 719_468;
348    let era: i64 = if z >= 0 { z } else { z - 146_096 } / 146_097;
349    let doe = z - era * 146_097; // [0, 146096]
350    let yoe = (doe - doe / 1460 + doe / 36524 - doe / 146096) / 365; // [0, 399]
351    let y = yoe + era * 400;
352    let doy = doe - (365 * yoe + yoe / 4 - yoe / 100); // [0, 365]
353    let mp = (5 * doy + 2) / 153; // [0, 11]
354    let d = doy - (153 * mp + 2) / 5 + 1; // [1, 31]
355    let mo = if mp < 10 { mp + 3 } else { mp - 9 }; // [1, 12]
356    let yr = if mo <= 2 { y + 1 } else { y };
357    Some((
358        i32::try_from(yr).ok()?,
359        u8::try_from(mo).expect("month bounded by algorithm to [1, 12]"),
360        u8::try_from(d).expect("day bounded by algorithm to [1, 31]"),
361    ))
362}
363
364/// Maximum recursion depth for [`json_merge_patch`] application.
365///
366/// Beyond this depth [`json_merge_patch`] returns
367/// [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] without applying any further levels.
368/// Mitigates stack DoS from adversarial `PatchObject` values
369/// (bd:JMAP-sc1b.97). 32 levels comfortably exceeds any legitimate JMAP
370/// `/set update` shape — the deepest standard JMAP `/set update` shape
371/// (Email with nested `bodyStructure`) tops out around 6 levels, so the
372/// cap fires only on adversarial input.
373///
374/// Crate-private (bd:JMAP-wlip.4): consumers see the cap-exceeded
375/// behaviour via [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`], not by reading the
376/// constant directly. The crate reserves the right to tighten the
377/// value (e.g. 32 → 16) without a major-version bump because the
378/// contract is "the function may return DepthExceeded", not "the cap
379/// is exactly N".
380pub(crate) const MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH: usize = 32;
381
382/// Error returned by [`json_merge_patch`] when a patch cannot be applied.
383///
384/// Marked `#[non_exhaustive]` so future RFC 7396 failure modes (e.g. a
385/// size cap in addition to the depth cap) can be added without an API
386/// break.
387#[non_exhaustive]
388#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
389pub enum MergePatchError {
390    /// The patch nests deeper than the crate's `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`
391    /// DoS-guard cap.
392    ///
393    /// Callers SHOULD map this to
394    /// [`SetError`](crate::SetError) with
395    /// [`SetErrorType::InvalidPatch`](crate::SetErrorType::InvalidPatch)
396    /// and MUST discard any partially-mutated `target` rather than
397    /// persisting it — see the contract on [`json_merge_patch`].
398    ///
399    /// # Why no `reached` / `max` payload (bd:JMAP-jfia.39)
400    ///
401    /// The variant is intentionally unit-shaped. The cap value is
402    /// available in the `Display` impl (which interpolates
403    /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`) for log-line and user-message use.
404    /// A typed payload `{ reached: usize, max: usize }` was
405    /// considered and rejected for now because (a) no current
406    /// consumer in the workspace destructures the reached depth or
407    /// the cap programmatically — all 6 call sites map to
408    /// `SetErrorType::InvalidPatch` with a generic description; and
409    /// (b) changing a unit variant to a struct variant is a breaking
410    /// pattern-match change even on a `#[non_exhaustive]` enum (the
411    /// existing `if let Err(MergePatchError::DepthExceeded)` pattern
412    /// would stop compiling). If a future consumer needs
413    /// programmatic access to the depth, the additive evolution is
414    /// to add a new variant alongside (e.g.
415    /// `DepthExceededDetail { reached: usize, max: usize }`) and
416    /// emit the new variant from `json_merge_patch`. The unit
417    /// variant would then become unreachable but remain valid
418    /// pattern syntax for any pinned-version consumer.
419    DepthExceeded,
420}
421
422impl std::fmt::Display for MergePatchError {
423    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
424        match self {
425            Self::DepthExceeded => write!(
426                f,
427                "merge patch nesting exceeds {MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH} levels"
428            ),
429        }
430    }
431}
432
433impl std::error::Error for MergePatchError {}
434
435/// Apply a JSON Merge Patch (RFC 7396) to `target` in-place.
436///
437/// Used by every `*-server` backend's `update_object` implementation
438/// to merge a sparse `/set update` patch into the stored serialized
439/// object. Extracted from per-crate copies in bd:JMAP-sc1b.103 — keep
440/// edits here so all five reference backends stay byte-identical.
441///
442/// # Errors
443///
444/// Returns [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] when the patch nests
445/// deeper than the crate's internal `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard
446/// cap (added in bd:JMAP-sc1b.97, made non-silent in bd:JMAP-wlip.1).
447/// The exact value is intentionally not exposed; consumers see the
448/// behaviour via the typed error rather than reading the constant.
449/// Below the cap the behaviour is exactly RFC 7396 and the call always
450/// returns `Ok(())`.
451///
452/// # Partial-mutation contract
453///
454/// On `Err(DepthExceeded)`, `target` may have been mutated up to the
455/// level where the cap fired — RFC 7396 merging is applied recursively
456/// in place and the function does not roll back on error. Callers MUST
457/// discard `target` rather than persist it. The standard pattern in
458/// every `*-server` `update_object` impl is to operate on a `.clone()`
459/// of the stored value and only `insert(...)` it back on `Ok(())`; that
460/// pattern is naturally safe because the stored value is left untouched
461/// on error.
462pub fn json_merge_patch(target: &mut Value, patch: Value) -> Result<(), MergePatchError> {
463    json_merge_patch_inner(target, patch, 0)
464}
465
466fn json_merge_patch_inner(
467    target: &mut Value,
468    patch: Value,
469    depth: usize,
470) -> Result<(), MergePatchError> {
471    if depth > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH {
472        return Err(MergePatchError::DepthExceeded);
473    }
474    match patch {
475        Value::Object(patch_map) => {
476            // Per RFC 7396 §2: "If the target value is not a JSON object,
477            // the resulting value will be the merge patch." We therefore
478            // reset a non-Object target to an empty Object before merging
479            // — this is reachable when a Patch creates a nested field that
480            // is absent from the target (the parent recursion frame inserted
481            // Value::Null as a placeholder).
482            if !target.is_object() {
483                *target = Value::Object(Map::new());
484            }
485            let target_map = target
486                .as_object_mut()
487                .expect("target was just set to Value::Object above");
488            for (key, patch_val) in patch_map {
489                if patch_val.is_null() {
490                    target_map.remove(&key);
491                } else {
492                    let entry = target_map.entry(key).or_insert(Value::Null);
493                    json_merge_patch_inner(entry, patch_val, depth + 1)?;
494                }
495            }
496        }
497        other => *target = other,
498    }
499    Ok(())
500}
501
502/// Error returned by [`apply_jmap_patch`] and [`apply_patch_object`] when
503/// a PatchObject cannot be applied.
504///
505/// Every variant is an RFC 8620 §5.3 violation for which "the update
506/// MUST be rejected with an "invalidPatch" error". Callers SHOULD map
507/// any variant to [`SetError`](crate::SetError) with
508/// [`SetErrorType::InvalidPatch`](crate::SetErrorType::InvalidPatch);
509/// the `Display` form is suitable as its description.
510///
511/// Marked `#[non_exhaustive]` so further §5.3 checks can be added
512/// without an API break.
513#[non_exhaustive]
514#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
515pub enum PatchPathError {
516    /// A part before the last does not exist on the patched object.
517    ParentMissing,
518    /// A part before the last names an array, so the pointer would
519    /// reference inside an array.
520    InsideArray,
521    /// A part before the last names a value that is neither an object nor
522    /// an array (string, number, boolean or null), which has no members.
523    ParentNotObject,
524    /// A `~` in the path is not followed by `0` or `1`, so the path is
525    /// not a valid RFC 6901 JSON Pointer.
526    InvalidEscape,
527    /// The pointer of one patch is a prefix of the pointer of another in
528    /// the same PatchObject (e.g. `"alerts/1/offset"` and `"alerts"`).
529    PrefixConflict,
530    /// The path's segment count plus the value's object/array nesting
531    /// exceeds the crate's `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard cap.
532    ///
533    /// Not an RFC 8620 §5.3 rule: it is this crate's server limit
534    /// (RFC 8620 §3.6.1 lets a server reject requests that exceed its
535    /// limits), so repeated path patches cannot grow a stored value's
536    /// depth without bound. It is still reported as invalidPatch.
537    DepthExceeded,
538}
539
540impl std::fmt::Display for PatchPathError {
541    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
542        match self {
543            Self::ParentMissing => f.write_str("patch path parent does not exist"),
544            Self::InsideArray => f.write_str("patch path references inside an array"),
545            Self::ParentNotObject => f.write_str("patch path parent is not an object"),
546            Self::InvalidEscape => f.write_str("patch path has a '~' not followed by '0' or '1'"),
547            Self::PrefixConflict => {
548                f.write_str("patch has a path that is a prefix of another path")
549            }
550            Self::DepthExceeded => {
551                write!(f, "patch nesting exceeds {MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH} levels")
552            }
553        }
554    }
555}
556
557impl std::error::Error for PatchPathError {}
558
559/// Apply one RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject entry (`path` → `value`) to
560/// `target` in-place.
561///
562/// `path` is a PatchObject key: an RFC 6901 JSON Pointer with the
563/// implicit leading `/` omitted (e.g. `"mailboxIds/abc123"`). Each
564/// `/`-separated reference token is decoded per RFC 6901 §4 (`~1` → `/`,
565/// then `~0` → `~`). Every token before the last must name an existing
566/// object member; the last token names the member to set. A `null`
567/// `value` removes that member (a no-op when it is absent); any other
568/// value inserts or replaces it.
569///
570/// Extracted from per-crate copies in bd:JMAP-j6ab. Extension servers
571/// MUST call this rather than reimplement it.
572///
573/// Empty tokens are legal: RFC 6901 §3 allows a zero-length
574/// `reference-token`, and its §5 example evaluates `"/"` to the member
575/// named `""`. The RFC 8620 §5.3 "null sets the property default" rule
576/// is type-specific and left to the caller. The rule that no two pointers
577/// in one PatchObject may be prefixes of each other is checked by
578/// [`apply_patch_object`].
579///
580/// # Errors
581///
582/// Returns [`PatchPathError`] when a part before the last does not exist
583/// ([`ParentMissing`](PatchPathError::ParentMissing)), is an array
584/// ([`InsideArray`](PatchPathError::InsideArray)) or is another
585/// non-object value ([`ParentNotObject`](PatchPathError::ParentNotObject)),
586/// when `path` contains an invalid escape
587/// ([`InvalidEscape`](PatchPathError::InvalidEscape)), or when the
588/// number of `/`-separated segments in `path` plus the object/array
589/// nesting of `value` (a scalar nests 0 levels) exceeds the crate's
590/// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` DoS-guard cap
591/// ([`DepthExceeded`](PatchPathError::DepthExceeded)).
592///
593/// # Mutation contract
594///
595/// A single call is all-or-nothing: on `Err`, `target` is unchanged.
596/// A PatchObject has several entries, and an error on a later entry
597/// does not undo earlier ones, so callers applying a whole PatchObject
598/// MUST use [`apply_patch_object`].
599pub fn apply_jmap_patch(
600    target: &mut Map<String, Value>,
601    path: &str,
602    value: Value,
603) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
604    let segments = path.split('/').count();
605    if segments > MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH
606        || nests_deeper_than(&value, MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - segments)
607    {
608        return Err(PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
609    }
610    let (parents, leaf) = match path.rsplit_once('/') {
611        Some((parents, leaf)) => (Some(parents), leaf),
612        None => (None, path),
613    };
614    let leaf = decode_pointer_token(leaf)?;
615    let mut parent = target;
616    for token in parents.into_iter().flat_map(|p| p.split('/')) {
617        parent = match parent.get_mut(decode_pointer_token(token)?.as_ref()) {
618            Some(Value::Object(map)) => map,
619            Some(Value::Array(_)) => return Err(PatchPathError::InsideArray),
620            Some(_) => return Err(PatchPathError::ParentNotObject),
621            None => return Err(PatchPathError::ParentMissing),
622        };
623    }
624    if value.is_null() {
625        parent.remove(leaf.as_ref());
626    } else {
627        parent.insert(leaf.into_owned(), value);
628    }
629    Ok(())
630}
631
632/// Apply a whole RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject to `target`.
633///
634/// Each entry is applied with [`apply_jmap_patch`]. The value at each
635/// pointer is set as given: a top-level key such as `"name"` replaces that
636/// property wholesale, with no nested merge of object values (RFC 8620
637/// §5.3: "The value to set for this property").
638///
639/// # Errors
640///
641/// Returns [`PatchPathError::PrefixConflict`] when the decoded pointer of
642/// one key is a whole-segment prefix of another (`"alerts"` and
643/// `"alerts/1/offset"` conflict; `"alert"` and `"alerts/x"` do not), and
644/// otherwise any error [`apply_jmap_patch`] returns for an entry.
645///
646/// # Mutation contract
647///
648/// All-or-nothing: on `Err`, `target` is unchanged.
649pub fn apply_patch_object(
650    target: &mut Map<String, Value>,
651    patch: &Map<String, Value>,
652) -> Result<(), PatchPathError> {
653    let mut pointers = patch
654        .keys()
655        .map(|k| {
656            k.split('/')
657                .map(decode_pointer_token)
658                .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()
659        })
660        .collect::<Result<Vec<_>, _>>()?;
661    // Sorted, a pointer that prefixes any other also prefixes its successor.
662    pointers.sort_unstable();
663    if pointers.windows(2).any(|w| w[1].starts_with(&w[0])) {
664        return Err(PatchPathError::PrefixConflict);
665    }
666    let mut patched = target.clone();
667    for (path, value) in patch {
668        apply_jmap_patch(&mut patched, path, value.clone())?;
669    }
670    *target = patched;
671    Ok(())
672}
673
674/// Whether `value` nests objects or arrays more than `limit` levels deep
675/// (a scalar nests 0 levels). Recursion is bounded by `limit`, not by the
676/// input.
677fn nests_deeper_than(value: &Value, limit: usize) -> bool {
678    match value {
679        Value::Object(map) => limit == 0 || map.values().any(|v| nests_deeper_than(v, limit - 1)),
680        Value::Array(items) => limit == 0 || items.iter().any(|v| nests_deeper_than(v, limit - 1)),
681        _ => false,
682    }
683}
684
685/// Decode one RFC 6901 reference token: `~1` → `/`, then `~0` → `~`
686/// (RFC 6901 §4 order, so `~01` becomes `~1`, not `/`).
687fn decode_pointer_token(token: &str) -> Result<Cow<'_, str>, PatchPathError> {
688    if !token.contains('~') {
689        return Ok(Cow::Borrowed(token));
690    }
691    let escapes_valid = token
692        .match_indices('~')
693        .all(|(i, _)| matches!(token.as_bytes().get(i + 1), Some(b'0' | b'1')));
694    if !escapes_valid {
695        return Err(PatchPathError::InvalidEscape);
696    }
697    Ok(Cow::Owned(token.replace("~1", "/").replace("~0", "~")))
698}
699
700/// Resolve a request-side `position` argument (RFC 8620 §5.5) into a
701/// 0-based start index suitable for slicing the full ordered result
702/// list (bd:JMAP-qz9v.48).
703///
704/// `position` is the signed offset from the `/query` request. The
705/// foundation handler at [`crate::handlers::handle_query`] parses it
706/// via [`serde_json::Value::as_i64`], so the value reaching the
707/// backend is any `i64` (including `i64::MIN`). Non-negative values
708/// are absolute offsets from the start of the result list; negative
709/// values are end-relative offsets per RFC 8620 §5.5 ("`-1` represents
710/// the last entry, `-2` the second to last, and so on").
711///
712/// Returns a `usize` clamped to `[0, total]`. The clamp at the high
713/// end matches the slice-safety property: `all_ids[start..]` is
714/// guaranteed not to panic regardless of the input `position`.
715///
716/// # Edge cases this helper exists to centralize
717///
718/// 1. `position == 0` → `0`.
719/// 2. `position > total` → `total` (yields an empty page, matching
720///    the RFC's silent-clamp semantics — `/query` does not error on
721///    out-of-range positions).
722/// 3. `position == i64::MIN` → handled via [`i64::saturating_neg`],
723///    which returns `i64::MAX` rather than overflowing. The resulting
724///    `usize::MAX`-magnitude offset is then absorbed by
725///    [`usize::saturating_sub`].
726/// 4. `position` exceeding `usize::MAX` on a 32-bit target (`i64`
727///    values above `2^32 - 1`) → clamped to `total` rather than
728///    truncated. The previous workspace idiom (`position as usize`)
729///    silently wrapped the high bits on 32-bit, returning a small
730///    `start` index that did not match the caller's intent.
731///
732/// # Why this lives in the foundation
733///
734/// The pattern is identical across every extension server's `/query`
735/// backend impl. Centralizing it eliminates the per-crate
736/// `(position as usize)` / `(position.saturating_neg() as usize)`
737/// idiom that clippy::pedantic flags as `cast_possible_truncation` +
738/// `cast_sign_loss`, and prevents future siblings from re-introducing
739/// the strictly-worse `(-position) as usize` variant (which panics on
740/// `i64::MIN` in debug builds and wraps in release).
741///
742/// # Example
743///
744/// ```
745/// use jmap_server::resolve_query_offset;
746///
747/// // Absolute offset.
748/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 100), 0);
749/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(25, 100), 25);
750///
751/// // End-relative offset.
752/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 100), 99);
753/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-100, 100), 0);
754///
755/// // Out-of-range clamps to total.
756/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1_000, 100), 100);
757/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1_000, 100), 0);
758///
759/// // i64::MIN does not overflow.
760/// assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 100), 0);
761/// ```
762#[must_use]
763pub fn resolve_query_offset(position: i64, total: usize) -> usize {
764    if position >= 0 {
765        // `i64 >= 0` → fits in `u64`. `usize::try_from` returns the
766        // value on 64-bit targets and `Err` on 32-bit targets only
767        // when the magnitude exceeds `usize::MAX`; saturating to
768        // `usize::MAX` is then clamped to `total` by `.min`.
769        usize::try_from(position).unwrap_or(usize::MAX).min(total)
770    } else {
771        // `saturating_neg` maps `i64::MIN` to `i64::MAX` instead of
772        // overflowing. Every other negative `i64` negates exactly.
773        let neg = usize::try_from(position.saturating_neg()).unwrap_or(usize::MAX);
774        total.saturating_sub(neg)
775    }
776}
777
778/// Enforce RFC 8620 §5.3 `maxObjectsInSet` cap at the top of a `/set`
779/// handler (bd:JMAP-ayoz.41.1).
780///
781/// Counts entries in the wire `create` (object), `update` (object), and
782/// `destroy` (array) arguments. Returns
783/// [`JmapError::limit("maxObjectsInSet")`][JmapError::limit] — which maps
784/// to HTTP 400 + wire `type: "limit"` via [`crate::response::error_status`]
785/// — when the sum exceeds `max`.
786///
787/// Call at the top of every `handle_*_set` after the `account_exists`
788/// gate and before any per-entry processing. A request carrying
789/// megabytes of `/set` ops is rejected before the handler touches the
790/// storage layer:
791///
792/// ```ignore
793/// let (account_id, args) = extract_account_id(args)?;
794/// if !backend.account_exists(caller, &account_id).await
795///     .map_err(|e| server_fail_from_backend(&e))?
796/// {
797///     return Err(JmapError::account_not_found());
798/// }
799/// jmap_server::helpers::enforce_max_objects_in_set(
800///     &args,
801///     backend.max_objects_in_set(caller, &account_id),
802/// )?;
803/// ```
804///
805/// # Why this lives in the foundation
806///
807/// `maxObjectsInSet` is a RFC 8620 §5.3 base-protocol cap, not an
808/// extension concept. Every `jmap-*-server` extension's `handle_*_set`
809/// needs the same check; the helper is the single source of truth so a
810/// future revision (different error shape, additional counting rule,
811/// alternate semantics for non-object `create` / `update`) lands in one
812/// place instead of being propagated through 28 handler sites.
813///
814/// # Counting rules
815///
816/// - `create` is counted as `args["create"].as_object()?.len()` —
817///   missing key, `null`, or non-object types count as 0.
818/// - `update` is counted the same way (RFC 8620 §5.3 `update` is
819///   `Id[PatchObject]`).
820/// - `destroy` is counted as `args["destroy"].as_array()?.len()` —
821///   missing key, `null`, or non-array types count as 0.
822///
823/// Wire-shape validation of the individual `create` / `update` /
824/// `destroy` arguments belongs to the per-handler argument parsing,
825/// not to this cap-enforcement helper. A non-object `create` survives
826/// the cap check (counts as 0) and is rejected by the handler's
827/// downstream `args.remove("create")` match arm. Conversely, a
828/// well-formed but over-limit `create` is rejected here before the
829/// handler runs.
830///
831/// # Errors
832///
833/// Returns `JmapError::limit("maxObjectsInSet")` when the sum exceeds
834/// `max`. The HTTP layer maps this to a 400 response with the limit
835/// name in the RFC 7807 `"limit"` field.
836pub fn enforce_max_objects_in_set(args: &Map<String, Value>, max: u64) -> Result<(), JmapError> {
837    let create_count = args
838        .get("create")
839        .and_then(|v| v.as_object())
840        .map_or(0u64, |m| m.len() as u64);
841    let update_count = args
842        .get("update")
843        .and_then(|v| v.as_object())
844        .map_or(0u64, |m| m.len() as u64);
845    let destroy_count = args
846        .get("destroy")
847        .and_then(|v| v.as_array())
848        .map_or(0u64, |a| a.len() as u64);
849    // u64 saturation: each count is bounded by serde_json's body parse
850    // (Map::len / Vec::len are usize; on 64-bit targets usize == u64,
851    // on 32-bit targets usize < u64). The sum cannot exceed
852    // 3 * u32::MAX even on 32-bit hosts, well within u64 range.
853    let count = create_count
854        .saturating_add(update_count)
855        .saturating_add(destroy_count);
856    if count > max {
857        return Err(JmapError::limit("maxObjectsInSet"));
858    }
859    Ok(())
860}
861
862#[cfg(test)]
863mod tests {
864    use super::{
865        apply_jmap_patch, apply_patch_object, civil_from_days, enforce_max_objects_in_set,
866        extract_account_id, json_merge_patch, now_utc_string, resolve_query_offset,
867        MergePatchError, PatchPathError, MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH,
868    };
869    use serde_json::json;
870
871    /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-wlip.5): a malformed accountId — empty string,
872    /// containing forbidden ASCII characters, or exceeding 255 bytes —
873    /// MUST surface as `invalidArguments`, not silently pass through to
874    /// the backend's `account_exists` call.
875    ///
876    /// Test vectors hand-built from RFC 8620 §1.2's Id grammar
877    /// (SAFE-CHAR = `%x21 / %x23-7E`).
878    #[test]
879    fn extract_account_id_rejects_malformed_id() {
880        // Empty string.
881        let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "" }))
882            .expect_err("empty accountId must fail validation");
883        assert_eq!(err.error_type.as_str(), "invalidArguments");
884
885        // Contains a space (0x20 — outside SAFE-CHAR's 0x21+ lower bound).
886        let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "my account" }))
887            .expect_err("space in accountId must fail validation");
888        assert_eq!(err.error_type.as_str(), "invalidArguments");
889
890        // Contains a DQUOTE (0x22 — explicitly excluded by SAFE-CHAR).
891        let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": "a\"b" }))
892            .expect_err("DQUOTE in accountId must fail validation");
893        assert_eq!(err.error_type.as_str(), "invalidArguments");
894
895        // 256 bytes — exceeds the 255 cap.
896        let long: String = "a".repeat(256);
897        let err = extract_account_id(json!({ "accountId": long }))
898            .expect_err("over-long accountId must fail validation");
899        assert_eq!(err.error_type.as_str(), "invalidArguments");
900    }
901
902    /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-wlip.5): a well-formed accountId passes
903    /// validation and is returned intact. Positive control paired with
904    /// the rejection test above.
905    ///
906    /// Also pins (bd:JMAP-jfia.9): the returned args map MUST NOT
907    /// contain accountId. The helper consumes the field rather than
908    /// leaving it as a residual key for downstream handlers to
909    /// re-parse or surface as "unexpected key".
910    #[test]
911    fn extract_account_id_accepts_well_formed_id() {
912        let (id, rest) = extract_account_id(json!({
913            "accountId": "u123-abc_DEF",
914            "ids": ["e1", "e2"]
915        }))
916        .expect("well-formed accountId must pass validation");
917        assert_eq!(id.as_ref(), "u123-abc_DEF");
918        // Remaining args still contain the unrelated keys.
919        assert!(rest.contains_key("ids"));
920        // accountId MUST have been removed from the args map
921        // (bd:JMAP-jfia.9). matches optional_arg's consume semantics.
922        assert!(
923            !rest.contains_key("accountId"),
924            "accountId must be removed from args after extraction"
925        );
926    }
927
928    /// Test vectors derived independently with Python's `datetime.date` module.
929    /// `days` is the count of days since 1970-01-01.
930    #[test]
931    fn civil_from_days_known_dates() {
932        let cases: &[(i64, (i32, u8, u8))] = &[
933            (0, (1970, 1, 1)),       // Unix epoch
934            (365, (1971, 1, 1)),     // one year later (1970 is not a leap year)
935            (10957, (2000, 1, 1)),   // Y2K
936            (11016, (2000, 2, 29)),  // leap day in a century-divisible leap year
937            (11017, (2000, 3, 1)),   // day after the leap day (era boundary in algorithm)
938            (19358, (2023, 1, 1)),   // a recent non-leap year start
939            (19722, (2023, 12, 31)), // end of 2023
940            (19782, (2024, 2, 29)),  // leap day in 2024
941            (19783, (2024, 3, 1)),   // day after 2024 leap day
942        ];
943
944        for &(days, expected) in cases {
945            assert_eq!(
946                civil_from_days(days),
947                Some(expected),
948                "civil_from_days({days}) mismatch"
949            );
950        }
951    }
952
953    /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.2): civil_from_days MUST return None rather
954    /// than panic on inputs whose computed year overflows i32. The
955    /// Hinnant algorithm's intermediate `y = yoe + era * 400` value is
956    /// bounded by `i64::MAX / 146_097 ≈ ±6.3e13`, only a thin slice of
957    /// which fits in i32. The outer `now_utc_string_checked`
958    /// u64→i64 sentinel only catches u64 seconds exceeding `i64::MAX`,
959    /// so corrupted-clock inputs between the i32-year boundary and
960    /// i64::MAX reach this function. A panic here would surface as
961    /// serverFail under dispatcher task::spawn isolation — degraded,
962    /// but a contract violation versus the function's "fallible
963    /// without panicking" contract.
964    ///
965    /// Test vectors: the maximum days-from-epoch derived from
966    /// i64::MAX seconds (the regime that reaches civil_from_days
967    /// after passing the outer u64→i64 sentinel), and the symmetric
968    /// negative case. These years are deep enough into the i64
969    /// algorithm range to definitely overflow i32. Plus a
970    /// non-overflowing positive control just below the threshold to
971    /// prove the boundary check fires only when warranted.
972    #[test]
973    fn civil_from_days_returns_none_on_year_overflow() {
974        // i64::MAX / 86400 ≈ 1.07e14 days → year ≈ 2.92e11, well past i32::MAX (~2.15e9).
975        let max_days = i64::MAX / 86400;
976        assert_eq!(
977            civil_from_days(max_days),
978            None,
979            "i64::MAX / 86400 days must overflow i32 year"
980        );
981
982        // i64::MIN / 86400 ≈ -1.07e14 days — symmetric negative case.
983        let min_days = i64::MIN / 86400;
984        assert_eq!(
985            civil_from_days(min_days),
986            None,
987            "i64::MIN / 86400 days must overflow i32 year"
988        );
989
990        // Positive control: a far-future but i32-fitting year should
991        // still succeed. Year ~58_798_075 (from 10 * i32::MAX days)
992        // fits in i32 with room to spare, so this MUST return Some.
993        let year_58m_days = 10_i64 * i64::from(i32::MAX);
994        let result = civil_from_days(year_58m_days);
995        assert!(
996            result.is_some(),
997            "i32-fitting year must return Some; got {result:?}"
998        );
999    }
1000
1001    /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): now_utc_string_checked MUST return
1002    /// `Some(UTCDate)` on a sane clock (every host the test runs on
1003    /// in practice). The civil_from_days_returns_none_on_year_overflow
1004    /// test above pins the underlying None-on-corrupted-clock
1005    /// behaviour at the algorithm level; this test pins the
1006    /// happy-path contract: a sane clock yields the typed wire format,
1007    /// not a sentinel string.
1008    #[test]
1009    fn now_utc_string_checked_returns_some_on_sane_clock() {
1010        use super::now_utc_string_checked;
1011        let dt = now_utc_string_checked().expect(
1012            "test host clock must be reasonable enough for now_utc_string_checked to succeed",
1013        );
1014        let s: &str = dt.as_ref();
1015        assert_eq!(s.len(), 24, "wire shape must be 24 chars: {s:?}");
1016        assert!(s.ends_with('Z'), "must end with Z: {s:?}");
1017    }
1018
1019    /// Oracle (bd:JMAP-jfia.30): now_utc_string (the panicking variant)
1020    /// MUST agree with now_utc_string_checked on a sane clock — i.e.
1021    /// the .expect() in now_utc_string does not introduce a wire-format
1022    /// discrepancy versus the Option-returning variant.
1023    #[test]
1024    fn now_utc_string_matches_checked_variant_on_sane_clock() {
1025        use super::now_utc_string_checked;
1026        let panicky = now_utc_string();
1027        let checked = now_utc_string_checked().expect("test host clock must be reasonable");
1028        // Both calls observe SystemTime::now() at slightly different
1029        // instants; the seconds part can differ if the test runs across
1030        // a second boundary. Compare the prefix up to the seconds
1031        // resolution.
1032        let panicky_s: &str = panicky.as_ref();
1033        let checked_s: &str = checked.as_ref();
1034        assert_eq!(
1035            panicky_s.len(),
1036            checked_s.len(),
1037            "wire-format lengths must match: panicky={panicky_s:?} checked={checked_s:?}"
1038        );
1039        // Compare the date portion only (YYYY-MM-DD, 10 chars).
1040        assert_eq!(
1041            &panicky_s[..10],
1042            &checked_s[..10],
1043            "date portions must match: panicky={panicky_s:?} checked={checked_s:?}"
1044        );
1045    }
1046
1047    #[test]
1048    fn now_utc_string_format() {
1049        // bd:JMAP-wlip.20 — return type is UTCDate; AsRef<str> gives
1050        // the underlying wire-format string for shape assertions.
1051        let dt = now_utc_string();
1052        let s: &str = dt.as_ref();
1053        // Must match YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS.mmmZ (24 chars)
1054        assert_eq!(s.len(), 24, "unexpected length: {s}");
1055        assert!(s.ends_with('Z'), "must end with Z: {s}");
1056        assert_eq!(&s[4..5], "-", "missing year-month separator: {s}");
1057        assert_eq!(&s[7..8], "-", "missing month-day separator: {s}");
1058        assert_eq!(&s[10..11], "T", "missing date-time separator: {s}");
1059        assert_eq!(&s[13..14], ":", "missing hour-minute separator: {s}");
1060        assert_eq!(&s[16..17], ":", "missing minute-second separator: {s}");
1061        assert_eq!(&s[19..20], ".", "missing decimal point before millis: {s}");
1062        // milliseconds are 3 decimal digits
1063        assert!(
1064            s[20..23].chars().all(|c| c.is_ascii_digit()),
1065            "milliseconds must be 3 digits: {s}"
1066        );
1067        assert!(
1068            s.starts_with("20"),
1069            "year should start with 20 in 21st century: {s}"
1070        );
1071    }
1072
1073    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
1074    // json_merge_patch (RFC 7396)
1075    //
1076    // Test oracles are hand-built JSON values derived from RFC 7396 §2 and §3
1077    // examples, plus the regression case from bd:JMAP-sc1b.87. No oracle is
1078    // computed by the function under test (test-integrity rule from
1079    // workspace AGENTS.md).
1080    // -----------------------------------------------------------------------
1081
1082    /// Oracle: bd:JMAP-sc1b.97 — a 1000-deep merge patch must NOT crash
1083    /// via stack overflow. The depth cap returns
1084    /// [`MergePatchError::DepthExceeded`] beyond [`MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`]
1085    /// rather than recursing further.
1086    ///
1087    /// The test does not use the function as its own oracle: the input
1088    /// is hand-built (a 1000-deep `{ "a": { "a": ... { "a": {} } } }`
1089    /// chain where every level is Object, matching the structural
1090    /// shape of a real PatchObject — the documented latent panic from
1091    /// bd:JMAP-sc1b.87 only fires on non-Object leaves, which a typed
1092    /// PatchObject cannot produce). The assertion checks that the
1093    /// call completes without panicking AND that it surfaces the
1094    /// depth-exceeded error rather than silently succeeding (the
1095    /// pre-bd:JMAP-wlip.1 silent-truncation bug).
1096    #[test]
1097    fn json_merge_patch_does_not_stack_overflow() {
1098        const DEPTH: usize = 1000;
1099        let mut target = serde_json::json!({});
1100        for _ in 0..DEPTH {
1101            target = serde_json::json!({ "a": target });
1102        }
1103        let mut patch = serde_json::json!({});
1104        for _ in 0..DEPTH {
1105            patch = serde_json::json!({ "a": patch });
1106        }
1107        let err = json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch)
1108            .expect_err("deep patch must surface DepthExceeded, not silently truncate");
1109        assert_eq!(
1110            err,
1111            MergePatchError::DepthExceeded,
1112            "deep patch must return MergePatchError::DepthExceeded"
1113        );
1114    }
1115
1116    /// Oracle: bd:JMAP-wlip.1 — a patch at exactly [`MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`]
1117    /// levels (the deepest legal patch) MUST apply successfully. The cap
1118    /// fires only when the patch tries to recurse one level beyond. The
1119    /// expected target shape is hand-built level-by-level from the same
1120    /// counter the patch uses, so the oracle is independent of the
1121    /// recursion under test.
1122    #[test]
1123    fn json_merge_patch_at_exact_cap_applies() {
1124        // Build a patch nested exactly MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH levels deep.
1125        // Outermost level is depth=1; innermost leaf-Object is at depth
1126        // MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH. The first depth-cap check fires at
1127        // depth == MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH + 1, so this is the deepest
1128        // patch that still applies.
1129        let mut patch = serde_json::json!({ "leaf": "value" });
1130        for _ in 0..(MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - 1) {
1131            patch = serde_json::json!({ "a": patch });
1132        }
1133        let mut target = serde_json::json!({});
1134        json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("patch at the cap must apply");
1135        // Walk the resulting target down its 'a' chain to verify the
1136        // leaf field landed.
1137        let mut cursor = &target;
1138        for _ in 0..(MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH - 1) {
1139            cursor = cursor.get("a").expect("each level must have 'a'");
1140        }
1141        assert_eq!(
1142            cursor.get("leaf"),
1143            Some(&serde_json::Value::String("value".to_owned())),
1144            "the leaf field at exactly MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH must be applied"
1145        );
1146    }
1147
1148    /// Oracle: a shallow merge patch under the cap still applies
1149    /// normally. Positive control paired with the stack-overflow test
1150    /// above to prove the depth cap only fires at the boundary, not on
1151    /// every call.
1152    #[test]
1153    fn json_merge_patch_shallow_applies_normally() {
1154        let mut target = serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 2 } });
1155        let patch = serde_json::json!({ "b": { "c": 99, "d": 7 }, "e": null });
1156        json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("shallow patch must succeed");
1157        assert_eq!(
1158            target,
1159            serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 99, "d": 7 } }),
1160            "RFC 7396 merge semantics broken at shallow depth"
1161        );
1162    }
1163
1164    /// Regression: a Patch that adds a nested Object to a previously-
1165    /// absent field used to panic with `expect("merge patch target
1166    /// must be an object")` because the parent recursion frame
1167    /// inserted Value::Null as the placeholder, then recursed into
1168    /// Null with an Object patch.
1169    ///
1170    /// Per RFC 7396 §2 the correct behaviour is to reset the non-Object
1171    /// target to an empty Object and merge into it. Oracle is hand-
1172    /// derived from RFC 7396 §2's pseudocode:
1173    /// `Target[Name] = MergePatch(Target[Name], Value)` where
1174    /// MergePatch resets a non-Object target to `{}`.
1175    #[test]
1176    fn json_merge_patch_adds_nested_object_to_absent_field() {
1177        let mut target = serde_json::json!({ "a": 1 });
1178        let patch = serde_json::json!({ "b": { "c": 2 } });
1179        json_merge_patch(&mut target, patch).expect("nested-add patch must succeed");
1180        assert_eq!(
1181            target,
1182            serde_json::json!({ "a": 1, "b": { "c": 2 } }),
1183            "patch must add the nested object at the previously-absent field"
1184        );
1185    }
1186
1187    /// Oracle: [`MergePatchError`] implements [`std::error::Error`] and
1188    /// has a stable Display form referencing the cap value. Pinning the
1189    /// Display string keeps the error message stable across refactors;
1190    /// the cap value is interpolated from the public constant so this
1191    /// test does not need updating if the cap changes.
1192    #[test]
1193    fn merge_patch_error_display() {
1194        let err = MergePatchError::DepthExceeded;
1195        let s = err.to_string();
1196        assert!(
1197            s.contains(&MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH.to_string()),
1198            "Display must mention the cap value; got {s:?}"
1199        );
1200        assert!(
1201            s.contains("merge patch"),
1202            "Display must identify the error source; got {s:?}"
1203        );
1204    }
1205
1206    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
1207    // apply_jmap_patch (RFC 8620 §5.3 PatchObject paths, RFC 6901)
1208    //
1209    // Oracles are hand-built JSON values derived from the quoted RFC
1210    // text; the function under test is never its own oracle.
1211    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
1212
1213    /// Build a `Map` from a JSON object literal.
1214    fn obj(v: serde_json::Value) -> serde_json::Map<String, serde_json::Value> {
1215        match v {
1216            serde_json::Value::Object(m) => m,
1217            other => panic!("fixture must be a JSON object, got {other}"),
1218        }
1219    }
1220
1221    /// Apply `path` → `value` to `before` and assert it fails with `want`
1222    /// and leaves the object unchanged.
1223    fn assert_patch_rejected(
1224        before: serde_json::Value,
1225        path: &str,
1226        value: serde_json::Value,
1227        want: PatchPathError,
1228    ) {
1229        let mut target = obj(before.clone());
1230        let err = apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, path, value).expect_err("patch must be rejected");
1231        assert_eq!(err, want, "wrong error for path {path:?}");
1232        assert_eq!(
1233            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1234            before,
1235            "rejected patch {path:?} must leave the object unchanged"
1236        );
1237    }
1238
1239    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "Anything else: The value to set for this
1240    /// property (this may be a replacement or addition to the object
1241    /// being patched)."
1242    #[test]
1243    fn apply_jmap_patch_non_null_adds_or_replaces() {
1244        let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": 1 }));
1245        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a", json!(2)).expect("replace");
1246        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "b", json!("x")).expect("add");
1247        assert_eq!(
1248            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1249            json!({ "a": 2, "b": "x" })
1250        );
1251    }
1252
1253    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "If null, ... remove the property from the
1254    /// patched object.  If the key is not present in the parent, this a
1255    /// no-op."
1256    #[test]
1257    fn apply_jmap_patch_null_removes_and_absent_is_noop() {
1258        let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": 1, "m": { "k": true } }));
1259        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("remove");
1260        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m/k", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("nested remove");
1261        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m/absent", serde_json::Value::Null).expect("no-op");
1262        assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), json!({ "m": {} }));
1263    }
1264
1265    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "The keys are a path in JSON Pointer
1266    /// format [RFC6901], with an implicit leading "/"". `mailboxIds/abc`
1267    /// sets member `abc` of the existing `mailboxIds` object and leaves
1268    /// its siblings alone.
1269    #[test]
1270    fn apply_jmap_patch_nested_path_sets_member_of_existing_object() {
1271        let mut target = obj(json!({ "mailboxIds": { "inbox": true }, "x": { "y": { "z": 1 } } }));
1272        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "mailboxIds/abc", json!(true)).expect("set");
1273        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "x/y/w", json!(2)).expect("deep set");
1274        assert_eq!(
1275            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1276            json!({ "mailboxIds": { "inbox": true, "abc": true }, "x": { "y": { "z": 1, "w": 2 } } })
1277        );
1278    }
1279
1280    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "All parts prior to the last (i.e., the
1281    /// value after the final slash) MUST already exist on the object
1282    /// being patched." A missing parent is rejected, never created, for
1283    /// both non-null and null values.
1284    #[test]
1285    fn apply_jmap_patch_missing_parent_is_rejected() {
1286        let before = json!({ "a": { "b": {} } });
1287        for value in [json!("v"), serde_json::Value::Null] {
1288            assert_patch_rejected(
1289                before.clone(),
1290                "x/y",
1291                value.clone(),
1292                PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
1293            );
1294            assert_patch_rejected(
1295                before.clone(),
1296                "a/c/d",
1297                value,
1298                PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
1299            );
1300        }
1301    }
1302
1303    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "All parts prior to the last ... MUST
1304    /// already exist on the object being patched." A string, number,
1305    /// boolean or null has no members, so a part beneath one does not
1306    /// exist; the existing value must not be clobbered.
1307    #[test]
1308    fn apply_jmap_patch_non_object_parent_is_rejected() {
1309        let before = json!({ "s": "text", "n": 42, "b": true, "z": null });
1310        for parent in ["s", "n", "b", "z"] {
1311            assert_patch_rejected(
1312                before.clone(),
1313                &format!("{parent}/sub"),
1314                json!("would-clobber"),
1315                PatchPathError::ParentNotObject,
1316            );
1317        }
1318    }
1319
1320    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "The pointer MUST NOT reference inside an
1321    /// array (i.e., you MUST NOT insert/delete from an array; the array
1322    /// MUST be replaced in its entirety instead)." Applies to numeric
1323    /// tokens and to paths that would descend through an array element.
1324    #[test]
1325    fn apply_jmap_patch_inside_array_is_rejected() {
1326        let before = json!({ "list": ["a", { "k": 1 }] });
1327        assert_patch_rejected(
1328            before.clone(),
1329            "list/0",
1330            json!("x"),
1331            PatchPathError::InsideArray,
1332        );
1333        assert_patch_rejected(
1334            before.clone(),
1335            "list/1/k",
1336            json!(2),
1337            PatchPathError::InsideArray,
1338        );
1339        assert_patch_rejected(
1340            before,
1341            "list/0",
1342            serde_json::Value::Null,
1343            PatchPathError::InsideArray,
1344        );
1345    }
1346
1347    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "the array MUST be replaced in its entirety
1348    /// instead": setting the array-valued property itself is allowed.
1349    #[test]
1350    fn apply_jmap_patch_replaces_whole_array() {
1351        let mut target = obj(json!({ "list": ["a"] }));
1352        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "list", json!(["b", "c"])).expect("replace array");
1353        assert_eq!(
1354            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1355            json!({ "list": ["b", "c"] })
1356        );
1357    }
1358
1359    /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §4 — "first transforming any occurrence of the
1360    /// sequence '~1' to '/', and then transforming any occurrence of the
1361    /// sequence '~0' to '~' ... (the string '~01' correctly becomes '~1'
1362    /// after transformation)." Decoding is per token, after splitting on
1363    /// `/`, so `a~1b/c` addresses member `c` of member `a/b`.
1364    #[test]
1365    fn apply_jmap_patch_decodes_rfc6901_escapes() {
1366        let mut target = obj(json!({ "a/b": {}, "m~n": {} }));
1367        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "foo~1bar", json!(1)).expect("~1");
1368        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "foo~0bar", json!(2)).expect("~0");
1369        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "~01", json!(3)).expect("~01");
1370        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a~1b/c", json!(4)).expect("escaped parent");
1371        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "m~0n/~1", json!(5)).expect("escaped parent and leaf");
1372        assert_eq!(
1373            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1374            json!({
1375                "foo/bar": 1,
1376                "foo~bar": 2,
1377                "~1": 3,
1378                "a/b": { "c": 4 },
1379                "m~n": { "/": 5 }
1380            })
1381        );
1382    }
1383
1384    /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §3 — `escaped = "~" ( "0" / "1" )` and "It is an
1385    /// error condition if a JSON Pointer value does not conform to this
1386    /// syntax". RFC 8620 §5.3 requires keys in JSON Pointer format, so a
1387    /// malformed escape in any token is rejected.
1388    #[test]
1389    fn apply_jmap_patch_invalid_escape_is_rejected() {
1390        let before = json!({ "a": {} });
1391        for path in ["~2", "x~", "a/~", "~x/b", "a/b~"] {
1392            assert_patch_rejected(
1393                before.clone(),
1394                path,
1395                json!(1),
1396                PatchPathError::InvalidEscape,
1397            );
1398        }
1399    }
1400
1401    /// Oracle: RFC 6901 §3 — `reference-token = *( unescaped / escaped )`
1402    /// permits an empty token, and the §5 example evaluates `"/"` to the
1403    /// member named `""` (`"" : 0`). The PatchObject key `""` is the
1404    /// pointer `"/"`; `"a/"` is the pointer `"/a/"`.
1405    #[test]
1406    fn apply_jmap_patch_empty_token_names_empty_member() {
1407        let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": {} }));
1408        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "", json!(0)).expect("empty top-level token");
1409        apply_jmap_patch(&mut target, "a/", json!(1)).expect("empty nested token");
1410        assert_eq!(
1411            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1412            json!({ "": 0, "a": { "": 1 } })
1413        );
1414    }
1415
1416    /// Oracle: an empty token is an ordinary member name, so a missing
1417    /// empty-named parent is rejected like any other missing parent
1418    /// (RFC 8620 §5.3 "All parts prior to the last ... MUST already
1419    /// exist").
1420    #[test]
1421    fn apply_jmap_patch_missing_empty_parent_is_rejected() {
1422        assert_patch_rejected(
1423            json!({ "a": {} }),
1424            "a//b",
1425            json!(1),
1426            PatchPathError::ParentMissing,
1427        );
1428    }
1429
1430    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
1431    // apply_patch_object (RFC 8620 §5.3 whole PatchObject)
1432    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
1433
1434    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "There MUST NOT be two patches in the
1435    /// PatchObject where the pointer of one is the prefix of the pointer
1436    /// of the other, e.g., "alerts/1/offset" and "alerts""; on violation
1437    /// "the update MUST be rejected with an "invalidPatch" error".
1438    #[test]
1439    fn apply_patch_object_prefix_conflict_is_rejected() {
1440        let before = json!({ "alerts": { "1": { "offset": 0 } } });
1441        let mut target = obj(before.clone());
1442        let patch = obj(json!({ "alerts/1/offset": 5, "alerts": {} }));
1443        let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
1444        assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::PrefixConflict);
1445        assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
1446    }
1447
1448    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 forbids only a pointer that is "the prefix of
1449    /// the pointer of the other"; JSON Pointers are compared by reference
1450    /// token (RFC 6901 §3), so "alert" is not a prefix of "alerts/x".
1451    #[test]
1452    fn apply_patch_object_near_prefix_is_accepted() {
1453        let mut target = obj(json!({ "alerts": {} }));
1454        let patch = obj(json!({ "alert": 1, "alerts/x": 2 }));
1455        apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect("no prefix conflict");
1456        assert_eq!(
1457            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1458            json!({ "alert": 1, "alerts": { "x": 2 } })
1459        );
1460    }
1461
1462    /// Oracle: RFC 8620 §5.3 — "if there is any violation, the update MUST
1463    /// be rejected"; the valid entry "a" must not be applied either.
1464    #[test]
1465    fn apply_patch_object_partial_failure_leaves_target_unchanged() {
1466        let before = json!({ "a": 1 });
1467        let mut target = obj(before.clone());
1468        let patch = obj(json!({ "a": 2, "m/k": 1 }));
1469        let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
1470        assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::ParentMissing);
1471        assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
1472    }
1473
1474    /// A value nesting `levels` objects deep (`0` is the scalar `1`).
1475    fn nested(levels: usize) -> serde_json::Value {
1476        (0..levels).fold(json!(1), |inner, _| json!({ "k": inner }))
1477    }
1478
1479    /// Oracle: this crate's DoS guard, not an RFC 8620 §5.3 rule (RFC 8620
1480    /// §3.6.1 lets a server reject requests beyond its limits). Path
1481    /// segments plus value nesting may not exceed `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`
1482    /// (32): 3 + 30 = 33 is rejected before any entry is applied.
1483    #[test]
1484    fn apply_patch_object_path_plus_value_over_depth_cap_is_rejected() {
1485        let before = json!({ "x": 1, "a": { "b": {} } });
1486        let mut target = obj(before.clone());
1487        let patch = obj(json!({ "x": 2, "a/b/c": nested(30) }));
1488        let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
1489        assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
1490        assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
1491    }
1492
1493    /// Oracle: the crate's DoS guard rejects only depth beyond
1494    /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH`; exactly 3 segments + 29 levels = 32 applies.
1495    #[test]
1496    fn apply_patch_object_path_plus_value_at_depth_cap_applies() {
1497        let mut target = obj(json!({ "a": { "b": {} } }));
1498        let patch = obj(json!({ "a/b/c": nested(29) }));
1499        apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect("at the cap must apply");
1500        assert_eq!(
1501            serde_json::Value::Object(target),
1502            json!({ "a": { "b": { "c": nested(29) } } })
1503        );
1504    }
1505
1506    /// Oracle: the crate's DoS guard; a key of 33 segments exceeds
1507    /// `MAX_MERGE_PATCH_DEPTH` even with a scalar value.
1508    #[test]
1509    fn apply_patch_object_path_over_depth_cap_is_rejected() {
1510        let before = json!({ "a": {} });
1511        let mut target = obj(before.clone());
1512        let path = format!("a{}", "/k".repeat(32));
1513        let patch = obj(json!({ path: 1 }));
1514        let err = apply_patch_object(&mut target, &patch).expect_err("must be rejected");
1515        assert_eq!(err, PatchPathError::DepthExceeded);
1516        assert_eq!(serde_json::Value::Object(target), before);
1517    }
1518
1519    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
1520    // enforce_max_objects_in_set (bd:JMAP-ayoz.41.1) — RFC 8620 §5.3
1521    //
1522    // Oracles for all tests below are hand-built JmapError comparisons
1523    // and hand-built JSON args; the helper itself is never the oracle.
1524    // ------------------------------------------------------------------
1525
1526    /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): an empty `/set` args envelope (no
1527    /// `create` / `update` / `destroy` keys) MUST pass any positive cap.
1528    #[test]
1529    fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_empty_args_is_ok() {
1530        let args = json!({}).as_object().unwrap().clone();
1531        enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 500).expect("empty args must be under any positive cap");
1532    }
1533
1534    /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): at the exact boundary count == max, the
1535    /// helper MUST return Ok. The cap is enforced as strictly-greater
1536    /// (`count > max`), not greater-or-equal.
1537    #[test]
1538    fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_at_limit_is_ok() {
1539        // 5 + 5 + 5 = 15 entries against max=15 must pass.
1540        let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
1541        let mut update = serde_json::Map::new();
1542        let mut destroy = Vec::new();
1543        for i in 0..5 {
1544            create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
1545            update.insert(format!("u{i}"), json!({}));
1546            destroy.push(json!(format!("d{i}")));
1547        }
1548        let args = json!({
1549            "create": create,
1550            "update": update,
1551            "destroy": destroy,
1552        })
1553        .as_object()
1554        .unwrap()
1555        .clone();
1556        enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 15).expect("exact-boundary count must be allowed");
1557    }
1558
1559    /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3 + §3.6.1): one entry over the cap MUST
1560    /// return JmapError of type "limit" with description "maxObjectsInSet".
1561    /// The wire shape is verified by hand-building the expected
1562    /// JmapError independently of the helper.
1563    #[test]
1564    fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_over_limit_returns_limit_error() {
1565        // 5 + 5 + 6 = 16 entries against max=15 must fail.
1566        let mut create = serde_json::Map::new();
1567        let mut update = serde_json::Map::new();
1568        let mut destroy = Vec::new();
1569        for i in 0..5 {
1570            create.insert(format!("c{i}"), json!({}));
1571            update.insert(format!("u{i}"), json!({}));
1572        }
1573        for i in 0..6 {
1574            destroy.push(json!(format!("d{i}")));
1575        }
1576        let args = json!({
1577            "create": create,
1578            "update": update,
1579            "destroy": destroy,
1580        })
1581        .as_object()
1582        .unwrap()
1583        .clone();
1584        let err = enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 15)
1585            .expect_err("16-entry args against max=15 must fail");
1586        // Independent oracle — hand-built JmapError, not derived from
1587        // the function under test.
1588        let expected = jmap_types::JmapError::limit("maxObjectsInSet");
1589        assert_eq!(
1590            err.error_type.as_str(),
1591            expected.error_type.as_str(),
1592            "type must be \"limit\""
1593        );
1594        assert_eq!(
1595            err.description.as_deref(),
1596            Some("maxObjectsInSet"),
1597            "description must name the exceeded cap"
1598        );
1599    }
1600
1601    /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): a non-object `create` argument (e.g.
1602    /// `null` or a string) counts as 0 — wire-shape validation belongs
1603    /// to the per-handler argument parsing, not this cap helper. The
1604    /// handler will reject the malformed `create` downstream; this
1605    /// helper only counts well-formed entries.
1606    #[test]
1607    fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_ignores_non_object_create() {
1608        let args = json!({
1609            "create": null,
1610            "update": null,
1611            "destroy": ["id1"],
1612        })
1613        .as_object()
1614        .unwrap()
1615        .clone();
1616        // Only the 1 destroy entry counts.
1617        enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 1).expect("non-object create/update count as 0");
1618    }
1619
1620    /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): a non-array `destroy` argument counts
1621    /// as 0. Same rationale as the create/update test above.
1622    #[test]
1623    fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_ignores_non_array_destroy() {
1624        let args = json!({
1625            "create": { "c0": {} },
1626            "destroy": "not-an-array",
1627        })
1628        .as_object()
1629        .unwrap()
1630        .clone();
1631        // Only the 1 create entry counts.
1632        enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 1).expect("non-array destroy counts as 0");
1633    }
1634
1635    /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.3): the cap counts the SUM of all three
1636    /// sources. A request whose individual create/update/destroy
1637    /// counts are each below the cap can still trip the cap when
1638    /// summed.
1639    #[test]
1640    fn enforce_max_objects_in_set_sums_all_three() {
1641        // 3 + 3 + 3 = 9; against max=5, must fail because the SUM > max
1642        // even though each individual count <= max.
1643        let args = json!({
1644            "create": { "c0": {}, "c1": {}, "c2": {} },
1645            "update": { "u0": {}, "u1": {}, "u2": {} },
1646            "destroy": ["d0", "d1", "d2"],
1647        })
1648        .as_object()
1649        .unwrap()
1650        .clone();
1651        let err =
1652            enforce_max_objects_in_set(&args, 5).expect_err("sum-of-all-three must trip the cap");
1653        assert_eq!(err.error_type.as_str(), "limit");
1654        assert_eq!(err.description.as_deref(), Some("maxObjectsInSet"));
1655    }
1656
1657    /// Oracle (RFC 8620 §5.5 + bd:JMAP-qz9v.48): `position` is a signed
1658    /// offset where non-negative is absolute and negative is
1659    /// end-relative. All hand-computed values below come from reading
1660    /// the spec text, NOT from the implementation under test.
1661    #[test]
1662    fn resolve_query_offset_absolute() {
1663        // Non-negative position: absolute offset, clamped at total.
1664        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 100), 0);
1665        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1, 100), 1);
1666        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(50, 100), 50);
1667        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(99, 100), 99);
1668        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(100, 100), 100);
1669        // Past-the-end → clamped to total (RFC 8620 §5.5 silent-clamp).
1670        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(101, 100), 100);
1671        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(10_000, 100), 100);
1672        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 100), 100);
1673    }
1674
1675    #[test]
1676    fn resolve_query_offset_end_relative() {
1677        // RFC 8620 §5.5: "-1 represents the last entry, -2 the second
1678        // to last". Implemented as `total - |position|`, saturating at
1679        // 0 from below.
1680        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 100), 99);
1681        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-2, 100), 98);
1682        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-99, 100), 1);
1683        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-100, 100), 0);
1684        // Past-the-start → clamped to 0.
1685        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-101, 100), 0);
1686        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-10_000, 100), 0);
1687    }
1688
1689    /// Oracle: with total=0 (empty result list), every position
1690    /// resolves to 0 (the only valid index, and a no-op slice).
1691    #[test]
1692    fn resolve_query_offset_empty_total() {
1693        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(0, 0), 0);
1694        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(1, 0), 0);
1695        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(-1, 0), 0);
1696        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 0), 0);
1697        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 0), 0);
1698    }
1699
1700    /// Oracle: `i64::MIN` would overflow `-position` (the previous
1701    /// workspace idiom at mail-server `memory/mod.rs:980`) but
1702    /// `saturating_neg` returns `i64::MAX`. The resulting end-relative
1703    /// offset of `i64::MAX` is well past any realistic `total`, so for
1704    /// any realistic total the result is 0.
1705    ///
1706    /// For the synthetic case `total == usize::MAX`, the offset stays
1707    /// within the saturation range and the result is
1708    /// `usize::MAX - i64::MAX`, which on a 64-bit target is exactly
1709    /// `0x8000_0000_0000_0000`. The point of the regression guard is
1710    /// that the call does NOT panic (which it would under the prior
1711    /// `(-position) as usize` idiom in debug builds).
1712    #[test]
1713    fn resolve_query_offset_i64_min_does_not_overflow() {
1714        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 1), 0);
1715        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, 100), 0);
1716        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, i64::MAX as usize), 0);
1717        // Synthetic upper bound: the answer is computable but not 0.
1718        // What matters is no overflow / no panic, and start <= total.
1719        let start = resolve_query_offset(i64::MIN, usize::MAX);
1720        assert_eq!(start, usize::MAX - (i64::MAX as usize));
1721        // And `i64::MAX` on the positive side is also handled.
1722        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 0), 0);
1723        assert_eq!(resolve_query_offset(i64::MAX, 1), 1);
1724    }
1725
1726    /// Oracle: the bead's specific concern was that `position as usize`
1727    /// truncates on 32-bit targets. On 64-bit (this test host) the
1728    /// `i64`-to-`usize` conversion is lossless within `[0, i64::MAX]`,
1729    /// so the truncation cannot be directly demonstrated; what we CAN
1730    /// verify is that the helper uses `usize::try_from` semantics, so
1731    /// a value above `i64::MAX` (only reachable here via direct cast
1732    /// from an unsigned constant) clamps to `total` rather than
1733    /// wrapping. The `i64::MIN` case in the prior test is the real
1734    /// regression guard.
1735    #[test]
1736    fn resolve_query_offset_truncation_resistant() {
1737        // The slice-safety property: `total..=total` is always a valid
1738        // start index for `slice[start..]` (yields empty slice). The
1739        // helper MUST return a value in `0..=total`.
1740        for &pos in &[i64::MIN, -1_000_000, -1, 0, 1, 1_000_000, i64::MAX] {
1741            for &total in &[0usize, 1, 100, 10_000] {
1742                let start = resolve_query_offset(pos, total);
1743                assert!(
1744                    start <= total,
1745                    "resolve_query_offset({pos}, {total}) = {start} violates start <= total"
1746                );
1747            }
1748        }
1749    }
1750}