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An append-only log whose history cannot be rewritten without detection.

A signature proves who wrote something; it cannot prove that everyone was shown the same something. That is what this is for. The log publishes one 32-byte root per size, and answers two questions:

  • Inclusion: “is this entry in the log of size n?” — an audit path of about log₂(n) hashes.
  • Consistency: “is the log of size m a prefix of the log of size n?” — the proof that nothing already published was altered or removed.

Consistency is the one that matters. Without it a server can show one history to a victim and another to everyone else; with it, doing so requires producing two roots for one size, which is permanent, transferable evidence of misbehaviour.

The hashing follows RFC 6962: leaves are prefixed 0x00 and internal nodes 0x01, so a leaf can never be reinterpreted as a node — the second-preimage attack that an unprefixed Merkle tree allows.

§What a log cannot do by itself

It cannot detect a split view on its own: two divergent logs are each internally consistent. Catching that needs witnesses — independent parties who gossip roots and refuse to sign two roots for one size. Nothing here implements witnessing, and a log without it is a promise, not a proof.

Structs§

Checkpoint
The tree head a log publishes: origin, size and root.
ConsistencyProof
Proof that a smaller log is a prefix of a larger one.
Cosignature
How a cosignature line was verified, so a caller can tell “the witness I meant signed this” from “some line had the right key id”.
InclusionProof
Proof that one entry is in the log at a given size.
NoteSignature
One signature line: who, which key, and the raw signature bytes.
SignedNote
A parsed note: the signed text and every signature line, known or not.
TransparencyLog
The log itself. Holds leaf hashes only: the entries are the caller’s.
Witness
A witness the caller trusts for this log: a name and an Ed25519 key.

Enums§

AddCheckpointOutcome
What a witness said, classified from the status code exactly as c2sp.org/tlog-witness defines it, so a caller never has to guess from a status alone which of the four refusals it received.
LogError

Constants§

C2SP_ED25519_ALGORITHM
The C2SP algorithm byte for Ed25519 cosignatures. c2sp.org/signed-note assigns 0x01; HIDE-Sign uses the 0xff escape followed by a type string, so a note carrying both can never confuse the two.
CHECKPOINT_CONTEXT
Signature context for a checkpoint note, log or witness alike.
MAX_NOTE_BYTES
32 HIDE-Sign lines are about 150 KB; anything larger is refused unread.
MAX_ORIGIN_BYTES
Origins are ASCII without spaces or ‘+’, so a key name can equal the origin and no Unicode lookalike can name the same log twice.
MAX_WITNESS_PROOF_LINES
A witness is allowed at most 63 consistency proof lines.

Functions§

add_checkpoint_body
The body of a POST <prefix>/add-checkpoint request: the old size line, the consistency proof lines, an empty line, then the note.
c2sp_key_id
The key id a C2SP cosignature line carries: SHA-256(name || 0x0A || algorithm || public_key)[:4].
classify_add_checkpoint
Classifies an add-checkpoint response. A status this specification does not name is refused rather than mapped onto the nearest one.
cosignature_input
The exact bytes an Ed25519 C2SP cosignature is computed over. Every line is newline-terminated, and the timestamp is ASCII decimal with no leading zeroes.
decode_checkpoint
empty_tree_root
The empty tree, RFC 6962 §2.1: the hash of an empty string.
encode_checkpoint
Encodes a root for publication: size and hash together, because a hash with no size is not a commitment to anything checkable.
epoch_leaf
The leaf that logs one state of an identity’s epoch chain.
identity_leaf
The leaf that logs one state of an identity: which identity (its root link), which recovery key it binds (by device id), and which history (the head link and entry count).
is_empty_tree_checkpoint
The root a size-zero checkpoint must carry, so a caller can build one that a witness will not reject with 422. Whether a checkpoint a witness would accept at size zero is well-formed.
key_id
SHA-256(name || 0x0A || 0xFF || "HIDE/1.0 hide-sign" || verifying_key)[:4].
leaf_hash
Hashes a leaf. The prefix is what stops a leaf being read as a node.
verify_consistency
Checks that old_root really is the root the log had before it grew to new_root. This is the check that catches a rewritten history.
verify_ed25519_cosignature
Verifies a C2SP Ed25519 cosignature from witness over note, in addition to the log’s own HIDE-Sign signature, and requires the checkpoint to be the one origin names.
verify_inclusion
Checks an audit path against a root. The verifier holds only the root, the entry, and the proof — never the log.

Type Aliases§

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