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Crate hide_mls

Crate hide_mls 

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Group messaging for HIDE identities, over MLS (RFC 9420).

Everything HIDE does elsewhere protects objects at rest. This is different: a live group where members join and leave, and where a message sent today must stay unreadable to a member removed yesterday and to one who joins tomorrow. That is a ratchet problem, not a file-format problem, so the protocol machinery is mls-rs and this crate adds no cryptography.

What it does add is the join between an MLS group and a HIDE identity: the credential carried in the group names a device from an identity log and proves it. The HIDE hybrid signing key of that device signs the MLS signature public key, so a roster entry cannot claim to be a device it does not hold the key for. “Who is in this group” and “which devices does this person trust” are then answered from the same place, and revoking a device is not silently independent of removing it from a group.

§Honest limits

  • mls-rs has no third-party security audit, and neither does HIDE.
  • The cipher suite here is classical X25519, not post-quantum. MLS’s PQ ciphersuites are still an IETF draft and no Rust provider implements them yet; see PQ_STATUS. HIDE’s own object encryption is hybrid PQ, so a group message is protected differently from a sealed file. Saying that plainly matters more than implying uniform protection.
  • Removing a device from an identity does not by itself evict it from every group. HIDE checks the link, it does not make eviction automatic: the group still has to remove the device with an MLS commit, and untrusted_members is how a caller finds out which ones are due.

Structs§

HideIdentityProvider
Validates roster entries against a HIDE identity’s membership.
HideMlsRules
MLS checks the roster when a member is added, and never again. A device that HIDE revoked afterwards is still a member MLS is happy to hear from: it can commit, and it can leave a by-reference proposal in the cache for an honest client to fold into its next commit (for example a Remove of the honest device). These rules close that window, using the same membership the identity provider validates against, so update reaches both.
Message
Re-exported so callers need not depend on mls-rs directly for the common path. A MLS protocol message for sending data over the wire.

Enums§

MlsError
Received
An event generated as a result of processing a message for a group with Group::process_incoming_message.

Constants§

HIDE_CREDENTIAL
Private-use credential type carrying a HIDE device binding. RFC 9420 §17.5 reserves 0xF000..=0xFFFF for private use.
MAX_MLS_MESSAGE
Largest wire message accepted from the network. mls-rs is third-party and unaudited, so nothing arbitrary is handed to its parser: a legitimate handshake or application message is orders of magnitude below this.
PQ_STATUS
Where post-quantum group messaging actually stands, so a caller reading the API does not have to guess. Checked against the IETF drafts on 2026-09-07.

Functions§

accept_from_trusted
Rejects an application message whose sender the identity no longer trusts.
client_for
Builds the MLS client for one device of a HIDE identity.
client_with_provider
As client_for, with a provider the caller keeps a handle to, so it can push a newer membership into the running client with HideIdentityProvider::update.
decode_message
encode_message
Serialises a message for transport.
sender_device
The device id behind a received application message, so a caller can decide whether it still trusts the sender.
untrusted_members
Checks every member of a group against an identity’s current membership.