Expand description
Group messaging for HIDE identities, over MLS (RFC 9420).
Everything HIDE does elsewhere protects objects at rest. This is different:
a live group where members join and leave, and where a message sent today
must stay unreadable to a member removed yesterday and to one who joins
tomorrow. That is a ratchet problem, not a file-format problem, so the
protocol machinery is mls-rs and this crate adds no cryptography.
What it does add is the join between an MLS group and a HIDE identity: the credential carried in the group names a device from an identity log and proves it. The HIDE hybrid signing key of that device signs the MLS signature public key, so a roster entry cannot claim to be a device it does not hold the key for. “Who is in this group” and “which devices does this person trust” are then answered from the same place, and revoking a device is not silently independent of removing it from a group.
§Honest limits
mls-rshas no third-party security audit, and neither does HIDE.- The cipher suite here is classical X25519, not post-quantum. MLS’s PQ
ciphersuites are still an IETF draft and no Rust provider implements them
yet; see
PQ_STATUS. HIDE’s own object encryption is hybrid PQ, so a group message is protected differently from a sealed file. Saying that plainly matters more than implying uniform protection. - Removing a device from an identity does not by itself evict it from every
group. HIDE checks the link, it does not make eviction automatic: the
group still has to remove the device with an MLS commit, and
untrusted_membersis how a caller finds out which ones are due.
Structs§
- Hide
Identity Provider - Validates roster entries against a HIDE identity’s membership.
- Hide
MlsRules - MLS checks the roster when a member is added, and never again. A device
that HIDE revoked afterwards is still a member MLS is happy to hear from:
it can commit, and it can leave a by-reference proposal in the cache for an
honest client to fold into its next commit (for example a Remove of the
honest device). These rules close that window, using the same membership
the identity provider validates against, so
updatereaches both. - Message
- Re-exported so callers need not depend on
mls-rsdirectly for the common path. A MLS protocol message for sending data over the wire.
Enums§
- MlsError
- Received
- An event generated as a result of processing a message for a group with
Group::process_incoming_message.
Constants§
- HIDE_
CREDENTIAL - Private-use credential type carrying a HIDE device binding. RFC 9420 §17.5 reserves 0xF000..=0xFFFF for private use.
- MAX_
MLS_ MESSAGE - Largest wire message accepted from the network.
mls-rsis third-party and unaudited, so nothing arbitrary is handed to its parser: a legitimate handshake or application message is orders of magnitude below this. - PQ_
STATUS - Where post-quantum group messaging actually stands, so a caller reading the API does not have to guess. Checked against the IETF drafts on 2026-09-07.
Functions§
- accept_
from_ trusted - Rejects an application message whose sender the identity no longer trusts.
- client_
for - Builds the MLS client for one device of a HIDE identity.
- client_
with_ provider - As
client_for, with a provider the caller keeps a handle to, so it can push a newer membership into the running client withHideIdentityProvider::update. - decode_
message - encode_
message - Serialises a message for transport.
- sender_
device - The device id behind a received application message, so a caller can decide whether it still trusts the sender.
- untrusted_
members - Checks every member of a group against an identity’s current membership.