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harn_vm/orchestration/
nested_invocation.rs

1//! Capability-ceiling guard for nested Harn invocations.
2//!
3//! When a script that already runs under a parent execution policy
4//! launches another Harn invocation — `harn run`, `harn workflow run`,
5//! `harn supervisor fire/replay`, or a Burin harness — Harn must scan
6//! the target and reject anything that asks for *more* than the parent
7//! ceiling. This module hosts the scanner: it accepts a parent
8//! [`CapabilityPolicy`] plus a description of the nested target, and
9//! returns the list of dimensions where the target widens the parent.
10//!
11//! The scanner is deliberately conservative: when in doubt about what
12//! the target requests, it errs on the side of "ask for more" so the
13//! parent rejects rather than silently widens. It is the integration
14//! layer's job to wire this into the actual launch points (the `exec`,
15//! `shell`, `host_call` builtins, the workflow CLI, the supervisor
16//! API).
17
18use std::collections::BTreeSet;
19
20use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
21
22use super::workflow_bundle::WorkflowBundle;
23use super::workflow_patch::{bundle_capability_ceiling, CapabilityCeilingViolation};
24use super::CapabilityPolicy;
25
26/// One Harn invocation that could be launched from inside another.
27/// Each variant carries the data the scanner needs to project an
28/// effective requested ceiling.
29#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
30pub enum NestedInvocationTarget<'a> {
31    /// A `harn workflow run`-style invocation against a parsed bundle.
32    WorkflowBundle(&'a WorkflowBundle),
33    /// A `harn run`-style invocation against a Harn script source. The
34    /// scanner does a coarse string scan for builtins that require
35    /// elevated capabilities; that is enough to catch the obvious
36    /// widening attempts without forcing the AST into this layer.
37    HarnScript { path: &'a str, source: &'a str },
38    /// A Burin harness manifest. The scanner reads
39    /// `capability_ceiling` and `tools` if present, falling back to
40    /// "request everything" so the parent rejects unstructured
41    /// manifests rather than rubber-stamping them.
42    BurinHarness { manifest: &'a serde_json::Value },
43}
44
45#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
46pub struct NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
47    pub target_kind: String,
48    pub target_label: String,
49    pub parent: CapabilityPolicy,
50    pub requested: CapabilityPolicy,
51    pub violations: Vec<CapabilityCeilingViolation>,
52}
53
54impl NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
55    pub fn allowed(&self) -> bool {
56        self.violations.is_empty()
57    }
58}
59
60/// Compute the capability ceiling that running `target` would request
61/// of its parent runtime. This mirrors the projection used inside
62/// [`bundle_capability_ceiling`] so workflow bundles and standalone
63/// scripts share one comparison axis.
64pub fn requested_ceiling_for_target(target: &NestedInvocationTarget<'_>) -> CapabilityPolicy {
65    match target {
66        NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(bundle) => bundle_capability_ceiling(bundle),
67        NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript { source, .. } => scan_harn_script_ceiling(source),
68        NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness { manifest } => scan_burin_manifest_ceiling(manifest),
69    }
70}
71
72/// Enforce the parent ceiling against a nested invocation target.
73/// Returns a populated report; callers reject the launch if
74/// `report.allowed()` is false.
75pub fn enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
76    parent: &CapabilityPolicy,
77    target: &NestedInvocationTarget<'_>,
78) -> NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
79    let requested = requested_ceiling_for_target(target);
80    let violations = collect_violations(parent, &requested);
81    let (kind, label) = match target {
82        NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(bundle) => {
83            ("workflow_bundle".to_string(), bundle.id.clone())
84        }
85        NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript { path, .. } => {
86            ("harn_script".to_string(), path.to_string())
87        }
88        NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness { manifest } => {
89            let label = manifest
90                .get("id")
91                .and_then(|value| value.as_str())
92                .unwrap_or("<unknown>")
93                .to_string();
94            ("burin_harness".to_string(), label)
95        }
96    };
97    NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
98        target_kind: kind,
99        target_label: label,
100        parent: parent.clone(),
101        requested,
102        violations,
103    }
104}
105
106fn collect_violations(
107    parent: &CapabilityPolicy,
108    requested: &CapabilityPolicy,
109) -> Vec<CapabilityCeilingViolation> {
110    let mut violations = Vec::new();
111    if !parent.tools.is_empty() {
112        for tool in &requested.tools {
113            if !parent.tools.contains(tool) {
114                violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
115                    kind: "tool".to_string(),
116                    detail: format!("nested target requests tool '{tool}' outside parent ceiling"),
117                });
118            }
119        }
120    }
121    for (capability, ops) in &requested.capabilities {
122        match parent.capabilities.get(capability) {
123            Some(parent_ops) => {
124                for op in ops {
125                    if !parent_ops.contains(op) {
126                        violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
127                            kind: "capability".to_string(),
128                            detail: format!(
129                                "nested target requests '{capability}.{op}' outside parent ceiling"
130                            ),
131                        });
132                    }
133                }
134            }
135            None if !parent.capabilities.is_empty() => {
136                violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
137                    kind: "capability".to_string(),
138                    detail: format!(
139                        "nested target requests capability '{capability}' outside parent ceiling"
140                    ),
141                });
142            }
143            _ => {}
144        }
145    }
146    if let (Some(parent_level), Some(requested_level)) = (
147        parent.side_effect_level.as_deref(),
148        requested.side_effect_level.as_deref(),
149    ) {
150        if rank(requested_level) > rank(parent_level) {
151            violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
152                kind: "side_effect_level".to_string(),
153                detail: format!(
154                    "nested target requests side_effect_level '{requested_level}' outside parent ceiling '{parent_level}'"
155                ),
156            });
157        }
158    }
159    if !parent.workspace_roots.is_empty() {
160        for root in &requested.workspace_roots {
161            if !parent.workspace_roots.contains(root) {
162                violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
163                    kind: "workspace_root".to_string(),
164                    detail: format!(
165                        "nested target requests workspace_root '{root}' outside parent allowlist"
166                    ),
167                });
168            }
169        }
170    }
171    violations
172}
173
174fn rank(level: &str) -> usize {
175    match level {
176        "none" => 0,
177        "read_only" => 1,
178        "workspace_write" => 2,
179        "process_exec" => 3,
180        "network" => 4,
181        _ => 5,
182    }
183}
184
185/// Coarse capability projection for a Harn script source. We look for
186/// stdlib builtin tokens (`exec`, `shell`, `http_*`, `write_file`,
187/// `connector_call`, `llm_call`, etc.) and project an `(operation,
188/// side_effect_level)` set that the parent must allow. This is not
189/// type-aware — it intentionally over-includes rather than miss a
190/// widening attempt.
191fn scan_harn_script_ceiling(source: &str) -> CapabilityPolicy {
192    let stripped = strip_comments(source);
193    let mut capabilities: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, BTreeSet<String>> =
194        std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
195    let mut max_side_effect: Option<&'static str> = None;
196
197    for (token, capability, op, side_effect) in BUILTIN_CAPABILITIES {
198        if contains_call(&stripped, token) {
199            capabilities
200                .entry((*capability).to_string())
201                .or_default()
202                .insert((*op).to_string());
203            max_side_effect = match max_side_effect {
204                Some(current) if rank(current) >= rank(side_effect) => Some(current),
205                _ => Some(side_effect),
206            };
207        }
208    }
209
210    CapabilityPolicy {
211        tools: Vec::new(),
212        capabilities: capabilities
213            .into_iter()
214            .map(|(k, v)| (k, v.into_iter().collect()))
215            .collect(),
216        workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
217        side_effect_level: max_side_effect.map(|level| level.to_string()),
218        recursion_limit: None,
219        tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
220        tool_annotations: std::collections::BTreeMap::new(),
221        sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
222    }
223}
224
225fn scan_burin_manifest_ceiling(manifest: &serde_json::Value) -> CapabilityPolicy {
226    if let Some(ceiling) = manifest.get("capability_ceiling") {
227        if let Ok(parsed) = serde_json::from_value::<CapabilityPolicy>(ceiling.clone()) {
228            return parsed;
229        }
230    }
231    let tools = manifest
232        .get("tools")
233        .and_then(|value| value.as_array())
234        .map(|tools| {
235            tools
236                .iter()
237                .filter_map(|tool| tool.as_str().map(str::to_string))
238                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
239        })
240        .unwrap_or_default();
241
242    CapabilityPolicy {
243        tools,
244        capabilities: std::collections::BTreeMap::new(),
245        workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
246        side_effect_level: Some("network".to_string()),
247        recursion_limit: None,
248        tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
249        tool_annotations: std::collections::BTreeMap::new(),
250        sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
251    }
252}
253
254/// Strip line/block comments and the contents of string literals so the
255/// builtin scanner only sees actual source identifiers. Quoted text is
256/// replaced with whitespace of the same length to keep byte offsets and
257/// line numbers stable for any future diagnostics.
258fn strip_comments(source: &str) -> String {
259    let mut out = String::with_capacity(source.len());
260    let mut in_block = false;
261    let mut chars = source.chars().peekable();
262    while let Some(c) = chars.next() {
263        if in_block {
264            if c == '*' && matches!(chars.peek(), Some('/')) {
265                chars.next();
266                in_block = false;
267            }
268            continue;
269        }
270        if c == '/' {
271            match chars.peek() {
272                Some('/') => {
273                    for next in chars.by_ref() {
274                        if next == '\n' {
275                            out.push('\n');
276                            break;
277                        }
278                    }
279                    continue;
280                }
281                Some('*') => {
282                    chars.next();
283                    in_block = true;
284                    continue;
285                }
286                _ => {}
287            }
288        }
289        if c == '#' {
290            for next in chars.by_ref() {
291                if next == '\n' {
292                    out.push('\n');
293                    break;
294                }
295            }
296            continue;
297        }
298        if c == '"' || c == '\'' {
299            out.push(' ');
300            let quote = c;
301            while let Some(next) = chars.next() {
302                if next == '\\' {
303                    chars.next();
304                    out.push(' ');
305                    out.push(' ');
306                    continue;
307                }
308                if next == quote {
309                    out.push(' ');
310                    break;
311                }
312                out.push(if next == '\n' { '\n' } else { ' ' });
313            }
314            continue;
315        }
316        out.push(c);
317    }
318    out
319}
320
321fn contains_call(source: &str, token: &str) -> bool {
322    let bytes = source.as_bytes();
323    let needle = token.as_bytes();
324    if bytes.len() < needle.len() + 1 {
325        return false;
326    }
327    let mut start = 0;
328    while let Some(pos) = find_subslice(&bytes[start..], needle) {
329        let absolute = start + pos;
330        let before = if absolute == 0 {
331            None
332        } else {
333            Some(bytes[absolute - 1])
334        };
335        let after = bytes.get(absolute + needle.len()).copied();
336        let valid_before = match before {
337            None => true,
338            Some(c) => !is_identifier_byte(c),
339        };
340        let valid_after = matches!(after, Some(b'(') | Some(b' ') | Some(b'\t'))
341            || matches!(after, Some(b'\n') | Some(b'\r'));
342        if valid_before && valid_after {
343            return true;
344        }
345        start = absolute + needle.len();
346    }
347    false
348}
349
350fn find_subslice(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
351    if needle.is_empty() || haystack.len() < needle.len() {
352        return None;
353    }
354    haystack
355        .windows(needle.len())
356        .position(|window| window == needle)
357}
358
359fn is_identifier_byte(b: u8) -> bool {
360    b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'_'
361}
362
363const BUILTIN_CAPABILITIES: &[(&str, &str, &str, &str)] = &[
364    ("read_file", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
365    ("read_file_result", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
366    ("read_file_bytes", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
367    ("render", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
368    ("render_prompt", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
369    (
370        "render_with_provenance",
371        "workspace",
372        "read_text",
373        "read_only",
374    ),
375    ("list_dir", "workspace", "list", "read_only"),
376    ("file_exists", "workspace", "exists", "read_only"),
377    ("stat", "workspace", "exists", "read_only"),
378    ("write_file", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
379    (
380        "write_file_bytes",
381        "workspace",
382        "write_text",
383        "workspace_write",
384    ),
385    ("append_file", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
386    ("mkdir", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
387    ("copy_file", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
388    ("delete_file", "workspace", "delete", "workspace_write"),
389    ("apply_edit", "workspace", "apply_edit", "workspace_write"),
390    ("exec", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
391    ("exec_at", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
392    ("shell", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
393    ("shell_at", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
394    ("http_get", "network", "http", "network"),
395    ("http_post", "network", "http", "network"),
396    ("http_put", "network", "http", "network"),
397    ("http_patch", "network", "http", "network"),
398    ("http_delete", "network", "http", "network"),
399    ("http_request", "network", "http", "network"),
400    ("http_download", "network", "http", "network"),
401    ("connector_call", "connector", "call", "network"),
402    ("secret_get", "connector", "secret_get", "read_only"),
403    ("llm_call", "llm", "call", "network"),
404    ("llm_call_safe", "llm", "call", "network"),
405    ("llm_completion", "llm", "call", "network"),
406    ("llm_stream", "llm", "call", "network"),
407    ("agent_loop", "llm", "call", "network"),
408    ("vision_ocr", "vision", "ocr", "process_exec"),
409    ("mcp_call", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
410    ("mcp_connect", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
411];
412
413#[cfg(test)]
414mod tests {
415    use super::*;
416    use std::collections::BTreeMap;
417
418    fn permissive_parent() -> CapabilityPolicy {
419        let mut capabilities = BTreeMap::new();
420        capabilities.insert(
421            "workspace".to_string(),
422            vec!["read_text".to_string(), "list".to_string()],
423        );
424        capabilities.insert("connector".to_string(), vec!["call".to_string()]);
425        capabilities.insert("process".to_string(), vec!["exec".to_string()]);
426        capabilities.insert("network".to_string(), vec!["http".to_string()]);
427        capabilities.insert("llm".to_string(), vec!["call".to_string()]);
428        CapabilityPolicy {
429            tools: Vec::new(),
430            capabilities,
431            workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
432            side_effect_level: Some("network".to_string()),
433            recursion_limit: None,
434            tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
435            tool_annotations: BTreeMap::new(),
436            sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
437        }
438    }
439
440    fn read_only_parent() -> CapabilityPolicy {
441        let mut capabilities = BTreeMap::new();
442        capabilities.insert(
443            "workspace".to_string(),
444            vec![
445                "read_text".to_string(),
446                "list".to_string(),
447                "exists".to_string(),
448            ],
449        );
450        CapabilityPolicy {
451            tools: Vec::new(),
452            capabilities,
453            workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
454            side_effect_level: Some("read_only".to_string()),
455            recursion_limit: None,
456            tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
457            tool_annotations: BTreeMap::new(),
458            sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
459        }
460    }
461
462    #[test]
463    fn harn_script_with_only_reads_passes_under_read_only_parent() {
464        let source = r#"
465            let body = read_file("README.md")
466            let exists = file_exists("Cargo.toml")
467        "#;
468        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
469            &read_only_parent(),
470            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
471                path: "test.harn",
472                source,
473            },
474        );
475        assert!(report.allowed(), "{report:#?}");
476    }
477
478    #[test]
479    fn harn_script_with_exec_is_rejected_under_read_only_parent() {
480        let source = r#"
481            let result = exec("ls", ["-la"])
482        "#;
483        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
484            &read_only_parent(),
485            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
486                path: "exec.harn",
487                source,
488            },
489        );
490        assert!(!report.allowed());
491        let kinds: Vec<&str> = report.violations.iter().map(|v| v.kind.as_str()).collect();
492        assert!(kinds.contains(&"capability"));
493        assert!(kinds.contains(&"side_effect_level"));
494    }
495
496    #[test]
497    fn harn_script_with_http_is_rejected_under_read_only_parent() {
498        let source = r#"
499            http_get("https://example.com")
500        "#;
501        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
502            &read_only_parent(),
503            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
504                path: "http.harn",
505                source,
506            },
507        );
508        assert!(!report.allowed());
509    }
510
511    #[test]
512    fn harn_script_with_vision_ocr_is_rejected_under_read_only_parent() {
513        let source = r#"
514            vision_ocr("receipt.png")
515        "#;
516        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
517            &read_only_parent(),
518            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
519                path: "vision.harn",
520                source,
521            },
522        );
523        assert!(!report.allowed());
524        let kinds: Vec<&str> = report.violations.iter().map(|v| v.kind.as_str()).collect();
525        assert!(kinds.contains(&"capability"));
526        assert!(kinds.contains(&"side_effect_level"));
527    }
528
529    #[test]
530    fn harn_script_keyword_inside_string_does_not_trigger() {
531        let source = r#"
532            let label = "exec is not invoked here"
533            let body = read_file("README.md")
534        "#;
535        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
536            &read_only_parent(),
537            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
538                path: "string.harn",
539                source,
540            },
541        );
542        assert!(
543            report.allowed(),
544            "false positive on quoted token: {report:#?}"
545        );
546    }
547
548    #[test]
549    fn harn_script_keyword_in_comment_is_ignored() {
550        let source = r#"
551            // exec("rm -rf /") is what we used to do but no longer
552            let x = read_file("README.md")
553        "#;
554        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
555            &read_only_parent(),
556            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
557                path: "comments.harn",
558                source,
559            },
560        );
561        assert!(
562            report.allowed(),
563            "false positive on commented token: {report:#?}"
564        );
565    }
566
567    #[test]
568    fn workflow_bundle_with_act_auto_is_rejected_under_read_only_parent() {
569        let mut bundle = super::super::workflow_test_fixtures::pr_monitor_bundle();
570        bundle.policy.autonomy_tier = "act_auto".to_string();
571        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
572            &read_only_parent(),
573            &NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(&bundle),
574        );
575        assert!(!report.allowed());
576    }
577
578    #[test]
579    fn burin_manifest_with_explicit_ceiling_is_used_directly() {
580        let manifest = serde_json::json!({
581            "id": "burin.harness.repair",
582            "capability_ceiling": {
583                "capabilities": {
584                    "workspace": ["read_text"]
585                },
586                "side_effect_level": "read_only"
587            }
588        });
589        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
590            &read_only_parent(),
591            &NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness {
592                manifest: &manifest,
593            },
594        );
595        assert!(report.allowed(), "{report:#?}");
596    }
597
598    #[test]
599    fn burin_manifest_without_ceiling_falls_back_to_network_and_is_rejected() {
600        let manifest = serde_json::json!({"id": "burin.harness.unknown"});
601        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
602            &read_only_parent(),
603            &NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness {
604                manifest: &manifest,
605            },
606        );
607        assert!(!report.allowed());
608    }
609
610    #[test]
611    fn permissive_parent_accepts_workflow_bundle() {
612        let bundle = super::super::workflow_test_fixtures::pr_monitor_bundle();
613        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
614            &permissive_parent(),
615            &NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(&bundle),
616        );
617        assert!(report.allowed(), "{report:#?}");
618    }
619}