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harn_vm/orchestration/
nested_invocation.rs

1//! Capability-ceiling guard for nested Harn invocations.
2//!
3//! When a script that already runs under a parent execution policy
4//! launches another Harn invocation — `harn run`, `harn workflow run`,
5//! `harn supervisor fire/replay`, or a Burin harness — Harn must scan
6//! the target and reject anything that asks for *more* than the parent
7//! ceiling. This module hosts the scanner: it accepts a parent
8//! [`CapabilityPolicy`] plus a description of the nested target, and
9//! returns the list of dimensions where the target widens the parent.
10//!
11//! The scanner is deliberately conservative: when in doubt about what
12//! the target requests, it errs on the side of "ask for more" so the
13//! parent rejects rather than silently widens. It is the integration
14//! layer's job to wire this into the actual launch points (the `exec`,
15//! `shell`, `host_call` builtins, the workflow CLI, the supervisor
16//! API).
17
18use std::collections::BTreeSet;
19
20use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
21
22use super::workflow_bundle::WorkflowBundle;
23use super::workflow_patch::{bundle_capability_ceiling, CapabilityCeilingViolation};
24use super::CapabilityPolicy;
25
26/// One Harn invocation that could be launched from inside another.
27/// Each variant carries the data the scanner needs to project an
28/// effective requested ceiling.
29#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
30pub enum NestedInvocationTarget<'a> {
31    /// A `harn workflow run`-style invocation against a parsed bundle.
32    WorkflowBundle(&'a WorkflowBundle),
33    /// A `harn run`-style invocation against a Harn script source. The
34    /// scanner does a coarse string scan for builtins that require
35    /// elevated capabilities; that is enough to catch the obvious
36    /// widening attempts without forcing the AST into this layer.
37    HarnScript { path: &'a str, source: &'a str },
38    /// A Burin harness manifest. The scanner reads
39    /// `capability_ceiling` and `tools` if present, falling back to
40    /// "request everything" so the parent rejects unstructured
41    /// manifests rather than rubber-stamping them.
42    BurinHarness { manifest: &'a serde_json::Value },
43}
44
45#[derive(Clone, Debug, Default, Serialize, Deserialize, PartialEq)]
46pub struct NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
47    pub target_kind: String,
48    pub target_label: String,
49    pub parent: CapabilityPolicy,
50    pub requested: CapabilityPolicy,
51    pub violations: Vec<CapabilityCeilingViolation>,
52}
53
54impl NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
55    pub fn allowed(&self) -> bool {
56        self.violations.is_empty()
57    }
58}
59
60/// Compute the capability ceiling that running `target` would request
61/// of its parent runtime. This mirrors the projection used inside
62/// [`bundle_capability_ceiling`] so workflow bundles and standalone
63/// scripts share one comparison axis.
64pub fn requested_ceiling_for_target(target: &NestedInvocationTarget<'_>) -> CapabilityPolicy {
65    match target {
66        NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(bundle) => bundle_capability_ceiling(bundle),
67        NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript { source, .. } => scan_harn_script_ceiling(source),
68        NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness { manifest } => scan_burin_manifest_ceiling(manifest),
69    }
70}
71
72/// Enforce the parent ceiling against a nested invocation target.
73/// Returns a populated report; callers reject the launch if
74/// `report.allowed()` is false.
75pub fn enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
76    parent: &CapabilityPolicy,
77    target: &NestedInvocationTarget<'_>,
78) -> NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
79    let requested = requested_ceiling_for_target(target);
80    let violations = collect_violations(parent, &requested);
81    let (kind, label) = match target {
82        NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(bundle) => {
83            ("workflow_bundle".to_string(), bundle.id.clone())
84        }
85        NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript { path, .. } => {
86            ("harn_script".to_string(), path.to_string())
87        }
88        NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness { manifest } => {
89            let label = manifest
90                .get("id")
91                .and_then(|value| value.as_str())
92                .unwrap_or("<unknown>")
93                .to_string();
94            ("burin_harness".to_string(), label)
95        }
96    };
97    NestedInvocationCeilingReport {
98        target_kind: kind,
99        target_label: label,
100        parent: parent.clone(),
101        requested,
102        violations,
103    }
104}
105
106fn collect_violations(
107    parent: &CapabilityPolicy,
108    requested: &CapabilityPolicy,
109) -> Vec<CapabilityCeilingViolation> {
110    let mut violations = Vec::new();
111    if !parent.tools.is_empty() {
112        for tool in &requested.tools {
113            if !parent.tools.contains(tool) {
114                violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
115                    kind: "tool".to_string(),
116                    detail: format!("nested target requests tool '{tool}' outside parent ceiling"),
117                });
118            }
119        }
120    }
121    for (capability, ops) in &requested.capabilities {
122        match parent.capabilities.get(capability) {
123            Some(parent_ops) => {
124                for op in ops {
125                    if !parent_ops.contains(op) {
126                        violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
127                            kind: "capability".to_string(),
128                            detail: format!(
129                                "nested target requests '{capability}.{op}' outside parent ceiling"
130                            ),
131                        });
132                    }
133                }
134            }
135            None if !parent.capabilities.is_empty() => {
136                violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
137                    kind: "capability".to_string(),
138                    detail: format!(
139                        "nested target requests capability '{capability}' outside parent ceiling"
140                    ),
141                });
142            }
143            _ => {}
144        }
145    }
146    if let (Some(parent_level), Some(requested_level)) = (
147        parent.side_effect_level.as_deref(),
148        requested.side_effect_level.as_deref(),
149    ) {
150        if rank(requested_level) > rank(parent_level) {
151            violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
152                kind: "side_effect_level".to_string(),
153                detail: format!(
154                    "nested target requests side_effect_level '{requested_level}' outside parent ceiling '{parent_level}'"
155                ),
156            });
157        }
158    }
159    if !parent.workspace_roots.is_empty() {
160        for root in &requested.workspace_roots {
161            if !parent.workspace_roots.contains(root) {
162                violations.push(CapabilityCeilingViolation {
163                    kind: "workspace_root".to_string(),
164                    detail: format!(
165                        "nested target requests workspace_root '{root}' outside parent allowlist"
166                    ),
167                });
168            }
169        }
170    }
171    violations
172}
173
174fn rank(level: &str) -> usize {
175    match level {
176        "none" => 0,
177        "read_only" => 1,
178        "workspace_write" => 2,
179        "process_exec" => 3,
180        "network" => 4,
181        _ => 5,
182    }
183}
184
185/// Coarse capability projection for a Harn script source. We look for
186/// stdlib builtin tokens (`exec`, `shell`, `http_*`, `write_file`,
187/// `connector_call`, `llm_call`, etc.) and project an `(operation,
188/// side_effect_level)` set that the parent must allow. This is not
189/// type-aware — it intentionally over-includes rather than miss a
190/// widening attempt.
191fn scan_harn_script_ceiling(source: &str) -> CapabilityPolicy {
192    let stripped = strip_comments(source);
193    let mut capabilities: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, BTreeSet<String>> =
194        std::collections::BTreeMap::new();
195    let mut max_side_effect: Option<&'static str> = None;
196
197    for (token, capability, op, side_effect) in BUILTIN_CAPABILITIES {
198        if contains_call(&stripped, token) {
199            capabilities
200                .entry((*capability).to_string())
201                .or_default()
202                .insert((*op).to_string());
203            max_side_effect = match max_side_effect {
204                Some(current) if rank(current) >= rank(side_effect) => Some(current),
205                _ => Some(side_effect),
206            };
207        }
208    }
209
210    CapabilityPolicy {
211        tools: Vec::new(),
212        capabilities: capabilities
213            .into_iter()
214            .map(|(k, v)| (k, v.into_iter().collect()))
215            .collect(),
216        workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
217        side_effect_level: max_side_effect.map(|level| level.to_string()),
218        recursion_limit: None,
219        tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
220        tool_annotations: std::collections::BTreeMap::new(),
221        sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
222    }
223}
224
225fn scan_burin_manifest_ceiling(manifest: &serde_json::Value) -> CapabilityPolicy {
226    if let Some(ceiling) = manifest.get("capability_ceiling") {
227        if let Ok(parsed) = serde_json::from_value::<CapabilityPolicy>(ceiling.clone()) {
228            return parsed;
229        }
230    }
231    let tools = manifest
232        .get("tools")
233        .and_then(|value| value.as_array())
234        .map(|tools| {
235            tools
236                .iter()
237                .filter_map(|tool| tool.as_str().map(str::to_string))
238                .collect::<Vec<_>>()
239        })
240        .unwrap_or_default();
241
242    CapabilityPolicy {
243        tools,
244        capabilities: std::collections::BTreeMap::new(),
245        workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
246        side_effect_level: Some("network".to_string()),
247        recursion_limit: None,
248        tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
249        tool_annotations: std::collections::BTreeMap::new(),
250        sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
251    }
252}
253
254/// Strip line/block comments and the contents of string literals so the
255/// builtin scanner only sees actual source identifiers. Quoted text is
256/// replaced with whitespace of the same length to keep byte offsets and
257/// line numbers stable for any future diagnostics.
258fn strip_comments(source: &str) -> String {
259    let mut out = String::with_capacity(source.len());
260    let mut in_block = false;
261    let mut chars = source.chars().peekable();
262    while let Some(c) = chars.next() {
263        if in_block {
264            if c == '*' && matches!(chars.peek(), Some('/')) {
265                chars.next();
266                in_block = false;
267            }
268            continue;
269        }
270        if c == '/' {
271            match chars.peek() {
272                Some('/') => {
273                    for next in chars.by_ref() {
274                        if next == '\n' {
275                            out.push('\n');
276                            break;
277                        }
278                    }
279                    continue;
280                }
281                Some('*') => {
282                    chars.next();
283                    in_block = true;
284                    continue;
285                }
286                _ => {}
287            }
288        }
289        if c == '#' {
290            for next in chars.by_ref() {
291                if next == '\n' {
292                    out.push('\n');
293                    break;
294                }
295            }
296            continue;
297        }
298        if c == '"' || c == '\'' {
299            out.push(' ');
300            let quote = c;
301            while let Some(next) = chars.next() {
302                if next == '\\' {
303                    chars.next();
304                    out.push(' ');
305                    out.push(' ');
306                    continue;
307                }
308                if next == quote {
309                    out.push(' ');
310                    break;
311                }
312                out.push(if next == '\n' { '\n' } else { ' ' });
313            }
314            continue;
315        }
316        out.push(c);
317    }
318    out
319}
320
321fn contains_call(source: &str, token: &str) -> bool {
322    let bytes = source.as_bytes();
323    let needle = token.as_bytes();
324    if bytes.len() < needle.len() + 1 {
325        return false;
326    }
327    let mut start = 0;
328    while let Some(pos) = find_subslice(&bytes[start..], needle) {
329        let absolute = start + pos;
330        let before = if absolute == 0 {
331            None
332        } else {
333            Some(bytes[absolute - 1])
334        };
335        let after = bytes.get(absolute + needle.len()).copied();
336        let valid_before = match before {
337            None => true,
338            Some(c) => !is_identifier_byte(c),
339        };
340        let valid_after = matches!(after, Some(b'(') | Some(b' ') | Some(b'\t'))
341            || matches!(after, Some(b'\n') | Some(b'\r'));
342        if valid_before && valid_after {
343            return true;
344        }
345        start = absolute + needle.len();
346    }
347    false
348}
349
350fn find_subslice(haystack: &[u8], needle: &[u8]) -> Option<usize> {
351    if needle.is_empty() || haystack.len() < needle.len() {
352        return None;
353    }
354    haystack
355        .windows(needle.len())
356        .position(|window| window == needle)
357}
358
359fn is_identifier_byte(b: u8) -> bool {
360    b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || b == b'_'
361}
362
363const BUILTIN_CAPABILITIES: &[(&str, &str, &str, &str)] = &[
364    ("read_file", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
365    ("read_file_result", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
366    ("read_file_bytes", "workspace", "read_text", "read_only"),
367    ("list_dir", "workspace", "list", "read_only"),
368    ("file_exists", "workspace", "exists", "read_only"),
369    ("stat", "workspace", "exists", "read_only"),
370    ("write_file", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
371    (
372        "write_file_bytes",
373        "workspace",
374        "write_text",
375        "workspace_write",
376    ),
377    ("append_file", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
378    ("mkdir", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
379    ("copy_file", "workspace", "write_text", "workspace_write"),
380    ("delete_file", "workspace", "delete", "workspace_write"),
381    ("apply_edit", "workspace", "apply_edit", "workspace_write"),
382    ("exec", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
383    ("exec_at", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
384    ("shell", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
385    ("shell_at", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
386    ("http_get", "network", "http", "network"),
387    ("http_post", "network", "http", "network"),
388    ("http_put", "network", "http", "network"),
389    ("http_patch", "network", "http", "network"),
390    ("http_delete", "network", "http", "network"),
391    ("http_request", "network", "http", "network"),
392    ("http_download", "network", "http", "network"),
393    ("connector_call", "connector", "call", "network"),
394    ("secret_get", "connector", "secret_get", "read_only"),
395    ("llm_call", "llm", "call", "network"),
396    ("llm_call_safe", "llm", "call", "network"),
397    ("llm_completion", "llm", "call", "network"),
398    ("llm_stream", "llm", "call", "network"),
399    ("agent_loop", "llm", "call", "network"),
400    ("mcp_call", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
401    ("mcp_connect", "process", "exec", "process_exec"),
402];
403
404#[cfg(test)]
405mod tests {
406    use super::*;
407    use std::collections::BTreeMap;
408
409    fn permissive_parent() -> CapabilityPolicy {
410        let mut capabilities = BTreeMap::new();
411        capabilities.insert(
412            "workspace".to_string(),
413            vec!["read_text".to_string(), "list".to_string()],
414        );
415        capabilities.insert("connector".to_string(), vec!["call".to_string()]);
416        capabilities.insert("process".to_string(), vec!["exec".to_string()]);
417        capabilities.insert("network".to_string(), vec!["http".to_string()]);
418        capabilities.insert("llm".to_string(), vec!["call".to_string()]);
419        CapabilityPolicy {
420            tools: Vec::new(),
421            capabilities,
422            workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
423            side_effect_level: Some("network".to_string()),
424            recursion_limit: None,
425            tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
426            tool_annotations: BTreeMap::new(),
427            sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
428        }
429    }
430
431    fn read_only_parent() -> CapabilityPolicy {
432        let mut capabilities = BTreeMap::new();
433        capabilities.insert(
434            "workspace".to_string(),
435            vec![
436                "read_text".to_string(),
437                "list".to_string(),
438                "exists".to_string(),
439            ],
440        );
441        CapabilityPolicy {
442            tools: Vec::new(),
443            capabilities,
444            workspace_roots: Vec::new(),
445            side_effect_level: Some("read_only".to_string()),
446            recursion_limit: None,
447            tool_arg_constraints: Vec::new(),
448            tool_annotations: BTreeMap::new(),
449            sandbox_profile: crate::orchestration::SandboxProfile::default(),
450        }
451    }
452
453    #[test]
454    fn harn_script_with_only_reads_passes_under_read_only_parent() {
455        let source = r#"
456            let body = read_file("README.md")
457            let exists = file_exists("Cargo.toml")
458        "#;
459        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
460            &read_only_parent(),
461            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
462                path: "test.harn",
463                source,
464            },
465        );
466        assert!(report.allowed(), "{report:#?}");
467    }
468
469    #[test]
470    fn harn_script_with_exec_is_rejected_under_read_only_parent() {
471        let source = r#"
472            let result = exec("ls", ["-la"])
473        "#;
474        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
475            &read_only_parent(),
476            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
477                path: "exec.harn",
478                source,
479            },
480        );
481        assert!(!report.allowed());
482        let kinds: Vec<&str> = report.violations.iter().map(|v| v.kind.as_str()).collect();
483        assert!(kinds.contains(&"capability"));
484        assert!(kinds.contains(&"side_effect_level"));
485    }
486
487    #[test]
488    fn harn_script_with_http_is_rejected_under_read_only_parent() {
489        let source = r#"
490            http_get("https://example.com")
491        "#;
492        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
493            &read_only_parent(),
494            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
495                path: "http.harn",
496                source,
497            },
498        );
499        assert!(!report.allowed());
500    }
501
502    #[test]
503    fn harn_script_keyword_inside_string_does_not_trigger() {
504        let source = r#"
505            let label = "exec is not invoked here"
506            let body = read_file("README.md")
507        "#;
508        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
509            &read_only_parent(),
510            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
511                path: "string.harn",
512                source,
513            },
514        );
515        assert!(
516            report.allowed(),
517            "false positive on quoted token: {report:#?}"
518        );
519    }
520
521    #[test]
522    fn harn_script_keyword_in_comment_is_ignored() {
523        let source = r#"
524            // exec("rm -rf /") is what we used to do but no longer
525            let x = read_file("README.md")
526        "#;
527        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
528            &read_only_parent(),
529            &NestedInvocationTarget::HarnScript {
530                path: "comments.harn",
531                source,
532            },
533        );
534        assert!(
535            report.allowed(),
536            "false positive on commented token: {report:#?}"
537        );
538    }
539
540    #[test]
541    fn workflow_bundle_with_act_auto_is_rejected_under_read_only_parent() {
542        let mut bundle = super::super::workflow_test_fixtures::pr_monitor_bundle();
543        bundle.policy.autonomy_tier = "act_auto".to_string();
544        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
545            &read_only_parent(),
546            &NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(&bundle),
547        );
548        assert!(!report.allowed());
549    }
550
551    #[test]
552    fn burin_manifest_with_explicit_ceiling_is_used_directly() {
553        let manifest = serde_json::json!({
554            "id": "burin.harness.repair",
555            "capability_ceiling": {
556                "capabilities": {
557                    "workspace": ["read_text"]
558                },
559                "side_effect_level": "read_only"
560            }
561        });
562        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
563            &read_only_parent(),
564            &NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness {
565                manifest: &manifest,
566            },
567        );
568        assert!(report.allowed(), "{report:#?}");
569    }
570
571    #[test]
572    fn burin_manifest_without_ceiling_falls_back_to_network_and_is_rejected() {
573        let manifest = serde_json::json!({"id": "burin.harness.unknown"});
574        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
575            &read_only_parent(),
576            &NestedInvocationTarget::BurinHarness {
577                manifest: &manifest,
578            },
579        );
580        assert!(!report.allowed());
581    }
582
583    #[test]
584    fn permissive_parent_accepts_workflow_bundle() {
585        let bundle = super::super::workflow_test_fixtures::pr_monitor_bundle();
586        let report = enforce_nested_invocation_ceiling(
587            &permissive_parent(),
588            &NestedInvocationTarget::WorkflowBundle(&bundle),
589        );
590        assert!(report.allowed(), "{report:#?}");
591    }
592}