fraiseql_cli/schema/pg_catalog.rs
1//! Live-`PostgreSQL` catalog access for the `--against-db` checks.
2//!
3//! A thin wrapper over a [`deadpool_postgres`] pool that answers the two
4//! questions the `validate --against-db` (#397) and `doctor --against-db`
5//! (#409) checks need:
6//!
7//! - **Function resolution / signature** — for a `sql_source` name, which overloads exist, what are
8//! their *input* argument types/names (in call order), and what columns does each return?
9//! (`resolve_functions`)
10//! - **PL/pgSQL body resolution** — does the `plpgsql_check` extension exist, and which managed
11//! functions call something the catalog can't resolve? (`plpgsql_check_available` /
12//! `plpgsql_check_unresolved_calls`)
13//!
14//! All catalog queries are `PostgreSQL`-specific (`pg_proc`, `pg_type`,
15//! `pg_attribute`, `plpgsql_check`); the surrounding logic in
16//! [`super::mutation_contract`] is database-agnostic and unit-tested without a
17//! connection.
18
19use anyhow::{Context, Result};
20use deadpool_postgres::Pool;
21use fraiseql_db::postgres::PostgresTlsConfig;
22
23/// A single output column of a `PostgreSQL` function's result row.
24///
25/// Populated from either the `OUT`/`TABLE` parameters of a `RETURNS TABLE(…)`
26/// function or the attributes of a composite `RETURNS <type>` — both are how
27/// FraiseQL mutation functions declare the row the server decodes into
28/// `MutationResponse`.
29#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
30pub struct OutColumn {
31 /// Column name as it appears in the result row (matched against the
32 /// `MutationResponse` field names).
33 pub name: String,
34 /// `format_type` rendering of the column type (e.g. `"boolean"`,
35 /// `"jsonb"`, `"text[]"`, `"app.mutation_error_class"`).
36 pub type_name: String,
37 /// Whether the column type is a `PostgreSQL` `enum` (`pg_type.typtype = 'e'`).
38 /// Mutation functions legitimately type `error_class` as either `text` or a
39 /// project-specific enum, so the contract check accepts both.
40 pub is_enum: bool,
41}
42
43/// One overload of a `PostgreSQL` function, reduced to what the mutation-contract
44/// check needs: the *input* arguments (in positional call order, excluding
45/// `OUT`/`TABLE` columns) and the output columns.
46#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
47pub struct PgFunction {
48 /// Schema the function lives in.
49 pub schema: String,
50 /// Function name (unqualified).
51 pub name: String,
52 /// Input argument types in call order (`format_type`), modes `IN`/`INOUT`/
53 /// `VARIADIC` only — these are the positions the server binds.
54 pub in_types: Vec<String>,
55 /// Input argument names in call order; `None` for unnamed positions.
56 pub in_names: Vec<Option<String>>,
57 /// Output columns of the result row (see [`OutColumn`]). Empty when the
58 /// function returns a scalar / `record` the catalog cannot expand.
59 pub out_columns: Vec<OutColumn>,
60 /// Whether the function returns a set (`RETURNS SETOF …` / `RETURNS
61 /// TABLE(…)`). A function a query reads from must.
62 pub returns_set: bool,
63 /// `pg_proc.provolatile`: `"i"` (`IMMUTABLE`), `"s"` (`STABLE`) or `"v"` (`VOLATILE`).
64 /// A function a query reads from may not be `VOLATILE`: a read may be cached,
65 /// retried or served from a replica, and none of those is safe for a function that
66 /// writes.
67 pub volatility: String,
68 /// Implementation language (`pg_language.lanname`, e.g. `plpgsql`, `sql`,
69 /// `c`). The payload-key consumption scan (#384) only reads `plpgsql`/`sql`
70 /// bodies — for other languages `source` is a symbol, not scannable text.
71 pub language: String,
72 /// Function body (`pg_proc.prosrc`). For `plpgsql`/`sql` functions this is
73 /// the actual source text.
74 pub source: String,
75}
76
77/// A single unresolved internal call surfaced by `plpgsql_check` (#409).
78#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
79pub struct BodyError {
80 /// Calling function, rendered as `schema.fn(argtypes)` (`regprocedure`).
81 pub caller: String,
82 /// Line number within the function body, when reported.
83 pub lineno: Option<i32>,
84 /// The `plpgsql_check` diagnostic message.
85 pub message: String,
86}
87
88/// A single live column of a table, as the change-log contract drift check
89/// (#380) reads it from `information_schema.columns`.
90#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
91pub struct LiveColumn {
92 /// Column name (`information_schema.columns.column_name`).
93 pub name: String,
94 /// `PostgreSQL` base type (`information_schema.columns.udt_name`): the
95 /// lower-case underlying type, e.g. `"uuid"`, `"int8"`, `"text"`, `"jsonb"`,
96 /// `"timestamptz"`, `"_text"` (the element form of `text[]`). Compared
97 /// against [`fraiseql_observers::migrations::ContractColumn::udt`].
98 pub udt_name: String,
99}
100
101/// Outcome of the PL/pgSQL body-resolution pass.
102#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
103pub enum PlpgsqlCheckOutcome {
104 /// `plpgsql_check` is not available on this server — the pass was skipped.
105 Unavailable,
106 /// The pass ran; `errors` is empty when every internal call resolved.
107 Ran {
108 /// Unresolved internal calls found.
109 errors: Vec<BodyError>,
110 },
111}
112
113/// Live Row-Level Security posture of `core.tb_entity_change_log` and whether the
114/// connecting role can read it under that posture (for the `fraiseql doctor`
115/// change-log RLS check, #437 F6 / #443).
116#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
117pub struct ChangeLogRlsStatus {
118 /// Whether `ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY` is active on the table.
119 pub rls_enabled: bool,
120 /// Whether the connecting role bypasses RLS (`BYPASSRLS` or superuser).
121 pub can_bypass: bool,
122 /// Whether the connecting role owns the table (owners are exempt under `ENABLE`).
123 pub is_owner: bool,
124 /// The connecting role name (for the diagnostic message).
125 pub role_name: String,
126}
127
128/// PUBLIC-held privileges on one change-log relation, for the `fraiseql doctor`
129/// least-privilege check (#443).
130///
131/// Migration 12 `REVOKE ALL … FROM PUBLIC` keeps the change-log — every tenant's
132/// before/after payload — off the world-readable `PUBLIC` pseudo-role; a non-empty
133/// `privileges` means that REVOKE is not in force and the relation is
134/// world-accessible.
135#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
136pub struct PublicGrant {
137 /// Relation name (`tb_entity_change_log` / `v_entity_change_log` /
138 /// `v_entity_change_log_debezium`).
139 pub relname: String,
140 /// Privilege types currently granted to PUBLIC (e.g. `["SELECT"]`); empty when
141 /// the least-privilege baseline is intact.
142 pub privileges: Vec<String>,
143}
144
145/// Live actor-attribution posture of `core.tb_entity_change_log` for the
146/// `fraiseql doctor` actor check (#390).
147///
148/// The actor model stamps every mutation-runner write with a canonical
149/// [`fraiseql_core::security::ActorType`] token; migration 08's
150/// `chk_entity_change_log_actor_type` refuses anything else on new writes. This
151/// introspection reports what the *live* table actually holds, so the doctor can
152/// surface pre-constraint rogue values and unattributed rows.
153#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
154pub struct ChangeLogActorStats {
155 /// Rows whose `actor_type` is NULL — pre-actor-model rows, or writes made
156 /// without an authenticated security context.
157 pub null_rows: i64,
158 /// Distinct non-NULL `actor_type` values outside the canonical token set —
159 /// evidence of a rogue writer (only possible before the CHECK constraint, or
160 /// while it is missing).
161 pub unknown_values: Vec<String>,
162 /// Whether `chk_entity_change_log_actor_type` is installed on the table.
163 pub constraint_installed: bool,
164}
165
166/// Security posture of `core.fn_entity_change_log_capture()` for the
167/// `fraiseql doctor` capture-function check (#443 / #437 F6).
168///
169/// The external-write capture function must be `SECURITY DEFINER` (so it runs as
170/// the table owner, exempt under change-log RLS) **with a pinned `search_path`** (a
171/// DEFINER function with a mutable `search_path` is a privilege-escalation vector).
172#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
173pub struct CaptureFnSecurity {
174 /// Whether the function is `SECURITY DEFINER` (`pg_proc.prosecdef`).
175 pub security_definer: bool,
176 /// The pinned `search_path` value from `pg_proc.proconfig` (the text after
177 /// `search_path=`), or `None` when no `search_path` is pinned.
178 pub search_path: Option<String>,
179}
180
181/// Result of auditing `sql_source` views for the `security_invoker` requirement.
182#[derive(Debug)]
183pub struct SecurityInvokerAudit {
184 /// Whether any RLS policy exists in the database (RLS is in use at all).
185 pub rls_in_use: bool,
186 /// The audited views (by bare relname) that are NOT `security_invoker`.
187 pub views_without_invoker: Vec<String>,
188}
189
190/// A row-level security policy whose expression reads a session setting.
191#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
192pub struct PolicySettingRead {
193 /// The policy's table schema.
194 pub schema: String,
195 /// The policy's table.
196 pub table: String,
197 /// The policy's name.
198 pub policy: String,
199 /// The setting its `USING` or `WITH CHECK` expression reads.
200 pub setting: String,
201}
202
203/// A live `PostgreSQL` connection pool for catalog introspection.
204pub struct PgCatalog {
205 pool: Pool,
206}
207
208impl PgCatalog {
209 /// Read the catalogue through a pool the caller already connected.
210 #[must_use]
211 pub(crate) const fn from_pool(pool: Pool) -> Self {
212 Self { pool }
213 }
214
215 /// Connect to `db_url` (`PostgreSQL` only) for catalog introspection.
216 ///
217 /// # Errors
218 ///
219 /// Returns an error if `db_url` is not a PostgreSQL connection string (see
220 /// [`crate::connection::require_postgres`]), the server cannot be reached, or
221 /// it is older than PostgreSQL 18.
222 pub async fn connect(db_url: &str, tls: &PostgresTlsConfig) -> Result<Self> {
223 let pool = crate::connection::postgres_pool(db_url, "catalogue introspection", tls).await?;
224 Ok(Self { pool })
225 }
226
227 /// Whether the plan of `select` reads any index once sequential scans are priced out
228 /// (#1513): the question "is there an index that serves this", asked of the planner
229 /// rather than of index names, so an equivalent index under any name counts.
230 ///
231 /// Runs in a read-only transaction that is rolled back; `enable_seqscan = off` is
232 /// local to it.
233 ///
234 /// # Errors
235 ///
236 /// Returns an error if the connection fails or `select` does not plan (a missing
237 /// relation).
238 pub async fn plan_reads_an_index(&self, select: &str) -> Result<bool> {
239 let mut client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
240 let tx = client.build_transaction().read_only(true).start().await?;
241 tx.batch_execute("SET LOCAL enable_seqscan = off").await?;
242 let row = tx.query_one(&format!("EXPLAIN (FORMAT JSON) {select}"), &[]).await?;
243 let plan: serde_json::Value = row.try_get(0)?;
244 tx.rollback().await?;
245 Ok(plan_reads_index(&plan))
246 }
247
248 /// Resolve all overloads of a (possibly schema-qualified) function name.
249 ///
250 /// Unqualified names resolve against the connection's `search_path`
251 /// (`current_schemas(false)`), mirroring how the runtime resolves an
252 /// unqualified `sql_source`. Matching is case-sensitive — the runtime quotes
253 /// each identifier component, so `proname` is compared verbatim.
254 ///
255 /// Returns an empty vec when no function of that name is visible.
256 ///
257 /// # Errors
258 ///
259 /// Returns an error if the connection or any catalog query fails.
260 pub async fn resolve_functions(&self, sql_source: &str) -> Result<Vec<PgFunction>> {
261 // One row per overload: input-arg types/names (modes IN/INOUT/VARIADIC
262 // only — OUT/TABLE columns are excluded so the count matches what the
263 // server binds positionally) plus oid + proretset for follow-up.
264 const BASE: &str = "\
265 SELECT p.oid, n.nspname, p.proname, p.proretset, p.provolatile::text AS provolatile, \
266 l.lanname, COALESCE(p.prosrc, '') AS prosrc, \
267 COALESCE((SELECT array_agg(format_type(t, NULL) ORDER BY ord) \
268 FROM unnest(COALESCE(p.proallargtypes, p.proargtypes::oid[])) \
269 WITH ORDINALITY AS a(t, ord) \
270 LEFT JOIN unnest(p.proargmodes) WITH ORDINALITY AS m(mode, mord) ON mord = ord \
271 WHERE COALESCE(m.mode, 'i') IN ('i','b','v')), ARRAY[]::text[]) AS in_types, \
272 COALESCE((SELECT array_agg(COALESCE(nm, '') ORDER BY ord) \
273 FROM unnest(COALESCE(p.proallargtypes, p.proargtypes::oid[])) \
274 WITH ORDINALITY AS a(t, ord) \
275 LEFT JOIN unnest(p.proargmodes) WITH ORDINALITY AS m(mode, mord) ON mord = ord \
276 LEFT JOIN unnest(p.proargnames) WITH ORDINALITY AS nmt(nm, nord) ON nord = ord \
277 WHERE COALESCE(m.mode, 'i') IN ('i','b','v')), ARRAY[]::text[]) AS in_names \
278 FROM pg_proc p \
279 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace \
280 JOIN pg_language l ON l.oid = p.prolang ";
281
282 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
283 let (schema, name) = split_qualified(sql_source);
284
285 let rows = if let Some(schema) = schema {
286 client
287 .query(
288 &format!("{BASE} WHERE n.nspname = $1 AND p.proname = $2"),
289 &[&schema, &name],
290 )
291 .await
292 } else {
293 client
294 .query(
295 &format!(
296 "{BASE} WHERE p.proname = $1 AND n.nspname = ANY(current_schemas(false))"
297 ),
298 &[&name],
299 )
300 .await
301 }
302 .context("failed to query pg_proc for function resolution")?;
303
304 let mut functions = Vec::with_capacity(rows.len());
305 for row in rows {
306 let oid: u32 = row.get("oid");
307 let in_names: Vec<String> = row.get("in_names");
308 functions.push(PgFunction {
309 schema: row.get("nspname"),
310 name: row.get("proname"),
311 in_types: row.get("in_types"),
312 in_names: in_names
313 .into_iter()
314 .map(|n| if n.is_empty() { None } else { Some(n) })
315 .collect(),
316 out_columns: self.out_columns(oid).await?,
317 returns_set: row.get("proretset"),
318 volatility: row.get("provolatile"),
319 language: row.get("lanname"),
320 source: row.get("prosrc"),
321 });
322 }
323 Ok(functions)
324 }
325
326 /// Output columns of one function (by oid).
327 ///
328 /// Tries the `OUT`/`TABLE` parameter path first (`RETURNS TABLE(…)`); if the
329 /// function has none, falls back to the attributes of a composite return
330 /// type (`RETURNS <composite>` / `RETURNS SETOF <composite>`). A scalar or
331 /// bare-`record` return yields an empty vec.
332 async fn out_columns(&self, oid: u32) -> Result<Vec<OutColumn>> {
333 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
334
335 // Path 1: OUT/TABLE output parameters.
336 let table_rows = client
337 .query(
338 "SELECT COALESCE(nm, '') AS name, format_type(t, NULL) AS type_name, \
339 (tt.typtype = 'e') AS is_enum \
340 FROM pg_proc p, \
341 unnest(p.proallargtypes) WITH ORDINALITY AS a(t, ord) \
342 JOIN unnest(p.proargmodes) WITH ORDINALITY AS m(mode, mord) ON mord = ord \
343 LEFT JOIN unnest(p.proargnames) WITH ORDINALITY AS nmt(nm, nord) ON nord = ord \
344 JOIN pg_type tt ON tt.oid = t \
345 WHERE p.oid = $1 AND m.mode IN ('o','b','t') ORDER BY ord",
346 &[&oid],
347 )
348 .await
349 .context("failed to query OUT/TABLE result columns")?;
350 if !table_rows.is_empty() {
351 return Ok(table_rows.iter().map(row_to_out_column).collect());
352 }
353
354 // Path 2: composite return type attributes.
355 let comp_rows = client
356 .query(
357 "SELECT att.attname AS name, \
358 format_type(att.atttypid, att.atttypmod) AS type_name, \
359 (at.typtype = 'e') AS is_enum \
360 FROM pg_proc p \
361 JOIN pg_type rt ON rt.oid = p.prorettype \
362 JOIN pg_attribute att ON att.attrelid = rt.typrelid \
363 AND att.attnum > 0 AND NOT att.attisdropped \
364 JOIN pg_type at ON at.oid = att.atttypid \
365 WHERE p.oid = $1 ORDER BY att.attnum",
366 &[&oid],
367 )
368 .await
369 .context("failed to query composite result columns")?;
370 Ok(comp_rows.iter().map(row_to_out_column).collect())
371 }
372
373 /// Whether the `plpgsql_check` extension is installable (present in
374 /// `pg_available_extensions`).
375 ///
376 /// # Errors
377 ///
378 /// Returns an error if the catalog query fails.
379 pub async fn plpgsql_check_available(&self) -> Result<bool> {
380 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
381 let row = client
382 .query_one(
383 "SELECT EXISTS(SELECT 1 FROM pg_available_extensions WHERE name = 'plpgsql_check')",
384 &[],
385 )
386 .await
387 .context("failed to probe for the plpgsql_check extension")?;
388 Ok(row.get(0))
389 }
390
391 /// The references between TVIEWs that `sql_sources` name (#1587), from `pg_tviews`'
392 /// registry: each child TVIEW's column holding a parent TVIEW's identity, proven by a
393 /// `FOREIGN KEY` and indexed (a reference whose index is gone is left out: it would not
394 /// be served by one). Both ends are matched by relation, so a plain view over a TVIEW, or
395 /// a source naming none, takes part in none. Empty when the registry has no `references`.
396 ///
397 /// # Errors
398 ///
399 /// Returns an error if the catalog query fails.
400 pub async fn tview_references(
401 &self,
402 sql_sources: &[String],
403 ) -> Result<Vec<crate::schema::native_joins::TviewReference>> {
404 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
405 let has_references: bool = client
406 .query_one(
407 "SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_attribute \
408 WHERE attrelid = to_regclass('tviews.registry') AND attname = 'references' \
409 AND NOT attisdropped)",
410 &[],
411 )
412 .await
413 .context("failed to probe for tviews.registry.references")?
414 .get(0);
415 let mut sql_sources = sql_sources.to_vec();
416 sql_sources.sort();
417 sql_sources.dedup();
418 if !has_references || sql_sources.is_empty() {
419 return Ok(Vec::new());
420 }
421 let rows = client
422 .query(
423 "WITH s AS (SELECT name, to_regclass(name)::oid AS rel \
424 FROM unnest($1::text[]) AS name), \
425 tv AS (SELECT to_regclass(quote_ident(g.schema) || '.' || \
426 quote_ident(g.name))::oid AS rel, \
427 g.entity, g.\"references\" AS refs \
428 FROM tviews.registry g) \
429 SELECT c.name AS child, p.name AS parent, ref.key AS foreign_key, \
430 ref.value ->> 'column' AS referenced_key \
431 FROM s c JOIN tv ct ON ct.rel = c.rel \
432 CROSS JOIN LATERAL jsonb_each(ct.refs) ref \
433 JOIN tv pt ON pt.entity = ref.value ->> 'entity' \
434 JOIN s p ON p.rel = pt.rel \
435 WHERE ref.value ->> 'index' IS NOT NULL",
436 &[&sql_sources],
437 )
438 .await
439 .context("failed to read tviews.registry.references")?;
440 Ok(rows
441 .iter()
442 .map(|row| crate::schema::native_joins::TviewReference {
443 child: row.get("child"),
444 parent: row.get("parent"),
445 foreign_key: row.get("foreign_key"),
446 referenced_key: row.get("referenced_key"),
447 })
448 .collect())
449 }
450
451 /// Whether `tviews.pg_tviews_flush_and_report(integer, boolean, boolean)`, the call a
452 /// `cascade_source = "pg_tviews"` mutation makes before its commit (#1391), resolves: a
453 /// function of that name whose first three parameters are those and whose others all
454 /// have defaults. `pg_tviews` added a defaulted fourth (`types`), so an exact signature
455 /// is not the question (#1600).
456 ///
457 /// # Errors
458 ///
459 /// Returns an error if the catalog query fails.
460 pub async fn pg_tviews_flush_available(&self) -> Result<bool> {
461 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
462 let row = client
463 .query_one(
464 "SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_proc p \
465 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace \
466 WHERE n.nspname = 'tviews' AND p.proname = 'pg_tviews_flush_and_report' \
467 AND p.pronargs >= 3 AND p.pronargs - p.pronargdefaults <= 3 \
468 AND p.proargtypes[0] = 'integer'::regtype \
469 AND p.proargtypes[1] = 'boolean'::regtype \
470 AND p.proargtypes[2] = 'boolean'::regtype)",
471 &[],
472 )
473 .await
474 .context("failed to probe for pg_tviews_flush_and_report")?;
475 Ok(row.get(0))
476 }
477
478 /// Run the PL/pgSQL body-resolution pass over `schemas` and return every
479 /// unresolved internal call (#409).
480 ///
481 /// Skips gracefully when `plpgsql_check` is unavailable
482 /// ([`PlpgsqlCheckOutcome::Unavailable`]). Trigger functions are excluded
483 /// (they need a relation OID to analyse), and only `error`-level
484 /// `function … does not exist` diagnostics are reported — warnings and
485 /// runtime-only temp-table references are not contract breakage.
486 ///
487 /// # Errors
488 ///
489 /// Returns an error if `CREATE EXTENSION` or the analysis query fails (e.g.
490 /// insufficient privileges to create the extension).
491 pub async fn plpgsql_check_unresolved_calls(
492 &self,
493 schemas: &[String],
494 ) -> Result<PlpgsqlCheckOutcome> {
495 if !self.plpgsql_check_available().await? {
496 return Ok(PlpgsqlCheckOutcome::Unavailable);
497 }
498 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
499 client
500 .batch_execute("CREATE EXTENSION IF NOT EXISTS plpgsql_check")
501 .await
502 .context("failed to CREATE EXTENSION plpgsql_check")?;
503
504 let rows = client
505 .query(
506 "SELECT (p.oid::regprocedure)::text AS caller, t.lineno, t.message \
507 FROM pg_proc p \
508 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace \
509 JOIN pg_language l ON l.oid = p.prolang AND l.lanname = 'plpgsql' \
510 CROSS JOIN LATERAL plpgsql_check_function_tb(p.oid, fatal_errors := false) t \
511 WHERE n.nspname = ANY($1) \
512 AND p.prorettype <> 'trigger'::regtype \
513 AND t.level = 'error' \
514 AND t.message ~* 'function .* does not exist' \
515 ORDER BY 1, 2",
516 &[&schemas],
517 )
518 .await
519 .context("failed to run the plpgsql_check body-resolution pass")?;
520
521 let errors = rows
522 .iter()
523 .map(|row| BodyError {
524 caller: row.get("caller"),
525 lineno: row.get("lineno"),
526 message: row.get("message"),
527 })
528 .collect();
529 Ok(PlpgsqlCheckOutcome::Ran { errors })
530 }
531
532 /// Read the columns of `schema.table` from `information_schema.columns`
533 /// (name + `udt_name`), in declaration order.
534 ///
535 /// Returns an **empty** vec when the table does not exist (or is invisible to
536 /// the connecting role) — the change-log contract drift check (#380) reads
537 /// that as "table absent, the migration will install it" rather than an
538 /// error.
539 ///
540 /// # Errors
541 ///
542 /// Returns an error if the connection or the catalog query fails.
543 pub async fn table_columns(&self, schema: &str, table: &str) -> Result<Vec<LiveColumn>> {
544 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
545 let rows = client
546 .query(
547 "SELECT column_name, udt_name FROM information_schema.columns \
548 WHERE table_schema = $1 AND table_name = $2 ORDER BY ordinal_position",
549 &[&schema, &table],
550 )
551 .await
552 .context("failed to query information_schema.columns")?;
553 Ok(rows
554 .iter()
555 .map(|row| LiveColumn {
556 name: row.get("column_name"),
557 udt_name: row.get("udt_name"),
558 })
559 .collect())
560 }
561
562 /// Read the live RLS posture of `core.tb_entity_change_log` and whether the
563 /// connecting role can read it under that posture (#437 F6 / #443).
564 ///
565 /// Returns `None` when the table is absent (or invisible to the connecting
566 /// role) — the doctor check reads that as "not present, skipped".
567 ///
568 /// # Errors
569 ///
570 /// Returns an error if the connection or the catalog query fails.
571 pub async fn change_log_rls_status(&self) -> Result<Option<ChangeLogRlsStatus>> {
572 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
573 let rows = client
574 .query(
575 "SELECT c.relrowsecurity AS rls_enabled, \
576 (r.rolbypassrls OR r.rolsuper) AS can_bypass, \
577 (pg_get_userbyid(c.relowner) = current_user) AS is_owner, \
578 current_user::text AS role_name \
579 FROM pg_class c \
580 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace \
581 JOIN pg_roles r ON r.rolname = current_user \
582 WHERE n.nspname = 'core' AND c.relname = 'tb_entity_change_log'",
583 &[],
584 )
585 .await
586 .context("failed to query change-log RLS status from pg_class/pg_roles")?;
587 Ok(rows.first().map(|row| ChangeLogRlsStatus {
588 rls_enabled: row.get("rls_enabled"),
589 can_bypass: row.get("can_bypass"),
590 is_owner: row.get("is_owner"),
591 role_name: row.get("role_name"),
592 }))
593 }
594
595 /// The row-level security policies whose `USING` or `WITH CHECK` expression calls
596 /// `current_setting` on one of `settings`, one entry per (policy, setting).
597 ///
598 /// Read from the expression text `pg_policies` deparses (`current_setting('app.x'::text,
599 /// true)`), case-insensitively. A policy that reads the setting through a function it
600 /// calls is not seen.
601 ///
602 /// # Errors
603 ///
604 /// Returns an error if the connection or the catalog query fails.
605 pub async fn policies_reading_settings(
606 &self,
607 settings: &[String],
608 ) -> Result<Vec<PolicySettingRead>> {
609 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
610 let rows = client
611 .query(
612 "SELECT p.schemaname::text AS schema_name, p.tablename::text AS table_name, \
613 p.policyname::text AS policy_name, s.name AS setting \
614 FROM pg_policies p CROSS JOIN unnest($1::text[]) AS s(name) \
615 WHERE strpos(lower(coalesce(p.qual, '') || ' ' || coalesce(p.with_check, '')), \
616 'current_setting(''' || lower(s.name) || '''') > 0 \
617 ORDER BY 1, 2, 3, 4",
618 &[&settings],
619 )
620 .await
621 .context("failed to read policy expressions from pg_policies")?;
622 Ok(rows
623 .iter()
624 .map(|r| PolicySettingRead {
625 schema: r.get("schema_name"),
626 table: r.get("table_name"),
627 policy: r.get("policy_name"),
628 setting: r.get("setting"),
629 })
630 .collect())
631 }
632
633 /// Audit the given `sql_source` views (bare relnames) for `security_invoker`.
634 ///
635 /// A *default* view runs with the view owner's privileges and bypasses the
636 /// caller's RLS; only a `security_invoker` view honours base-table RLS
637 /// — the requirement the cascade RLS boundary (and the query path) rely on.
638 /// Returns which audited views lack the option, plus whether any RLS policy
639 /// exists at all (the requirement only bites under RLS).
640 ///
641 /// # Errors
642 ///
643 /// Returns an error if the connection or a catalog query fails.
644 pub async fn security_invoker_audit(&self, views: &[String]) -> Result<SecurityInvokerAudit> {
645 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
646 let rls_in_use: bool = client
647 .query_one("SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_policies) AS in_use", &[])
648 .await
649 .context("failed to query pg_policies for RLS usage")?
650 .get("in_use");
651 let rows = client
652 .query(
653 "SELECT c.relname \
654 FROM pg_class c JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace \
655 WHERE c.relkind = 'v' AND c.relname = ANY($1) \
656 AND NOT EXISTS ( \
657 SELECT 1 FROM pg_options_to_table(c.reloptions) o \
658 WHERE o.option_name = 'security_invoker' \
659 AND lower(o.option_value) IN ('true', 'on', '1'))",
660 &[&views],
661 )
662 .await
663 .context("failed to audit view security_invoker options from pg_class")?;
664 Ok(SecurityInvokerAudit {
665 rls_in_use,
666 views_without_invoker: rows.iter().map(|r| r.get::<_, String>("relname")).collect(),
667 })
668 }
669
670 /// Read the privileges granted to the `PUBLIC` pseudo-role on the three
671 /// change-log relations (the table + its two views) that exist in `core`
672 /// (#443).
673 ///
674 /// Returns one [`PublicGrant`] per *present* relation, listing the privileges
675 /// PUBLIC currently holds (empty when none). An empty vec means none of the
676 /// three relations exist — the doctor check reads that as "not present,
677 /// skipped". PUBLIC grants are read from `pg_class.relacl` via `aclexplode`
678 /// (the PUBLIC grantee has OID `0`); a `NULL` ACL (the default for a fresh
679 /// relation) explodes to no rows, i.e. PUBLIC holds nothing.
680 ///
681 /// # Errors
682 ///
683 /// Returns an error if the connection or the catalog query fails.
684 pub async fn change_log_public_grants(&self) -> Result<Vec<PublicGrant>> {
685 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
686 let rows = client
687 .query(
688 "SELECT c.relname, \
689 COALESCE( \
690 array_agg(DISTINCT a.privilege_type) FILTER (WHERE a.grantee = 0), \
691 ARRAY[]::text[]) AS public_privs \
692 FROM pg_class c \
693 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace \
694 LEFT JOIN LATERAL aclexplode(c.relacl) a ON true \
695 WHERE n.nspname = 'core' \
696 AND c.relname IN ('tb_entity_change_log', 'v_entity_change_log', \
697 'v_entity_change_log_debezium') \
698 GROUP BY c.relname \
699 ORDER BY c.relname",
700 &[],
701 )
702 .await
703 .context("failed to query change-log PUBLIC grants from pg_class.relacl")?;
704 Ok(rows
705 .iter()
706 .map(|row| PublicGrant {
707 relname: row.get("relname"),
708 privileges: row.get("public_privs"),
709 })
710 .collect())
711 }
712
713 /// Read the live actor-attribution posture of `core.tb_entity_change_log`
714 /// (#390): how many rows carry no `actor_type`, which out-of-contract values
715 /// exist, and whether the domain CHECK constraint is installed.
716 ///
717 /// `valid_tokens` is the canonical roster (built from
718 /// [`fraiseql_core::security::ActorType::ALL`] by the caller). Returns `None`
719 /// when the table is absent — the doctor check reads that as "not present,
720 /// skipped".
721 ///
722 /// # Errors
723 ///
724 /// Returns an error if the connection or a catalog query fails.
725 pub async fn change_log_actor_stats(
726 &self,
727 valid_tokens: &[String],
728 ) -> Result<Option<ChangeLogActorStats>> {
729 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
730 let table_exists: bool = client
731 .query_one(
732 "SELECT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_class c \
733 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace \
734 WHERE n.nspname = 'core' AND c.relname = 'tb_entity_change_log') AS present",
735 &[],
736 )
737 .await
738 .context("failed to check for core.tb_entity_change_log in pg_class")?
739 .get("present");
740 if !table_exists {
741 return Ok(None);
742 }
743
744 let row = client
745 .query_one(
746 "SELECT \
747 (SELECT count(*) FROM core.tb_entity_change_log \
748 WHERE actor_type IS NULL) AS null_rows, \
749 (SELECT COALESCE(array_agg(DISTINCT actor_type ORDER BY actor_type), \
750 ARRAY[]::text[]) \
751 FROM core.tb_entity_change_log \
752 WHERE actor_type IS NOT NULL AND actor_type <> ALL($1)) AS unknown_values, \
753 EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_constraint con \
754 JOIN pg_class c ON c.oid = con.conrelid \
755 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = c.relnamespace \
756 WHERE n.nspname = 'core' AND c.relname = 'tb_entity_change_log' \
757 AND con.conname = 'chk_entity_change_log_actor_type') \
758 AS constraint_installed",
759 &[&valid_tokens],
760 )
761 .await
762 .context("failed to query change-log actor attribution stats")?;
763 Ok(Some(ChangeLogActorStats {
764 null_rows: row.get("null_rows"),
765 unknown_values: row.get("unknown_values"),
766 constraint_installed: row.get("constraint_installed"),
767 }))
768 }
769
770 /// Read the security posture of `core.fn_entity_change_log_capture()` (#443 /
771 /// #437 F6): whether it is `SECURITY DEFINER` (`pg_proc.prosecdef`) and the
772 /// pinned `search_path` from `pg_proc.proconfig`, if any.
773 ///
774 /// Returns `None` when the function is absent — the doctor check reads that as
775 /// "not present, skipped".
776 ///
777 /// # Errors
778 ///
779 /// Returns an error if the connection or the catalog query fails.
780 pub async fn capture_fn_security(&self) -> Result<Option<CaptureFnSecurity>> {
781 let client = self.pool.get().await.context("failed to acquire DB connection")?;
782 let rows = client
783 .query(
784 "SELECT p.prosecdef AS security_definer, \
785 (SELECT cfg FROM unnest(p.proconfig) AS cfg \
786 WHERE cfg LIKE 'search_path=%' LIMIT 1) AS search_path_cfg \
787 FROM pg_proc p \
788 JOIN pg_namespace n ON n.oid = p.pronamespace \
789 WHERE n.nspname = 'core' AND p.proname = 'fn_entity_change_log_capture' \
790 LIMIT 1",
791 &[],
792 )
793 .await
794 .context("failed to query capture-function security from pg_proc")?;
795 Ok(rows.first().map(|row| {
796 let raw: Option<String> = row.get("search_path_cfg");
797 CaptureFnSecurity {
798 security_definer: row.get("security_definer"),
799 search_path: raw
800 .map(|s| s.strip_prefix("search_path=").unwrap_or(&s).to_string()),
801 }
802 }))
803 }
804}
805
806/// Build an [`OutColumn`] from a `(name, type_name, is_enum)` catalog row.
807fn row_to_out_column(row: &tokio_postgres::Row) -> OutColumn {
808 OutColumn {
809 name: row.get("name"),
810 type_name: row.get("type_name"),
811 is_enum: row.get("is_enum"),
812 }
813}
814
815/// Split a possibly schema-qualified function name into `(schema, name)`.
816///
817/// Mirrors the runtime's identifier handling: an unqualified name (no `.`)
818/// resolves via `search_path`; a `schema.fn` name pins the schema. Split on the
819/// first `.` so `schema.fn` → `(Some("schema"), "fn")`.
820fn split_qualified(sql_source: &str) -> (Option<String>, String) {
821 match sql_source.split_once('.') {
822 Some((schema, name)) => (Some(schema.to_string()), name.to_string()),
823 None => (None, sql_source.to_string()),
824 }
825}
826
827/// Whether any node of an `EXPLAIN (FORMAT JSON)` plan reads an index.
828fn plan_reads_index(plan: &serde_json::Value) -> bool {
829 match plan {
830 serde_json::Value::Object(node) => {
831 node.contains_key("Index Name") || node.values().any(plan_reads_index)
832 },
833 serde_json::Value::Array(items) => items.iter().any(plan_reads_index),
834 _ => false,
835 }
836}