feather_reader/

net.rs

//! Hardened outbound HTTP for **untrusted, user-supplied feed URLs**.
//!
//! A feed reader fetches arbitrary URLs on behalf of its users: the add-feed
//! flow, the background poller, and OPML import all hand a *user-controlled*
//! host to `reqwest`. Left unguarded that is a textbook **SSRF** primitive — a
//! subscribed feed can `302` to `http://169.254.169.254/` (cloud metadata) or
//! `http://127.0.0.1:<port>/` (an internal service), and because the body is
//! reflected back into the reader UI the exfiltration is *non-blind*.
//!
//! This module centralises the defence so every fetch path shares one guard:
//!
//! 1. **Scheme allow-list** — only `http` / `https`. No `file:`, `gopher:`, …
//! 2. **IP allow-list** — the target host is resolved to IP(s) and rejected if
//!    *any* resolved address is one no public feed can live at: loopback,
//!    link-local, private, ULA, multicast, unspecified, broadcast, and the
//!    reserved, shared and documentation ranges — including any of those
//!    embedded in an IPv6 address. [`is_forbidden_ip`] has the complete list.
//! 3. **Per-hop re-validation** — auto-redirect is disabled and redirects are
//!    followed manually, re-running (1) and (2) on **every** hop, so a benign
//!    first host cannot bounce us onto an internal one.
//! 4. **Capped streaming body** — the response body is streamed and aborted the
//!    moment it exceeds [`MAX_BODY_BYTES`], so a gzip decompression bomb cannot
//!    materialise gigabytes before a post-hoc size check (a Content-Length
//!    guard is useless once gzip strips the header).
//!
//! Resolution happens immediately before each request. The vetted IP is then
//! **pinned** onto the connection (reqwest `.resolve(host, addr)`), so `connect`
//! reuses the exact address that passed [`is_forbidden_ip`] rather than doing an
//! independent second DNS lookup. That closes the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU window: an
//! attacker-controlled resolver cannot answer "public IP" for the check and
//! "127.0.0.1" for the connect, because there is no second resolution.

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::{IpAddr, Ipv4Addr, Ipv6Addr, SocketAddr};
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
use std::sync::{LazyLock, Mutex};
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};

use anyhow::{bail, Context, Result};
use reqwest::header::{
    HeaderName, HeaderValue, AUTHORIZATION, CONTENT_TYPE, COOKIE, PROXY_AUTHORIZATION,
    WWW_AUTHENTICATE,
};
use reqwest::{Client, Response};
use url::{Host, Url};

/// Cap on how many bytes we will read from any body, streamed. 8 MiB is
/// comfortably above any sane feed; a body that exceeds it is aborted mid-stream
/// (never fully buffered), which is what defeats a gzip decompression bomb.
pub const MAX_BODY_BYTES: usize = 8 * 1024 * 1024;

/// Total per-request timeout for a guarded fetch. Matches
/// [`crate::feed::build_client`]'s `FETCH_TIMEOUT` so the poller's per-hop
/// pinned client is bounded the same way the feed client is — an unattended
/// poll can't hang forever on a slow/silent upstream.
///
/// `pub(crate)` so a caller that wraps a *multi-request* walk in its own
/// deadline can size that deadline against this per-request bound rather than
/// hardcoding a second copy of the number — see [`crate::network::RelayClient`].
pub(crate) const FETCH_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(30);

/// Per-read idle timeout: cap the wait for the *next* body chunk, so a server
/// that trickles bytes forever (slowloris) can't tie up a fetch under the total
/// timeout. Matches [`crate::feed::build_client`]'s `READ_TIMEOUT`.
const READ_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15);

/// Maximum number of redirect hops we will follow (each re-validated).
///
/// `pub(crate)` alongside [`FETCH_TIMEOUT`] because the two together give the
/// real worst-case cost of ONE guarded request: the redirect loop runs
/// `0..=MAX_REDIRECTS`, and every hop builds a fresh [`pinned_client`] carrying
/// its own full [`FETCH_TIMEOUT`]. A caller that wraps a guarded request in an
/// outer deadline must budget `(MAX_REDIRECTS + 1) * FETCH_TIMEOUT`, not one
/// `FETCH_TIMEOUT` — getting that wrong silently pre-empts the inner logic.
pub(crate) const MAX_REDIRECTS: usize = 5;

/// Worst-case wall-clock cost of a single guarded request, redirects included.
/// The number an outer deadline has to respect; see [`MAX_REDIRECTS`].
pub(crate) const WORST_CASE_REQUEST: Duration =
    Duration::from_secs(FETCH_TIMEOUT.as_secs() * (MAX_REDIRECTS as u64 + 1));

/// Whether an already-resolved IP address is one we must never connect to on
/// behalf of an untrusted URL (SSRF sinks).
///
/// This is the complete list; keep it in step with the code.
///
/// **IPv4**
///
/// * `0.0.0.0/8` — "this network", including the unspecified `0.0.0.0` (RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3)
/// * `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` — private (RFC 1918)
/// * `100.64.0.0/10` — shared address space, carrier-grade NAT and overlay VPNs (RFC 6598)
/// * `127.0.0.0/8` — loopback (RFC 1122 §3.2.1.3)
/// * `169.254.0.0/16` — link-local, where cloud metadata lives (RFC 3927)
/// * `192.0.0.0/24` — IETF protocol assignments (RFC 6890)
/// * `192.0.2.0/24`, `198.51.100.0/24`, `203.0.113.0/24` — documentation,
///   TEST-NET-1/2/3 (RFC 5737)
/// * `198.18.0.0/15` — benchmarking (RFC 2544)
/// * `224.0.0.0/4` — multicast (RFC 5771)
/// * `240.0.0.0/4` — reserved (RFC 1112 §4), which includes the limited
///   broadcast address `255.255.255.255` (RFC 919)
///
/// **IPv6**
///
/// * `::` unspecified and `::1` loopback (RFC 4291)
/// * `100::/64` — discard-only (RFC 6666)
/// * `2001:db8::/32` — documentation (RFC 3849)
/// * `fc00::/7` — unique local (RFC 4193)
/// * `fe80::/10` — link-local (RFC 4291)
/// * `fec0::/10` — site-local, deprecated but still routed internally on some
///   networks (RFC 3879)
/// * `ff00::/8` — multicast (RFC 4291)
/// * Any address that embeds a forbidden IPv4 one: mapped and compatible
///   (RFC 4291), IPv4-translated (RFC 2765), NAT64 (RFC 6052), 6to4 (RFC 3056),
///   Teredo (RFC 4380) and ISATAP (RFC 5214). These are decoded and checked
///   against the same IPv4 list above. The rest of `64:ff9b::/32` outside the
///   well-known `/96`, including RFC 8215's local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48`, is
///   refused outright. See `embedded_v4`.
pub fn is_forbidden_ip(ip: &IpAddr) -> bool {
    match ip {
        IpAddr::V4(v4) => is_forbidden_v4(v4),
        IpAddr::V6(v6) => is_forbidden_v6(v6),
    }
}

fn is_forbidden_v4(ip: &Ipv4Addr) -> bool {
    ip.is_loopback()            // 127.0.0.0/8
        || ip.is_private()      // 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16
        || ip.is_link_local()   // 169.254.0.0/16 (cloud metadata)
        || ip.is_unspecified()  // 0.0.0.0
        || ip.is_multicast()    // 224.0.0.0/4
        // 240.0.0.0/4 reserved (RFC 1112 §4). This also covers the broadcast
        // address 255.255.255.255, so a separate `is_broadcast()` would be dead.
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [240..=255, ..])
        // Documentation ranges, TEST-NET-1/2/3 (RFC 5737).
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [192, 0, 2, _])
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [198, 51, 100, _])
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [203, 0, 113, _])
        // Carrier-grade NAT / "this-host" / benchmarking ranges — not routable
        // to a legitimate public feed, but reachable internally.
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [0, ..])
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [100, b, ..] if (64..=127).contains(&b)) // 100.64/10 CGNAT (also used by overlay VPNs)
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [192, 0, 0, _])
        || matches!(ip.octets(), [198, 18..=19, _, _])
}

fn is_forbidden_v6(ip: &Ipv6Addr) -> bool {
    if ip.is_loopback() || ip.is_unspecified() || ip.is_multicast() {
        return true;
    }
    // Unwrap IPv4-mapped / -compatible addresses and re-check against the v4
    // rules, so `::ffff:127.0.0.1` and friends can't slip past.
    if let Some(v4) = ip.to_ipv4() {
        return is_forbidden_v4(&v4);
    }
    // **And every OTHER way an IPv6 address carries an IPv4 one.** `to_ipv4()`
    // stops at the mapped and compatible forms; five more families embed an
    // address this function would refuse on sight, and all five were getting
    // through. See [`embedded_v4`].
    //
    // This arm only ever returns `true`, so an address whose embedded IPv4 is
    // public still falls through to the link-local and ULA checks below — which
    // is what keeps `fe80::5efe:8.8.8.8` refused for being link-local.
    if embedded_v4(ip).iter().any(is_forbidden_v4) {
        return true;
    }
    let seg = ip.segments();
    // fe80::/10 link-local (incl. RFC-4291 metadata equivalents).
    let link_local = (seg[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfe80;
    // fec0::/10 site-local: deprecated (RFC 3879), but some networks still
    // route it internally.
    let site_local = (seg[0] & 0xffc0) == 0xfec0;
    // fc00::/7 unique-local addresses.
    let ula = (seg[0] & 0xfe00) == 0xfc00;
    // 100::/64 discard-only (RFC 6666).
    let discard = seg[..4] == [0x0100, 0, 0, 0];
    // 2001:db8::/32 documentation (RFC 3849). Never globally routed.
    let documentation = seg[0] == 0x2001 && seg[1] == 0x0db8;
    link_local || site_local || ula || discard || documentation
}

/// Every IPv4 address `ip` embeds under a translation scheme, for re-checking
/// against the v4 rules.
///
/// **`to_ipv4()` is not the whole story, and the gap was a live SSRF hole.** It
/// handles `::ffff:a.b.c.d` and `::a.b.c.d`. These it does not:
///
/// * **NAT64** — `64:ff9b::/32`. RFC 6052's well-known prefix is defined as a
///   `/96`, so inside it the IPv4 is the last 32 bits and is decoded. The rest
///   of the `/32`, including RFC 8215's local-use `64:ff9b:1::/48`, is refused
///   outright, because RFC 6052 §2.2 allows six embedding lengths and which one
///   a local deployment used is not something this code can know.
/// * **6to4** — `2002::/16` (RFC 3056), IPv4 in the next two groups.
/// * **IPv4-translated** — `::ffff:0:0:0/96` (RFC 2765), one group away from the
///   mapped form.
/// * **Teredo** — `2001::/32` (RFC 4380): the relay's IPv4 in groups 2-3 and the
///   client's in groups 6-7, the latter obfuscated by XOR with all-ones. Both are
///   returned; either one reaching an internal address is enough to refuse.
/// * **ISATAP** — RFC 5214, and the odd one out: **no prefix to anchor on.** The
///   IPv4 is the low 32 bits behind the IANA-reserved `00-00-5E-FE` OUI, under
///   ANY /64, so an ordinary-looking global address can carry one. A link-local
///   ISATAP address was already refused for being `fe80::/10`; one under a
///   global prefix was not refused at all.
///
/// Decoded rather than blanket-refused for 6to4, IPv4-translated and Teredo,
/// because those prefixes carry public addresses too and a blocklist would take
/// out ordinary traffic. `allows_ipv6_that_embeds_a_public_ipv4` holds that line.
///
/// Found while bumping a JavaScript dependency whose advisory was this class:
/// "no classifier recognizes the NAT64 local-use range". Ours did not either.
fn embedded_v4(ip: &Ipv6Addr) -> Vec<Ipv4Addr> {
    let seg = ip.segments();
    let v4 = |hi: u16, lo: u16| {
        Ipv4Addr::new(
            (hi >> 8) as u8,
            (hi & 0xff) as u8,
            (lo >> 8) as u8,
            (lo & 0xff) as u8,
        )
    };
    // NAT64, split by prefix length because only one of the two is unambiguous.
    //
    // RFC 6052's well-known prefix is DEFINED as `64:ff9b::/96`, so inside it
    // the IPv4 is unambiguously the last 32 bits and decodes like the others.
    // That matters for availability, not just tidiness: a DNS64 resolver
    // (RFC 6147) synthesises a well-known-prefix AAAA for every IPv4-only host,
    // and `first_vetted` rejects a whole DNS answer set if ANY address in it is
    // forbidden — so refusing the prefix outright makes every IPv4-only feed
    // publisher unfetchable on an IPv6-only network. Which is the network this
    // guard was written for.
    //
    // Nothing is given up by decoding: `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` still refuses,
    // because 169.254.169.254 refuses on its own merits. RFC 6052 §3.1 also
    // forbids the well-known prefix from carrying a non-global IPv4 at all, so
    // such an address is malformed as well as hostile.
    //
    // The REST of `64:ff9b::/32` — notably RFC 8215's local-use
    // `64:ff9b:1::/48` — stays refused outright, and that is deliberate rather
    // than lazy. RFC 6052 §2.2 defines six embedding lengths, and which one a
    // local-use deployment chose is a property of that deployment. Guessing
    // wrong reads the wrong bits, which could turn an internal target into a
    // public-looking one — so for anything but the /96 the conservative answer
    // is the only safe one. `LOCALHOST` there is a stand-in for "forbidden",
    // not a claim about where the address points.
    if seg[0] == 0x0064 && seg[1] == 0xff9b {
        if seg[2..6] == [0, 0, 0, 0] {
            return vec![v4(seg[6], seg[7])];
        }
        return vec![Ipv4Addr::LOCALHOST];
    }
    // **From here the arms ACCUMULATE instead of returning.** An early return
    // was a bypass: 6to4 delegates `2002:<site-v4>::/48` to whoever owns that
    // IPv4 and the site assigns identifiers inside it, so a site running ISATAP
    // in its own 6to4 space produces `2002:<site-v4>:0:0:5efe:<internal-v4>` —
    // two readings of DISJOINT bits, both true at once. Returning the 6to4 site
    // address alone reported a public address and skipped the tunnel endpoint.
    //
    // This is the opposite of the Teredo case below, and the difference is
    // which bits each family claims, not which is more important.
    let mut out = Vec::new();
    // 6to4: the site's IPv4 in groups 1-2, disjoint from the identifier.
    if seg[0] == 0x2002 {
        out.push(v4(seg[1], seg[2]));
    }
    // IPv4-translated: `::ffff:0:a.b.c.d`.
    //
    // This one accumulates for uniformity rather than necessity, and the
    // distinction is worth recording: it requires `seg[5] == 0` where ISATAP
    // requires `0x5efe`, and `seg[..4] == 0` excludes 6to4 and Teredo too, so
    // it can only ever be the sole match. Returning here instead is an
    // EQUIVALENT mutant — no test can tell the difference, and one written to
    // try would be asserting on nothing. It pushes so that an arm added below
    // it later is not silently skipped, which is the mistake the 6to4 arm
    // above made.
    if seg[..4] == [0, 0, 0, 0] && seg[4] == 0xffff && seg[5] == 0 {
        out.push(v4(seg[6], seg[7]));
    }
    // Teredo: relay, then the client with the RFC 4380 obfuscation undone.
    //
    // **The one arm that still returns, because it CLAIMS the identifier's
    // bits.** Teredo's client address lives in groups 6-7 complemented — the
    // same bits ISATAP reads uncomplemented — so the two readings are of one
    // field and contradict each other. Accumulating both would refuse a
    // legitimate Teredo address whenever the inverse of its client address
    // happens to be internal. Returning here resolves that in favour of the
    // prefix, which `a_teredo_address_is_read_as_teredo_not_as_isatap` pins.
    if seg[0] == 0x2001 && seg[1] == 0 {
        out.push(v4(seg[2], seg[3]));
        out.push(v4(seg[6] ^ 0xffff, seg[7] ^ 0xffff));
        return out;
    }
    // ISATAP, and it is last so that Teredo above can suppress it.
    //
    // The others are prefix-anchored; this one is not — the IPv4 sits in the low
    // 32 bits behind the IANA `00-00-5E-FE` OUI under ANY /64, so the test is on
    // the interface identifier and matches whatever the prefix. Being reachable
    // under another family's prefix is the point, not an edge case: it is why
    // the arms above accumulate rather than return.
    //
    // **`seg[4]` is deliberately not constrained.** RFC 5214 spells the
    // identifier as `000000ug 00000000 0x5E 0xFE` + the IPv4, so a spec-exact
    // test would require all of `seg[4]` except the `u` and `g` bits to be
    // zero. Two drafts of this arm tried to be that precise and the first was
    // wrong: it enumerated `0x0000` and `0x0200`, missed the two values with
    // `g` set, and so was bypassable by flipping one bit while reading as
    // complete.
    //
    // The asymmetry decides it. Reading the marker loosely costs a false
    // positive only when a non-ISATAP address happens to carry `0x5efe` in
    // group 5 AND its low 32 bits decode to a forbidden IPv4 — and `00-00-5E`
    // is IANA's own OUI, reserved for this, so a real interface identifier does
    // not land there. Reading it strictly costs a total bypass if any tunnel
    // driver is more lenient than the RFC about the reserved bits. A guard
    // should be conservative about what it accepts as safe, which here means
    // the simpler condition, not the more exact one.
    if seg[5] == 0x5efe {
        out.push(v4(seg[6], seg[7]));
    }
    out
}

/// Validate a URL's scheme (http/https only). Returns the host as a string.
fn check_scheme(url: &Url) -> Result<()> {
    match url.scheme() {
        "http" | "https" => Ok(()),
        other => bail!("refusing non-http(s) URL scheme {other:?}"),
    }
}

/// Resolve a URL's host to socket addresses, reject if *any* resolved IP is a
/// forbidden (SSRF) target, and return the **vetted** `SocketAddr` to pin the
/// connection to.
///
/// An IP literal host is checked directly (no DNS); a named host is resolved via
/// the async resolver and *every* answer must pass — but the returned address is
/// the specific one `connect` must use, so no independent second resolution can
/// slip a rebound IP past the check (DNS-rebinding TOCTOU). Handles both IPv4 and
/// IPv6 answers.
async fn resolve_and_check(url: &Url) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
    let host = url.host().context("URL has no host")?;
    let port = url
        .port_or_known_default()
        .context("URL has no usable port")?;

    match host {
        Host::Ipv4(ip) => {
            if is_forbidden_ip(&IpAddr::V4(ip)) {
                bail!("refusing to fetch forbidden (internal) address {ip}");
            }
            Ok(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V4(ip), port))
        }
        Host::Ipv6(ip) => {
            if is_forbidden_ip(&IpAddr::V6(ip)) {
                bail!("refusing to fetch forbidden (internal) address {ip}");
            }
            Ok(SocketAddr::new(IpAddr::V6(ip), port))
        }
        Host::Domain(name) => {
            // **Test seam — `#[cfg(test)]`, so it does not exist in a release
            // build at all.** Not a parameter, not an env var, not a feature
            // flag: the compiler removes it, so there is no runtime bypass to
            // reason about. It exists because the guard is otherwise untestable
            // end-to-end — a local test server lives on loopback, which
            // `is_forbidden_ip` correctly refuses, so nothing could ever drive a
            // real redirect through this function. See `test_host_override`.
            #[cfg(test)]
            if let Some(addr) = test_override_for(name, port) {
                return Ok(addr);
            }
            let addrs = tokio::net::lookup_host((name, port))
                .await
                .with_context(|| format!("resolving host {name:?}"))?;
            first_vetted(name, addrs)
        }
    }
}

/// Pick the address to pin to from a host's DNS answers, rejecting the whole
/// set if ANY answer is forbidden.
///
/// **Extracted so it can be tested.** Inline in the resolver it was unreachable
/// without real DNS returning a mixed answer set, and a mutation that checked
/// only the FIRST answer left the entire suite green — a DNS-rebinding style
/// attack that publishes `1.2.3.4, 127.0.0.1` would have been accepted on the
/// strength of the first record.
///
/// Rejecting wholesale rather than filtering is deliberate: a host that resolves
/// to any internal address is not a host we want to talk to, even on the answers
/// that look fine.
fn first_vetted(name: &str, addrs: impl Iterator<Item = SocketAddr>) -> Result<SocketAddr> {
    let mut vetted: Option<SocketAddr> = None;
    for sa in addrs {
        let ip = sa.ip();
        if is_forbidden_ip(&ip) {
            bail!("refusing to fetch {name:?}: resolves to forbidden address {ip}");
        }
        // Keep the FIRST vetted answer as the address to pin the connect to.
        // Every answer is still checked (the loop continues), so a mixed A/AAAA
        // set with any forbidden entry is rejected wholesale.
        if vetted.is_none() {
            vetted = Some(sa);
        }
    }
    vetted.ok_or_else(|| anyhow::anyhow!("host {name:?} did not resolve to any address"))
}

/// Test-only host→address overrides, consulted by [`resolve_and_check`] before
/// real DNS. Keyed by host so tests using distinct hostnames never collide, and
/// gone entirely from a release build.
#[cfg(test)]
static TEST_HOSTS: std::sync::Mutex<Option<std::collections::HashMap<String, SocketAddr>>> =
    std::sync::Mutex::new(None);

/// The TEST certificate authority, and the leaf it issues for test hostnames.
///
/// **Why this exists at all.** An OAuth issuer is required to be `https`
/// (`discovery::validate_issuer_form`), so a plain-HTTP loopback server cannot
/// stand in for an authorization server — which meant the real `login::complete`
/// could never be driven end to end, and the wiring between its tested core and
/// the network had no coverage. A review proved that gap was live: the
/// authorization-server mix-up defence could be disabled in that wiring with the
/// whole suite green.
///
/// **Why a CA rather than relaxing the rule.** The alternative was a test-only
/// escape from the https requirement. That would *suspend* a security rule; this
/// *satisfies* it — the server really presents a certificate and the client
/// really validates the chain. It also keeps the existing tests that assert
/// `http` issuers are REJECTED meaningful, which a blanket relaxation would not.
///
/// Generated once per process. `#[cfg(test)]`, so none of it — not the trust
/// decision, not the key material — exists in a release build.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) struct TestPki {
    /// PEM of the CA certificate, for `reqwest`'s root store.
    pub ca_pem: String,
    /// PEM of the leaf certificate chain, for the server.
    pub leaf_pem: String,
    /// PEM of the leaf private key, for the server.
    pub leaf_key_pem: String,
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn test_pki() -> &'static TestPki {
    static PKI: std::sync::OnceLock<TestPki> = std::sync::OnceLock::new();
    PKI.get_or_init(|| {
        use rcgen::{
            BasicConstraints, CertificateParams, DnType, IsCa, KeyPair, KeyUsagePurpose, SanType,
        };

        let mut ca_params = CertificateParams::default();
        ca_params
            .distinguished_name
            .push(DnType::CommonName, "featherreader test CA");
        ca_params.is_ca = IsCa::Ca(BasicConstraints::Constrained(0));
        ca_params.key_usages = vec![
            KeyUsagePurpose::KeyCertSign,
            KeyUsagePurpose::CrlSign,
            KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature,
        ];
        let ca_key = KeyPair::generate().expect("test CA key");
        let ca_cert = ca_params
            .clone()
            .self_signed(&ca_key)
            .expect("test CA cert");
        let issuer = rcgen::Issuer::new(ca_params, ca_key);

        // SANs for the hostnames the tests register with `test_host_override`.
        // A wildcard would not cover the multi-label names, so they are listed.
        let mut leaf_params = CertificateParams::default();
        leaf_params
            .distinguished_name
            .push(DnType::CommonName, "featherreader test leaf");
        leaf_params.subject_alt_names = TEST_TLS_HOSTS
            .iter()
            .map(|h| SanType::DnsName((*h).try_into().expect("test SAN")))
            .collect();
        let leaf_key = KeyPair::generate().expect("test leaf key");
        let leaf_cert = leaf_params
            .signed_by(&leaf_key, &issuer)
            .expect("test leaf cert");

        TestPki {
            ca_pem: ca_cert.pem(),
            leaf_pem: leaf_cert.pem(),
            leaf_key_pem: leaf_key.serialize_pem(),
        }
    })
}

#[cfg(test)]
/// A loopback HTTPS server presenting the test CA's leaf, routing by path.
///
/// The point of the TLS is not TLS: it is that an OAuth issuer must be
/// `https`, so nothing could drive the real `login::complete` against a
/// local server. The client validates this chain for real — no invalid-cert
/// acceptance anywhere.
///
/// `routes` maps a path to a canned `(status, body)`. Unknown paths 404.
/// Every request line is recorded.
pub(crate) async fn spawn_tls<F>(
    build_routes: F,
) -> (SocketAddr, std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<String>>>)
where
    F: FnOnce(SocketAddr) -> std::collections::HashMap<String, Vec<TestResponse>>,
{
    use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
    use tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::{CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer};

    // Both `ring` and `aws-lc-rs` are reachable in this tree, so rustls refuses
    // to guess a process-level provider for the SERVER side here. Install ring.
    //
    // **Two earlier versions of this comment were wrong in opposite directions;
    // this is what reqwest 0.13 actually does** (`async_impl/client.rs`):
    //
    //     let provider = rustls::crypto::CryptoProvider::get_default()
    //         .map(|arc| arc.clone())
    //         .unwrap_or_else(default_rustls_crypto_provider);
    //
    // So it READS the process default and falls back to aws-lc-rs. Installing
    // ring here therefore DOES affect reqwest clients built afterwards in the
    // same test binary — which makes the client's provider depend on whether any
    // test called `spawn_tls` first. Benign (ring and aws-lc-rs interoperate),
    // and absent from release builds, where nothing installs a default and
    // production is genuinely aws-lc-rs. Recorded precisely because two previous
    // attempts at this comment stated a checkable fact without checking it.
    //
    // `install_default` errors if something got there first, which is fine.
    static PROVIDER: std::sync::Once = std::sync::Once::new();
    PROVIDER.call_once(|| {
        let _ = tokio_rustls::rustls::crypto::ring::default_provider().install_default();
    });

    let pki = test_pki();
    let certs: Vec<CertificateDer<'static>> = rustls_pemfile_certs(pki.leaf_pem.as_bytes());
    let key: PrivateKeyDer<'static> = rustls_pemfile_key(pki.leaf_key_pem.as_bytes());

    let config = tokio_rustls::rustls::ServerConfig::builder()
        .with_no_client_auth()
        .with_single_cert(certs, key)
        .expect("test server TLS config");
    let acceptor = tokio_rustls::TlsAcceptor::from(std::sync::Arc::new(config));

    let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
    let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
    // Routes are built from the bound address: the documents have to name their
    // own port, and the port is not known until the listener exists.
    let routes = build_routes(addr);
    let log = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
    let sink = std::sync::Arc::clone(&log);
    let hits: std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashMap<String, usize>>> =
        Default::default();

    tokio::spawn(async move {
        loop {
            let Ok((sock, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
                break;
            };
            let acceptor = acceptor.clone();
            let routes = routes.clone();
            let sink = std::sync::Arc::clone(&sink);
            let hits = std::sync::Arc::clone(&hits);
            tokio::spawn(async move {
                let Ok(mut tls) = acceptor.accept(sock).await else {
                    return;
                };
                // **The head, and the body when `content-length` says how
                // much — before replying.**
                //
                // A single `read` is what the capturing sidecar on the #138
                // branch did, and the review of that branch found the trap: if
                // the head and the body land in separate segments, the capture
                // holds only the head, and every `contains` assertion over it
                // then passes for the wrong reason.
                //
                // Nothing here asserts on a body today — the assertions are the
                // request line and the DPoP header, and both panic loudly when
                // absent rather than passing — so that false green is not live
                // in this harness. It is the NEXT body assertion that would
                // inherit one, which is the whole reason the same shape was
                // worth fixing there.
                //
                // **A chunked body is NOT drained.** With no `content-length`
                // there is nothing to wait for, so this stops after the head —
                // exactly what the single read did. Every request this harness
                // sees is a GET or a reqwest-buffered form and carries a length,
                // but nothing here enforces that, so a future chunked request
                // would be captured short and quietly. Said plainly rather than
                // left inside a claim to have read "the whole request".
                //
                // Draining also stops the reply being written while the client
                // is still sending, which would make a split request a broken
                // pipe rather than a response.
                let mut raw: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
                let mut chunk = [0u8; 4096];
                loop {
                    let Ok(n) = tls.read(&mut chunk).await else {
                        return;
                    };
                    if n == 0 {
                        break;
                    }
                    raw.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
                    let Some(split) = raw.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n") else {
                        continue;
                    };
                    let (head, body) = raw.split_at(split + 4);
                    let want = String::from_utf8_lossy(head).lines().find_map(|l| {
                        let (k, v) = l.split_once(':')?;
                        k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
                            .then(|| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())?
                    });
                    if want.is_none_or(|want| body.len() >= want) {
                        break;
                    }
                }
                let req = String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw).to_string();
                let path = req
                    .lines()
                    .next()
                    .and_then(|l| l.split_whitespace().nth(1))
                    .unwrap_or("/")
                    .to_string();
                sink.lock().unwrap().push(req);
                // Nth hit on this path picks the Nth canned reply; the last one
                // repeats. That is what lets a route answer a nonce challenge
                // once and something else afterwards — the only way to observe
                // whether a request was RETRIED.
                let n = {
                    let mut c = hits.lock().unwrap();
                    let e = c.entry(path.clone()).or_insert(0usize);
                    let n = *e;
                    *e += 1;
                    n
                };
                let reply = routes
                    .get(&path)
                    .and_then(|v| v.get(n.min(v.len().saturating_sub(1))))
                    .cloned()
                    .unwrap_or_else(|| TestResponse::json(404, "not found"));
                let extra: String = reply
                    .headers
                    .iter()
                    .map(|(k, v)| format!("{k}: {v}\r\n"))
                    .collect();
                let (status, body) = (reply.status, reply.body);
                let resp = format!(
                    "HTTP/1.1 {status} X\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\n{extra}\
                     Content-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n{body}",
                    body.len()
                );
                let _ = tls.write_all(resp.as_bytes()).await;
                let _ = tls.shutdown().await;
            });
        }
    });
    (addr, log)
}

#[cfg(test)]
fn rustls_pemfile_certs(
    pem: &[u8],
) -> Vec<tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::CertificateDer<'static>> {
    // Minimal PEM splitter — avoids another dependency for two blocks.
    decode_pem_blocks(pem, "CERTIFICATE")
        .into_iter()
        .map(Into::into)
        .collect()
}

#[cfg(test)]
fn rustls_pemfile_key(pem: &[u8]) -> tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::PrivateKeyDer<'static> {
    let der = decode_pem_blocks(pem, "PRIVATE KEY")
        .into_iter()
        .next()
        .expect("a private key block");
    tokio_rustls::rustls::pki_types::PrivatePkcs8KeyDer::from(der).into()
}

#[cfg(test)]
fn decode_pem_blocks(pem: &[u8], label: &str) -> Vec<Vec<u8>> {
    use base64::Engine as _;
    let text = String::from_utf8_lossy(pem);
    let begin = format!("-----BEGIN {label}-----");
    let end = format!("-----END {label}-----");
    let mut out = Vec::new();
    let mut rest = text.as_ref();
    while let Some(i) = rest.find(&begin) {
        let after = &rest[i + begin.len()..];
        let Some(j) = after.find(&end) else { break };
        let b64: String = after[..j].chars().filter(|c| !c.is_whitespace()).collect();
        out.push(
            base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD
                .decode(b64)
                .expect("valid base64 in test PEM"),
        );
        rest = &after[j + end.len()..];
    }
    out
}

/// One canned reply from the TLS test server.
#[cfg(test)]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub(crate) struct TestResponse {
    pub status: u16,
    pub body: String,
    pub headers: Vec<(String, String)>,
}

#[cfg(test)]
impl TestResponse {
    pub fn json(status: u16, body: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
        Self {
            status,
            body: body.into(),
            headers: Vec::new(),
        }
    }

    pub fn with_header(mut self, k: &str, v: &str) -> Self {
        self.headers.push((k.to_string(), v.to_string()));
        self
    }
}

/// Hostnames the test leaf is valid for. Adding a new `.test` host to a test
/// means adding it here, which is deliberate friction: the certificate is
/// supposed to be narrow.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) const TEST_TLS_HOSTS: &[&str] = &[
    "pds-e2e.test",
    "as-e2e.test",
    "feed-tls.test",
    "hop-tls.test",
    "as-evil.test",
    // A second authorization server, for a session that moves issuer mid
    // sign-out (its token must never reach the first one).
    "as-other.test",
    // The app's OWN JWKS, which the revoke-all pre-flight fetches with a
    // plain client (operator config, not attacker input): `localhost`
    // resolves to loopback by itself, which is exactly the address the SSRF
    // guard refuses and a split-horizon self-host serves its JWKS on.
    "localhost",
];

/// Point `host` at `addr` for the rest of the process, bypassing DNS **and** the
/// forbidden-IP check for that host only.
///
/// **Registrations are process-global and last-write-wins.** Several tests
/// register the SAME hostnames to different servers concurrently. What keeps
/// them apart is not the host key — an earlier comment claimed it was — but that
/// reqwest's `.resolve()` ignores the port, so every registration collapses to
/// `127.0.0.1` and each test's URL port routes it back to its own listener. That
/// is incidental, and would break the moment a test server bound anything other
/// than loopback.
///
/// Bypassing the IP check is the entire point: the test server is on loopback,
/// which the guard is right to refuse. Only the registered host is exempt —
/// anything else in the same test, including every redirect target, still goes
/// through the real check. That is what makes a redirect test meaningful.
#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) fn test_host_override(host: &str, addr: SocketAddr) {
    TEST_HOSTS
        .lock()
        .unwrap()
        .get_or_insert_with(Default::default)
        .insert(host.to_string(), addr);
}

#[cfg(test)]
fn test_override_for(name: &str, port: u16) -> Option<SocketAddr> {
    let guard = TEST_HOSTS.lock().unwrap();
    let map = guard.as_ref()?;
    map.get(name)
        .copied()
        .or_else(|| map.get(&format!("{name}:{port}")).copied())
}

/// How long an idle pinned client may be kept before it is rebuilt.
///
/// Not a security boundary — the address is re-resolved and re-checked on every
/// single request, and a changed address misses the cache by construction. This
/// only bounds how long a pooled connection to a once-vetted address may live,
/// and keeps the map from holding entries for hosts nobody fetches any more.
const PINNED_CLIENT_TTL: Duration = Duration::from_secs(300);

/// Most distinct (host, address) pairs kept. A bound, not a target: the reader
/// talks to one PDS, while the poller talks to as many hosts as there are feeds.
const MAX_PINNED_CLIENTS: usize = 256;

/// How long a pinned client may hold an IDLE socket open.
///
/// Deliberately shorter than [`PINNED_CLIENT_TTL`] so a client releases its
/// sockets before the cache releases the client — otherwise the last minute of
/// an entry's life is pure socket rent. See [`build_pinned_client`] for why the
/// pool needs bounding at all.
const POOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);

/// Pinned clients, keyed by the **vetted address** they are pinned to.
///
/// ## Why this is safe to reuse
///
/// Building a fresh client per request meant a fresh connection pool, so every
/// PDS call paid a full TCP + TLS handshake: measured at 91 ms against this
/// project's PDS versus 30 ms on a warm connection. That is most of why the
/// Rust repo backend measured ~3x slower than the Node sidecar, which pools.
///
/// Reuse does NOT weaken the DNS-rebinding defence, because the defence does not
/// live in the client's lifetime:
///
/// * every request still resolves the host and runs [`is_forbidden_ip`] over
///   EVERY answer before this cache is consulted — a host that now resolves to
///   an internal address is refused before a pooled client could be returned;
/// * the key includes the vetted [`SocketAddr`], so a host that legitimately
///   moves to a different address MISSES the cache and gets a client pinned to
///   the new one. A pooled connection can only ever be reused for an address
///   that was just re-vetted this request.
struct PinnedClients {
    entries: Mutex<HashMap<(String, SocketAddr), (Client, Instant)>>,
    /// How many clients have actually been constructed. Test-only bookkeeping:
    /// it is the only way to observe that a hit avoided a rebuild, since
    /// `reqwest::Client` exposes no identity.
    builds: AtomicUsize,
}

impl PinnedClients {
    fn new() -> Self {
        Self {
            entries: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
            builds: AtomicUsize::new(0),
        }
    }

    /// A client pinned to `addr` for `host`, reusing a pooled one when the
    /// address is unchanged and the entry is fresh.
    fn get(&self, host: &str, addr: SocketAddr, now: Instant) -> Result<Client> {
        let key = (host.to_string(), addr);
        // A poisoned lock here is NOT fatal and must not be treated as fatal: the
        // guard is held across a fallible builder, so one panic inside it would
        // otherwise make EVERY subsequent outbound request panic, forever, with a
        // live-looking process and a green /health. Recover the data like the rate
        // limiter already does — a torn entry is a cache entry, worst case a rebuild.
        let mut entries = self.entries.lock().unwrap_or_else(|p| p.into_inner());

        if let Some((client, last_used)) = entries.get_mut(&key) {
            if now.duration_since(*last_used) < PINNED_CLIENT_TTL {
                *last_used = now;
                // Cloning a `reqwest::Client` shares its connection pool, which
                // is the entire point — a clone is a handle, not a new pool.
                return Ok(client.clone());
            }
        }

        let client = build_pinned_client(host, addr)?;
        self.builds.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);

        // Drop anything idle past the TTL before considering the bound, so a
        // burst of one-off hosts does not evict the PDS client we use constantly.
        entries.retain(|_, (_, last_used)| now.duration_since(*last_used) < PINNED_CLIENT_TTL);
        if entries.len() >= MAX_PINNED_CLIENTS {
            if let Some(oldest) = entries
                .iter()
                .min_by_key(|(_, (_, last_used))| *last_used)
                .map(|(k, _)| k.clone())
            {
                entries.remove(&oldest);
            }
        }
        entries.insert(key, (client.clone(), now));
        Ok(client)
    }
}

static PINNED_CLIENTS: LazyLock<PinnedClients> = LazyLock::new(PinnedClients::new);

/// Build a per-hop client that **pins** DNS for `host` to the already-vetted
/// `addr`, so reqwest's `connect` reuses the exact IP that passed the SSRF check
/// instead of doing its own second resolution (the DNS-rebinding fix). The pin is
/// scoped to `host`, keyed to the address family of `addr` (works for both IPv4
/// and IPv6). Mirrors [`crate::feed::build_client`]'s policy: the same total
/// [`FETCH_TIMEOUT`] + per-read [`READ_TIMEOUT`] (so the unattended poller keeps
/// its slowloris / slow-upstream defence even though each hop is a freshly built
/// client), and auto-redirect off — [`guarded_get`] follows + re-validates each
/// hop itself.
fn build_pinned_client(host: &str, addr: SocketAddr) -> Result<Client> {
    let builder = Client::builder()
        .user_agent(crate::USER_AGENT)
        // Bound each hop the same way the feed client is bounded: a total
        // request timeout plus a per-read idle timeout. Without these the
        // per-hop client the poller actually connects through had NO timeouts,
        // leaving the unattended poll with no defence against a slowloris /
        // never-finishing upstream.
        .timeout(FETCH_TIMEOUT)
        .read_timeout(READ_TIMEOUT)
        // Bound the idle connection pool too.
        //
        // These clients are CACHED — up to `MAX_PINNED_CLIENTS` of them, each
        // holding its own pool — and every entry keeps live keep-alive TLS
        // connections open until it is evicted. With reqwest's defaults
        // (unlimited idle per host, no idle timeout) a poller touching many
        // distinct feed hosts drives the cache toward its bound and each entry
        // toward an unbounded number of sockets, on a 512 MB box with one shared
        // core. The cache was given a size bound for the same reason; its pools
        // were not.
        //
        // One idle connection per host is the right number here: reuse across
        // the ~300 s TTL is what the cache exists for (measured 91 ms cold
        // versus 30 ms warm), and nothing in this codebase issues concurrent
        // requests to the SAME host through one client — `guarded_get` walks
        // redirect hops sequentially, and the poller's concurrency is across
        // DIFFERENT feeds. The idle timeout is well under the cache TTL so
        // sockets are released before the client itself is.
        .pool_max_idle_per_host(1)
        .pool_idle_timeout(POOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT)
        // **Ignore ambient proxy configuration.** reqwest defaults
        // `auto_sys_proxy: true`, so `HTTP_PROXY` / `HTTPS_PROXY` / `ALL_PROXY`
        // in the process environment silently route every request through a
        // proxy — and a proxied request is sent in absolute form for the PROXY
        // to resolve the hostname. That defeats the two mechanisms this whole
        // module rests on at once: the `.resolve()` pin below never sees the
        // connection, and `is_forbidden_ip` never sees the address, because we
        // no longer do the resolving.
        //
        // Measured before this line existed, with `HTTP_PROXY` set: the vetted
        // address received ZERO requests, the proxy received
        // `GET http://pinned.invalid/feed HTTP/1.1`, and the call returned
        // `Ok(200)`. It failed OPEN and silently.
        //
        // Not remotely triggerable — it needs a proxy variable in the server's
        // own environment — but that is one `fly secrets set`, one debugging
        // session, or one base image away, and nothing would have reported the
        // guard had stopped working.
        .no_proxy()
        // Override reqwest's resolver for this host only: connect goes straight
        // to the vetted socket address — no independent re-resolution.
        .resolve(host, addr)
        // No auto-redirect: guarded_get follows + re-validates each hop.
        .redirect(reqwest::redirect::Policy::none());

    // **The TEST certificate authority — `#[cfg(test)]`, so a release build has
    // neither this call nor the certificate.**
    //
    // This is the one test seam in this file that touches TLS TRUST, so it is
    // worth being exact about what it does and does not do. It ADDS one root:
    // the built-in roots stay, nothing is disabled, and `danger_accept_invalid_
    // certs` is NOT used — a server still has to present a chain that validates,
    // and a hostname still has to match a SAN. What it buys is that a loopback
    // test server can hold a certificate the client will accept, which is what
    // makes it possible to drive the real `login::complete` (and the real
    // redirect path) against a server at all: the OAuth issuer must be `https`.
    //
    // `test_pki()` is itself `#[cfg(test)]`, so removing the attribute here
    // fails to compile rather than silently trusting an extra root in prod.
    #[cfg(test)]
    let builder = builder.add_root_certificate(
        reqwest::Certificate::from_pem(test_pki().ca_pem.as_bytes())
            .context("parsing the test CA")?,
    );

    builder
        .build()
        .context("failed to build IP-pinned fetch client")
}

/// The per-hop client for an already-vetted `(host, addr)`, pooled.
///
/// Callers must have run [`resolve_and_check`] for THIS request before calling
/// this — the cache trusts its key, and the key is only as good as the check
/// that produced it.
fn pinned_client(host: &str, addr: SocketAddr) -> Result<Client> {
    PINNED_CLIENTS.get(host, addr, Instant::now())
}

/// Fetch a user-supplied URL through the full SSRF guard: scheme + IP checks on
/// the initial URL and on **every** redirect hop, following redirects manually.
///
/// The passed `client` is used only as a policy reference; each hop is actually
/// sent through a freshly-built `pinned_client` whose DNS for the target host
/// is pinned to the exact IP that just passed `resolve_and_check` — so the
/// connect can't be rebound onto an internal address between the check and the
/// TCP handshake.
///
/// `extra_headers` are applied to every hop (e.g. the conditional-GET
/// `If-None-Match` / `If-Modified-Since` validators) — **except** credential
/// headers (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, …), which are dropped the moment a
/// redirect leaves the original origin, mirroring what reqwest's own redirect
/// policy does for the shared client (see `hop_headers`). Returns the final
/// `Response` (headers only; the body is read separately via [`read_capped`]).
/// `Err` on a blocked scheme/address, an exhausted redirect budget, or a
/// transport error.
pub async fn guarded_get(
    client: &Client,
    url: &str,
    extra_headers: &[(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
) -> Result<Response> {
    guarded_get_inner(client, url, extra_headers, true, MAX_REDIRECTS).await
}

/// The SSRF core of [`guarded_get`] **without** the feed-privacy layer: scheme +
/// IP allow-list, connect-pinning, and per-hop re-validation, but no
/// `classify_feed_privacy` check.
///
/// This is the entry point for **non-feed** fetches of *user-influenced* URLs —
/// notably atproto identity resolution (a handle's PDS host, a `did:web`
/// well-known document, and a DID document's `serviceEndpoint`). Those are
/// legitimate atproto XRPC / DID-doc requests, so the feed-privacy heuristic
/// (which flags Substack/Patreon-style token URLs) must not apply — but the SSRF
/// guard absolutely must, since a hostile `did:web` or `serviceEndpoint` can
/// otherwise point the server at `169.254.169.254`, loopback, or a private host.
pub async fn guarded_get_no_privacy(
    client: &Client,
    url: &str,
    extra_headers: &[(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
) -> Result<Response> {
    guarded_get_inner(client, url, extra_headers, false, MAX_REDIRECTS).await
}

/// Like [`guarded_get_no_privacy`] but **refuses redirects outright**.
///
/// For the OAuth discovery and DID documents, following a redirect is not a
/// convenience — it is a hole. The mix-up defence rests on comparing a
/// document's `issuer` against *the URL it was fetched from*; if a `302` can move
/// the fetch to another origin, that comparison is against the original URL while
/// the bytes came from somewhere else, and the check silently stops meaning
/// anything. The reference client sets `redirect: 'manual'`/`'error'` on every
/// one of these fetches for the same reason.
///
/// Applies to: `/.well-known/oauth-protected-resource`,
/// `/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server`, `plc.directory/<did>`, `did:web`
/// `did.json`, and the client-metadata self-fetch. It deliberately does NOT
/// apply to `/.well-known/atproto-did`, where the handle spec explicitly permits
/// redirects.
pub async fn guarded_get_no_redirect(
    client: &Client,
    url: &str,
    extra_headers: &[(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
) -> Result<Response> {
    guarded_get_inner(client, url, extra_headers, false, 0).await
}

/// Whether a header carries credentials that must never follow a redirect onto a
/// different origin. Mirrors reqwest's own `redirect::remove_sensitive_headers`
/// set (`Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Cookie2`, `Proxy-Authorization`,
/// `WWW-Authenticate`), which the shared client applies automatically — and which
/// [`guarded_get_inner`] must reimplement because it disables auto-redirect and
/// re-applies `extra_headers` by hand on every manually-followed hop.
fn is_sensitive_header(name: &HeaderName) -> bool {
    name == AUTHORIZATION
        || name == COOKIE
        || name == PROXY_AUTHORIZATION
        || name == WWW_AUTHENTICATE
        || name.as_str() == "cookie2"
}

/// Same-origin in the web sense: identical scheme, host, and effective port.
fn same_origin(a: &Url, b: &Url) -> bool {
    a.scheme() == b.scheme()
        && a.host_str() == b.host_str()
        && a.port_or_known_default() == b.port_or_known_default()
}

/// The headers to apply on THIS hop: all of `extra` while we are still on the
/// original origin, otherwise only the non-sensitive ones.
///
/// The comparison base is the **original** URL rather than the previous hop (what
/// reqwest does). That is strictly stricter: an `a → b → a` redirect chain never
/// re-attaches the credential, at the cost of a small, deliberate divergence from
/// the stock client's behaviour.
fn hop_headers<'a>(
    original: &Url,
    current: &Url,
    extra: &'a [(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
) -> Vec<&'a (HeaderName, HeaderValue)> {
    let cross_origin = !same_origin(original, current);
    extra
        .iter()
        .filter(|(name, _)| !(cross_origin && is_sensitive_header(name)))
        .collect()
}

async fn guarded_get_inner(
    client: &Client,
    url: &str,
    extra_headers: &[(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
    check_privacy: bool,
    max_redirects: usize,
) -> Result<Response> {
    // `client` is retained in the signature for API stability + as the policy
    // template; the actual send goes through a per-hop IP-pinned client.
    let _ = client;
    let mut current = Url::parse(url).with_context(|| format!("not a valid URL {url:?}"))?;
    // The origin the caller's credentials belong to; a hop off it drops them.
    let original = current.clone();

    for _ in 0..=max_redirects {
        check_scheme(&current)?;
        // Re-validate PRIVACY on EVERY hop: a public URL can `30x` to a
        // secret-bearing private feed (Substack/Patreon/tokened podcast). Without
        // this, the private target would be fetched — its body streamed and
        // reflected into the UI — before storage is refused, violating the
        // "never fetched" half of the public-feeds-only guarantee. Classify the
        // resolved target BEFORE the request and abort the whole fetch if private.
        // (Skipped for non-feed atproto identity fetches — see
        // [`guarded_get_no_privacy`].)
        if check_privacy {
            if let crate::feed::FeedPrivacy::Private(reason) =
                crate::feed::classify_feed_privacy(current.as_str())
            {
                bail!("refusing to fetch private/paid feed URL (redirect target): {reason}");
            }
        }
        // Re-validate on EVERY hop and capture the vetted address to pin to.
        let vetted = resolve_and_check(&current).await?;
        let host = current
            .host_str()
            .context("URL lost its host between hops")?
            .to_string();
        let hop_client = pinned_client(&host, vetted)?;

        let mut req = hop_client.get(current.clone());
        // Sensitive headers (Authorization / Cookie / …) are applied only while
        // the hop is still on the ORIGINAL origin: a hostile upstream must not be
        // able to `302` a caller's bearer token onto a host it controls.
        for (name, value) in hop_headers(&original, &current, extra_headers) {
            req = req.header(name.clone(), value.clone());
        }
        let resp = req
            .send()
            .await
            .with_context(|| format!("fetching {current}"))?;

        // **Only the statuses that actually relocate — NOT all of `3xx`.**
        //
        // `is_redirection()` is `300..=399`, which swallows `304 Not Modified`.
        // A 304 carries no `Location` *by definition*, so it fell into the
        // branch below and failed the whole fetch with "redirect response
        // without a usable Location header". `feed.rs` sends `If-None-Match` /
        // `If-Modified-Since` on every poll and has a correct 304 branch — which
        // could therefore never be reached. The effect was that "nothing new"
        // became a recorded failure plus exponential backoff, punishing exactly
        // the feeds that implement conditional GET properly. Observed in
        // production against 9to5mac.com, proton.me and kodi.tv, all live.
        //
        // **304 is the ONLY status carved out.** Everything else in `3xx`
        // relocates in some sense, and stays inside this branch — because
        // `guarded_get_no_redirect` documents that it "refuses redirects
        // outright", and the OAuth mix-up defence rests on that holding for all
        // of them, not just the five we would otherwise follow.
        if resp.status() != reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_MODIFIED && resp.status().is_redirection() {
            if max_redirects == 0 {
                bail!(
                    "refusing to follow a {} redirect while fetching {url:?} \u{2014} \
                     this document's origin is load-bearing and must not be moved",
                    resp.status()
                );
            }
            // Of the relocating statuses, only these five name a single target
            // worth following. `300 Multiple Choices` names no one target, and
            // `305 Use Proxy` names a PROXY — following it would route the
            // request through a host the RESPONSE chose.
            //
            // **Refused, not returned.** Handing one back would be worse than
            // erroring: callers do not uniformly check the status.
            // `web::resolve_feed_url` reads the body straight into feed
            // autodiscovery, so a `305` whose error page carries a
            // `<link rel="alternate">` would become a subscription.
            if !matches!(resp.status().as_u16(), 301 | 302 | 303 | 307 | 308) {
                bail!(
                    "refusing to act on a {} response while fetching {url:?} \u{2014} \
                     it names no single target that can be followed safely",
                    resp.status()
                );
            }
            let location = resp
                .headers()
                .get(reqwest::header::LOCATION)
                .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
                .context("redirect response without a usable Location header")?;
            // Resolve the (possibly relative) Location against the current URL,
            // then loop to re-validate the new hop before touching it.
            current = current
                .join(location)
                .with_context(|| format!("resolving redirect Location {location:?}"))?;
            continue;
        }

        return Ok(resp);
    }

    bail!("too many redirects (> {max_redirects}) while fetching {url:?}")
}

/// POST a JSON body to a **user-influenced** URL through the SSRF guard.
///
/// The write-side counterpart to [`guarded_get_no_privacy`], and the only way
/// [`crate::atproto::PdsClient`] is allowed to reach a PDS host it did not
/// choose. It runs the same scheme allow-list, the same IP allow-list, and the
/// same connect-pinning (via `pinned_client`), so the DNS-rebinding window
/// between "`assert_public_target` said this host is public" and "the TCP
/// handshake happens" is closed for writes exactly as it is for reads.
///
/// `Content-Type: application/json` is set here rather than by the caller, so
/// the one header the XRPC wire format requires cannot be forgotten; the caller
/// passes only its credential header(s).
///
/// **Redirects are refused, not followed** — the single deliberate divergence
/// from [`guarded_get`]. A `307`/`308` re-sends the method *and the body*
/// verbatim, and reqwest's cross-origin header sanitisation only strips
/// **headers**: an app password or a record body lives in the JSON payload, so a
/// hostile PDS answering `307 Location: https://evil.example/collect` would
/// exfiltrate it however carefully the headers were handled. There is no
/// legitimate reason for a PDS to redirect an `com.atproto.repo.*` write, so the
/// safe behaviour and the correct behaviour coincide: `Err`, loudly.
pub async fn guarded_post_json(
    client: &Client,
    url: &str,
    extra_headers: &[(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
    body: Vec<u8>,
) -> Result<Response> {
    guarded_post(client, url, extra_headers, PostBody::Json(body)).await
}

/// A request body together with the content type that describes it.
///
/// The two travel as ONE value deliberately. Passing the content type alongside
/// the bytes made it possible to send a JSON body labelled as a form, or the
/// reverse — a swap no test could see without a live server, and the SSRF guard
/// forbids pointing one of these at loopback. Deriving the header from the same
/// value that produces the bytes removes the failure mode instead of watching
/// for it.
pub(crate) enum PostBody<'a> {
    Json(Vec<u8>),
    Form(&'a [(&'a str, &'a str)]),
}

impl PostBody<'_> {
    fn content_type(&self) -> HeaderValue {
        match self {
            PostBody::Json(_) => HeaderValue::from_static("application/json"),
            PostBody::Form(_) => HeaderValue::from_static("application/x-www-form-urlencoded"),
        }
    }

    /// Every form value goes through the serializer rather than string
    /// interpolation: an OAuth form carries the authorization code, the PKCE
    /// verifier and the client assertion, and a raw `&` or `=` in any of them
    /// would otherwise splice an extra parameter into the request.
    fn into_bytes(self) -> Vec<u8> {
        match self {
            PostBody::Json(bytes) => bytes,
            PostBody::Form(params) => {
                let mut ser = url::form_urlencoded::Serializer::new(String::new());
                for (k, v) in params {
                    ser.append_pair(k, v);
                }
                ser.finish().into_bytes()
            }
        }
    }
}

/// POST a form-encoded body to a **user-influenced** URL through the SSRF guard.
///
/// The OAuth counterpart to [`guarded_post_json`]: PAR, token exchange and
/// refresh are all `application/x-www-form-urlencoded`. It matters more here
/// than anywhere else that the guard applies — these are the requests that
/// carry the client assertion and the authorization code, so an issuer URL
/// that resolves to loopback or RFC1918 has to fail closed *before* the
/// credential leaves the process.
///
/// Redirects are refused for the same reason as [`guarded_post_json`], and more
/// acutely: a `307` would re-send the assertion and code to the new host.
pub async fn guarded_post_form(
    client: &Client,
    url: &str,
    extra_headers: &[(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
    params: &[(&str, &str)],
) -> Result<Response> {
    guarded_post(client, url, extra_headers, PostBody::Form(params)).await
}

/// The shared body of [`guarded_post_json`] and [`guarded_post_form`]. Kept as
/// one function so the guard cannot drift between the two content types.
async fn guarded_post(
    client: &Client,
    url: &str,
    extra_headers: &[(HeaderName, HeaderValue)],
    body: PostBody<'_>,
) -> Result<Response> {
    let content_type = body.content_type();
    let body = body.into_bytes();
    // As in `guarded_get_inner`: `client` is the policy template; the send goes
    // through a freshly built, IP-pinned client.
    let _ = client;
    let target = Url::parse(url).with_context(|| format!("not a valid URL {url:?}"))?;
    check_scheme(&target)?;
    let vetted = resolve_and_check(&target).await?;
    let host = target.host_str().context("URL has no host")?.to_string();
    let hop_client = pinned_client(&host, vetted)?;

    let mut req = hop_client
        .post(target.clone())
        .header(CONTENT_TYPE, content_type)
        .body(body);
    for (name, value) in extra_headers {
        req = req.header(name.clone(), value.clone());
    }
    let resp = req
        .send()
        .await
        .with_context(|| format!("posting to {target}"))?;

    // Unlike the GET path this refuses the WHOLE of `3xx`, `304` included, and
    // that is deliberate: nothing here sends `If-None-Match`/`If-Modified-Since`,
    // so a 304 to a POST is a server protocol violation rather than a
    // conditional-GET success, and there is no sane way to act on it.
    //
    // It is worded separately all the same. Calling a 304 "a redirect we refused
    // to follow" is the same misattribution that made the GET bug take a
    // production investigation to find — the message should not send the next
    // reader looking for a `Location` that was never supposed to exist.
    if resp.status().is_redirection() {
        if resp.status() == reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_MODIFIED {
            bail!(
                "a POST to {url:?} answered 304 Not Modified, which is not a valid \
                 response to a request carrying no conditional headers"
            );
        }
        let location = resp
            .headers()
            .get(reqwest::header::LOCATION)
            .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok())
            .unwrap_or("<none>");
        bail!(
            "refusing to follow a {} redirect on a POST to {url:?} (Location: {location}) — \
             a 307/308 would re-send the request body to the new host",
            resp.status()
        );
    }

    Ok(resp)
}

/// A response body refused by [`read_capped`] for exceeding its cap.
///
/// Typed so a caller can tell "the server answered, too much" from "the server
/// never answered" (#227): a publication read files it as `Body`.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, thiserror::Error)]
#[error("response body exceeded the {cap} byte cap; aborting")]
pub struct BodyTooLarge {
    /// The cap it exceeded, in bytes.
    pub cap: usize,
}

/// Read a response body, streaming chunk-by-chunk and **aborting** the moment
/// the accumulated size would exceed [`MAX_BODY_BYTES`]. Never trusts
/// `Content-Length` (gzip strips it) and never fully buffers an over-cap body —
/// this is the decompression-bomb / OOM guard.
pub async fn read_capped(mut resp: Response) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
    let mut buf: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(16 * 1024);
    while let Some(chunk) = resp.chunk().await.context("reading response body chunk")? {
        if buf.len() + chunk.len() > MAX_BODY_BYTES {
            return Err(BodyTooLarge {
                cap: MAX_BODY_BYTES,
            }
            .into());
        }
        buf.extend_from_slice(&chunk);
    }
    Ok(buf)
}

/// Validate that a URL is safe to use as an outbound target: `http`/`https`
/// scheme AND every resolved IP passes the SSRF allow-list. Returns `Ok(())` for
/// a public target, `Err` for a forbidden one (loopback / link-local / private /
/// ULA / CGNAT / metadata) or a bad scheme.
///
/// Use this to vet a URL *before* it is stashed and later fetched by a client
/// that does not itself route through [`guarded_get`] — notably an atproto PDS
/// `serviceEndpoint` resolved out of a (hostile-controllable) DID document, so a
/// `serviceEndpoint: "http://169.254.169.254/"` is rejected at resolve time
/// rather than reaching a raw XRPC client.
pub async fn assert_public_target(url: &str) -> Result<()> {
    let parsed = Url::parse(url).with_context(|| format!("not a valid URL {url:?}"))?;
    check_scheme(&parsed)?;
    resolve_and_check(&parsed).await?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Scheme-allow-list a URL destined to be rendered as an `href` (an entry's
/// "View original" link, a feed's site link). Accepts only `http`/`https`;
/// anything else (notably `javascript:` / `data:` — stored-XSS vectors that
/// survive HTML escaping) yields `None` so the caller drops the link.
pub fn safe_link(raw: &str) -> Option<String> {
    let trimmed = raw.trim();
    if trimmed.is_empty() {
        return None;
    }
    match Url::parse(trimmed) {
        Ok(u) if matches!(u.scheme(), "http" | "https") => Some(trimmed.to_string()),
        _ => None,
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
pub(crate) mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn forbids_loopback_and_link_local_and_private_v4() {
        for ip in [
            "127.0.0.1",
            "127.1.2.3",
            "169.254.169.254", // cloud metadata
            "10.0.0.5",
            "172.16.9.9",
            "192.168.1.1",
            "0.0.0.0",
            "255.255.255.255",
            "100.64.0.1", // 100.64/10 CGNAT range (also overlay VPNs)
        ] {
            let ip: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(is_forbidden_ip(&ip), "{ip} should be forbidden");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn allows_public_v4() {
        for ip in ["1.1.1.1", "8.8.8.8", "93.184.216.34"] {
            let ip: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(!is_forbidden_ip(&ip), "{ip} should be allowed");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn forbids_internal_v6() {
        for ip in [
            "::1",
            "fe80::1",
            "fc00::1",
            "fd00::1",
            "::ffff:127.0.0.1",
            "::",
        ] {
            let ip: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(is_forbidden_ip(&ip), "{ip} should be forbidden");
        }
    }

    /// **An IPv6 address that EMBEDS a forbidden IPv4 one is a forbidden address,
    /// and four families of them were getting through.**
    ///
    /// `is_forbidden_v6` unwrapped IPv4-mapped (`::ffff:a.b.c.d`) and
    /// IPv4-compatible (`::a.b.c.d`) forms, which is where `to_ipv4()` stops. It
    /// did not unwrap:
    ///
    /// * **NAT64**, `64:ff9b::/32` — the well-known prefix of RFC 6052 and the
    ///   local-use prefix of RFC 8215. On a NAT64/DNS64 network,
    ///   `64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe` is the cloud metadata service.
    /// * **6to4**, `2002::/16` (RFC 3056) — the IPv4 sits in the next two groups,
    ///   so `2002:a9fe:a9fe::` is the same address again.
    /// * **IPv4-translated**, `::ffff:0:0/96` (RFC 2765) — one group away from the
    ///   mapped form `to_ipv4()` does handle.
    /// * **Teredo**, `2001::/32` (RFC 4380) — carries the relay's IPv4 in groups
    ///   2-3 and the client's, obfuscated by XOR with all-ones, in groups 6-7.
    /// * **ISATAP**, RFC 5214 — the IPv4 in the low 32 bits behind the IANA
    ///   `00-00-5E-FE` OUI, under ANY /64. The only one of the five with no
    ///   prefix to anchor on, so `2606:4700::5efe:c0a8:1` is an entirely
    ///   ordinary-looking global address that names 192.168.0.1.
    ///
    /// Found while bumping a JavaScript dependency whose advisory was the same
    /// class: "no classifier recognizes the NAT64 local-use range". Ours did not
    /// either.
    ///
    /// Whether a given deployment can route these depends on a translator being on
    /// the path — but the attacker does not need to know that, only to try it, and
    /// an IPv6-only network with DNS64 is now the ordinary case rather than the
    /// exotic one. This guard is defence in depth against exactly the address that
    /// reaches the host's own network without looking like it.
    #[test]
    fn forbids_ipv6_that_embeds_a_forbidden_ipv4() {
        for (ip, what) in [
            ("64:ff9b::7f00:1", "NAT64 well-known -> 127.0.0.1"),
            ("64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe", "NAT64 well-known -> 169.254.169.254"),
            ("64:ff9b::c0a8:1", "NAT64 well-known -> 192.168.0.1"),
            ("64:ff9b:1::7f00:1", "NAT64 local-use, RFC 8215"),
            ("64:ff9b:1:ffff::1", "anywhere in the NAT64 /32"),
            ("2002:7f00:1::", "6to4 -> 127.0.0.1"),
            ("2002:a9fe:a9fe::", "6to4 -> 169.254.169.254"),
            ("::ffff:0:7f00:1", "IPv4-translated -> 127.0.0.1"),
            // Teredo, laid out the way the format actually is: server IPv4 in
            // groups 2-3, client IPv4 in groups 6-7 XORed with all-ones. Each case
            // keeps the OTHER field public, so it fails for the reason its label
            // claims rather than because a zero field is forbidden anyway.
            ("2001:0:7f00:1:0:0:f7f7:fbfb", "Teredo server -> 127.0.0.1"),
            ("2001:0:808:808:0:0:80ff:fffe", "Teredo client -> 127.0.0.1"),
            (
                "2001:0:808:808:0:0:5601:5601",
                "Teredo client -> 169.254.169.254",
            ),
            // ISATAP (RFC 5214): the IPv4 sits in the low 32 bits behind the
            // IANA-reserved `00-00-5E-FE` OUI, under ANY /64 — so unlike the
            // four above there is no prefix to anchor on, and a perfectly
            // ordinary-looking global address can carry one.
            //
            // These sit under a real global prefix, not the `2001:db8::/32`
            // documentation one: that prefix is refused on its own (#217), so
            // a fixture there would pass with the ISATAP arm deleted.
            ("2606:4700::5efe:7f00:1", "ISATAP -> 127.0.0.1"),
            ("2606:4700::5efe:a9fe:a9fe", "ISATAP -> 169.254.169.254"),
            // All four values the IID's first byte can take, kept as named
            // regressions. RFC 5214 spells it `000000ug`, so `u` and `g` are
            // both free. The first draft of this guard enumerated only the two
            // with `g` clear, leaving the other two allowed — a one-bit bypass
            // of a guard that read as complete. Reverting the arm to that
            // enumeration fails on the `g=1` rows below.
            (
                "2606:4700::200:5efe:a9fe:a9fe",
                "ISATAP u=1 g=0 -> 169.254.169.254",
            ),
            ("2606:4700::100:5efe:7f00:1", "ISATAP u=0 g=1 -> 127.0.0.1"),
            ("2606:4700::300:5efe:7f00:1", "ISATAP u=1 g=1 -> 127.0.0.1"),
            (
                "2606:4700::5efe:c0a8:1",
                "ISATAP under a REAL public prefix -> 192.168.0.1",
            ),
            // **An ISATAP identifier INSIDE another family's prefix.** 6to4
            // delegates `2002:<site-v4>::/48` to whoever owns that IPv4, and
            // the site assigns identifiers inside it — so a site running ISATAP
            // in its own 6to4 space produces exactly this. The two families
            // read DISJOINT bits (6to4 the site address in groups 1-2, ISATAP
            // the tunnel endpoint in groups 6-7), so both readings are true at
            // once and checking only the first is a bypass.
            (
                "2002:808:808:0:0:5efe:a9fe:a9fe",
                "6to4 site 8.8.8.8 + ISATAP -> 169.254.169.254",
            ),
            (
                "2002:808:808:0:0:5efe:7f00:1",
                "6to4 site 8.8.8.8 + ISATAP -> 127.0.0.1",
            ),
            (
                "2002:101:101:0:0:5efe:c0a8:1",
                "6to4 site 1.1.1.1 + ISATAP -> 192.168.0.1",
            ),
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(
                is_forbidden_ip(&parsed),
                "{ip} reaches {what} and was allowed",
            );
        }
    }

    /// The other direction, and it is not decoration: refusing every address that
    /// merely *looks* translated would take out ordinary public traffic. A 6to4
    /// address wrapping a PUBLIC IPv4, and a Teredo address wrapping one, must both
    /// still be allowed — that is what makes this a decode rather than a
    /// prefix-blocklist.
    #[test]
    fn allows_ipv6_that_embeds_a_public_ipv4() {
        for (ip, what) in [
            ("2002:0808:0808::", "6to4 -> 8.8.8.8"),
            (
                "2001:0:808:808:0:0:f7f7:fbfb",
                "Teredo, server 8.8.8.8 and client 8.8.4.4",
            ),
            ("::ffff:0:808:808", "IPv4-translated -> 8.8.8.8"),
            ("2606:4700::5efe:808:808", "ISATAP -> 8.8.8.8"),
            // The DNS64 case, and the reason NAT64 is decoded rather than
            // prefix-refused: a resolver doing DNS64 synthesises exactly this
            // for an IPv4-only host, so refusing the prefix outright makes
            // every IPv4-only feed publisher unfetchable on an IPv6-only
            // network — the very network that motivated the guard.
            ("64:ff9b::808:808", "NAT64 well-known prefix -> 8.8.8.8"),
            // Both readings of one address, both public. The arms accumulate,
            // so this is the case that keeps that a decode rather than "any
            // 6to4 address carrying a `5efe` identifier is refused".
            (
                "2002:808:808:0:0:5efe:808:404",
                "6to4 site 8.8.8.8 + ISATAP 8.8.4.4",
            ),
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(!is_forbidden_ip(&parsed), "{ip} is {what} and was refused");
        }
    }

    /// **The well-known prefix decodes; the local-use one does not — and the
    /// difference is deliberate, so it needs a test and not just a comment.**
    ///
    /// `64:ff9b::/96` is a fixed-length prefix by definition (RFC 6052 §3.1), so
    /// the embedded IPv4 is unambiguously the last 32 bits. RFC 8215's local-use
    /// `64:ff9b:1::/48` is not: RFC 6052 §2.2 allows six embedding lengths and
    /// which one a deployment chose is a property of that deployment. Guessing
    /// wrong reads the wrong bits and could render an internal target as a
    /// public-looking address, so everything outside the /96 is refused whole.
    ///
    /// The cost is real and accepted: a site translating through its local-use
    /// prefix cannot fetch through this reader. The alternative is a decode that
    /// is wrong whenever the guess is wrong, in the one direction that matters.
    ///
    /// Extending the decode to the whole `/32` fails this test.
    #[test]
    fn a_local_use_nat64_prefix_is_refused_even_wrapping_a_public_address() {
        let ip: IpAddr = "64:ff9b:1::808:808".parse().unwrap();
        assert!(
            is_forbidden_ip(&ip),
            "the local-use NAT64 prefix was decoded as if its embedding length \
             were known",
        );
    }

    /// **The DNS64 path, end to end through the function that rejects answer
    /// sets.** This is the interaction the unit cases cannot see.
    ///
    /// On an IPv6-only network a DNS64 resolver (RFC 6147) synthesises a
    /// well-known-prefix AAAA for every IPv4-only host, and that synthesised
    /// address is the ONLY answer — there is no "ordinary address we resolve
    /// anyway". Since `first_vetted` rejects a whole set if any member is
    /// forbidden, refusing `64:ff9b::/96` outright made every IPv4-only feed
    /// publisher unfetchable on exactly the network this guard was written for.
    ///
    /// Both directions, because the fix must not cost the guard: a synthesised
    /// answer for a PUBLIC host resolves, and a synthesised answer for the
    /// metadata service still poisons the set.
    #[test]
    fn a_dns64_answer_set_for_an_ipv4_only_host_is_fetchable() {
        let synthesised: SocketAddr = "[64:ff9b::808:808]:80".parse().unwrap();
        let public_v4: SocketAddr = "1.2.3.4:80".parse().unwrap();

        // IPv6-only: the synthesised address is the whole answer.
        assert_eq!(
            first_vetted("v4only.example", [synthesised].into_iter()).unwrap(),
            synthesised,
            "a DNS64-synthesised answer for a public host was refused, which \
             makes every IPv4-only publisher unfetchable behind NAT64",
        );
        // Dual-stack with DNS64: the synthesised answer must not poison the set.
        assert!(first_vetted("both.example", [public_v4, synthesised].into_iter()).is_ok());

        // And the guard still bites: synthesising the metadata service is
        // exactly the attack, and one such answer rejects the whole set.
        let hostile: SocketAddr = "[64:ff9b::a9fe:a9fe]:80".parse().unwrap();
        assert!(
            first_vetted("evil.example", [public_v4, hostile].into_iter()).is_err(),
            "a NAT64-synthesised metadata address was accepted",
        );
        assert!(first_vetted("evil.example", [hostile].into_iter()).is_err());
    }

    /// **The ISATAP marker is read loosely ON PURPOSE, and this is the test that
    /// says so.**
    ///
    /// RFC 5214 spells the interface identifier `000000ug 00000000 0x5E 0xFE` +
    /// the IPv4, so a spec-exact test would also require the six reserved bits
    /// of `seg[4]` to be zero and would ALLOW the address below. `embedded_v4`
    /// tests only for `0x5efe` in group 5, so it refuses it.
    ///
    /// That is a deliberate over-refusal, and without this test it was a
    /// comment and nothing else: restoring the spec-exact mask
    /// (`seg[4] & !0x0300 == 0`) passed all 960 tests. The asymmetry is the
    /// argument — reading the marker loosely costs a false positive only if a
    /// non-ISATAP interface identifier carries IANA's own `00-00-5E` OUI *and*
    /// its low 32 bits decode to an internal address, while reading it strictly
    /// costs a total bypass if any tunnel driver is more lenient than the RFC.
    ///
    /// So if a future change tightens this arm toward the spec, that is a
    /// decision to take deliberately, by deleting this test and saying why —
    /// not something to discover from a bypass.
    #[test]
    fn a_reserved_bit_in_the_isatap_identifier_does_not_buy_a_bypass() {
        let ip: IpAddr = "2606:4700::400:5efe:7f00:1".parse().unwrap();
        assert!(
            is_forbidden_ip(&ip),
            "an identifier carrying 00-00-5E-FE and 127.0.0.1 was allowed \
             because a reserved bit was set",
        );
    }

    /// **The ISATAP test is on the interface identifier, so it matches under any
    /// prefix — including prefixes that belong to one of the other four.**
    ///
    /// A Teredo address with zero flags whose obfuscated port happens to be
    /// `0x5efe` matches the ISATAP pattern too, and the two readings disagree:
    /// Teredo stores the client address complemented, so the ISATAP reading of
    /// the same bits is its bitwise inverse. Here the Teredo reading is server
    /// 8.8.8.8 and client 128.255.255.254 — both public, so the address is
    /// legitimate — while the ISATAP reading of those low 32 bits is 127.0.0.1.
    ///
    /// Teredo is the one arm that still RETURNS rather than accumulating, which
    /// suppresses the ISATAP reading of bits Teredo has already claimed.
    /// `2001:0000::/32` is IANA-assigned Teredo space, a real ISATAP host would
    /// not be using it, and refusing this would be a false positive on an
    /// address whose traffic goes to a Teredo relay rather than to loopback.
    ///
    /// Making the Teredo arm accumulate like the others — i.e. letting the
    /// ISATAP arm also read groups 6-7 here — fails this test. That is the
    /// whole difference between this case and the 6to4 one: there the two
    /// families read disjoint bits and both readings hold, here they read the
    /// same field and contradict each other.
    #[test]
    fn a_teredo_address_is_read_as_teredo_not_as_isatap() {
        let ip: IpAddr = "2001:0:808:808:0:5efe:7f00:1".parse().unwrap();
        assert!(
            !is_forbidden_ip(&ip),
            "an address in Teredo space was read as ISATAP and wrongly refused",
        );
    }

    /// **The embedded-IPv4 arm may only ADD refusals, never grant permission.**
    ///
    /// It is checked before the link-local and ULA rules, so if it returned a
    /// verdict rather than falling through, an ISATAP address wrapping a PUBLIC
    /// IPv4 under an `fe80::/10` prefix would come back allowed — a link-local
    /// address let through because the thing it embeds happens to be fine.
    ///
    /// Changing `if embedded_v4(..).any(..) { return true; }` to return the
    /// condition fails this test — and also `forbids_internal_v6` and
    /// `every_blocklist_branch_is_load_bearing`, which were already standing
    /// guard over the fall-through in general. So this case is a NAMED
    /// regression for the ISATAP interaction rather than the only thing holding
    /// the property down; it is measured, not assumed, and stated that way
    /// because a test whose comment claims more than it catches is the defect
    /// this file keeps finding.
    #[test]
    fn a_link_local_isatap_address_is_still_refused_for_being_link_local() {
        let ip: IpAddr = "fe80::5efe:808:808".parse().unwrap();
        assert!(
            is_forbidden_ip(&ip),
            "fe80::/10 wrapping a public IPv4 escaped the link-local rule",
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn allows_public_v6() {
        let ip: IpAddr = "2606:4700:4700::1111".parse().unwrap();
        assert!(!is_forbidden_ip(&ip));
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resolve_and_check_rejects_ip_literals() {
        for bad in [
            "http://127.0.0.1/feed.xml",
            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
            "http://[::1]:80/x",
            "http://192.168.0.1/",
        ] {
            let u = Url::parse(bad).unwrap();
            assert!(
                resolve_and_check(&u).await.is_err(),
                "{bad} should be rejected"
            );
        }
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resolve_and_check_allows_public_ip_literal() {
        let u = Url::parse("http://1.1.1.1/").unwrap();
        let addr = resolve_and_check(&u).await.unwrap();
        // The vetted address is pinned back verbatim (IP literal, no DNS).
        assert_eq!(addr, "1.1.1.1:80".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap());
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn resolve_and_check_pins_public_ipv6_literal() {
        let u = Url::parse("http://[2606:4700:4700::1111]:443/").unwrap();
        let addr = resolve_and_check(&u).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            addr,
            "[2606:4700:4700::1111]:443".parse::<SocketAddr>().unwrap()
        );
    }

    // ── the pinned-client cache ──────────────────────────────────────────────

    const V4: &str = "93.184.216.34:443";
    const V4_OTHER: &str = "93.184.216.35:443";

    fn at(base: Instant, secs: u64) -> Instant {
        base + Duration::from_secs(secs)
    }

    /// A repeat request to the same vetted address REUSES the client, so the
    /// connection pool survives and the TLS handshake is paid once.
    ///
    /// Measured motivation: a fresh connection to this project's PDS costs 91 ms
    /// against 30 ms warm, which was most of the ~3x gap between the Rust repo
    /// backend and the Node sidecar.
    #[test]
    fn the_same_vetted_address_reuses_one_client() {
        let cache = PinnedClients::new();
        let now = Instant::now();
        let addr: SocketAddr = V4.parse().unwrap();

        for i in 0..5 {
            cache.get("example.com", addr, at(now, i)).unwrap();
        }
        assert_eq!(
            cache.builds.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
            1,
            "each request rebuilt the client, so every call pays a TLS handshake"
        );
    }

    /// **A CHANGED ADDRESS MUST NOT REUSE THE POOL.**
    ///
    /// This is the property that makes the cache safe. The DNS-rebinding defence
    /// is that we connect only to an address vetted for THIS request; a cache
    /// keyed on the host alone would hand back a connection pinned to an address
    /// vetted minutes ago, quietly undoing it. The key includes the address, so
    /// a move is a miss.
    #[test]
    fn a_changed_address_does_not_reuse_the_pooled_client() {
        let cache = PinnedClients::new();
        let now = Instant::now();

        cache.get("example.com", V4.parse().unwrap(), now).unwrap();
        cache
            .get("example.com", V4_OTHER.parse().unwrap(), at(now, 1))
            .unwrap();

        assert_eq!(
            cache.builds.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
            2,
            "the same host at a DIFFERENT address reused a connection pinned to the old one"
        );
        assert_eq!(cache.entries.lock().unwrap().len(), 2);
    }

    /// Two hosts that happen to resolve to the same address still get their own
    /// clients — the pin is per host, and SNI/Host differ.
    #[test]
    fn different_hosts_at_one_address_are_separate_clients() {
        let cache = PinnedClients::new();
        let now = Instant::now();
        let addr: SocketAddr = V4.parse().unwrap();

        cache.get("a.example.com", addr, now).unwrap();
        cache.get("b.example.com", addr, now).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(cache.builds.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 2);
    }

    /// An entry idle past the TTL is rebuilt, bounding how long a pooled
    /// connection to a once-vetted address can live.
    #[test]
    fn an_idle_entry_is_rebuilt_after_the_ttl() {
        let cache = PinnedClients::new();
        let now = Instant::now();
        let addr: SocketAddr = V4.parse().unwrap();

        cache.get("example.com", addr, now).unwrap();
        cache
            .get(
                "example.com",
                addr,
                now + PINNED_CLIENT_TTL + Duration::from_secs(1),
            )
            .unwrap();
        assert_eq!(cache.builds.load(Ordering::Relaxed), 2);
    }

    /// Use keeps an entry alive: a client fetched every minute must not be
    /// rebuilt just because it was first created more than a TTL ago. The TTL is
    /// idle time, not total age — otherwise the busiest client in the process
    /// would be the one thrown away on a schedule.
    #[test]
    fn continued_use_keeps_an_entry_alive() {
        let cache = PinnedClients::new();
        let now = Instant::now();
        let addr: SocketAddr = V4.parse().unwrap();

        for minute in 0..20 {
            cache
                .get("example.com", addr, at(now, minute * 60))
                .unwrap();
        }
        assert_eq!(
            cache.builds.load(Ordering::Relaxed),
            1,
            "a continuously-used client was expired by age rather than idleness"
        );
    }

    /// A client must release its idle sockets BEFORE the cache releases the
    /// client. The other way round, every entry spends the tail of its life
    /// holding connections nothing will reuse — which is the whole cost the pool
    /// bound exists to avoid.
    #[test]
    fn idle_sockets_are_released_before_their_client_is() {
        assert!(
            POOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT < PINNED_CLIENT_TTL,
            "pool idle timeout {POOL_IDLE_TIMEOUT:?} is not shorter than the \
             client TTL {PINNED_CLIENT_TTL:?}"
        );
    }

    /// The map is bounded. The poller talks to as many hosts as there are feeds,
    /// so an unbounded map would be a slow leak of connection pools.
    #[test]
    fn the_cache_is_bounded() {
        let cache = PinnedClients::new();
        let now = Instant::now();
        for i in 0..(MAX_PINNED_CLIENTS + 50) {
            let addr: SocketAddr = format!("93.184.216.34:{}", 1024 + i).parse().unwrap();
            cache.get(&format!("h{i}.example.com"), addr, now).unwrap();
        }
        assert!(
            cache.entries.lock().unwrap().len() <= MAX_PINNED_CLIENTS,
            "the cache grew past its bound"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn pinned_client_builds_for_both_families() {
        // Both address families must produce a usable pinned client.
        assert!(pinned_client("example.com", "93.184.216.34:80".parse().unwrap()).is_ok());
        assert!(
            pinned_client("example.com", "[2606:4700:4700::1111]:443".parse().unwrap()).is_ok()
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn scheme_allowlist_rejects_non_http() {
        assert!(check_scheme(&Url::parse("http://example.com/").unwrap()).is_ok());
        assert!(check_scheme(&Url::parse("https://example.com/").unwrap()).is_ok());
        // url::Url::parse rejects `javascript:` as opaque, but file/ftp parse.
        assert!(check_scheme(&Url::parse("file:///etc/passwd").unwrap()).is_err());
        assert!(check_scheme(&Url::parse("ftp://example.com/").unwrap()).is_err());
    }

    /// A raw HTTP server on loopback that answers every request with `body`
    /// (fixed Content-Length). Returns its `http://127.0.0.1:port/` base URL.
    /// Used to exercise [`read_capped`] against a real reqwest `Response`.
    /// A JSON server that records every raw request (head and body, read to
    /// `content-length`) and answers each with `reply`. For asserting on the
    /// BYTES a client sent — the only assertion that catches a record that is
    /// wrong on the way out.
    pub(crate) async fn serve_json_capturing(
        reply: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> (String, std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<String>>>) {
        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
        let log = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
        let sink = std::sync::Arc::clone(&log);
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            loop {
                let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
                    break;
                };
                let mut raw: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
                let mut chunk = [0u8; 4096];
                let text = loop {
                    let Ok(n) = sock.read(&mut chunk).await else {
                        break String::new();
                    };
                    if n == 0 {
                        break String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw).to_string();
                    }
                    raw.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
                    let Some(split) = raw.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n") else {
                        continue;
                    };
                    let (head, body) = raw.split_at(split + 4);
                    let want = String::from_utf8_lossy(head).lines().find_map(|l| {
                        let (k, v) = l.split_once(':')?;
                        k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
                            .then(|| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())?
                    });
                    if want.is_none_or(|w| body.len() >= w) {
                        break String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw).to_string();
                    }
                };
                sink.lock().unwrap().push(text);
                let header = format!(
                    "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
                    reply.len()
                );
                let _ = sock.write_all(header.as_bytes()).await;
                let _ = sock.write_all(&reply).await;
                let _ = sock.flush().await;
            }
        });
        (format!("http://{addr}"), log)
    }

    /// [`serve_body`] that also counts requests — for an assertion that a URL
    /// was NEVER fetched, which a body alone cannot make.
    pub(crate) async fn serve_body_counted(
        body: Vec<u8>,
    ) -> (String, std::sync::Arc<std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize>) {
        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
        let hits = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
        let counter = std::sync::Arc::clone(&hits);
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            loop {
                let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
                    break;
                };
                counter.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
                let body = body.clone();
                tokio::spawn(async move {
                    let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
                    let _ = sock.read(&mut buf).await;
                    let header = format!(
                        "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/rss+xml\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
                        body.len()
                    );
                    let _ = sock.write_all(header.as_bytes()).await;
                    let _ = sock.write_all(&body).await;
                    let _ = sock.flush().await;
                });
            }
        });
        (format!("http://{addr}/"), hits)
    }

    /// Serve a different body per request, in order, repeating the last.
    ///
    /// **The fixed-body servers cannot test a walk.** `serve_body` answers every
    /// request identically, so a paging walk sees the same cursor twice and its
    /// repeat-detection guard stops it at two pages. Anything that only happens
    /// across pages — a budget accumulating, a cursor advancing — is therefore
    /// unreachable with them, which is how a cap that was per-page rather than
    /// per-walk once passed an entire suite.
    ///
    /// Each request is a fresh connection (`Connection: close`), so accept order
    /// is request order for the sequential walks that use this.
    pub(crate) async fn serve_bodies_in_sequence(bodies: Vec<Vec<u8>>) -> String {
        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
        assert!(!bodies.is_empty(), "serve_bodies_in_sequence needs a body");
        let bodies = std::sync::Arc::new(bodies);
        let next = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::atomic::AtomicUsize::new(0));
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            loop {
                let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
                    break;
                };
                let i = next.fetch_add(1, std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
                let body = bodies[i.min(bodies.len() - 1)].clone();
                tokio::spawn(async move {
                    // **Drain the whole request head, not one fixed read.** A
                    // DPoP-signed XRPC request head measures ~880 bytes, so a
                    // single 1024-byte read is within a longer NSID or cursor
                    // of leaving bytes unread — and closing with data still in
                    // the receive queue makes the kernel send RST instead of
                    // FIN, which can discard a response the client has not
                    // drained. That surfaces as an intermittent connection
                    // reset in a test whose failure would read as a budget bug.
                    let mut req = Vec::new();
                    let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
                    // Drain the head, then the body it declares. Stopping at
                    // the head is not enough: the sidecar's list call is a POST,
                    // so on any platform that does not coalesce head and body
                    // into one segment the body stays in the receive queue, and
                    // closing on unread bytes is the RST-instead-of-FIN case
                    // this loop exists to avoid.
                    let mut want: Option<usize> = None;
                    loop {
                        match sock.read(&mut buf).await {
                            Ok(0) => break,
                            Ok(n) => {
                                req.extend_from_slice(&buf[..n]);
                                let Some(head_end) = req.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n")
                                else {
                                    continue;
                                };
                                let head_len = head_end + 4;
                                if want.is_none() {
                                    let head = String::from_utf8_lossy(&req[..head_len]);
                                    want = Some(
                                        head.lines()
                                            .find_map(|l| {
                                                let (k, v) = l.split_once(':')?;
                                                k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
                                                    .then(|| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())?
                                            })
                                            .unwrap_or(0),
                                    );
                                }
                                if req.len() >= head_len + want.unwrap_or(0) {
                                    break;
                                }
                            }
                            Err(_) => break,
                        }
                    }
                    let header = format!(
                        "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: application/json\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
                        body.len()
                    );
                    let _ = sock.write_all(header.as_bytes()).await;
                    let _ = sock.write_all(&body).await;
                    let _ = sock.flush().await;
                });
            }
        });
        format!("http://{addr}/")
    }

    pub(crate) async fn serve_body(body: Vec<u8>) -> String {
        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            loop {
                let (mut sock, _) = match listener.accept().await {
                    Ok(p) => p,
                    Err(_) => break,
                };
                let body = body.clone();
                tokio::spawn(async move {
                    // Drain the request headers (best-effort) then reply.
                    let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
                    let _ = sock.read(&mut buf).await;
                    let header = format!(
                        "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Type: text/plain\r\nContent-Length: {}\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
                        body.len()
                    );
                    let _ = sock.write_all(header.as_bytes()).await;
                    let _ = sock.write_all(&body).await;
                    let _ = sock.flush().await;
                });
            }
        });
        format!("http://{addr}/")
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn read_capped_rejects_over_cap_body() {
        // A body one byte over the cap must be rejected (and never fully
        // buffered past the cap). Fetch directly (bypassing the SSRF guard, which
        // rightly forbids loopback) to exercise read_capped on a real Response.
        let big = vec![b'x'; MAX_BODY_BYTES + 1];
        let base = serve_body(big).await;
        let client = reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap();
        let resp = client.get(&base).send().await.unwrap();
        let err = read_capped(resp).await.unwrap_err();
        assert!(
            err.to_string().contains("exceeded"),
            "unexpected error: {err}"
        );
        // #227: an oversized body is `Body`, not "never produced a response".
        assert_eq!(
            crate::feed::publication_failure_kind(&err),
            crate::feed::FailureKind::Body,
            "{err:#}"
        );
    }

    #[tokio::test]
    async fn read_capped_accepts_small_body() {
        let base = serve_body(b"hello world".to_vec()).await;
        let client = reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap();
        let resp = client.get(&base).send().await.unwrap();
        let body = read_capped(resp).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(body, b"hello world");
    }

    /// A raw HTTP server on loopback that answers `/final` with `200 arrived`
    /// and **everything else** with `302 Location: /final`. Returns its bound
    /// address, so a caller can pin a client to it by address rather than name.
    ///
    /// This is the fixture the two tests below need and that the module did not
    /// previously have. Note it returns the `SocketAddr`, not a URL: the whole
    /// point is to reach it under a hostname that does not resolve.
    pub(crate) async fn serve_redirect_to_final() -> SocketAddr {
        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            loop {
                let (mut sock, _) = match listener.accept().await {
                    Ok(p) => p,
                    Err(_) => break,
                };
                tokio::spawn(async move {
                    let mut buf = [0u8; 1024];
                    let n = sock.read(&mut buf).await.unwrap_or(0);
                    let req = String::from_utf8_lossy(&buf[..n]).to_string();
                    let resp = if req.starts_with("GET /final") {
                        "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 7\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\narrived"
                    } else {
                        "HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nLocation: /final\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\n\
                         Connection: close\r\n\r\n"
                    };
                    let _ = sock.write_all(resp.as_bytes()).await;
                    let _ = sock.flush().await;
                });
            }
        });
        addr
    }

    /// **The connect goes to the address the guard vetted — enforcement, not
    /// decision.**
    ///
    /// `resolve_and_check` vets an address and `build_pinned_client` then
    /// `.resolve()`s the host to exactly that address, so the TCP connect cannot
    /// be rebound onto an internal one in the window between the two. That is
    /// the DNS-rebinding defence the module doc spends 25 lines on.
    ///
    /// **Nothing observed it.** Deleting `.resolve(host, addr)` left all 659
    /// tests green, because every other test either passes an IP literal — where
    /// a second resolution is a no-op — or asserts on `is_forbidden_ip`
    /// directly. `is_forbidden_ip` is thoroughly tested; what carries its verdict
    /// to the socket was not tested at all.
    ///
    /// This pins it in the one way that cannot silently stop discriminating: the
    /// host **resolves nowhere**. `.invalid` is reserved by RFC 2606 and is
    /// guaranteed never to exist, so the only route to the stub is the pin. Drop
    /// `.resolve()` and the client falls back to real DNS and cannot connect —
    /// which is also why this test needs no network.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn the_connect_is_pinned_to_the_vetted_address() {
        let addr = serve_redirect_to_final().await;
        let host = "pinned-target.invalid";
        let client = pinned_client(host, addr).expect("building a pinned client");

        let resp = client
            .get(format!("http://{host}:{}/final", addr.port()))
            .send()
            .await
            .expect(
                "a pinned host must reach the vetted address without consulting DNS — \
                 if this failed to connect, the `.resolve()` pin is gone",
            );
        assert_eq!(resp.status(), 200);
        assert_eq!(resp.text().await.unwrap(), "arrived");
    }

    /// **The per-hop client must not follow redirects on its own.**
    ///
    /// `guarded_get_inner` follows redirects *manually* so it can re-run the
    /// scheme check, the privacy check and `resolve_and_check` on every hop, and
    /// so it can strip credential headers when a hop leaves the original origin.
    /// All of that is bypassed if reqwest follows the redirect internally: the
    /// connect to hop 2 happens inside reqwest, against an address nothing
    /// vetted. For `guarded_post` it is worse still — reqwest would re-send a
    /// `307`'s BODY (a client assertion, an auth code) to the new origin before
    /// `guarded_post`'s own 3xx refusal ever ran.
    ///
    /// Flipping `Policy::none()` to `Policy::limited(10)` left all 659 tests
    /// green. The existing redirect test could not catch it: it builds a 302 stub
    /// and then discards the address with `let _ = addr`, because the guard
    /// forbids loopback and the stub was therefore unreachable *through* the
    /// guard. It asserts on a private URL passed directly in, so no redirect ever
    /// occurs in it.
    ///
    /// Pinning by address sidesteps that — `pinned_client` does not consult the
    /// guard, so the stub is reachable — and the assertion is on the status the
    /// caller receives: `302`, handed back for the loop to re-validate, not the
    /// `200` that reqwest would return after quietly following it.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn the_pinned_client_does_not_follow_redirects_itself() {
        let addr = serve_redirect_to_final().await;
        let host = "redirector.invalid";
        let client = pinned_client(host, addr).expect("building a pinned client");

        let resp = client
            .get(format!("http://{host}:{}/start", addr.port()))
            .send()
            .await
            .expect("the stub must answer the first hop");

        assert_eq!(
            resp.status(),
            302,
            "the per-hop client must hand the 30x BACK to guarded_get_inner for \
             re-validation; a 200 here means reqwest followed it internally and the \
             second hop was connected to without passing resolve_and_check",
        );
        assert_eq!(
            resp.headers()
                .get(reqwest::header::LOCATION)
                .and_then(|v| v.to_str().ok()),
            Some("/final"),
            "the Location must reach the caller — it is what the next hop re-validates",
        );
    }

    /// **Every branch of the v4/v6 blocklist is load-bearing.**
    ///
    /// Four branches were unreachable from the existing tests: `is_multicast()`
    /// on both families, `192.0.0.0/24` ("this host on this network", IETF
    /// protocol assignments) and `198.18.0.0/15` (benchmarking). Deleting all
    /// four at once left the suite green, so a quarter of the blocklist could
    /// have been dropped in a refactor without a single failure.
    ///
    /// These are not decorative: multicast to an internal group and the
    /// benchmarking range are both reachable on a real network and neither can
    /// host a legitimate public feed.
    #[test]
    fn every_blocklist_branch_is_load_bearing() {
        for ip in [
            "224.0.0.1",       // v4 multicast, all-systems group
            "239.255.255.250", // v4 multicast, SSDP — a real LAN discovery target
            "192.0.0.1",       // 192.0.0.0/24, IETF protocol assignments
            "192.0.0.171",     // same /24
            "198.18.0.1",      // 198.18/15 benchmarking
            "198.19.255.255",  // top of the benchmarking range
            "0.0.0.0",         // unspecified
            "0.1.2.3",         // rest of 0/8
            "255.255.255.255", // broadcast
            "100.64.0.1",      // CGNAT floor
            "100.127.255.255", // CGNAT ceiling
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(is_forbidden_ip(&parsed), "{ip} must be forbidden");
        }
        for ip in [
            "ff02::1",                // v6 multicast, all-nodes
            "::1",                    // v6 loopback
            "::",                     // v6 unspecified
            "fe80::1",                // v6 link-local
            "fc00::1",                // v6 ULA
            "fd00::1",                // v6 ULA
            "::ffff:127.0.0.1",       // v4-mapped loopback
            "::ffff:169.254.169.254", // v4-mapped cloud metadata
            "::ffff:10.0.0.1",        // v4-mapped RFC1918
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(is_forbidden_ip(&parsed), "{ip} must be forbidden");
        }
    }

    /// **The blocklist must not over-block, and only boundaries can show that.**
    ///
    /// A guard that refuses everything passes every all-negative test, and the
    /// existing positive cases (`1.1.1.1`, `8.8.8.8`, `93.184.216.34`) sit
    /// nowhere near a blocked range, so none of them would notice. Widening
    /// `172.16/12` to all of `172/8` and `100.64/10` to all of `100/8` — which
    /// would silently refuse Google and AWS address space — left the suite green.
    ///
    /// Each address here is the one immediately OUTSIDE a blocked range, so an
    /// off-by-one in any CIDR boundary fails this test and nothing else.
    #[test]
    fn the_blocklist_does_not_over_block_adjacent_public_space() {
        for ip in [
            "9.255.255.255",   // just below 10/8
            "11.0.0.0",        // just above 10/8
            "172.15.255.255",  // just below 172.16/12
            "172.32.0.0",      // just above 172.16/12 (172.217.x is Google)
            "192.167.255.255", // just below 192.168/16
            "192.169.0.0",     // just above 192.168/16
            "169.253.255.255", // just below 169.254/16
            "169.255.0.0",     // just above 169.254/16
            "126.255.255.255", // just below 127/8
            "128.0.0.0",       // just above 127/8
            "100.63.255.255",  // just below 100.64/10 CGNAT
            "100.128.0.0",     // just above 100.64/10 (100.20.x is AWS)
            "192.0.1.0",       // just above 192.0.0.0/24
            "198.17.255.255",  // just below 198.18/15
            "198.20.0.0",      // just above 198.18/15
            "223.255.255.255", // just below 224/4 multicast
            "1.0.0.0",         // just above 0/8
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(
                !is_forbidden_ip(&parsed),
                "{ip} is public and adjacent to a blocked range — refusing it means a \
                 CIDR boundary is wrong and real feeds are unreachable",
            );
        }
        for ip in ["2606:4700:4700::1111", "2001:4860:4860::8888"] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(
                !is_forbidden_ip(&parsed),
                "{ip} is public and must be allowed"
            );
        }
    }

    /// **Reserved and documentation ranges no public feed can live in (#217).**
    ///
    /// Each range is pinned at its first, a middle and its last address, so a
    /// rule that is missing, or narrower than its CIDR, fails here. The
    /// neighbours just outside are in
    /// `the_reserved_ranges_stop_at_their_boundaries`.
    #[test]
    fn forbids_reserved_and_documentation_ranges() {
        for (ip, what) in [
            // 240.0.0.0/4, reserved (RFC 1112 §4). `is_broadcast()` only ever
            // covered the top address of it.
            ("240.0.0.0", "240/4 reserved, first"),
            ("247.255.0.1", "240/4 reserved, middle"),
            ("255.255.255.254", "240/4 reserved, last below broadcast"),
            ("255.255.255.255", "240/4 reserved, limited broadcast"),
            // RFC 5737 documentation ranges.
            ("192.0.2.0", "TEST-NET-1, first"),
            ("192.0.2.128", "TEST-NET-1, middle"),
            ("192.0.2.255", "TEST-NET-1, last"),
            ("198.51.100.0", "TEST-NET-2, first"),
            ("198.51.100.128", "TEST-NET-2, middle"),
            ("198.51.100.255", "TEST-NET-2, last"),
            ("203.0.113.0", "TEST-NET-3, first"),
            ("203.0.113.128", "TEST-NET-3, middle"),
            ("203.0.113.255", "TEST-NET-3, last"),
            // fec0::/10, deprecated site-local (RFC 3879).
            ("fec0::", "site-local, first"),
            ("fee0::1", "site-local, middle"),
            (
                "feff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff",
                "site-local, last",
            ),
            // 100::/64, discard-only (RFC 6666).
            ("100::", "discard-only, first"),
            ("100::8000:0:0:0", "discard-only, middle"),
            ("100::ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff", "discard-only, last"),
            // 2001:db8::/32, documentation (RFC 3849).
            ("2001:db8::", "IPv6 documentation, first"),
            ("2001:db8:8000::1", "IPv6 documentation, middle"),
            (
                "2001:db8:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff",
                "IPv6 documentation, last",
            ),
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(is_forbidden_ip(&parsed), "{ip} is {what} and was allowed");
        }
    }

    /// The other side of each boundary in `forbids_reserved_and_documentation_ranges`.
    ///
    /// Most of these are allowed, and an off-by-one or an over-wide mask fails
    /// on them. Three are not, because the range's neighbour is already refused
    /// by an older rule; they are asserted anyway, with the rule named, so that
    /// the new lines cannot quietly take over or drop what the old ones did.
    /// `240/4` has no upper neighbour and `fec0::/10` has none that is allowed:
    /// `fe80::/10` sits below it and `ff00::/8` above.
    #[test]
    fn the_reserved_ranges_stop_at_their_boundaries() {
        for ip in [
            "192.0.1.255",                            // below TEST-NET-1
            "192.0.3.0",                              // above TEST-NET-1
            "198.51.99.255",                          // below TEST-NET-2
            "198.51.101.0",                           // above TEST-NET-2
            "203.0.112.255",                          // below TEST-NET-3
            "203.0.114.0",                            // above TEST-NET-3
            "ff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff",  // below 100::/64
            "100:0:0:1::",                            // above 100::/64
            "2001:db7:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff", // below 2001:db8::/32
            "2001:db9::",                             // above 2001:db8::/32
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(
                !is_forbidden_ip(&parsed),
                "{ip} is just outside a reserved range and was refused — a \
                 boundary is wrong",
            );
        }
        for (ip, rule) in [
            ("239.255.255.255", "multicast, 224.0.0.0/4"),
            (
                "febf:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff",
                "link-local, fe80::/10",
            ),
            ("ff00::", "multicast, ff00::/8"),
        ] {
            let parsed: IpAddr = ip.parse().unwrap();
            assert!(is_forbidden_ip(&parsed), "{ip} must stay refused as {rule}");
        }
    }

    /// **Every new IPv4 range is refused through every IPv6 wrapping the guard
    /// unwraps (#217 on top of #210).** That holds because `is_forbidden_v6`
    /// sends both the `to_ipv4()` result and every [`embedded_v4`] candidate
    /// through the one `is_forbidden_v4`. This test is what keeps that true if
    /// someone gives either path its own list.
    ///
    /// Teredo keeps the OTHER field at 8.8.8.8, so each case fails for the
    /// field its label names. The neighbours of the ranges, wrapped the same
    /// way, stay allowed.
    #[test]
    fn the_reserved_ipv4_ranges_are_refused_inside_ipv6() {
        fn wrappings(v4: Ipv4Addr) -> Vec<(&'static str, Ipv6Addr)> {
            let [a, b, c, d] = v4.octets();
            let hi = u16::from_be_bytes([a, b]);
            let lo = u16::from_be_bytes([c, d]);
            vec![
                ("mapped", v4.to_ipv6_mapped()),
                ("compatible", v4.to_ipv6_compatible()),
                ("NAT64", Ipv6Addr::new(0x64, 0xff9b, 0, 0, 0, 0, hi, lo)),
                ("6to4", Ipv6Addr::new(0x2002, hi, lo, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)),
                ("translated", Ipv6Addr::new(0, 0, 0, 0, 0xffff, 0, hi, lo)),
                (
                    "Teredo server",
                    Ipv6Addr::new(0x2001, 0, hi, lo, 0, 0, 0xf7f7, 0xf7f7),
                ),
                (
                    "Teredo client",
                    Ipv6Addr::new(0x2001, 0, 0x0808, 0x0808, 0, 0, !hi, !lo),
                ),
                (
                    "ISATAP",
                    Ipv6Addr::new(0x2606, 0x4700, 0, 0, 0, 0x5efe, hi, lo),
                ),
            ]
        }
        for v4 in [
            "240.0.0.0",
            "247.255.0.1",
            "255.255.255.254",
            "192.0.2.0",
            "192.0.2.255",
            "198.51.100.0",
            "198.51.100.255",
            "203.0.113.0",
            "203.0.113.255",
        ] {
            for (form, v6) in wrappings(v4.parse().unwrap()) {
                assert!(
                    is_forbidden_ip(&IpAddr::V6(v6)),
                    "{v6} ({form} of {v4}) was allowed",
                );
            }
        }
        for v4 in ["192.0.3.0", "198.51.99.255", "203.0.114.0"] {
            for (form, v6) in wrappings(v4.parse().unwrap()) {
                assert!(
                    !is_forbidden_ip(&IpAddr::V6(v6)),
                    "{v6} ({form} of public {v4}) was refused",
                );
            }
        }
    }

    /// **Regression (v0.2.8):** the write-side guard must refuse the same targets
    /// the read-side one does — loopback, cloud metadata, RFC1918, ULA — *before*
    /// the connect, so a rebound PDS host never receives a request body carrying
    /// an app password or a session bearer.
    ///
    /// (The companion rule — a `307`/`308` is refused rather than followed,
    /// because a redirect re-sends the BODY and reqwest only sanitises headers —
    /// is not exercised here for the same reason `read_capped`'s stub is fetched
    /// unguarded: the guard forbids loopback, so a local stub server can never be
    /// reached through it. It is enforced by construction in `guarded_post_json`.)
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn guarded_post_refuses_internal_targets() {
        let client = Client::builder().build().unwrap();
        for url in [
            "http://127.0.0.1:9/xrpc/com.atproto.server.createSession",
            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
            "http://10.0.0.5/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.applyWrites",
            "http://[::1]/xrpc/com.atproto.repo.deleteRecord",
        ] {
            let err = guarded_post_json(&client, url, &[], b"{}".to_vec())
                .await
                .unwrap_err()
                .to_string();
            assert!(
                err.contains("forbidden") || err.contains("internal"),
                "{url}: expected an SSRF refusal, got: {err}"
            );
        }
    }

    /// A non-http(s) scheme is refused on the write path too.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn guarded_post_refuses_bad_schemes() {
        let client = Client::builder().build().unwrap();
        for url in ["file:///etc/passwd", "gopher://example.com/1"] {
            let err = guarded_post_json(&client, url, &[], b"{}".to_vec())
                .await
                .unwrap_err()
                .to_string();
            assert!(err.contains("scheme"), "{url}: got: {err}");
        }
    }

    /// **A public first hop that `30x`es to a private, secret-bearing feed is
    /// refused BEFORE the private target is fetched** — the per-hop privacy
    /// re-check in [`guarded_get`].
    ///
    /// The previous version of this test spawned a redirecting server and then
    /// threw it away (`let _ = addr;`), asserting on the private URL passed in
    /// directly — so it exercised the FIRST-hop check only, and a mutation that
    /// skipped privacy on every later hop left the whole suite green. Now a
    /// real server really redirects, and the assertion that matters is on the
    /// private target's request log: **zero**. "Never fetched" is the half of
    /// the public-feeds-only guarantee this check exists for.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_redirect_to_a_private_feed_is_refused_before_it_is_fetched() {
        let (target_addr, target_log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;
        test_host_override("private-target.test", target_addr);
        let (hop_addr, hop_log) = spawn_http(vec![redirect_to(&format!(
            "http://private-target.test:{}/feed/private/deadbeefcafe1234",
            target_addr.port()
        ))])
        .await;
        test_host_override("private-hop.test", hop_addr);

        let err = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://private-hop.test:{}/feed.xml", hop_addr.port()),
            &[],
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("a redirect to a private feed was followed");
        let rendered = format!("{err:#}");
        assert!(
            rendered.contains("private/paid feed URL (redirect target)"),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {rendered}"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            hop_log.lock().unwrap().len(),
            1,
            "the public first hop is fetched"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            target_log.lock().unwrap().len(),
            0,
            "the private target was FETCHED before being refused"
        );
    }

    /// Header names/values for the hop-header tests: one credential, one benign
    /// conditional-GET validator.
    fn hop_fixture() -> Vec<(HeaderName, HeaderValue)> {
        vec![
            (AUTHORIZATION, HeaderValue::from_static("Bearer secret")),
            (
                reqwest::header::IF_NONE_MATCH,
                HeaderValue::from_static("\"etag\""),
            ),
        ]
    }

    #[test]
    fn sensitive_header_set() {
        assert!(is_sensitive_header(&AUTHORIZATION));
        assert!(is_sensitive_header(&COOKIE));
        assert!(is_sensitive_header(&PROXY_AUTHORIZATION));
        assert!(is_sensitive_header(&WWW_AUTHENTICATE));
        assert!(is_sensitive_header(&HeaderName::from_static("cookie2")));
        assert!(!is_sensitive_header(&reqwest::header::IF_NONE_MATCH));
        assert!(!is_sensitive_header(&reqwest::header::IF_MODIFIED_SINCE));
        assert!(!is_sensitive_header(&reqwest::header::ACCEPT));
    }

    #[test]
    fn hop_headers_keeps_all_on_same_origin() {
        let extra = hop_fixture();
        let original = Url::parse("https://pds.example.com/xrpc/x").unwrap();
        // The very first hop (identical URL) keeps everything…
        assert_eq!(hop_headers(&original, &original, &extra).len(), 2);
        // …and so does a same-origin path change (a `302 /a → /b` on one host).
        let same = Url::parse("https://pds.example.com/other/path?q=1").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(hop_headers(&original, &same, &extra).len(), 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn hop_headers_strips_authorization_cross_host() {
        let extra = hop_fixture();
        let original = Url::parse("https://pds.example.com/x").unwrap();
        let evil = Url::parse("https://evil.example.net/y").unwrap();
        let kept = hop_headers(&original, &evil, &extra);
        assert_eq!(kept.len(), 1, "the bearer must not follow a cross-host 302");
        assert_eq!(kept[0].0, reqwest::header::IF_NONE_MATCH);
    }

    #[test]
    fn hop_headers_strips_on_port_and_scheme_change() {
        let extra = hop_fixture();
        let original = Url::parse("https://a.example/x").unwrap();
        for downgraded in ["http://a.example/x", "https://a.example:8443/x"] {
            let current = Url::parse(downgraded).unwrap();
            let kept = hop_headers(&original, &current, &extra);
            assert_eq!(kept.len(), 1, "{downgraded} must drop the credential");
            assert_eq!(kept[0].0, reqwest::header::IF_NONE_MATCH);
        }
        // The default port spelled explicitly is still the same origin.
        let explicit = Url::parse("https://a.example:443/x").unwrap();
        assert_eq!(hop_headers(&original, &explicit, &extra).len(), 2);
    }

    #[test]
    fn safe_link_allowlist() {
        assert_eq!(
            safe_link("https://ok.example/x").as_deref(),
            Some("https://ok.example/x")
        );
        assert_eq!(
            safe_link("  http://ok.example/  ").as_deref(),
            Some("http://ok.example/")
        );
        assert_eq!(safe_link("javascript:alert(document.domain)"), None);
        assert_eq!(safe_link("data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>"), None);
        assert_eq!(safe_link(""), None);
        assert_eq!(safe_link("   "), None);
        // A relative/naked path isn't an absolute http(s) URL → dropped.
        assert_eq!(safe_link("/relative/path"), None);
    }

    /// The OAuth token/PAR calls are form POSTs carrying a client assertion and,
    /// on the token call, the authorization code. They must go through the SAME
    /// SSRF guard as everything else: a PDS or issuer URL that resolves to
    /// loopback/RFC1918 has to fail closed BEFORE the credential is sent.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn guarded_post_form_fails_closed_on_a_forbidden_target() {
        let client = Client::new();
        for url in [
            "http://127.0.0.1:2583/oauth/token",
            "http://[::1]:2583/oauth/token",
            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
            "http://10.0.0.5/oauth/token",
        ] {
            let err = guarded_post_form(&client, url, &[], &[("grant_type", "authorization_code")])
                .await
                .expect_err("must refuse {url}");
            let msg = err.to_string().to_lowercase();
            assert!(
                msg.contains("forbidden") || msg.contains("refus") || msg.contains("resolve"),
                "unexpected error for {url}: {err:#}"
            );
        }
    }

    /// A non-http(s) scheme must be rejected before any DNS work.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn guarded_post_form_rejects_non_http_schemes() {
        let client = Client::new();
        assert!(
            guarded_post_form(&client, "file:///etc/passwd", &[], &[("a", "b")])
                .await
                .is_err()
        );
    }

    /// OAuth metadata and DID documents must be fetched WITHOUT following
    /// redirects, and still through the SSRF guard.
    /// Asserts on the GUARD's error, not merely `is_err()`. Connecting to
    /// `127.0.0.1` fails anyway (refused, or a slow timeout for an unrouted
    /// RFC1918 address), so an `is_err()`-only assertion passes with
    /// `resolve_and_check` deleted and proves nothing.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn guarded_get_no_redirect_still_fails_closed_on_forbidden_targets() {
        let client = Client::new();
        for url in [
            "http://127.0.0.1/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
            "http://192.168.1.1/.well-known/did.json",
            "http://[::1]/.well-known/did.json",
        ] {
            let err = guarded_get_no_redirect(&client, url, &[])
                .await
                .expect_err("must refuse");
            let rendered = format!("{err:#}");
            assert!(
                rendered.contains("forbidden (internal) address"),
                "{url} failed for the wrong reason: {rendered}"
            );
        }
        // And the scheme check, which is a different branch entirely.
        let err = guarded_get_no_redirect(&client, "file:///etc/passwd", &[])
            .await
            .expect_err("must refuse");
        assert!(format!("{err:#}").contains("non-http(s) URL scheme"));
    }

    /// **`guarded_get_no_redirect` does not follow even one hop.** Its sibling
    /// above proves the SSRF guard on this path; nothing proved the ZERO. Every
    /// case there is an internal address or a bad scheme, so `max_redirects =
    /// 0` — the function's reason to exist — was never exercised, and a
    /// mutation passing `MAX_REDIRECTS` instead left the whole suite green.
    ///
    /// That mutation is the authorization-server mix-up defence collapsing:
    /// OAuth metadata, `plc.directory`, `did:web` documents and the client
    /// metadata self-fetch would all be read from wherever a `302` pointed,
    /// while `issuer` is compared against the URL that was asked for.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn guarded_get_no_redirect_refuses_to_follow_even_one_hop() {
        let (b_addr, b_log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;
        test_host_override("no-redirect-b.test", b_addr);
        let (a_addr, a_log) = spawn_http(vec![redirect_to(&format!(
            "http://no-redirect-b.test:{}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
            b_addr.port()
        ))])
        .await;
        test_host_override("no-redirect-a.test", a_addr);

        let err = guarded_get_no_redirect(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!(
                "http://no-redirect-a.test:{}/.well-known/oauth-authorization-server",
                a_addr.port()
            ),
            &[],
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("a redirect was followed on the no-redirect path");
        let rendered = format!("{err:#}");
        assert!(
            rendered.contains("origin is load-bearing"),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {rendered}"
        );
        assert_eq!(a_log.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(
            b_log.lock().unwrap().len(),
            0,
            "the redirect target was fetched — the hop was followed"
        );
    }

    /// **A POST is never redirected.** The code comment on `guarded_post` says
    /// this branch is "not exercised here"; now it is. A `307` re-sends the
    /// method AND the body — an app password or an authorization code — to the
    /// host the response chose.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn guarded_post_refuses_a_redirect_rather_than_resending_the_body() {
        let (elsewhere_addr, elsewhere_log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;
        test_host_override("post-elsewhere.test", elsewhere_addr);
        let (addr, log) = spawn_http(vec![format!(
            "HTTP/1.1 307 Temporary Redirect\r\nLocation: http://post-elsewhere.test:{}/token\r\n\
             Content-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n",
            elsewhere_addr.port()
        )])
        .await;
        test_host_override("post-redirect.test", addr);

        let err = guarded_post_form(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://post-redirect.test:{}/token", addr.port()),
            &[],
            &[
                ("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
                ("code", "SECRET-CODE"),
            ],
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("a POST followed a redirect");
        let rendered = format!("{err:#}");
        assert!(
            rendered.contains("re-send the request body"),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {rendered}"
        );
        assert_eq!(log.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
        assert_eq!(
            elsewhere_log.lock().unwrap().len(),
            0,
            "the body was re-sent to the host the response chose"
        );
    }

    /// **The redirect budget is enforced.** `MAX_REDIRECTS` bounds every
    /// outbound fetch, and until now nothing drove a chain long enough to
    /// reach it. One host redirects to itself `MAX_REDIRECTS + 2` times; the
    /// guard must give up after `MAX_REDIRECTS + 1` requests, not loop on.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn too_many_redirects_is_refused() {
        // Bound first so every Location can name this server's own port.
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        let port = listener.local_addr().unwrap().port();
        let hops: Vec<String> = (0..MAX_REDIRECTS + 2)
            .map(|i| redirect_to(&format!("http://redirect-loop.test:{port}/hop{i}")))
            .collect();
        let (addr, log) = spawn_http_on(listener, hops).await;
        test_host_override("redirect-loop.test", addr);

        let err = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://redirect-loop.test:{port}/hop0"),
            &[],
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("an endless redirect chain was not refused");
        let rendered = format!("{err:#}");
        assert!(
            rendered.contains("too many redirects"),
            "refused for the wrong reason: {rendered}"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            log.lock().unwrap().len(),
            MAX_REDIRECTS + 1,
            "the guard made a different number of requests than its budget allows"
        );
    }

    /// The content type must follow the body it describes. Because both come
    /// from the same value, a JSON body can never be labelled as a form.
    #[test]
    fn the_content_type_follows_the_body_kind() {
        assert_eq!(
            PostBody::Json(b"{}".to_vec()).content_type(),
            "application/json"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            PostBody::Form(&[("a", "b")]).content_type(),
            "application/x-www-form-urlencoded"
        );
        // And the bytes are encoded to match.
        assert_eq!(
            PostBody::Json(b"{\"a\":1}".to_vec()).into_bytes(),
            b"{\"a\":1}"
        );
        assert_eq!(PostBody::Form(&[("a", "b c")]).into_bytes(), b"a=b+c");
    }

    /// Form encoding must percent-encode values; a value containing `&` or `=`
    /// must not be able to inject an extra parameter into the body.
    #[test]
    fn form_body_percent_encodes_and_cannot_inject_parameters() {
        let body = PostBody::Form(&[
            ("grant_type", "authorization_code"),
            ("code", "abc&scope=evil"),
            ("redirect_uri", "https://x.example/oauth/callback"),
        ])
        .into_bytes();
        let s = String::from_utf8(body).unwrap();
        assert!(s.contains("grant_type=authorization_code"));
        assert!(
            s.matches("scope=").count() == 0,
            "a `&` in a value injected a parameter: {s}"
        );
        assert!(s.contains("%26"), "the `&` was not encoded: {s}");
        assert!(s.contains("%3A%2F%2F"), "the `://` was not encoded: {s}");
    }

    // ── SSRF ENFORCEMENT (not just the decision) ─────────────────────────────
    //
    // Everything below drives a REAL redirect through `guarded_get_inner`
    // against a real HTTP server. None of it was possible before the
    // `test_host_override` seam: the guard correctly refuses loopback, so a
    // local test server was unreachable through it, and three enforcement
    // properties had no coverage at all. Each had a mutation that left the
    // whole suite green.

    /// A tiny HTTP server that replays canned responses and records every raw
    /// request it received. Returns its address and the request log.
    async fn spawn_http(
        responses: Vec<String>,
    ) -> (SocketAddr, std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<String>>>) {
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        spawn_http_on(listener, responses).await
    }

    /// [`spawn_http`] on a listener the caller already bound — for a test whose
    /// canned responses must name the server's own port (a redirect loop).
    async fn spawn_http_on(
        listener: tokio::net::TcpListener,
        responses: Vec<String>,
    ) -> (SocketAddr, std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Vec<String>>>) {
        use tokio::io::{AsyncReadExt, AsyncWriteExt};
        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
        let log = std::sync::Arc::new(std::sync::Mutex::new(Vec::new()));
        let sink = std::sync::Arc::clone(&log);
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            let mut i = 0usize;
            loop {
                let Ok((mut sock, _)) = listener.accept().await else {
                    break;
                };
                // **The whole request, not the first 8 KB of it.**
                //
                // This used to be one `read` into a fixed buffer. Anything past
                // it was never captured, and the assertions over this log are
                // NEGATIVE — `!seen.contains("authorization:")` in the
                // cross-origin credential test — so a short capture satisfies
                // them exactly as well as a stripped header does. The two are
                // indistinguishable, and only one of them means the guard works.
                //
                // Same shape as `spawn_tls`, deliberately: three test servers
                // that read alike means the next one copied from any of them
                // starts correct. And the same limit applies — with no
                // `content-length` there is nothing to wait for, so a chunked
                // body stops after the head.
                let mut raw: Vec<u8> = Vec::new();
                let mut chunk = [0u8; 4096];
                loop {
                    // **A read error DISCARDS the connection rather than logging
                    // what arrived so far.** Breaking here and pushing the
                    // partial would put a truncated request in the log — the
                    // exact thing this change exists to stop, arriving by a
                    // different door. `spawn_tls` returns for the same reason.
                    let Ok(n) = sock.read(&mut chunk).await else {
                        return;
                    };
                    if n == 0 {
                        break;
                    }
                    raw.extend_from_slice(&chunk[..n]);
                    let Some(split) = raw.windows(4).position(|w| w == b"\r\n\r\n") else {
                        continue;
                    };
                    let (head, body) = raw.split_at(split + 4);
                    let want = String::from_utf8_lossy(head).lines().find_map(|l| {
                        let (k, v) = l.split_once(':')?;
                        k.eq_ignore_ascii_case("content-length")
                            .then(|| v.trim().parse::<usize>().ok())?
                    });
                    if want.is_none_or(|want| body.len() >= want) {
                        break;
                    }
                }
                if raw.is_empty() {
                    continue;
                }
                sink.lock()
                    .unwrap()
                    .push(String::from_utf8_lossy(&raw).to_string());
                let body = responses
                    .get(i)
                    .cloned()
                    .unwrap_or_else(|| responses.last().cloned().unwrap_or_default());
                i += 1;
                let _ = sock.write_all(body.as_bytes()).await;
                let _ = sock.flush().await;
            }
        });
        (addr, log)
    }

    /// **The SSRF guard must ignore ambient proxy configuration.**
    ///
    /// reqwest defaults `auto_sys_proxy: true`. With `HTTP_PROXY` set in the
    /// process environment, a request is sent to the proxy in ABSOLUTE form —
    /// `GET http://host/path` — and over https as `CONNECT host:443`, for the
    /// PROXY to resolve the hostname.
    ///
    /// Precisely what breaks: `resolve_and_check` still runs its own lookup and
    /// still rejects forbidden IPs, so it is not that the check is skipped. It
    /// is that the checked address is no longer the address connected to — the
    /// proxy re-resolves the name on its own network, so the vetted result is
    /// decorative. DNS rebinding, split-horizon DNS and anything reachable from
    /// the proxy but not from here all come back. And the call returns 200, so
    /// it fails OPEN.
    ///
    /// Measured before `.no_proxy()` existed: vetted server 0 requests, proxy
    /// received `GET http://pin-vs-proxy.invalid/feed HTTP/1.1`, result
    /// `Ok(200)`.
    ///
    /// **Why this re-execs itself.** reqwest reads the proxy environment when
    /// the client is BUILT, so the variable has to be present before the
    /// builder runs. `set_var` is a data race against the ~39 `env::var` reads
    /// in this binary and is the one thing this codebase refuses to do in
    /// tests. So the parent owns both servers, and the child inherits
    /// `HTTP_PROXY` from birth — no mutation of a live environment anywhere.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn the_pinned_client_ignores_ambient_proxy_configuration() {
        const VETTED: &str = "FR_AMBIENT_PROXY_VETTED";
        const HOST: &str = "ambient-proxy-probe.invalid";

        if let Ok(vetted) = std::env::var(VETTED) {
            // ── child: HTTP_PROXY is already in our environment ──
            let addr: SocketAddr = vetted.parse().unwrap();
            let client = build_pinned_client(HOST, addr).expect("client");
            let _ = client.get(format!("http://{HOST}/probe")).send().await;
            return;
        }

        // ── parent: owns both servers, so it can see who was contacted ──
        let (vetted_addr, vetted_log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;
        let (proxy_addr, proxy_log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;

        // `tokio::process`, NOT `std::process`: a blocking `output()` here
        // would hold this single-threaded runtime, so the servers above could
        // never accept the child's connection — and the test would fail with
        // "did not reach the vetted address" for a reason that has nothing to
        // do with proxies. That exact false failure happened while writing it.
        let out = tokio::process::Command::new(std::env::current_exe().unwrap())
            // FULL path: `--exact` matches the whole test name including the
            // module. With the bare function name the child matched nothing,
            // ran zero tests, and exited 0 — so the parent saw a "successful"
            // child that had done nothing, and blamed the pin. The
            // `1 test` assertion below is there so that can never pass silently
            // again.
            .args([
                "net::tests::the_pinned_client_ignores_ambient_proxy_configuration",
                "--exact",
                "--test-threads=1",
            ])
            // **Clear the inherited proxy KILL-SWITCHES.**
            //
            // The child inherits this process's environment, and two inherited
            // values make the whole test vacuous — it passes with `.no_proxy()`
            // DELETED. Verified: `NO_PROXY='*'` and `REQUEST_METHOD=GET`
            // (hyper-util treats the latter as a CGI context and disables proxy
            // env entirely) each turn a genuine failure into `1 passed`.
            //
            // GitHub-hosted runners set none of these, so the gap was invisible
            // here — a self-hosted or corporate runner would have silently
            // neutered the regression test while it kept reporting success.
            .env_remove("NO_PROXY")
            .env_remove("no_proxy")
            .env_remove("REQUEST_METHOD")
            .env(VETTED, vetted_addr.to_string())
            .env("HTTP_PROXY", format!("http://{proxy_addr}"))
            .env("HTTPS_PROXY", format!("http://{proxy_addr}"))
            .env("ALL_PROXY", format!("http://{proxy_addr}"))
            .output()
            .await
            .expect("re-exec the test binary");
        let stdout = String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stdout);
        assert!(
            out.status.success(),
            "child run failed: {}",
            String::from_utf8_lossy(&out.stderr)
        );
        assert!(
            stdout.contains("1 passed"),
            "the child ran no test, so this proves nothing about proxies — \
             check the --exact filter. Child stdout:\n{stdout}"
        );

        let proxied = proxy_log.lock().unwrap().clone();
        let direct = vetted_log.lock().unwrap().len();
        assert!(
            proxied.is_empty(),
            "the pinned client used an ambient proxy, so the connect pin and \
             `is_forbidden_ip` were both bypassed — the proxy resolves the \
             hostname itself. Proxy saw: {proxied:?}"
        );
        assert_eq!(
            direct, 1,
            "the pinned client did not reach the vetted address it was pinned to",
        );
    }

    fn ok_200() -> String {
        "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\nContent-Length: 2\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\nhi".to_string()
    }
    fn redirect_to(loc: &str) -> String {
        format!("HTTP/1.1 302 Found\r\nLocation: {loc}\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
    }
    /// No `Location` and no body — which is what a 304 *is*, not a stub of one.
    fn not_modified_304() -> String {
        "HTTP/1.1 304 Not Modified\r\nETag: \"v1\"\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n".to_string()
    }
    /// `305 Use Proxy` — a relocating 3xx that names a PROXY, WITH a `Location`,
    /// so it would have been followed before the narrowing.
    fn use_proxy_305(loc: &str) -> String {
        format!("HTTP/1.1 305 Use Proxy\r\nLocation: {loc}\r\nContent-Length: 0\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
    }

    /// **An unfollowable 3xx is refused, not handed back.**
    ///
    /// Narrowing the follow set to `301|302|303|307|308` left a choice for the
    /// rest: return them, or refuse. Returning is the worse one, because callers
    /// do not uniformly check the status — `web::resolve_feed_url` reads the body
    /// straight into feed autodiscovery, so a `305` whose error page carries a
    /// `<link rel="alternate">` would quietly become a subscription.
    ///
    /// A 305 also carries a `Location`, so before the narrowing it was FOLLOWED:
    /// the request went through a proxy the response chose. Refusing is the
    /// stricter behaviour in both directions.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn an_unfollowable_3xx_is_refused_rather_than_returned() {
        let (addr, log) = spawn_http(vec![use_proxy_305("http://proxy.invalid:3128/")]).await;
        test_host_override("use-proxy.test", addr);

        let err = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://use-proxy.test:{}/feed.xml", addr.port()),
            &[],
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("a 305 was returned to the caller instead of refused");

        let msg = format!("{err:#}");
        assert!(
            msg.contains("305") && msg.contains("no single target"),
            "refused, but not as an unfollowable status: {msg}",
        );
        // Refused at the first hop: the proxy it named was never contacted.
        assert_eq!(log.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
    }

    /// **A `304 Not Modified` must reach the caller, not be read as a redirect.**
    ///
    /// `is_redirection()` is `300..=399`, so 304 — which carries no `Location`
    /// by definition — fell into the redirect branch and failed the whole fetch
    /// with "redirect response without a usable Location header". `feed.rs`
    /// sends `If-None-Match`/`If-Modified-Since` on every poll and has a correct
    /// 304 branch (`feed.rs`, `status == StatusCode::NOT_MODIFIED`) that could
    /// never be reached, so every feed answering "unchanged" was recorded as a
    /// failure and backed off exponentially.
    ///
    /// This was not theoretical: production logged it against `9to5mac.com`,
    /// `proton.me` and `kodi.tv`, and `/stats` reported 68 of 111 feeds failing
    /// while its own copy explained them away as "usually gone rather than
    /// flaky". Re-running the poller's conditional GET by hand returned
    /// `HTTP 304` with zero `Location` headers.
    ///
    /// The hop count is asserted too: a 304 must not provoke a second request.
    /// Returning the response but still looping would satisfy a status-only
    /// assertion while re-fetching every unchanged feed.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_304_reaches_the_caller_instead_of_being_read_as_a_redirect() {
        let (addr, log) = spawn_http(vec![not_modified_304()]).await;
        test_host_override("not-modified.test", addr);

        let resp = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://not-modified.test:{}/feed.xml", addr.port()),
            &[],
        )
        .await
        .expect("a 304 was treated as a redirect");

        assert_eq!(
            resp.status(),
            reqwest::StatusCode::NOT_MODIFIED,
            "the 304 did not survive the guard intact",
        );
        assert_eq!(
            log.lock().unwrap().len(),
            1,
            "a 304 caused more than one request — it was followed, not returned",
        );
    }

    /// **A real redirect is still followed** — the other half of the narrowing
    /// above, which would otherwise be satisfied by never following anything.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_302_is_still_followed_after_the_304_narrowing() {
        let (b_addr, _b_log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;
        test_host_override("still-follows-b.test", b_addr);
        let (a_addr, a_log) = spawn_http(vec![redirect_to(&format!(
            "http://still-follows-b.test:{}/final",
            b_addr.port()
        ))])
        .await;
        test_host_override("still-follows-a.test", a_addr);

        let resp = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://still-follows-a.test:{}/feed.xml", a_addr.port()),
            &[],
        )
        .await
        .expect("the 302 was not followed");

        assert_eq!(resp.status(), reqwest::StatusCode::OK);
        assert_eq!(a_log.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
    }

    /// **A redirect to a forbidden address is refused — the marquee SSRF
    /// property, and until now it had no end-to-end test.**
    ///
    /// `guarded_get_refuses_private_redirect_target` builds a 302 stub and then
    /// throws it away (`let _ = addr;`), asserting on a private URL passed in
    /// directly. Nothing drove a redirect through the guard, and a mutation that
    /// validated only the first hop — resolving redirect targets with a bare
    /// `lookup_host` and no `is_forbidden_ip` — left all 679 tests passing.
    ///
    /// Here a real server really 302s to the cloud metadata endpoint. Only the
    /// test server's own host is exempted from the IP check; the redirect target
    /// is an IP literal and goes through the real one.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_redirect_to_a_forbidden_address_is_refused() {
        let (addr, log) = spawn_http(vec![redirect_to(
            "http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/",
        )])
        .await;
        test_host_override("hop-forbidden.test", addr);

        let err = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://hop-forbidden.test:{}/feed.xml", addr.port()),
            &[],
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("a 302 to the metadata endpoint was followed");

        let msg = format!("{err:#}");
        assert!(
            msg.contains("169.254.169.254") && msg.contains("forbidden"),
            "refused, but not by the address check: {msg}",
        );
        // The hop happened; the SECOND hop is what was stopped.
        assert_eq!(log.lock().unwrap().len(), 1);
    }

    /// **Credentials do not follow a redirect off the original origin.**
    ///
    /// `hop_headers` is tested as a pure function; nothing tested that
    /// `guarded_get_inner` actually calls it. Swapping the call for a plain
    /// `extra_headers` — so a bearer token rides to whatever host an upstream
    /// names — left the whole suite green.
    ///
    /// Two real servers on two hosts. The first 302s to the second; the second
    /// records what it was sent.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn credentials_are_dropped_when_a_redirect_leaves_the_origin() {
        let (b_addr, b_log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;
        test_host_override("cred-b.test", b_addr);
        let (a_addr, _a_log) = spawn_http(vec![redirect_to(&format!(
            "http://cred-b.test:{}/next",
            b_addr.port()
        ))])
        .await;
        test_host_override("cred-a.test", a_addr);

        let resp = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://cred-a.test:{}/feed.xml", a_addr.port()),
            &[(
                HeaderName::from_static("authorization"),
                HeaderValue::from_static("Bearer super-secret"),
            )],
        )
        .await
        .expect("the cross-origin hop should still succeed, just without the token");
        assert!(resp.status().is_success());

        let seen = b_log.lock().unwrap().join("\n").to_ascii_lowercase();
        // **Anchor the two negatives below.** `!contains` is satisfied by the
        // header being absent OR by the capture being short, and those are
        // indistinguishable from here. Asserting the hop was recorded at all
        // means an empty or truncated capture fails loudly instead of reading
        // as a pass — which, for a check about not leaking a bearer token
        // across origins, is the difference that matters.
        assert!(
            seen.contains("get /next"),
            "hop B recorded no request, so the assertions below prove nothing:\n{seen}",
        );
        assert!(
            !seen.contains("super-secret"),
            "the bearer token was forwarded across origins:\n{seen}",
        );
        assert!(
            !seen.contains("authorization:"),
            "the Authorization header survived a cross-origin redirect:\n{seen}",
        );
    }

    /// **...but they DO survive a same-origin redirect.**
    ///
    /// The other direction, without which the test above is satisfied by a guard
    /// that strips every header always — which would quietly break every
    /// authenticated fetch in the app.
    ///
    /// A RELATIVE `Location` keeps the hop on the same origin without the
    /// response needing to know its own port.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn credentials_survive_a_same_origin_redirect() {
        let (addr, log) = spawn_http(vec![redirect_to("/second"), ok_200()]).await;
        test_host_override("cred-same.test", addr);

        let resp = guarded_get(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://cred-same.test:{}/feed.xml", addr.port()),
            &[(
                HeaderName::from_static("authorization"),
                HeaderValue::from_static("Bearer keep-me"),
            )],
        )
        .await
        .expect("a same-origin redirect should be followed");
        assert!(resp.status().is_success());

        let reqs = log.lock().unwrap().clone();
        assert_eq!(reqs.len(), 2, "the redirect was not followed");
        assert!(
            reqs[1].to_ascii_lowercase().contains("keep-me"),
            "the token was stripped on a SAME-origin redirect — over-stripping \
             would break every authenticated fetch:\n{}",
            reqs[1],
        );
    }

    /// **Every DNS answer is checked, not just the first.**
    ///
    /// A host that publishes `1.2.3.4, 127.0.0.1` must be rejected wholesale.
    /// Checking only the first answer left the suite green, because nothing
    /// exercised a multi-answer set — real DNS in a test cannot be made to
    /// return one.
    #[test]
    fn a_mixed_dns_answer_set_is_rejected_wholesale() {
        let public: SocketAddr = "1.2.3.4:80".parse().unwrap();
        let private: SocketAddr = "127.0.0.1:80".parse().unwrap();
        let link_local: SocketAddr = "169.254.169.254:80".parse().unwrap();

        // All public: the first is pinned.
        assert_eq!(
            first_vetted(
                "ok.example",
                [public, "5.6.7.8:80".parse().unwrap()].into_iter()
            )
            .unwrap(),
            public,
        );
        // A forbidden answer ANYWHERE rejects the set — including last, which is
        // exactly what a first-answer-only check would miss.
        for bad in [private, link_local] {
            assert!(
                first_vetted("evil.example", [public, bad].into_iter()).is_err(),
                "{bad} in the answer set was accepted because a good answer came first",
            );
            assert!(first_vetted("evil.example", [bad, public].into_iter()).is_err());
        }
        // No answers at all is an error, not a silent pass.
        assert!(first_vetted("empty.example", std::iter::empty()).is_err());
    }

    /// **The capture must hold the whole request, not the first 8 KB of it.**
    ///
    /// `spawn_http` recorded one `sock.read()` into a fixed 8 KB buffer and
    /// treated that as the request. Anything past it was never captured — and
    /// never seen by the assertions that read the capture.
    ///
    /// That matters because the assertions downstream are NEGATIVE:
    /// `credentials_are_dropped_when_a_redirect_leaves_the_origin` checks
    /// `!seen.contains("authorization:")`. A short capture satisfies that exactly
    /// as well as a stripped header does, and the two are indistinguishable.
    ///
    /// A body larger than the buffer makes the truncation deterministic rather
    /// than waiting on TCP segmentation, which is why this test can go red at
    /// all.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn the_request_capture_is_not_truncated_at_the_buffer_size() {
        let (addr, log) = spawn_http(vec![ok_200()]).await;
        test_host_override("big-body.test", addr);

        // Comfortably past the old 8 KB read, with a sentinel at the very end.
        let filler = "x".repeat(32 * 1024);
        let body = format!("{{\"pad\":\"{filler}\",\"tail\":\"THE-LAST-BYTES\"}}");

        // Not `let _ =`: a refused POST leaves the capture empty, and
        // "captured no request at all" would be the only symptom with the
        // cause thrown away.
        guarded_post_json(
            &reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap(),
            &format!("http://big-body.test:{}/ingest", addr.port()),
            &[],
            body.into_bytes(),
        )
        .await
        .expect("the POST to the test server failed before anything was captured");

        let seen = log.lock().unwrap().join("\n");
        // Positive anchor first: without it, the tail assertion below could pass
        // vacuously on an empty capture in some future refactor.
        assert!(
            seen.contains("POST /ingest"),
            "the server captured no request at all: {} bytes",
            seen.len()
        );
        assert!(
            seen.contains("THE-LAST-BYTES"),
            "the capture stops short of the request's end, so every negative \
             assertion over it — including the one about not leaking an \
             Authorization header across origins — can pass for the wrong \
             reason. captured {} bytes",
            seen.len()
        );
    }

    // ── TLS test server ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────

    /// How many times [`guarded_get_for_a_verdict`] asks, while the answer keeps
    /// being a timeout rather than a verdict about the certificate.
    ///
    /// **Nothing pins this number, and that is disclosed rather than implied.**
    /// Any value above one behaves identically on a healthy run, so pinning it
    /// would need a server that stalls past the 15 s per-read bound — a 15 s
    /// test. What IS pinned, in both directions, is the classifier the loop turns
    /// on: `a_timeout_is_recognised_as_a_timeout_and_not_a_certificate_verdict`
    /// for one, the assertion inside
    /// `the_test_ca_is_trusted_and_still_validates_hostnames` for the other.
    const VERDICT_ATTEMPTS: usize = 3;

    /// Whether an error out of [`guarded_get`] is a TIMEOUT rather than a verdict
    /// about the certificate.
    ///
    /// Classified from `reqwest::Error::is_timeout` through the `with_context`
    /// layer `guarded_get_inner` adds, not from the message text — the message
    /// is not a contract, and matching on it is how this file's other
    /// error-shape assertion passed for the wrong reason once already.
    fn is_timeout(err: &anyhow::Error) -> bool {
        err.downcast_ref::<reqwest::Error>()
            .is_some_and(reqwest::Error::is_timeout)
    }

    /// [`guarded_get`], asked again while the only answer is a timeout.
    ///
    /// **The certificate test is about whether the chain validates, and a
    /// timeout is not a verdict on that.** It was observed failing on the first
    /// HTTPS request in a freshly linked test binary — 11.7 s and 20.3 s
    /// measured on one macOS machine, against the 15 s per-read bound
    /// `build_pinned_client` sets. Nine later attempts on the same machine
    /// measured 8–17 ms, so the cause is NOT pinned; the leading candidate is
    /// CPU starvation with ~900 tests in flight, which no amount of warming
    /// would fix.
    ///
    /// Two earlier attempts at this are worth naming, because both were wrong in
    /// ways this one avoids. Widening `READ_TIMEOUT` changed a production
    /// constant to accommodate a test. Warming the platform verifier once per
    /// process rested on a claim that is simply false — reqwest builds
    /// `rustls_platform_verifier` whether or not an extra root is present
    /// (`reqwest-0.13/src/async_impl/client.rs`: both arms of
    /// `if config.root_certs.is_empty()`), so there was no test-only path to
    /// warm; it also failed silently, and issued a request into the caller's
    /// captured log.
    ///
    /// Retrying the timeout is insensitive to *which* cause it was, changes no
    /// production bound, and cannot mask a validation failure: a certificate
    /// verdict is returned on the first ask.
    async fn guarded_get_for_a_verdict(client: &Client, url: &str) -> Result<Response> {
        for _ in 1..VERDICT_ATTEMPTS {
            match guarded_get(client, url, &[]).await {
                Err(err) if is_timeout(&err) => {
                    eprintln!("asking {url} again after a timeout, not a verdict: {err:#}");
                }
                verdict => return verdict,
            }
        }
        guarded_get(client, url, &[]).await
    }

    /// **The retry turns entirely on this classifier, so pin it.**
    ///
    /// A classifier that stops recognising timeouts leaves the certificate test
    /// exactly as latency-sensitive as it was, with nothing to say so. The
    /// opposite direction — a certificate error must NOT read as a timeout, or a
    /// genuine validation failure would be retried and then reported as one — is
    /// asserted where such an error already exists, in
    /// `the_test_ca_is_trusted_and_still_validates_hostnames`.
    ///
    /// Uses a real timeout against a socket that is accepted and never answered,
    /// through the same `with_context` wrapping `guarded_get_inner` applies, so
    /// the downcast is exercised through a context layer rather than on a bare
    /// error.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn a_timeout_is_recognised_as_a_timeout_and_not_a_certificate_verdict() {
        let listener = tokio::net::TcpListener::bind("127.0.0.1:0").await.unwrap();
        let addr = listener.local_addr().unwrap();
        tokio::spawn(async move {
            // Accept and hold: answering nothing is the point, and dropping the
            // socket would end the request as a connection close instead.
            let mut held = Vec::new();
            while let Ok((sock, _)) = listener.accept().await {
                held.push(sock);
            }
        });

        let client = Client::builder()
            .no_proxy()
            .timeout(Duration::from_millis(250))
            .build()
            .unwrap();
        let raw = client
            .get(format!("http://{addr}/never"))
            .send()
            .await
            .expect_err("a server that never answers must not produce a response");
        assert!(
            raw.is_timeout(),
            "the silent server ended the request some other way, so this test is \
             not exercising a timeout at all: {raw}",
        );
        let err = anyhow::Error::from(raw).context(format!("fetching http://{addr}/never"));

        assert!(
            is_timeout(&err),
            "a real read timeout was not recognised as one, so the retry would \
             never retry and the certificate test stays latency-sensitive: {err:#}",
        );
    }

    /// **The chain really validates — no invalid-cert acceptance anywhere.**
    ///
    /// The foundation every test below rests on. If this passed because
    /// validation were disabled rather than because the CA is trusted, none of
    /// the others would mean anything, so it is asserted directly: a host the
    /// leaf has NO SAN for must still fail.
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn the_test_ca_is_trusted_and_still_validates_hostnames() {
        let (addr, _log) = spawn_tls(|_| {
            let mut r = std::collections::HashMap::new();
            r.insert("/ok".to_string(), vec![TestResponse::json(200, "{}")]);
            r
        })
        .await;
        test_host_override("feed-tls.test", addr);
        // Registered, resolvable — but NOT in the leaf's SAN list.
        test_host_override("not-in-san.test", addr);

        let client = reqwest::Client::builder().build().unwrap();
        // Asked again on a timeout — see `guarded_get_for_a_verdict`. A timeout
        // is not a verdict about this chain, and this test is only about the
        // verdict.
        let ok = guarded_get_for_a_verdict(
            &client,
            &format!("https://feed-tls.test:{}/ok", addr.port()),
        )
        .await
        .expect("a SAN-matching https host should be accepted");
        assert!(ok.status().is_success());

        let err = guarded_get_for_a_verdict(
            &client,
            &format!("https://not-in-san.test:{}/ok", addr.port()),
        )
        .await
        .expect_err("a host with no SAN must still fail: validation is NOT disabled");
        // **The other half of the classifier, pinned where such an error exists.**
        // If a certificate verdict read as a timeout, this failure would be
        // retried `VERDICT_ATTEMPTS` times and then reported anyway — and the
        // retry would be masking exactly the failure it must never mask.
        assert!(
            !is_timeout(&err),
            "a certificate verdict was classified as a timeout, so the retry              would retry a genuine validation failure: {err:#}",
        );
        // **Assert the CERTIFICATE reason, not merely that it failed.**
        //
        // An earlier version accepted `msg.contains("name")`, which the DNS error
        // `nodename nor servname provided` also satisfies — so deleting the
        // `test_host_override` line above made this pass while proving nothing
        // about SAN validation. Verified: it did.
        let msg = format!("{err:#}").to_ascii_lowercase();
        assert!(
            msg.contains("notvalidforname") || msg.contains("invalid peer certificate"),
            "failed, but not because the certificate is invalid for this name — a \
             DNS or connect failure would prove nothing here: {msg}",
        );
    }
}