Expand description
Offline Windows DPAPI decryption — a DonPAPI/dploot-class core in pure Rust. No FFI, no live host: point it at files copied off disk.
masterkey— parse a user masterkey file and decrypt it from the user’s password + SID.blob— parse aDPAPI_BLOB(CryptProtectDataoutput) and decrypt it with a masterkey.crypto— the underlying primitives.
§VALIDATION STATUS (read this)
This is the one crate in the ADhammer set that is a from-scratch crypto build, not an extraction of already-live code. Its honesty bar is therefore explicit:
-
Primitives — VALIDATED. PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 (RFC 6070), HMAC-SHA1 (RFC 2202) and HMAC-SHA512 (RFC 4231) are checked against published known-answer vectors in
crypto’s tests — a genuine external oracle, not a self-round-trip. -
Parsers — VALIDATED (structure). Deterministic layout tests for the masterkey file, masterkey subfield, and
DPAPI_BLOB, plus truncation-safety. -
Masterkey decrypt chain — VALIDATED (0.1.2, 2026-08-31). The full parser +
ms_derive_key+ AES256-CBC + HMAC-verify chain is exercised on every test run against a deterministic KAT (KAT_MK_SUBFIELDinmasterkey::tests). 0.1.2 rebuilt the KAT from synthetic throwaway credentials viadocs/synthetic_kat.py— earlier 0.1.1 embedded values derived from a real lab masterkey (Administrator on the icedracon testlab) and was yanked to stop the credential-material distribution; the synthetic KAT still exercises byte-oracle equivalence with impacket 0.14dpapi.pybecause it uses the same algorithm that impacket implements — but nothing in the fixture maps back to a real account.The masterkey chain itself was proved correct against a real Windows Server 2025 domain Administrator masterkey during the 0.1.1 development cycle; that experiment is what discovered 0.1.0’s PBKDF2 used the RFC 8018 formulation, while Windows DPAPI uses a non-standard variant that feeds the running XOR back into the PRF at every round (
ms_derive_key). 0.1.1+ routes every masterkey decrypt through that variant, adds MD4- Protected-Users pre-key derivations, and
unlock_masterkeyhandles standalone, pre-2019 domain-joined, and 2019+ domain-joined / Protected-Users accounts transparently. Operators can re-run the live byte-oracle themselves via the ignoredtest_real_masterkey/test_real_masterkey_with_pwdkeytests +DPAPI_MK_FILE=…/DPAPI_MK_PWDKEY=…env vars.
- Protected-Users pre-key derivations, and
-
Blob decrypt chain — NOT YET VALIDATED end-to-end. The
blobderivation follows MS-DPAPI and impacket, but has not been run against a real Windows-generated blob yet — validate the same way: run impacketdpapi.py credential/vaultagainst the same bytes as the byte-oracle.
Re-exports§
pub use blob::DpapiBlob;pub use masterkey::MasterKey;pub use masterkey::MasterKeyFile;
Modules§
- blob
- DPAPI data-blob (
DPAPI_BLOB) parsing and decryption. - crypto
- DPAPI crypto primitives. These are the parts validated against published RFC
known-answer vectors (see the tests) — PBKDF2-HMAC-SHA1 (RFC 6070) and HMAC (RFC 2202 /
4231). The DPAPI-specific derivation that uses them lives in
masterkey/blob. - masterkey
- DPAPI user masterkey file parsing and decryption.
Enums§
- Dpapi
Error - Errors from parsing or decrypting DPAPI structures.
Functions§
- unlock_
masterkey - Convenience: decrypt a masterkey file’s masterkey from a password + SID. Tries all three pre-key derivations in this order — standalone SHA1, domain MD4, Protected-Users PBKDF2- SHA256 — and returns the first that HMAC-verifies. On a Server 2019+ domain admin the Protected-Users variant is what wins; on an old Server 2012 standalone box it’s the SHA1 variant. Caller doesn’t have to know which category the account is in.