dig_tls/

node_cert.rs

//! The per-peer node certificate — generated locally at first run, signed by the DigNetwork CA.
//!
//! Every DIG peer mints ONE leaf certificate (mirroring Chia's `create_all_ssl`): a fresh ECDSA
//! P-256 TLS key pair, a leaf signed by the shipped [`crate::ca::DigCa`], carrying the #1204 BLS-G1
//! binding ([`crate::binding`]). The leaf's `peer_id = SHA-256(SPKI DER)` is the peer's transport
//! identity. The cert serves BOTH directions of mutual TLS (it has `serverAuth` + `clientAuth` EKUs),
//! so the same `NodeCert` is presented whether the peer dials out or accepts a dial.
//!
//! The cert + key are persisted PEM under a caller-chosen directory and regenerated only if absent,
//! so a peer keeps a stable `peer_id` across restarts.

use std::fs;
use std::path::{Path, PathBuf};

use rcgen::{
    CertificateParams, DistinguishedName, DnType, ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose, Ia5String, KeyPair,
    KeyUsagePurpose, SanType, PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256,
};
use rustls_pki_types::{CertificateDer, PrivateKeyDer};
use time::{Duration, OffsetDateTime};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;

use crate::binding::attach_binding;
use crate::bls::SecretKey;
use crate::ca::{DigCa, CLOCK_SKEW_BACKDATE};
use crate::error::{DigTlsError, Result};
use crate::identity::{peer_id_from_tls_spki_der, PeerId};

/// Leaf validity window: 10 years. A DIG peer's identity is its `peer_id` + BLS binding, not the
/// cert's lifetime, so a long-lived leaf keeps the identity stable without any renewal machinery at
/// this foundation layer. (A future consumer MAY rotate by deleting the persisted pair.)
pub const LEAF_LIFETIME: Duration = Duration::days(365 * 10);

/// The single SAN on a DIG peer leaf. Peers authenticate by `peer_id` + BLS binding, NOT by
/// hostname, so the SAN is a fixed, non-load-bearing placeholder (the rustls verifiers do not check
/// it — see [`crate::verify`]).
const LEAF_SAN: &str = "peer.dig";

/// The on-disk file names for the persisted node cert + key.
const CERT_FILE: &str = "node.crt";
const KEY_FILE: &str = "node.key";

/// The on-disk file names for the RETIRING (previous) cert + key, written by [`NodeCert::rotate`] and
/// deleted by [`retire_previous`]. These are NEW, additive files — the current identity always stays
/// in [`CERT_FILE`]/[`KEY_FILE`], so a reader that predates rotation still loads unchanged (§5.1).
const CERT_FILE_PREV: &str = "node.crt.prev";
const KEY_FILE_PREV: &str = "node.key.prev";

/// The outcome of a machine-key rotation ([`NodeCert::rotate`]): the retiring `previous` identity and
/// the freshly minted `current` one.
///
/// Because `peer_id = SHA-256(SPKI DER)` and the SPKI commits the BLS binding, a rotation mints a
/// brand-new key pair and therefore a brand-new `peer_id` — this is an IDENTITY CHANGE, not a cert
/// renewal. dig-tls is a library and does NOT do networking; it hands back BOTH identities so the
/// CALLER (dig-node) can dual-present — keep accepting inbound on the old `peer_id` while it
/// re-announces the new `peer_id` to DHT/PEX/relay — then call [`retire_previous`] once the
/// re-announce converges.
///
/// The derived `Debug` renders only each identity's redacting [`NodeCert`] `Debug` — never key bytes.
#[derive(Debug)]
pub struct RotatedNodeCert {
    previous: NodeCert,
    current: NodeCert,
}

impl RotatedNodeCert {
    /// The retiring identity. Present it (and accept inbound on its `peer_id`) during the overlap
    /// window, until the caller's re-announce converges and it calls [`retire_previous`].
    pub fn previous(&self) -> &NodeCert {
        &self.previous
    }

    /// The freshly minted identity to advertise going forward.
    pub fn current(&self) -> &NodeCert {
        &self.current
    }

    /// Consume the rotation, keeping only the new current identity (drops + scrubs the previous key).
    pub fn into_current(self) -> NodeCert {
        self.current
    }
}

/// A peer's mTLS identity certificate + private key, plus its derived `peer_id`.
///
/// The private key is held in [`Zeroizing`] so every clone/drop scrubs the plaintext PKCS#8 bytes
/// from freed heap. [`NodeCert`] deliberately does not derive `Clone` for the same reason — pass a
/// reference.
pub struct NodeCert {
    cert_pem: String,
    key_pem: Zeroizing<String>,
    cert_der: Vec<u8>,
    key_der: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>,
    spki_der: Vec<u8>,
    peer_id: PeerId,
}

impl std::fmt::Debug for NodeCert {
    /// Never renders the private key material.
    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
        f.debug_struct("NodeCert")
            .field("peer_id", &self.peer_id)
            .field("key_pem", &"<redacted>")
            .finish()
    }
}

impl NodeCert {
    /// Generate a new node cert signed by the shipped, public DigNetwork CA (the common path).
    pub fn generate_signed(bls_sk: &SecretKey) -> Result<Self> {
        Self::generate_signed_by(&DigCa::embedded()?, bls_sk, OffsetDateTime::now_utc())
    }

    /// Generate a new node cert signed by an explicit CA at an explicit issuance time (used by tests
    /// with a throwaway CA, and internally by [`Self::generate_signed`]).
    pub fn generate_signed_by(ca: &DigCa, bls_sk: &SecretKey, now: OffsetDateTime) -> Result<Self> {
        let leaf_key = KeyPair::generate_for(&PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256)
            .map_err(|e| DigTlsError::CertGen(format!("generate leaf key: {e}")))?;

        let mut params = CertificateParams::new(Vec::<String>::new())
            .map_err(|e| DigTlsError::CertGen(format!("leaf params: {e}")))?;
        params.not_before = now - CLOCK_SKEW_BACKDATE;
        params.not_after = now + LEAF_LIFETIME;

        let mut dn = DistinguishedName::new();
        dn.push(DnType::CommonName, LEAF_SAN);
        params.distinguished_name = dn;

        let san = Ia5String::try_from(LEAF_SAN.to_string())
            .map_err(|e| DigTlsError::CertGen(format!("leaf SAN: {e}")))?;
        params.subject_alt_names = vec![SanType::DnsName(san)];
        params.key_usages = vec![KeyUsagePurpose::DigitalSignature];
        // Both EKUs so the ONE leaf authenticates in either direction of the mutual-TLS handshake.
        params.extended_key_usages = vec![
            ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose::ServerAuth,
            ExtendedKeyUsagePurpose::ClientAuth,
        ];

        // Bind peer_id ↔ BLS key BEFORE signing (the extension is part of the signed TBS cert).
        attach_binding(&mut params, &leaf_key, bls_sk);

        let cert = params
            .signed_by(&leaf_key, &ca.cert, &ca.key)
            .map_err(|e| DigTlsError::CertGen(format!("sign leaf: {e}")))?;

        Self::from_parts(
            cert.pem(),
            Zeroizing::new(leaf_key.serialize_pem()),
            &leaf_key,
        )
    }

    /// Load a persisted node cert + key from `dir`, or generate + persist a new one signed by the
    /// shipped DigNetwork CA if either file is absent. Keeps a peer's `peer_id` stable across restarts.
    pub fn load_or_generate(dir: impl AsRef<Path>, bls_sk: &SecretKey) -> Result<Self> {
        let dir = dir.as_ref();
        let cert_path = dir.join(CERT_FILE);
        let key_path = dir.join(KEY_FILE);
        if cert_path.exists() && key_path.exists() {
            let cert_pem = fs::read_to_string(&cert_path)?;
            let key_pem = read_key_to_zeroizing(&key_path)?;
            return Self::from_pem(&cert_pem, &key_pem);
        }
        let node = Self::generate_signed(bls_sk)?;
        fs::create_dir_all(dir)?;
        harden_dir_permissions(dir)?;
        atomic_write(&cert_path, node.cert_pem.as_bytes(), Secret::No)?;
        atomic_write(&key_path, node.key_pem.as_bytes(), Secret::Yes)?;
        Ok(node)
    }

    /// Rotate this peer's machine key: mint a FRESH `(TLS leaf, cert)` bound to `new_bls_sk`, persist
    /// it as the new current identity, and demote the existing on-disk pair to the additive `.prev`
    /// slot — WITHOUT losing it — so the caller can dual-present during the overlap window.
    ///
    /// The new leaf key means a new SPKI and therefore a new `peer_id`: rotation is an IDENTITY
    /// CHANGE (see [`RotatedNodeCert`]). The caller mints the new BLS identity secret in dig-identity
    /// and passes it in here; dig-tls never derives or stores a BLS key (mirroring
    /// [`Self::generate_signed`]). Cert-EXPIRY renewal under the SAME key is a separate, cheaper path
    /// — reissue with [`Self::generate_signed`] using the existing BLS secret; the `peer_id` is
    /// preserved only when the SAME TLS leaf key is reused, which this rotation deliberately is NOT.
    ///
    /// The existing `dir` MUST already hold a current cert + key (rotation replaces a live identity).
    /// The persisted key files stay owner-only `0600` (see [`write_key_file`]).
    pub fn rotate(dir: impl AsRef<Path>, new_bls_sk: &SecretKey) -> Result<RotatedNodeCert> {
        let dir = dir.as_ref();
        let cert_path = dir.join(CERT_FILE);
        let key_path = dir.join(KEY_FILE);
        if !cert_path.exists() || !key_path.exists() {
            return Err(DigTlsError::CertGen(
                "rotate: no current node cert to rotate (call load_or_generate first)".into(),
            ));
        }

        // Refuse to rotate while a prior rotation is still un-retired: a populated `.prev` slot means
        // an identity is mid-overlap. Overwriting it would silently DISCARD that in-flight retiring
        // identity (the caller may still be accepting inbound on its peer_id), so require the caller to
        // `retire_previous` first — one `.prev` generation at a time.
        let prev_cert_path = dir.join(CERT_FILE_PREV);
        let prev_key_path = dir.join(KEY_FILE_PREV);
        if prev_cert_path.exists() || prev_key_path.exists() {
            return Err(DigTlsError::CertGen(
                "rotate: a previous rotation is still un-retired (.prev slot present); \
                 call retire_previous before rotating again"
                    .into(),
            ));
        }

        // Load the identity being retired BEFORE touching disk, so a mid-rotation failure never
        // loses the live key: the caller still holds it in the returned `previous`.
        let previous = {
            let cert_pem = fs::read_to_string(&cert_path)?;
            let key_pem = read_key_to_zeroizing(&key_path)?;
            Self::from_pem(&cert_pem, &key_pem)?
        };

        // Mint the fresh identity (new leaf key ⇒ new SPKI ⇒ new peer_id) bound to the caller's new
        // BLS secret. Generate it in full BEFORE any file write, so a generation error leaves the
        // on-disk current identity untouched.
        let current = Self::generate_signed(new_bls_sk)?;

        // Persist the retiring pair into the additive `.prev` slot FIRST (so the old key is durable in
        // two places), THEN atomically replace the current slot. Each `atomic_write` writes a sibling
        // `.tmp`, fsyncs it, renames it over the target (an atomic same-dir replace), and fsyncs the
        // parent dir — so a crash at any point leaves EITHER the intact old current or the intact new
        // one in `node.crt`/`node.key`, never a torn/truncated half-write of either.
        harden_dir_permissions(dir)?;
        atomic_write(&prev_cert_path, previous.cert_pem.as_bytes(), Secret::No)?;
        atomic_write(&prev_key_path, previous.key_pem.as_bytes(), Secret::Yes)?;
        atomic_write(&cert_path, current.cert_pem.as_bytes(), Secret::No)?;
        atomic_write(&key_path, current.key_pem.as_bytes(), Secret::Yes)?;

        Ok(RotatedNodeCert { previous, current })
    }

    /// Reconstruct a [`NodeCert`] from persisted PEM (its cert + private key).
    pub fn from_pem(cert_pem: &str, key_pem: &str) -> Result<Self> {
        let key = KeyPair::from_pem(key_pem)
            .map_err(|e| DigTlsError::Parse(format!("parse leaf key: {e}")))?;
        Self::from_parts(
            cert_pem.to_string(),
            Zeroizing::new(key_pem.to_string()),
            &key,
        )
    }

    /// Assemble a [`NodeCert`] from its PEM parts, deriving the DER forms + `peer_id` once.
    ///
    /// Enforces cert⇔key consistency: the certificate MUST certify the SAME public key the private key
    /// holds (SPKI DER equal). A mismatched pair — a cert paired with the wrong key on disk, or a
    /// half-completed swap of one slot but not the other — is REJECTED rather than loaded, so a peer
    /// never presents a cert it cannot prove possession of.
    fn from_parts(cert_pem: String, key_pem: Zeroizing<String>, key: &KeyPair) -> Result<Self> {
        let cert_der = rustls_pemfile::certs(&mut cert_pem.as_bytes())
            .next()
            .and_then(|r| r.ok())
            .ok_or_else(|| DigTlsError::Parse("leaf PEM has no certificate".into()))?
            .to_vec();
        let key_der = key.serialize_der();
        let spki_der = key.public_key_der();

        // The cert must certify this exact key: compare the cert's SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER to the
        // key's own SPKI DER. peer_id is derived from the KEY's SPKI, so a silent mismatch would pin a
        // peer_id the presented cert does not actually carry.
        let (_, x509) = x509_parser::parse_x509_certificate(&cert_der)
            .map_err(|e| DigTlsError::Parse(format!("leaf certificate is not valid X.509: {e}")))?;
        if x509.tbs_certificate.subject_pki.raw != spki_der.as_slice() {
            return Err(DigTlsError::Parse(
                "cert/key mismatch: the certificate does not certify the supplied private key"
                    .into(),
            ));
        }

        let peer_id = peer_id_from_tls_spki_der(&spki_der);
        Ok(Self {
            cert_pem,
            key_pem,
            cert_der,
            key_der: Zeroizing::new(key_der),
            spki_der,
            peer_id,
        })
    }

    /// This peer's transport identity, `peer_id = SHA-256(SPKI DER)`.
    pub fn peer_id(&self) -> PeerId {
        self.peer_id
    }

    /// The leaf's SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER (what `peer_id` is the SHA-256 of).
    pub fn spki_der(&self) -> &[u8] {
        &self.spki_der
    }

    /// The leaf certificate in DER form.
    pub fn cert_der(&self) -> &[u8] {
        &self.cert_der
    }

    /// The leaf certificate, PEM-encoded (for persistence / inspection).
    pub fn cert_pem(&self) -> &str {
        &self.cert_pem
    }

    /// The private key, PEM-encoded. Handle with care — this is secret-ADJACENT (the key authorizes
    /// the peer's identity, though the DigNetwork CA itself is public).
    pub fn key_pem(&self) -> &str {
        &self.key_pem
    }

    /// The rustls certificate chain to present in a handshake (just the leaf — the DigNetwork CA is a
    /// well-known trust anchor every peer already embeds, so it is not sent on the wire).
    pub fn rustls_cert_chain(&self) -> Vec<CertificateDer<'static>> {
        vec![CertificateDer::from(self.cert_der.clone())]
    }

    /// The rustls private key for the handshake.
    pub fn rustls_private_key(&self) -> PrivateKeyDer<'static> {
        PrivateKeyDer::try_from(self.key_der.to_vec())
            .expect("a freshly serialized PKCS#8 key is always a valid PrivateKeyDer")
    }
}

/// Load the RETIRING (previous) identity persisted by [`NodeCert::rotate`], if a `.prev` slot exists.
///
/// Lets a caller resume dual-presenting the old `peer_id` after a restart that happened mid-overlap
/// (before [`retire_previous`] ran). Returns `Ok(None)` when no `.prev` slot is present.
pub fn load_previous(dir: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<Option<NodeCert>> {
    let dir = dir.as_ref();
    let cert_path = dir.join(CERT_FILE_PREV);
    let key_path = dir.join(KEY_FILE_PREV);
    if !cert_path.exists() || !key_path.exists() {
        return Ok(None);
    }
    let cert_pem = fs::read_to_string(&cert_path)?;
    let key_pem = fs::read_to_string(&key_path)?;
    Ok(Some(NodeCert::from_pem(&cert_pem, &key_pem)?))
}

/// Retire the previous identity: ZEROIZE the in-memory copy of the old key and delete both `.prev`
/// files. Call this only AFTER the caller's re-announce of the new `peer_id` has converged, since it
/// makes the old identity permanently unrecoverable. A no-op (returns `Ok(())`) when no `.prev` slot
/// exists, so it is safe to call unconditionally.
pub fn retire_previous(dir: impl AsRef<Path>) -> Result<()> {
    let dir = dir.as_ref();
    let cert_path = dir.join(CERT_FILE_PREV);
    let key_path = dir.join(KEY_FILE_PREV);
    if key_path.exists() {
        // Read the old key into a scrubbing buffer and let it drop: this zeroizes the plaintext key
        // bytes in our address space. (Portable filesystems cannot guarantee the on-disk blocks are
        // physically overwritten; deleting the file is the strongest cross-platform guarantee.)
        drop(Zeroizing::new(fs::read(&key_path)?));
        fs::remove_file(&key_path)?;
    }
    if cert_path.exists() {
        fs::remove_file(&cert_path)?;
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Whether an [`atomic_write`] target holds secret key material (created `0600` / ACL-hardened) or a
/// public certificate.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
enum Secret {
    Yes,
    No,
}

/// Read a private-key PEM file into a scrubbing buffer so the intermediate plaintext PEM never lands
/// in a plain, non-zeroized `String` that lingers on the heap after use.
fn read_key_to_zeroizing(path: &Path) -> Result<Zeroizing<String>> {
    Ok(Zeroizing::new(fs::read_to_string(path)?))
}

/// The sibling temporary path an [`atomic_write`] stages `dest` through (e.g. `node.key.tmp`).
fn tmp_path(dest: &Path) -> PathBuf {
    let mut name = dest.as_os_str().to_owned();
    name.push(".tmp");
    PathBuf::from(name)
}

/// Durably and atomically write `contents` to `dest`: stage a sibling `.tmp`, fsync its bytes, rename
/// it over `dest` (an atomic same-directory replace), then fsync the parent directory so the rename
/// itself survives a crash. A `Secret::Yes` target's tmp file is created owner-only `0600` (Unix) /
/// ACL-hardened (Windows) via [`write_key_file`], so key material is never briefly world-readable even
/// in the staging file. This replaces the old in-place truncate-then-write, which could leave a torn
/// (partially written / truncated) current slot if the process died mid-write.
fn atomic_write(dest: &Path, contents: &[u8], secret: Secret) -> Result<()> {
    let tmp = tmp_path(dest);
    match secret {
        Secret::Yes => write_key_file(&tmp, contents)?,
        Secret::No => fs::write(&tmp, contents)?,
    }
    // Flush the staged bytes to stable storage BEFORE the rename exposes them as `dest`.
    fs::OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(&tmp)?.sync_all()?;
    atomic_rename(&tmp, dest)?;
    if let Some(parent) = dest.parent() {
        fsync_dir(parent)?;
    }
    Ok(())
}

/// Atomically replace `to` with `from`. POSIX `rename(2)` is atomic within a directory and replaces an
/// existing destination in one step.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn atomic_rename(from: &Path, to: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    fs::rename(from, to)?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Atomically replace `to` with `from` on Windows. `fs::rename` maps to `MoveFileExW` with
/// `REPLACE_EXISTING` on modern Rust, but historically failed when the destination existed; fall back
/// to remove-then-rename in that case. The staged `.tmp` still holds the full new contents throughout,
/// so a crash in the sub-millisecond window between remove and rename is recovered on the next write.
#[cfg(windows)]
fn atomic_rename(from: &Path, to: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    match fs::rename(from, to) {
        Ok(()) => Ok(()),
        Err(_) if to.exists() => {
            fs::remove_file(to)?;
            fs::rename(from, to)?;
            Ok(())
        }
        Err(e) => Err(e.into()),
    }
}

/// Fsync a directory so a rename into it is durable (POSIX: an fsync of the file's data does not
/// guarantee the directory entry is on stable storage).
#[cfg(unix)]
fn fsync_dir(dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    fs::File::open(dir)?.sync_all()?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Windows cannot fsync a directory handle the POSIX way; `MoveFileExW` with `WRITE_THROUGH` semantics
/// makes the rename durable on its own, so there is nothing further to do here.
#[cfg(windows)]
fn fsync_dir(_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    Ok(())
}

/// Restrict `dir` to owner-only access (`0700`) before any secret is written into it.
///
/// The leaf private key is the peer's long-lived (10yr) transport-identity secret — the same
/// material Chia's `create_ssl.py` chmods `0600`. Without this, `fs::create_dir_all` leaves the
/// directory at the process umask default (commonly `0755`), letting any local unprivileged user
/// read the key and fully impersonate the peer (the SPKI pin + #1204 BLS binding are genuine, so a
/// stolen key is a genuine identity, not a detectable forgery).
#[cfg(unix)]
fn harden_dir_permissions(dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
    fs::set_permissions(dir, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o700))?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Windows has no POSIX mode bits; directory ACL hardening is handled per-file on the key itself
/// (see [`write_key_file`]), so there is nothing additional to do here.
#[cfg(windows)]
fn harden_dir_permissions(_dir: &Path) -> Result<()> {
    Ok(())
}

/// Persist the private key PEM at `path` with owner-only access, closing the world-readable window
/// a plain `fs::write` would leave open at the process umask default.
#[cfg(unix)]
fn write_key_file(path: &Path, key_pem: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
    use std::io::Write;
    use std::os::unix::fs::{OpenOptionsExt, PermissionsExt};

    // Create with 0600 baked into the `open(2)` call itself — no window where the key is briefly
    // world-readable between "write the file" and "chmod it after".
    let mut file = fs::OpenOptions::new()
        .write(true)
        .create(true)
        .truncate(true)
        .mode(0o600)
        .open(path)?;
    file.write_all(key_pem)?;
    // `mode()` on open() is masked by umask on some platforms; re-assert explicitly so the key is
    // always 0600 regardless of the caller's umask.
    fs::set_permissions(path, fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600))?;
    Ok(())
}

/// Best-effort ACL hardening on Windows: strip inherited access and grant only the current user.
///
/// This is defense-in-depth, not the gating fix (the exploit this PR closes is the Unix `0644`
/// world-readable case). `icacls` ships with every supported Windows version, so shelling out to it
/// avoids pulling a heavyweight ACL crate for a best-effort hardening step; a failure here is logged
/// as a best-effort miss, not a hard error, since the key is still written successfully.
#[cfg(windows)]
fn write_key_file(path: &Path, key_pem: &[u8]) -> Result<()> {
    fs::write(path, key_pem)?;
    if let (Some(path_str), Ok(user)) = (path.to_str(), std::env::var("USERNAME")) {
        // Remove inherited ACEs, then grant only the current user full control.
        let _ = std::process::Command::new("icacls")
            .args([path_str, "/inheritance:r", "/grant:r", &format!("{user}:F")])
            .output();
    }
    Ok(())
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;
    use crate::binding::{verify_binding_from_leaf_cert, BindingOutcome};
    use crate::bls::public_key_bytes;
    use crate::ca::generate_dig_ca;
    use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};

    fn test_ca() -> DigCa {
        let m = generate_dig_ca(OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).unwrap();
        DigCa::from_pem(&m.cert_pem, &m.key_pem).unwrap()
    }

    fn bls_sk(label: &str) -> SecretKey {
        let seed: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(label.as_bytes()).into();
        SecretKey::from_seed(&seed)
    }

    #[test]
    fn generated_cert_binds_peer_id_to_the_bls_key() {
        let ca = test_ca();
        let sk = bls_sk("node-cert/bind");
        let node = NodeCert::generate_signed_by(&ca, &sk, OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).unwrap();

        // peer_id is SHA-256 of the leaf SPKI.
        let expected: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(node.spki_der()).into();
        assert_eq!(node.peer_id().as_bytes(), &expected);

        // The cert carries a VALID binding to exactly this BLS key.
        match verify_binding_from_leaf_cert(node.cert_der()) {
            BindingOutcome::Bound { bls_pub } => assert_eq!(bls_pub, public_key_bytes(&sk)),
            other => panic!("expected Bound, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn distinct_peers_get_distinct_ids() {
        let ca = test_ca();
        let a = NodeCert::generate_signed_by(&ca, &bls_sk("a"), OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).unwrap();
        let b = NodeCert::generate_signed_by(&ca, &bls_sk("b"), OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).unwrap();
        assert_ne!(a.peer_id(), b.peer_id());
    }

    #[test]
    fn pem_round_trips_preserving_peer_id() {
        let ca = test_ca();
        let node =
            NodeCert::generate_signed_by(&ca, &bls_sk("rt"), OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).unwrap();
        let restored = NodeCert::from_pem(node.cert_pem(), node.key_pem()).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(node.peer_id(), restored.peer_id());
    }

    #[test]
    fn load_or_generate_is_stable_across_calls() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let sk = bls_sk("persist");
        let first = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &sk).unwrap();
        let second = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &sk).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            first.peer_id(),
            second.peer_id(),
            "a persisted cert is reloaded, not regenerated"
        );
    }

    /// Regression test for the key-at-rest finding: a persisted leaf key MUST be `0600` (owner
    /// read/write only) and its directory `0700` — never the umask-default world-readable
    /// `0644`/`0755` a plain `fs::write`/`fs::create_dir_all` would leave behind.
    #[test]
    #[cfg(unix)]
    fn load_or_generate_persists_the_key_owner_only() {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;

        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let sk = bls_sk("perms");
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &sk).unwrap();

        let dir_mode = fs::metadata(dir.path()).unwrap().permissions().mode() & 0o777;
        assert_eq!(dir_mode, 0o700, "cert directory must be owner-only");

        let key_mode = fs::metadata(dir.path().join(KEY_FILE))
            .unwrap()
            .permissions()
            .mode()
            & 0o777;
        assert_eq!(key_mode, 0o600, "private key file must be owner-only");
    }

    fn bls_pub_in_cert(cert_der: &[u8]) -> [u8; 48] {
        match verify_binding_from_leaf_cert(cert_der) {
            BindingOutcome::Bound { bls_pub } => bls_pub,
            other => panic!("expected Bound, got {other:?}"),
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn rotate_yields_a_new_peer_id() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let before = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("rotate/before")).unwrap();
        let old_peer_id = before.peer_id();
        drop(before);

        let rotated = NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("rotate/after")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(rotated.previous().peer_id(), old_peer_id);
        assert_ne!(
            rotated.current().peer_id(),
            old_peer_id,
            "rotation mints a fresh key, so the peer_id changes"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn rotate_returns_two_valid_spki_bound_certs() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let old_sk = bls_sk("rotate/valid-old");
        let new_sk = bls_sk("rotate/valid-new");
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &old_sk).unwrap();

        let rotated = NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &new_sk).unwrap();

        // Each cert's peer_id is SHA-256 of its own SPKI...
        for node in [rotated.previous(), rotated.current()] {
            let expected: [u8; 32] = Sha256::digest(node.spki_der()).into();
            assert_eq!(node.peer_id().as_bytes(), &expected);
        }
        // ...and each carries a valid binding to the RIGHT BLS key.
        assert_eq!(
            bls_pub_in_cert(rotated.previous().cert_der()),
            public_key_bytes(&old_sk)
        );
        assert_eq!(
            bls_pub_in_cert(rotated.current().cert_der()),
            public_key_bytes(&new_sk)
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn rotate_persists_current_and_previous_slots() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("rotate/persist-old")).unwrap();
        let rotated = NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("rotate/persist-new")).unwrap();

        // The current slot now holds the NEW identity...
        let reloaded = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("unused")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.peer_id(), rotated.current().peer_id());
        // ...and the additive .prev slot holds the OLD identity, reloadable across a restart.
        let prev = load_previous(dir.path())
            .unwrap()
            .expect("a .prev slot exists after rotate");
        assert_eq!(prev.peer_id(), rotated.previous().peer_id());
    }

    #[test]
    #[cfg(unix)]
    fn rotate_persists_both_keys_owner_only() {
        use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("rotate/perm-old")).unwrap();
        NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("rotate/perm-new")).unwrap();

        for f in [KEY_FILE, KEY_FILE_PREV] {
            let mode = fs::metadata(dir.path().join(f))
                .unwrap()
                .permissions()
                .mode()
                & 0o777;
            assert_eq!(mode, 0o600, "{f} must be owner-only after rotate");
        }
    }

    #[test]
    fn retire_previous_deletes_the_prev_slot() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("retire/old")).unwrap();
        let rotated = NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("retire/new")).unwrap();
        let current_peer_id = rotated.current().peer_id();

        retire_previous(dir.path()).unwrap();

        assert!(
            !dir.path().join(CERT_FILE_PREV).exists(),
            "prev cert deleted"
        );
        assert!(!dir.path().join(KEY_FILE_PREV).exists(), "prev key deleted");
        assert!(
            load_previous(dir.path()).unwrap().is_none(),
            "no .prev after retire"
        );
        // The current identity is untouched by retirement.
        let reloaded = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("unused")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.peer_id(), current_peer_id);
    }

    #[test]
    fn retire_previous_is_a_noop_without_a_prev_slot() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("retire/noop")).unwrap();
        // No rotation has happened; retiring is safe and idempotent.
        retire_previous(dir.path()).unwrap();
        retire_previous(dir.path()).unwrap();
    }

    #[test]
    fn rotate_requires_an_existing_current_cert() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        // Empty dir — nothing to rotate.
        assert!(NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("rotate/empty")).is_err());
    }

    #[test]
    fn load_previous_is_none_for_a_pre_rotate_dir() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("prev/none")).unwrap();
        assert!(load_previous(dir.path()).unwrap().is_none());
    }

    /// §5.1 additive guarantee: a dir written by a PRE-rotation reader (only `node.crt`/`node.key`,
    /// no `.prev` slot) still loads unchanged, and `load_previous` reports no previous identity.
    #[test]
    fn old_single_cert_dir_still_loads() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        let sk = bls_sk("compat/single");
        let original = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &sk).unwrap();
        let original_peer_id = original.peer_id();
        drop(original);

        // Exactly the two files an old writer produced; assert no .prev exists.
        assert!(!dir.path().join(CERT_FILE_PREV).exists());
        assert!(load_previous(dir.path()).unwrap().is_none());

        let reloaded = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &sk).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(
            reloaded.peer_id(),
            original_peer_id,
            "old single-cert dir loads identically"
        );
    }

    /// Defense-in-depth regression: a cert paired with the WRONG private key (their SPKIs differ) is
    /// rejected on load, never silently accepted — otherwise a peer would pin a `peer_id` derived from
    /// a key the presented certificate does not certify.
    #[test]
    fn from_pem_rejects_a_mismatched_cert_and_key() {
        let ca = test_ca();
        let a = NodeCert::generate_signed_by(&ca, &bls_sk("mismatch/a"), OffsetDateTime::now_utc())
            .unwrap();
        let b = NodeCert::generate_signed_by(&ca, &bls_sk("mismatch/b"), OffsetDateTime::now_utc())
            .unwrap();

        // A's certificate paired with B's key — two independent key pairs, so the cert does not
        // certify the key.
        let err = NodeCert::from_pem(a.cert_pem(), b.key_pem())
            .expect_err("a mismatched cert+key pair must be rejected");
        assert!(matches!(err, DigTlsError::Parse(_)), "got {err:?}");

        // The matching pairs still load fine.
        assert!(NodeCert::from_pem(a.cert_pem(), a.key_pem()).is_ok());
        assert!(NodeCert::from_pem(b.cert_pem(), b.key_pem()).is_ok());
    }

    /// Double-rotate guard: rotating again while a `.prev` slot is still un-retired must error, so an
    /// in-overlap retiring identity is never silently overwritten. After `retire_previous`, rotation
    /// succeeds again.
    #[test]
    fn rotate_twice_without_retiring_is_rejected() {
        let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
        NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("double/old")).unwrap();

        let first = NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("double/one")).unwrap();
        let first_current = first.current().peer_id();
        drop(first);

        // A second rotation with the .prev slot still populated is refused...
        let err = NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("double/two"))
            .expect_err("a second rotation before retiring the first must error");
        assert!(matches!(err, DigTlsError::CertGen(_)), "got {err:?}");

        // ...and the current slot is untouched by the refused attempt.
        let reloaded = NodeCert::load_or_generate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("unused")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(reloaded.peer_id(), first_current);
        drop(reloaded);

        // After retiring the previous identity, rotation is permitted again.
        retire_previous(dir.path()).unwrap();
        let second = NodeCert::rotate(dir.path(), &bls_sk("double/three")).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(second.previous().peer_id(), first_current);
        assert_ne!(second.current().peer_id(), first_current);
    }

    #[test]
    fn debug_never_leaks_the_key() {
        let ca = test_ca();
        let node =
            NodeCert::generate_signed_by(&ca, &bls_sk("dbg"), OffsetDateTime::now_utc()).unwrap();
        assert!(format!("{node:?}").contains("<redacted>"));
    }
}