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dig_session/
session.rs

1//! The [`Session`] facade: unlock an existing key, or enroll a new identity.
2
3use std::sync::Arc;
4
5use dig_identity::{derive_identity_sk, master_secret_key_from_seed};
6use dig_keystore::scheme::KeyScheme;
7use dig_keystore::{BackendKey, KdfParams, KeychainBackend, Keystore, L1WalletBls, Password};
8use zeroize::Zeroizing;
9
10use crate::{Result, SessionError, UnlockedIdentity};
11
12/// Entry point for turning stored, encrypted key material into a live signer.
13///
14/// `Session` is a stateless namespace over the compose-only flow
15/// `dig_keystore::Keystore::<K>::load -> unlock -> SignerHandle<K>`, plus the
16/// enrollment path that derives the canonical dig-identity signing key and
17/// persists it. It holds no state of its own; every method is associated.
18pub struct Session;
19
20impl Session {
21    /// Unlock an existing keystore file into an [`UnlockedIdentity`].
22    ///
23    /// Generic over the storage scheme `K`: use [`dig_keystore::L1WalletBls`]
24    /// for a stored, already-derived key (the identity signing key, wallet
25    /// keys) and [`dig_keystore::BlsSigning`] for a seed-derived validator key.
26    /// The scheme is verified against the file's magic on load, so unlocking a
27    /// file with the wrong scheme fails cleanly rather than yielding a bogus key.
28    ///
29    /// # Errors
30    ///
31    /// Returns [`SessionError::Keystore`] if the file is missing, the password
32    /// is wrong, the ciphertext is tampered, or the scheme does not match.
33    pub fn unlock<K: KeyScheme>(
34        backend: Arc<dyn KeychainBackend>,
35        path: BackendKey,
36        password: Password,
37    ) -> Result<UnlockedIdentity<K>> {
38        let keystore = Keystore::<K>::load(backend, path)?;
39        let signer = keystore.unlock(password)?;
40        Ok(UnlockedIdentity::new(signer))
41    }
42
43    /// Enroll a new identity: derive the canonical dig-identity BLS signing key
44    /// from `seed`, persist it encrypted under `password`, and return it
45    /// unlocked and ready to sign.
46    ///
47    /// The identity key is derived exactly once, via
48    /// [`dig_identity::master_secret_key_from_seed`] followed by
49    /// [`dig_identity::derive_identity_sk`] (the hardened path
50    /// `m/12381'/8444'/9'/0'`), and the resulting secret key's canonical bytes
51    /// are stored. See the module-level note in [`crate`] on why the storage
52    /// scheme is [`L1WalletBls`] (faithful `from_bytes` round-trip) rather than
53    /// `BlsSigning` (which would re-derive via `from_seed` and produce a
54    /// different key).
55    ///
56    /// # Errors
57    ///
58    /// Returns [`SessionError::EmptySeed`] if `seed` is empty, or
59    /// [`SessionError::Keystore`] if a file already exists at `path` or the
60    /// write fails.
61    pub fn enroll_identity(
62        backend: Arc<dyn KeychainBackend>,
63        path: BackendKey,
64        password: Password,
65        seed: &[u8],
66    ) -> Result<UnlockedIdentity<L1WalletBls>> {
67        if seed.is_empty() {
68            return Err(SessionError::EmptySeed);
69        }
70
71        // Derive the canonical identity signing key ONCE, extract its canonical
72        // bytes, and drop the transient key material as early as possible.
73        //
74        // Custody note: `master` and `identity_sk` are `chia_bls::SecretKey`,
75        // which — even in the latest chia-bls (0.46) — is a plain
76        // `#[derive(Clone)]` wrapper over `blst_scalar` with NO `Zeroize`/`Drop`
77        // impl. We therefore cannot wipe those foreign scalars in place; the
78        // best we can do is (a) confine them to the smallest possible scope so
79        // the compiler drops them the instant we no longer need them, and (b)
80        // route every byte buffer WE own through `Zeroizing` so it is wiped on
81        // drop. The 32-byte `to_bytes()` array is a stack temporary, so it is
82        // wrapped in `Zeroizing` before being copied into the returned `Vec`.
83        // A cross-repo follow-up requests `Zeroize` on `chia_bls::SecretKey`
84        // (or a zeroizing derivation in dig-identity); see #1327.
85        let secret: Zeroizing<Vec<u8>> = {
86            let master = master_secret_key_from_seed(seed);
87            let identity_sk = derive_identity_sk(&master);
88            let canonical_bytes = Zeroizing::new(identity_sk.to_bytes());
89            Zeroizing::new(canonical_bytes.to_vec())
90            // `master` and `identity_sk` drop here — as early as possible.
91        };
92
93        // Persist the already-derived key. `unlock` needs the password again,
94        // and `create` consumes it, so clone before the move.
95        let unlock_password = Password::new(password.as_bytes());
96        let keystore = Keystore::<L1WalletBls>::create(
97            backend,
98            path,
99            password,
100            Some(secret),
101            KdfParams::DEFAULT,
102        )?;
103        let signer = keystore.unlock(unlock_password)?;
104        Ok(UnlockedIdentity::new(signer))
105    }
106}