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dig_node_control_interface/
traits.rs

1//! The two contract traits: the client-facing call builder/parser and the node-facing handler.
2//!
3//! * [`ControlCall`] binds a typed params struct to its [`ControlMethod`] and its typed result — so
4//!   a caller writes `client.request(&SetCapParams { cap_bytes })` and gets back a `SetCapResult`,
5//!   never a stringly-typed `Value`.
6//! * [`ControlClient`] is what a CLIENT depends on: build a JSON-RPC request from a typed call, and
7//!   parse a response back into the typed result (or a [`ControlError`]). Pure — no transport; the
8//!   consumer carries the bytes over dig-ipc / loopback-mTLS itself.
9//! * [`ControlHandler`] is what a NODE implements to SERVE the surface: one typed method per control
10//!   method, plus a provided [`dispatch`](ControlHandler::dispatch) that routes a raw request to the
11//!   right method — the single anti-drift seam the conformance KATs exercise.
12
13use async_trait::async_trait;
14use serde::de::DeserializeOwned;
15use serde::Serialize;
16use serde_json::Value;
17
18use crate::envelope::{JsonRpcRequest, JsonRpcResponse, RequestId};
19use crate::error::{ControlError, ControlErrorCode};
20use crate::method::ControlMethod;
21use crate::params;
22use crate::results;
23
24/// A typed control call: a params struct that knows its [`ControlMethod`] and its result type.
25///
26/// Implemented by every struct in [`crate::params`]; this is what makes
27/// [`ControlClient::parse_response`] return the right typed result for each method at compile time.
28pub trait ControlCall: Serialize {
29    /// The wire method this call invokes.
30    const METHOD: ControlMethod;
31    /// The typed result this call returns on success.
32    type Output: DeserializeOwned;
33}
34
35/// Serialize a typed call's params into a JSON object (`{}` for a no-param call, never `null`).
36fn params_value<C: ControlCall>(call: &C) -> Value {
37    match serde_json::to_value(call) {
38        Ok(Value::Null) => Value::Object(Default::default()),
39        Ok(v) => v,
40        Err(_) => Value::Object(Default::default()),
41    }
42}
43
44/// Build the JSON-RPC request envelope for a typed control call. Pure.
45pub fn build_request<C: ControlCall>(id: RequestId, call: &C) -> JsonRpcRequest {
46    JsonRpcRequest::new(id, C::METHOD.name(), params_value(call))
47}
48
49/// Parse a JSON-RPC response into a typed result, or the [`ControlError`] it carried. Pure.
50pub fn parse_response<C: ControlCall>(
51    response: JsonRpcResponse,
52) -> Result<C::Output, ControlError> {
53    let value = response.into_result()?;
54    serde_json::from_value(value).map_err(|e| {
55        ControlError::of(
56            ControlErrorCode::ControlError,
57            format!("failed to parse {} result: {e}", C::METHOD.name()),
58        )
59    })
60}
61
62/// The client-facing half of the contract: turn typed calls into requests and responses back into
63/// typed results.
64///
65/// The default implementations cover every client; a consumer implements this trait only to
66/// customise request construction (e.g. attaching the control token in a bespoke way). The blanket
67/// [`DefaultControlClient`] gives callers the standard behaviour for free.
68pub trait ControlClient {
69    /// Build the request envelope for a typed call with the given request `id`.
70    fn build_request<C: ControlCall>(&self, id: RequestId, call: &C) -> JsonRpcRequest {
71        build_request(id, call)
72    }
73
74    /// Parse a response envelope into the typed result for call type `C`.
75    fn parse_response<C: ControlCall>(
76        &self,
77        response: JsonRpcResponse,
78    ) -> Result<C::Output, ControlError> {
79        parse_response::<C>(response)
80    }
81}
82
83/// The standard, zero-configuration [`ControlClient`] using the default request/response behaviour.
84#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default)]
85pub struct DefaultControlClient;
86
87impl ControlClient for DefaultControlClient {}
88
89/// The node-facing half of the contract: a running node implements this to SERVE the control
90/// surface. Each method is typed to the catalog's params/results; the provided
91/// [`dispatch`](ControlHandler::dispatch) routes a raw [`JsonRpcRequest`] to the right method so a
92/// server needs only one entry point and can never mis-route.
93///
94/// Open/proxied shapes (the updater beacon status, the pairing list, the peer-pool snapshot) return
95/// [`Value`] rather than a frozen struct, matching the catalog's [`ControlCall::Output`] for those
96/// methods.
97#[async_trait]
98pub trait ControlHandler: Sync {
99    /// `control.status`
100    async fn status(&self) -> Result<results::StatusResult, ControlError>;
101    /// `control.config.get`
102    async fn config_get(&self) -> Result<results::ConfigResult, ControlError>;
103    /// `control.config.setUpstream`
104    async fn config_set_upstream(
105        &self,
106        params: params::SetUpstreamParams,
107    ) -> Result<results::SetUpstreamResult, ControlError>;
108    /// `control.log.setLevel`
109    async fn log_set_level(
110        &self,
111        params: params::SetLevelParams,
112    ) -> Result<results::SetLevelResult, ControlError>;
113    /// `control.cache.get`
114    async fn cache_get(&self) -> Result<results::CacheView, ControlError>;
115    /// `control.cache.setCap`
116    async fn cache_set_cap(
117        &self,
118        params: params::SetCapParams,
119    ) -> Result<results::SetCapResult, ControlError>;
120    /// `control.cache.clear`
121    async fn cache_clear(&self) -> Result<results::CacheClearResult, ControlError>;
122    /// `control.hostedStores.list`
123    async fn hosted_stores_list(&self) -> Result<results::HostedStoresListResult, ControlError>;
124    /// `control.hostedStores.pin`
125    async fn hosted_stores_pin(
126        &self,
127        params: params::PinParams,
128    ) -> Result<results::PinResult, ControlError>;
129    /// `control.hostedStores.unpin`
130    async fn hosted_stores_unpin(
131        &self,
132        params: params::UnpinParams,
133    ) -> Result<results::UnpinResult, ControlError>;
134    /// `control.hostedStores.status`
135    async fn hosted_stores_status(
136        &self,
137        params: params::HostedStoreStatusParams,
138    ) -> Result<results::HostedStoreStatusResult, ControlError>;
139    /// `control.capsule.fetch`
140    async fn capsule_fetch(
141        &self,
142        params: params::CapsuleFetchParams,
143    ) -> Result<results::CapsuleFetchResult, ControlError>;
144    /// `control.sync.status`
145    async fn sync_status(&self) -> Result<results::SyncStatusResult, ControlError>;
146    /// `control.sync.trigger`
147    async fn sync_trigger(
148        &self,
149        params: params::SyncTriggerParams,
150    ) -> Result<results::SyncTriggerResult, ControlError>;
151    /// `control.updater.status`
152    async fn updater_status(&self) -> Result<Value, ControlError>;
153    /// `control.updater.setChannel`
154    async fn updater_set_channel(
155        &self,
156        params: params::SetChannelParams,
157    ) -> Result<Value, ControlError>;
158    /// `control.updater.pause`
159    async fn updater_pause(&self, params: params::PauseParams) -> Result<Value, ControlError>;
160    /// `control.updater.resume`
161    async fn updater_resume(&self) -> Result<Value, ControlError>;
162    /// `control.updater.checkNow`
163    async fn updater_check_now(&self) -> Result<Value, ControlError>;
164    /// `control.pairing.list`
165    async fn pairing_list(&self) -> Result<Value, ControlError>;
166    /// `control.pairing.approve`
167    async fn pairing_approve(
168        &self,
169        params: params::ApproveParams,
170    ) -> Result<results::PairingApproveResult, ControlError>;
171    /// `control.pairing.revoke`
172    async fn pairing_revoke(
173        &self,
174        params: params::RevokeParams,
175    ) -> Result<results::PairingRevokeResult, ControlError>;
176    /// `control.peerStatus`
177    async fn peer_status(&self) -> Result<Value, ControlError>;
178    /// `control.peers.connect`
179    async fn peers_connect(
180        &self,
181        params: params::PeersConnectParams,
182    ) -> Result<results::PeersConnectResult, ControlError>;
183    /// `control.peers.disconnect`
184    async fn peers_disconnect(
185        &self,
186        params: params::PeersDisconnectParams,
187    ) -> Result<results::PeersDisconnectResult, ControlError>;
188    /// `control.chiaPeers.add` — start trusting a Chia full node the operator RUNS.
189    ///
190    /// An implementation MUST write through to the ONE peer store its wallet replica reads; a
191    /// second peer list is a drift bug waiting to happen.
192    ///
193    /// Three obligations the shell cannot infer from the types:
194    ///
195    /// - it requires the MASTER token ([`ControlMethod::requires_master_token`]). The entry it
196    ///   writes carries authority that outlives the calling token, and `control.pairing.revoke`
197    ///   does not remove it;
198    /// - `params.ip` is canonicalised with [`crate::params::canonical_peer_ip`] and STORED in that
199    ///   form, so `remove` and `list` can match what `add` wrote;
200    /// - `corroboration_bypassed` reports the RESULTING trust state and `notice` carries the
201    ///   node's own warning verbatim. Reporting a bypass that did not happen tells an operator
202    ///   they configured a node they did not.
203    async fn chia_peers_add(
204        &self,
205        params: params::ChiaPeersAddParams,
206    ) -> Result<results::ChiaPeersAddResult, ControlError>;
207    /// `control.chiaPeers.list` — the tracked Chia full-node peers, banned ones included.
208    ///
209    /// Ordinary token tier: a read that confers nothing, and a paired client that cannot show the
210    /// operator this list cannot show them the trust state they are subject to.
211    async fn chia_peers_list(&self) -> Result<results::ChiaPeersListResult, ControlError>;
212    /// `control.chiaPeers.remove` — stop trusting a Chia full node.
213    ///
214    /// MASTER token, like `add`. This is the ONLY un-trust remedy, so an implementation MUST
215    /// return [`results::ChiaPeerRemovalOutcome::NoSuchPeer`] when nothing matched rather than
216    /// reporting a removal it did not perform.
217    async fn chia_peers_remove(
218        &self,
219        params: params::ChiaPeersRemoveParams,
220    ) -> Result<results::ChiaPeersRemoveResult, ControlError>;
221    /// `control.subscribe`
222    ///
223    /// `params.kind` is OPTIONAL on the wire and absent means
224    /// [`SubscriptionKind::Capsule`](params::SubscriptionKind::Capsule). An implementation MUST
225    /// persist untagged rows it already holds as capsules rather than discarding them: a node that
226    /// refuses to read its own pre-existing `subscriptions.json` starts with an empty one, and the
227    /// upgrade silently unsubscribes the user from everything.
228    async fn subscribe(
229        &self,
230        params: params::SubscribeParams,
231    ) -> Result<results::SubscribeResult, ControlError>;
232    /// `control.unsubscribe`
233    async fn unsubscribe(
234        &self,
235        params: params::UnsubscribeParams,
236    ) -> Result<results::UnsubscribeResult, ControlError>;
237    /// `control.listSubscriptions`
238    async fn list_subscriptions(&self) -> Result<results::ListSubscriptionsResult, ControlError>;
239    /// `control.wallet.balance` (READ-only)
240    async fn wallet_balance(
241        &self,
242        params: params::WalletBalanceParams,
243    ) -> Result<results::WalletBalanceResult, ControlError>;
244    /// `control.wallet.coins` (READ-only, OPEN)
245    ///
246    /// An empty `coins` list MUST mean "a chain was consulted and this address holds nothing".
247    /// A read that could not consult a chain MUST return the matching catalogued error instead.
248    async fn wallet_coins(
249        &self,
250        params: params::WalletCoinsParams,
251    ) -> Result<results::WalletCoinsResult, ControlError>;
252    /// `control.wallet.coinById` (READ-only, OPEN)
253    ///
254    /// `Ok(coin: None)` MUST mean "a chain was consulted and holds no such coin". A read that could
255    /// not consult a chain MUST return the matching catalogued error instead — a caller that cannot
256    /// tell those apart reports a spent mint as pending forever.
257    ///
258    /// The params are validated at DESERIALIZATION (lowercase 64-hex, `0x` stripped), so any path
259    /// that decodes `WalletCoinByIdParams` refuses malformed ids as `INVALID_PARAMS` before this
260    /// method is called.
261    async fn wallet_coin_by_id(
262        &self,
263        params: params::WalletCoinByIdParams,
264    ) -> Result<results::WalletCoinByIdResult, ControlError>;
265    /// `control.wallet.coinSpend` (READ-only, OPEN)
266    ///
267    /// `Ok(spend: None)` MUST mean "a chain was consulted and holds no spend of that coin" — the
268    /// coin is unspent, or unknown. A read that could not consult a chain MUST return the matching
269    /// catalogued error instead: a caller following a singleton forward reads "no spend" as *this is
270    /// the tip* and stops walking, so a failure disguised as absence produces a spend built against
271    /// a superseded singleton.
272    ///
273    /// A returned spend's `puzzle_reveal` MUST tree-hash to the spent coin's own `puzzle_hash`, and
274    /// the implementation MUST fail closed — an error, never an unverified reveal — when it does not
275    /// or when the reveal will not parse. The reveal comes from a peer, and a peer can lie.
276    ///
277    /// The params are validated at DESERIALIZATION (lowercase 64-hex, `0x` stripped), so any path
278    /// that decodes `WalletCoinSpendParams` refuses malformed ids as `INVALID_PARAMS` before this
279    /// method is called.
280    async fn wallet_coin_spend(
281        &self,
282        params: params::WalletCoinSpendParams,
283    ) -> Result<results::WalletCoinSpendResult, ControlError>;
284    /// `control.wallet.coinsByParent` (READ-only, OPEN)
285    ///
286    /// Returns the parent's DIRECT children and nothing further. An implementation MUST NOT recurse:
287    /// a transitive walk over caller-supplied input is unbounded work the caller cannot bound, and a
288    /// partial walk returned as a complete one is a lineage with a silent hole in it.
289    ///
290    /// An empty list MUST mean "a chain was consulted and this parent created no known children".
291    /// A read that could not consult a chain MUST return the matching catalogued error instead.
292    ///
293    /// The answer is ONE PAGE. An implementation MUST return at most
294    /// `params.effective_limit()` records, in ASCENDING `coin_id` order, starting strictly after
295    /// `params.after_coin_id` when one is given; it MUST set `complete` to whether the page carries
296    /// the last child; and it MUST set `cursor` to the last record it actually returned (`None` for
297    /// an empty page). It MUST NOT report `complete: true` on a page it truncated — a caller reads
298    /// that as the end of a lineage branch. The params are validated at DESERIALIZATION, so an
299    /// out-of-range page size is refused as `INVALID_PARAMS` before this method is called.
300    ///
301    /// Every record MUST report `asset: None`: naming a coin by its parent classifies nothing, and
302    /// asserting a class this read never verified is a claim a caller would then spend against.
303    async fn wallet_coins_by_parent(
304        &self,
305        params: params::WalletCoinsByParentParams,
306    ) -> Result<results::WalletCoinsByParentResult, ControlError>;
307    /// `control.wallet.arrivals` (READ-only, TOKEN-GATED)
308    ///
309    /// Gated although it is a read: the caller supplies only a cursor, so the answer names this
310    /// node's OWN watched puzzle hashes and the receive history behind them.
311    ///
312    /// Every returned row MUST be a CONFIRMED arrival that the node itself judged: above its arrival
313    /// baseline, not previously reported, and not the wallet's own change. An implementation MUST NOT
314    /// emit a mempool sighting here, and MUST answer an empty page rather than an error when it has
315    /// no baseline — "nothing arrived" is the honest answer from a wallet that cannot yet tell
316    /// history from news.
317    ///
318    /// `cursor` MUST be the position of the last row actually returned (or the caller's `after_seq`
319    /// for an empty page) and MUST NOT be `latest`; see
320    /// [`WalletArrivalsResult::latest`](results::WalletArrivalsResult::latest).
321    async fn wallet_arrivals(
322        &self,
323        params: params::WalletArrivalsParams,
324    ) -> Result<results::WalletArrivalsResult, ControlError>;
325    /// `control.wallet.peak` (READ-only, OPEN)
326    async fn wallet_peak(&self) -> Result<results::WalletPeakResult, ControlError>;
327    /// `control.peerCounts` (READ-only, OPEN)
328    ///
329    /// `dig_peer_count` MUST be dig-node-core's `connected_peers` — the same figure
330    /// `control.peerStatus` reports — and `chia_peer_count` MUST be the SAME observation
331    /// `wallet_sync_status` reports, served from ONE source so the two answers agree. `None` means
332    /// the count cannot be observed; a network that is not running is UNKNOWN, never `Some(0)`.
333    async fn peer_counts(&self) -> Result<results::PeerCountsResult, ControlError>;
334    /// `control.wallet.syncStatus` (READ-only, OPEN)
335    ///
336    /// `WalletSyncPhase::Synced` MUST require BOTH that the initial catch-up completed and that at
337    /// least one Chia peer connection is live now, which makes it strictly stronger than
338    /// `WalletPeakResult::synced`. `peak_height` MUST be the node's OWN replica's height or `None`,
339    /// never an oracle's, and `chia_peer_count` counts CHIA full-node peers -- never DIG peers.
340    async fn wallet_sync_status(&self) -> Result<results::WalletSyncStatusResult, ControlError>;
341    /// `control.wallet.broadcast` (TOKEN-GATED)
342    ///
343    /// Pushes an ALREADY-SIGNED bundle: the implementation never signs, and never receives anything
344    /// it could sign with (§908). A mempool refusal is `Ok` with `accepted: false`; failing to
345    /// reach a mempool is `Err`.
346    async fn wallet_broadcast(
347        &self,
348        params: params::WalletBroadcastParams,
349    ) -> Result<results::WalletBroadcastResult, ControlError>;
350    /// `control.wallet.watch` (TOKEN-GATED)
351    ///
352    /// Enrols PUBLIC keys for the node's chain replica to follow. The implementation MUST derive the
353    /// addresses itself, from the SAME derivation it applies to the keys already in its own custody
354    /// — a second derivation is a second opinion about which addresses a key covers, and the client
355    /// would read the difference as missing money.
356    ///
357    /// It MUST be IDEMPOTENT: keys already enrolled are reported as `added: 0` and the call
358    /// succeeds. It MUST persist the enrolment across restarts — a set that evaporates on restart
359    /// makes a node that syncs today and reports a zero balance tomorrow.
360    ///
361    /// The params are validated at DESERIALIZATION (lowercase 96-hex, `0x` stripped), so any path
362    /// that decodes `WalletWatchParams` refuses a malformed key as `INVALID_PARAMS` — for the WHOLE
363    /// request — before this method is called.
364    async fn wallet_watch(
365        &self,
366        params: params::WalletWatchParams,
367    ) -> Result<results::WalletWatchResult, ControlError>;
368    /// `control.wallet.unwatch` (TOKEN-GATED)
369    ///
370    /// Deregisters keys, and the following MUST actually stop: the addresses leave the replica's
371    /// watched set, not merely the list this node reports. A registry that keeps syncing what it
372    /// says it forgot is the failure this method exists to make impossible.
373    ///
374    /// Deregistering a key that was never enrolled is a success reporting `removed: 0`.
375    async fn wallet_unwatch(
376        &self,
377        params: params::WalletUnwatchParams,
378    ) -> Result<results::WalletUnwatchResult, ControlError>;
379    /// `control.wallet.watched` (READ-only, TOKEN-GATED)
380    ///
381    /// Gated although it is a read: the caller supplies nothing, so the answer names this node's OWN
382    /// enrolled keys.
383    ///
384    /// MUST return exactly the keys enrolment added, in the wire form they were accepted in, so a
385    /// client can compare its own set against the node's by value. MUST NOT include the node's own
386    /// custody keys: this method reports what was ENROLLED through it, and a caller reconciling
387    /// against a superset would unwatch keys it never watched.
388    async fn wallet_watched(&self) -> Result<results::WalletWatchedResult, ControlError>;
389    /// `control.wallet.reservations.held` (READ-only, TOKEN-GATED)
390    ///
391    /// Gated although it is a read: the caller supplies nothing, so the answer names this node's OWN
392    /// in-flight commitments.
393    ///
394    /// An implementation MUST read its own clock rather than accept one, MUST omit every reservation
395    /// that has already lapsed at that instant, and MUST report the clock it used as `as_of_unix`.
396    ///
397    /// An implementation that cannot read its reservation set MUST return
398    /// [`ControlErrorCode::WalletReservationsUnavailable`](crate::error::ControlErrorCode::WalletReservationsUnavailable)
399    /// and MUST NOT return an empty list. "Nothing is held" permits a caller to spend; "I cannot
400    /// tell" must stop it, and the two are indistinguishable once collapsed.
401    async fn wallet_reservations_held(
402        &self,
403    ) -> Result<results::WalletReservationsHeldResult, ControlError>;
404    /// `control.wallet.reservations.reserve` (TOKEN-GATED)
405    ///
406    /// Acquisition MUST be atomic across concurrent callers: take EVERY coin in `coin_ids` or take
407    /// none. On a clash an implementation MUST have written nothing and MUST answer
408    /// [`ControlErrorCode::WalletCoinsReserved`](crate::error::ControlErrorCode::WalletCoinsReserved)
409    /// — never a shortfall code, because the user has the money and is waiting on a settlement, and
410    /// never a partial success, because a caller believing it holds inputs it does not is the state
411    /// all-or-none exists to make unreachable.
412    ///
413    /// An empty `coin_ids` MUST succeed, returning a handle that releases nothing.
414    ///
415    /// The hold MUST expire on its own. An implementation clamps the requested `ttl_secs` to its own
416    /// maximum, applies its default when none is given, and MUST report the lifetime it actually
417    /// applied — a caller told nothing would release on a schedule the node does not keep.
418    ///
419    /// An implementation MUST NOT require, accept or store key material here (§908). A reservation
420    /// is bookkeeping: it narrows what a selector will choose and authorizes nothing.
421    async fn wallet_reservations_reserve(
422        &self,
423        params: params::WalletReservationsReserveParams,
424    ) -> Result<results::WalletReservationsReserveResult, ControlError>;
425    /// `control.wallet.reservations.release` (TOKEN-GATED)
426    ///
427    /// Releasing a handle that names no live reservation — lapsed, or already released — MUST be a
428    /// SUCCESS reporting `released: false`, never an error. A caller releasing on confirmation
429    /// cannot know whether the TTL got there first, and an error there teaches callers to discard
430    /// the result, which is how the release path stops being called at all.
431    ///
432    /// An implementation MUST free every coin the handle holds, or none of them, for the same reason
433    /// acquisition is all-or-none: a half-freed reservation leaves coins held by a handle the caller
434    /// has thrown away, and only the TTL would ever recover them.
435    async fn wallet_reservations_release(
436        &self,
437        params: params::WalletReservationsReleaseParams,
438    ) -> Result<results::WalletReservationsReleaseResult, ControlError>;
439    /// `control.spends.list` (READ-only, TOKEN-GATED)
440    ///
441    /// One page of the automated-spend audit record — the spends this node made WITHOUT
442    /// per-transaction approval. Gated although it is a read: the caller names no identifier, so the
443    /// answer is this node's OWN spending history.
444    ///
445    /// An implementation MUST NOT let this call initiate, sign, retry, cancel or amend a spend, and
446    /// MUST NOT expose any control method that edits or deletes an entry. The record replaces
447    /// authorization with accountability, and an editable record accounts for nothing.
448    ///
449    /// Four obligations, each of which a plausible implementation gets wrong:
450    ///
451    /// - **Report the failure STAGE, never a bare "failed."** Only
452    ///   [`SpendFailureStage::Signing`](results::SpendFailureStage::Signing) means the money
453    ///   definitely did not move; a broadcast or confirmation failure is an unknown outcome. An
454    ///   implementation that flattens the stage makes every client structurally unable to tell a
455    ///   person the truth about their money.
456    /// - **Keep [`Unresolved`](results::SpendOutcome::Unresolved) distinct from `Failed`.** It means
457    ///   the node signed and does not know how it ended.
458    /// - **State completeness explicitly.** `complete` MUST be `false` whenever a matching row was
459    ///   withheld, and `cursor` MUST be the id of the last row actually returned.
460    /// - **Report unreadable entries.** `unreadable_lines` MUST count entries the node could not
461    ///   parse; a trail that lost rows must never read as a tidy shorter one. A record that could not
462    ///   be read AT ALL is
463    ///   [`SpendAuditUnreadable`](crate::error::ControlErrorCode::SpendAuditUnreadable), never an
464    ///   empty page — while a record that was never written IS an empty page, because a node that has
465    ///   never spent automatically is the ordinary case.
466    async fn spends_list(
467        &self,
468        params: params::SpendsListParams,
469    ) -> Result<results::SpendsListResult, ControlError>;
470    /// `control.collateral.requirement` (TOKEN-GATED)
471    ///
472    /// This epoch's derived per-store collateral requirement, with the census inputs behind it.
473    ///
474    /// Gated although the figure itself is derivable from chain by anyone: the UNKNOWN branch names
475    /// this node's own census position, and the caller supplies no identifier, so the answer is a
476    /// fact about this node rather than a relayed public one.
477    ///
478    /// Three obligations, each of which a plausible implementation gets wrong:
479    ///
480    /// - **Answer `unknown` WITH a reason rather than a number the node does not have.** A node that
481    ///   has not censused the epoch, or that sits inside `CENSUS_FINALITY_DEPTH_BLOCKS` of the tip,
482    ///   MUST return [`Unknown`](results::CollateralRequirementResult::Unknown). It MUST NOT return
483    ///   a zero, a stale epoch's figure presented as this epoch's, or an error that a client would
484    ///   render as "no collateral required" — under-posting costs the operator that epoch's rewards.
485    /// - **Report the protocol version that COMPUTED the epoch**, not the newest version this build
486    ///   implements. The two differ exactly when a node has upgraded mid-schedule, which is the one
487    ///   case where a client needs to know the difference.
488    /// - **Never derive the figure from the local safety margin.** The margin MUST NOT reach any
489    ///   value another node derives; `required_per_store_dig_base_units` is the pre-margin
490    ///   requirement, and a node that returned the margined amount here would make its own
491    ///   preference look like the network's price.
492    async fn collateral_requirement(
493        &self,
494    ) -> Result<results::CollateralRequirementResult, ControlError>;
495
496    /// `control.collateral.margin.get` (TOKEN-GATED)
497    ///
498    /// The node's local safety margin in basis points.
499    ///
500    /// A node whose stored configuration predates the field MUST answer
501    /// [`DEFAULT_SAFETY_MARGIN_BP`](params::DEFAULT_SAFETY_MARGIN_BP), never `0`: a zero margin is a
502    /// deliberate choice to post the requirement exactly, and reporting it for a config that never
503    /// expressed one tells the operator they opted out of a cushion they never declined.
504    async fn collateral_margin_get(&self) -> Result<results::CollateralMarginResult, ControlError>;
505
506    /// `control.collateral.margin.set` (TOKEN-GATED)
507    ///
508    /// Persist the node's local safety margin and return the margin now in force.
509    ///
510    /// The node is the authoritative home for this setting — the flywheel is headless, so a machine
511    /// with no GUI must be able to set it — and dig-app is a remote control for the same value.
512    ///
513    /// Two obligations:
514    ///
515    /// - **Persist it**, so it survives a restart. A margin that lapses to the default on reboot
516    ///   silently changes what the node posts.
517    /// - **Return what was actually stored.** The returned `margin_bp` MUST equal the accepted
518    ///   request's, because a value above [`MAX_SAFETY_MARGIN_BP`](params::MAX_SAFETY_MARGIN_BP) is
519    ///   REFUSED rather than clamped. An implementation that clamped and returned the clamped value
520    ///   would leave the caller's stored intent and the node's behaviour disagreeing on the money
521    ///   path.
522    async fn collateral_margin_set(
523        &self,
524        params: params::CollateralMarginSetParams,
525    ) -> Result<results::CollateralMarginResult, ControlError>;
526
527    /// `control.collateral.buffer` (TOKEN-GATED)
528    ///
529    /// The $DIG this node recommends holding, and its funding position against that figure.
530    ///
531    /// Gated although it is a read, for the same reason `control.wallet.watched` is: the caller
532    /// supplies nothing, so the answer is this node's OWN served set, operator preference and
533    /// balance — an association, not a relayed public fact.
534    ///
535    /// Four obligations, each of which a plausible implementation gets wrong:
536    ///
537    /// - **Answer `unknown` WITH a reason rather than a number the node does not have.** A zero here
538    ///   reads as *no buffer needed* — the money lie in its purest form, because an operator acting
539    ///   on it posts nothing and loses the epoch. An implementation MUST NOT substitute a zero, a
540    ///   previous epoch's buffer presented as this one's, or an error a client renders as "nothing
541    ///   required".
542    /// - **Count the pairs THIS NODE serves.** `pairs_served_by_this_node` is this node's own
543    ///   `(owner, store, root)` set. The census `stores` figure from
544    ///   `control.collateral.requirement` is a network-wide advertisement count and MUST NOT be
545    ///   substituted for it; a node that cannot enumerate its own set answers
546    ///   [`ServedSetUnknown`](results::CollateralBufferUnknownReason::ServedSetUnknown).
547    /// - **State the horizon actually used.** `horizon_epochs` and `escalation_ceiling_micros` MUST
548    ///   describe the headroom this answer contains, not a documented default. Escalation compounds
549    ///   at up to +12.5% per epoch ([`ESCALATION_UP_STEP_DENOM`](params::ESCALATION_UP_STEP_DENOM)), so a
550    ///   buffer quoted against an unstated horizon cannot be checked by anyone.
551    /// - **Decide the funding state here, once.** `funding_state` is the node's verdict, not a hint;
552    ///   an implementation that returned a placeholder and left clients to threshold the numbers
553    ///   themselves recreates the rival derivations this method exists to prevent.
554    async fn collateral_buffer(&self) -> Result<results::CollateralBufferResult, ControlError>;
555
556    /// `control.mirror.bondStates` (TOKEN-GATED)
557    ///
558    /// The per-`(store, root)` state of every mirror bond this node holds, and the $DIG they lock.
559    ///
560    /// An implementation MUST:
561    ///
562    /// - **Keep the seven states apart.** `unfunded` is the only genuine out-of-funds state.
563    ///   `deferred` (no priced requirement), `pending` (submitted, unconfirmed), `withheld`
564    ///   (`Relayed` provenance) and `disabled` (the node-wide switch) all mean "no coin yet" and
565    ///   none of them means "send money". Collapsing any of them into `unfunded` is the dig-app#300
566    ///   defect this method exists to remove.
567    /// - **Read `bonded` and `reclaiming` amounts FROM THE COIN**, never from this epoch's
568    ///   requirement. A coin created under a previous requirement locks the previous amount, and
569    ///   the current price is not a fact about an existing coin.
570    /// - **Enumerate the SERVED set, not only the desired-bond set.**
571    ///   [`Withheld`](results::MirrorBondState::Withheld) means a capsule this node holds with
572    ///   `Relayed` provenance, which is by construction absent from the `Held` set; a derivation
573    ///   keyed on `Held` alone can never emit it and silently answers "no such row" where the
574    ///   contract promises "withheld on purpose". An implementation that CANNOT see provenance MUST
575    ///   answer
576    ///   [`ProvenanceUnknown`](results::MirrorBondStatesUnknownReason::ProvenanceUnknown) for the
577    ///   whole call and MUST NOT return a `known` page — a page with its withheld rows silently
578    ///   missing claims a completeness the node knows it lacks.
579    /// - **Answer [`Unknown`](results::MirrorBondStatesResult::Unknown) for the WHOLE call** when it
580    ///   cannot enumerate its bonds, cannot read chain, cannot read its own in-flight creates, or
581    ///   cannot determine provenance.
582    ///   There is no per-row unknown and no empty-list fallback: `entries: []` with
583    ///   `complete: true` asserts this node holds no bonds, and a partial list read as a complete
584    ///   one hides exactly the bonds nobody is watching.
585    /// - **Compute `locked_dig_base_units` over the WHOLE set, including reclaiming coins**, and
586    ///   never over the page. A reclaim in flight still locks its money.
587    /// - **Order rows by ascending `(store_id, root)` and keep that order stable across the pages of
588    ///   one walk**, over the LOWERCASE unprefixed hex spelling of both halves, since `after` means
589    ///   *strictly after this key in that order* and uppercase hex sorts elsewhere. Set `complete`
590    ///   explicitly, and set `cursor` to the key of the LAST row actually handed back (`null` for an
591    ///   empty page) — never to a position the node "got to".
592    async fn mirror_bond_states(
593        &self,
594        params: params::MirrorBondStatesParams,
595    ) -> Result<results::MirrorBondStatesResult, ControlError>;
596
597    /// `control.profile.putBody` (TOKEN-GATED)
598    ///
599    /// An implementation MUST independently resolve the profile's root ON CHAIN, recompute the root
600    /// of the supplied body, and REFUSE the call unless the two agree and that root is confirmed.
601    /// The caller's `root` is a claim to be checked — never a fact to be trusted — and dig-app gets
602    /// no exemption: it holds the key and signs the root (§908), but the bytes reach the node the
603    /// same way a peer's bytes do, and the same check binds both. An implementation that stores
604    /// what it is handed makes this node serve arbitrary bytes under someone else's profile id.
605    ///
606    /// A body whose DECODED length exceeds [`MAX_BODY_BYTES`](params::MAX_BODY_BYTES) (4 MiB) MUST
607    /// be refused as `INVALID_PARAMS`, before it is persisted: a body larger than that cannot be
608    /// served to a peer inside dig-gossip's frame ceiling, so accepting it would store something
609    /// permanently unsyncable.
610    ///
611    /// Returning `Ok` therefore asserts BOTH that the root was confirmed on chain and that the body
612    /// is persisted and servable. A refusal is an error, never an `Ok` carrying `stored: false`.
613    async fn profile_put_body(
614        &self,
615        params: params::ProfilePutBodyParams,
616    ) -> Result<results::ProfilePutBodyResult, ControlError>;
617    /// `control.profile.getBody` (READ-only, TOKEN-GATED)
618    ///
619    /// `Ok(body_b64: None)` MUST mean "this node was consulted and holds no body at that root". A
620    /// read that FAILED MUST return a catalogued error instead — a caller that reads a failure as
621    /// absence renders an existing profile as an empty one.
622    ///
623    /// The returned `root` MUST be the root the caller asked for; a node MUST NOT substitute a
624    /// newer body it happens to hold.
625    async fn profile_get_body(
626        &self,
627        params: params::ProfileGetBodyParams,
628    ) -> Result<results::ProfileGetBodyResult, ControlError>;
629    /// `pairing.request` (OPEN)
630    async fn pairing_request(
631        &self,
632        params: params::RequestParams,
633    ) -> Result<results::PairingRequestResult, ControlError>;
634    /// `pairing.poll` (OPEN)
635    async fn pairing_poll(
636        &self,
637        params: params::PollParams,
638    ) -> Result<results::PairingPollResult, ControlError>;
639
640    /// Route a raw JSON-RPC request to the right typed method and build the response envelope.
641    ///
642    /// Deserializes the params for methods that take them, calls the handler, and serializes the
643    /// typed result. An unknown method → `METHOD_NOT_FOUND`; malformed params → `INVALID_PARAMS`.
644    /// This is the single seam a server dispatches through — the KATs exercise it end-to-end.
645    async fn dispatch(&self, request: JsonRpcRequest) -> JsonRpcResponse {
646        let id = request.id.clone();
647        let Some(method) = ControlMethod::from_name(&request.method) else {
648            return JsonRpcResponse::error(
649                id,
650                ControlError::of(
651                    ControlErrorCode::MethodNotFound,
652                    format!("unknown control method: {}", request.method),
653                ),
654            );
655        };
656        match self.dispatch_method(method, request.params).await {
657            Ok(result) => JsonRpcResponse::success(id, result),
658            Err(err) => JsonRpcResponse::error(id, err),
659        }
660    }
661
662    /// Route to the typed method by [`ControlMethod`], returning the result as a [`Value`]. Split
663    /// from [`dispatch`](ControlHandler::dispatch) so the envelope wrapping stays in one place.
664    #[doc(hidden)]
665    async fn dispatch_method(
666        &self,
667        method: ControlMethod,
668        params: Value,
669    ) -> Result<Value, ControlError> {
670        /// Deserialize a method's params, mapping a shape error to `INVALID_PARAMS`.
671        fn decode<T: DeserializeOwned>(params: Value) -> Result<T, ControlError> {
672            serde_json::from_value(params)
673                .map_err(|e| ControlError::of(ControlErrorCode::InvalidParams, e.to_string()))
674        }
675        /// Serialize a typed result to a `Value` (infallible for our derive-Serialize results).
676        fn encode<T: Serialize>(value: T) -> Result<Value, ControlError> {
677            serde_json::to_value(value)
678                .map_err(|e| ControlError::of(ControlErrorCode::ControlError, e.to_string()))
679        }
680        match method {
681            ControlMethod::Status => encode(self.status().await?),
682            ControlMethod::ConfigGet => encode(self.config_get().await?),
683            ControlMethod::ConfigSetUpstream => {
684                encode(self.config_set_upstream(decode(params)?).await?)
685            }
686            ControlMethod::LogSetLevel => encode(self.log_set_level(decode(params)?).await?),
687            ControlMethod::CacheGet => encode(self.cache_get().await?),
688            ControlMethod::CacheSetCap => encode(self.cache_set_cap(decode(params)?).await?),
689            ControlMethod::CacheClear => encode(self.cache_clear().await?),
690            ControlMethod::HostedStoresList => encode(self.hosted_stores_list().await?),
691            ControlMethod::HostedStoresPin => {
692                encode(self.hosted_stores_pin(decode(params)?).await?)
693            }
694            ControlMethod::HostedStoresUnpin => {
695                encode(self.hosted_stores_unpin(decode(params)?).await?)
696            }
697            ControlMethod::HostedStoresStatus => {
698                encode(self.hosted_stores_status(decode(params)?).await?)
699            }
700            ControlMethod::CapsuleFetch => encode(self.capsule_fetch(decode(params)?).await?),
701            ControlMethod::SyncStatus => encode(self.sync_status().await?),
702            ControlMethod::SyncTrigger => encode(self.sync_trigger(decode(params)?).await?),
703            ControlMethod::UpdaterStatus => self.updater_status().await,
704            ControlMethod::UpdaterSetChannel => self.updater_set_channel(decode(params)?).await,
705            ControlMethod::UpdaterPause => self.updater_pause(decode(params)?).await,
706            ControlMethod::UpdaterResume => self.updater_resume().await,
707            ControlMethod::UpdaterCheckNow => self.updater_check_now().await,
708            ControlMethod::PairingList => self.pairing_list().await,
709            ControlMethod::PairingApprove => encode(self.pairing_approve(decode(params)?).await?),
710            ControlMethod::PairingRevoke => encode(self.pairing_revoke(decode(params)?).await?),
711            ControlMethod::PeerStatus => self.peer_status().await,
712            ControlMethod::PeerCounts => encode(self.peer_counts().await?),
713            ControlMethod::PeersConnect => encode(self.peers_connect(decode(params)?).await?),
714            ControlMethod::PeersDisconnect => encode(self.peers_disconnect(decode(params)?).await?),
715            ControlMethod::ChiaPeersAdd => encode(self.chia_peers_add(decode(params)?).await?),
716            ControlMethod::ChiaPeersList => encode(self.chia_peers_list().await?),
717            ControlMethod::ChiaPeersRemove => {
718                encode(self.chia_peers_remove(decode(params)?).await?)
719            }
720            ControlMethod::Subscribe => encode(self.subscribe(decode(params)?).await?),
721            ControlMethod::Unsubscribe => encode(self.unsubscribe(decode(params)?).await?),
722            ControlMethod::ListSubscriptions => encode(self.list_subscriptions().await?),
723            ControlMethod::WalletBalance => encode(self.wallet_balance(decode(params)?).await?),
724            ControlMethod::WalletCoins => encode(self.wallet_coins(decode(params)?).await?),
725            // Re-validated here idempotently; deserialization already enforced the same rule.
726            ControlMethod::WalletCoinById => {
727                let params: params::WalletCoinByIdParams = decode(params)?;
728                encode(self.wallet_coin_by_id(params.validated()?).await?)
729            }
730            // Re-validated here idempotently; deserialization already enforced the same rule.
731            ControlMethod::WalletCoinSpend => {
732                let params: params::WalletCoinSpendParams = decode(params)?;
733                encode(self.wallet_coin_spend(params.validated()?).await?)
734            }
735            ControlMethod::WalletCoinsByParent => {
736                let params: params::WalletCoinsByParentParams = decode(params)?;
737                encode(self.wallet_coins_by_parent(params.validated()?).await?)
738            }
739            ControlMethod::WalletArrivals => encode(self.wallet_arrivals(decode(params)?).await?),
740            ControlMethod::WalletPeak => encode(self.wallet_peak().await?),
741            ControlMethod::WalletSyncStatus => encode(self.wallet_sync_status().await?),
742            ControlMethod::WalletBroadcast => encode(self.wallet_broadcast(decode(params)?).await?),
743            // Re-validated here idempotently; deserialization already enforced the same rule.
744            ControlMethod::WalletWatch => {
745                let params: params::WalletWatchParams = decode(params)?;
746                encode(self.wallet_watch(params.validated()?).await?)
747            }
748            // Re-validated here idempotently; deserialization already enforced the same rule.
749            ControlMethod::WalletUnwatch => {
750                let params: params::WalletUnwatchParams = decode(params)?;
751                encode(self.wallet_unwatch(params.validated()?).await?)
752            }
753            ControlMethod::WalletWatched => encode(self.wallet_watched().await?),
754            ControlMethod::WalletReservationsHeld => encode(self.wallet_reservations_held().await?),
755            ControlMethod::WalletReservationsReserve => {
756                encode(self.wallet_reservations_reserve(decode(params)?).await?)
757            }
758            ControlMethod::WalletReservationsRelease => {
759                encode(self.wallet_reservations_release(decode(params)?).await?)
760            }
761            ControlMethod::CollateralRequirement => encode(self.collateral_requirement().await?),
762            ControlMethod::CollateralBuffer => encode(self.collateral_buffer().await?),
763            // Re-validated here idempotently; `MirrorBondStatesParams`'s own `Deserialize` already
764            // enforced the page bound. A limit above the cap is REFUSED, never clamped, or the
765            // cursor handed back names a position the caller never asked about.
766            ControlMethod::MirrorBondStates => {
767                let params: params::MirrorBondStatesParams = decode(params)?;
768                encode(self.mirror_bond_states(params.validated()?).await?)
769            }
770            ControlMethod::CollateralMarginGet => encode(self.collateral_margin_get().await?),
771            // `CollateralMarginSetParams` derives `Deserialize`, so decoding enforces NOTHING beyond
772            // the field's type. `validated()` here is the SOLE enforcement of `MAX_SAFETY_MARGIN_BP`
773            // on this money-path mutation — dropping it admits an unbounded margin, and the margin
774            // arithmetic saturates rather than failing, so the result is a silently enormous posting.
775            ControlMethod::CollateralMarginSet => {
776                let params: params::CollateralMarginSetParams = decode(params)?;
777                encode(self.collateral_margin_set(params.validated()?).await?)
778            }
779            // Re-validated here idempotently; deserialization already enforced the same rule.
780            ControlMethod::SpendsList => {
781                let params: params::SpendsListParams = decode(params)?;
782                encode(self.spends_list(params.validated()?).await?)
783            }
784            ControlMethod::ProfilePutBody => encode(self.profile_put_body(decode(params)?).await?),
785            ControlMethod::ProfileGetBody => encode(self.profile_get_body(decode(params)?).await?),
786            ControlMethod::PairingRequest => encode(self.pairing_request(decode(params)?).await?),
787            ControlMethod::PairingPoll => encode(self.pairing_poll(decode(params)?).await?),
788        }
789    }
790}