Crate dig_nat 

dig-nat — abstract NAT traversal for DIG Node peer connections

One API, connect, establishes a mutually-authenticated (mTLS) connection to a peer using the best available NAT-traversal method, transparently. The caller never chooses the method — they describe the peer once and get back a verified PeerConnection; which technique got there is reported for observability but is not something the caller handles.

Traversal order (first success wins, relay last)

Internally the strategy attempts, in this order:

1. Direct — peer publicly reachable / already port-forwarded (method::direct)
2. UPnP/IGD port mapping (method::upnp)
3. NAT-PMP (RFC 6886, method::natpmp)
4. PCP (RFC 6887, method::pcp)
5. Relay-coordinated hole-punch (RLY-007, method::hole_punch)
6. Relayed transport via relay.dig.net — the LAST resort (relay)

stun (RFC 5389) discovers this node’s reflexive address for candidate advertisement + hole-punch coordination.

Streaming-first + multiplexed transport

Whatever tier establishes the connection, the result is uniform: a PeerConnection wrapping a single mTLS byte stream in yamux multiplexing. The caller opens many cheap concurrent logical streams (PeerConnection::open_stream) with no head-of-line blocking, and byte-range streams (PeerConnection::open_range_stream) scoped to [offset, len) of a resource — so a downloader fetches DIFFERENT ranges from DIFFERENT peers in parallel and reassembles. The API is streaming (read bytes as they arrive), never buffer-the-whole-response.

Identity + mTLS — delegated to dig-tls

Every peer connection is mutual TLS, and the entire certificate model is owned by the canonical dig-tls crate (L00): the shipped public DigNetwork CA, the per-peer CA-signed NodeCert, peer_id = SHA-256(TLS SPKI DER), the #1204 BLS-G1 cert binding, and the ready rustls mutual-auth configs. dig-nat presents this node’s NodeCert and uses dig_tls::client_config to pin the remote’s peer_id to the peer::PeerTarget::peer_id the caller asked for — so the transport is self-authenticating. dig-nat holds NO cert/binding/peer_id code of its own (it was extracted to dig-tls in 0.6.0); the names below are re-exports for convenience.

Graceful fallback + relay resilience

Each method is bounded by a per-method timeout; if ALL fail, connect returns a clear NatError::AllMethodsFailed (never panics, never hangs). The relay client — used both as the last-resort transport and as a node’s persistent reachability channel — establishes and maintains its session with keepalive + capped-exponential-backoff reconnect, tolerates the relay being down (retries in the background, never crashes the node), logs once per state change, and honours the DIG_RELAY_URL=off opt-out. See relay::RelayStatus.

Example

let peer = PeerTarget::with_addr(peer_id, addr, "DIG_MAINNET");
let conn = connect(&peer, &node, &NatConfig::default()).await?;
println!("connected to {} via {:?}", conn.peer_id, conn.method);

Re-exports

pub use config::NatConfig;

pub use config::NatConfigBuilder;

pub use error::MethodError;

pub use error::NatError;

pub use method::TraversalKind;

pub use method::TraversalMethod;

pub use mux::AvailabilityAnswer;

pub use mux::AvailabilityItem;

pub use mux::AvailabilityRequest;

pub use mux::AvailabilityResponse;

pub use mux::PeerSession;

pub use mux::PeerStream;

pub use mux::RangeFrame;

pub use mux::RangeRequest;

pub use peer::PeerConnection;

pub use peer::PeerTarget;

pub use relay_descriptor::verify_relay_descriptor;

pub use relay_descriptor::RelayDescriptor;

pub use relay_descriptor::RelayDescriptorError;

Modules

config

Connection configuration — the enabled methods, per-method timeout, relay/STUN endpoints, and the cert-binding policy that shape a crate::connect call. Built with a fluent builder; the caller never selects the traversal method (only which ones are enabled).

dialer

The production Dialer — performs the real rustls mTLS dial to a reachable address and returns a PeerConnection whose remote peer_id has been verified.

error

Error + status types for NAT traversal.

method

Traversal methods — one module per NAT-traversal technique behind a common TraversalMethod trait, plus the TraversalKind tag the strategy orders them by.

mux

Stream multiplexing + byte-range streams over a single established peer connection.

peer

The peer the caller wants to reach (PeerTarget) and the connection they get back (PeerConnection).

relay

Relay client — the LAST-RESORT transport + the node’s persistent reachability channel.

relay_descriptor

Relay descriptor verification (#1199) — a self-authenticating (peer_id, addrs, BLS_pub) record.

strategy

The traversal strategy — orders the enabled methods (direct-first, relay-last), tries each with a bounded timeout, and returns the FIRST connection that establishes. This is where “the caller doesn’t choose the method” is realised.

stun

Minimal STUN (RFC 5389) client — discover this node’s reflexive (public) transport address.

wire

Relay protocol wire types — vendored, byte-identical to dig-relay’s src/wire.rs, dig-node’s relay::RelayMessage, and dig-gossip’s relay_types (requirements RLY-001 through RLY-007).

Structs

CapturedBlsPub

The peer’s verified BLS G1 identity pubkey, captured from the #1204 cert binding when the handshake carried a valid one. None means no valid binding was presented (a legacy peer under BindingPolicy::Opportunistic, or BindingPolicy::Off). The sealing layer seals to this key.

CapturedPeerId

The peer_id a verifier derived from the certificate the peer presented, captured for the caller. Shared via Arc<Mutex<_>> because rustls verifiers are Sync and run inside the handshake.

NodeCert

A peer’s mTLS identity certificate + private key, plus its derived peer_id.

PeerId

A peer’s stable network identity: the 32-byte SHA-256 of its TLS SPKI DER.

Enums

BindingOutcome

The result of checking a leaf certificate for a valid BLS binding, BEFORE the policy is applied.

BindingPolicy

The verification stance for a peer’s cert binding — a LOCAL decision (never wire-negotiated).

Functions

connect

Establish a mutually-authenticated connection to peer, choosing the traversal method transparently (first success wins; relay is the last resort).

peer_id_from_leaf_cert_der

Extract the SubjectPublicKeyInfo DER from a leaf X.509 certificate (DER-encoded) and derive the PeerId. Returns None if the certificate cannot be parsed as X.509.

peer_id_from_tls_spki_der

Derive a PeerId from a TLS SubjectPublicKeyInfo block in PKIX DER form.

verify_binding_from_leaf_cert

Verify the BLS binding carried by a DER-encoded leaf certificate.