derec_library/protocol/

types.rs

// SPDX-License-Identifier: Apache-2.0
// Copyright (c) 2026 DeRec Alliance. All rights reserved.

//! Protocol-layer types.
//!
//! Everything in this module is "post-pairing" — the channel and store
//! shapes the orchestrator manages once a pair handshake completes. The
//! primitives layer never touches these (it operates on raw wire bytes
//! and the cross-layer [`crate::types::ChannelId`] / [`crate::types::SharedKey`]
//! aliases).
//!
//! Re-exported at [`crate::protocol`] for ergonomic access, so callers
//! can write `use derec_library::protocol::Channel;` rather than
//! `use derec_library::protocol::types::Channel;`.

use crate::types::ChannelId;
use derec_cryptography::pairing::PairingSecretKeyMaterial;
use derec_proto::ContactMessage;
#[cfg(any(feature = "serde", target_arch = "wasm32"))]
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use zeroize::Zeroizing;

/// Selects which channels to target for a discovery request.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum Target {
    /// Send to all paired channels (most common case).
    All,
    /// Send to a single channel.
    Single(ChannelId),
    /// Send to a specific set of channels.
    Many(Vec<ChannelId>),
}

/// Status of a channel in the protocol lifecycle.
///
/// Replica channels start as `Pending` after pairing completes and transition
/// to `Paired` once fingerprint verification succeeds. Helper/Owner channels
/// are `Paired` immediately after pairing.
#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Default)]
#[cfg_attr(
    any(feature = "serde", target_arch = "wasm32"),
    derive(Serialize, Deserialize)
)]
pub enum ChannelStatus {
    /// Channel is awaiting fingerprint verification (replica only).
    Pending,
    /// Channel is fully paired and ready for protocol messages.
    #[default]
    Paired,
}

/// A channel — the post-pairing representation of a peer.
///
/// Stored by [`crate::protocol::DeRecChannelStore`] and returned by its
/// `channels()` method.
///
/// `Serialize` / `Deserialize` are derived for the FFI and WASM bridges,
/// which ship channels to host languages as JSON over the language
/// boundary. Library consumers writing a Rust `DeRecChannelStore` see
/// only the typed value and never observe the serde representation;
/// the wire format is not part of the public API and may change
/// independently. `#[serde(default)]` annotations let bridges decode
/// legacy bytes that predate later-added fields without erroring.
#[derive(Clone, Debug)]
#[cfg_attr(
    any(feature = "serde", target_arch = "wasm32"),
    derive(Serialize, Deserialize)
)]
pub struct Channel {
    /// Unique identifier for this channel.
    pub id: ChannelId,
    /// The peer's transport endpoint.
    pub transport: derec_proto::TransportProtocol,
    /// Application-level identity metadata for the peer on this channel.
    ///
    /// Free-form key/value pairs — the protocol treats this as opaque and
    /// never inspects keys or values. Anything an app wants to remember
    /// about *who* is on the other end (display name, account id, avatar
    /// URI, ...) lives here. App-level identity logic (e.g. auto-linking
    /// by display name) reads from this map; the protocol does not.
    ///
    /// On the initiator side, this is whatever the caller supplied when
    /// starting [`crate::protocol::DeRecFlow::Pairing`]. On the responder
    /// side, it is the peer's own `communication_info` extracted from the
    /// wire pair-request — the same map that surfaces in
    /// [`crate::protocol::DeRecEvent::PairingCompleted::peer_communication_info`].
    #[cfg_attr(any(feature = "serde", target_arch = "wasm32"), serde(default))]
    pub communication_info: std::collections::HashMap<String, String>,
    /// Lifecycle status. Messages on `Pending` channels are ignored.
    #[cfg_attr(any(feature = "serde", target_arch = "wasm32"), serde(default))]
    pub status: ChannelStatus,
    /// Unix timestamp (seconds) when the channel was created.
    #[cfg_attr(any(feature = "serde", target_arch = "wasm32"), serde(default))]
    pub created_at: u64,
    /// This node's role on this channel, fixed at pairing time.
    ///
    /// The orchestrator enforces flow directionality against this value: an
    /// `Owner` may initiate `ProtectSecret` / `VerifyShares` / `Discovery` /
    /// `RecoverSecret`; a `Helper` may not. Inbound messages are gated the
    /// other way around — a `StoreShareRequest` is only honored on a channel
    /// where this node is the `Helper`, and so on.
    pub role: derec_proto::SenderKind,
    /// The peer's replica identity, populated only when `role` is
    /// `ReplicaSource` or `ReplicaDestination`.
    ///
    /// Extracted from the peer's `derec.replica_id` entry in
    /// `CommunicationInfo` during the pair handshake. `None` on
    /// Helper/Owner channels and as a defensive default on
    /// freshly-paired Replica channels where the peer did not advertise
    /// one.
    #[cfg_attr(any(feature = "serde", target_arch = "wasm32"), serde(default))]
    pub replica_id: Option<u64>,
}

/// Per-helper metadata stored inside the secret bag for recovery.
///
/// Each entry records the pairing state of a Helper so that recovery can
/// re-establish communication channels without external configuration.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct HelperInfo {
    /// Unique channel identifier assigned during pairing.
    #[prost(uint64, tag = "1")]
    pub channel_id: u64,
    /// The Helper's message endpoint URI.
    #[prost(string, tag = "2")]
    pub transport_uri: ::prost::alloc::string::String,
    /// Symmetric key negotiated during pairing (32 bytes).
    #[prost(bytes = "vec", tag = "4")]
    pub shared_key: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<u8>,
    /// App-level identity metadata for this helper. Free-form key/value
    /// pairs — the protocol treats it as opaque, never inspects keys or
    /// values, and copies it verbatim from [`Channel::communication_info`]
    /// at protect-time. A recovering owner who decodes the bag can use
    /// this to recognise each helper (e.g. by a `"name"` key the app set
    /// on pairing).
    ///
    /// **Wire stability**: the now-removed `name: String` was previously at
    /// tag 3. Using tag 5 lets prost silently drop the old `name` field
    /// when decoding legacy bags (empty `communication_info`), and lets
    /// older codebases silently drop this new field when decoding new
    /// bags. Degraded but not broken in either direction.
    #[prost(map = "string, string", tag = "5")]
    pub communication_info:
        ::std::collections::HashMap<::prost::alloc::string::String, ::prost::alloc::string::String>,
}

/// A single user-facing secret within the bag.
///
/// The Owner can store multiple logical secrets (credentials, keys, notes)
/// inside a single secret bag. Each `UserSecret` is independently
/// identifiable so the application can present, add, or remove individual
/// entries while the protocol treats the entire bag as one opaque blob.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct UserSecret {
    /// Application-defined identifier.
    #[prost(bytes = "vec", tag = "1")]
    pub id: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<u8>,
    /// Human-readable label.
    #[prost(string, tag = "2")]
    pub name: ::prost::alloc::string::String,
    /// Raw secret bytes.
    #[prost(bytes = "vec", tag = "3")]
    pub data: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<u8>,
}

/// Snapshot of the user-facing secret contents persisted by
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecUserSecretStore`] for one `secret_id`.
///
/// Written every time the application calls
/// `start(FlowKind::ProtectSecret)`; read by the pair-completion
/// auto-publish hook so a freshly-paired Helper or Replica receives the
/// current state without an explicit re-publish from the app.
#[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
pub struct UserSecrets {
    /// Secret version this snapshot represents. Monotonically increasing
    /// per `secret_id` — the protocol bumps it on every publish.
    pub version: u32,
    /// User-facing secret entries. Same wire shape as
    /// [`Secret::secrets`].
    pub secrets: Vec<UserSecret>,
    /// Optional human-readable label for this version, forwarded to
    /// helpers in `StoreShareRequest.description`.
    pub description: Option<String>,
    /// Owner-side cached replica composite for this version, populated
    /// after the VSS split completes. Lets the Owner resume future
    /// `ProtectSecret` rounds without re-deriving share material, and
    /// surfaces under [`Secret::replicas`] on the next snapshot rebuild.
    /// `None` when this `secret_id` has no replica setup (or before
    /// the first sharing round commits).
    pub replicas: Option<Replicas>,
}

/// Per-replica metadata stored inside the [`Secret`] — mirrors
/// [`HelperInfo`] but for the replica role and carries the extra
/// `replica_id` + `sender_kind` fields needed by the replica model.
///
/// **No per-pair key**: all replica channels for a given `secret_id`
/// converge on a single group key (see [`ReplicaSecretPayload::shared_key`]
/// for how that key is handed off to a new joiner). Each replica's
/// `(secret_id, channel_id)` entry in
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore`] holds that same group key, so
/// any replica can address any other replica's peers by loading the
/// channel key from its own secret store — this struct does not need to
/// carry it.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct ReplicaInfo {
    /// Channel identifier the originator uses to address this peer.
    #[prost(uint64, tag = "1")]
    pub channel_id: u64,
    /// The peer's message endpoint URI.
    #[prost(string, tag = "2")]
    pub transport_uri: ::prost::alloc::string::String,
    /// App-level identity metadata for this peer. Same opacity contract
    /// as [`HelperInfo::communication_info`].
    #[prost(map = "string, string", tag = "4")]
    pub communication_info:
        ::std::collections::HashMap<::prost::alloc::string::String, ::prost::alloc::string::String>,
    /// The peer's `replica_id` — global stable identity of the replica
    /// device, separate from the per-channel `channel_id`.
    #[prost(uint64, tag = "5")]
    pub replica_id: u64,
    /// Raw `SenderKind` value the peer played in this pair (typically
    /// `REPLICA_SOURCE` or `REPLICA_DESTINATION`). Carried for future
    /// conflict-resolution flows; not used by the protocol layer today.
    #[prost(int32, tag = "6")]
    pub sender_kind: i32,
}

/// The protocol's `secret` — serialized into `DeRecSecret.secret_data`.
///
/// This is the actual payload that gets protobuf-encoded, then placed into
/// the `secret_data` bytes field of the canonical `DeRecSecret` protobuf
/// message before encryption and distribution. Matches the DeRec
/// specification's `secret` term (distinct from a `UserSecret` entry,
/// which is one application-defined item *inside* this struct).
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct Secret {
    /// Snapshot of all paired Helpers at the time of distribution.
    #[prost(message, repeated, tag = "1")]
    pub helpers: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<HelperInfo>,
    /// The user-facing secrets the Owner wishes to protect.
    #[prost(message, repeated, tag = "2")]
    pub secrets: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<UserSecret>,
    /// Replica composite: the destination peers, the per-helper share
    /// map, and the group key. `None` when this `secret_id` has no
    /// replica setup. See [`Replicas`] for field semantics.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "3")]
    pub replicas: ::core::option::Option<Replicas>,
    /// The `replica_id` of the device that created or last updated this
    /// version of the secret. Used by Destinations to attribute origin
    /// and will drive future conflict-resolution logic.
    #[prost(uint64, tag = "4")]
    pub owner_replica_id: u64,
}

/// Replica composite carried inside [`Secret`] — the destination
/// roster + the 32-byte group key shared by every replica channel.
///
/// The per-helper share map is *not* part of this composite: VSS
/// shares are derived from the encoded `Secret` bytes and so cannot
/// be embedded inside the `Secret` itself. The wire-level share map
/// rides on [`ReplicaSecretPayload`] alongside the encoded `Secret`
/// instead.
///
/// `shared_key` must be 32 bytes when [`Self::replicas`] is
/// non-empty. The library enforces this invariant on the producer
/// side during sharing round construction and on the consumer side in
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecProtocol::restore`].
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct Replicas {
    /// Snapshot of all paired Replica Destinations at protect time.
    #[prost(message, repeated, tag = "1")]
    pub replicas: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<ReplicaInfo>,
    /// 32-byte replica group key.
    #[prost(bytes = "vec", tag = "2")]
    pub shared_key: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<u8>,
}

/// A single helper's share of the current secret bag — wire-pairs a
/// `channel_id` with the serialized `CommittedDeRecShare` bytes that
/// were sent to that helper. Part of [`ReplicaSecretPayload`].
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct ChannelShare {
    /// Channel id of the helper that holds this share.
    #[prost(uint64, tag = "1")]
    pub channel_id: u64,
    /// Serialized `CommittedDeRecShare` bytes — the same payload the
    /// helper received in their `StoreShareRequest`.
    #[prost(bytes = "vec", tag = "2")]
    pub committed_share: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<u8>,
}

/// The composite payload sent to each Replica Destination on a
/// `ProtectSecret` round. Carries the full [`Secret`] plus the map of
/// `(channel_id → committed_share)` for the same round, so the
/// Destination can recover via either path — read the secret directly,
/// or contact each helper using `secret.helpers[i].shared_key` and
/// request their stored share.
///
/// # Group-key handover
///
/// All replica channels for a given `secret_id` converge on a single
/// symmetric "group" key. The `shared_key` field carries that group key
/// inside the encrypted payload **only** when the sender knows the
/// receiver doesn't have it yet — i.e. on the first round to a newly
/// paired Destination. Both sides swap their stored channel key
/// (`(secret_id, channel_id)` in [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore`])
/// from the per-pair ephemeral handshake key to the group key:
///
/// - **Sender**: swap immediately after the request envelope is sent.
///   The ack response from the new joiner will already be encrypted
///   with the group key.
/// - **Receiver**: swap before encrypting the ack response, so the
///   ack uses the group key and matches what the sender expects.
///
/// On the first-ever replica pair, the group key is implicitly the
/// pair-handshake key — `shared_key` is left empty, no swap happens,
/// and the channel-key entry both sides already saved is the group key.
#[derive(Clone, PartialEq, ::prost::Message)]
pub struct ReplicaSecretPayload {
    /// The full secret the sender is committing to this version.
    #[prost(message, optional, tag = "1")]
    pub secret: ::core::option::Option<Secret>,
    /// One entry per helper that received a VSS share on this round.
    #[prost(message, repeated, tag = "2")]
    pub shares: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<ChannelShare>,
    /// 32-byte replica-group key. Present only on the first-sync round
    /// to a newly-paired Destination; empty on every subsequent round
    /// (since the receiving channel already holds the group key) and
    /// empty when the receiving Destination is the very first pair for
    /// this `secret_id` (the pair-handshake key is implicitly the group
    /// key). See type-level docs for the swap protocol.
    #[prost(bytes = "vec", tag = "3")]
    pub shared_key: ::prost::alloc::vec::Vec<u8>,
}

/// Kind of secret material stored by [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore`].
///
/// Each variant has its own lifecycle (see per-variant docs). Used as the
/// `kind` argument to [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore::load`] and
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore::remove`]; on
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore::save`] the kind is inferred from
/// the [`SecretValue`] variant and need not be passed.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum SecretKind {
    /// The post-pairing symmetric channel key (see [`SecretValue::SharedKey`]).
    SharedKey = 0,
    /// The ephemeral ECIES / ML-KEM key material used during pairing.
    PairingSecret = 1,
    /// The initiator's [`ContactMessage`] stored transiently between
    /// `start` and pairing completion. Removed once the shared key
    /// is derived.
    PairingContact = 2,
}

/// How [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore::load_many`] handles channels
/// with no stored secret of the requested [`SecretKind`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum MissingPolicy {
    /// Silently drop missing channels from the returned vector.
    ///
    /// Use when missing entries are an expected outcome — e.g. a `Target::Many`
    /// list that mixes paired and unpaired channels.
    Skip,
    /// Return [`crate::protocol::SecretStoreError::MissingEntries`] carrying
    /// the channel ids that had no entry.
    ///
    /// Use when every input id is expected to have an entry — e.g. after
    /// filtering to channels already known to
    /// [`crate::protocol::DeRecChannelStore`]. A miss signals a cross-store
    /// invariant violation.
    Fail,
}

/// Opaque, serialized pairing key material as held by
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore`] under [`SecretValue::PairingSecret`].
///
/// This is the store-boundary form of the ephemeral key pair the pairing
/// handshake produces. The protocol deliberately exposes it as an opaque
/// byte blob rather than a cryptographic type, so a store implementation can
/// persist and reload it without depending on `derec-cryptography` or any
/// serialization framework: call [`as_bytes`](Self::as_bytes) to obtain the
/// bytes to persist on `save`, and hand the same bytes back to
/// [`from_bytes`](Self::from_bytes) on `load`.
///
/// The byte layout is a library-internal detail, is not part of the public
/// API, and may change between versions; treat the blob as opaque and never
/// interpret it.
///
/// The bytes are held in [`zeroize::Zeroizing`] so the plaintext key material
/// is wiped from memory on drop.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct PairingKeyMaterial(Zeroizing<Vec<u8>>);

impl PairingKeyMaterial {
    /// Wrap raw bytes previously obtained from [`as_bytes`](Self::as_bytes)
    /// and persisted by a store.
    pub fn from_bytes(bytes: Vec<u8>) -> Self {
        Self(Zeroizing::new(bytes))
    }

    /// The opaque bytes to persist. Round-trips through
    /// [`from_bytes`](Self::from_bytes).
    pub fn as_bytes(&self) -> &[u8] {
        self.0.as_slice()
    }

    /// Serialize live pairing secret key material into the store-boundary
    /// form.
    ///
    /// Library-internal: the pairing handlers call this before handing the
    /// value to the secret store, keeping the `ark-serialize` encoding an
    /// implementation detail that never crosses the public API.
    pub(crate) fn from_secret(material: &PairingSecretKeyMaterial) -> Self {
        use ark_serialize::CanonicalSerialize as _;
        let mut buf = Vec::with_capacity(material.compressed_size());
        material
            .serialize_compressed(&mut buf)
            .expect("ark serialization of PairingSecretKeyMaterial is infallible");
        Self(Zeroizing::new(buf))
    }

    /// Reconstruct live pairing secret key material from the store-boundary
    /// form.
    ///
    /// Library-internal: the pairing handlers call this after loading the
    /// value from the secret store. A decode failure means the persisted
    /// bytes were corrupted or truncated, which is an internal invariant
    /// violation rather than valid caller input.
    pub(crate) fn to_secret(&self) -> crate::Result<PairingSecretKeyMaterial> {
        use ark_serialize::CanonicalDeserialize as _;
        PairingSecretKeyMaterial::deserialize_compressed(self.0.as_slice())
            .map_err(|_| crate::Error::Invariant("stored PairingSecret bytes failed to decode"))
    }
}

#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
impl Serialize for PairingKeyMaterial {
    fn serialize<S>(&self, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
    where
        S: serde::Serializer,
    {
        self.0.as_slice().serialize(serializer)
    }
}

#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
impl<'de> Deserialize<'de> for PairingKeyMaterial {
    fn deserialize<D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<Self, D::Error>
    where
        D: serde::Deserializer<'de>,
    {
        let bytes = Vec::<u8>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
        Ok(Self(Zeroizing::new(bytes)))
    }
}

/// Serde adapter for the prost [`ContactMessage`] carried by
/// [`SecretValue::PairingContact`]. prost messages have no native serde
/// support, so the value is (de)serialized through its canonical protobuf
/// byte encoding.
#[cfg(feature = "serde")]
mod contact_serde {
    use super::ContactMessage;
    use prost::Message as _;
    use serde::{Deserialize as _, Deserializer, Serialize as _, Serializer};

    pub(super) fn serialize<S>(contact: &ContactMessage, serializer: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
    where
        S: Serializer,
    {
        contact.encode_to_vec().serialize(serializer)
    }

    pub(super) fn deserialize<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<ContactMessage, D::Error>
    where
        D: Deserializer<'de>,
    {
        let bytes = Vec::<u8>::deserialize(deserializer)?;
        ContactMessage::decode(bytes.as_slice()).map_err(serde::de::Error::custom)
    }
}

/// The payload returned by [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore::load`] and
/// passed to [`crate::protocol::DeRecSecretStore::save`].
///
/// Variants are 1:1 with [`SecretKind`].
///
/// With the `serde` feature enabled, `Serialize` / `Deserialize` are
/// derived so a store implementation can persist an entry with any serde
/// format instead of hand-rolling a codec. This is an alternative to the
/// byte-level accessors on the individual payloads (e.g.
/// [`PairingKeyMaterial::as_bytes`] / [`PairingKeyMaterial::from_bytes`]);
/// implementors pick whichever fits their backend, and consumers that do
/// not use serde pay no dependency for it. The serde wire format is not
/// part of the public API and may change independently.
#[derive(Clone)]
#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", derive(Serialize, Deserialize))]
pub enum SecretValue {
    /// The post-pairing symmetric channel key. Established by pairing and used
    /// to authenticate and encrypt every subsequent message on the channel.
    SharedKey(crate::types::SharedKey),
    /// The ephemeral ECIES / ML-KEM key material created by `start` and
    /// consumed when the pairing response arrives. Removed once the shared
    /// key is derived. Held as an opaque [`PairingKeyMaterial`] blob so
    /// store implementors never touch a cryptography primitive.
    PairingSecret(PairingKeyMaterial),
    /// The initiator's [`ContactMessage`], needed by
    /// [`crate::primitives::pairing::response::process`] to derive the shared
    /// key. Ephemeral — removed after pairing completes.
    PairingContact(#[cfg_attr(feature = "serde", serde(with = "contact_serde"))] ContactMessage),
}

/// Tag identifying which kind of in-flight orchestrator state an entry in
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore`] holds. Used by
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore::load_all`] to filter by category.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum StateKind {
    /// Outstanding [`derec_proto::VerifyShareRequestMessage`], one per
    /// channel. Load-bearing for the replay-defence binding gate.
    PendingVerification,
    /// Recovery accumulator, one per `(secret_id, version)`. Holds every
    /// [`derec_proto::GetShareResponseMessage`] received so far for that
    /// reconstruction target.
    PendingRecovery,
    /// Outstanding unpair acknowledgement, one per channel. Carries the
    /// `started_at` unix-seconds timestamp so the orchestrator can time
    /// out unresponsive peers.
    PendingUnpair,
    /// Active sharing round. At most one entry exists per `secret_id`
    /// (a new `start(ProtectSecret)` overwrites any prior round). Holds
    /// the per-channel tallies (`pending` / `confirmed` / `failed`) and
    /// the `started_at` timestamp used to time out unresponsive helpers.
    SharingRound,
}

/// Secondary-key selector identifying a single row within a given
/// [`StateKind`] under a `secret_id`. Passed to
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore::load`] and
/// [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore::remove`].
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)]
pub enum StateKey {
    /// Row is scoped to one channel.
    PendingVerification { channel_id: ChannelId },
    /// Row is scoped to one reconstruction target.
    PendingRecovery { version: u32 },
    /// Row is scoped to one channel.
    PendingUnpair { channel_id: ChannelId },
    /// At most one row per `secret_id`. No secondary key.
    SharingRound,
}

impl StateKey {
    /// The [`StateKind`] this key selects. Used by store implementations
    /// that persist rows in a `(secret_id, kind, secondary_key)` schema.
    pub fn kind(&self) -> StateKind {
        match self {
            StateKey::PendingVerification { .. } => StateKind::PendingVerification,
            StateKey::PendingRecovery { .. } => StateKind::PendingRecovery,
            StateKey::PendingUnpair { .. } => StateKind::PendingUnpair,
            StateKey::SharingRound => StateKind::SharingRound,
        }
    }
}

/// The payload of one row in the [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore`].
///
/// # Write pattern
///
/// The library treats [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore::save`] as
/// **full-replacement upsert** — there is no per-item merge or append
/// semantic at the store level. Accumulator-style state
/// ([`StateItem::PendingRecovery`] and [`StateItem::SharingRound`]) grows
/// via load-modify-save cycles from the library. Backends do not need to
/// implement any append primitive; a naive replace-on-save is correct.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub enum StateItem {
    /// The full outstanding [`derec_proto::VerifyShareRequestMessage`] the
    /// orchestrator sent for this channel. Retained so the corresponding
    /// inbound [`derec_proto::VerifyShareResponseMessage`] can be validated
    /// against the exact `(nonce, secret_id, version)` triple that was
    /// minted at request time.
    ///
    /// Overwritten in place by a subsequent `save` for the same
    /// `(secret_id, channel_id)`; the most recent challenge wins.
    PendingVerification {
        channel_id: ChannelId,
        request: derec_proto::VerifyShareRequestMessage,
    },

    /// Accumulator for one in-progress recovery target.
    ///
    /// The library writes this variant one share at a time as each inbound
    /// [`derec_proto::GetShareResponseMessage`] arrives. The write sequence
    /// under a single `(secret_id, version)` is:
    ///
    /// 1. First response arrives. Library calls `save` with a `shares`
    ///    vector containing exactly one element.
    /// 2. Second response arrives. Library `load`s the accumulator,
    ///    appends the new share to the returned Vec, and `save`s the
    ///    grown Vec back.
    /// 3. …repeat until threshold. On threshold met, library `remove`s
    ///    the accumulator.
    ///
    /// Implementations MUST accept `shares` vectors of any length,
    /// including one. Every `save` replaces the stored value in place
    /// with the caller-supplied Vec; no append primitive is required.
    ///
    /// # Concurrency
    ///
    /// See [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore`] for the multi-instance
    /// concurrency contract. Concurrent inbound shares racing on the same
    /// accumulator will clobber each other via a naive load-modify-save;
    /// the application layer is responsible for serializing concurrent
    /// `process()` calls that touch the same `(secret_id, version)` if
    /// this matters.
    PendingRecovery {
        version: u32,
        shares: Vec<derec_proto::GetShareResponseMessage>,
    },

    /// Outstanding unpair acknowledgement window. `started_at` is the
    /// unix-seconds timestamp stamped when the request was sent; the
    /// orchestrator sweeps expired entries via
    /// [`crate::protocol::DeRecStateStore::load_all`].
    PendingUnpair {
        channel_id: ChannelId,
        started_at: u64,
    },

    /// Active sharing round for `secret_id`. Created by
    /// `start(ProtectSecret)` and cleared by the orchestrator once every
    /// targeted helper has responded (confirmed, rejected, or timed
    /// out). At most one entry exists per `secret_id`; a fresh
    /// `start(ProtectSecret)` overwrites any prior in-flight round.
    ///
    /// `pending` / `confirmed` / `failed` partition the round's target
    /// channels; the union is invariant across the round's lifetime.
    /// `started_at` is the unix-seconds timestamp used to time out
    /// unresponsive helpers.
    SharingRound {
        version: u32,
        pending: std::collections::HashSet<ChannelId>,
        confirmed: std::collections::HashSet<ChannelId>,
        failed: std::collections::HashSet<ChannelId>,
        started_at: u64,
    },
}

impl StateItem {
    /// The [`StateKind`] this item is an instance of.
    pub fn kind(&self) -> StateKind {
        match self {
            StateItem::PendingVerification { .. } => StateKind::PendingVerification,
            StateItem::PendingRecovery { .. } => StateKind::PendingRecovery,
            StateItem::PendingUnpair { .. } => StateKind::PendingUnpair,
            StateItem::SharingRound { .. } => StateKind::SharingRound,
        }
    }

    /// The [`StateKey`] identifying this item within its `(secret_id, kind)`
    /// partition. Convenience so callers don't have to hand-construct a
    /// key that matches the payload.
    pub fn key(&self) -> StateKey {
        match self {
            StateItem::PendingVerification { channel_id, .. } => StateKey::PendingVerification {
                channel_id: *channel_id,
            },
            StateItem::PendingRecovery { version, .. } => {
                StateKey::PendingRecovery { version: *version }
            }
            StateItem::PendingUnpair { channel_id, .. } => StateKey::PendingUnpair {
                channel_id: *channel_id,
            },
            StateItem::SharingRound { .. } => StateKey::SharingRound,
        }
    }
}

/// A single stored share entry, fully self-describing.
#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
pub struct Share {
    /// Numeric identifier of the secret this share belongs to.
    pub secret_id: u64,
    /// Version number of the secret.
    pub version: u32,
    /// Stable per-device identifier of the replica that produced this
    /// share, copied from
    /// [`derec_proto::StoreShareRequestMessage::replica_id`] when the
    /// helper persisted the write.
    ///
    /// `None` when the writer was a non-replica `Owner`. `Some(id)` when
    /// the writer was `ReplicaSource`. Two distinct replicas may produce
    /// the same `(secret_id, channel_id, version)` independently
    /// — see [`crate::protocol::DeRecShareStore::save`] for the
    /// conceptual storage key and the disambiguation contract.
    pub replica_id: Option<u64>,
    /// Opaque protobuf bytes — see [`crate::protocol::DeRecShareStore`] for
    /// the per-side format.
    pub bytes: Vec<u8>,
}

#[cfg(all(test, feature = "serde"))]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    /// Every `SecretValue` variant round-trips through serde — the path a
    /// store implementation takes when it opts for serde over the
    /// byte-level accessors. Exercises the custom `PairingKeyMaterial`
    /// impls and the prost `ContactMessage` adapter.
    #[test]
    fn secret_value_serde_round_trips_all_variants() {
        let cases = [
            SecretValue::SharedKey([7u8; 32]),
            SecretValue::PairingSecret(PairingKeyMaterial::from_bytes(vec![1, 2, 3, 4, 5])),
            SecretValue::PairingContact(ContactMessage {
                nonce: 42,
                ..Default::default()
            }),
        ];

        for value in cases {
            let json = serde_json::to_vec(&value).expect("serialize");
            let decoded: SecretValue = serde_json::from_slice(&json).expect("deserialize");
            match (&value, &decoded) {
                (SecretValue::SharedKey(a), SecretValue::SharedKey(b)) => assert_eq!(a, b),
                (SecretValue::PairingSecret(a), SecretValue::PairingSecret(b)) => {
                    assert_eq!(a.as_bytes(), b.as_bytes())
                }
                (SecretValue::PairingContact(a), SecretValue::PairingContact(b)) => {
                    assert_eq!(a, b)
                }
                _ => panic!("variant changed across serde round-trip"),
            }
        }
    }

    /// The serde form and the `from_bytes`/`as_bytes` form describe the
    /// same opaque blob, so a value serialized one way decodes the other.
    #[test]
    fn pairing_key_material_serde_matches_byte_accessors() {
        let material = PairingKeyMaterial::from_bytes(vec![9, 8, 7, 6]);
        let json = serde_json::to_vec(&material).expect("serialize");
        let decoded: PairingKeyMaterial = serde_json::from_slice(&json).expect("deserialize");
        assert_eq!(material.as_bytes(), decoded.as_bytes());
    }
}