Module model

Structs§

Authority
CanonicalJson: JSON held in canonical form — parsed and re-emitted with sorted object keys and no insignificant whitespace — so two semantically-equal JSON values share identical bytes and therefore identical hashes (ADR 0004 item 6). The inner form is an invariant: there is no way to construct a non-canonical value. Build via FactValue::json / CanonicalJson::new; the canonicalization is re-applied on deserialize, so the invariant also holds on the trusted-reload path.
Confidence
Evidence
FactEvent
Predicate
Provenance
Subject
WriteAttestation: A per-write source signature carried inside Provenance (ADR 0013). The signed message is crate::attestation_message — the domain-framed canonical bytes of the event with attestation stripped — so any holder of public_key can re-verify offline that the event content is exactly what the source key signed. The hash chain covers the attestation bytes themselves, so the attestation is as tamper-evident as the rest of the event.

AttestationAlgorithm: The attestation signature scheme. A closed enum (not a free string) so an unknown or misspelled algorithm fails loudly at deserialize time instead of silently “verifying”.
AuthorityLevel
ChallengeKind: What kind of write the incumbent was challenged by (ADR 0015). Only challenges that were real contests lost on strength are recorded — see ChallengeRejection.
ChallengeRejection: Why the firewall rejected the challenge (ADR 0015). These are the strength-based rejections; malformed writes, duplicates, and terminal-state mutations are not “survived” challenges and are never recorded.
ContradictionBasis
EvidenceKind
ExpirationReason
FactEventKind
FactValue
RetractionReason
SupersessionReason
Ttl
ValidationError