decdn_protocol/

message.rs

//! Wire message payload types for deCDN ALPN protocols.
//!
//! Every ALPN defines a top-level enum (e.g. [`ProbeMessage`]) whose variants
//! wrap the per-message structs. The enum is serialized as the outermost
//! postcard value inside a length-prefixed frame (see [`crate::framing`]).
//!
//! # Signed-field freezing (ADR 013 §Signed Field Freezing)
//!
//! [`ProbeResponse`] is exactly a signed [`ProbeResponseBody`] plus its
//! `slash_sig`; every unsigned field trails in [`ProbeResponseExt`], encoded
//! separately and decoded two-phase (ADR 013 §Tier 1). Unlike an Ed25519
//! signature over postcard bytes, `slash_sig` is **not** computed over a
//! postcard serialization: it is an EIP-712
//! secp256k1 signature over the *typed-data hash of the body fields*
//! `{hash, has_blob, rate_per_mb, timestamp_us}`, exactly as defined in ADR
//! 014 §EIP-712 Type Definitions and implemented in
//! `decdn_incentive::ProbeSlashData`. There is intentionally no
//! `signing_bytes()` helper here — postcard bytes are *not* the signing
//! input, and exposing one would invite incompatible verifier
//! implementations. The `#[serde(deserialize_with)]` validation on
//! `rate_per_mb` lives on the body field so the protocol-boundary bound on
//! [`MAX_RATE_PER_MB`] continues to apply (issue #378).
//!
//! This establishes the `cdn/probe/v1` signed baseline — it is **not** an
//! ALPN bump. ADR 013 freezes a signed field set at the protocol version that
//! introduces it; `cdn/probe/v1` had no prior signed `ProbeResponse`, so the
//! set `{hash, has_blob, rate_per_mb, timestamp_us}` is the v1 baseline (ADR
//! 005 §`cdn/probe/v1`, ADR 014 §1). `total_bytes` rides in
//! [`ProbeResponseExt`] as the ADR 013 Tier-1 unsigned-evolution exemplar (ADR
//! 005 §`cdn/probe/v1`) and is deliberately NOT covered by `slash_sig`. The
//! `ProbeMessage` variant order is unchanged.
//!
//! This crate deliberately does not depend on any crypto library. The caller
//! (`decdn_incentive::ProbeSlashData` and the probe handler/CLI) computes and
//! verifies the EIP-712 `slash_sig`.

use serde::de::{self, Deserializer};
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};

/// Maximum permitted value for [`ProbeResponseBody::rate_per_mb`] (issue #378).
///
/// 1000 µUSDC/MB (USDC at 6 decimals: ~$1/GB), a realistic ceiling about 100×
/// market price (~10 µUSDC/MB ≈ $0.01/GB). It bounds two things at once. It is
/// the largest `rate_per_mb` the wire decodes, and it caps the governance
/// `deliveryFloor` on-chain (ADR 003 §Rate-floor enforcement); the floor can
/// never exceed the wire price. A cap far above market lets a governance floor
/// near the ceiling drive credited bytes toward zero and suppress ADR-036
/// vote-weight accrual, so the cap stays close to real prices.
///
/// The value also participates in the client selection score
/// `rate_per_mb × rtt_ms × scale / reputation²` (issue #322, ADR 001 §Node
/// Selection Algorithm); a peer-controlled `u64::MAX` would overflow the
/// multiplication and could silently let a malicious node win the selection.
/// Selection-formula callers SHOULD still use saturating arithmetic as
/// defense-in-depth — the bound is the protocol-boundary check, not a
/// substitute for safe math.
pub const MAX_RATE_PER_MB: u64 = 1000;

/// Length in bytes of an EOA secp256k1 EIP-712 signature (`r‖s‖v`, 32+32+1).
///
/// ADR 014 §1 mandates `slash_sig` is **non-empty** and that requesters MUST
/// reject missing/zero-length signatures — it does not itself fix a byte
/// length. Off-chain `slash_sig` producers are EOA-only — ADR 024 §Off-Chain
/// ERC-1271 Verification: "Every signature deCDN produces or verifies
/// off-chain … is the fixed 65-byte secp256k1 `r‖s‖v` form" — which is always
/// exactly this length. Variable-length
/// **ERC-1271** smart-account signatures are verified on-chain by
/// `SlashJudge` via `SignatureChecker.isValidSignatureNow` (ADR 014
/// §On-Chain Verification); enforcing exactly this length off-chain is the
/// correct, intentionally-strict bound for the EOA producer set. When
/// off-chain ERC-1271 handling lands this constant becomes a lower bound.
pub const SLASH_SIG_LEN: usize = 65;

/// Errors produced when validating wire-decoded protocol messages.
///
/// `RateTooLarge` surfaces from the [`Deserialize`] impl on
/// [`ProbeResponseBody`] (postcard wraps it as [`postcard::Error`] which the
/// framing layer maps to [`crate::FrameError::Decode`]).
/// `InvalidSlashSigLen` is a requester-side obligation enforced via
/// [`ProbeResponse::validate`] — it is intentionally NOT enforced at decode
/// time so the handler can build the response before signing it.
#[derive(Debug, thiserror::Error, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum MessageValidationError {
    /// `rate_per_mb` exceeds [`MAX_RATE_PER_MB`].
    #[error("rate_per_mb {rate} exceeds MAX_RATE_PER_MB ({max})", max = MAX_RATE_PER_MB)]
    RateTooLarge {
        /// The rate that was offered.
        rate: u64,
    },
    /// `rate_per_mb` is zero. A zero rate trivially wins client selection
    /// (score `rate × rtt × scale / reputation²` → 0, sorting to the top)
    /// while earning the node nothing — an obvious misconfiguration. Nodes
    /// reject it at config resolution; requesters MUST also reject it on
    /// receive (#252, ADR 005 §Rate bounds validation). Enforced via
    /// [`ProbeResponse::validate`] / `StreamResponse::validate`, not at decode
    /// time, so a handler can still build a response before signing it.
    #[error("rate_per_mb is zero (requesters must reject; #252)")]
    RateIsZero,
    /// `slash_sig` is missing or not [`SLASH_SIG_LEN`] bytes. ADR 014 §1
    /// mandates a non-empty signature on every `ProbeResponse`; the
    /// EOA-only off-chain signing path (ADR 024 §Off-Chain Signature
    /// Verification — EOA Recovery Only) makes that exactly [`SLASH_SIG_LEN`],
    /// which requesters MUST reject deviations from.
    #[error(
        "slash_sig has invalid length {len} \
         (ADR 014 §1: mandatory non-empty; EOA form is {expected} bytes)",
        expected = SLASH_SIG_LEN
    )]
    InvalidSlashSigLen {
        /// The signature length that was offered.
        len: usize,
    },
    /// A wire [`crate::client::Voucher`]'s `signature` is not
    /// [`crate::client::VOUCHER_SIG_LEN`] bytes. The EOA off-chain voucher
    /// signing form (ADR 024 §Off-Chain Signature Verification — EOA Recovery Only) is exactly that
    /// length; receivers reject deviations before reconstructing the EIP-712
    /// typed data.
    #[error("Voucher.signature has invalid length {len} (EOA form is 65 bytes)")]
    InvalidVoucherSigLen {
        /// The signature length that was offered.
        len: usize,
    },
    /// A wire [`crate::client::ClientBinding`]'s `binding_signature` is not
    /// [`crate::client::BINDING_SIG_LEN`] bytes. The `BindNodeId` attestation
    /// is the same EOA off-chain signing form (ADR 024 §Off-Chain ERC-1271
    /// Verification); receivers reject deviations before `decdn_incentive`
    /// recovers the bound address.
    #[error("ClientBinding.binding_signature has invalid length {len} (EOA form is 65 bytes)")]
    InvalidBindingSigLen {
        /// The signature length that was offered.
        len: usize,
    },
    /// A [`crate::client::StreamResponse`] carries `body.ok == true` yet also an
    /// `error`. A node MUST NOT both promise to serve and report a failure
    /// (ADR 005 §`cdn/client/v1`). Enforced via
    /// [`crate::client::StreamResponseExt::validate`].
    #[error("StreamResponse has ok=true but also carries an error")]
    StreamErrorWithOk,
    /// A [`crate::client::StreamResponse`] carries `body.ok == false` but no
    /// `error` code. A refusal MUST name its reason (ADR 005
    /// §`cdn/client/v1`). Enforced via [`crate::client::StreamResponseExt::validate`].
    #[error("StreamResponse has ok=false but no error code")]
    MissingStreamError,
    /// A [`crate::client::StreamResponse`] carries a mid-stream-only
    /// [`crate::client::StreamError::VoucherRejected`] in its `error` field.
    /// That variant rides exclusively in [`crate::client::ClientMessage::StreamError`]
    /// (ADR 005 §`VoucherRejected` semantics). Enforced via
    /// [`crate::client::StreamResponseExt::validate`].
    #[error("StreamResponse.error carries VoucherRejected (a mid-stream-only code)")]
    VoucherRejectedInResponse,
    /// A [`crate::client::ChunkData`] carries a zero-length payload. ADR 005
    /// §Frame size permits a *shorter* final frame, never an *empty*
    /// one: an empty frame advances neither the receiver's cumulative byte count
    /// nor its voucher accounting, so an unbounded run of them drives the receive
    /// loop without application-level progress (#1088). Enforced by
    /// [`crate::client::ChunkData::new`], the `try_from` decode gate, and every
    /// `encode_chunk_*` helper ([`crate::client::encode_chunk_frame`],
    /// [`crate::client::encode_chunk_frame_headers`], and the crate-private one the
    /// latter builds on) — every route to a frame body.
    #[error(
        "ChunkData carries a zero-length payload (ADR 005: a chunk must carry at least 1 byte)"
    )]
    EmptyChunk,
    /// The postcard message body of a [`crate::client::ChunkData`] frame —
    /// discriminant + length prefix + payload, which is the length the framing prefix
    /// announces — exceeds [`crate::framing::MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE`] (ADR 013 §Wire
    /// Framing).
    ///
    /// The field is named for what it holds: this is always larger than the
    /// `payload_len` the caller passed in, so comparing it against that is a category
    /// error.
    #[error("ChunkData frame length {frame_len} exceeds MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE ({max})", max = crate::framing::MAX_MESSAGE_SIZE)]
    ChunkTooLarge {
        /// The refused frame-body length, in bytes.
        frame_len: usize,
    },
    /// A wire [`crate::client::WireCapability`]'s `owner_signature` is empty.
    /// The EOA form is exactly [`crate::client::VOUCHER_SIG_LEN`] bytes but an
    /// ERC-1271 contract-signer form may be longer, so only the non-empty
    /// floor is a wire-level check; the rest is `decdn_incentive`'s job
    /// (ADR 024 §Off-Chain Signature Verification — EOA Recovery Only).
    #[error("WireCapability.owner_signature is empty")]
    EmptyCapabilitySignature,
}

/// Top-level protocol enum for `cdn/probe/v1`. Variant order is frozen per
/// ADR 013 — new variants MUST be appended at the end.
///
/// ⚠️ **VARIANT ORDER FROZEN — ADR 013 §Protocol Enums**
/// Postcard encodes each variant as its declaration-order index. Reordering,
/// inserting, or removing a variant is a wire-breaking change requiring an
/// ALPN version bump (`cdn/probe/v2`). The discriminant assignments are
/// locked in by the tests `probe_message_request_discriminant_is_zero` and
/// `probe_message_response_discriminant_is_one` — if you change this enum,
/// those tests will fail and tell you why.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub enum ProbeMessage {
    /// discriminant 0 — asserted by `probe_message_request_discriminant_is_zero`
    Request(ProbeRequest),
    /// discriminant 1 — asserted by `probe_message_response_discriminant_is_one`
    Response(ProbeResponse),
}

impl crate::framing::TopLevelEnum for ProbeMessage {
    /// `Request` (0), `Response` (1). Pinned by
    /// `probe_message_variant_count_matches_discriminants`.
    const VARIANT_COUNT: u32 = 2;
}

/// Client → node request on `cdn/probe/v1` (ADR 005 §`cdn/probe/v1`).
///
/// A probe is unauthenticated and unpaid: it asks a candidate node whether it
/// holds `hash` and at what rate it will serve it, so the client can rank
/// candidates on both availability and price in a single round-trip.
/// `timestamp_us` is a requester-generated microsecond timestamp echoed back
/// in [`ProbeResponseBody::timestamp_us`]; it serves both response
/// correlation and RTT measurement (RTT = `receive_time` − `timestamp_us`)
/// and is
/// part of the EIP-712 signed set so the slashing window can be computed
/// on-chain from a single requester clock (ADR 014 §1).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProbeRequest {
    /// BLAKE3 hash of the blob being queried (iroh `Hash`, 32 bytes).
    pub hash: [u8; 32],
    /// Requester-generated microseconds since Unix epoch, echoed back.
    pub timestamp_us: u64,
}

/// Node → client response on `cdn/probe/v1` (ADR 005 §`cdn/probe/v1`).
///
/// **This struct holds only the frozen base** (ADR 013 §Tier 1): the signed
/// [`ProbeResponseBody`] and the `slash_sig` covering it. Unsigned fields live
/// in [`ProbeResponseExt`], which travels as separate trailing bytes — see
/// [`encode_probe_response`] / [`parse_probe_response_ext`].
///
/// The split is what keeps a future unsigned field out of Tier 3. Postcard is
/// positional and fills no defaults for absent trailing fields, so an
/// `Option<T>` appended to *this* struct would fail to decode against an older
/// sender that never wrote it; appended to the separately-decoded extension it
/// costs no coordination at all.
///
/// `slash_sig` is mandatory and non-empty on the wire; requesters MUST reject
/// missing/zero-length signatures (enforced via [`ProbeResponse::validate`] and
/// the requester's [`SLASH_SIG_LEN`] check).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProbeResponse {
    /// Signed body. Its wire layout is frozen per ADR 013.
    pub body: ProbeResponseBody,
    /// EIP-712 secp256k1 signature over the typed-data hash of `body`'s
    /// fields `{hash, has_blob, rate_per_mb, timestamp_us}` (ADR 014 §1; see
    /// `decdn_incentive::ProbeSlashData`). Always exactly [`SLASH_SIG_LEN`]
    /// bytes — *not* a signature over postcard bytes. The verify path
    /// rejects any other length.
    pub slash_sig: Vec<u8>,
}

/// Optional [`ProbeResponse`] extension fields, carried as trailing bytes after
/// the `ProbeResponse` message via the two-phase pattern (ADR 013 §Tier 1; see
/// [`encode_probe_response`] / [`parse_probe_response_ext`]).
///
/// Nothing here is covered by `slash_sig`, and nothing here may become
/// load-bearing for payment, slashing, or any decision a lying node profits
/// from: an unsigned field is a hint, and the sender is the party with the
/// motive to shade it.
///
/// New fields are appended to the END of this struct and MUST be `Option<T>` or
/// have a meaningful `Default`. Insertions and reordering are Tier-3.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Default, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProbeResponseExt {
    /// Blob size in bytes when known. Nodes SHOULD include it when the size is
    /// known so requesters can estimate cost before opening a payment pool.
    /// Unsigned: treat it as a sizing hint, never as a commitment.
    pub total_bytes: Option<u64>,
    /// Which discovery blocks (`decdn_protocol::coverage`) this node will
    /// serve. Unsigned: treat it as a hint, never as a commitment. A
    /// requester MUST treat `body.has_blob` and `coverage.is_empty()` as a
    /// biconditional — see the consistency check at the probe consumer — and
    /// drop a response where they disagree rather than trust either field
    /// alone.
    pub coverage: crate::Coverage,
}

impl ProbeResponseExt {
    /// Does this ext's `coverage` agree with the signed body's `has_blob`
    /// (ADR 013 §Tier 1; #1506)? An honest responder's `has_blob` and
    /// `coverage.is_empty()` are a biconditional by construction (the probe
    /// handler derives `has_blob` FROM `coverage`, never the other way
    /// round), so any disagreement means a malformed or dishonest response.
    ///
    /// Neither field is in the signed set, so a mismatch has no attributable
    /// author to slash: a requester finding `false` here MUST drop the
    /// candidate rather than admit it, and must NOT score it to local
    /// reputation — the same treatment an unrecovered `slash_sig` gets.
    #[must_use]
    pub fn consistent_with(&self, has_blob: bool) -> bool {
        has_blob != self.coverage.is_empty()
    }
}

/// Signed fields of a [`ProbeResponse`]. Layout is frozen per ADR 013 — future
/// additions go on [`ProbeResponse`] as optional unsigned fields, not here.
///
/// `rate_per_mb` is bounded by [`MAX_RATE_PER_MB`] at the wire boundary — the
/// field-level `deserialize_rate_per_mb` hook rejects oversize values so a
/// malicious node cannot poison the client selection score with an
/// overflow-inducing rate (issue #378). Server-side construction is
/// unconstrained at the type level; the node's config layer
/// (`resolve_payment`) enforces the same ceiling at startup and on hot
/// reload, keeping the bound bilateral.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
pub struct ProbeResponseBody {
    /// BLAKE3 hash this response answers for, echoed from the request.
    pub hash: [u8; 32],
    /// Whether the node currently holds the blob and will serve it. A node
    /// MUST NOT sign `true` unless it can guarantee delivery within the
    /// slashing window (ADR 005 §Probe-triggered eviction hold).
    pub has_blob: bool,
    /// The node's current quoted rate in payment-token base units per MB. The
    /// token is USDC, fixed at contract deployment (ADR 003), so the wire
    /// carries no token identifier and the units need no normalization.
    /// Bounded by [`MAX_RATE_PER_MB`].
    #[serde(deserialize_with = "deserialize_rate_per_mb")]
    pub rate_per_mb: u64,
    /// The requester-generated microsecond timestamp from the corresponding
    /// [`ProbeRequest`], echoed back unchanged.
    pub timestamp_us: u64,
}

/// Encode a [`ProbeResponse`] with its optional trailing [`ProbeResponseExt`]
/// (ADR 013 §Tier 1, two-phase).
///
/// The base message and the extension are encoded as two adjacent postcard
/// values in one frame. Encoding them separately is what makes a future field
/// appended to [`ProbeResponseExt`] invisible to an older receiver, which stops
/// consuming at the end of the base and discards the rest.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Propagates a [`postcard::Error`] if serialization fails.
pub fn encode_probe_response(
    resp: &ProbeResponse,
    ext: Option<&ProbeResponseExt>,
) -> Result<Vec<u8>, postcard::Error> {
    let mut buf = postcard::to_allocvec(&ProbeMessage::Response(resp.clone()))?;
    if let Some(ext) = ext {
        buf.extend_from_slice(&postcard::to_allocvec(ext)?);
    }
    Ok(buf)
}

/// Parse the trailing [`ProbeResponseExt`] bytes returned as the remainder by
/// [`crate::decode_message`] after a `ProbeMessage::Response`.
///
/// An empty remainder ⇒ [`ProbeResponseExt::default`] (no size hint). Trailing
/// bytes beyond the known fields are tolerated for forward compatibility (ADR
/// 013 §Tier 1): a future optional field appended to [`ProbeResponseExt`] is
/// read by new receivers and skipped by old ones.
///
/// # Errors
///
/// Returns a [`postcard::Error`] if a non-empty remainder is not a valid
/// `ProbeResponseExt` prefix.
pub fn parse_probe_response_ext(remainder: &[u8]) -> Result<ProbeResponseExt, postcard::Error> {
    if remainder.is_empty() {
        Ok(ProbeResponseExt::default())
    } else {
        Ok(postcard::take_from_bytes::<ProbeResponseExt>(remainder)?.0)
    }
}

impl ProbeResponse {
    /// Validate field invariants. The wire-decode path enforces the
    /// `rate_per_mb` bound automatically via `deserialize_rate_per_mb`; this
    /// method additionally enforces the requester-side mandatory-`slash_sig`
    /// rule (ADR 014 §1) and is exposed so construction sites can re-check
    /// before sending and tests can assert validity without a full
    /// encode/decode roundtrip.
    pub const fn validate(&self) -> Result<(), MessageValidationError> {
        if self.body.rate_per_mb > MAX_RATE_PER_MB {
            return Err(MessageValidationError::RateTooLarge {
                rate: self.body.rate_per_mb,
            });
        }
        // #252: requesters MUST reject a zero rate on receive. The decode hook
        // only bounds the upper end (a peer-controlled overflow source, #378);
        // zero is a legitimate `u64` the wire accepts but a requester must not.
        if self.body.rate_per_mb == 0 {
            return Err(MessageValidationError::RateIsZero);
        }
        if self.slash_sig.len() != SLASH_SIG_LEN {
            return Err(MessageValidationError::InvalidSlashSigLen {
                len: self.slash_sig.len(),
            });
        }
        Ok(())
    }
}

// Field-level deserialize hook so the protocol boundary rejects oversize
// `rate_per_mb` (issue #378). Using `#[serde(deserialize_with)]` rather
// than a hand-written `impl Deserialize for ProbeResponseBody` keeps the
// struct's field order and codec in lockstep with the derive — there is
// no mirror struct to drift out of sync. The wire bytes are byte-identical
// to what a fully-derived `Deserialize` would have read, so postcard's
// positional layout is preserved.
pub(crate) fn deserialize_rate_per_mb<'de, D>(deserializer: D) -> Result<u64, D::Error>
where
    D: Deserializer<'de>,
{
    let rate = u64::deserialize(deserializer)?;
    if rate > MAX_RATE_PER_MB {
        return Err(de::Error::custom(MessageValidationError::RateTooLarge {
            rate,
        }));
    }
    Ok(rate)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests;