/*
 * Copyright (C) 2015 Benjamin Fry <benjaminfry@me.com>
 *
 * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
 * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
 * You may obtain a copy of the License at
 *
 *     http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
 *
 * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
 * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
 * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
 * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
 * limitations under the License.
 */

//! signer is a structure for performing many of the signing processes of the DNSSec specification
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use chrono::Duration;
#[cfg(feature = "dnssec")]
use rr::rdata::DNSSECRData;
use proto::error::{ProtoErrorKind, ProtoResult};
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use proto::rr::dnssec::{tbs, TBS};

use op::{Message, MessageFinalizer};
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use rr::dnssec::{Algorithm, KeyPair};
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use rr::rdata::SIG;
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use rr::rdata::{DNSSECRecordType, DNSKEY, KEY};
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use rr::RData;
use rr::Record;
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use rr::{DNSClass, Name, RecordType};
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use serialize::binary::BinEncoder;

#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
use rr::dnssec::Private;

/// Use for performing signing and validation of DNSSec based components.
///
/// TODO: warning this struct and it's impl are under high volatility, expect breaking changes
///
/// [RFC 4035](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4035), DNSSEC Protocol Modifications, March 2005
///
/// ```text
/// 5.3.  Authenticating an RRset with an RRSIG RR
///
///    A validator can use an RRSIG RR and its corresponding DNSKEY RR to
///    attempt to authenticate RRsets.  The validator first checks the RRSIG
///    RR to verify that it covers the RRset, has a valid time interval, and
///    identifies a valid DNSKEY RR.  The validator then constructs the
///    canonical form of the signed data by appending the RRSIG RDATA
///    (excluding the Signature Field) with the canonical form of the
///    covered RRset.  Finally, the validator uses the public key and
///    signature to authenticate the signed data.  Sections 5.3.1, 5.3.2,
///    and 5.3.3 describe each step in detail.
///
/// 5.3.1.  Checking the RRSIG RR Validity
///
///    A security-aware resolver can use an RRSIG RR to authenticate an
///    RRset if all of the following conditions hold:
///
///    o  The RRSIG RR and the RRset MUST have the same owner name and the
///       same class.
///
///    o  The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name field MUST be the name of the zone
///       that contains the RRset.
///
///    o  The RRSIG RR's Type Covered field MUST equal the RRset's type.
///
///    o  The number of labels in the RRset owner name MUST be greater than
///       or equal to the value in the RRSIG RR's Labels field.
///
///    o  The validator's notion of the current time MUST be less than or
///       equal to the time listed in the RRSIG RR's Expiration field.
///
///    o  The validator's notion of the current time MUST be greater than or
///       equal to the time listed in the RRSIG RR's Inception field.
///
///    o  The RRSIG RR's Signer's Name, Algorithm, and Key Tag fields MUST
///       match the owner name, algorithm, and key tag for some DNSKEY RR in
///       the zone's apex DNSKEY RRset.
///
///    o  The matching DNSKEY RR MUST be present in the zone's apex DNSKEY
///       RRset, and MUST have the Zone Flag bit (DNSKEY RDATA Flag bit 7)
///       set.
///
///    It is possible for more than one DNSKEY RR to match the conditions
///    above.  In this case, the validator cannot predetermine which DNSKEY
///    RR to use to authenticate the signature, and it MUST try each
///    matching DNSKEY RR until either the signature is validated or the
///    validator has run out of matching public keys to try.
///
///    Note that this authentication process is only meaningful if the
///    validator authenticates the DNSKEY RR before using it to validate
///    signatures.  The matching DNSKEY RR is considered to be authentic if:
///
///    o  the apex DNSKEY RRset containing the DNSKEY RR is considered
///       authentic; or
///
///    o  the RRset covered by the RRSIG RR is the apex DNSKEY RRset itself,
///       and the DNSKEY RR either matches an authenticated DS RR from the
///       parent zone or matches a trust anchor.
///
/// 5.3.2.  Reconstructing the Signed Data
///
///    Once the RRSIG RR has met the validity requirements described in
///    Section 5.3.1, the validator has to reconstruct the original signed
///    data.  The original signed data includes RRSIG RDATA (excluding the
///    Signature field) and the canonical form of the RRset.  Aside from
///    being ordered, the canonical form of the RRset might also differ from
///    the received RRset due to DNS name compression, decremented TTLs, or
///    wildcard expansion.  The validator should use the following to
///    reconstruct the original signed data:
///
///          signed_data = RRSIG_RDATA | RR(1) | RR(2)...  where
///
///             "|" denotes concatenation
///
///             RRSIG_RDATA is the wire format of the RRSIG RDATA fields
///                with the Signature field excluded and the Signer's Name
///                in canonical form.
///
///             RR(i) = name | type | class | OrigTTL | RDATA length | RDATA
///
///                name is calculated according to the function below
///
///                class is the RRset's class
///
///                type is the RRset type and all RRs in the class
///
///                OrigTTL is the value from the RRSIG Original TTL field
///
///                All names in the RDATA field are in canonical form
///
///                The set of all RR(i) is sorted into canonical order.
///
///             To calculate the name:
///                let rrsig_labels = the value of the RRSIG Labels field
///
///                let fqdn = RRset's fully qualified domain name in
///                                canonical form
///
///                let fqdn_labels = Label count of the fqdn above.
///
///                if rrsig_labels = fqdn_labels,
///                    name = fqdn
///
///                if rrsig_labels < fqdn_labels,
///                   name = "*." | the rightmost rrsig_label labels of the
///                                 fqdn
///
///                if rrsig_labels > fqdn_labels
///                   the RRSIG RR did not pass the necessary validation
///                   checks and MUST NOT be used to authenticate this
///                   RRset.
///
///    The canonical forms for names and RRsets are defined in [RFC4034].
///
///    NSEC RRsets at a delegation boundary require special processing.
///    There are two distinct NSEC RRsets associated with a signed delegated
///    name.  One NSEC RRset resides in the parent zone, and specifies which
///    RRsets are present at the parent zone.  The second NSEC RRset resides
///    at the child zone and identifies which RRsets are present at the apex
///    in the child zone.  The parent NSEC RRset and child NSEC RRset can
///    always be distinguished as only a child NSEC RR will indicate that an
///    SOA RRset exists at the name.  When reconstructing the original NSEC
///    RRset for the delegation from the parent zone, the NSEC RRs MUST NOT
///    be combined with NSEC RRs from the child zone.  When reconstructing
///    the original NSEC RRset for the apex of the child zone, the NSEC RRs
///    MUST NOT be combined with NSEC RRs from the parent zone.
///
///    Note that each of the two NSEC RRsets at a delegation point has a
///    corresponding RRSIG RR with an owner name matching the delegated
///    name, and each of these RRSIG RRs is authoritative data associated
///    with the same zone that contains the corresponding NSEC RRset.  If
///    necessary, a resolver can tell these RRSIG RRs apart by checking the
///    Signer's Name field.
///
/// 5.3.3.  Checking the Signature
///
///    Once the resolver has validated the RRSIG RR as described in Section
///    5.3.1 and reconstructed the original signed data as described in
///    Section 5.3.2, the validator can attempt to use the cryptographic
///    signature to authenticate the signed data, and thus (finally!)
///    authenticate the RRset.
///
///    The Algorithm field in the RRSIG RR identifies the cryptographic
///    algorithm used to generate the signature.  The signature itself is
///    contained in the Signature field of the RRSIG RDATA, and the public
///    key used to verify the signature is contained in the Public Key field
///    of the matching DNSKEY RR(s) (found in Section 5.3.1).  [RFC4034]
///    provides a list of algorithm types and provides pointers to the
///    documents that define each algorithm's use.
///
///    Note that it is possible for more than one DNSKEY RR to match the
///    conditions in Section 5.3.1.  In this case, the validator can only
///    determine which DNSKEY RR is correct by trying each matching public
///    key until the validator either succeeds in validating the signature
///    or runs out of keys to try.
///
///    If the Labels field of the RRSIG RR is not equal to the number of
///    labels in the RRset's fully qualified owner name, then the RRset is
///    either invalid or the result of wildcard expansion.  The resolver
///    MUST verify that wildcard expansion was applied properly before
///    considering the RRset to be authentic.  Section 5.3.4 describes how
///    to determine whether a wildcard was applied properly.
///
///    If other RRSIG RRs also cover this RRset, the local resolver security
///    policy determines whether the resolver also has to test these RRSIG
///    RRs and how to resolve conflicts if these RRSIG RRs lead to differing
///    results.
///
///    If the resolver accepts the RRset as authentic, the validator MUST
///    set the TTL of the RRSIG RR and each RR in the authenticated RRset to
///    a value no greater than the minimum of:
///
///    o  the RRset's TTL as received in the response;
///
///    o  the RRSIG RR's TTL as received in the response;
///
///    o  the value in the RRSIG RR's Original TTL field; and
///
///    o  the difference of the RRSIG RR's Signature Expiration time and the
///       current time.
///
/// 5.3.4.  Authenticating a Wildcard Expanded RRset Positive Response
///
///    If the number of labels in an RRset's owner name is greater than the
///    Labels field of the covering RRSIG RR, then the RRset and its
///    covering RRSIG RR were created as a result of wildcard expansion.
///    Once the validator has verified the signature, as described in
///    Section 5.3, it must take additional steps to verify the non-
///    existence of an exact match or closer wildcard match for the query.
///    Section 5.4 discusses these steps.
///
///    Note that the response received by the resolver should include all
///    NSEC RRs needed to authenticate the response (see Section 3.1.3).
/// ```
#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
pub struct Signer {
    // TODO: this should really be a trait and generic struct over KEY and DNSKEY
    key_rdata: RData,
    key: KeyPair<Private>,
    algorithm: Algorithm,
    signer_name: Name,
    sig_duration: Duration,
    is_zone_signing_key: bool,
}

/// Placeholder type for when OpenSSL and *ring* are disabled; enable OpenSSL and Ring for support
#[cfg(not(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring")))]
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct Signer;

#[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
impl Signer {
    /// Version of Signer for verifying RRSIGs and SIG0 records.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `key_rdata` - the DNSKEY and public key material
    /// * `key` - the private key for signing, unless validating, where just the public key is necessary
    /// * `signer_name` - name in the zone to which this DNSKEY is bound
    /// * `sig_duration` - time period for which this key is valid, 0 when verifying
    /// * `is_zone_update_auth` - this key may be used for updating the zone
    pub fn dnssec(
        key_rdata: DNSKEY,
        key: KeyPair<Private>,
        signer_name: Name,
        sig_duration: Duration,
    ) -> Self {
        let algorithm = key_rdata.algorithm();
        let is_zone_signing_key = key_rdata.zone_key();

        Signer {
            key_rdata: key_rdata.into(),
            key: key,
            algorithm: algorithm,
            signer_name: signer_name,
            sig_duration: sig_duration,
            is_zone_signing_key: is_zone_signing_key,
        }
    }

    /// Version of Signer for verifying RRSIGs and SIG0 records.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `key_rdata` - the KEY and public key material
    /// * `key` - the private key for signing, unless validating, where just the public key is necessary
    /// * `signer_name` - name in the zone to which this DNSKEY is bound
    /// * `is_zone_update_auth` - this key may be used for updating the zone
    pub fn sig0(key_rdata: KEY, key: KeyPair<Private>, signer_name: Name) -> Self {
        let algorithm = key_rdata.algorithm();

        Signer {
            key_rdata: key_rdata.into(),
            key: key,
            algorithm: algorithm,
            signer_name: signer_name,
            sig_duration: Duration::zero(),
            is_zone_signing_key: false,
        }
    }

    /// Version of Signer for signing RRSIGs and SIG0 records.
    #[deprecated(note = "use SIG0 or DNSSec constructors")]
    pub fn new(
        algorithm: Algorithm,
        key: KeyPair<Private>,
        signer_name: Name,
        sig_duration: Duration,
        is_zone_signing_key: bool,
        _: bool,
    ) -> Self {
        let dnskey = key
            .to_dnskey(algorithm)
            .expect("something went wrong, use one of the SIG0 or DNSSec constructors");

        Signer {
            key_rdata: dnskey.into(),
            key: key,
            algorithm: algorithm,
            signer_name: signer_name,
            sig_duration: sig_duration,
            is_zone_signing_key: is_zone_signing_key,
        }
    }

    /// Return the key used for validation/signing
    pub fn key(&self) -> &KeyPair<Private> {
        &self.key
    }

    /// Returns the duration that this signature is valid for
    pub fn sig_duration(&self) -> Duration {
        self.sig_duration
    }

    /// A hint to the DNSKey associated with this Signer can be used to sign/validate records in the zone
    pub fn is_zone_signing_key(&self) -> bool {
        self.is_zone_signing_key
    }

    /// Signs a hash.
    ///
    /// This will panic if the `key` is not a private key and can be used for signing.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `hash` - the hashed resource record set, see `rrset_tbs`.
    ///
    /// # Return value
    ///
    /// The signature, ready to be stored in an `RData::RRSIG`.
    pub fn sign(&self, tbs: &TBS) -> ProtoResult<Vec<u8>> {
        self.key
            .sign(self.algorithm, tbs)
            .map_err(|e| ProtoErrorKind::Msg(format!("signing error: {}", e)).into())
    }

    /// Returns the algorithm this Signer will use to either sign or validate a signature
    pub fn algorithm(&self) -> Algorithm {
        self.algorithm
    }

    /// The name of the signing entity, e.g. the DNS server name.
    ///
    /// This should match the name on key in the zone.
    pub fn signer_name(&self) -> &Name {
        &self.signer_name
    }

    /// The key tag is calculated as a hash to more quickly lookup a DNSKEY.
    ///
    /// [RFC 1035](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035), DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFICATION, November 1987
    ///
    /// ```text
    /// RFC 2535                DNS Security Extensions               March 1999
    ///
    /// 4.1.6 Key Tag Field
    ///
    ///  The "key Tag" is a two octet quantity that is used to efficiently
    ///  select between multiple keys which may be applicable and thus check
    ///  that a public key about to be used for the computationally expensive
    ///  effort to check the signature is possibly valid.  For algorithm 1
    ///  (MD5/RSA) as defined in [RFC 2537], it is the next to the bottom two
    ///  octets of the public key modulus needed to decode the signature
    ///  field.  That is to say, the most significant 16 of the least
    ///  significant 24 bits of the modulus in network (big endian) order. For
    ///  all other algorithms, including private algorithms, it is calculated
    ///  as a simple checksum of the KEY RR as described in Appendix C.
    ///
    /// Appendix C: Key Tag Calculation
    ///
    ///  The key tag field in the SIG RR is just a means of more efficiently
    ///  selecting the correct KEY RR to use when there is more than one KEY
    ///  RR candidate available, for example, in verifying a signature.  It is
    ///  possible for more than one candidate key to have the same tag, in
    ///  which case each must be tried until one works or all fail.  The
    ///  following reference implementation of how to calculate the Key Tag,
    ///  for all algorithms other than algorithm 1, is in ANSI C.  It is coded
    ///  for clarity, not efficiency.  (See section 4.1.6 for how to determine
    ///  the Key Tag of an algorithm 1 key.)
    ///
    ///  /* assumes int is at least 16 bits
    ///     first byte of the key tag is the most significant byte of return
    ///     value
    ///     second byte of the key tag is the least significant byte of
    ///     return value
    ///     */
    ///
    ///  int keytag (
    ///
    ///          unsigned char key[],  /* the RDATA part of the KEY RR */
    ///          unsigned int keysize, /* the RDLENGTH */
    ///          )
    ///  {
    ///  long int    ac;    /* assumed to be 32 bits or larger */
    ///
    ///  for ( ac = 0, i = 0; i < keysize; ++i )
    ///      ac += (i&1) ? key[i] : key[i]<<8;
    ///  ac += (ac>>16) & 0xFFFF;
    ///  return ac & 0xFFFF;
    ///  }
    /// ```
    pub fn calculate_key_tag(&self) -> ProtoResult<u16> {
        // TODO:
        let mut bytes: Vec<u8> = Vec::with_capacity(512);
        {
            let mut e = BinEncoder::new(&mut bytes);
            self.key_rdata.emit(&mut e)?;
        }
        Ok(DNSKEY::calculate_key_tag_internal(&bytes))
    }

    /// Signs the given message, returning the signature bytes.
    ///
    /// # Arguments
    ///
    /// * `message` - the message to sign
    ///
    /// [rfc2535](https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2535#section-4.1.8.1), Domain Name System Security Extensions, 1999
    ///
    /// ```text
    /// 4.1.8.1 Calculating Transaction and Request SIGs
    ///
    ///  A response message from a security aware server may optionally
    ///  contain a special SIG at the end of the additional information
    ///  section to authenticate the transaction.
    ///
    ///  This SIG has a "type covered" field of zero, which is not a valid RR
    ///  type.  It is calculated by using a "data" (see Section 4.1.8) of the
    ///  entire preceding DNS reply message, including DNS header but not the
    ///  IP header and before the reply RR counts have been adjusted for the
    ///  inclusion of any transaction SIG, concatenated with the entire DNS
    ///  query message that produced this response, including the query's DNS
    ///  header and any request SIGs but not its IP header.  That is
    ///
    ///  data = full response (less transaction SIG) | full query
    ///
    ///  Verification of the transaction SIG (which is signed by the server
    ///  host key, not the zone key) by the requesting resolver shows that the
    ///  query and response were not tampered with in transit, that the
    ///  response corresponds to the intended query, and that the response
    ///  comes from the queried server.
    ///
    ///  A DNS request may be optionally signed by including one or more SIGs
    ///  at the end of the query. Such SIGs are identified by having a "type
    ///  covered" field of zero. They sign the preceding DNS request message
    ///  including DNS header but not including the IP header or any request
    ///  SIGs at the end and before the request RR counts have been adjusted
    ///  for the inclusions of any request SIG(s).
    ///
    ///  WARNING: Request SIGs are unnecessary for any currently defined
    ///  request other than update [RFC 2136, 2137] and will cause some old
    ///  DNS servers to give an error return or ignore a query.  However, such
    ///  SIGs may in the future be needed for other requests.
    ///
    ///  Except where needed to authenticate an update or similar privileged
    ///  request, servers are not required to check request SIGs.
    /// ```
    ///  ---
    ///
    /// NOTE: In classic RFC style, this is unclear, it implies that each SIG record is not included in
    ///  the Additional record count, but this makes it more difficult to process and calculate more
    ///  than one SIG0 record. Annoyingly, it means that the Header is signed with different material
    ///  (i.e. additional record count - #SIG0 records), so the exact header sent is NOT the header
    ///  being verified.
    ///
    ///  ---
    pub fn sign_message(&self, message: &Message, pre_sig0: &SIG) -> ProtoResult<Vec<u8>> {
        tbs::message_tbs(message, pre_sig0).and_then(|tbs| self.sign(&tbs))
    }
}

impl MessageFinalizer for Signer {
    #[cfg(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring"))]
    fn finalize_message(&self, message: &Message, current_time: u32) -> ProtoResult<Vec<Record>> {
        debug!("signing message: {:?}", message);
        let key_tag: u16 = self.calculate_key_tag()?;

        // this is based on RFCs 2535, 2931 and 3007

        // 'For all SIG(0) RRs, the owner name, class, TTL, and original TTL, are
        //  meaningless.' - 2931
        let mut sig0 = Record::new();

        // The TTL fields SHOULD be zero
        sig0.set_ttl(0);

        // The CLASS field SHOULD be ANY
        sig0.set_dns_class(DNSClass::ANY);

        // The owner name SHOULD be root (a single zero octet).
        sig0.set_name(Name::root());
        let num_labels = sig0.name().num_labels();

        let expiration_time: u32 = current_time + (5 * 60); // +5 minutes in seconds

        sig0.set_rr_type(RecordType::DNSSEC(DNSSECRecordType::SIG));
        let pre_sig0 = SIG::new(
            // type covered in SIG(0) is 0 which is what makes this SIG0 vs a standard SIG
            RecordType::ZERO,
            self.algorithm(),
            num_labels,
            // see above, original_ttl is meaningless, The TTL fields SHOULD be zero
            0,
            // recommended time is +5 minutes from now, to prevent timing attacks, 2 is probably good
            expiration_time,
            // current time, this should be UTC
            // unsigned numbers of seconds since the start of 1 January 1970, GMT
            current_time,
            key_tag,
            // can probably get rid of this clone if the owndership is correct
            self.signer_name().clone(),
            Vec::new(),
        );
        let signature: Vec<u8> = self.sign_message(message, &pre_sig0)?;
        sig0.set_rdata(RData::DNSSEC(DNSSECRData::SIG(pre_sig0.set_sig(signature))));

        Ok(vec![sig0])
    }

    #[cfg(not(any(feature = "openssl", feature = "ring")))]
    fn finalize_message(&self, _: &Message, _: u32) -> ProtoResult<Vec<Record>> {
        Err(
            ProtoErrorKind::Message("the ring or openssl feature must be enabled for signing")
                .into(),
        )
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
#[cfg(feature = "openssl")]
mod tests {
    extern crate openssl;
    use self::openssl::bn::BigNum;
    use self::openssl::pkey::Private;
    use self::openssl::rsa::Rsa;

    use op::{Message, Query};
    use rr::dnssec::*;
    use rr::rdata::key::KeyUsage;
    use rr::rdata::{DNSSECRData, SIG};
    use rr::{DNSClass, Name, Record, RecordType};

    pub use super::*;

    fn assert_send_and_sync<T: Send + Sync>() {
        assert!(true)
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_send_and_sync() {
        assert_send_and_sync::<Signer>();
    }

    fn pre_sig0(signer: &Signer, inception_time: u32, expiration_time: u32) -> SIG {
        SIG::new(
            // type covered in SIG(0) is 0 which is what makes this SIG0 vs a standard SIG
            RecordType::ZERO,
            signer.algorithm(),
            0,
            // see above, original_ttl is meaningless, The TTL fields SHOULD be zero
            0,
            // recommended time is +5 minutes from now, to prevent timing attacks, 2 is probably good
            expiration_time,
            // current time, this should be UTC
            // unsigned numbers of seconds since the start of 1 January 1970, GMT
            inception_time,
            signer.calculate_key_tag().unwrap(),
            // can probably get rid of this clone if the owndership is correct
            signer.signer_name().clone(),
            Vec::new(),
        )
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_sign_and_verify_message_sig0() {
        let origin: Name = Name::parse("example.com.", None).unwrap();
        let mut question: Message = Message::new();
        let mut query: Query = Query::new();
        query.set_name(origin.clone());
        question.add_query(query);

        let rsa = Rsa::generate(2048).unwrap();
        let key = KeyPair::from_rsa(rsa).unwrap();
        let sig0key = key.to_sig0key(Algorithm::RSASHA256).unwrap();
        let signer = Signer::sig0(sig0key.clone(), key, Name::root());

        let pre_sig0 = pre_sig0(&signer, 0, 300);
        let sig = signer.sign_message(&question, &pre_sig0).unwrap();
        println!("sig: {:?}", sig);

        assert!(!sig.is_empty());

        assert!(sig0key.verify_message(&question, &sig, &pre_sig0).is_ok());

        // now test that the sig0 record works correctly.
        assert!(question.sig0().is_empty());
        question.finalize(&signer, 0).expect("should have signed");
        assert!(!question.sig0().is_empty());

        let sig = signer.sign_message(&question, &pre_sig0);
        println!("sig after sign: {:?}", sig);

        if let &RData::DNSSEC(DNSSECRData::SIG(ref sig)) = question.sig0()[0].rdata() {
            assert!(sig0key.verify_message(&question, sig.sig(), &sig).is_ok());
        }
    }

    #[test]
    #[allow(deprecated)]
    fn test_sign_and_verify_rrset() {
        let rsa = Rsa::generate(2048).unwrap();
        let key = KeyPair::from_rsa(rsa).unwrap();
        let sig0key = key
            .to_sig0key_with_usage(Algorithm::RSASHA256, KeyUsage::Zone)
            .unwrap();
        let signer = Signer::sig0(sig0key, key, Name::root());

        let origin: Name = Name::parse("example.com.", None).unwrap();
        let rrsig = Record::new()
            .set_name(origin.clone())
            .set_ttl(86400)
            .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
            .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
            .set_rdata(RData::DNSSEC(DNSSECRData::SIG(SIG::new(
                RecordType::NS,
                Algorithm::RSASHA256,
                origin.num_labels(),
                86400,
                5,
                0,
                signer.calculate_key_tag().unwrap(),
                origin.clone(),
                vec![],
            )))).clone();
        let rrset = vec![
            Record::new()
                .set_name(origin.clone())
                .set_ttl(86400)
                .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("a.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                .clone(),
            Record::new()
                .set_name(origin.clone())
                .set_ttl(86400)
                .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("b.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                .clone(),
        ];

        let tbs = tbs::rrset_tbs_with_rrsig(&rrsig, &rrset).unwrap();
        let sig = signer.sign(&tbs).unwrap();

        let pub_key = signer.key().to_public_bytes().unwrap();
        let pub_key = PublicKeyEnum::from_public_bytes(&pub_key, Algorithm::RSASHA256).unwrap();

        assert!(
            pub_key
                .verify(Algorithm::RSASHA256, tbs.as_ref(), &sig)
                .is_ok()
        );
    }

    fn get_rsa_from_vec(params: &Vec<u32>) -> Result<Rsa<Private>, openssl::error::ErrorStack> {
        Rsa::from_private_components(
            BigNum::from_u32(params[0]).unwrap(), // modulus: n
            BigNum::from_u32(params[1]).unwrap(), // public exponent: e,
            BigNum::from_u32(params[2]).unwrap(), // private exponent: de,
            BigNum::from_u32(params[3]).unwrap(), // prime1: p,
            BigNum::from_u32(params[4]).unwrap(), // prime2: q,
            BigNum::from_u32(params[5]).unwrap(), // exponent1: dp,
            BigNum::from_u32(params[6]).unwrap(), // exponent2: dq,
            BigNum::from_u32(params[7]).unwrap(), // coefficient: qi
        )
    }

    #[test]
    #[allow(deprecated)]
    fn test_calculate_key_tag() {
        let test_vectors = vec![
            (vec![33, 3, 21, 11, 3, 1, 1, 1], 9739),
            (
                vec![
                    0xc2fedb69, 0x10001, 0x6ebb9209, 0xf743, 0xc9e3, 0xd07f, 0x6275, 0x1095,
                ],
                42354,
            ),
        ];

        for &(ref input_data, exp_result) in test_vectors.iter() {
            let rsa = get_rsa_from_vec(input_data).unwrap();
            let rsa_pem = rsa.private_key_to_pem().unwrap();
            println!("pkey:\n{}", String::from_utf8(rsa_pem).unwrap());

            let key = KeyPair::from_rsa(rsa).unwrap();
            let sig0key = key
                .to_sig0key_with_usage(Algorithm::RSASHA256, KeyUsage::Zone)
                .unwrap();
            let signer = Signer::sig0(sig0key, key, Name::root());
            let key_tag = signer.calculate_key_tag().unwrap();

            assert_eq!(key_tag, exp_result);
        }
    }

    #[test]
    #[allow(deprecated)]
    fn test_calculate_key_tag_pem() {
        let x = "-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
MC0CAQACBQC+L6pNAgMBAAECBQCYj0ZNAgMA9CsCAwDHZwICeEUCAnE/AgMA3u0=
-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----
";

        let rsa = Rsa::private_key_from_pem(x.as_bytes()).unwrap();
        let rsa_pem = rsa.private_key_to_pem().unwrap();
        println!("pkey:\n{}", String::from_utf8(rsa_pem).unwrap());

        let key = KeyPair::from_rsa(rsa).unwrap();
        let sig0key = key
            .to_sig0key_with_usage(Algorithm::RSASHA256, KeyUsage::Zone)
            .unwrap();
        let signer = Signer::sig0(sig0key, key, Name::root());
        let key_tag = signer.calculate_key_tag().unwrap();

        assert_eq!(key_tag, 28551);
    }

    // TODO: these tests technically came from TBS in trust_dns_proto
    #[cfg(feature = "openssl")]
    #[cfg(test)]
    mod tests {
        extern crate openssl;
        use self::openssl::rsa::Rsa;

        use rr::dnssec::tbs::*;
        use rr::dnssec::*;
        use rr::rdata::{DNSSECRData, SIG};
        use rr::*;

        #[test]
        fn test_rrset_tbs() {
            let rsa = Rsa::generate(2048).unwrap();
            let key = KeyPair::from_rsa(rsa).unwrap();
            let sig0key = key.to_sig0key(Algorithm::RSASHA256).unwrap();
            let signer = Signer::sig0(sig0key, key, Name::root());

            let origin: Name = Name::parse("example.com.", None).unwrap();
            let rrsig = Record::new()
                .set_name(origin.clone())
                .set_ttl(86400)
                .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                .set_rdata(RData::DNSSEC(DNSSECRData::SIG(SIG::new(
                    RecordType::NS,
                    Algorithm::RSASHA256,
                    origin.num_labels(),
                    86400,
                    5,
                    0,
                    signer.calculate_key_tag().unwrap(),
                    origin.clone(),
                    vec![],
                )))).clone();
            let rrset = vec![
                Record::new()
                    .set_name(origin.clone())
                    .set_ttl(86400)
                    .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                    .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                    .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("a.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                    .clone(),
                Record::new()
                    .set_name(origin.clone())
                    .set_ttl(86400)
                    .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                    .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                    .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("b.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                    .clone(),
            ];

            let tbs = rrset_tbs_with_rrsig(&rrsig, &rrset).unwrap();
            assert!(!tbs.as_ref().is_empty());

            let rrset = vec![
                Record::new()
                    .set_name(origin.clone())
                    .set_ttl(86400)
                    .set_rr_type(RecordType::CNAME)
                    .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                    .set_rdata(RData::CNAME(
                        Name::parse("a.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap(),
                    )).clone(), // different type
                Record::new()
                    .set_name(Name::parse("www.example.com.", None).unwrap())
                    .set_ttl(86400)
                    .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                    .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                    .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("a.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                    .clone(), // different name
                Record::new()
                    .set_name(origin.clone())
                    .set_ttl(86400)
                    .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                    .set_dns_class(DNSClass::CH)
                    .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("a.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                    .clone(), // different class
                Record::new()
                    .set_name(origin.clone())
                    .set_ttl(86400)
                    .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                    .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                    .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("a.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                    .clone(),
                Record::new()
                    .set_name(origin.clone())
                    .set_ttl(86400)
                    .set_rr_type(RecordType::NS)
                    .set_dns_class(DNSClass::IN)
                    .set_rdata(RData::NS(Name::parse("b.iana-servers.net.", None).unwrap()))
                    .clone(),
            ];

            let filtered_tbs = rrset_tbs_with_rrsig(&rrsig, &rrset).unwrap();
            assert!(!filtered_tbs.as_ref().is_empty());
            assert_eq!(tbs.as_ref(), filtered_tbs.as_ref());
        }
    }
}