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//! Components, their associated signatures, and some useful methods. //! //! Whereas a [`ComponentBundle`] owns a `Component` and its //! associated [`Signature`]s, a [`ComponentAmalgamation`] references //! a `ComponentBundle` and its containing [`Cert`]. This additional //! context means that a `ComponentAmalgamation` can implement more of //! OpenPGP's high-level semantics than a `ComponentBundle` can. For //! instance, most of the information about a primary key, such as its //! capabilities, is on the primary User ID's binding signature. A //! `ComponentAmalgamation` can find the certificate's primary User //! ID; a `ComponentBundle` can't. Similarly, when looking up a //! subpacket, if it isn't present in the component's binding //! signature, then an OpenPGP implementation [is supposed to] consult //! the certificate's direct key signatures. A //! `ComponentAmalgamation` has access to this information; a //! `ComponentBundle` doesn't. //! //! Given the limitations of a `ComponentBundle`, it would seem more //! useful to just change it to include a reference to its containing //! certificate. That change would make `ComponentAmalgamation`s //! redundant. Unfortunately, this isn't possible, because it would //! result in a self-referential data structure, which Rust doesn't //! allow. To understand how this arises, consider a certificate `C`, //! which contains a `ComponentBundle` `B`. If `B` contains a //! reference to `C`, then `C` references itself, because `C` contains //! `B`! //! //! ```text //! Cert:[ Bundle:[ &Cert ] ] //! ^ | //! `------------' //! ``` //! //! # Policy //! //! Although a `ComponentAmalgamation` contains the information //! necessary to realize high-level OpenPGP functionality, components //! can have multiple self signatures, and functions that consult the //! binding signature need to determine the best one to use. There //! are two main concerns here. //! //! First, we need to protect the user from forgeries. As attacks //! improve, cryptographic algorithms that were once considered secure //! now provide insufficient security margins. For instance, in 2007 //! it was possible to find [MD5 collisions] using just a few seconds //! of computing time on a desktop computer. Sequoia provides a //! flexible mechanism, called [`Policy`] objects, that allow users to //! implement this type of filtering: before a self signature is used, //! a policy object is queried to determine whether the `Signature` //! should be rejected. If so, then it is skipped. //! //! Second, we need an algorithm to determine the most appropriate //! self signature. Obvious non-candidate self signatures are self //! signatures whose creation time is in the future. We don't assume //! that these self signatures are bad per se, but that they represent //! a policy that should go into effect some time in the future. //! //! We extend this idea of a self signature representing a policy for //! a certain period of time to all self signatures. In particular, //! Sequoia takes the view that *a binding signature represents a //! policy that is valid from its creation time until its expiry*. //! Thus, when considering what self signature to use, we need a //! reference time. Given the reference time, we then use the self //! signature that was in effect at that time, i.e., the most recent, //! non-expired, non-revoked self signature that was created at or //! prior to the reference time. In other words, we ignore self //! signatures created after the reference time. We take the position //! that if the certificate holder wants a new policy to apply to //! existing signatures, then the new self signature should be //! backdated, and existing self signatures revoked, if necessary. //! //! Consider evaluating a signature over a document. Sequoia's //! [streaming verifier] uses the signature's creation time as the //! reference time. Thus, if the signature was created on June 9th, //! 2011, then, when evaluating that signature, the streaming verifier //! uses a self signature that was live at that time, since that was //! the self signature that represented the signer's policy at the //! time the signature over the document was created. //! //! A consequence of this approach is that even if the self signature //! were considered expired at the time the signature was evaluated //! (e.g., "now"), this fact doesn't invalidate the signature. That //! is, a self siganture's lifetime does not impact a signature's //! lifetime; a signature's lifetime is defined by its own creation //! time and expiry. Similarly, a key's lifetime is defined by its //! own creation time and expiry. //! //! This interpretation of lifetimes removes a major disadvantage that //! comes with fast rotation of subkeys: if an implementation binds //! the lifetime of signatures to the signing key, and the key //! expires, then old signatures are considered invalid. Consider a //! user who generates a new signature subkey each week, and sets it //! to expire after exactly one week. If we use the policy that the //! signature is only valid while the key *and* the self signature are //! live, then if someone checks the signature a week after receiving //! it, the signature will be considered invalid, because the key has //! expired. The practical result is that all old messages from this //! user will be considered invalid! Unfortunately, this will result //! in users becoming accustomed to seeing invalid signatures, and //! cause them to be less suspcious of them. //! //! Sequoia's low-level mechanisms support this interpretation of self //! signatures, but they do *not* enforce it. It is still possible to //! realize other policies using this low-level API. //! //! The possibility of abuse of this interpretation of signature //! lifetimes is limited. If a key has been compromised, then the //! right thing to do is to revoke it. Expiry doesn't help: the //! attacker can simply create self-signatures that say whatever she //! wants. Assuming the secret key material has not been compromised, //! then an attacker could still reuse a message that would otherwise //! be considered expired. However, the attacker will not be able to //! change the signature's creation time, so, assuming a mail context //! and MUAs that check that the time in the message's headers matches //! the signature's creation time, the mails will appear old. //! Further, this type of attack will be mitigated by the proposed //! "[Intended Recipients]" subpacket, which more tightly binds the //! message to its context. //! //! # [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`] //! //! Most operations need to query a `ComponentAmalgamation` for //! multiple pieces of information. Accidentally using a different //! `Policy` or a different reference time for one of the queries is //! easy, especially when the queries are spread across multiple //! functions. Further, using `None` for the reference time can //! result in subtle timing bugs as each function translates it to the //! current time on demand. In these cases, the correct approach //! would be for the user of the library to get the current time at //! the start of the operation. But, this is less convenient. //! Finally, passing a `Policy` and a reference time to most function //! calls clutters the code. //! //! To mitigate these issues, we have a separate data structure, //! `ValidComponentAmalgamation`, which combines a //! `ComponetAmalgamation`, a `Policy` and a reference time. It //! implements methods that require a `Policy` and reference time, but //! instead of requiring the caller to pass them in, it uses the ones //! embedded in the data structure. Further, when the //! `ValidComponentAmalgamation` constructor is passed `None` for the //! reference time, it eagerly stores the current time, and uses that //! for all operations. This approach elegantly solves all of the //! aforementioned problems. //! //! # Lifetimes //! //! `ComponentAmalgamation` autoderefs to `ComponentBundle`. //! Unfortunately, due to the definition of the [`Deref` trait], //! `ComponentBundle` is assigned the same lifetime as //! `ComponentAmalgamation`. However, it's lifetime is actually `'a`. //! Particularly when using combinators like [`std::iter::map`], the //! `ComponentBundle`'s lifetime is longer. Consider the following //! code, which doesn't compile: //! //! ```compile_fail //! # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; //! use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; //! use openpgp::packet::prelude::*; //! //! # let (cert, _) = CertBuilder::new() //! # .add_userid("Alice") //! # .add_signing_subkey() //! # .add_transport_encryption_subkey() //! # .generate().unwrap(); //! cert.userids() //! .map(|ua| { //! // Use auto deref to get the containing `&ComponentBundle`. //! let b: &ComponentBundle<_> = &ua; //! b //! }) //! .collect::<Vec<&UserID>>(); //! ``` //! //! Compiling it results in the following error: //! //! > `b` returns a value referencing data owned by the current //! > function //! //! This error occurs because the `Deref` trait says that the lifetime //! of the target, i.e., `&ComponentBundle`, is bounded by `ua`'s //! lifetime, whose lifetime is indeed limited to the closure. But, //! `&ComponentBundle` is independent of `ua`; it is a copy of the //! `ComponentAmalgamation`'s reference to the `ComponentBundle` whose //! lifetime is `'a`! Unfortunately, this can't be expressed using //! `Deref`. But, it can be done using separate methods as shown //! below for the [`ComponentAmalgamation::component`] method: //! //! ``` //! # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; //! use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; //! use openpgp::packet::prelude::*; //! //! # let (cert, _) = CertBuilder::new() //! # .add_userid("Alice") //! # .add_signing_subkey() //! # .add_transport_encryption_subkey() //! # .generate().unwrap(); //! cert.userids() //! .map(|ua| { //! // ua's lifetime is this closure. But `component()` //! // returns a reference whose lifetime is that of //! // `cert`. //! ua.component() //! }) //! .collect::<Vec<&UserID>>(); //! ``` //! //! [`ComponentBundle`]: ../bundle/index.html //! [`Signature`]: ../../packet/signature/index.html //! [`ComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamation.html //! [`Cert`]: ../index.html //! [is supposed to]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.3 //! [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidComponentAmalgamation.html //! [`std::iter::map`]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/std/iter/struct.Map.html //! [MD5 collisions]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MD5 //! [`Policy`]: ../../policy/index.html //! [streaming verifier]: ../../parse/stream.html //! [Intended Recipients]: https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-09.html#name-intended-recipient-fingerpr //! [signature expirations]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.10 //! [`Deref` trait]: https://doc.rust-lang.org/stable/std/ops/trait.Deref.html //! [`ComponentAmalgamation::component`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamation.html#method.component use std::time; use std::time::SystemTime; use std::clone::Clone; use crate::{ cert::prelude::*, Error, packet::{ Signature, Unknown, UserAttribute, UserID, }, Result, policy::Policy, types::{ AEADAlgorithm, CompressionAlgorithm, Features, HashAlgorithm, KeyServerPreferences, RevocationKey, RevocationStatus, SymmetricAlgorithm, }, }; mod iter; pub use iter::{ ComponentAmalgamationIter, UnknownComponentAmalgamationIter, UserAttributeAmalgamationIter, UserIDAmalgamationIter, ValidComponentAmalgamationIter, ValidUserAttributeAmalgamationIter, ValidUserIDAmalgamationIter, }; pub mod key; /// Embeds a policy and a reference time in an amalgamation. /// /// This is used to turn a [`ComponentAmalgamation`] into a /// [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`], and a [`KeyAmalgamation`] into a /// [`ValidKeyAmalgamation`]. /// /// A certificate or a component is consider valid if: /// /// - It has a self signature that is live at time `t`. /// /// - The policy considers it acceptable. /// /// - The certificate is valid. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// use openpgp::policy::{Policy, StandardPolicy}; /// /// const POLICY: &dyn Policy = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// /// fn f(ua: UserIDAmalgamation) -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// let ua = ua.with_policy(POLICY, None)?; /// // ... /// # Ok(()) /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # let ua = cert.userids().nth(0).expect("User IDs"); /// # f(ua); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` /// /// [`ComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamation.html /// [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidComponentAmalgamation.html /// [`KeyAmalgamation`]: struct.KeyAmalgamation.html /// [`ValidKeyAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidKeyAmalgamation.html pub trait ValidateAmalgamation<'a, C: 'a> { /// The type returned by `with_policy`. /// /// This is either a [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`] or /// a [`ValidKeyAmalgamation`]. /// /// [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidComponentAmalgamation.html /// [`ValidKeyAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidKeyAmalgamation.html type V; /// Uses the specified `Policy` and reference time with the amalgamation. /// /// If `time` is `None`, the current time is used. fn with_policy<T>(self, policy: &'a dyn Policy, time: T) -> Result<Self::V> where T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>>, Self: Sized; } /// Applies a policy to an amalgamation. /// /// This is an internal variant of `ValidateAmalgamation`, which /// allows validating a component for an otherwise invalid /// certificate. See `ValidComponentAmalgamation::primary` for an /// explanation. trait ValidateAmalgamationRelaxed<'a, C: 'a> { /// The type returned by `with_policy`. type V; /// Changes the amalgamation's policy. /// /// If `time` is `None`, the current time is used. /// /// If `valid_cert` is `false`, then this does not also check /// whether the certificate is valid; it only checks whether the /// component is valid. Normally, this should be `true`. This /// option is only expose to allow breaking an infinite recursion: /// /// - To check if a certificate is valid, we check if the /// primary key is valid. /// /// - To check if the primary key is valid, we need the primary /// key's self signature /// /// - To find the primary key's self signature, we need to find /// the primary user id /// /// - To find the primary user id, we need to check if the user /// id is valid. /// /// - To check if the user id is valid, we need to check that /// the corresponding certificate is valid. fn with_policy_relaxed<T>(self, policy: &'a dyn Policy, time: T, valid_cert: bool) -> Result<Self::V> where T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>>, Self: Sized; } /// Methods for valid amalgamations. /// /// The methods exposed by a `ValidComponentAmalgamation` are similar /// to those exposed by a `ComponentAmalgamation`, but the policy and /// reference time are included in the `ValidComponentAmalgamation`. /// This helps prevent using different policies or different reference /// times when using a component, which can easily happen when the /// checks span multiple functions. pub trait ValidAmalgamation<'a, C: 'a> { /// Maps the given function over binding and direct key signature. /// /// Makes `f` consider both the binding signature and the direct /// key signature. Information in the binding signature takes /// precedence over the direct key signature. See also [Section /// 5.2.3.3 of RFC 4880]. /// /// [Section 5.2.3.3 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.3 fn map<F: Fn(&'a Signature) -> Option<T>, T>(&self, f: F) -> Option<T> { f(self.binding_signature()) .or_else(|| self.direct_key_signature().ok().and_then(f)) } /// Returns the valid amalgamation's associated certificate. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # use openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy; /// # /// fn f(ua: &ValidUserIDAmalgamation) { /// let cert = ua.cert(); /// // ... /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # let fpr = cert.fingerprint(); /// # let ua = cert.userids().nth(0).expect("User IDs"); /// # assert_eq!(ua.cert().fingerprint(), fpr); /// # f(&ua.with_policy(p, None)?); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn cert(&self) -> &ValidCert<'a>; /// Returns the amalgamation's reference time. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # use std::time::{SystemTime, Duration, UNIX_EPOCH}; /// # /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # use openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy; /// fn f(ua: &ValidUserIDAmalgamation) { /// let t = ua.time(); /// // ... /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let t = UNIX_EPOCH + Duration::from_secs(1554542220); /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .set_creation_time(t) /// # .generate()?; /// # let ua = cert.userids().nth(0).expect("User IDs"); /// # let ua = ua.with_policy(p, t)?; /// # assert_eq!(t, ua.time()); /// # f(&ua); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn time(&self) -> SystemTime; /// Returns the amalgamation's policy. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # use openpgp::policy::{Policy, StandardPolicy}; /// # /// fn f(ua: &ValidUserIDAmalgamation) { /// let policy = ua.policy(); /// // ... /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let p: &dyn Policy = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # let ua = cert.userids().nth(0).expect("User IDs"); /// # let ua = ua.with_policy(p, None)?; /// # assert!(std::ptr::eq(p, ua.policy())); /// # f(&ua); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn policy(&self) -> &'a dyn Policy; /// Returns the component's binding signature as of the reference time. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # use openpgp::policy::{Policy, StandardPolicy}; /// # /// fn f(ua: &ValidUserIDAmalgamation) { /// let sig = ua.binding_signature(); /// // ... /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let p: &dyn Policy = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # let ua = cert.userids().nth(0).expect("User IDs"); /// # let ua = ua.with_policy(p, None)?; /// # f(&ua); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn binding_signature(&self) -> &'a Signature; /// Returns the certificate's direct key signature as of the /// reference time, if any. /// /// Subpackets on direct key signatures apply to all components of /// the certificate, cf. [Section 5.2.3.3 of RFC 4880]. /// /// [Section 5.2.3.3 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.3 /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # use openpgp::policy::{Policy, StandardPolicy}; /// # /// fn f(ua: &ValidUserIDAmalgamation) { /// let sig = ua.direct_key_signature(); /// // ... /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let p: &dyn Policy = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # let cert = cert.with_policy(p, None)?; /// # let ua = cert.userids().nth(0).expect("User IDs"); /// # assert!(std::ptr::eq(ua.direct_key_signature().unwrap(), /// # cert.direct_key_signature().unwrap())); /// # f(&ua); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn direct_key_signature(&self) -> Result<&'a Signature> { self.cert().cert.primary.binding_signature(self.policy(), self.time()) } /// Returns the component's revocation status as of the amalgamation's /// reference time. /// /// This does *not* check whether the certificate has been /// revoked. For that, use `Cert::revocation_status()`. /// /// Note, as per [RFC 4880], a key is considered to be revoked at /// some time if there were no soft revocations created as of that /// time, and no hard revocations: /// /// > If a key has been revoked because of a compromise, all signatures /// > created by that key are suspect. However, if it was merely /// > superseded or retired, old signatures are still valid. /// /// [RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.23 /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # use openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy; /// use openpgp::types::RevocationStatus; /// /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # let cert = cert.with_policy(p, None)?; /// # let ua = cert.userids().nth(0).expect("User IDs"); /// match ua.revocation_status() { /// RevocationStatus::Revoked(revs) => { /// // The certificate holder revoked the User ID. /// # unreachable!(); /// } /// RevocationStatus::CouldBe(revs) => { /// // There are third-party revocations. You still need /// // to check that they are valid (this is necessary, /// // because without the Certificates are not normally /// // available to Sequoia). /// # unreachable!(); /// } /// RevocationStatus::NotAsFarAsWeKnow => { /// // We have no evidence that the User ID is revoked. /// } /// } /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn revocation_status(&self) -> RevocationStatus<'a>; } /// A certificate component, its associated data, and useful methods. /// /// [`Cert::userids`], [`Cert::primary_userid`], [`Cert::user_attributes`], and /// [`Cert::unknowns`] return `ComponentAmalgamation`s. /// /// `ComponentAmalgamation` implements [`ValidateAmalgamation`], which /// allows you to turn a `ComponentAmalgamation` into a /// [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`] using /// [`ComponentAmalgamation::with_policy`]. /// /// [See the module's documentation] for more details. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # use openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy; /// # /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # let fpr = cert.fingerprint(); /// // Iterate over all User IDs. /// for ua in cert.userids() { /// // ua is a `ComponentAmalgamation`, specifically, a `UserIDAmalgamation`. /// } /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` /// /// [`Cert`]: ../struct.Cert.html /// [`Cert::userids`]: ../struct.Cert.html#method.userids /// [`Cert::primary_userid`]: ../struct.Cert.html#method.primary_userid /// [`Cert::user_attributes`]: ../struct.Cert.html#method.user_attributes /// [`Cert::unknowns`]: ../struct.Cert.html#method.unknown /// [`ValidateAmalgamation`]: trait.ValidateAmalgamation.html /// [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidComponentAmalgamation.html /// [`ComponentAmalgamation::with_policy`]: trait.ValidateAmalgamation.html#method.with_policy /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html #[derive(Debug, PartialEq)] pub struct ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { cert: &'a Cert, bundle: &'a ComponentBundle<C>, } /// A User ID and its associated data. /// /// A specialized version of [`ComponentAmalgamation`]. /// /// [`ComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamation.html pub type UserIDAmalgamation<'a> = ComponentAmalgamation<'a, UserID>; /// A User Attribute and its associated data. /// /// A specialized version of [`ComponentAmalgamation`]. /// /// [`ComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamation.html pub type UserAttributeAmalgamation<'a> = ComponentAmalgamation<'a, UserAttribute>; /// An Unknown component and its associated data. /// /// A specialized version of [`ComponentAmalgamation`]. /// /// [`ComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamation.html pub type UnknownComponentAmalgamation<'a> = ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Unknown>; // derive(Clone) doesn't work with generic parameters that don't // implement clone. But, we don't need to require that C implements // Clone, because we're not cloning C, just the reference. // // See: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/26925 impl<'a, C> Clone for ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { fn clone(&self) -> Self { Self { cert: self.cert, bundle: self.bundle, } } } impl<'a, C> std::ops::Deref for ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { type Target = ComponentBundle<C>; fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.bundle } } impl<'a, C> ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { /// Creates a new amalgamation. pub(crate) fn new(cert: &'a Cert, bundle: &'a ComponentBundle<C>) -> Self { Self { cert, bundle, } } /// Returns the component's associated certificate. /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// # /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// for u in cert.userids() { /// // It's not only an identical `Cert`, it's the same one. /// assert!(std::ptr::eq(u.cert(), &cert)); /// } /// # Ok(()) } /// ``` pub fn cert(&self) -> &'a Cert { &self.cert } /// Selects a binding signature. /// /// Uses the provided policy and reference time to select an /// appropriate binding signature. /// /// Note: this function is not exported. Users of this interface /// should do: ca.with_policy(policy, time)?.binding_signature(). fn binding_signature<T>(&self, policy: &dyn Policy, time: T) -> Result<&'a Signature> where T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>> { let time = time.into().unwrap_or_else(SystemTime::now); self.bundle.binding_signature(policy, time) } /// Returns this amalgamation's bundle. /// /// Note: although `ComponentAmalgamation` derefs to a /// `&ComponentBundle`, this method provides a more accurate /// lifetime, which is helpful when returning the reference from a /// function. [See the module's documentation] for more details. /// /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// use openpgp::packet::prelude::*; /// /// # let (cert, _) = CertBuilder::new() /// # .add_userid("Alice") /// # .add_signing_subkey() /// # .add_transport_encryption_subkey() /// # .generate().unwrap(); /// cert.userids() /// .map(|ua| { /// // The following doesn't work: /// // /// // let b: &ComponentBundle<_> = &ua; b /// // /// // Because ua's lifetime is this closure and autoderef /// // assigns `b` the same lifetime as `ua`. `bundle()`, /// // however, returns a reference whose lifetime is that /// // of `cert`. /// ua.bundle() /// }) /// .collect::<Vec<&ComponentBundle<_>>>(); /// ``` pub fn bundle(&self) -> &'a ComponentBundle<C> { &self.bundle } /// Returns this amalgamation's component. /// /// Note: although `ComponentAmalgamation` derefs to a /// `&Component` (via `&ComponentBundle`), this method provides a /// more accurate lifetime, which is helpful when returning the /// reference from a function. [See the module's documentation] /// for more details. /// /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html pub fn component(&self) -> &'a C { self.bundle().component() } /// The component's self-signatures. /// /// This method is a forwarder for /// [`ComponentBundle::self_signatures`]. Although /// `ComponentAmalgamation` derefs to a `&ComponentBundle`, this /// method provides a more accurate lifetime, which is helpful /// when returning the reference from a function. [See the /// module's documentation] for more details. /// /// [`ComponentBundle::self_signatures`]: ../bundle/struct.ComponentBundle.html#method.self_signatures /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html pub fn self_signatures(&self) -> &'a [Signature] { self.bundle().self_signatures() } /// The component's third-party certifications. /// /// This method is a forwarder for /// [`ComponentBundle::certifications`]. Although /// `ComponentAmalgamation` derefs to a `&ComponentBundle`, this /// method provides a more accurate lifetime, which is helpful /// when returning the reference from a function. [See the /// module's documentation] for more details. /// /// [`ComponentBundle::certifications`]: ../bundle/struct.ComponentBundle.html#method.certifications /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html pub fn certifications(&self) -> &'a [Signature] { self.bundle().certifications() } /// The component's revocations that were issued by the /// certificate holder. /// /// This method is a forwarder for /// [`ComponentBundle::self_revocations`]. Although /// `ComponentAmalgamation` derefs to a `&ComponentBundle`, this /// method provides a more accurate lifetime, which is helpful /// when returning the reference from a function. [See the /// module's documentation] for more details. /// /// [`ComponentBundle::self_revocations`]: ../bundle/struct.ComponentBundle.html#method.self_revocations /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html pub fn self_revocations(&self) -> &'a [Signature] { self.bundle().self_revocations() } /// The component's revocations that were issued by other /// certificates. /// /// This method is a forwarder for /// [`ComponentBundle::other_revocations`]. Although /// `ComponentAmalgamation` derefs to a `&ComponentBundle`, this /// method provides a more accurate lifetime, which is helpful /// when returning the reference from a function. [See the /// module's documentation] for more details. /// /// [`ComponentBundle::other_revocations`]: ../bundle/struct.ComponentBundle.html#method.other_revocations /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html pub fn other_revocations(&self) -> &'a [Signature] { self.bundle().other_revocations() } /// Returns a list of any designated revokers for this component. /// /// This function returns the designated revokers listed on both /// this component's binding signature and the certificate's /// direct key signature. /// /// Note: the returned list is deduplicated. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// # use openpgp::Result; /// use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// use openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy; /// use openpgp::types::RevocationKey; /// /// # fn main() -> Result<()> { /// let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// /// let (alice, _) = /// CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// .generate()?; /// // Make Alice a designated revoker for Bob. /// let (bob, _) = /// CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("bob@example.org")) /// .set_revocation_keys(vec![ (&alice).into() ]) /// .generate()?; /// /// // Make sure Alice is listed as a designated revoker for Bob /// // on a component. /// assert_eq!(bob.with_policy(p, None)?.primary_userid()?.revocation_keys(p) /// .collect::<Vec<&RevocationKey>>(), /// vec![ &(&alice).into() ]); /// # Ok(()) } /// ``` pub fn revocation_keys(&self, policy: &dyn Policy) -> Box<dyn Iterator<Item = &'a RevocationKey> + 'a> { let mut keys = std::collections::HashSet::new(); for rk in self.self_signatures().iter() .filter(|sig| { policy.signature(sig).is_ok() }) .flat_map(|sig| sig.revocation_keys()) { keys.insert(rk); } for rk in self.cert().primary_key().self_signatures().iter() .filter(|sig| { policy.signature(sig).is_ok() }) .flat_map(|sig| sig.revocation_keys()) { keys.insert(rk); } Box::new(keys.into_iter()) } } macro_rules! impl_with_policy { ($func:ident, $value:ident $(, $arg:ident: $type:ty )*) => { fn $func<T>(self, policy: &'a dyn Policy, time: T, $($arg: $type, )*) -> Result<Self::V> where T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>>, Self: Sized { let time = time.into().unwrap_or_else(SystemTime::now); if $value { self.cert.with_policy(policy, time)?; } let binding_signature = self.binding_signature(policy, time)?; let cert = self.cert; // We can't do `Cert::with_policy` as that would // result in infinite recursion. But at this point, // we know the certificate is valid (unless the caller // doesn't care). Ok(ValidComponentAmalgamation { ca: self, cert: ValidCert { cert: cert, policy: policy, time: time, }, binding_signature: binding_signature, }) } } } impl<'a, C> ValidateAmalgamation<'a, C> for ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { type V = ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C>; impl_with_policy!(with_policy, true); } impl<'a, C> ValidateAmalgamationRelaxed<'a, C> for ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { type V = ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C>; impl_with_policy!(with_policy_relaxed, valid_cert, valid_cert: bool); } impl<'a> UserIDAmalgamation<'a> { /// Returns a reference to the User ID. /// /// Note: although `ComponentAmalgamation<UserID>` derefs to a /// `&UserID` (via `&ComponentBundle`), this method provides a /// more accurate lifetime, which is helpful when returning the /// reference from a function. [See the module's documentation] /// for more details. /// /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html pub fn userid(&self) -> &'a UserID { self.component() } } impl<'a> UserAttributeAmalgamation<'a> { /// Returns a reference to the User Attribute. /// /// Note: although `ComponentAmalgamation<UserAttribute>` derefs /// to a `&UserAttribute` (via `&ComponentBundle`), this method /// provides a more accurate lifetime, which is helpful when /// returning the reference from a function. [See the module's /// documentation] for more details. /// /// [See the module's documentation]: index.html pub fn user_attribute(&self) -> &'a UserAttribute { self.component() } } /// A `ComponentAmalgamation` plus a `Policy` and a reference time. /// /// A `ValidComponentAmalgamation` combines a /// [`ComponentAmalgamation`] with a [`Policy`] and a reference time. /// This allows it to implement the [`ValidAmalgamation`] trait, which /// provides methods that require a [`Policy`] and a reference time. /// Although `ComponentAmalgamation` could implement these methods by /// requiring that the caller explicitly pass them in, embedding them /// in the `ValidComponentAmalgamation` helps ensure that multipart /// operations, even those that span multiple functions, use the same /// `Policy` and reference time. /// /// A `ValidComponentAmalgamation` is typically obtained by /// transforming a `ComponentAmalgamation` using /// [`ValidateAmalgamation::with_policy`]. A /// [`ComponentAmalgamationIter`] can also be changed to yield /// `ValidComponentAmalgamation`s. /// /// A `ValidComponentAmalgamation` is guaranteed to come from a valid /// certificate, and have a valid and live binding signature at the /// specified reference time. Note: this only means that the binding /// signatures are live; it says nothing about whether the /// *certificate* is live. If you care about that, then you need to /// check it separately. /// /// # Examples /// /// Print out information about all non-revoked User IDs. /// /// ``` /// # extern crate sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// use openpgp::packet::prelude::*; /// use openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy; /// use openpgp::types::RevocationStatus; /// /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); /// # let (cert, _) = CertBuilder::new() /// # .add_userid("Alice") /// # .add_signing_subkey() /// # .add_transport_encryption_subkey() /// # .generate().unwrap(); /// for u in cert.userids() { /// // Create a `ValidComponentAmalgamation`. This may fail if /// // there are no binding signatures that are accepted by the /// // policy and that are live right now. /// let u = u.with_policy(p, None)?; /// /// // Before using the User ID, we still need to check that it is /// // not revoked; `ComponentAmalgamation::with_policy` ensures /// // that there is a valid *binding signature*, not that the /// // `ComponentAmalgamation` is valid. /// // /// // Note: `ValidComponentAmalgamation::revocation_status` and /// // `Preferences::preferred_symmetric_algorithms` use the /// // embedded policy and timestamp. Even though we used `None` for /// // the timestamp (i.e., now), they are guaranteed to use the same /// // timestamp, because `with_policy` eagerly transforms it into /// // the current time. /// // /// // Note: we only check whether the User ID is not revoked. If /// // we were using a key, we'd also want to check that it is alive. /// // (Keys can expire, but User IDs cannot.) /// if let RevocationStatus::Revoked(_revs) = u.revocation_status() { /// // Revoked by the key owner. (If we care about /// // designated revokers, then we need to check those /// // ourselves.) /// } else { /// // Print information about the User ID. /// eprintln!("{}: preferred symmetric algorithms: {:?}", /// String::from_utf8_lossy(u.value()), /// u.preferred_symmetric_algorithms()); /// } /// } /// # Ok(()) } /// ``` /// /// [`ComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamation.html /// [`Policy`]: ../../policy/index.html /// [`ValidAmalgamation`]: trait.ValidAmalgamation.html /// [`ValidateAmalgamation::with_policy`]: trait.ValidateAmalgamation.html#tymethod.with_policy /// [`ComponentAmalgamationIter`]: struct.ComponentAmalgamationIter.html #[derive(Debug)] pub struct ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { ca: ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C>, cert: ValidCert<'a>, // The binding signature at time `time`. (This is just a cache.) binding_signature: &'a Signature, } /// A Valid User ID and its associated data. /// /// A specialized version of [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]. /// /// [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidComponentAmalgamation.html pub type ValidUserIDAmalgamation<'a> = ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, UserID>; /// A Valid User Attribute and its associated data. /// /// A specialized version of [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]. /// /// [`ValidComponentAmalgamation`]: struct.ValidComponentAmalgamation.html pub type ValidUserAttributeAmalgamation<'a> = ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, UserAttribute>; // derive(Clone) doesn't work with generic parameters that don't // implement clone. But, we don't need to require that C implements // Clone, because we're not cloning C, just the reference. // // See: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/26925 impl<'a, C> Clone for ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { fn clone(&self) -> Self { Self { ca: self.ca.clone(), cert: self.cert.clone(), binding_signature: self.binding_signature, } } } impl<'a, C> std::ops::Deref for ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { type Target = ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C>; fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { assert!(std::ptr::eq(self.ca.cert(), self.cert.cert())); &self.ca } } impl<'a, C: 'a> From<ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C>> for ComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { fn from(vca: ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C>) -> Self { assert!(std::ptr::eq(vca.ca.cert(), vca.cert.cert())); vca.ca } } impl<'a, C> ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> where C: Ord { /// Returns the amalgamated primary component at time `time` /// /// If `time` is None, then the current time is used. /// `ValidComponentAmalgamationIter` for the definition of a valid component. /// /// The primary component is determined by taking the components that /// are alive at time `t`, and sorting them as follows: /// /// - non-revoked first /// - primary first /// - signature creation first /// /// If there is more than one, than one is selected in a /// deterministic, but undefined manner. /// /// If `valid_cert` is `false`, then this does not also check /// whether the certificate is valid; it only checks whether the /// component is valid. Normally, this should be `true`. This /// option is only expose to allow breaking an infinite recursion: /// /// - To check if a certificate is valid, we check if the /// primary key is valid. /// /// - To check if the primary key is valid, we need the primary /// key's self signature /// /// - To find the primary key's self signature, we need to find /// the primary user id /// /// - To find the primary user id, we need to check if the user /// id is valid. /// /// - To check if the user id is valid, we need to check that /// the corresponding certificate is valid. pub(super) fn primary(cert: &'a Cert, iter: std::slice::Iter<'a, ComponentBundle<C>>, policy: &'a dyn Policy, t: SystemTime, valid_cert: bool) -> Result<ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C>> { use std::cmp::Ordering; let mut error = None; // Filter out components that are not alive at time `t`. // // While we have the binding signature, extract a few // properties to avoid recomputing the same thing multiple // times. iter.filter_map(|c| { // No binding signature at time `t` => not alive. let sig = match c.binding_signature(policy, t) { Ok(sig) => Some(sig), Err(e) => { error = Some(e); None }, }?; let revoked = c._revocation_status(policy, t, false, Some(sig)); let primary = sig.primary_userid().unwrap_or(false); let signature_creation_time = match sig.signature_creation_time() { Some(time) => Some(time), None => { error = Some(Error::MalformedPacket( "Signature has no creation time".into()).into()); None }, }?; Some(((c, sig, revoked), primary, signature_creation_time)) }) .max_by(|(a, a_primary, a_signature_creation_time), (b, b_primary, b_signature_creation_time)| { match (destructures_to!(RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) = &a.2), destructures_to!(RevocationStatus::Revoked(_) = &b.2)) { (true, false) => return Ordering::Less, (false, true) => return Ordering::Greater, _ => (), } match (a_primary, b_primary) { (true, false) => return Ordering::Greater, (false, true) => return Ordering::Less, _ => (), } match a_signature_creation_time.cmp(&b_signature_creation_time) { Ordering::Less => return Ordering::Less, Ordering::Greater => return Ordering::Greater, Ordering::Equal => (), } // Fallback to a lexographical comparison. Prefer // the "smaller" one. match a.0.component().cmp(&b.0.component()) { Ordering::Less => return Ordering::Greater, Ordering::Greater => return Ordering::Less, Ordering::Equal => panic!("non-canonicalized Cert (duplicate components)"), } }) .ok_or_else(|| { error.map(|e| e.context(format!( "No binding signature at time {}", crate::fmt::time(&t)))) .unwrap_or(Error::NoBindingSignature(t).into()) }) .and_then(|c| ComponentAmalgamation::new(cert, (c.0).0) .with_policy_relaxed(policy, t, valid_cert)) } } impl<'a, C> ValidateAmalgamation<'a, C> for ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { type V = Self; fn with_policy<T>(self, policy: &'a dyn Policy, time: T) -> Result<Self::V> where T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>>, Self: Sized, { assert!(std::ptr::eq(self.ca.cert(), self.cert.cert())); let time = time.into().unwrap_or_else(SystemTime::now); self.ca.with_policy(policy, time) } } impl<'a, C> ValidAmalgamation<'a, C> for ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { fn cert(&self) -> &ValidCert<'a> { assert!(std::ptr::eq(self.ca.cert(), self.cert.cert())); &self.cert } fn time(&self) -> SystemTime { assert!(std::ptr::eq(self.ca.cert(), self.cert.cert())); self.cert.time } fn policy(&self) -> &'a dyn Policy { assert!(std::ptr::eq(self.ca.cert(), self.cert.cert())); self.cert.policy } fn binding_signature(&self) -> &'a Signature { assert!(std::ptr::eq(self.ca.cert(), self.cert.cert())); self.binding_signature } fn revocation_status(&self) -> RevocationStatus<'a> { self.bundle._revocation_status(self.policy(), self.cert.time, false, Some(self.binding_signature)) } } impl<'a, C> crate::cert::Preferences<'a> for ValidComponentAmalgamation<'a, C> { fn preferred_symmetric_algorithms(&self) -> Option<&'a [SymmetricAlgorithm]> { self.map(|s| s.preferred_symmetric_algorithms()) } fn preferred_hash_algorithms(&self) -> Option<&'a [HashAlgorithm]> { self.map(|s| s.preferred_hash_algorithms()) } fn preferred_compression_algorithms(&self) -> Option<&'a [CompressionAlgorithm]> { self.map(|s| s.preferred_compression_algorithms()) } fn preferred_aead_algorithms(&self) -> Option<&'a [AEADAlgorithm]> { self.map(|s| s.preferred_aead_algorithms()) } fn key_server_preferences(&self) -> Option<KeyServerPreferences> { self.map(|s| s.key_server_preferences()) } fn preferred_key_server(&self) -> Option<&'a [u8]> { self.map(|s| s.preferred_key_server()) } fn features(&self) -> Option<Features> { self.map(|s| s.features()) } } #[cfg(test)] mod test { use crate::policy::StandardPolicy as P; use crate::cert::prelude::*; // derive(Clone) doesn't work with generic parameters that don't // implement clone. Make sure that our custom implementations // work. // // See: https://github.com/rust-lang/rust/issues/26925 #[test] fn clone() { let p = &P::new(); let (cert, _) = CertBuilder::new() .add_userid("test@example.example") .generate() .unwrap(); let userid : UserIDAmalgamation = cert.userids().nth(0).unwrap(); assert_eq!(userid.userid(), userid.clone().userid()); let userid : ValidUserIDAmalgamation = userid.with_policy(p, None).unwrap(); let c = userid.clone(); assert_eq!(userid.userid(), c.userid()); assert_eq!(userid.time(), c.time()); } #[test] fn map() { // The reference returned by `ComponentAmalgamation::userid` // and `ComponentAmalgamation::user_attribute` is bound by the // reference to the `Component` in the // `ComponentAmalgamation`, not the `ComponentAmalgamation` // itself. let (cert, _) = CertBuilder::new() .add_userid("test@example.example") .generate() .unwrap(); let _ = cert.userids().map(|ua| ua.userid()) .collect::<Vec<_>>(); let _ = cert.user_attributes().map(|ua| ua.user_attribute()) .collect::<Vec<_>>(); } }