[−][src]Enum sequoia_openpgp::packet::Signature
Holds a signature packet.
Signature packets are used to hold all kinds of signatures including certifications, and signatures over documents. See Section 5.2 of RFC 4880 for details.
When signing a document, a Signature
packet is typically created
indirectly by the streaming Signer
. Similarly, a Signature
packet is created as a side effect of parsing a signed message
using the PacketParser
.
Signature
packets are also used for self signatures on Keys,
self signatures on User IDs, self signatures on User
Attributes, certifications of User IDs, and certifications of
User Attributes. In these cases, you'll typically want to use
the SignatureBuilder
to create the Signature
packet. See
the linked documentation for details, and examples.
Note: This enum cannot be exhaustively matched to allow future extensions.
A note on equality
Two Signature
packets are considered equal if their serialized
form is equal. Notably this includes the unhashed subpacket area
and the order of subpackets and notations. This excludes the
computed digest and signature level, which are not serialized.
A consequence of considering packets in the unhashed subpacket
area is that an adversary can take a valid signature and create
many distinct but valid signatures by changing the unhashed
subpacket area. This has the potential of creating a denial of
service vector, if Signature
s are naively deduplicated. To
protect against this, consider using Signature::normalized_eq
.
Examples
Add a User ID to an existing certificate:
use std::time; use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; use openpgp::packet::prelude::*; use openpgp::policy::StandardPolicy; let p = &StandardPolicy::new(); let t1 = time::SystemTime::now(); let t2 = t1 + time::Duration::from_secs(1); let (cert, _) = CertBuilder::new() .set_creation_time(t1) .add_userid("Alice <alice@example.org>") .generate()?; // Add a new User ID. let mut signer = cert .primary_key().key().clone().parts_into_secret()?.into_keypair()?; // Use the existing User ID's signature as a template. This ensures that // we use the same let userid = UserID::from("Alice <alice@other.com>"); let template: signature::SignatureBuilder = cert.with_policy(p, t1)?.primary_userid().unwrap() .binding_signature().clone().into(); let sig = template.clone() .set_signature_creation_time(t2)?; let sig = userid.bind(&mut signer, &cert, sig)?; let cert = cert.merge_packets(vec![ Packet::from(userid), sig.into() ])?;
Variants
V4(Signature4)
Signature packet version 4.
Implementations
impl Signature
[src]
Hashing-related functionality.
pub fn hash_standalone<'a, S>(sig: S) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
[src]
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
Computes the message digest of standalone signatures.
pub fn hash_timestamp<'a, S>(sig: S) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
[src]
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
Computes the message digest of timestamp signatures.
pub fn hash_direct_key<'a, P, S>(
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
[src]
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
Returns the message digest of the direct key signature over the specified primary key.
pub fn hash_subkey_binding<'a, P, Q, S>(
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<Q, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
[src]
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<Q, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
Returns the message digest of the subkey binding over the specified primary key and subkey.
pub fn hash_primary_key_binding<'a, P, Q, S>(
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<Q, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
[src]
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<Q, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
Returns the message digest of the primary key binding over the specified primary key and subkey.
pub fn hash_userid_binding<'a, P, S>(
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
userid: &UserID
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
[src]
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
userid: &UserID
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
Returns the message digest of the user ID binding over the specified primary key, user ID, and signature.
pub fn hash_user_attribute_binding<'a, P, S>(
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
ua: &UserAttribute
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
[src]
sig: S,
key: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
ua: &UserAttribute
) -> Result<Vec<u8>> where
P: KeyParts,
S: Into<&'a SignatureBuilder>,
Returns the message digest of the user attribute binding over the specified primary key, user attribute, and signature.
impl Signature
[src]
pub fn get_issuers(&self) -> Vec<KeyHandle>
[src]
Collects all the issuers.
A signature can contain multiple hints as to who issued the signature.
pub fn normalized_eq(&self, other: &Signature) -> bool
[src]
Compares Signatures ignoring the unhashed subpacket area.
We ignore the unhashed subpacket area when comparing signatures. This prevents a malicious party to take valid signatures, add subpackets to the unhashed area, yielding valid but distinct signatures.
The problem we are trying to avoid here is signature spamming. Ignoring the unhashed subpackets means that we can deduplicate signatures using this predicate.
pub fn normalize(&self) -> Self
[src]
Normalizes the signature.
This function normalizes the unhashed signature subpackets. It removes all but the following self-authenticating subpackets:
SubpacketValue::Issuer
SubpacketValue::IssuerFingerprint
SubpacketValue::EmbeddedSignature
pub fn verify_digest<P, R, D>(&self, key: &Key<P, R>, digest: D) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
D: AsRef<[u8]>,
[src]
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
D: AsRef<[u8]>,
Verifies the signature against hash
.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether key
can made
valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the key
is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature, has a
subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the signing
capability, etc.
pub fn verify<P, R>(&self, key: &Key<P, R>) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the signature over text or binary documents using
key
.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether key
can make
valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the key
is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature, has a
subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the signing
capability, etc.
pub fn verify_standalone<P, R>(&self, key: &Key<P, R>) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the standalone signature using key
.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether key
can make
valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the key
is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature, has a
subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the signing
capability, etc.
pub fn verify_timestamp<P, R>(&self, key: &Key<P, R>) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the timestamp signature using key
.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether key
can make
valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the key
is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature, has a
subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the signing
capability, etc.
pub fn verify_direct_key<P, Q, R>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the direct key signature.
self
is the direct key signature, signer
is the
key that allegedly made the signature, and pk
is the primary
key.
For a self-signature, signer
and pk
will be the same.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_primary_key_revocation<P, Q, R>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the primary key revocation certificate.
self
is the primary key revocation certificate, signer
is
the key that allegedly made the signature, and pk
is the
primary key,
For a self-signature, signer
and pk
will be the same.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_subkey_binding<P, Q, R, S>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<S, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
S: KeyParts,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<S, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
S: KeyParts,
Verifies the subkey binding.
self
is the subkey key binding signature, signer
is the
key that allegedly made the signature, pk
is the primary
key, and subkey
is the subkey.
For a self-signature, signer
and pk
will be the same.
If the signature indicates that this is a Signing
capable
subkey, then the back signature is also verified. If it is
missing or can't be verified, then this function returns
false.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_primary_key_binding<P, Q>(
&self,
pk: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<Q, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
[src]
&self,
pk: &Key<P, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<Q, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
Verifies the primary key binding.
self
is the primary key binding signature, pk
is the
primary key, and subkey
is the subkey.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether subkey
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_subkey_revocation<P, Q, R, S>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<S, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
S: KeyParts,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
subkey: &Key<S, SubordinateRole>
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
S: KeyParts,
Verifies the subkey revocation.
self
is the subkey key revocation certificate, signer
is
the key that allegedly made the signature, pk
is the primary
key, and subkey
is the subkey.
For a self-revocation, signer
and pk
will be the same.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_userid_binding<P, Q, R>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
userid: &UserID
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
userid: &UserID
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the user id binding.
self
is the user id binding signature, signer
is the key
that allegedly made the signature, pk
is the primary key,
and userid
is the user id.
For a self-signature, signer
and pk
will be the same.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_userid_revocation<P, Q, R>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
userid: &UserID
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
userid: &UserID
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the user id revocation certificate.
self
is the revocation certificate, signer
is the key
that allegedly made the signature, pk
is the primary key,
and userid
is the user id.
For a self-signature, signer
and pk
will be the same.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_user_attribute_binding<P, Q, R>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
ua: &UserAttribute
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
ua: &UserAttribute
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the user attribute binding.
self
is the user attribute binding signature, signer
is
the key that allegedly made the signature, pk
is the primary
key, and ua
is the user attribute.
For a self-signature, signer
and pk
will be the same.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_user_attribute_revocation<P, Q, R>(
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
ua: &UserAttribute
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
&self,
signer: &Key<P, R>,
pk: &Key<Q, PrimaryRole>,
ua: &UserAttribute
) -> Result<()> where
P: KeyParts,
Q: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies the user attribute revocation certificate.
self
is the user attribute binding signature, signer
is
the key that allegedly made the signature, pk
is the primary
key, and ua
is the user attribute.
For a self-signature, signer
and pk
will be the same.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
pub fn verify_message<M, P, R>(&self, signer: &Key<P, R>, msg: M) -> Result<()> where
M: AsRef<[u8]>,
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
[src]
M: AsRef<[u8]>,
P: KeyParts,
R: KeyRole,
Verifies a signature of a message.
self
is the message signature, signer
is
the key that allegedly made the signature and msg
is the message.
This function is for short messages, if you want to verify larger files
use Verifier
.
Note: Due to limited context, this only verifies the cryptographic signature, checks the signature's type, and checks that the key predates the signature. Further constraints on the signature, like creation and expiration time, or signature revocations must be checked by the caller.
Likewise, this function does not check whether signer
can
made valid signatures; it is up to the caller to make sure the
key is not revoked, not expired, has a valid self-signature,
has a subkey binding signature (if appropriate), has the
signing capability, etc.
impl Signature
[src]
Methods from Deref<Target = Signature4>
pub fn version(&self) -> u8
[src]
Gets the version.
pub fn typ(&self) -> SignatureType
[src]
Gets the signature type.
pub fn pk_algo(&self) -> PublicKeyAlgorithm
[src]
Gets the public key algorithm.
pub fn hash_algo(&self) -> HashAlgorithm
[src]
Gets the hash algorithm.
pub fn digest_prefix(&self) -> &[u8; 2]
[src]
Gets the hash prefix.
pub fn mpis(&self) -> &Signature
[src]
Gets the signature packet's MPIs.
pub fn computed_digest(&self) -> Option<&[u8]>
[src]
Gets the computed hash value.
pub fn level(&self) -> usize
[src]
Gets the signature level.
A level of 0 indicates that the signature is directly over the data, a level of 1 means that the signature is a notarization over all level 0 signatures and the data, and so on.
pub fn exportable(&self) -> Result<()>
[src]
Tests whether or not this signature is exportable.
Trait Implementations
impl Clone for Signature
[src]
impl Debug for Signature
[src]
impl Deref for Signature
[src]
type Target = Signature4
The resulting type after dereferencing.
fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target
[src]
impl DerefMut for Signature
[src]
impl Eq for Signature
[src]
impl<'a> From<&'a Signature> for &'a SignatureBuilder
[src]
impl From<Signature> for SignatureBuilder
[src]
impl From<Signature> for Packet
[src]
impl From<Signature4> for Signature
[src]
fn from(s: Signature4) -> Self
[src]
impl Hash for Signature
[src]
impl Hash for Signature
[src]
fn hash<__H: Hasher>(&self, state: &mut __H)
[src]
fn hash_slice<H>(data: &[Self], state: &mut H) where
H: Hasher,
1.3.0[src]
H: Hasher,
impl IntoIterator for Signature
[src]
Implement IntoIterator
so that
cert::merge_packets(sig)
just works.
type Item = Signature
The type of the elements being iterated over.
type IntoIter = Once<Signature>
Which kind of iterator are we turning this into?
fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter
[src]
impl Marshal for Signature
[src]
fn serialize(&self, o: &mut dyn Write) -> Result<()>
[src]
fn export(&self, o: &mut dyn Write) -> Result<()>
[src]
impl MarshalInto for Signature
[src]
fn serialized_len(&self) -> usize
[src]
fn serialize_into(&self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize>
[src]
fn export_into(&self, buf: &mut [u8]) -> Result<usize>
[src]
fn export_to_vec(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>>
[src]
fn to_vec(&self) -> Result<Vec<u8>>
[src]
impl<'a> Parse<'a, Signature> for Signature
[src]
fn from_reader<R: 'a + Read>(reader: R) -> Result<Self>
[src]
fn from_file<P: AsRef<Path>>(path: P) -> Result<T>
[src]
fn from_bytes<D: AsRef<[u8]> + ?Sized>(data: &'a D) -> Result<T>
[src]
impl PartialEq<Signature> for Signature
[src]
impl StructuralEq for Signature
[src]
impl StructuralPartialEq for Signature
[src]
impl<'a> TryFrom<&'a Signature> for OnePassSig3
[src]
Auto Trait Implementations
impl RefUnwindSafe for Signature
impl Send for Signature
impl Sync for Signature
impl Unpin for Signature
impl UnwindSafe for Signature
Blanket Implementations
impl<T> Any for T where
T: 'static + ?Sized,
[src]
T: 'static + ?Sized,
impl<T> Borrow<T> for T where
T: ?Sized,
[src]
T: ?Sized,
impl<T> BorrowMut<T> for T where
T: ?Sized,
[src]
T: ?Sized,
fn borrow_mut(&mut self) -> &mut T
[src]
impl<T> From<T> for T
[src]
impl<T, U> Into<U> for T where
U: From<T>,
[src]
U: From<T>,
impl<I> IntoIterator for I where
I: Iterator,
[src]
I: Iterator,
type Item = <I as Iterator>::Item
The type of the elements being iterated over.
type IntoIter = I
Which kind of iterator are we turning this into?
fn into_iter(self) -> I
[src]
impl<T> ToOwned for T where
T: Clone,
[src]
T: Clone,
type Owned = T
The resulting type after obtaining ownership.
fn to_owned(&self) -> T
[src]
fn clone_into(&self, target: &mut T)
[src]
impl<T, U> TryFrom<U> for T where
U: Into<T>,
[src]
U: Into<T>,
type Error = Infallible
The type returned in the event of a conversion error.
fn try_from(value: U) -> Result<T, <T as TryFrom<U>>::Error>
[src]
impl<T, U> TryInto<U> for T where
U: TryFrom<T>,
[src]
U: TryFrom<T>,