eoka 0.7.2

Stealth browser automation for Rust. Puppeteer/Playwright alternative with anti-bot bypass.
Documentation 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

// Real headless/new and headed Chrome both report the native pair
// (reduce=false, no-preference=true). Wrapping matchMedia used to fabricate
// an impossible both-false state, so it is intentionally left untouched.
// The pointer/hover mismatch real headless X servers have is fixed natively
// with `--blink-settings=primaryPointerType=4,...` in the launch arguments.

// PerformanceObserver is fully implemented in current headless Chrome. The one
// observable difference older headless builds had was an empty
// `supportedEntryTypes`, which a detector can read without constructing an
// observer. Restore the desktop list only in that case; never stub observe()
// or delivery, because a silent observer is itself a headless signal.
try {
    if (typeof PerformanceObserver === 'function') {
        const types = PerformanceObserver.supportedEntryTypes;
        if (!Array.isArray(types) || types.length === 0) {
            // Native returns the same frozen array on every read.
            const desktop = Object.freeze(['element', 'event', 'first-input',
                'interaction-contentful-paint', 'largest-contentful-paint', 'layout-shift',
                'long-animation-frame', 'longtask', 'mark', 'measure', 'navigation', 'paint',
                'resource', 'soft-navigation', 'visibility-state']);
            Object.defineProperty(PerformanceObserver, 'supportedEntryTypes', {
                get: _eoka_mark(() => desktop, 'get supportedEntryTypes'),
                configurable: true
            });
        }
    }
} catch(e) {}

// `isSecureContext` must stay native: it follows the scheme (and sandbox
// flags), so forcing it true on an http:// page would contradict
// location.protocol. Only repair the impossible https-but-insecure state, and
// only in the top-level frame: an https iframe under an http (or sandboxed)
// ancestor is genuinely not a secure context and lacks every [SecureContext]
// API, so claiming true there would contradict the rest of the frame.
try {
    if (window.isSecureContext === false && window.location.protocol === 'https:' &&
            window.top === window) {
        Object.defineProperty(window, 'isSecureContext', {
            get: _eoka_mark(() => true, 'get isSecureContext'),
            configurable: true
        });
    }
} catch(e) {}

// `window.sandbox` does not exist in stock Chrome. This script runs at
// document start, before page globals exist, so any value here comes from the
// automation environment and is safe to remove.
try {
    if ('sandbox' in window) {
        delete window.sandbox;
    }
} catch(e) {}

// Ensure window.origin is correct
try {
    if (!window.origin || window.origin === 'null') {
        Object.defineProperty(window, 'origin', {
            get: _eoka_mark(function() { return window.location.origin; }, 'get origin'),
            configurable: true
        });
    }
} catch(e) {}