cleanlib_client/
envelope.rs

1//! `VerdictEnvelopeV1` + `ReasonCode` — schema-locked mirror of
2//! `@cleanstart/cleanlib-sdk@0.4.1` (tarball sha-1
3//! `b5f00c160907a6ea1f490f14a9bda6f6de34b8b6`).
4//!
5//! Sister of:
6//! - sdk-js  `dist/reason-codes.js` + `dist/verdict-envelope.schema.json`
7//! - sdk-py  `cleanlib_sdk/reason_codes.py`
8//! - sdk-go  `reason_codes.go`
9//!
10//! Drift between any of the four SDK consumers is a CI failure;
11//! `cleanlib-contract-fixtures` v1.0.0 verifies byte-identical
12//! `(status, reason_code)` across all 4 implementations.
13//!
14//! Freshness-precedence rule (ratified 2026-05-28; binding via App dispatch §4
15//! + Client dispatch §2.3): when the substance-driving signal's
16//! `availability == "degraded_stale"`, the substance-derived status tier is
17//! PRESERVED and the `reason_code` OVERRIDES to `VERDICT_DEGRADED_STALE`.
18//! Server-side `VERDICT_DEGRADED_STALE` is architecturally distinct from the
19//! client-side `LIVE_DEGRADED` cache-fallback state (extension status bar +
20//! Cli7 offline mode).
21
22use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
23
24/// Tri-state envelope status tier — sister of sdk-js Literal type
25/// `'ALLOW' | 'WARN' | 'DENY'`.
26#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Deserialize, Serialize)]
27pub enum Status {
28    #[serde(rename = "ALLOW")]
29    Allow,
30    #[serde(rename = "WARN")]
31    Warn,
32    #[serde(rename = "DENY")]
33    Deny,
34}
35
36impl Status {
37    /// Canonical wire-format string — what App emits + what every other SDK
38    /// asserts on.
39    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
40        match self {
41            Status::Allow => "ALLOW",
42            Status::Warn => "WARN",
43            Status::Deny => "DENY",
44        }
45    }
46}
47
48impl std::fmt::Display for Status {
49    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
50        f.write_str(self.as_str())
51    }
52}
53
54/// Canonical 15-value `ReasonCode` registry — Rust mirror of sdk-js v0.4.1
55/// `dist/reason-codes.js`. Drift = CI failure.
56#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Deserialize, Serialize)]
57pub enum ReasonCode {
58    // ─── Status outcomes (verdict-tier reasons) ──────────────────────────
59    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_CLEAN")]
60    VerdictClean,
61    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_RECOMMENDED_VERSION_NEWER")]
62    VerdictRecommendedVersionNewer,
63    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_ABANDONED")]
64    VerdictAbandoned,
65    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_LOW_TRUST")]
66    VerdictLowTrust,
67    /// CLEANLIB-511 (B2) / 503: unified reason for a VECTOR_VERDICT CVE finding
68    /// at LOW/MEDIUM/HIGH severity — retires the incoherent per-severity codes
69    /// (VERDICT_CLEAN on LOW = "no findings", VERDICT_ABANDONED on MEDIUM =
70    /// "unmaintained", VERDICT_LOW_TRUST on HIGH) which asserted facts unrelated
71    /// to "has a CVE". Severity is carried in `rich_data.severity`.
72    /// VERDICT_ABANDONED stays reserved for the genuine `abandonment_score`
73    /// signal (derive_status), VERDICT_EXPLOITATION_CRITICAL for CRITICAL.
74    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_CVE_FOUND")]
75    VerdictCveFound,
76    /// CLEANLIB S1 (cycle-22, closes PM 731999 §1): canonical reason for a
77    /// not-yet-assessed package. `INSUFFICIENT_DATA` fails closed to WARN +
78    /// `VERDICT_NOT_YET_ASSESSED` — replaces the cycle-21 D1 `VERDICT_CLEAN`
79    /// placeholder (status-correct but reason-incoherent, Discipline #60).
80    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_NOT_YET_ASSESSED")]
81    VerdictNotYetAssessed,
82    /// Server-side substrate freshness — substance-derived tier preserved,
83    /// reason overridden to surface staleness. Distinct from client-side
84    /// `LIVE_DEGRADED` cache-fallback (extension status bar; Cli7 offline mode).
85    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_DEGRADED_STALE")]
86    VerdictDegradedStale,
87    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_HAS_REMEDIATION")]
88    VerdictHasRemediation,
89    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_KEV_LISTED")]
90    VerdictKevListed,
91    /// CLEANLIB-176: package named in ransomware campaigns
92    /// (`CVE_FINDING_ON_RANSOMWARE` source projection). Semantically distinct
93    /// from KEV — a CVE can be ransomware-linked without being CISA-KEV-listed
94    /// and vice-versa; conflating them defeats the 176 differentiation goal.
95    /// Cross-SDK + Threat ratification PENDING (see CLEANLIB-176 comment 658233).
96    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_RANSOMWARE_LISTED")]
97    VerdictRansomwareListed,
98    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_EXPLOITATION_CRITICAL")]
99    VerdictExploitationCritical,
100    /// CLEANLIB-176: confirmed/likely-malicious package (`MALICIOUS_TRIAGE`
101    /// source projection — typosquat / backdoor / protestware). Distinct from
102    /// `VERDICT_EXPLOITATION_CRITICAL` (a *CVE* being actively exploited):
103    /// malicious means remove + audit + rotate, not upgrade.
104    /// Cross-SDK + Threat ratification PENDING (see CLEANLIB-176 comment 658233).
105    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_MALICIOUS")]
106    VerdictMalicious,
107    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_OBFUSCATED")]
108    VerdictObfuscated,
109    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_DENY_LIST")]
110    VerdictDenyList,
111    /// CLEANLIB-518 (§3): the App could not resolve the requested semver range
112    /// to a concrete version (`source_state = RANGE_NOT_RESOLVED`, CLEANLIB-513).
113    /// Distinct from `VERDICT_NOT_YET_ASSESSED` — the package is not un-assessed,
114    /// the *range* is unresolved, so the customer must pin a concrete version.
115    /// Fixes the CLI banner↔body contradiction where a range-not-resolved verdict
116    /// rendered the "❔ Not yet assessed" banner while the reasoning body said the
117    /// opposite. Fails CLOSED to WARN (an unresolved range is not an ALLOW).
118    #[serde(rename = "VERDICT_RANGE_NOT_RESOLVED")]
119    VerdictRangeNotResolved,
120
121    // ─── Client-transport reasons ────────────────────────────────────────
122    #[serde(rename = "CLIENT_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE")]
123    ClientNetworkUnreachable,
124    #[serde(rename = "CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED")]
125    ClientAuthFailed,
126    #[serde(rename = "CLIENT_BEARER_MISSING")]
127    ClientBearerMissing,
128    #[serde(rename = "CLIENT_RATE_LIMITED")]
129    ClientRateLimited,
130
131    // ─── Domain — 404 from /api/v1/remediation/:eco/:name ───────────────
132    #[serde(rename = "REMEDIATION_NOT_FOUND")]
133    RemediationNotFound,
134}
135
136impl ReasonCode {
137    /// Canonical wire-format string — what App emits + what every other SDK
138    /// asserts on.
139    pub fn as_str(&self) -> &'static str {
140        match self {
141            ReasonCode::VerdictClean => "VERDICT_CLEAN",
142            ReasonCode::VerdictRecommendedVersionNewer => "VERDICT_RECOMMENDED_VERSION_NEWER",
143            ReasonCode::VerdictAbandoned => "VERDICT_ABANDONED",
144            ReasonCode::VerdictLowTrust => "VERDICT_LOW_TRUST",
145            ReasonCode::VerdictCveFound => "VERDICT_CVE_FOUND",
146            ReasonCode::VerdictNotYetAssessed => "VERDICT_NOT_YET_ASSESSED",
147            ReasonCode::VerdictDegradedStale => "VERDICT_DEGRADED_STALE",
148            ReasonCode::VerdictHasRemediation => "VERDICT_HAS_REMEDIATION",
149            ReasonCode::VerdictKevListed => "VERDICT_KEV_LISTED",
150            ReasonCode::VerdictRansomwareListed => "VERDICT_RANSOMWARE_LISTED",
151            ReasonCode::VerdictExploitationCritical => "VERDICT_EXPLOITATION_CRITICAL",
152            ReasonCode::VerdictMalicious => "VERDICT_MALICIOUS",
153            ReasonCode::VerdictObfuscated => "VERDICT_OBFUSCATED",
154            ReasonCode::VerdictDenyList => "VERDICT_DENY_LIST",
155            ReasonCode::VerdictRangeNotResolved => "VERDICT_RANGE_NOT_RESOLVED",
156            ReasonCode::ClientNetworkUnreachable => "CLIENT_NETWORK_UNREACHABLE",
157            ReasonCode::ClientAuthFailed => "CLIENT_AUTH_FAILED",
158            ReasonCode::ClientBearerMissing => "CLIENT_BEARER_MISSING",
159            ReasonCode::ClientRateLimited => "CLIENT_RATE_LIMITED",
160            ReasonCode::RemediationNotFound => "REMEDIATION_NOT_FOUND",
161        }
162    }
163}
164
165impl std::fmt::Display for ReasonCode {
166    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
167        f.write_str(self.as_str())
168    }
169}
170
171/// All 20 canonical reason-code values — consumed by drift-check CI.
172/// CLEANLIB-176 added `VERDICT_RANSOMWARE_LISTED` + `VERDICT_MALICIOUS` (15→17);
173/// S1 (cycle-22) added VERDICT_NOT_YET_ASSESSED (17→18); CLEANLIB-511(B2)/503 added VERDICT_CVE_FOUND (18→19);
174/// CLEANLIB-518(§3) added VERDICT_RANGE_NOT_RESOLVED (19→20). The
175/// three external SDKs (js/py/go) land these in coordinated follow-on PRs.
176pub const ALL_REASON_CODES: &[ReasonCode] = &[
177    ReasonCode::VerdictClean,
178    ReasonCode::VerdictRecommendedVersionNewer,
179    ReasonCode::VerdictAbandoned,
180    ReasonCode::VerdictLowTrust,
181    ReasonCode::VerdictCveFound,
182    ReasonCode::VerdictNotYetAssessed,
183    ReasonCode::VerdictDegradedStale,
184    ReasonCode::VerdictHasRemediation,
185    ReasonCode::VerdictKevListed,
186    ReasonCode::VerdictRansomwareListed,
187    ReasonCode::VerdictExploitationCritical,
188    ReasonCode::VerdictMalicious,
189    ReasonCode::VerdictObfuscated,
190    ReasonCode::VerdictDenyList,
191    ReasonCode::VerdictRangeNotResolved,
192    ReasonCode::ClientNetworkUnreachable,
193    ReasonCode::ClientAuthFailed,
194    ReasonCode::ClientBearerMissing,
195    ReasonCode::ClientRateLimited,
196    ReasonCode::RemediationNotFound,
197];
198
199/// Canonical wire-strings for the verdict `source` field — Rust mirror of
200/// `cleanlib_core::VerdictSource` SCREAMING_SNAKE serde output. The first four
201/// are the cycle-≤16 originals; the last four are the CLEANLIB-176 projection
202/// variants that let customers separate "has CVEs" (upgrade) from "actively
203/// exploited" (KEV) / "ransomware-linked" / "malicious" (remove+audit+rotate).
204/// Used by [`crate::verdict_to_envelope_v1`] to refine the reason_code by
205/// source while preserving the label-derived status tier.
206pub const ALL_VERDICT_SOURCES: &[&str] = &[
207    "ALLOWED_NO_FINDINGS",
208    "VECTOR_VERDICT",
209    "DM_THRESHOLD_BLOCK",
210    "INSUFFICIENT_DATA",
211    "CVE_FINDING",
212    "CVE_FINDING_ON_KEV",
213    "CVE_FINDING_ON_RANSOMWARE",
214    "MALICIOUS_TRIAGE",
215];
216
217/// `VerdictEnvelopeV1` — parsed shape of the `verdict-envelope.v1.json`
218/// schema. Top-level fields are required; rich sub-objects are sparse and
219/// `#[serde(default)]`-tolerant so the SDK can consume partial responses
220/// during cycle-N spec evolution without forcing a recompile.
221///
222/// Sister of:
223/// - sdk-js  `VerdictEnvelopeV1Schema` (zod)
224/// - sdk-py  no struct (dict[str, Any] in Python)
225/// - sdk-go  `map[string]any` (loose) — but Rust gets a typed struct.
226#[derive(Debug, Clone, Deserialize, Serialize)]
227pub struct VerdictEnvelopeV1 {
228    pub status: String,
229    pub reason_code: String,
230    pub human_message: String,
231    pub as_of: String,
232    /// CLEANLIB-505 (III): full-nanosecond `as_of`, dual-emitted alongside the
233    /// (possibly µs-truncated) `as_of` string. Additive migration-window field
234    /// (A3-style) — Python truncates `as_of` to µs at datetime-parse, so the
235    /// raw ns timestamp is carried here as a string for consumers that need
236    /// sub-µs precision. Rust preserves ns in `as_of` already, so this mirrors
237    /// it. `skip_serializing_if = None` → byte-identical v1 when absent.
238    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
239    pub as_of_ns: Option<String>,
240
241    #[serde(default)]
242    pub rich_data: Option<serde_json::Value>,
243    #[serde(default)]
244    pub remediation: Option<serde_json::Value>,
245    #[serde(default)]
246    pub exploitability: Option<serde_json::Value>,
247    /// CLEANLIB-104 App-3.1 Gate M3: non-Optional per the design doc §3.3
248    /// exit criterion ("derive_status.rs line 57 stops using as_ref on
249    /// availability"). `#[serde(default)]` gives `Value::Null` on absent-key
250    /// payloads — fail-open: consumers see a defaulted block, not an
251    /// unwrap-panic. `derive_status.rs` uses `Some(&envelope.availability)`
252    /// against the untyped JSON-Value helpers (see line 57).
253    ///
254    /// `skip_serializing_if = "Value::is_null"` preserves the wire byte-
255    /// identity on happy-path envelopes: when the adapter passes through a
256    /// default `AvailabilityBlock` (degraded_stale=false), the envelope
257    /// serializes as `Null` and the field is omitted — matching the pre-M3
258    /// `Option<Value>::None` shape.
259    #[serde(default, skip_serializing_if = "serde_json::Value::is_null")]
260    pub availability: serde_json::Value,
261}
262
263#[cfg(test)]
264mod tests {
265    use super::*;
266
267    #[test]
268    fn parses_minimal_envelope() {
269        let json = r#"{
270            "status": "ALLOW",
271            "reason_code": "VERDICT_CLEAN",
272            "human_message": "ok",
273            "as_of": "2026-05-28"
274        }"#;
275        let env: VerdictEnvelopeV1 = serde_json::from_str(json).unwrap();
276        assert_eq!(env.status, "ALLOW");
277        assert_eq!(env.reason_code, "VERDICT_CLEAN");
278        assert!(env.rich_data.is_none());
279        assert!(env.remediation.is_none());
280        assert!(env.exploitability.is_none());
281        // CLEANLIB-104 M3: availability is non-Optional; absent JSON key
282        // deserializes to `Value::Null` (the serde default for
283        // `serde_json::Value`).
284        assert!(env.availability.is_null());
285    }
286
287    #[test]
288    fn all_20_reason_codes_present() {
289        // Drift-check sister of sdk-py ALL_REASON_CODES + sdk-go AllReasonCodes.
290        // CLEANLIB-176: 15 → 17 (+VERDICT_RANSOMWARE_LISTED +VERDICT_MALICIOUS).
291        // S1 (cycle-22, PM 731999 §1): 17 → 18 (+VERDICT_NOT_YET_ASSESSED).
292        // CLEANLIB-511(B2)/503: 18 → 19 (+VERDICT_CVE_FOUND).
293        // CLEANLIB-518(§3): 19 → 20 (+VERDICT_RANGE_NOT_RESOLVED).
294        assert_eq!(ALL_REASON_CODES.len(), 20);
295        assert!(ALL_REASON_CODES.contains(&ReasonCode::VerdictCveFound));
296        assert!(ALL_REASON_CODES.contains(&ReasonCode::VerdictNotYetAssessed));
297        assert!(ALL_REASON_CODES.contains(&ReasonCode::VerdictRangeNotResolved));
298    }
299
300    #[test]
301    fn all_verdict_sources_recognized() {
302        // CLEANLIB-176: the SDK must recognize all 8 wire-strings for the
303        // verdict `source` field (4 originals + 4 projection variants) so it
304        // never silently misclassifies a known source as unknown.
305        assert_eq!(ALL_VERDICT_SOURCES.len(), 8);
306        assert!(ALL_VERDICT_SOURCES.contains(&"CVE_FINDING_ON_KEV"));
307        assert!(ALL_VERDICT_SOURCES.contains(&"CVE_FINDING_ON_RANSOMWARE"));
308        assert!(ALL_VERDICT_SOURCES.contains(&"MALICIOUS_TRIAGE"));
309    }
310
311    #[test]
312    fn reason_code_string_roundtrip() {
313        for rc in ALL_REASON_CODES {
314            let s = serde_json::to_string(rc).unwrap();
315            let back: ReasonCode = serde_json::from_str(&s).unwrap();
316            assert_eq!(&back, rc);
317            // as_str() matches serde wire format (quoted JSON string).
318            assert_eq!(format!("\"{}\"", rc.as_str()), s);
319        }
320    }
321
322    #[test]
323    fn status_string_roundtrip() {
324        for st in [Status::Allow, Status::Warn, Status::Deny] {
325            let s = serde_json::to_string(&st).unwrap();
326            let back: Status = serde_json::from_str(&s).unwrap();
327            assert_eq!(back, st);
328            assert_eq!(format!("\"{}\"", st.as_str()), s);
329        }
330    }
331}
cleanlib_client/envelope.rs

cleanlib_client/
envelope.rs
