cheers_verify/edge.rs
1//! The [`EdgeVerifier`] facade — what a CF Worker holds.
2
3use cheers_core::{Claims, Error, PeerKey, TokenVerifier};
4
5use crate::revocation::RevocationReader;
6
7/// Edge facade: verify a token, then check it hasn't been revoked.
8///
9/// Holds a [`TokenVerifier`] and a [`RevocationReader`] — and nothing else.
10/// There is **no `TokenMinter` in this type**, so an edge built on it cannot
11/// forge sessions even if compromised; that absence is the whole point of the
12/// asymmetric codec split. Generic (not `dyn`) so the "no minter" property is a
13/// fact about the type, not a runtime convention. Pair a
14/// [`PasetoV4PublicVerifier`](crate::PasetoV4PublicVerifier) with a CF-KV-backed
15/// `RevocationReader`.
16pub struct EdgeVerifier<V, Rd> {
17 verifier: V,
18 revoked: Rd,
19}
20
21impl<V, Rd> EdgeVerifier<V, Rd>
22where
23 V: TokenVerifier + Send + Sync,
24 Rd: RevocationReader,
25{
26 pub fn new(verifier: V, revoked: Rd) -> Self {
27 Self { verifier, revoked }
28 }
29
30 /// The revocation set this verifier reads — **read-only**.
31 ///
32 /// Exposed (R728-F2) so a surface that also admits a *different* claim
33 /// shape checks the SAME set. `McpClaims` is verified by an inherent
34 /// method on [`PasetoV4PublicVerifier`](crate::PasetoV4PublicVerifier)
35 /// rather than through [`TokenVerifier`], so it cannot ride
36 /// [`verify_at`](Self::verify_at); handing such a caller its own second
37 /// reader would let the two halves of one route disagree about what is
38 /// dead. Returning the reader cannot widen anyone —
39 /// [`RevocationReader`] can ask, never revoke.
40 pub fn revocations(&self) -> &Rd {
41 &self.revoked
42 }
43
44 /// Verify `token` against `now`, then reject it if its `jti` is revoked.
45 ///
46 /// Two stages, cheapest first: cryptographic verification (stateless, local
47 /// to the edge) gates the revocation read, so a forged or expired token
48 /// never reaches the revocation set. A token that verifies but whose `jti`
49 /// is revoked returns [`Error::Revoked`].
50 pub async fn verify_at(&self, token: &str, now: i64) -> Result<Claims, Error> {
51 let claims = self.verifier.verify_at(token, now)?;
52 if self.revoked.is_revoked(&claims.jti).await? {
53 return Err(Error::Revoked);
54 }
55 Ok(claims)
56 }
57
58 /// [`verify_at`](Self::verify_at), plus: the token must be bound to
59 /// `presented` — the long-lived public key the *connecting peer* already
60 /// proved possession of in the transport handshake (R515).
61 ///
62 /// This is what turns a bearer token into a proof that **token holder ==
63 /// connecting peer**. Without it a stolen token replays under the thief's
64 /// own node key and they become the victim user; with it the stolen token
65 /// names a key the thief cannot present, and this returns
66 /// [`Error::PeerKeyMismatch`].
67 ///
68 /// Three stages, cheapest and most local first: signature (stateless),
69 /// binding (a byte compare, still local), then the revocation read (the
70 /// only I/O). An **unbound** token is rejected here too — it asserts
71 /// nothing about any node key, so it cannot satisfy a binding check. A
72 /// deployment that also admits unbound tokens must call
73 /// [`verify_at`](Self::verify_at) and branch on
74 /// [`Claims::peer_key`](cheers_core::Claims::peer_key) itself, so that
75 /// choice is visible at the call site.
76 ///
77 /// The caller supplies `presented` from its own transport — cheers has no
78 /// view of the connection and never infers the peer key from the token.
79 pub async fn verify_bound_at(
80 &self,
81 token: &str,
82 presented: &PeerKey,
83 now: i64,
84 ) -> Result<Claims, Error> {
85 let claims = self.verifier.verify_at(token, now)?;
86 if !claims.is_bound_to(presented) {
87 return Err(Error::PeerKeyMismatch);
88 }
89 if self.revoked.is_revoked(&claims.jti).await? {
90 return Err(Error::Revoked);
91 }
92 Ok(claims)
93 }
94}