cheers_verify/edge.rs
1//! The [`EdgeVerifier`] facade — what a CF Worker holds.
2
3use cheers_core::{Claims, Error, PeerKey, TokenVerifier};
4
5use crate::revocation::RevocationReader;
6
7/// Edge facade: verify a token, then check it hasn't been revoked.
8///
9/// Holds a [`TokenVerifier`] and a [`RevocationReader`] — and nothing else.
10/// There is **no `TokenMinter` in this type**, so an edge built on it cannot
11/// forge sessions even if compromised; that absence is the whole point of the
12/// asymmetric codec split. Generic (not `dyn`) so the "no minter" property is a
13/// fact about the type, not a runtime convention. Pair a
14/// [`PasetoV4PublicVerifier`](crate::PasetoV4PublicVerifier) with a CF-KV-backed
15/// `RevocationReader`.
16pub struct EdgeVerifier<V, Rd> {
17 verifier: V,
18 revoked: Rd,
19}
20
21impl<V, Rd> EdgeVerifier<V, Rd>
22where
23 V: TokenVerifier + Send + Sync,
24 Rd: RevocationReader,
25{
26 pub fn new(verifier: V, revoked: Rd) -> Self {
27 Self { verifier, revoked }
28 }
29
30 /// Verify `token` against `now`, then reject it if its `jti` is revoked.
31 ///
32 /// Two stages, cheapest first: cryptographic verification (stateless, local
33 /// to the edge) gates the revocation read, so a forged or expired token
34 /// never reaches the revocation set. A token that verifies but whose `jti`
35 /// is revoked returns [`Error::Revoked`].
36 pub async fn verify_at(&self, token: &str, now: i64) -> Result<Claims, Error> {
37 let claims = self.verifier.verify_at(token, now)?;
38 if self.revoked.is_revoked(&claims.jti).await? {
39 return Err(Error::Revoked);
40 }
41 Ok(claims)
42 }
43
44 /// [`verify_at`](Self::verify_at), plus: the token must be bound to
45 /// `presented` — the long-lived public key the *connecting peer* already
46 /// proved possession of in the transport handshake (R515).
47 ///
48 /// This is what turns a bearer token into a proof that **token holder ==
49 /// connecting peer**. Without it a stolen token replays under the thief's
50 /// own node key and they become the victim user; with it the stolen token
51 /// names a key the thief cannot present, and this returns
52 /// [`Error::PeerKeyMismatch`].
53 ///
54 /// Three stages, cheapest and most local first: signature (stateless),
55 /// binding (a byte compare, still local), then the revocation read (the
56 /// only I/O). An **unbound** token is rejected here too — it asserts
57 /// nothing about any node key, so it cannot satisfy a binding check. A
58 /// deployment that also admits unbound tokens must call
59 /// [`verify_at`](Self::verify_at) and branch on
60 /// [`Claims::peer_key`](cheers_core::Claims::peer_key) itself, so that
61 /// choice is visible at the call site.
62 ///
63 /// The caller supplies `presented` from its own transport — cheers has no
64 /// view of the connection and never infers the peer key from the token.
65 pub async fn verify_bound_at(
66 &self,
67 token: &str,
68 presented: &PeerKey,
69 now: i64,
70 ) -> Result<Claims, Error> {
71 let claims = self.verifier.verify_at(token, now)?;
72 if !claims.is_bound_to(presented) {
73 return Err(Error::PeerKeyMismatch);
74 }
75 if self.revoked.is_revoked(&claims.jti).await? {
76 return Err(Error::Revoked);
77 }
78 Ok(claims)
79 }
80}