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crate::ix!();
/**
| Data structure to keep track of, and schedule,
| transaction downloads from peers.
|
| === Specification ===
|
| We keep track of which peers have announced
| which transactions, and use that to determine
| which requests should go to which peer, when,
| and in what order.
|
| The following information is tracked per
| peer/tx combination ("announcement"):
|
| - Which peer announced it (through their
| NodeId)
|
| - The txid or wtxid of the transaction
| (collectively called "txhash" in what follows)
|
| - Whether it was a tx or wtx announcement (see
| BIP339).
|
| - What the earliest permitted time is that that
| transaction can be requested from that peer
| (called "reqtime").
|
| - Whether it's from a "preferred" peer or
| not. Which announcements get this flag is
| determined by the caller, but this is
| designed for outbound peers, or other peers
| that we have a higher level of trust in. Even
| when the peers' preferredness changes, the
| preferred flag of existing announcements from
| that peer won't change.
|
| - Whether or not the transaction was requested
| already, and if so, when it times out (called
| "expiry").
|
| - Whether or not the transaction request failed
| already (timed out, or invalid transaction or
| NOTFOUND was received).
|
-------------------------------
| Transaction requests are then assigned to
| peers, following these rules:
|
| - No transaction is requested as long as
| another request for the same txhash is
| outstanding (it needs to fail first by
| passing expiry, or a NOTFOUND or invalid
| transaction has to be received for it).
|
| Rationale: to avoid wasting bandwidth on
| multiple copies of the same
| transaction. Note that this only
| works per txhash, so if the same
| transaction is announced both
| through txid and wtxid, we have no
| means to prevent fetching both
| (the caller can however mitigate
| this by delaying one, see
| further).
|
| - The same transaction is never requested twice
| from the same peer, unless the announcement
| was forgotten in between, and
| re-announced. Announcements are forgotten
| only:
|
| - If a peer goes offline, all its
| announcements are forgotten.
|
| - If a transaction has been successfully
| received, or is otherwise no longer needed,
| the caller can call ForgetTxHash, which
| removes all announcements across all peers
| with the specified txhash.
|
| - If for a given txhash only already-failed
| announcements remain, they are all forgotten.
|
| Rationale: giving a peer multiple chances to
| announce a transaction would
| allow them to bias requests in
| their favor, worsening
| transaction censoring
| attacks. The flip side is that
| as long as an attacker manages
| to prevent us from receiving
| a transaction, failed announcements
| (including those from honest peers)
| will linger longer, increasing
| memory usage somewhat. The impact
| of this is limited by imposing
| a cap on the number of tracked
| announcements per peer. As failed
| requests in response to
| announcements from honest peers
| should be rare, this almost solely
| hinders attackers. Transaction
| censoring attacks can be done by
| announcing transactions quickly
| while not answering requests for
| them. See
| https://allquantor.at/blockchainbib/pdf/miller2015topology.pdf
| for more information.
|
| - Transactions are not requested from a peer
| until its reqtime has passed.
|
| Rationale: enable the calling code to define
| a delay for less-than-ideal peers,
| so that (presumed) better peers
| have a chance to give their
| announcement first.
|
| - If multiple viable candidate peers exist
| according to the above rules, pick a peer as
| follows:
|
| - If any preferred peers are available,
| non-preferred peers are not considered for
| what follows.
|
| Rationale: preferred peers are more trusted
| by us, so are less likely to be
| under attacker control.
|
| - Pick a uniformly random peer among the
| candidates.
|
| Rationale: random assignments are hard to
| influence for attackers.
|
-------------------------------
| Together these rules strike a balance between
| being fast in non-adverserial conditions and
| minimizing susceptibility to censorship
| attacks. An attacker that races the network:
|
| - Will be unsuccessful if all preferred
| connections are honest (and there is at least
| one preferred connection).
|
| - If there are P preferred connections of which
| Ph>=1 are honest, the attacker can delay us
| from learning about a transaction by
| k expiration periods, where
|
| k ~ 1 + NHG(N=P-1,K=P-Ph-1,r=1),
|
| which has mean P/(Ph+1) (where NHG stands for
| Negative Hypergeometric distribution).
|
| The "1 +" is due to the fact that the
| attacker can be the first to announce through
| a preferred connection in this scenario,
| which very likely means they get the first
| request.
|
| - If all P preferred connections are to the
| attacker, and there are NP non-preferred
| connections of which NPh>=1 are honest, where
| we assume that the attacker can disconnect
| and reconnect those connections, the
| distribution becomes
|
| k ~ P + NB(p=1-NPh/NP,r=1)
|
| (where NB stands for Negative Binomial
| distribution), which has mean P-1+NP/NPh.
|
-------------------------------
| Complexity:
|
| - Memory usage is proportional to the total
| number of tracked announcements (Size()) plus
| the number of peers with a nonzero number of
| tracked announcements.
|
| - CPU usage is generally logarithmic in the
| total number of tracked announcements, plus
| the number of announcements affected by an
| operation (amortized O(1) per announcement).
*/
pub struct TxRequestTracker {
/**
| Avoid littering this header file with
| implementation details.
|
*/
impl_: Box<TxRequestTrackerImpl>,
}
impl TxRequestTracker {
/*
| Conceptually, the data structure consists
| of a collection of "announcements", one for
| each peer/txhash combination:
|
| - CANDIDATE announcements represent
| transactions that were announced by
| a peer, and that become available for
| download after their reqtime has passed.
|
| - REQUESTED announcements represent
| transactions that have been requested,
| and which we're awaiting a response for
| from that peer. Their expiry value
| determines when the request times out.
|
| - COMPLETED announcements represent
| transactions that have been requested
| from a peer, and a NOTFOUND or
| a transaction was received in response
| (valid or not), or they timed
| out. They're only kept around to prevent
| requesting them again. If only COMPLETED
| announcements for a given txhash remain
| (so no CANDIDATE
| or REQUESTED ones), all of them are
| deleted (this is an invariant, and
| maintained by all operations below).
|
| The operations below manipulate the data
| structure.
*/
/* The operations below inspect the data structure */
/**
| Construct a TxRequestTracker.
|
*/
pub fn new(deterministic: Option<bool>) -> Self {
let deterministic: bool = deterministic.unwrap_or(false);
todo!();
/*
: m_impl{std::make_unique<TxRequestTracker::Impl>(deterministic)}
*/
}
/**
| Deletes all announcements for a given
| txhash (both txid and wtxid ones).
|
| This should be called when a transaction
| is no longer needed. The caller should
| ensure that new announcements for the
| same txhash will not trigger new ReceivedInv
| calls, at least in the short term after
| this call.
|
*/
pub fn forget_tx_hash(&mut self, txhash: &u256) {
(*self.impl_).forget_tx_hash(txhash);
}
/**
| Deletes all announcements for a given
| peer.
|
| It should be called when a peer goes offline.
|
*/
pub fn disconnected_peer(&mut self, peer: NodeId) {
(*self.impl_).disconnected_peer(peer);
}
/**
| Count how many REQUESTED announcements
| a peer has.
|
*/
pub fn count_in_flight(&self, peer: NodeId) -> usize {
(*self.impl_).count_in_flight(peer)
}
/**
| Count how many CANDIDATE announcements
| a peer has.
|
*/
pub fn count_candidates(&self, peer: NodeId) -> usize {
(*self.impl_).count_candidates(peer)
}
/**
| Count how many announcements a peer
| has (REQUESTED, CANDIDATE, and COMPLETED
| combined).
|
*/
pub fn count(&self, peer: NodeId) -> usize {
(*self.impl_).count(peer)
}
/**
| Count how many announcements are being
| tracked in total across all peers and
| transaction hashes.
|
*/
pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
(*self.impl_).size()
}
/**
| Run internal consistency check (testing
| only).
|
*/
pub fn sanity_check(&self) {
(*self.impl_).sanity_check();
}
/**
| Run a time-dependent internal consistency
| check (testing only).
|
| This can only be called immediately
| after GetRequestable, with the same
| 'now' parameter.
|
*/
pub fn post_get_requestable_sanity_check(&self, now: OffsetDateTime /* micros */) {
(*self.impl_).post_get_requestable_sanity_check(now);
}
/**
| Adds a new CANDIDATE announcement.
|
| Does nothing if one already exists for
| that (txhash, peer) combination (whether
| it's CANDIDATE, REQUESTED, or
|
| COMPLETED). Note that the txid/wtxid
| property is ignored for determining
| uniqueness, so if an announcement is
| added for a wtxid H, while one for txid
| H from the same peer already exists,
| it will be ignored. This is harmless
| as the txhashes being equal implies
| it is a non-segwit transaction, so it
| doesn't matter how it is fetched. The
| new announcement is given the specified
| preferred and reqtime values, and takes
| its is_wtxid from the specified gtxid.
|
*/
pub fn received_inv(&mut self,
peer: NodeId,
gtxid: &GenTxId,
preferred: bool,
reqtime: OffsetDateTime /* micros */) {
(*self.impl_).received_inv(peer, gtxid, preferred, reqtime);
}
/**
| Marks a transaction as requested, with
| a specified expiry.
|
| If no CANDIDATE announcement for the
| provided peer and txhash exists, this
| call has no effect. Otherwise:
|
| - That announcement is converted to
| REQUESTED.
|
| - If any other REQUESTED announcement
| for the same txhash already existed,
| it means an unexpected request was made
| (GetRequestable will never advise
| doing so). In this case it is converted
| to COMPLETED, as we're no longer waiting
| for a response to it.
|
*/
pub fn requested_tx(&mut self,
peer: NodeId,
txhash: &u256,
expiry: OffsetDateTime /* micros */) {
(*self.impl_).requested_tx(peer, txhash, expiry);
}
/**
| Converts a CANDIDATE or REQUESTED announcement
| to a COMPLETED one. If no such announcement
| exists for the provided peer and txhash,
| nothing happens.
|
| It should be called whenever a transaction
| or NOTFOUND was received from a peer.
| When the transaction is not needed entirely
| anymore, ForgetTxhash should be called
| instead of, or in addition to, this call.
|
*/
pub fn received_response(&mut self,
peer: NodeId,
txhash: &u256) {
(*self.impl_).received_response(peer, txhash);
}
/**
| Find the txids to request now from peer.
|
| It does the following:
|
| - Convert all REQUESTED announcements (for
| all txhashes/peers) with (expiry <= now)
| to COMPLETED ones. These are returned in
| expired, if non-nullptr.
|
| - Requestable announcements are selected:
| CANDIDATE announcements from the specified
| peer with (reqtime <= now) for which no
| existing REQUESTED announcement with the
| same txhash from a different peer exists,
| and for which the specified peer is the
| best choice among all (reqtime <= now)
| CANDIDATE announcements with the same
| txhash (subject to preferredness rules,
| and tiebreaking using a deterministic
| salted hash of peer and txhash).
|
| - The selected announcements are converted
| to GenTxIds using their is_wtxid flag, and
| returned in announcement order (even if
| multiple were added at the same time, or
| when the clock went backwards while they
| were being added). This is done to
| minimize disruption from dependent
| transactions being requested out of order:
| if multiple dependent transactions are
| announced simultaneously by one peer, and
| end up being requested from them, the
| requests will happen in announcement
| order.
|
*/
pub fn get_requestable(&mut self,
peer: NodeId,
now: OffsetDateTime /* micros */,
expired: Amo<Vec<(NodeId,GenTxId)>>) -> Vec<GenTxId> {
(*self.impl_).get_requestable(peer, now, expired)
}
/**
| Access to the internal priority computation
| (testing only)
|
*/
pub fn compute_priority(&self,
txhash: &u256,
peer: NodeId,
preferred: bool) -> u64 {
(*self.impl_).compute_priority(txhash, peer, preferred)
}
}