auths_verifier/

freshness.rs

//! Freshness model for verification verdicts (ADR 009 — bounded freshness, verifier-set
//! policy).
//!
//! Offline verification cannot guarantee real-time freshness: a verifier only knows what
//! is in the slice it was handed. So a positive verdict carries a freshness bound, and the
//! *tolerance* is the relying party's policy — never the signer's. See
//! `docs/architecture/ADRs/009-freshness-verdict-model.md`.

use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::time::Duration;

/// How fresh a positive verdict is, relative to the verifier's freshness policy. A positive
/// verdict is never bare: it is always qualified by one of these.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "snake_case")]
pub enum Freshness {
    /// The supplied freshness evidence is within the policy window.
    Fresh,
    /// No source fresher than the supplied slice was available (offline). The verdict is
    /// valid as-of its bound, but freshness cannot be confirmed — this is named, never a
    /// silent pass and never a hard reject.
    Unknown,
    /// The supplied freshness evidence is provably older than the policy window.
    Stale,
}

impl Default for Freshness {
    /// Offline-unknown is the safe default: absent any fresher-source evidence, a verdict's
    /// freshness cannot be confirmed, so it is named [`Freshness::Unknown`] — never silently
    /// treated as fresh. This is what `#[serde(default)]` resolves a missing field to.
    fn default() -> Self {
        Freshness::Unknown
    }
}

/// What the verifier knows about a source fresher than the supplied slice (ADR 009 D3–D5).
/// The verifier reads no clock and no network — this is an INPUT supplied at the boundary
/// (a bundle timestamp, a witness head, a transparency-log tip), the one model both the
/// time-based (bundle) and positional (KEL/credential) call sites share.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum FreshnessEvidence {
    /// No source fresher than the supplied slice was available (offline) → `Unknown`.
    Offline,
    /// The age of the freshest available source (a witness-head / checkpoint timestamp);
    /// time-based, used by bundle verification. Within the policy window → `Fresh`, beyond
    /// it → `Stale`.
    SourceAge(Duration),
    /// A known-fresher tip handed to the verifier out of band (a witness head / log tip),
    /// compared against the slice's `as_of`; positional, used by KEL/credential verification.
    FresherTip {
        /// The freshest tip sequence the verifier knows of.
        latest_seq: u128,
        /// The sequence the verified slice is as-of.
        slice_as_of: u128,
    },
}

/// The relying party's freshness tolerance. Verifier-set, never signer-set: a bundle
/// producer states an age, but the verifier caps the trust window (ADR 009 D2 — this is what
/// kills the "1-year bundle" anti-pattern).
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct FreshnessPolicy {
    /// Maximum age of the freshness evidence before the verdict is [`Freshness::Stale`].
    pub max_age: Duration,
    /// Whether [`Freshness::Unknown`] (offline / unconfirmable) is trusted. A strict relying
    /// party sets this to `false`; the offline-friendly default tolerates it.
    pub trust_unknown: bool,
}

impl Default for FreshnessPolicy {
    /// ADR 009 D2 default: a 24-hour window, tolerating `Unknown` (offline-friendly).
    fn default() -> Self {
        Self {
            max_age: Duration::from_secs(24 * 60 * 60),
            trust_unknown: true,
        }
    }
}

impl FreshnessPolicy {
    /// A strict policy: a short window, and `Unknown` is denied (requires a fresh source —
    /// a witness/checkpoint head).
    ///
    /// Args:
    /// * `max_age`: the maximum age of freshness evidence before it is `Stale`.
    pub fn strict(max_age: Duration) -> Self {
        Self {
            max_age,
            trust_unknown: false,
        }
    }

    /// Classify a verdict's freshness from the evidence of a fresher source.
    ///
    /// [`FreshnessEvidence::Offline`] NAMES the oracle as [`Freshness::Unknown`] — never a
    /// silent pass and never a hard reject. A source within the window (or a slice at/beyond a
    /// known-fresher tip) is [`Freshness::Fresh`]; one provably past it is [`Freshness::Stale`].
    ///
    /// Args:
    /// * `evidence`: what the verifier was told about a source fresher than the slice.
    ///
    /// Usage:
    /// ```ignore
    /// let f = policy.classify(FreshnessEvidence::SourceAge(bundle_age));
    /// ```
    pub fn classify(&self, evidence: FreshnessEvidence) -> Freshness {
        match evidence {
            FreshnessEvidence::Offline => Freshness::Unknown,
            FreshnessEvidence::SourceAge(age) if age <= self.max_age => Freshness::Fresh,
            FreshnessEvidence::SourceAge(_) => Freshness::Stale,
            FreshnessEvidence::FresherTip {
                latest_seq,
                slice_as_of,
            } if latest_seq > slice_as_of => Freshness::Stale,
            FreshnessEvidence::FresherTip { .. } => Freshness::Fresh,
        }
    }

    /// Whether a freshness level clears this policy for a trust decision.
    ///
    /// Args:
    /// * `freshness`: the classified freshness of an otherwise-valid verdict.
    pub fn trusts(&self, freshness: Freshness) -> bool {
        match freshness {
            Freshness::Fresh => true,
            Freshness::Unknown => self.trust_unknown,
            Freshness::Stale => false,
        }
    }
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn classify_names_the_oracle_offline_is_unknown() {
        let p = FreshnessPolicy::default(); // 24h, tolerates unknown
        // Offline — no fresher source than the slice → Unknown (named), never a silent pass
        // and never a hard reject.
        assert_eq!(p.classify(FreshnessEvidence::Offline), Freshness::Unknown);
        // A source within the window → Fresh; older than the window → Stale.
        assert_eq!(
            p.classify(FreshnessEvidence::SourceAge(Duration::from_secs(3600))),
            Freshness::Fresh
        );
        assert_eq!(
            p.classify(FreshnessEvidence::SourceAge(Duration::from_secs(25 * 3600))),
            Freshness::Stale
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn classify_positional_slice_behind_a_fresher_tip_is_stale() {
        let p = FreshnessPolicy::default();
        // A slice behind a known-fresher tip → Stale (it cannot see the later events,
        // including a revocation).
        assert_eq!(
            p.classify(FreshnessEvidence::FresherTip {
                latest_seq: 5,
                slice_as_of: 3,
            }),
            Freshness::Stale
        );
        // A slice at (or beyond) the known-fresher tip → Fresh.
        assert_eq!(
            p.classify(FreshnessEvidence::FresherTip {
                latest_seq: 3,
                slice_as_of: 3,
            }),
            Freshness::Fresh
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn strict_denies_unknown_and_stale_default_tolerates_unknown() {
        let strict = FreshnessPolicy::strict(Duration::from_secs(3600));
        assert!(strict.trusts(Freshness::Fresh));
        assert!(
            !strict.trusts(Freshness::Unknown),
            "strict denies offline-unknown"
        );
        assert!(!strict.trusts(Freshness::Stale));
        // The offline-friendly default tolerates Unknown but never Stale.
        assert!(FreshnessPolicy::default().trusts(Freshness::Unknown));
        assert!(!FreshnessPolicy::default().trusts(Freshness::Stale));
    }

    #[test]
    fn the_default_window_is_24h() {
        assert_eq!(
            FreshnessPolicy::default().max_age,
            Duration::from_secs(86_400)
        );
    }
}