1use crate::errors::{AuthError, Result};
2use crate::storage::{AuthStorage, SessionData};
3use crate::tokens::AuthToken;
4use aes_gcm::{
5 Aes256Gcm, Key, KeyInit, Nonce,
6 aead::{Aead, Payload},
7};
8use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose::STANDARD as BASE64};
9use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
10use std::collections::HashMap;
11use std::env;
12use std::fs;
13use std::time::Duration;
14use zeroize::Zeroize;
15
16#[cfg(test)]
35pub(crate) static TEST_ENCRYPTION_ENV_LOCK: tokio::sync::Mutex<()> =
36 tokio::sync::Mutex::const_new(());
37
38#[cfg(test)]
46pub(crate) struct EncryptionEnvGuard;
47
48#[cfg(test)]
49impl EncryptionEnvGuard {
50 pub(crate) fn set(key: &str) -> Self {
51 unsafe {
55 std::env::set_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY", key);
56 std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE");
57 }
58 Self
59 }
60}
61
62#[cfg(test)]
63impl Drop for EncryptionEnvGuard {
64 fn drop(&mut self) {
65 unsafe {
68 std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY");
69 }
70 }
71}
72
73const CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION: u8 = 2;
87
88const FORMAT_V1: u8 = 1;
90
91const ALGORITHM: &str = "AES-256-GCM";
93
94const DECRYPT_FAILED: &str = "Decryption failed";
99
100fn bound_aad(v: u8, algorithm: &str, key_id: &str, record_aad: &[u8]) -> Vec<u8> {
107 let mut out = Vec::with_capacity(48 + algorithm.len() + key_id.len() + record_aad.len());
108 out.extend_from_slice(b"auth-framework/storage-envelope");
109 out.push(v);
110 for part in [algorithm.as_bytes(), key_id.as_bytes(), record_aad] {
111 out.extend_from_slice(&(part.len() as u32).to_be_bytes());
112 out.extend_from_slice(part);
113 }
114 out
115}
116
117fn default_format_version() -> u8 {
118 0
129}
130
131#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
146pub struct EncryptedData {
147 pub data: String,
149 pub nonce: String,
151 pub algorithm: String,
153 #[serde(default)]
156 pub key_id: String,
157 #[serde(default = "default_format_version")]
162 pub v: u8,
163 #[serde(default)]
166 pub key_derivation: String,
167}
168
169pub trait KeyProvider: Send + Sync {
177 fn load_keys(&self) -> Result<LoadedKeys>;
185}
186
187pub struct LoadedKeys {
190 pub current_key_id: String,
191 pub keys: HashMap<String, [u8; 32]>,
196}
197
198pub struct EnvKeyProvider;
230
231impl KeyProvider for EnvKeyProvider {
232 fn load_keys(&self) -> Result<LoadedKeys> {
233 if let Ok(path) = env::var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE") {
234 return Self::load_from_file(&path);
235 }
236
237 let mut key_data = env::var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY").map_err(|_| {
238 AuthError::config(
239 "No storage encryption key configured: set AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY \
240 (or AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE for multi-key rotation). \
241 Refusing to start rather than silently storing data unencrypted.",
242 )
243 })?;
244 let key_id = env::var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY_ID").unwrap_or_else(|_| "1".to_string());
245 let key = decode_key(&key_data);
246 key_data.zeroize();
247 let key = key?;
248
249 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
250 keys.insert(key_id.clone(), key);
251 Ok(LoadedKeys {
252 current_key_id: key_id,
253 keys,
254 })
255 }
256}
257
258impl EnvKeyProvider {
259 fn load_from_file(path: &str) -> Result<LoadedKeys> {
260 #[derive(Deserialize)]
261 struct KeysFile {
262 current: String,
263 keys: HashMap<String, String>,
264 }
265
266 check_keys_file_permissions(path, strict_permissions_requested())?;
267
268 let mut contents = fs::read_to_string(path).map_err(|e| {
269 AuthError::config(format!(
270 "Failed to read AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE '{path}': {e}"
271 ))
272 })?;
273 let parsed: Result<KeysFile> = serde_json::from_str(&contents).map_err(|e| {
274 AuthError::config(format!(
275 "Failed to parse AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE '{path}': {e}"
276 ))
277 });
278 contents.zeroize();
279 let mut parsed = parsed?;
280
281 if !parsed.keys.contains_key(&parsed.current) {
282 for encoded in parsed.keys.values_mut() {
285 encoded.zeroize();
286 }
287 return Err(AuthError::config(format!(
288 "AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE '{path}': current key id '{}' \
289 is not present in 'keys'",
290 parsed.current
291 )));
292 }
293
294 let mut keys = HashMap::with_capacity(parsed.keys.len());
303 let mut first_error = None;
304 for (id, mut encoded) in parsed.keys {
305 match decode_key(&encoded) {
306 Ok(key) => {
307 keys.insert(id, key);
308 }
309 Err(e) if first_error.is_none() => {
310 first_error = Some(e);
311 }
312 Err(_) => {}
313 }
314 encoded.zeroize();
315 }
316
317 if let Some(error) = first_error {
318 for key_bytes in keys.values_mut() {
319 key_bytes.zeroize();
320 }
321 return Err(error);
322 }
323
324 Ok(LoadedKeys {
325 current_key_id: parsed.current,
326 keys,
327 })
328 }
329}
330
331const STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV: &str = "AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS";
334
335#[cfg_attr(not(unix), allow(dead_code))]
338fn keys_file_mode_too_open(mode: u32) -> bool {
339 mode & 0o077 != 0
340}
341
342fn strict_permissions_requested() -> bool {
343 env::var(STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV)
344 .map(|value| {
345 matches!(
346 value.trim().to_ascii_lowercase().as_str(),
347 "1" | "true" | "yes"
348 )
349 })
350 .unwrap_or(false)
351}
352
353fn check_keys_file_permissions(path: &str, strict: bool) -> Result<()> {
362 #[cfg(unix)]
363 {
364 use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
365 if let Ok(metadata) = fs::metadata(path) {
366 let mode = metadata.permissions().mode();
367 if keys_file_mode_too_open(mode) {
368 if strict {
369 return Err(AuthError::config(format!(
370 "AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE '{path}' has mode {:o}: it is \
371 accessible to group or other. Restrict it to the owner (chmod 600) \
372 or unset {STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV}.",
373 mode & 0o777
374 )));
375 }
376 tracing::warn!(
377 path = path,
378 mode = format!("{mode:o}"),
379 "AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE is readable by group or other -- \
380 restrict it to the owner only (chmod 600), or set \
381 {STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV}=1 to make this fatal."
382 );
383 }
384 }
385 }
386 #[cfg(not(unix))]
387 {
388 let _ = path;
389 if strict {
390 tracing::warn!(
391 "{STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV} is set but key-file permissions cannot be \
392 inspected on this platform; it is not enforced."
393 );
394 }
395 }
396 Ok(())
397}
398
399pub(crate) fn env_key_source_in_use() -> bool {
405 env::var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE").is_err()
406 && env::var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY").is_ok()
407}
408
409pub(crate) async fn stored_envelopes_exist<S: AuthStorage + ?Sized>(
413 storage: &S,
414 limit: usize,
415) -> Result<bool> {
416 for key in storage.list_kv_keys("").await?.into_iter().take(limit) {
417 if let Some(raw) = storage.get_kv(&key).await?
418 && StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(&raw)
419 {
420 return Ok(true);
421 }
422 }
423 Ok(false)
424}
425
426fn safe_log_id(key: &str) -> String {
444 use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
445 let hash_hex = hex::encode(&Sha256::digest(key.as_bytes())[..8]);
446 match key.split_once(':') {
447 Some((namespace, _)) => format!("{namespace}:{hash_hex}"),
448 None => format!("key:{hash_hex}"),
449 }
450}
451
452fn decode_key(encoded: &str) -> Result<[u8; 32]> {
453 let mut key_bytes = BASE64
454 .decode(encoded)
455 .map_err(|_| AuthError::config("Invalid base64 in storage encryption key"))?;
456 if key_bytes.len() != 32 {
457 key_bytes.zeroize();
458 return Err(AuthError::config(
459 "Storage encryption key must be 32 bytes (256 bits) once base64-decoded",
460 ));
461 }
462 let mut key = [0u8; 32];
463 key.copy_from_slice(&key_bytes);
464 key_bytes.zeroize();
465 Ok(key)
466}
467
468pub struct StorageEncryption {
513 current_key_id: String,
514 ciphers: HashMap<String, Aes256Gcm>,
515}
516
517impl StorageEncryption {
518 pub fn new(provider: &dyn KeyProvider) -> Result<Self> {
522 let mut loaded = provider.load_keys()?;
523
524 let validation_error = if loaded.current_key_id.is_empty() {
529 Some(AuthError::config(
530 "Key provider's current_key_id must not be empty",
531 ))
532 } else if loaded.keys.keys().any(|id| id.is_empty()) {
533 Some(AuthError::config(
534 "Key provider returned a key with an empty id -- an empty id is reserved \
535 to mean \"format-version-0 envelope, no key id at all\"",
536 ))
537 } else if !loaded.keys.contains_key(&loaded.current_key_id) {
538 Some(AuthError::config(format!(
539 "Key provider's current_key_id '{}' is not among the keys it loaded",
540 loaded.current_key_id
541 )))
542 } else {
543 None
544 };
545
546 if let Some(error) = validation_error {
547 for key_bytes in loaded.keys.values_mut() {
548 key_bytes.zeroize();
549 }
550 return Err(error);
551 }
552
553 let ciphers = loaded
554 .keys
555 .iter()
556 .map(|(id, key_bytes)| {
557 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(key_bytes);
558 (id.clone(), Aes256Gcm::new(key))
559 })
560 .collect();
561 for key_bytes in loaded.keys.values_mut() {
565 key_bytes.zeroize();
566 }
567 Ok(Self {
568 current_key_id: loaded.current_key_id,
569 ciphers,
570 })
571 }
572
573 pub fn from_env() -> Result<Self> {
576 Self::new(&EnvKeyProvider)
577 }
578
579 #[cfg(test)]
581 pub fn new_random() -> Self {
582 use rand::Rng;
583 let mut key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
584 rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key_bytes);
585 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&key_bytes);
586 let mut ciphers = HashMap::new();
587 ciphers.insert("test".to_string(), Aes256Gcm::new(key));
588 key_bytes.zeroize();
589 Self {
590 current_key_id: "test".to_string(),
591 ciphers,
592 }
593 }
594
595 pub fn generate_key() -> String {
598 use rand::Rng;
599 let mut key_bytes = [0u8; 32];
600 rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut key_bytes);
601 let encoded = BASE64.encode(key_bytes);
602 key_bytes.zeroize();
603 encoded
604 }
605
606 pub fn encrypt(&self, plaintext: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result<EncryptedData> {
611 use rand::Rng;
612 let cipher = self.ciphers.get(&self.current_key_id).ok_or_else(|| {
613 AuthError::internal("Current encryption key missing from loaded cipher set")
614 })?;
615
616 let mut nonce_bytes = [0u8; 12];
624 rand::rng().fill_bytes(&mut nonce_bytes);
625 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
626
627 let bound = bound_aad(CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION, ALGORITHM, &self.current_key_id, aad);
628 let ciphertext = cipher
629 .encrypt(
630 nonce,
631 Payload {
632 msg: plaintext,
633 aad: &bound,
634 },
635 )
636 .map_err(|e| AuthError::internal(format!("Encryption failed: {}", e)))?;
637
638 Ok(EncryptedData {
639 data: BASE64.encode(&ciphertext),
640 nonce: BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes),
641 algorithm: ALGORITHM.to_string(),
642 key_id: self.current_key_id.clone(),
643 v: CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION,
644 key_derivation: String::new(),
645 })
646 }
647
648 pub fn decrypt(&self, encrypted: &EncryptedData, aad: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
659 let fail = |why: &str| -> AuthError {
662 tracing::warn!(
665 key_id = ?encrypted.key_id.chars().take(64).collect::<String>(),
666 v = encrypted.v,
667 "storage envelope decryption failed: {why}"
668 );
669 AuthError::internal(DECRYPT_FAILED)
670 };
671
672 if encrypted.algorithm != ALGORITHM {
673 return Err(fail("unsupported algorithm"));
674 }
675
676 let ciphertext = BASE64
677 .decode(&encrypted.data)
678 .map_err(|_| fail("invalid base64 in data"))?;
679 let nonce_bytes = BASE64
680 .decode(&encrypted.nonce)
681 .map_err(|_| fail("invalid base64 in nonce"))?;
682 if nonce_bytes.len() != 12 {
683 return Err(fail("invalid nonce length"));
684 }
685 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
686
687 if encrypted.v == 0 {
688 for id in self.sorted_key_ids() {
692 if let Some(cipher) = self.ciphers.get(&id)
693 && let Ok(plaintext) = cipher.decrypt(
694 nonce,
695 Payload {
696 msg: &ciphertext,
697 aad: b"",
698 },
699 )
700 {
701 return Ok(plaintext);
702 }
703 }
704 return Err(fail("no loaded key opens this format-version-0 envelope"));
705 }
706
707 let cipher = self
708 .ciphers
709 .get(&encrypted.key_id)
710 .ok_or_else(|| fail("no loaded key for this key_id (rotated out?)"))?;
711
712 let bound;
715 let effective_aad: &[u8] = match encrypted.v {
716 FORMAT_V1 => aad,
717 CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION => {
718 bound = bound_aad(encrypted.v, &encrypted.algorithm, &encrypted.key_id, aad);
719 &bound
720 }
721 _ => return Err(fail("unsupported envelope version")),
722 };
723
724 cipher
725 .decrypt(
726 nonce,
727 Payload {
728 msg: &ciphertext,
729 aad: effective_aad,
730 },
731 )
732 .map_err(|_| fail("authentication failed (wrong key, wrong record, or tampered)"))
733 }
734
735 pub fn encrypt_for_storage(&self, data: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
739 let encrypted = self.encrypt(data, aad)?;
740 let serialized = serde_json::to_string(&encrypted).map_err(|e| {
741 AuthError::internal(format!("Failed to serialize encrypted data: {}", e))
742 })?;
743 Ok(serialized.into_bytes())
744 }
745
746 pub fn decrypt_from_storage(&self, data: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
749 let parsed = std::str::from_utf8(data)
752 .map_err(|e| e.to_string())
753 .and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<EncryptedData>(s).map_err(|e| e.to_string()));
754 let encrypted = parsed.map_err(|why| {
755 tracing::warn!("stored value is not a readable envelope: {why}");
756 AuthError::internal(DECRYPT_FAILED)
757 })?;
758 self.decrypt(&encrypted, aad)
759 }
760
761 pub fn parse_envelope(data: &[u8]) -> Option<EncryptedData> {
772 let encrypted = std::str::from_utf8(data)
773 .ok()
774 .and_then(|s| serde_json::from_str::<EncryptedData>(s).ok())?;
775 if encrypted.algorithm != ALGORITHM {
776 return None;
777 }
778 let well_formed = if encrypted.v == 0 {
782 encrypted.key_id.is_empty()
783 } else {
784 !encrypted.key_id.is_empty()
785 };
786 well_formed.then_some(encrypted)
787 }
788
789 fn sorted_key_ids(&self) -> Vec<String> {
792 let mut ids: Vec<String> = self.ciphers.keys().cloned().collect();
793 ids.sort();
794 ids
795 }
796
797 pub fn looks_like_envelope(data: &[u8]) -> bool {
802 Self::parse_envelope(data).is_some()
803 }
804}
805
806pub struct EncryptedStorage<T> {
819 inner: T,
820 encryption: StorageEncryption,
821 allow_plaintext_reads: bool,
823 allow_legacy_v0: bool,
825}
826
827impl<T> EncryptedStorage<T> {
828 pub fn new(
851 storage: T,
852 encryption: StorageEncryption,
853 allow_plaintext_reads: bool,
854 allow_legacy_v0: bool,
855 ) -> Self {
856 Self {
857 inner: storage,
858 encryption,
859 allow_plaintext_reads,
860 allow_legacy_v0,
861 }
862 }
863
864 pub fn into_inner(self) -> T {
865 self.inner
866 }
867}
868
869#[async_trait::async_trait]
870impl<T> AuthStorage for EncryptedStorage<T>
871where
872 T: AuthStorage + Send + Sync,
873{
874 async fn store_token(&self, token: &AuthToken) -> Result<()> {
877 self.inner.store_token(token).await
878 }
879
880 async fn get_token(&self, token_id: &str) -> Result<Option<AuthToken>> {
881 self.inner.get_token(token_id).await
882 }
883
884 async fn get_token_by_access_token(&self, access_token: &str) -> Result<Option<AuthToken>> {
885 self.inner.get_token_by_access_token(access_token).await
886 }
887
888 async fn update_token(&self, token: &AuthToken) -> Result<()> {
889 self.inner.update_token(token).await
890 }
891
892 async fn delete_token(&self, token_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
893 self.inner.delete_token(token_id).await
894 }
895
896 async fn list_user_tokens(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<Vec<AuthToken>> {
897 self.inner.list_user_tokens(user_id).await
898 }
899
900 async fn store_session(&self, session_id: &str, data: &SessionData) -> Result<()> {
901 self.inner.store_session(session_id, data).await
902 }
903
904 async fn get_session(&self, session_id: &str) -> Result<Option<SessionData>> {
905 self.inner.get_session(session_id).await
906 }
907
908 async fn delete_session(&self, session_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
909 self.inner.delete_session(session_id).await
910 }
911
912 async fn list_user_sessions(&self, user_id: &str) -> Result<Vec<SessionData>> {
913 self.inner.list_user_sessions(user_id).await
914 }
915
916 async fn count_active_sessions(&self) -> Result<u64> {
917 self.inner.count_active_sessions().await
918 }
919
920 async fn store_tokens_bulk(&self, tokens: &[AuthToken]) -> Result<()> {
926 self.inner.store_tokens_bulk(tokens).await
927 }
928
929 async fn delete_tokens_bulk(&self, token_ids: &[String]) -> Result<()> {
930 self.inner.delete_tokens_bulk(token_ids).await
931 }
932
933 async fn store_sessions_bulk(&self, sessions: &[(String, SessionData)]) -> Result<()> {
934 self.inner.store_sessions_bulk(sessions).await
935 }
936
937 async fn delete_sessions_bulk(&self, session_ids: &[String]) -> Result<()> {
938 self.inner.delete_sessions_bulk(session_ids).await
939 }
940
941 async fn get_kv_ttl(&self, key: &str) -> Result<Option<Duration>> {
944 self.inner.get_kv_ttl(key).await
946 }
947
948 async fn store_kv(&self, key: &str, value: &[u8], ttl: Option<Duration>) -> Result<()> {
949 let encrypted_value = self.encryption.encrypt_for_storage(value, key.as_bytes())?;
950 self.inner.store_kv(key, &encrypted_value, ttl).await
951 }
952
953 async fn get_kv(&self, key: &str) -> Result<Option<Vec<u8>>> {
969 let Some(raw) = self.inner.get_kv(key).await? else {
970 return Ok(None);
971 };
972
973 if let Some(envelope) = StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(&raw) {
974 if envelope.v < CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION && !self.allow_legacy_v0 {
975 return Err(AuthError::internal(format!(
976 "Value for record '{}' uses legacy envelope format version {} (its \
977 metadata is not bound into the authenticated data), and \
978 storage_encryption.allow_legacy_v0 is false. Run the migration tool \
979 (`auth-framework-admin security encrypt-kv --accept-legacy-v0`) to \
980 upgrade it to the current format, or temporarily set \
981 storage_encryption.allow_legacy_v0 = true if something else needs to \
982 read it first.",
983 safe_log_id(key),
984 envelope.v
985 )));
986 }
987 let decrypted = self.encryption.decrypt(&envelope, key.as_bytes())?;
988 return Ok(Some(decrypted));
989 }
990
991 if self.allow_plaintext_reads {
992 return Ok(Some(raw));
993 }
994
995 Err(AuthError::internal(format!(
996 "Value for record '{}' is not a valid encrypted envelope, and \
997 storage_encryption.allow_plaintext_reads is false. If this key genuinely \
998 predates encryption being enabled, run the migration tool \
999 (`auth-framework-admin security encrypt-kv`) or temporarily set \
1000 storage_encryption.allow_plaintext_reads = true while migrating.",
1001 safe_log_id(key)
1002 )))
1003 }
1004
1005 fn tracks_kv_ttl(&self) -> bool {
1006 self.inner.tracks_kv_ttl()
1008 }
1009
1010 fn encrypts_kv_at_rest(&self) -> bool {
1011 true
1012 }
1013
1014 async fn delete_kv(&self, key: &str) -> Result<()> {
1015 self.inner.delete_kv(key).await
1016 }
1017
1018 async fn list_kv_keys(&self, prefix: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>> {
1024 self.inner.list_kv_keys(prefix).await
1025 }
1026
1027 async fn cleanup_expired(&self) -> Result<()> {
1028 self.inner.cleanup_expired().await
1029 }
1030}
1031
1032#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, PartialEq, Eq)]
1040#[non_exhaustive]
1041pub struct KvEncryptionMigrationReport {
1042 pub dry_run: bool,
1044 pub scanned: u64,
1048 pub already_encrypted: u64,
1051 pub legacy_v0_found: u64,
1061 pub upgraded_from_legacy: u64,
1067 pub encrypted: u64,
1070 pub vanished: u64,
1073 pub failed: Vec<String>,
1084}
1085
1086#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, Default)]
1091#[non_exhaustive]
1092pub struct MigrationOptions {
1093 pub dry_run: bool,
1098 pub accept_legacy_v0: bool,
1103 pub accept_ttl_loss: bool,
1107}
1108
1109impl MigrationOptions {
1110 pub fn with_accept_ttl_loss(mut self, accept_ttl_loss: bool) -> Self {
1112 self.accept_ttl_loss = accept_ttl_loss;
1113 self
1114 }
1115
1116 pub fn with_dry_run(mut self, dry_run: bool) -> Self {
1122 self.dry_run = dry_run;
1123 self
1124 }
1125
1126 pub fn with_accept_legacy_v0(mut self, accept_legacy_v0: bool) -> Self {
1129 self.accept_legacy_v0 = accept_legacy_v0;
1130 self
1131 }
1132}
1133
1134pub async fn migrate_kv_to_encrypted<S: AuthStorage + ?Sized>(
1207 storage: &S,
1208 encryption: &StorageEncryption,
1209 prefix: &str,
1210 options: MigrationOptions,
1211) -> Result<KvEncryptionMigrationReport> {
1212 let MigrationOptions {
1213 dry_run,
1214 accept_legacy_v0,
1215 accept_ttl_loss,
1216 } = options;
1217
1218 if !dry_run && !accept_ttl_loss && !storage.tracks_kv_ttl() {
1222 return Err(AuthError::validation(
1223 "This storage backend does not report KV TTLs, so migrating would make every \
1224 expiring entry (OAuth codes, MFA/SMS codes, rate-limit windows, expiring API \
1225 keys, ...) permanent. Scope the prefix to durable secrets and pass \
1226 accept_ttl_loss (CLI: --accept-ttl-loss) to proceed anyway.",
1227 ));
1228 }
1229 let mut report = KvEncryptionMigrationReport {
1230 dry_run,
1231 ..Default::default()
1232 };
1233
1234 let keys = storage.list_kv_keys(prefix).await?;
1235 report.scanned = keys.len() as u64;
1236
1237 for key in keys {
1238 let ttl = storage.get_kv_ttl(&key).await?;
1242 let Some(mut raw) = storage.get_kv(&key).await? else {
1243 report.vanished += 1;
1245 continue;
1246 };
1247
1248 if let Some(envelope) = StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(&raw) {
1249 if envelope.v >= CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION {
1250 report.already_encrypted += 1;
1251 continue;
1252 }
1253
1254 match encryption.decrypt(&envelope, key.as_bytes()) {
1258 Err(_) => {
1259 tracing::warn!(
1260 record = %safe_log_id(&key),
1261 "migrate_kv_to_encrypted: could not decrypt format-version-0 \
1262 envelope with any loaded key -- skipping, not aborting the rest \
1263 of the run"
1264 );
1265 report.failed.push(safe_log_id(&key));
1266 }
1267 Ok(mut plaintext) => {
1268 report.legacy_v0_found += 1;
1269 if !dry_run && accept_legacy_v0 {
1270 if envelope.v == 0 {
1271 tracing::warn!(
1272 record = %safe_log_id(&key),
1273 "migrate_kv_to_encrypted: upgrading format-version-0 \
1274 envelope to the current format -- v0 has no AAD, so this \
1275 plaintext's association with this specific key was not \
1276 cryptographically verified by this upgrade"
1277 );
1278 } else {
1279 tracing::info!(
1280 record = %safe_log_id(&key),
1281 v = envelope.v,
1282 "migrate_kv_to_encrypted: upgrading legacy envelope to the \
1283 current format (its AAD bound the record key)"
1284 );
1285 }
1286 let encrypt_result =
1287 encryption.encrypt_for_storage(&plaintext, key.as_bytes());
1288 plaintext.zeroize();
1289 let new_envelope = encrypt_result?;
1290 storage.store_kv(&key, &new_envelope, ttl).await?;
1291 report.upgraded_from_legacy += 1;
1292 } else {
1293 plaintext.zeroize();
1294 }
1295 }
1296 }
1297 continue;
1298 }
1299
1300 report.encrypted += 1;
1301 if !dry_run {
1302 let encrypt_result = encryption.encrypt_for_storage(&raw, key.as_bytes());
1303 raw.zeroize();
1304 let envelope = encrypt_result?;
1305 storage.store_kv(&key, &envelope, ttl).await?;
1306 } else {
1307 raw.zeroize();
1308 }
1309 }
1310
1311 Ok(report)
1312}
1313
1314#[cfg(test)]
1315mod tests {
1316 use super::*;
1317 use crate::storage::MemoryStorage;
1318
1319 #[test]
1320 fn test_key_generation() {
1321 let key = StorageEncryption::generate_key();
1322 assert!(!key.is_empty());
1323 let decoded = BASE64.decode(&key).unwrap();
1324 assert_eq!(decoded.len(), 32);
1325 }
1326
1327 #[test]
1328 fn test_encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip() {
1329 let enc = StorageEncryption::new_random();
1330 let plaintext = b"super secret totp seed, not utf8 safe either: \xff\xfe";
1331 let encrypted = enc.encrypt(plaintext, b"user:alice:totp_secret").unwrap();
1332 let decrypted = enc.decrypt(&encrypted, b"user:alice:totp_secret").unwrap();
1333 assert_eq!(decrypted, plaintext);
1334 }
1335
1336 #[test]
1342 fn test_decrypt_rejects_wrong_aad() {
1343 let enc = StorageEncryption::new_random();
1344 let encrypted = enc
1345 .encrypt(b"alice's secret", b"user:alice:totp_secret")
1346 .unwrap();
1347 let result = enc.decrypt(&encrypted, b"user:bob:totp_secret");
1348 assert!(
1349 result.is_err(),
1350 "decrypting with the wrong AAD (a different record's key) must fail"
1351 );
1352 }
1353
1354 #[test]
1358 fn test_nonces_are_unique_across_many_encryptions() {
1359 let enc = StorageEncryption::new_random();
1360 let mut seen = std::collections::HashSet::new();
1361 for _ in 0..1000 {
1362 let encrypted = enc
1363 .encrypt(b"same plaintext every time", b"same:aad")
1364 .unwrap();
1365 assert_eq!(
1366 BASE64.decode(&encrypted.nonce).unwrap().len(),
1367 12,
1368 "nonce must be 96 bits"
1369 );
1370 assert!(
1371 seen.insert(encrypted.nonce.clone()),
1372 "nonce reused across encryptions -- this breaks AES-GCM's security guarantee"
1373 );
1374 }
1375 }
1376
1377 #[test]
1378 fn test_storage_roundtrip_non_utf8_bytes() {
1379 let enc = StorageEncryption::new_random();
1380 let raw_salt: &[u8] = &[0xDE, 0xAD, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0x00, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x81];
1381 let stored = enc.encrypt_for_storage(raw_salt, b"salt:key").unwrap();
1382 let restored = enc.decrypt_from_storage(&stored, b"salt:key").unwrap();
1383 assert_eq!(restored, raw_salt);
1384 }
1385
1386 struct EmptyKeyProvider;
1390 impl KeyProvider for EmptyKeyProvider {
1391 fn load_keys(&self) -> Result<LoadedKeys> {
1392 Err(AuthError::config("no key configured (test)"))
1393 }
1394 }
1395
1396 #[test]
1397 fn test_construction_fails_closed_with_no_key() {
1398 let result = StorageEncryption::new(&EmptyKeyProvider);
1399 assert!(
1400 result.is_err(),
1401 "StorageEncryption::new must fail, not silently construct an unusable/no-op encryptor"
1402 );
1403 }
1404
1405 struct FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys);
1406 impl KeyProvider for FixedKeyProvider {
1407 fn load_keys(&self) -> Result<LoadedKeys> {
1408 Ok(LoadedKeys {
1409 current_key_id: self.0.current_key_id.clone(),
1410 keys: self.0.keys.clone(),
1411 })
1412 }
1413 }
1414
1415 #[test]
1416 fn test_construction_rejects_empty_key_id() {
1417 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1423 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [1u8; 32]);
1424 keys.insert(String::new(), [2u8; 32]);
1425 let result = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1426 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1427 keys,
1428 }));
1429 assert!(
1430 result.is_err(),
1431 "an empty key id anywhere in the loaded key set must be rejected (it's reserved \
1432 for format-version-0 envelopes), even when current_key_id itself is valid"
1433 );
1434 }
1435
1436 struct TwoKeyProvider {
1440 current_id: String,
1441 old_key: [u8; 32],
1442 new_key: [u8; 32],
1443 old_id: String,
1444 }
1445 impl KeyProvider for TwoKeyProvider {
1446 fn load_keys(&self) -> Result<LoadedKeys> {
1447 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1448 keys.insert(self.old_id.clone(), self.old_key);
1449 keys.insert(self.current_id.clone(), self.new_key);
1450 Ok(LoadedKeys {
1451 current_key_id: self.current_id.clone(),
1452 keys,
1453 })
1454 }
1455 }
1456
1457 #[test]
1458 fn test_old_key_still_decrypts_after_rotation() {
1459 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1460 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [7u8; 32]);
1461 let enc_before_rotation = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1462 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1463 keys,
1464 }))
1465 .unwrap();
1466 let old_envelope = enc_before_rotation
1467 .encrypt(b"written before rotation", b"some:key")
1468 .unwrap();
1469 assert_eq!(old_envelope.key_id, "1");
1470
1471 let provider = TwoKeyProvider {
1473 current_id: "2".to_string(),
1474 old_id: "1".to_string(),
1475 old_key: [7u8; 32],
1476 new_key: [9u8; 32],
1477 };
1478 let enc_after_rotation = StorageEncryption::new(&provider).unwrap();
1479
1480 let new_envelope = enc_after_rotation
1482 .encrypt(b"written after rotation", b"some:key")
1483 .unwrap();
1484 assert_eq!(new_envelope.key_id, "2");
1485
1486 let decrypted_old = enc_after_rotation
1488 .decrypt(&old_envelope, b"some:key")
1489 .unwrap();
1490 assert_eq!(decrypted_old, b"written before rotation");
1491 }
1492
1493 #[test]
1499 fn test_decrypts_format_version_0_envelope() {
1500 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1501 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [3u8; 32]);
1502 let enc = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1503 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1504 keys,
1505 }))
1506 .unwrap();
1507
1508 let cipher = {
1511 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&[3u8; 32]);
1512 Aes256Gcm::new(key)
1513 };
1514 let nonce_bytes = [5u8; 12];
1515 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
1516 let ciphertext = cipher
1517 .encrypt(nonce, b"legacy-format plaintext".as_ref())
1518 .unwrap();
1519 let legacy_json = format!(
1520 r#"{{"data":"{}","nonce":"{}","algorithm":"AES-256-GCM","key_derivation":"direct"}}"#,
1521 BASE64.encode(&ciphertext),
1522 BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes)
1523 );
1524
1525 assert!(StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(
1526 legacy_json.as_bytes()
1527 ));
1528 let decrypted = enc
1529 .decrypt_from_storage(legacy_json.as_bytes(), b"irrelevant-for-v0")
1530 .unwrap();
1531 assert_eq!(decrypted, b"legacy-format plaintext".to_vec());
1532 }
1533
1534 #[tokio::test]
1544 async fn test_wrapper_rejects_v1_envelope_downgraded_to_look_like_v0() {
1545 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1546 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [4u8; 32]);
1547 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1548 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1549 keys,
1550 }))
1551 .unwrap();
1552
1553 let inner = MemoryStorage::new();
1554 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(inner, encryption, false, false);
1555
1556 wrapped
1557 .store_kv("user:alice:totp_secret", b"real secret", None)
1558 .await
1559 .unwrap();
1560
1561 let inner = wrapped.into_inner();
1562 let real_envelope: EncryptedData = serde_json::from_slice(
1563 &inner
1564 .get_kv("user:alice:totp_secret")
1565 .await
1566 .unwrap()
1567 .unwrap(),
1568 )
1569 .unwrap();
1570
1571 let downgraded_json = serde_json::json!({
1574 "data": real_envelope.data,
1575 "nonce": real_envelope.nonce,
1576 "algorithm": real_envelope.algorithm,
1577 })
1578 .to_string();
1579 inner
1580 .store_kv("user:alice:totp_secret", downgraded_json.as_bytes(), None)
1581 .await
1582 .unwrap();
1583
1584 let mut keys2 = HashMap::new();
1585 keys2.insert("1".to_string(), [4u8; 32]);
1586 let encryption2 = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1587 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1588 keys: keys2,
1589 }))
1590 .unwrap();
1591 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(inner, encryption2, false, false);
1592
1593 let result = wrapped.get_kv("user:alice:totp_secret").await;
1594 assert!(
1595 result.is_err(),
1596 "a v1 envelope downgraded to look like v0 must not be accepted as the record's \
1597 value, with allow_legacy_v0 at its default (false)"
1598 );
1599 }
1600
1601 #[tokio::test]
1602 async fn test_list_kv_keys_passes_through_unencrypted() {
1603 let inner = MemoryStorage::new();
1604 inner
1605 .store_kv("prefix:a", b"ignored by this test", None)
1606 .await
1607 .unwrap();
1608 inner
1609 .store_kv("prefix:b", b"ignored by this test", None)
1610 .await
1611 .unwrap();
1612 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(inner, StorageEncryption::new_random(), false, false);
1613
1614 let mut keys = wrapped.list_kv_keys("prefix:").await.unwrap();
1615 keys.sort();
1616 assert_eq!(
1617 keys,
1618 vec!["prefix:a".to_string(), "prefix:b".to_string()],
1619 "list_kv_keys must pass through to the inner backend, not use the trait's \
1620 empty-Vec default"
1621 );
1622 }
1623
1624 #[tokio::test]
1625 async fn test_encrypted_storage_roundtrip() {
1626 let inner = MemoryStorage::new();
1627 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(inner, StorageEncryption::new_random(), false, false);
1628
1629 wrapped
1630 .store_kv("user:alice:totp_secret", b"JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP", None)
1631 .await
1632 .unwrap();
1633 let value = wrapped.get_kv("user:alice:totp_secret").await.unwrap();
1634 assert_eq!(value, Some(b"JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP".to_vec()));
1635 }
1636
1637 #[tokio::test]
1641 async fn test_encrypted_storage_actually_encrypts_the_underlying_value() {
1642 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(
1643 MemoryStorage::new(),
1644 StorageEncryption::new_random(),
1645 false,
1646 false,
1647 );
1648
1649 wrapped
1650 .store_kv("user:alice:totp_secret", b"JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP", None)
1651 .await
1652 .unwrap();
1653
1654 let inner = wrapped.into_inner();
1655 let raw = inner
1656 .get_kv("user:alice:totp_secret")
1657 .await
1658 .unwrap()
1659 .unwrap();
1660 assert_ne!(
1661 raw,
1662 b"JBSWY3DPEHPK3PXP".to_vec(),
1663 "the underlying storage must not hold the plaintext value"
1664 );
1665 assert!(
1666 StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(&raw),
1667 "the underlying storage must hold a proper encrypted envelope"
1668 );
1669 }
1670
1671 #[tokio::test]
1679 async fn test_wrapper_rejects_ciphertext_swapped_between_records() {
1680 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1681 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [11u8; 32]);
1682 let loaded = LoadedKeys {
1683 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1684 keys,
1685 };
1686 let encryption_for_wrapper = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1687 current_key_id: loaded.current_key_id.clone(),
1688 keys: loaded.keys.clone(),
1689 }))
1690 .unwrap();
1691 let encryption_for_verification =
1695 StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(loaded)).unwrap();
1696
1697 let inner = MemoryStorage::new();
1698 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(inner, encryption_for_wrapper, false, false);
1699
1700 wrapped
1701 .store_kv("user:alice:totp_secret", b"alice-secret", None)
1702 .await
1703 .unwrap();
1704
1705 let inner = wrapped.into_inner();
1706 let raw = inner
1707 .get_kv("user:alice:totp_secret")
1708 .await
1709 .unwrap()
1710 .unwrap();
1711
1712 let decrypted = encryption_for_verification
1715 .decrypt(
1716 &serde_json::from_slice(&raw).unwrap(),
1717 b"user:alice:totp_secret",
1718 )
1719 .unwrap();
1720 assert_eq!(decrypted, b"alice-secret".to_vec());
1721
1722 let wrong_aad_result = encryption_for_verification.decrypt(
1727 &serde_json::from_slice(&raw).unwrap(),
1728 b"user:bob:totp_secret",
1729 );
1730 assert!(
1731 wrong_aad_result.is_err(),
1732 "the wrapper's envelope must not decrypt under a different record's key name -- \
1733 if it does, the wrapper is using a constant AAD instead of the real storage key"
1734 );
1735 }
1736
1737 #[tokio::test]
1742 async fn test_reads_legacy_plaintext_when_allowed() {
1743 let inner = MemoryStorage::new();
1744 inner
1745 .store_kv("legacy:key", b"pre-existing plaintext value", None)
1746 .await
1747 .unwrap();
1748 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(inner, StorageEncryption::new_random(), true, false);
1749
1750 let value = wrapped.get_kv("legacy:key").await.unwrap();
1751 assert_eq!(value, Some(b"pre-existing plaintext value".to_vec()));
1752 }
1753
1754 #[tokio::test]
1762 async fn test_rejects_non_envelope_value_when_plaintext_reads_disallowed() {
1763 let inner = MemoryStorage::new();
1764 inner
1765 .store_kv("user:alice:totp_secret", b"attacker-chosen-plaintext", None)
1766 .await
1767 .unwrap();
1768 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(inner, StorageEncryption::new_random(), false, false);
1769
1770 let result = wrapped.get_kv("user:alice:totp_secret").await;
1771 assert!(
1772 result.is_err(),
1773 "a non-envelope value must be rejected, not silently treated as plaintext, \
1774 when allow_plaintext_reads is false"
1775 );
1776 }
1777
1778 #[tokio::test]
1783 async fn test_migration_upgrades_v0_envelope_to_current_format() {
1784 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1785 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [6u8; 32]);
1786 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1787 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1788 keys,
1789 }))
1790 .unwrap();
1791
1792 let cipher = {
1795 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&[6u8; 32]);
1796 Aes256Gcm::new(key)
1797 };
1798 let nonce_bytes = [8u8; 12];
1799 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
1800 let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, b"v0 secret".as_ref()).unwrap();
1801 let v0_json = format!(
1802 r#"{{"data":"{}","nonce":"{}","algorithm":"AES-256-GCM","key_derivation":"direct"}}"#,
1803 BASE64.encode(&ciphertext),
1804 BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes)
1805 );
1806
1807 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
1808 storage
1809 .store_kv("secret:legacy", v0_json.as_bytes(), None)
1810 .await
1811 .unwrap();
1812
1813 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
1814 &storage,
1815 &encryption,
1816 "secret:",
1817 MigrationOptions {
1818 dry_run: false,
1819 accept_legacy_v0: true,
1820 ..Default::default()
1821 },
1822 )
1823 .await
1824 .unwrap();
1825 assert_eq!(
1826 report.legacy_v0_found, 1,
1827 "a decryptable v0 envelope must be counted as found"
1828 );
1829 assert_eq!(
1830 report.upgraded_from_legacy, 1,
1831 "with accept_legacy_v0 true on a real run, it must actually be upgraded"
1832 );
1833 assert_eq!(report.already_encrypted, 0);
1834 assert!(report.failed.is_empty());
1835
1836 let raw_after = storage.get_kv("secret:legacy").await.unwrap().unwrap();
1837 let envelope_after: EncryptedData = serde_json::from_slice(&raw_after).unwrap();
1838 assert_eq!(
1839 envelope_after.v, CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION,
1840 "the stored envelope must now be the current format, not still v0"
1841 );
1842 assert!(
1843 !envelope_after.key_id.is_empty(),
1844 "the upgraded envelope must have a real key_id"
1845 );
1846
1847 let decrypted = encryption
1850 .decrypt(&envelope_after, b"secret:legacy")
1851 .unwrap();
1852 assert_eq!(decrypted, b"v0 secret".to_vec());
1853
1854 let report2 = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
1856 &storage,
1857 &encryption,
1858 "secret:",
1859 MigrationOptions {
1860 dry_run: false,
1861 accept_legacy_v0: false,
1862 ..Default::default()
1863 },
1864 )
1865 .await
1866 .unwrap();
1867 assert_eq!(report2.upgraded_from_legacy, 0);
1868 assert_eq!(report2.already_encrypted, 1);
1869 }
1870
1871 #[tokio::test]
1876 async fn test_migration_does_not_upgrade_legacy_v0_without_accept_flag() {
1877 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1878 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [7u8; 32]);
1879 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1880 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1881 keys,
1882 }))
1883 .unwrap();
1884
1885 let cipher = {
1886 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&[7u8; 32]);
1887 Aes256Gcm::new(key)
1888 };
1889 let nonce_bytes = [3u8; 12];
1890 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
1891 let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, b"v0 secret".as_ref()).unwrap();
1892 let v0_json = format!(
1893 r#"{{"data":"{}","nonce":"{}","algorithm":"AES-256-GCM","key_derivation":"direct"}}"#,
1894 BASE64.encode(&ciphertext),
1895 BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes)
1896 );
1897
1898 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
1899 storage
1900 .store_kv("secret:legacy", v0_json.as_bytes(), None)
1901 .await
1902 .unwrap();
1903
1904 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
1906 &storage,
1907 &encryption,
1908 "secret:",
1909 MigrationOptions {
1910 dry_run: false,
1911 accept_legacy_v0: false,
1912 ..Default::default()
1913 },
1914 )
1915 .await
1916 .unwrap();
1917 assert_eq!(
1918 report.legacy_v0_found, 1,
1919 "the v0 envelope must still be detected/decrypted"
1920 );
1921 assert_eq!(
1922 report.upgraded_from_legacy, 0,
1923 "without accept_legacy_v0, nothing must actually be rewritten"
1924 );
1925
1926 let raw_after = storage.get_kv("secret:legacy").await.unwrap().unwrap();
1927 assert_eq!(
1928 raw_after,
1929 v0_json.as_bytes(),
1930 "the stored envelope must be byte-for-byte unchanged without accept_legacy_v0"
1931 );
1932 }
1933
1934 #[tokio::test]
1939 async fn test_migration_skips_undecryptable_v0_envelope_without_aborting() {
1940 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
1941 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [9u8; 32]);
1942 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
1943 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
1944 keys,
1945 }))
1946 .unwrap();
1947
1948 let bad_cipher = {
1951 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
1952 Aes256Gcm::new(key)
1953 };
1954 let nonce_bytes = [1u8; 12];
1955 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
1956 let bad_ciphertext = bad_cipher
1957 .encrypt(nonce, b"undecryptable".as_ref())
1958 .unwrap();
1959 let bad_v0_json = format!(
1960 r#"{{"data":"{}","nonce":"{}","algorithm":"AES-256-GCM","key_derivation":"direct"}}"#,
1961 BASE64.encode(&bad_ciphertext),
1962 BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes)
1963 );
1964
1965 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
1966 storage
1967 .store_kv("secret:bad", bad_v0_json.as_bytes(), None)
1968 .await
1969 .unwrap();
1970 storage
1971 .store_kv("secret:good_a", b"plaintext-a", None)
1972 .await
1973 .unwrap();
1974 storage
1975 .store_kv("secret:good_b", b"plaintext-b", None)
1976 .await
1977 .unwrap();
1978
1979 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
1980 &storage,
1981 &encryption,
1982 "secret:",
1983 MigrationOptions {
1984 dry_run: false,
1985 accept_legacy_v0: true,
1986 ..Default::default()
1987 },
1988 )
1989 .await
1990 .expect("one undecryptable record must not abort the whole migration");
1991
1992 assert_eq!(report.scanned, 3);
1993 assert_eq!(
1994 report.failed,
1995 vec![safe_log_id("secret:bad")],
1996 "the undecryptable record must be named (as a safe identifier, not the raw \
1997 key) in `failed`, not silently dropped"
1998 );
1999 assert_eq!(
2000 report.encrypted, 2,
2001 "the other two plaintext keys must still be processed despite the bad one"
2002 );
2003
2004 let good_a_after = storage.get_kv("secret:good_a").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2005 assert!(StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(&good_a_after));
2006 let good_b_after = storage.get_kv("secret:good_b").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2007 assert!(StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(&good_b_after));
2008
2009 let bad_after = storage.get_kv("secret:bad").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2011 assert_eq!(bad_after, bad_v0_json.as_bytes());
2012 }
2013
2014 #[tokio::test]
2019 async fn test_migration_dry_run_detects_undecryptable_v0_envelope() {
2020 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
2021 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [5u8; 32]);
2022 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
2023 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
2024 keys,
2025 }))
2026 .unwrap();
2027
2028 let bad_cipher = {
2029 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&[0u8; 32]);
2030 Aes256Gcm::new(key)
2031 };
2032 let nonce_bytes = [2u8; 12];
2033 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
2034 let bad_ciphertext = bad_cipher
2035 .encrypt(nonce, b"undecryptable".as_ref())
2036 .unwrap();
2037 let bad_v0_json = format!(
2038 r#"{{"data":"{}","nonce":"{}","algorithm":"AES-256-GCM","key_derivation":"direct"}}"#,
2039 BASE64.encode(&bad_ciphertext),
2040 BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes)
2041 );
2042
2043 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2044 storage
2045 .store_kv("secret:bad", bad_v0_json.as_bytes(), None)
2046 .await
2047 .unwrap();
2048
2049 let dry_report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2050 &storage,
2051 &encryption,
2052 "secret:",
2053 MigrationOptions {
2054 dry_run: true,
2055 accept_legacy_v0: true,
2056 ..Default::default()
2057 },
2058 )
2059 .await
2060 .unwrap();
2061 assert_eq!(
2062 dry_report.failed,
2063 vec![safe_log_id("secret:bad")],
2064 "a dry run must actually attempt the decrypt and report the same failure a \
2065 real run would, not optimistically assume every v0 envelope would succeed"
2066 );
2067 assert_eq!(dry_report.upgraded_from_legacy, 0);
2068 assert_eq!(dry_report.legacy_v0_found, 0);
2069 }
2070
2071 #[test]
2076 fn test_safe_log_id_never_contains_the_raw_secret() {
2077 let raw_secret = "ak_live_super_secret_bearer_token_12345";
2078 let key = format!("api_key:{raw_secret}");
2079 let id = safe_log_id(&key);
2080
2081 assert!(
2082 !id.contains(raw_secret),
2083 "safe_log_id must never contain the raw secret portion of the key, got: {id}"
2084 );
2085 assert!(
2086 id.starts_with("api_key:"),
2087 "safe_log_id should keep the (non-secret) namespace prefix, got: {id}"
2088 );
2089 assert_eq!(id, safe_log_id(&key));
2093 }
2094
2095 #[test]
2100 fn test_safe_log_id_handles_colonless_key_without_leaking_it() {
2101 let raw_secret = "a_bearer_token_with_no_colon_in_it_at_all";
2102 let id = safe_log_id(raw_secret);
2103
2104 assert!(
2105 !id.contains(raw_secret),
2106 "a colonless key must not appear verbatim in its safe_log_id, got: {id}"
2107 );
2108 assert!(
2109 id.starts_with("key:"),
2110 "a colonless key should fall back to the literal 'key:' prefix, got: {id}"
2111 );
2112 }
2113
2114 #[tokio::test]
2121 async fn test_dry_run_with_accept_legacy_v0_does_not_write_a_decryptable_v0_record() {
2122 let mut keys = HashMap::new();
2123 keys.insert("1".to_string(), [4u8; 32]);
2124 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeyProvider(LoadedKeys {
2125 current_key_id: "1".to_string(),
2126 keys,
2127 }))
2128 .unwrap();
2129
2130 let cipher = {
2131 let key = Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(&[4u8; 32]);
2132 Aes256Gcm::new(key)
2133 };
2134 let nonce_bytes = [6u8; 12];
2135 let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
2136 let ciphertext = cipher.encrypt(nonce, b"v0 secret".as_ref()).unwrap();
2137 let v0_json = format!(
2138 r#"{{"data":"{}","nonce":"{}","algorithm":"AES-256-GCM","key_derivation":"direct"}}"#,
2139 BASE64.encode(&ciphertext),
2140 BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes)
2141 );
2142
2143 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2144 storage
2145 .store_kv("secret:legacy", v0_json.as_bytes(), None)
2146 .await
2147 .unwrap();
2148
2149 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2151 &storage,
2152 &encryption,
2153 "secret:",
2154 MigrationOptions {
2155 dry_run: true,
2156 accept_legacy_v0: true,
2157 ..Default::default()
2158 },
2159 )
2160 .await
2161 .unwrap();
2162
2163 assert_eq!(
2164 report.legacy_v0_found, 1,
2165 "a dry run must still report a decryptable v0 record as found"
2166 );
2167 assert_eq!(
2168 report.upgraded_from_legacy, 0,
2169 "a dry run must never actually upgrade anything, even with accept_legacy_v0 true"
2170 );
2171
2172 let raw_after = storage.get_kv("secret:legacy").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2173 assert_eq!(
2174 raw_after,
2175 v0_json.as_bytes(),
2176 "a dry run with accept_legacy_v0 true must leave the record byte-for-byte \
2177 unchanged"
2178 );
2179 }
2180
2181 #[tokio::test]
2182 async fn test_migration_dry_run_reports_without_writing() {
2183 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2184 storage
2185 .store_kv("secret:a", b"plaintext-a", None)
2186 .await
2187 .unwrap();
2188 storage
2189 .store_kv("secret:b", b"plaintext-b", None)
2190 .await
2191 .unwrap();
2192 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new_random();
2193
2194 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2195 &storage,
2196 &encryption,
2197 "secret:",
2198 MigrationOptions {
2199 dry_run: true,
2200 accept_legacy_v0: false,
2201 ..Default::default()
2202 },
2203 )
2204 .await
2205 .unwrap();
2206
2207 assert!(report.dry_run);
2208 assert_eq!(report.scanned, 2);
2209 assert_eq!(report.encrypted, 2);
2210 assert_eq!(report.already_encrypted, 0);
2211
2212 let still_plaintext = storage.get_kv("secret:a").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2214 assert_eq!(still_plaintext, b"plaintext-a".to_vec());
2215 }
2216
2217 #[tokio::test]
2218 async fn test_migration_encrypts_plaintext_values() {
2219 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2220 storage
2221 .store_kv("secret:a", b"plaintext-a", None)
2222 .await
2223 .unwrap();
2224 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new_random();
2225
2226 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2227 &storage,
2228 &encryption,
2229 "secret:",
2230 MigrationOptions {
2231 dry_run: false,
2232 accept_legacy_v0: false,
2233 ..Default::default()
2234 },
2235 )
2236 .await
2237 .unwrap();
2238 assert_eq!(report.encrypted, 1);
2239
2240 let raw = storage.get_kv("secret:a").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2241 assert!(StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(&raw));
2242 let decrypted = encryption.decrypt_from_storage(&raw, b"secret:a").unwrap();
2243 assert_eq!(decrypted, b"plaintext-a".to_vec());
2244 }
2245
2246 #[tokio::test]
2251 async fn test_migration_is_idempotent_and_resumable() {
2252 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2253 storage
2254 .store_kv("secret:a", b"plaintext-a", None)
2255 .await
2256 .unwrap();
2257 storage
2258 .store_kv("secret:b", b"plaintext-b", None)
2259 .await
2260 .unwrap();
2261 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new_random();
2262
2263 let envelope_a = encryption
2266 .encrypt_for_storage(b"plaintext-a", b"secret:a")
2267 .unwrap();
2268 storage
2269 .store_kv("secret:a", &envelope_a, None)
2270 .await
2271 .unwrap();
2272
2273 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2276 &storage,
2277 &encryption,
2278 "secret:",
2279 MigrationOptions {
2280 dry_run: false,
2281 accept_legacy_v0: false,
2282 ..Default::default()
2283 },
2284 )
2285 .await
2286 .unwrap();
2287 assert_eq!(report.scanned, 2);
2288 assert_eq!(report.already_encrypted, 1);
2289 assert_eq!(report.encrypted, 1);
2290
2291 let raw_a_after = storage.get_kv("secret:a").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2292 assert_eq!(
2293 raw_a_after, envelope_a,
2294 "an already-encrypted value must be left byte-for-byte unchanged, not double-encrypted"
2295 );
2296 let raw_b_after = storage.get_kv("secret:b").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2297 assert!(StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(&raw_b_after));
2298
2299 let report2 = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2301 &storage,
2302 &encryption,
2303 "secret:",
2304 MigrationOptions {
2305 dry_run: false,
2306 accept_legacy_v0: false,
2307 ..Default::default()
2308 },
2309 )
2310 .await
2311 .unwrap();
2312 assert_eq!(report2.already_encrypted, 2);
2313 assert_eq!(report2.encrypted, 0);
2314 }
2315
2316 #[tokio::test]
2317 async fn test_migration_only_touches_matching_prefix() {
2318 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2319 storage
2320 .store_kv("secret:a", b"plaintext-a", None)
2321 .await
2322 .unwrap();
2323 storage
2324 .store_kv("other:b", b"plaintext-b", None)
2325 .await
2326 .unwrap();
2327 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new_random();
2328
2329 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2330 &storage,
2331 &encryption,
2332 "secret:",
2333 MigrationOptions {
2334 dry_run: false,
2335 accept_legacy_v0: false,
2336 ..Default::default()
2337 },
2338 )
2339 .await
2340 .unwrap();
2341 assert_eq!(report.scanned, 1);
2342
2343 let other_untouched = storage.get_kv("other:b").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2344 assert_eq!(
2345 other_untouched,
2346 b"plaintext-b".to_vec(),
2347 "a key outside the given prefix must not be touched"
2348 );
2349 }
2350
2351 #[tokio::test]
2354 async fn wrapper_passes_kv_ttl_through() {
2355 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(
2356 MemoryStorage::new(),
2357 StorageEncryption::new_random(),
2358 false,
2359 false,
2360 );
2361 wrapped
2362 .store_kv("k", b"v", Some(Duration::from_secs(600)))
2363 .await
2364 .unwrap();
2365 let ttl = wrapped.get_kv_ttl("k").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2366 assert!(ttl > Duration::from_secs(590) && ttl <= Duration::from_secs(600));
2367 }
2368
2369 struct FixedKeys {
2372 current: &'static str,
2373 keys: Vec<(&'static str, [u8; 32])>,
2374 }
2375
2376 impl KeyProvider for FixedKeys {
2377 fn load_keys(&self) -> Result<LoadedKeys> {
2378 Ok(LoadedKeys {
2379 current_key_id: self.current.to_string(),
2380 keys: self
2381 .keys
2382 .iter()
2383 .map(|(id, key)| (id.to_string(), *key))
2384 .collect(),
2385 })
2386 }
2387 }
2388
2389 const KEY_A: [u8; 32] = [0x11; 32];
2390 const KEY_B: [u8; 32] = [0x22; 32];
2391
2392 fn manual_envelope(
2395 key: &[u8; 32],
2396 key_id: &str,
2397 v: u8,
2398 plaintext: &[u8],
2399 aad: &[u8],
2400 ) -> Vec<u8> {
2401 let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(Key::<Aes256Gcm>::from_slice(key));
2402 let nonce_bytes = [7u8; 12];
2403 let ciphertext = cipher
2404 .encrypt(
2405 Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes),
2406 Payload {
2407 msg: plaintext,
2408 aad,
2409 },
2410 )
2411 .unwrap();
2412 serde_json::to_vec(&EncryptedData {
2413 data: BASE64.encode(ciphertext),
2414 nonce: BASE64.encode(nonce_bytes),
2415 algorithm: "AES-256-GCM".to_string(),
2416 key_id: key_id.to_string(),
2417 v,
2418 key_derivation: String::new(),
2419 })
2420 .unwrap()
2421 }
2422
2423 #[test]
2424 fn new_envelopes_use_format_v2() {
2425 let enc = StorageEncryption::new_random();
2426 assert_eq!(enc.encrypt(b"x", b"k").unwrap().v, 2);
2427 }
2428
2429 #[test]
2434 fn v2_aad_binds_key_id_and_version() {
2435 let enc = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeys {
2436 current: "a",
2437 keys: vec![("a", KEY_A), ("b", KEY_A)],
2438 })
2439 .unwrap();
2440 let envelope = enc.encrypt(b"secret", b"rec:1").unwrap();
2441 assert_eq!(enc.decrypt(&envelope, b"rec:1").unwrap(), b"secret");
2442
2443 let mut relabelled = envelope.clone();
2444 relabelled.key_id = "b".to_string();
2445 assert!(
2446 enc.decrypt(&relabelled, b"rec:1").is_err(),
2447 "relabelling key_id must fail authentication"
2448 );
2449
2450 let mut downgraded = envelope.clone();
2451 downgraded.v = 1;
2452 assert!(
2453 enc.decrypt(&downgraded, b"rec:1").is_err(),
2454 "rewriting v to 1 must not make a v2 ciphertext verify"
2455 );
2456 }
2457
2458 #[tokio::test]
2462 async fn v1_envelopes_are_legacy_and_migrate_to_v2() {
2463 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2464 storage
2465 .store_kv(
2466 "rec:1",
2467 &manual_envelope(&KEY_A, "1", 1, b"secret", b"rec:1"),
2468 None,
2469 )
2470 .await
2471 .unwrap();
2472 let provider = || FixedKeys {
2473 current: "1",
2474 keys: vec![("1", KEY_A)],
2475 };
2476
2477 let strict = EncryptedStorage::new(
2478 storage.clone(),
2479 StorageEncryption::new(&provider()).unwrap(),
2480 false,
2481 false,
2482 );
2483 assert!(
2484 strict.get_kv("rec:1").await.is_err(),
2485 "v1 must need the legacy policy"
2486 );
2487
2488 let lenient = EncryptedStorage::new(
2489 storage.clone(),
2490 StorageEncryption::new(&provider()).unwrap(),
2491 false,
2492 true,
2493 );
2494 assert_eq!(lenient.get_kv("rec:1").await.unwrap().unwrap(), b"secret");
2495
2496 let report = migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2497 &storage,
2498 &StorageEncryption::new(&provider()).unwrap(),
2499 "",
2500 MigrationOptions::default().with_accept_legacy_v0(true),
2501 )
2502 .await
2503 .unwrap();
2504 assert_eq!(report.upgraded_from_legacy, 1, "{report:?}");
2505
2506 let raw = storage.get_kv("rec:1").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2507 assert_eq!(StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(&raw).unwrap().v, 2);
2508 let strict_after = EncryptedStorage::new(
2510 storage,
2511 StorageEncryption::new(&provider()).unwrap(),
2512 false,
2513 false,
2514 );
2515 assert_eq!(
2516 strict_after.get_kv("rec:1").await.unwrap().unwrap(),
2517 b"secret"
2518 );
2519 }
2520
2521 #[tokio::test]
2524 async fn upgraded_records_cannot_be_swapped_between_keys() {
2525 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2526 for (key, secret) in [("rec:1", &b"one"[..]), ("rec:2", b"two")] {
2527 storage
2528 .store_kv(key, &manual_envelope(&KEY_A, "1", 0, secret, b""), None)
2529 .await
2530 .unwrap();
2531 }
2532 let provider = || FixedKeys {
2533 current: "1",
2534 keys: vec![("1", KEY_A)],
2535 };
2536 migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2537 &storage,
2538 &StorageEncryption::new(&provider()).unwrap(),
2539 "",
2540 MigrationOptions::default().with_accept_legacy_v0(true),
2541 )
2542 .await
2543 .unwrap();
2544
2545 let swapped = storage.get_kv("rec:1").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2546 storage.store_kv("rec:2", &swapped, None).await.unwrap();
2547 let strict = EncryptedStorage::new(
2548 storage,
2549 StorageEncryption::new(&provider()).unwrap(),
2550 false,
2551 false,
2552 );
2553 assert!(strict.get_kv("rec:2").await.is_err());
2554 }
2555
2556 #[test]
2559 fn envelope_classification_requires_version_and_key_id() {
2560 let shape = |extra: &str| {
2561 format!(
2562 r#"{{"data":"AAAA","nonce":"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA","algorithm":"AES-256-GCM"{extra}}}"#
2563 )
2564 };
2565 assert!(StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(shape(r#","v":2"#).as_bytes()).is_none());
2567 assert!(
2569 StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(shape(r#","v":1,"key_id":"""#).as_bytes()).is_none()
2570 );
2571 assert!(
2573 StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(shape(r#","v":2,"key_id":"1""#).as_bytes()).is_some()
2574 );
2575 assert!(StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(shape("").as_bytes()).is_some());
2577 }
2578
2579 #[test]
2582 fn decrypt_failures_share_one_error_text() {
2583 let enc = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeys {
2584 current: "a",
2585 keys: vec![("a", KEY_A), ("b", KEY_B)],
2586 })
2587 .unwrap();
2588 let good = enc.encrypt(b"secret", b"rec:1").unwrap();
2589
2590 let mut bad_base64 = good.clone();
2591 bad_base64.data = "!!not base64!!".to_string();
2592 let mut short_nonce = good.clone();
2593 short_nonce.nonce = BASE64.encode([1u8; 4]);
2594 let mut unknown_key = good.clone();
2595 unknown_key.key_id = "zzz".to_string();
2596 let mut wrong_algorithm = good.clone();
2597 wrong_algorithm.algorithm = "ROT13".to_string();
2598 let mut tampered = good.clone();
2599 let mut raw = BASE64.decode(&tampered.data).unwrap();
2600 raw[0] ^= 0x01;
2601 tampered.data = BASE64.encode(raw);
2602
2603 let messages: Vec<String> = [
2604 (&bad_base64, &b"rec:1"[..]),
2605 (&short_nonce, b"rec:1"),
2606 (&unknown_key, b"rec:1"),
2607 (&wrong_algorithm, b"rec:1"),
2608 (&tampered, b"rec:1"),
2609 (&good, b"rec:OTHER"),
2610 ]
2611 .iter()
2612 .map(|(envelope, aad)| enc.decrypt(envelope, aad).unwrap_err().to_string())
2613 .collect();
2614 assert!(
2615 messages.windows(2).all(|w| w[0] == w[1]),
2616 "decrypt failures must be indistinguishable, got: {messages:#?}"
2617 );
2618 }
2619
2620 #[test]
2621 fn legacy_trial_decryption_order_is_stable() {
2622 let enc = StorageEncryption::new(&FixedKeys {
2623 current: "k0",
2624 keys: (0..8)
2625 .map(|i| {
2626 let id: &'static str = Box::leak(format!("k{i}").into_boxed_str());
2627 (id, [i as u8 + 1; 32])
2628 })
2629 .rev()
2630 .collect(),
2631 })
2632 .unwrap();
2633 let ids = enc.sorted_key_ids();
2634 let mut expected = ids.clone();
2635 expected.sort();
2636 assert_eq!(ids, expected);
2637 assert_eq!(ids.len(), 8);
2638 }
2639
2640 #[test]
2641 fn safe_log_id_keeps_eight_hash_bytes() {
2642 let id = safe_log_id("api_key:abc123");
2643 let hash = id.strip_prefix("api_key:").unwrap();
2644 assert_eq!(hash.len(), 16, "8 bytes = 16 hex chars, got {id}");
2645 let colonless = safe_log_id("rawsecret");
2646 assert_eq!(colonless.strip_prefix("key:").unwrap().len(), 16);
2647 }
2648
2649 fn load_with_env(key: Option<&str>) -> Result<LoadedKeys> {
2652 let _lock = TEST_ENCRYPTION_ENV_LOCK.blocking_lock();
2653 unsafe {
2655 std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE");
2656 match key {
2657 Some(key) => std::env::set_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY", key),
2658 None => std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY"),
2659 }
2660 }
2661 let result = EnvKeyProvider.load_keys();
2662 unsafe { std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY") };
2664 result
2665 }
2666
2667 #[test]
2668 fn malformed_env_keys_fail_closed() {
2669 assert!(load_with_env(None).is_err(), "no key at all");
2670 assert!(load_with_env(Some("")).is_err(), "empty key");
2671 assert!(
2672 load_with_env(Some("!!!not base64!!!")).is_err(),
2673 "bad base64"
2674 );
2675 assert!(
2676 load_with_env(Some(&BASE64.encode([1u8; 16]))).is_err(),
2677 "16-byte key"
2678 );
2679 assert!(
2680 load_with_env(Some(&BASE64.encode([1u8; 33]))).is_err(),
2681 "33-byte key"
2682 );
2683 assert!(load_with_env(Some(&BASE64.encode([1u8; 32]))).is_ok());
2684 }
2685
2686 #[test]
2687 fn malformed_keys_file_fails_closed() {
2688 let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
2689 let good = BASE64.encode([3u8; 32]);
2690 let cases: [(&str, String); 4] = [
2691 ("not json", "{{{".to_string()),
2692 (
2693 "current missing from keys",
2694 format!(r#"{{"current":"x","keys":{{"1":"{good}"}}}}"#),
2695 ),
2696 (
2697 "one malformed entry",
2698 format!(r#"{{"current":"1","keys":{{"1":"{good}","2":"short"}}}}"#),
2699 ),
2700 ("empty keys", r#"{"current":"1","keys":{}}"#.to_string()),
2701 ];
2702 let _lock = TEST_ENCRYPTION_ENV_LOCK.blocking_lock();
2703 for (name, body) in cases {
2704 let path = dir.path().join("keys.json");
2705 std::fs::write(&path, body).unwrap();
2706 unsafe {
2708 std::env::set_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE", &path);
2709 }
2710 let result = EnvKeyProvider.load_keys();
2711 unsafe { std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE") };
2713 assert!(result.is_err(), "{name} must fail closed");
2714 }
2715 }
2716
2717 fn ttl_provider() -> FixedKeys {
2720 FixedKeys {
2721 current: "1",
2722 keys: vec![("1", KEY_A)],
2723 }
2724 }
2725
2726 #[tokio::test]
2727 async fn migration_preserves_ttl_when_encrypting_plaintext() {
2728 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2729 storage
2730 .store_kv("otp:1", b"123456", Some(Duration::from_secs(600)))
2731 .await
2732 .unwrap();
2733 storage.store_kv("durable:1", b"keep", None).await.unwrap();
2734
2735 migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2736 &storage,
2737 &StorageEncryption::new(&ttl_provider()).unwrap(),
2738 "",
2739 MigrationOptions::default(),
2740 )
2741 .await
2742 .unwrap();
2743
2744 let ttl = storage.get_kv_ttl("otp:1").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2745 assert!(
2746 ttl > Duration::from_secs(590) && ttl <= Duration::from_secs(600),
2747 "TTL must survive migration, got {ttl:?}"
2748 );
2749 assert_eq!(storage.get_kv_ttl("durable:1").await.unwrap(), None);
2750 let raw = storage.get_kv("otp:1").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2751 assert!(
2752 StorageEncryption::looks_like_envelope(&raw),
2753 "must be encrypted"
2754 );
2755 }
2756
2757 #[tokio::test]
2758 async fn legacy_upgrade_preserves_ttl() {
2759 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2760 storage
2761 .store_kv(
2762 "rec:1",
2763 &manual_envelope(&KEY_A, "", 0, b"secret", b""),
2764 Some(Duration::from_secs(600)),
2765 )
2766 .await
2767 .unwrap();
2768
2769 migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2770 &storage,
2771 &StorageEncryption::new(&ttl_provider()).unwrap(),
2772 "",
2773 MigrationOptions::default().with_accept_legacy_v0(true),
2774 )
2775 .await
2776 .unwrap();
2777
2778 let ttl = storage.get_kv_ttl("rec:1").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2779 assert!(ttl > Duration::from_secs(590) && ttl <= Duration::from_secs(600));
2780 let raw = storage.get_kv("rec:1").await.unwrap().unwrap();
2781 assert_eq!(
2782 StorageEncryption::parse_envelope(&raw).unwrap().v,
2783 CURRENT_FORMAT_VERSION
2784 );
2785 }
2786
2787 #[tokio::test]
2791 async fn migration_refuses_backend_that_cannot_report_ttl_without_opt_in() {
2792 let storage = crate::testing::utilities::MockStorage::new();
2793 let encryption = StorageEncryption::new(&ttl_provider()).unwrap();
2794
2795 assert!(
2796 migrate_kv_to_encrypted(&storage, &encryption, "", MigrationOptions::default())
2797 .await
2798 .is_err(),
2799 "a real run on a TTL-blind backend must be refused"
2800 );
2801 assert!(
2802 migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2803 &storage,
2804 &encryption,
2805 "",
2806 MigrationOptions::default().with_dry_run(true)
2807 )
2808 .await
2809 .is_ok(),
2810 "a dry run writes nothing, so it is allowed"
2811 );
2812 assert!(
2813 migrate_kv_to_encrypted(
2814 &storage,
2815 &encryption,
2816 "",
2817 MigrationOptions::default().with_accept_ttl_loss(true)
2818 )
2819 .await
2820 .is_ok(),
2821 "explicit opt-in proceeds"
2822 );
2823 }
2824
2825 #[tokio::test]
2826 async fn backends_that_honour_ttl_say_so() {
2827 let memory = MemoryStorage::new();
2828 assert!(memory.tracks_kv_ttl());
2829 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(
2830 MemoryStorage::new(),
2831 StorageEncryption::new_random(),
2832 false,
2833 false,
2834 );
2835 assert!(
2836 wrapped.tracks_kv_ttl(),
2837 "the wrapper forwards the inner answer"
2838 );
2839 let shared: std::sync::Arc<dyn AuthStorage> = std::sync::Arc::new(MemoryStorage::new());
2840 assert!(shared.tracks_kv_ttl(), "the Arc impl forwards too");
2841 assert!(
2842 !crate::testing::utilities::MockStorage::new().tracks_kv_ttl(),
2843 "a backend that ignores TTLs must say so"
2844 );
2845 }
2846
2847 #[test]
2850 fn keys_file_mode_check_flags_group_and_other_access() {
2851 for open in [0o644, 0o640, 0o604, 0o660, 0o666, 0o777, 0o601, 0o610] {
2852 assert!(keys_file_mode_too_open(open), "{open:o} must be flagged");
2853 }
2854 for closed in [0o600, 0o400, 0o700, 0o500, 0o200] {
2855 assert!(!keys_file_mode_too_open(closed), "{closed:o} must pass");
2856 }
2857 }
2858
2859 #[test]
2860 fn strict_permissions_env_parsing() {
2861 let _lock = TEST_ENCRYPTION_ENV_LOCK.blocking_lock();
2862 let read = |value: Option<&str>| {
2863 unsafe {
2865 match value {
2866 Some(v) => std::env::set_var(STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV, v),
2867 None => std::env::remove_var(STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV),
2868 }
2869 }
2870 strict_permissions_requested()
2871 };
2872 assert!(!read(None));
2873 assert!(!read(Some("")));
2874 assert!(!read(Some("0")));
2875 assert!(!read(Some("no")));
2876 assert!(read(Some("1")));
2877 assert!(read(Some("true")));
2878 assert!(read(Some("TRUE")));
2879 assert!(read(Some("Yes")));
2880 unsafe { std::env::remove_var(STRICT_KEY_FILE_PERMISSIONS_ENV) };
2882 }
2883
2884 #[cfg(unix)]
2886 #[test]
2887 fn keys_file_permissions_strict_mode_fails_startup() {
2888 use std::os::unix::fs::PermissionsExt;
2889 let dir = tempfile::tempdir().unwrap();
2890 let path = dir.path().join("keys.json");
2891 std::fs::write(&path, "{}").unwrap();
2892 let path_str = path.to_str().unwrap();
2893
2894 std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o644)).unwrap();
2895 assert!(
2896 check_keys_file_permissions(path_str, true).is_err(),
2897 "strict + 0644"
2898 );
2899 assert!(
2900 check_keys_file_permissions(path_str, false).is_ok(),
2901 "warn-only + 0644"
2902 );
2903
2904 std::fs::set_permissions(&path, std::fs::Permissions::from_mode(0o600)).unwrap();
2905 assert!(
2906 check_keys_file_permissions(path_str, true).is_ok(),
2907 "strict + 0600"
2908 );
2909 }
2910
2911 #[test]
2912 fn env_key_source_detection() {
2913 let _lock = TEST_ENCRYPTION_ENV_LOCK.blocking_lock();
2914 unsafe {
2916 std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE");
2917 std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY");
2918 }
2919 assert!(!env_key_source_in_use(), "no key configured at all");
2920 unsafe { std::env::set_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY", "irrelevant") };
2922 assert!(
2923 env_key_source_in_use(),
2924 "no keys file => the env var is the source"
2925 );
2926 unsafe { std::env::set_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE", "/some/keys.json") };
2928 assert!(!env_key_source_in_use(), "a keys file supports rotation");
2929 unsafe {
2931 std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEYS_FILE");
2932 std::env::remove_var("AUTH_STORAGE_ENCRYPTION_KEY");
2933 }
2934 }
2935
2936 #[tokio::test]
2937 async fn envelope_probe_finds_stored_envelopes_within_its_limit() {
2938 let enc = StorageEncryption::new_random();
2939 let storage = MemoryStorage::new();
2940 storage
2941 .store_kv("plain:1", b"just text", None)
2942 .await
2943 .unwrap();
2944 assert!(
2945 !stored_envelopes_exist(&storage, 10).await.unwrap(),
2946 "plaintext only"
2947 );
2948
2949 let sealed = enc.encrypt_for_storage(b"secret", b"sealed:1").unwrap();
2950 storage.store_kv("sealed:1", &sealed, None).await.unwrap();
2951 assert!(
2952 stored_envelopes_exist(&storage, 10).await.unwrap(),
2953 "envelope present"
2954 );
2955
2956 assert!(!stored_envelopes_exist(&storage, 0).await.unwrap());
2958 }
2959
2960 #[tokio::test]
2961 async fn encrypted_storage_says_it_encrypts() {
2962 let wrapped = EncryptedStorage::new(
2963 MemoryStorage::new(),
2964 StorageEncryption::new_random(),
2965 false,
2966 false,
2967 );
2968 assert!(wrapped.encrypts_kv_at_rest());
2969 assert!(!MemoryStorage::new().encrypts_kv_at_rest());
2970 let shared: std::sync::Arc<dyn AuthStorage> = std::sync::Arc::new(wrapped);
2971 assert!(shared.encrypts_kv_at_rest(), "the Arc impl forwards");
2972 }
2973}