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auth_framework/api/
saml.rs

1use crate::api::{ApiResponse, ApiState};
2use axum::{
3    extract::{Query, State},
4    http::StatusCode,
5    response::{Html, IntoResponse, Json},
6};
7use base64::Engine;
8use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
9use std::collections::HashMap;
10
11/// Escape a string for safe inclusion in XML attribute values and text content.
12/// Prevents XML injection by escaping the five predefined XML entities.
13fn xml_escape(input: &str) -> String {
14    let mut output = String::with_capacity(input.len());
15    for ch in input.chars() {
16        match ch {
17            '&' => output.push_str("&"),
18            '<' => output.push_str("&lt;"),
19            '>' => output.push_str("&gt;"),
20            '"' => output.push_str("&quot;"),
21            '\'' => output.push_str("&apos;"),
22            _ => output.push(ch),
23        }
24    }
25    output
26}
27
28#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
29use crate::methods::saml::{SamlTrustAnchors, VerifiedAssertion, verify_signed_assertion};
30#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
31use quick_xml::Reader;
32#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
33use quick_xml::events::Event;
34#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
35use quick_xml::name::QName;
36
37/// Extract the local name (without namespace prefix) from a `QName`, taking
38/// ownership to avoid temporary-lifetime issues from method chaining.
39#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
40fn xml_local<'a>(name: QName<'a>) -> &'a str {
41    let full = name.0;
42    match full.find(':') {
43        Some(pos) => &full[pos + 1..],
44        None => full,
45    }
46}
47
48/// SAML SSO initiation request
49#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
50pub struct SamlSsoRequest {
51    pub idp_entity_id: String,
52    pub relay_state: Option<String>,
53    pub force_authn: Option<bool>,
54    pub is_passive: Option<bool>,
55}
56
57/// SAML SSO response containing redirect URL
58#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
59pub struct SamlSsoResponse {
60    pub redirect_url: String,
61    pub saml_request: String,
62    pub relay_state: Option<String>,
63}
64
65/// SAML ACS (Assertion Consumer Service) request
66#[derive(Serialize, Deserialize)]
67pub struct SamlAcsRequest {
68    #[serde(rename = "SAMLResponse")]
69    pub saml_response: String,
70    #[serde(rename = "RelayState")]
71    pub relay_state: Option<String>,
72    #[serde(rename = "SigAlg")]
73    pub sig_alg: Option<String>,
74    #[serde(rename = "Signature")]
75    pub signature: Option<String>,
76}
77
78impl std::fmt::Debug for SamlAcsRequest {
79    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
80        let mut d = f.debug_struct("SamlAcsRequest");
81        d.field(
82            "saml_response",
83            &crate::utils::redact::redacted(&self.saml_response),
84        );
85        d.field("relay_state", &self.relay_state);
86        d.field("sig_alg", &self.sig_alg);
87        d.field("signature", &self.signature);
88        d.finish()
89    }
90}
91
92/// SAML metadata configuration
93#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
94pub struct SamlMetadataResponse {
95    pub entity_id: String,
96    pub acs_url: String,
97    pub sls_url: Option<String>,
98    pub certificate: Option<String>,
99    pub name_id_format: String,
100}
101
102#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
103struct SamlSpConfig {
104    entity_id: String,
105    acs_url: String,
106    #[serde(default)]
107    slo_url: Option<String>,
108}
109
110impl SamlSpConfig {
111    fn validate(self) -> Result<Self, String> {
112        if self.entity_id.trim().is_empty() {
113            return Err("missing entity_id".to_string());
114        }
115        if self.acs_url.trim().is_empty() {
116            return Err("missing acs_url".to_string());
117        }
118        Ok(self)
119    }
120
121    fn slo_url(&self) -> Result<&str, String> {
122        self.slo_url
123            .as_deref()
124            .filter(|value| !value.trim().is_empty())
125            .ok_or_else(|| "missing slo_url".to_string())
126    }
127}
128
129async fn load_saml_sp_config(state: &ApiState) -> Result<SamlSpConfig, String> {
130    let data = state
131        .auth_framework
132        .storage()
133        .get_kv("saml_sp:config")
134        .await
135        .map_err(|_| "failed to load saml_sp:config".to_string())?
136        .ok_or_else(|| "missing saml_sp:config".to_string())?;
137
138    serde_json::from_slice::<SamlSpConfig>(&data)
139        .map_err(|_| "invalid saml_sp:config JSON".to_string())?
140        .validate()
141}
142
143/// SAML logout request
144#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
145pub struct SamlLogoutRequest {
146    pub name_id: String,
147    pub session_index: Option<String>,
148    pub idp_entity_id: String,
149}
150
151/// SAML logout response
152#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
153pub struct SamlLogoutResponse {
154    pub redirect_url: String,
155    pub status: String,
156}
157
158/// Get SAML metadata for this SP (Service Provider).
159/// SP configuration (entity_id, acs_url, slo_url) is read from storage key `saml_sp:config`.
160/// Store a JSON object with those fields to customise the metadata for your deployment.
161pub async fn get_saml_metadata(State(state): State<ApiState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
162    let sp_config = match load_saml_sp_config(&state).await {
163        Ok(config) => config,
164        Err(error) => {
165            tracing::error!(error = %error, "SAML metadata requested without valid SP configuration");
166            return (
167                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
168                Html("SAML service provider configuration is missing or incomplete".to_string()),
169            )
170                .into_response();
171        }
172    };
173    let slo_url = match sp_config.slo_url() {
174        Ok(url) => url,
175        Err(error) => {
176            tracing::error!(error = %error, "SAML metadata requested without SLO URL configured");
177            return (
178                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
179                Html("SAML service provider configuration is missing or incomplete".to_string()),
180            )
181                .into_response();
182        }
183    };
184
185    let metadata_xml = format!(
186        r#"<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
187<md:EntityDescriptor xmlns:md="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:metadata"
188                     entityID="{entity_id}">
189  <md:SPSSODescriptor AuthnRequestsSigned="true" WantAssertionsSigned="true"
190                      protocolSupportEnumeration="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol">
191    <md:NameIDFormat>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress</md:NameIDFormat>
192    <md:AssertionConsumerService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-POST"
193                                Location="{acs_url}"
194                                index="0" />
195    <md:SingleLogoutService Binding="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:bindings:HTTP-Redirect"
196                               Location="{slo_url}" />
197  </md:SPSSODescriptor>
198</md:EntityDescriptor>"#,
199        entity_id = xml_escape(&sp_config.entity_id),
200        acs_url = xml_escape(&sp_config.acs_url),
201        slo_url = xml_escape(slo_url),
202    );
203
204    // Return SAML metadata with correct Content-Type per SAML metadata spec
205    (
206        StatusCode::OK,
207        [(
208            axum::http::header::CONTENT_TYPE,
209            "application/samlmetadata+xml",
210        )],
211        metadata_xml,
212    )
213        .into_response()
214}
215
216/// Initiate SAML SSO flow.
217/// The IdP must be pre-registered in storage under the key `saml_idp:{idp_entity_id}`
218/// as a JSON object with at least a `sso_url` field.  SP configuration is read from
219/// `saml_sp:config` (fields: `entity_id`, `acs_url`).
220pub async fn initiate_saml_sso(
221    State(state): State<ApiState>,
222    Json(request): Json<SamlSsoRequest>,
223) -> Json<ApiResponse<SamlSsoResponse>> {
224    // Look up IdP SSO URL from storage — reject unknown IdPs rather than
225    // redirecting to a hardcoded placeholder.
226    let idp_key = format!("saml_idp:{}", request.idp_entity_id);
227    let idp_sso_url = match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&idp_key).await {
228        Ok(Some(data)) => {
229            let cfg: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&data).unwrap_or_default();
230            match cfg["sso_url"].as_str() {
231                Some(url) => url.to_string(),
232                None => {
233                    return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
234                        "SAML_CONFIG_ERROR",
235                        "IdP config is missing required sso_url field",
236                    ));
237                }
238            }
239        }
240        Ok(None) => {
241            tracing::warn!(idp = %request.idp_entity_id, "SAML SSO: unknown IdP entity ID");
242            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
243                "SAML_UNKNOWN_IDP",
244                format!("IdP not configured: {}", request.idp_entity_id),
245            ));
246        }
247        Err(e) => {
248            tracing::error!(error = %e, "SAML SSO: storage error looking up IdP");
249            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
250                "server_error",
251                "Failed to look up IdP configuration",
252            ));
253        }
254    };
255
256    let sp_config = match load_saml_sp_config(&state).await {
257        Ok(config) => config,
258        Err(error) => {
259            tracing::error!(error = %error, "SAML SSO requested without valid SP configuration");
260            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
261                "SAML_CONFIG_ERROR",
262                "Service Provider configuration is missing required entity_id and acs_url values",
263            ));
264        }
265    };
266
267    // An IdP whose responses could not be verified must not be sent users: say so before the
268    // redirect, not after the login.
269    #[cfg(feature = "saml")]
270    if let Err(error) = idp_signing_anchors(&state, &request.idp_entity_id).await {
271        tracing::error!(idp = %request.idp_entity_id, error = %error, "SAML SSO: IdP has no usable pinned signing certificate");
272        return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
273            "SAML_CONFIG_ERROR",
274            format!(
275                "IdP '{}' cannot be used for login: {}",
276                request.idp_entity_id, error
277            ),
278        ));
279    }
280
281    // Generate SAML AuthnRequest
282    let request_id = format!("saml_{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
283    let issue_instant = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
284
285    let saml_request = format!(
286        r#"<samlp:AuthnRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
287                           xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
288                           ID="{request_id}"
289                           Version="2.0"
290                           IssueInstant="{issue_instant}"
291                           Destination="{idp_sso_url}"
292                           {force_authn}
293                           {is_passive}
294                           AssertionConsumerServiceURL="{sp_acs_url}">
295  <saml:Issuer>{sp_entity_id}</saml:Issuer>
296  <samlp:NameIDPolicy Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress"
297                      AllowCreate="true" />
298</samlp:AuthnRequest>"#,
299        force_authn = request
300            .force_authn
301            .map_or(String::new(), |fa| format!(r#"ForceAuthn="{}""#, fa)),
302        is_passive = request
303            .is_passive
304            .map_or(String::new(), |ip| format!(r#"IsPassive="{}""#, ip)),
305        sp_entity_id = xml_escape(&sp_config.entity_id),
306        sp_acs_url = xml_escape(&sp_config.acs_url),
307        idp_sso_url = xml_escape(&idp_sso_url),
308    );
309
310    // Encode SAML request
311    let encoded_request = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&saml_request);
312
313    // Build redirect URL
314    let mut redirect_url = format!(
315        "{}?SAMLRequest={}",
316        idp_sso_url,
317        urlencoding::encode(&encoded_request)
318    );
319
320    if let Some(relay_state) = &request.relay_state {
321        redirect_url.push_str(&format!("&RelayState={}", urlencoding::encode(relay_state)));
322    }
323
324    // Persist the AuthnRequest so the ACS handler can validate InResponseTo.
325    let request_key = format!("saml_request:{}", request_id);
326    let request_data = serde_json::json!({
327        "request_id": request_id,
328        "idp_entity_id": request.idp_entity_id,
329        "relay_state": request.relay_state,
330        "issued_at": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
331    })
332    .to_string();
333    if let Err(e) = state
334        .auth_framework
335        .storage()
336        .store_kv(
337            &request_key,
338            request_data.as_bytes(),
339            Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(600)),
340        )
341        .await
342    {
343        tracing::warn!(error = %e, "SAML SSO: failed to persist AuthnRequest — InResponseTo validation will be skipped");
344    }
345
346    Json(ApiResponse::success(SamlSsoResponse {
347        redirect_url,
348        saml_request: encoded_request,
349        relay_state: request.relay_state,
350    }))
351}
352
353/// Handle SAML ACS (Assertion Consumer Service) - where IdP sends response
354#[allow(
355    unreachable_code,
356    unused_variables,
357    reason = "without the `saml` feature the handler returns SAML_SIGNATURE_UNAVAILABLE early, leaving the rest unreachable and `state` and `saml_response_xml` unused"
358)]
359pub async fn handle_saml_acs(
360    State(state): State<ApiState>,
361    axum::Form(form_data): axum::Form<SamlAcsRequest>,
362) -> Json<ApiResponse<serde_json::Value>> {
363    // Decode SAML response
364    let saml_response_xml =
365        match base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(&form_data.saml_response) {
366            Ok(decoded) => match String::from_utf8(decoded) {
367                Ok(xml) => xml,
368                Err(e) => {
369                    tracing::warn!(error = %e, "SAML ACS: invalid UTF-8 in decoded response");
370                    return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error_typed(
371                        "Invalid SAML response encoding",
372                    ));
373                }
374            },
375            Err(e) => {
376                tracing::warn!(error = %e, "SAML ACS: base64 decode failed");
377                return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error_typed(
378                    "Invalid SAML response encoding",
379                ));
380            }
381        };
382
383    // --- XML Digital Signature Validation ---
384    // From here on only the assertion the signature covers is read.
385    #[cfg(feature = "saml")]
386    let verified = match validate_saml_signature(&state, &saml_response_xml).await {
387        Ok(verified) => {
388            tracing::info!("SAML ACS: XML signature validated successfully");
389            verified
390        }
391        Err(e) => {
392            tracing::error!(error = %e, "SAML ACS: XML signature validation failed");
393            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
394                "SAML_SIGNATURE_INVALID",
395                format!("SAML response signature validation failed: {}", e),
396            ));
397        }
398    };
399    #[cfg(not(feature = "saml"))]
400    {
401        tracing::error!(
402            "SAML ACS: XML signature validation is not available — \
403             the 'saml' feature is required for secure SAML processing"
404        );
405        return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
406            "SAML_SIGNATURE_UNAVAILABLE",
407            "SAML signature validation is not available; the server must be compiled with the 'saml' feature",
408        ));
409    }
410
411    // The assertion the signature covers; nothing else in the document is read below.
412    #[cfg(feature = "saml")]
413    let assertion_xml = verified.assertion_xml.clone();
414    #[cfg(not(feature = "saml"))]
415    let assertion_xml = saml_response_xml.clone();
416
417    // Validate InResponseTo: the SAML response must reference an AuthnRequest that
418    // we actually issued.  This prevents unsolicited response injection attacks.
419    #[cfg(feature = "saml")]
420    let in_response_to = signed_in_response_to(&saml_response_xml, &verified);
421    #[cfg(not(feature = "saml"))]
422    let in_response_to = extract_in_response_to(&saml_response_xml);
423    if let Some(irt) = in_response_to {
424        let request_key = format!("saml_request:{}", irt);
425        match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&request_key).await {
426            Ok(Some(_)) => {
427                // Valid outstanding request — consume it so it cannot be replayed.
428                let _ = state.auth_framework.storage().delete_kv(&request_key).await;
429            }
430            _ => {
431                tracing::warn!(in_response_to = %irt, "SAML ACS: InResponseTo references unknown or expired request");
432                return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
433                    "SAML_INVALID_RESPONSE",
434                    "SAML response references an unknown or expired authentication request",
435                ));
436            }
437        }
438    } else {
439        // Unsolicited SAML responses (no InResponseTo) are a common attack vector.
440        tracing::warn!(
441            "SAML ACS: response has no InResponseTo attribute — rejecting unsolicited response"
442        );
443        return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
444            "SAML_UNSOLICITED_RESPONSE",
445            "Unsolicited SAML responses are not accepted; initiate SSO via /api/v1/saml/sso first",
446        ));
447    }
448
449    // --- SAML Assertion Conditions Validation ---
450    // Validate NotBefore, NotOnOrAfter, and AudienceRestriction per SAML Core 2.5.1.
451    #[cfg(feature = "saml")]
452    {
453        let sp_entity_id = match load_saml_sp_config(&state).await {
454            Ok(config) => config.entity_id,
455            Err(error) => {
456                tracing::error!(error = %error, "SAML ACS requested without valid SP configuration");
457                return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
458                    "SAML_CONFIG_ERROR",
459                    "Service Provider configuration is missing required entity_id and acs_url values",
460                ));
461            }
462        };
463
464        if let Err(e) = validate_saml_conditions(&assertion_xml, &sp_entity_id) {
465            tracing::warn!(error = %e, "SAML ACS: assertion conditions validation failed");
466            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed("SAML_CONDITIONS_INVALID", e));
467        }
468    }
469
470    // Extract user information from assertion
471    let username = match extract_username_from_saml(&assertion_xml) {
472        Ok(user) => user,
473        Err(e) => return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed("SAML_PARSE_ERROR", e)),
474    };
475
476    let attributes = match extract_attributes_from_saml(&assertion_xml) {
477        Ok(attrs) => attrs,
478        Err(e) => return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed("SAML_PARSE_ERROR", e)),
479    };
480
481    // Issue a proper JWT/auth token using the framework's token infrastructure.
482    let scopes = vec![
483        "openid".to_string(),
484        "profile".to_string(),
485        "email".to_string(),
486    ];
487    let token = match state
488        .auth_framework
489        .token_manager()
490        .create_auth_token(&username, scopes, "saml", None)
491    {
492        Ok(t) => t,
493        Err(e) => {
494            tracing::error!(user = %username, error = %e, "SAML ACS: failed to create auth token");
495            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
496                "server_error",
497                "Failed to create authentication token",
498            ));
499        }
500    };
501
502    let token_data = serde_json::json!({
503        "access_token": token.access_token,
504        "token_type": "Bearer",
505        "expires_in": (token.expires_at - token.issued_at).num_seconds().max(0) as u64,
506        "refresh_token": token.refresh_token,
507        "user_id": username,
508        "authentication_method": "saml",
509        "attributes": attributes,
510        "relay_state": form_data.relay_state
511    });
512
513    tracing::info!(user = %username, "SAML authentication successful");
514    Json(ApiResponse::success_with_message(
515        token_data,
516        "SAML authentication successful",
517    ))
518}
519
520/// Initiate SAML Single Logout (SLO).
521/// The IdP must be pre-registered in storage under `saml_idp:{idp_entity_id}` with a `slo_url` field.
522pub async fn initiate_saml_slo(
523    State(state): State<ApiState>,
524    Json(request): Json<SamlLogoutRequest>,
525) -> Json<ApiResponse<SamlLogoutResponse>> {
526    // Look up IdP SLO URL from storage.
527    let idp_key = format!("saml_idp:{}", request.idp_entity_id);
528    let idp_slo_url = match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&idp_key).await {
529        Ok(Some(data)) => {
530            let cfg: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&data).unwrap_or_default();
531            match cfg["slo_url"].as_str() {
532                Some(url) => url.to_string(),
533                None => {
534                    return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
535                        "SAML_CONFIG_ERROR",
536                        "IdP config is missing required slo_url field",
537                    ));
538                }
539            }
540        }
541        Ok(None) => {
542            tracing::warn!(idp = %request.idp_entity_id, "SAML SLO: unknown IdP entity ID");
543            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
544                "SAML_UNKNOWN_IDP",
545                format!("IdP not configured: {}", request.idp_entity_id),
546            ));
547        }
548        Err(e) => {
549            tracing::error!(error = %e, "SAML SLO: storage error looking up IdP");
550            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
551                "server_error",
552                "Failed to look up IdP configuration",
553            ));
554        }
555    };
556
557    let sp_config = match load_saml_sp_config(&state).await {
558        Ok(config) => config,
559        Err(error) => {
560            tracing::error!(error = %error, "SAML SLO requested without valid SP configuration");
561            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
562                "SAML_CONFIG_ERROR",
563                "Service Provider configuration is missing required entity_id and acs_url values",
564            ));
565        }
566    };
567
568    let logout_id = format!("logout_{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4());
569    let issue_instant = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
570
571    // Build SAML LogoutRequest
572    let saml_logout_request = format!(
573        r#"<samlp:LogoutRequest xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
574                            xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
575                            ID="{logout_id}"
576                            Version="2.0"
577                            IssueInstant="{issue_instant}"
578                            Destination="{idp_slo_url}">
579    <saml:Issuer>{sp_entity_id}</saml:Issuer>
580  <saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">{name_id}</saml:NameID>
581  {session_index}
582</samlp:LogoutRequest>"#,
583        name_id = xml_escape(&request.name_id),
584        session_index = request.session_index.map_or(String::new(), |si| format!(
585            r#"<samlp:SessionIndex>{}</samlp:SessionIndex>"#,
586            xml_escape(&si)
587        )),
588        sp_entity_id = xml_escape(&sp_config.entity_id),
589        idp_slo_url = xml_escape(&idp_slo_url),
590    );
591
592    let encoded_request = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&saml_logout_request);
593    let redirect_url = format!(
594        "{}?SAMLRequest={}",
595        idp_slo_url,
596        urlencoding::encode(&encoded_request)
597    );
598
599    Json(ApiResponse::success_with_message(
600        SamlLogoutResponse {
601            redirect_url,
602            status: "logout_initiated".to_string(),
603        },
604        "SAML logout initiated",
605    ))
606}
607
608/// Handle SAML SLO response from IdP
609pub async fn handle_saml_slo_response(
610    State(_state): State<ApiState>,
611    Query(params): Query<HashMap<String, String>>,
612) -> Json<ApiResponse<()>> {
613    #[cfg(not(feature = "saml"))]
614    {
615        let _ = params;
616        Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
617            "SAML_SIGNATURE_UNAVAILABLE",
618            "SAML logout response validation is not available; the server must be compiled with the 'saml' feature",
619        ))
620    }
621
622    #[cfg(feature = "saml")]
623    {
624        let saml_response = match params.get("SAMLResponse") {
625            Some(response) => response,
626            None => {
627                return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error(
628                    "Missing SAMLResponse parameter",
629                ));
630            }
631        };
632
633        // Decode and validate SLO response.
634        let response_xml = match base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.decode(saml_response) {
635            Ok(decoded) => match String::from_utf8(decoded) {
636                Ok(xml) => xml,
637                Err(e) => {
638                    return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error(format!(
639                        "Invalid SLO response UTF-8: {}",
640                        e
641                    )));
642                }
643            },
644            Err(e) => {
645                return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error(format!(
646                    "Invalid SLO response encoding: {}",
647                    e
648                )));
649            }
650        };
651
652        let slo_success = xml_extract_status_code(&response_xml)
653            .map(|code| code == "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success")
654            .unwrap_or(false);
655
656        if slo_success {
657            // Invalidate the user's session associated with this SAML exchange.
658            // The SAML response should carry the NameID that maps to our user.
659            if let Some(name_id) = xml_extract_name_id(&response_xml) {
660                // Look up user by email (NameID) and invalidate their sessions.
661                if let Ok(Some(uid_bytes)) = _state
662                    .auth_framework
663                    .storage()
664                    .get_kv(&format!("user:email:{}", name_id))
665                    .await
666                {
667                    let user_id = String::from_utf8_lossy(&uid_bytes).to_string();
668                    let session_key = format!("sessions:user:{}", user_id);
669                    let _ = _state
670                        .auth_framework
671                        .storage()
672                        .delete_kv(&session_key)
673                        .await;
674                    tracing::info!(user_id = %user_id, "SAML SLO: invalidated sessions");
675                }
676            }
677
678            // Handle RelayState redirect if provided
679            if let Some(relay_state) = params.get("RelayState")
680                && !relay_state.is_empty()
681            {
682                tracing::debug!(relay_state = %relay_state, "SAML SLO: RelayState provided");
683            }
684
685            Json(ApiResponse::<()>::ok_with_message(
686                "SAML logout completed successfully",
687            ))
688        } else {
689            Json(ApiResponse::error(
690                "SAML_LOGOUT_FAILED",
691                "SAML logout failed",
692            ))
693        }
694    }
695}
696
697/// Create SAML assertion (for Identity Provider functionality)
698pub async fn create_saml_assertion(
699    State(state): State<ApiState>,
700    Json(request): Json<serde_json::Value>,
701) -> Json<ApiResponse<String>> {
702    let username = match request["username"].as_str() {
703        Some(user) => user,
704        None => return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error_typed("Username required")),
705    };
706
707    let audience = match request["audience"].as_str() {
708        Some(aud) => aud,
709        None => return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error_typed("Audience required")),
710    };
711
712    let sp_config = match load_saml_sp_config(&state).await {
713        Ok(config) => config,
714        Err(error) => {
715            tracing::error!(error = %error, "SAML assertion requested without valid SP configuration");
716            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
717                "SAML_CONFIG_ERROR",
718                "Service Provider configuration is missing required entity_id and acs_url values",
719            ));
720        }
721    };
722
723    let name_id = match request["email"].as_str().map(str::trim) {
724        Some(email) if !email.is_empty() => email.to_string(),
725        _ if username.contains('@') => username.to_string(),
726        _ => {
727            return Json(ApiResponse::validation_error_typed(
728                "Email required when username is not an email address",
729            ));
730        }
731    };
732
733    // Create SAML assertion with Response wrapper.
734    // Note: In production, this assertion should be signed with an XML-DSig
735    // private key. Without signing, relying parties that enforce signature
736    // verification will reject the assertion.
737    let assertion_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4();
738    let response_id = uuid::Uuid::new_v4();
739    let now = chrono::Utc::now();
740    let not_before = (now - chrono::Duration::minutes(1)).to_rfc3339();
741    let not_after = (now + chrono::Duration::hours(1)).to_rfc3339();
742    let now_str = now.to_rfc3339();
743    // Issuer is our own entity (acting as IdP), not the SP
744    let issuer = xml_escape(&sp_config.entity_id);
745    let audience_escaped = xml_escape(audience);
746    let name_id_escaped = xml_escape(&name_id);
747    let username_escaped = xml_escape(username);
748
749    let assertion_xml = format!(
750        r#"<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
751                         xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
752                         ID="response_{response_id}"
753                         IssueInstant="{now_str}"
754                         Destination="{audience_escaped}"
755                         Version="2.0">
756  <saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer>
757  <samlp:Status>
758    <samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/>
759  </samlp:Status>
760  <saml:Assertion ID="assertion_{assertion_id}"
761                  IssueInstant="{now_str}"
762                  Version="2.0">
763    <saml:Issuer>{issuer}</saml:Issuer>
764    <saml:Subject>
765      <saml:NameID Format="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:1.1:nameid-format:emailAddress">{name_id_escaped}</saml:NameID>
766      <saml:SubjectConfirmation Method="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:cm:bearer">
767        <saml:SubjectConfirmationData NotOnOrAfter="{not_after}" Recipient="{audience_escaped}"/>
768      </saml:SubjectConfirmation>
769    </saml:Subject>
770    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="{not_before}" NotOnOrAfter="{not_after}">
771      <saml:AudienceRestriction>
772        <saml:Audience>{audience_escaped}</saml:Audience>
773      </saml:AudienceRestriction>
774    </saml:Conditions>
775    <saml:AuthnStatement AuthnInstant="{now_str}" SessionIndex="session_{assertion_id}">
776      <saml:AuthnContext>
777        <saml:AuthnContextClassRef>urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:ac:classes:PasswordProtectedTransport</saml:AuthnContextClassRef>
778      </saml:AuthnContext>
779    </saml:AuthnStatement>
780    <saml:AttributeStatement>
781      <saml:Attribute Name="username">
782        <saml:AttributeValue>{username_escaped}</saml:AttributeValue>
783      </saml:Attribute>
784      <saml:Attribute Name="email">
785        <saml:AttributeValue>{name_id_escaped}</saml:AttributeValue>
786      </saml:Attribute>
787    </saml:AttributeStatement>
788  </saml:Assertion>
789</samlp:Response>"#,
790    );
791
792    Json(ApiResponse::success_with_message(
793        assertion_xml,
794        "SAML assertion created",
795    ))
796}
797
798/// List configured SAML Identity Providers.
799/// IdPs are indexed in storage under the key `saml_idps:index` (JSON array of entity ID strings).
800/// Each IdP's configuration is stored under `saml_idp:{entity_id}`.
801pub async fn list_saml_idps(
802    State(state): State<ApiState>,
803) -> Json<ApiResponse<Vec<serde_json::Value>>> {
804    // Load the IdP index from storage.
805    let entity_ids: Vec<String> = match state
806        .auth_framework
807        .storage()
808        .get_kv("saml_idps:index")
809        .await
810    {
811        Ok(Some(data)) => serde_json::from_slice(&data).unwrap_or_default(),
812        Ok(None) => vec![],
813        Err(e) => {
814            tracing::error!(error = %e, "Failed to load SAML IdP index");
815            return Json(ApiResponse::error_typed(
816                "server_error",
817                "Failed to load IdP list",
818            ));
819        }
820    };
821
822    // Fetch each IdP's config.
823    let mut idps = Vec::with_capacity(entity_ids.len());
824    for entity_id in &entity_ids {
825        let key = format!("saml_idp:{}", entity_id);
826        if let Ok(Some(data)) = state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&key).await
827            && let Ok(cfg) = serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&data)
828        {
829            idps.push(cfg);
830        }
831    }
832
833    Json(ApiResponse::success_with_message(
834        idps,
835        "SAML IdPs retrieved",
836    ))
837}
838
839/// The certificate pinned for the IdP `entity_id` (`signing_cert` in `saml_idp:{entity_id}`).
840/// Absent or unusable is an error: there is no fallback to a key the response carries.
841#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
842async fn idp_signing_anchors(
843    state: &ApiState,
844    entity_id: &str,
845) -> Result<SamlTrustAnchors, String> {
846    let idp_key = format!("saml_idp:{}", entity_id);
847    let idp_cfg_data = state
848        .auth_framework
849        .storage()
850        .get_kv(&idp_key)
851        .await
852        .map_err(|e| format!("Storage error loading IdP config: {}", e))?
853        .ok_or_else(|| format!("IdP not configured: {}", entity_id))?;
854
855    let idp_cfg: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&idp_cfg_data)
856        .map_err(|e| format!("Invalid IdP config JSON: {}", e))?;
857
858    let signing_cert_pem = idp_cfg["signing_cert"]
859        .as_str()
860        .filter(|pem| !pem.trim().is_empty())
861        .ok_or_else(|| format!("IdP '{}' has no signing_cert configured", entity_id))?;
862
863    let mut anchors = SamlTrustAnchors::new();
864    anchors
865        .trust_pem(entity_id, signing_cert_pem)
866        .map_err(|e| e.to_string())?;
867    Ok(anchors)
868}
869
870/// Validate the XML-DSig signature on a SAML response using the IdP's trusted signing key, and
871/// return the one assertion that signature covers.
872///
873/// The IdP's signing certificate (PEM-encoded X.509) must be stored under
874/// `saml_idp:{entity_id}` in the `signing_cert` field.  The IdP entity ID is
875/// extracted from the `<saml:Issuer>` element inside the SAML response, and used only to choose
876/// which configured certificate to verify with: the signed assertion must name the same issuer.
877///
878/// Everything the caller reads afterwards must come from the returned assertion, not from
879/// `saml_xml`: a signature proves one element genuine, and an attacker can put unsigned elements
880/// around it (see [`crate::methods::saml::dsig`]).
881#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
882async fn validate_saml_signature(
883    state: &ApiState,
884    saml_xml: &str,
885) -> Result<VerifiedAssertion, String> {
886    // Extract the IdP entity ID (Issuer) from the response so we can look up
887    // the correct signing key.
888    let issuer = extract_issuer(saml_xml)
889        .ok_or_else(|| "SAML response does not contain an Issuer element".to_string())?;
890
891    let anchors = idp_signing_anchors(state, &issuer).await?;
892    verify_signed_assertion(saml_xml, &anchors).map_err(|e| e.to_string())
893}
894
895/// Extract the `<saml:Issuer>` or `<saml2:Issuer>` value from the top-level
896/// `<samlp:Response>` element using proper XML parsing.
897#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
898fn extract_issuer(saml_xml: &str) -> Option<String> {
899    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(saml_xml);
900    let mut in_response = false;
901    let mut in_issuer = false;
902    let mut depth: u32 = 0;
903
904    loop {
905        match reader.read_event() {
906            Ok(Event::Start(e)) => {
907                let local = xml_local(e.name());
908                if local == "Response" && !in_response {
909                    in_response = true;
910                    depth = 1;
911                } else if in_response {
912                    depth += 1;
913                    // Issuer must be a direct child of Response (depth == 2).
914                    if local == "Issuer" && depth == 2 {
915                        in_issuer = true;
916                    }
917                }
918            }
919            Ok(Event::End(e)) => {
920                let local = xml_local(e.name());
921                if in_issuer && local == "Issuer" {
922                    in_issuer = false;
923                }
924                if in_response {
925                    depth -= 1;
926                    if depth == 0 {
927                        break; // Exited the Response element.
928                    }
929                }
930            }
931            Ok(Event::Text(t)) if in_issuer => {
932                let text: &str = &t;
933                let s = text.trim();
934                if !s.is_empty() {
935                    return Some(s.to_string());
936                }
937            }
938            Ok(Event::Eof) => break,
939            Err(_) => break,
940            _ => {}
941        }
942    }
943    None
944}
945
946/// The `InResponseTo` the signature vouches for: the `Response`'s when the `Response` is signed,
947/// otherwise the one on the signed assertion's `SubjectConfirmationData`. An attribute of an
948/// unsigned `Response` wrapper is the sender's claim, not the IdP's.
949#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
950fn signed_in_response_to(response_xml: &str, verified: &VerifiedAssertion) -> Option<String> {
951    if verified.response_signed
952        && let Some(irt) = extract_in_response_to(response_xml)
953    {
954        return Some(irt);
955    }
956    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(&verified.assertion_xml);
957    loop {
958        match reader.read_event() {
959            Ok(Event::Start(e)) | Ok(Event::Empty(e)) => {
960                if xml_local(e.name()) == "SubjectConfirmationData" {
961                    for attr in e.attributes().flatten() {
962                        if attr.key.as_ref() == "InResponseTo" {
963                            return Some(attr.value.to_string());
964                        }
965                    }
966                }
967            }
968            Ok(Event::Eof) | Err(_) => return None,
969            _ => {}
970        }
971    }
972}
973
974/// Extract the `InResponseTo` attribute from the top-level `<samlp:Response>` element
975/// using proper XML parsing.
976#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
977fn extract_in_response_to(saml_xml: &str) -> Option<String> {
978    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(saml_xml);
979    loop {
980        match reader.read_event() {
981            Ok(Event::Start(e)) | Ok(Event::Empty(e)) => {
982                if xml_local(e.name()) == "Response" {
983                    for attr in e.attributes().flatten() {
984                        if attr.key.as_ref() == "InResponseTo" {
985                            return Some(attr.value.to_string());
986                        }
987                    }
988                    return None; // Found Response but no InResponseTo.
989                }
990            }
991            Ok(Event::Eof) => break,
992            Err(_) => break,
993            _ => {}
994        }
995    }
996    None
997}
998
999/// Fallback InResponseTo extractor used when `saml` feature is disabled.
1000#[cfg(not(feature = "saml"))]
1001fn extract_in_response_to(saml_xml: &str) -> Option<String> {
1002    // Minimal string-based fallback — only used in the non-saml path which now
1003    // hard-fails before reaching username extraction, so this is defence-in-depth.
1004    let response_tag_start = saml_xml.find("<samlp:Response")?;
1005    let tag_end = saml_xml[response_tag_start..].find('>')?;
1006    let tag = &saml_xml[response_tag_start..response_tag_start + tag_end];
1007    let attr_start = tag.find("InResponseTo=\"")?;
1008    let value_start = attr_start + "InResponseTo=\"".len();
1009    let value_end = tag[value_start..].find('"')?;
1010    Some(tag[value_start..value_start + value_end].to_string())
1011}
1012
1013/// Extract the username from the `<saml:NameID>` element inside the first
1014/// `<saml:Assertion>` using proper XML parsing.
1015#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
1016fn extract_username_from_saml(saml_xml: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
1017    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(saml_xml);
1018    let mut in_assertion = false;
1019    let mut in_name_id = false;
1020
1021    loop {
1022        match reader.read_event() {
1023            Ok(Event::Start(e)) => {
1024                let local = xml_local(e.name());
1025                if local == "Assertion" {
1026                    in_assertion = true;
1027                } else if in_assertion && local == "NameID" {
1028                    in_name_id = true;
1029                }
1030            }
1031            Ok(Event::End(e)) => {
1032                let local = xml_local(e.name());
1033                if in_name_id && local == "NameID" {
1034                    in_name_id = false;
1035                }
1036                if local == "Assertion" {
1037                    break; // Only look in the first Assertion.
1038                }
1039            }
1040            Ok(Event::Text(t)) if in_name_id => {
1041                let text: &str = &t;
1042                let s = text.trim();
1043                if !s.is_empty() {
1044                    return Ok(s.to_string());
1045                }
1046            }
1047            Ok(Event::Eof) => break,
1048            Err(e) => return Err(format!("XML parse error extracting NameID: {}", e)),
1049            _ => {}
1050        }
1051    }
1052
1053    Err("Could not extract username from SAML assertion".to_string())
1054}
1055
1056/// Fallback username extractor used when `saml` feature is disabled.
1057#[cfg(not(feature = "saml"))]
1058fn extract_username_from_saml(_saml_xml: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
1059    // The non-saml path now hard-fails before reaching this point.
1060    Err("SAML parsing requires the 'saml' feature".to_string())
1061}
1062
1063/// Extract SAML attributes from `<saml:AttributeStatement>` using proper XML parsing.
1064#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
1065fn extract_attributes_from_saml(saml_xml: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, Vec<String>>, String> {
1066    let mut attributes = HashMap::new();
1067    attributes.insert("source".to_string(), vec!["saml".to_string()]);
1068    attributes.insert("auth_method".to_string(), vec!["saml_sso".to_string()]);
1069
1070    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(saml_xml);
1071    let mut in_attr_statement = false;
1072    let mut in_attribute = false;
1073    let mut in_attr_value = false;
1074    let mut current_attr_name: Option<String> = None;
1075    let mut current_values: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
1076
1077    loop {
1078        match reader.read_event() {
1079            Ok(Event::Start(e)) => {
1080                let local = xml_local(e.name());
1081                if local == "AttributeStatement" {
1082                    in_attr_statement = true;
1083                } else if in_attr_statement && local == "Attribute" {
1084                    in_attribute = true;
1085                    current_values.clear();
1086                    current_attr_name = None;
1087                    for attr in e.attributes().flatten() {
1088                        if xml_local(attr.key) == "Name" {
1089                            current_attr_name = Some(attr.value.to_string());
1090                        }
1091                    }
1092                } else if in_attribute && local == "AttributeValue" {
1093                    in_attr_value = true;
1094                }
1095            }
1096            Ok(Event::End(e)) => {
1097                let local = xml_local(e.name());
1098                if local == "AttributeValue" {
1099                    in_attr_value = false;
1100                } else if local == "Attribute" && in_attribute {
1101                    if let Some(name) = current_attr_name.take()
1102                        && !current_values.is_empty()
1103                    {
1104                        attributes.insert(name, std::mem::take(&mut current_values));
1105                    }
1106                    in_attribute = false;
1107                } else if local == "AttributeStatement" {
1108                    in_attr_statement = false;
1109                }
1110            }
1111            Ok(Event::Text(t)) if in_attr_value => {
1112                let text: &str = &t;
1113                let s = text.trim();
1114                if !s.is_empty() {
1115                    current_values.push(s.to_string());
1116                }
1117            }
1118            Ok(Event::Eof) => break,
1119            Err(_) => break,
1120            _ => {}
1121        }
1122    }
1123
1124    Ok(attributes)
1125}
1126
1127/// Fallback attribute extractor used when `saml` feature is disabled.
1128#[cfg(not(feature = "saml"))]
1129fn extract_attributes_from_saml(_saml_xml: &str) -> Result<HashMap<String, Vec<String>>, String> {
1130    Err("SAML parsing requires the 'saml' feature".to_string())
1131}
1132
1133/// Validate the SAML assertion's `<saml:Conditions>` element.
1134///
1135/// Checks:
1136/// - `NotBefore` / `NotOnOrAfter` against the current time (with 60-second clock skew allowance)
1137/// - `AudienceRestriction` contains the SP's entity ID
1138#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
1139fn validate_saml_conditions(saml_xml: &str, sp_entity_id: &str) -> Result<(), String> {
1140    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(saml_xml);
1141    let mut in_assertion = false;
1142    let mut in_conditions = false;
1143    let mut in_audience_restriction = false;
1144    let mut in_audience = false;
1145    let mut found_conditions = false;
1146    let mut not_before: Option<String> = None;
1147    let mut not_on_or_after: Option<String> = None;
1148    let mut audiences: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
1149
1150    loop {
1151        match reader.read_event() {
1152            Ok(Event::Start(e)) => {
1153                let local = xml_local(e.name());
1154                if local == "Assertion" {
1155                    in_assertion = true;
1156                } else if in_assertion && local == "Conditions" {
1157                    in_conditions = true;
1158                    found_conditions = true;
1159                    for attr in e.attributes().flatten() {
1160                        let key = attr.key.as_ref();
1161                        if key == "NotBefore" {
1162                            not_before = Some(attr.value.to_string());
1163                        } else if key == "NotOnOrAfter" {
1164                            not_on_or_after = Some(attr.value.to_string());
1165                        }
1166                    }
1167                } else if in_conditions && local == "AudienceRestriction" {
1168                    in_audience_restriction = true;
1169                } else if in_audience_restriction && local == "Audience" {
1170                    in_audience = true;
1171                }
1172            }
1173            Ok(Event::End(e)) => {
1174                let local = xml_local(e.name());
1175                if local == "Audience" {
1176                    in_audience = false;
1177                } else if local == "AudienceRestriction" {
1178                    in_audience_restriction = false;
1179                } else if local == "Conditions" {
1180                    break; // Only process the first Conditions element.
1181                } else if local == "Assertion" {
1182                    break;
1183                }
1184            }
1185            Ok(Event::Text(t)) if in_audience => {
1186                let text: &str = &t;
1187                let s = text.trim();
1188                if !s.is_empty() {
1189                    audiences.push(s.to_string());
1190                }
1191            }
1192            Ok(Event::Eof) => break,
1193            Err(e) => return Err(format!("XML parse error in Conditions: {}", e)),
1194            _ => {}
1195        }
1196    }
1197
1198    if !found_conditions {
1199        return Err("Assertion does not contain a Conditions element".to_string());
1200    }
1201
1202    // 60-second clock skew allowance per SAML implementation best practice.
1203    let skew = chrono::Duration::seconds(60);
1204    let now = chrono::Utc::now();
1205
1206    if let Some(nb) = not_before {
1207        let ts = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(&nb)
1208            .or_else(|_| chrono::DateTime::parse_from_str(&nb, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%.fZ"))
1209            .map_err(|e| format!("Invalid NotBefore timestamp '{}': {}", nb, e))?;
1210        if now < ts.with_timezone(&chrono::Utc) - skew {
1211            return Err(format!("Assertion is not yet valid (NotBefore: {})", nb));
1212        }
1213    }
1214
1215    if let Some(noa) = not_on_or_after {
1216        let ts = chrono::DateTime::parse_from_rfc3339(&noa)
1217            .or_else(|_| chrono::DateTime::parse_from_str(&noa, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S%.fZ"))
1218            .map_err(|e| format!("Invalid NotOnOrAfter timestamp '{}': {}", noa, e))?;
1219        if now >= ts.with_timezone(&chrono::Utc) + skew {
1220            return Err(format!("Assertion has expired (NotOnOrAfter: {})", noa));
1221        }
1222    }
1223
1224    // Audience restriction: at least one <Audience> must match the SP's entity ID.
1225    if !audiences.is_empty() && !audiences.iter().any(|a| a == sp_entity_id) {
1226        return Err(format!(
1227            "Assertion audience restriction does not include this SP (expected '{}', got {:?})",
1228            sp_entity_id, audiences
1229        ));
1230    }
1231
1232    Ok(())
1233}
1234
1235/// Extract the `StatusCode@Value` from the first `<samlp:Status>` element
1236/// using proper XML parsing (used for SLO response validation).
1237#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
1238fn xml_extract_status_code(saml_xml: &str) -> Option<String> {
1239    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(saml_xml);
1240    let mut in_status = false;
1241
1242    loop {
1243        match reader.read_event() {
1244            Ok(Event::Start(e)) | Ok(Event::Empty(e)) => {
1245                let local = xml_local(e.name());
1246                if local == "Status" {
1247                    in_status = true;
1248                } else if in_status && local == "StatusCode" {
1249                    for attr in e.attributes().flatten() {
1250                        if attr.key.as_ref() == "Value" {
1251                            return Some(attr.value.to_string());
1252                        }
1253                    }
1254                    return None; // StatusCode without Value attribute.
1255                }
1256            }
1257            Ok(Event::End(e)) => {
1258                if xml_local(e.name()) == "Status" {
1259                    return None; // Status element ended without StatusCode.
1260                }
1261            }
1262            Ok(Event::Eof) => break,
1263            Err(_) => break,
1264            _ => {}
1265        }
1266    }
1267    None
1268}
1269
1270/// Extract the NameID text from the first `<saml:NameID>` element.
1271#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
1272fn xml_extract_name_id(saml_xml: &str) -> Option<String> {
1273    let mut reader = Reader::from_str(saml_xml);
1274    let mut in_name_id = false;
1275
1276    loop {
1277        match reader.read_event() {
1278            Ok(Event::Start(e)) => {
1279                if xml_local(e.name()) == "NameID" {
1280                    in_name_id = true;
1281                }
1282            }
1283            Ok(Event::Text(e)) if in_name_id => {
1284                let text: &str = &e;
1285                let s = text.trim();
1286                if !s.is_empty() {
1287                    return Some(s.to_string());
1288                }
1289            }
1290            Ok(Event::End(e)) if in_name_id && xml_local(e.name()) == "NameID" => {
1291                return None; // Empty NameID
1292            }
1293            Ok(Event::Eof) => break,
1294            Err(_) => break,
1295            _ => {}
1296        }
1297    }
1298    None
1299}
1300
1301#[cfg(test)]
1302#[cfg(feature = "saml")]
1303mod tests {
1304    use super::*;
1305    #[cfg(feature = "saml")]
1306    use crate::methods::saml::dsig::key_from_x509_der;
1307    use chrono::{Duration, Utc};
1308
1309    /// Regression/coverage test for the bergshamra 0.9.2 bump's rewrite of
1310    /// `key_from_x509_der`: a real X.509 certificate (ECDSA P-256, the same
1311    /// key type this codebase's own rcgen-based cert-generation tests
1312    /// already use elsewhere) must import successfully through
1313    /// `KeyData::from_spki_der(kryptering::KeyAlgorithm::Ec(EcCurve::P256), ..)`
1314    /// after failing the RSA attempt first, exercising the same
1315    /// try-RSA-then-P256-then-P384 fallback loop a real RSA-keyed SAML IdP
1316    /// certificate would use (just landing on a different iteration).
1317    #[test]
1318    fn test_key_from_x509_der_accepts_ecdsa_p256_certificate() {
1319        let key_pair = rcgen::KeyPair::generate_for(&rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256)
1320            .expect("ECDSA P-256 key generation should succeed");
1321        let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::default();
1322        let cert = params
1323            .self_signed(&key_pair)
1324            .expect("self-signing should succeed");
1325
1326        let key = key_from_x509_der(cert.der().as_ref())
1327            .expect("a valid ECDSA P-256 certificate must be accepted");
1328        assert_eq!(key.usage, bergshamra::KeyUsage::Verify);
1329    }
1330
1331    /// Same coverage as the P-256 test above, but for the RSA branch of the
1332    /// try-RSA-then-P256-then-P384 loop: a real RSA-keyed certificate must
1333    /// land on the FIRST iteration (`KeyAlgorithm::Rsa`), not fall through
1334    /// to an EC branch misinterpreting the same DER bytes. The P-256 test
1335    /// alone cannot catch a bug confined to the RSA branch (e.g. the RSA
1336    /// arm silently swapped for an EC one, or removed from the loop
1337    /// entirely) since it never exercises that code path.
1338    #[test]
1339    fn test_key_from_x509_der_accepts_rsa_certificate() {
1340        let key_pair =
1341            rcgen::KeyPair::generate_rsa_for(&rcgen::PKCS_RSA_SHA256, rcgen::RsaKeySize::_2048)
1342                .expect("RSA key generation should succeed");
1343        let params = rcgen::CertificateParams::default();
1344        let cert = params
1345            .self_signed(&key_pair)
1346            .expect("self-signing should succeed");
1347
1348        let key = key_from_x509_der(cert.der().as_ref())
1349            .expect("a valid RSA certificate must be accepted");
1350        assert_eq!(key.usage, bergshamra::KeyUsage::Verify);
1351    }
1352
1353    /// Drift detector for the deliberate choice (not CireSnave's, mine, see
1354    /// the bergshamra dependency's own Cargo.toml comment) to select
1355    /// bergshamra's `aws-lc` feature alone -- excluding its default
1356    /// `legacy-algorithms`, `post-quantum`, and `pkcs11` features, none of
1357    /// which any current SAML use case needs. If someone edits the
1358    /// `bergshamra` dependency line to add one of those back (e.g. while
1359    /// chasing an unrelated build error) without updating this test and
1360    /// its comment, this goes red -- the point is making that an explicit,
1361    /// visible decision rather than a silent feature-creep.
1362    #[test]
1363    fn test_bergshamra_feature_choices_are_deliberate() {
1364        let manifest = include_str!("../../Cargo.toml");
1365        let mut bergshamra_lines = Vec::new();
1366        for line in manifest
1367            .lines()
1368            .skip_while(|l| !l.trim_start().starts_with("bergshamra = {"))
1369        {
1370            let done = line.trim_end().ends_with("optional = true }");
1371            bergshamra_lines.push(line);
1372            if done {
1373                break;
1374            }
1375        }
1376        let bergshamra_line = bergshamra_lines.join("\n");
1377
1378        assert!(
1379            bergshamra_line.contains(r#""aws-lc""#),
1380            "expected bergshamra's feature list to include \"aws-lc\": {bergshamra_line}"
1381        );
1382        for excluded in ["legacy-algorithms", "post-quantum", "pkcs11", "rustcrypto"] {
1383            assert!(
1384                !bergshamra_line.contains(excluded),
1385                "bergshamra's feature list now includes {excluded:?}, which was a deliberate \
1386                 exclusion (see the dependency's own Cargo.toml comment) -- if this is an \
1387                 intentional change, update that comment and this test together, don't just \
1388                 fix the assertion"
1389            );
1390        }
1391    }
1392
1393    #[test]
1394    fn test_key_from_x509_der_rejects_non_certificate_der() {
1395        let err = key_from_x509_der(b"not a certificate")
1396            .expect_err("garbage input must not be accepted as a certificate");
1397        assert!(err.contains("Failed to parse X.509 certificate"));
1398    }
1399
1400    #[test]
1401    fn test_extract_issuer() {
1402        // extract_issuer looks for an <Issuer> that is a direct child of a <Response> element.
1403        let xml = r#"<samlp:Response><saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer></samlp:Response>"#;
1404        assert_eq!(extract_issuer(xml).unwrap(), "https://idp.example.com");
1405    }
1406
1407    #[test]
1408    fn test_extract_username() {
1409        // extract_username_from_saml looks for a <NameID> inside an <Assertion> element.
1410        let xml = r#"<saml:Assertion><saml:Subject><saml:NameID>user@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject></saml:Assertion>"#;
1411        assert_eq!(extract_username_from_saml(xml).unwrap(), "user@example.com");
1412    }
1413
1414    #[test]
1415    fn test_validate_conditions_time() {
1416        // validate_saml_conditions looks for <Conditions> inside an <Assertion> element.
1417        let now = Utc::now();
1418        let past = now - Duration::minutes(10);
1419        let future = now + Duration::minutes(10);
1420        let xml = format!(
1421            r#"<saml:Assertion><saml:Conditions NotBefore="{}" NotOnOrAfter="{}"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>test-aud</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions></saml:Assertion>"#,
1422            past.to_rfc3339(),
1423            future.to_rfc3339()
1424        );
1425        assert!(validate_saml_conditions(&xml, "test-aud").is_ok());
1426
1427        let wrong_aud = format!(
1428            r#"<saml:Assertion><saml:Conditions NotBefore="{}" NotOnOrAfter="{}"><saml:AudienceRestriction><saml:Audience>wrong-aud</saml:Audience></saml:AudienceRestriction></saml:Conditions></saml:Assertion>"#,
1429            past.to_rfc3339(),
1430            future.to_rfc3339()
1431        );
1432        assert!(validate_saml_conditions(&wrong_aud, "test-aud").is_err());
1433    }
1434
1435    #[test]
1436    fn test_extract_status() {
1437        let xml = r#"<samlp:Status><samlp:StatusCode Value="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"/></samlp:Status>"#;
1438        assert_eq!(
1439            xml_extract_status_code(xml).unwrap(),
1440            "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:status:Success"
1441        );
1442    }
1443}