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auth_framework/server/security/
fapi.rs

1//! FAPI 2.0 (Financial-grade API) Security Profile Implementation
2//!
3//! This module implements the Financial-grade API (FAPI) 2.0 Security Profile,
4//! which provides enhanced security requirements for high-risk scenarios like
5//! financial services.
6//!
7//! # Security Features
8//!
9//! - **Enhanced Request Security**: JWS request object signing
10//! - **Response Security**: JWS response signing
11//! - **Advanced Client Authentication**: Enhanced mTLS and private key JWT
12//! - **Threat Protection**: JARM, DPoP, PAR mandatory
13//! - **Compliance Validation**: Automated FAPI 2.0 requirement checking
14//! - **Sender-Constrained Tokens**: Resource server validation of token binding
15//! - **Rich Authorization Requests**: RFC 9396 fine-grained authorization
16//! - **Enhanced Logging**: Detailed audit trails
17//!
18//! # FAPI 2.0 Requirements
19//!
20//! - Mutual TLS (mTLS) for client authentication
21//! - JWS request object signing (RFC 9101)
22//! - DPoP for sender constraining (RFC 9449)
23//! - Pushed Authorization Requests (PAR) (RFC 9126)
24//! - JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode (JARM)
25//! - Enhanced threat modeling and protection
26
27use crate::errors::{AuthError, Result};
28use crate::security::secure_jwt::SecureJwtValidator;
29use crate::server::{DpopManager, MutualTlsManager, PARManager, PrivateKeyJwtManager};
30use chrono::{DateTime, Duration, Utc};
31use jsonwebtoken::{Algorithm, DecodingKey, EncodingKey, Header, Validation};
32use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
33use serde_json::{Value, json};
34use std::collections::HashMap;
35use std::sync::Arc;
36use tokio::sync::RwLock;
37use uuid::Uuid;
38
39/// FAPI 2.0 Security Profile Manager
40#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
41pub struct FapiManager {
42    /// DPoP manager for sender constraining
43    dpop_manager: Arc<DpopManager>,
44
45    /// Mutual TLS manager for client authentication
46    mtls_manager: Arc<MutualTlsManager>,
47
48    /// PAR manager for pushed authorization requests
49    par_manager: Arc<PARManager>,
50
51    /// Private key JWT manager
52    private_key_jwt_manager: Arc<PrivateKeyJwtManager>,
53
54    /// JWT validator for request object validation
55    jwt_validator: Arc<SecureJwtValidator>,
56
57    /// FAPI configuration
58    config: FapiConfig,
59
60    /// Active FAPI sessions
61    sessions: Arc<RwLock<HashMap<String, FapiSession>>>,
62}
63
64/// FAPI 2.0 Configuration
65#[derive(Clone)]
66pub struct FapiConfig {
67    /// Issuer identifier
68    pub issuer: String,
69
70    /// Request object signing algorithm (required: RS256, PS256, or ES256)
71    pub request_signing_algorithm: Algorithm,
72
73    /// Response signing algorithm
74    pub response_signing_algorithm: Algorithm,
75
76    /// Private key for signing
77    pub private_key: EncodingKey,
78
79    /// Public key for verification
80    pub public_key: DecodingKey,
81
82    /// Maximum request object age (seconds)
83    pub max_request_age: i64,
84
85    /// Require DPoP for all requests
86    pub require_dpop: bool,
87
88    /// Require mTLS for all requests
89    pub require_mtls: bool,
90
91    /// Require PAR for authorization requests
92    pub require_par: bool,
93
94    /// Enable JARM (JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode)
95    pub enable_jarm: bool,
96
97    /// Enhanced audit logging
98    pub enhanced_audit: bool,
99
100    /// Whether the config is running in degraded mode (HMAC placeholder keys
101    /// instead of the required RSA keys). FAPI operations MUST reject requests
102    /// when this flag is true.
103    pub is_degraded: bool,
104}
105
106impl std::fmt::Debug for FapiConfig {
107    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
108        f.debug_struct("FapiConfig")
109            .field("issuer", &self.issuer)
110            .field("request_signing_algorithm", &self.request_signing_algorithm)
111            .field(
112                "response_signing_algorithm",
113                &self.response_signing_algorithm,
114            )
115            .field("private_key", &"<EncodingKey>")
116            .field("public_key", &"<DecodingKey>")
117            .field("max_request_age", &self.max_request_age)
118            .field("require_dpop", &self.require_dpop)
119            .field("require_mtls", &self.require_mtls)
120            .field("require_par", &self.require_par)
121            .field("enable_jarm", &self.enable_jarm)
122            .field("enhanced_audit", &self.enhanced_audit)
123            .field("is_degraded", &self.is_degraded)
124            .finish()
125    }
126}
127
128impl FapiConfig {
129    /// Create a new FAPI 2.0 configuration builder.
130    ///
131    /// The builder enforces strict FAPI 2.0 compliance by default (DPoP, mTLS, PAR, JARM enabled).
132    pub fn builder(
133        issuer: impl Into<String>,
134        private_key: EncodingKey,
135        public_key: DecodingKey,
136    ) -> FapiConfigBuilder {
137        FapiConfigBuilder {
138            issuer: issuer.into(),
139            request_signing_algorithm: Algorithm::PS256,
140            response_signing_algorithm: Algorithm::PS256,
141            private_key,
142            public_key,
143            max_request_age: 60,
144            require_dpop: true,
145            require_mtls: true,
146            require_par: true,
147            enable_jarm: true,
148            enhanced_audit: true,
149            is_degraded: false,
150        }
151    }
152
153    /// Load configuration from environment variables.
154    #[deprecated(since = "0.5.0", note = "use FapiConfig::from_env() instead")]
155    pub fn load_from_env() -> Self {
156        Self::from_env()
157    }
158
159    /// Create a FAPI configuration from standard environment variables.
160    ///
161    /// Reads `FAPI_ISSUER`, `FAPI_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH`, and `FAPI_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH`.
162    pub fn from_env() -> Self {
163        Self::default()
164    }
165}
166
167/// Builder for FAPI 2.0 Configuration
168pub struct FapiConfigBuilder {
169    issuer: String,
170    request_signing_algorithm: Algorithm,
171    response_signing_algorithm: Algorithm,
172    private_key: EncodingKey,
173    public_key: DecodingKey,
174    max_request_age: i64,
175    require_dpop: bool,
176    require_mtls: bool,
177    require_par: bool,
178    enable_jarm: bool,
179    enhanced_audit: bool,
180    is_degraded: bool,
181}
182
183impl FapiConfigBuilder {
184    /// Set the request signing algorithm (default: PS256).
185    ///
186    /// FAPI 2.0 requires PS256 or ES256.
187    pub fn request_signing_algorithm(mut self, alg: Algorithm) -> Self {
188        self.request_signing_algorithm = alg;
189        self
190    }
191
192    /// Set the response signing algorithm (default: PS256).
193    pub fn response_signing_algorithm(mut self, alg: Algorithm) -> Self {
194        self.response_signing_algorithm = alg;
195        self
196    }
197
198    /// Set the maximum allowed age for request objects in seconds (default: 60).
199    pub fn max_request_age(mut self, age: i64) -> Self {
200        self.max_request_age = age;
201        self
202    }
203
204    /// Set whether DPoP is required (default: true).
205    pub fn require_dpop(mut self, require: bool) -> Self {
206        self.require_dpop = require;
207        self
208    }
209
210    /// Set whether mTLS is required (default: true).
211    pub fn require_mtls(mut self, require: bool) -> Self {
212        self.require_mtls = require;
213        self
214    }
215
216    /// Set whether PAR is required (default: true).
217    pub fn require_par(mut self, require: bool) -> Self {
218        self.require_par = require;
219        self
220    }
221
222    /// Enable or disable JARM (default: true).
223    pub fn enable_jarm(mut self, enable: bool) -> Self {
224        self.enable_jarm = enable;
225        self
226    }
227
228    /// Enable or disable enhanced audit logging (default: true).
229    pub fn enhanced_audit(mut self, enable: bool) -> Self {
230        self.enhanced_audit = enable;
231        self
232    }
233
234    /// Mark this configuration as degraded (for testing/development only).
235    pub fn degraded(mut self) -> Self {
236        self.is_degraded = true;
237        self
238    }
239
240    /// Build the FapiConfig.
241    pub fn build(self) -> FapiConfig {
242        FapiConfig {
243            issuer: self.issuer,
244            request_signing_algorithm: self.request_signing_algorithm,
245            response_signing_algorithm: self.response_signing_algorithm,
246            private_key: self.private_key,
247            public_key: self.public_key,
248            max_request_age: self.max_request_age,
249            require_dpop: self.require_dpop,
250            require_mtls: self.require_mtls,
251            require_par: self.require_par,
252            enable_jarm: self.enable_jarm,
253            enhanced_audit: self.enhanced_audit,
254            is_degraded: self.is_degraded,
255        }
256    }
257}
258
259/// FAPI 2.0 Session
260#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
261pub struct FapiSession {
262    /// Session ID
263    pub session_id: String,
264
265    /// Client ID
266    pub client_id: String,
267
268    /// User ID
269    pub user_id: String,
270
271    /// Session creation time
272    pub created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
273
274    /// Session expiration time
275    pub expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
276
277    /// DPoP proof token
278    pub dpop_proof: Option<String>,
279
280    /// Client certificate thumbprint
281    pub cert_thumbprint: Option<String>,
282
283    /// Request object JTI (to prevent replay)
284    pub request_jti: Option<String>,
285
286    /// Authorized scopes
287    pub scopes: Vec<String>,
288
289    /// Session metadata
290    pub metadata: HashMap<String, Value>,
291}
292
293impl FapiSession {
294    /// Create a new builder for a FAPI 2.0 Session.
295    pub fn builder(
296        session_id: impl Into<String>,
297        client_id: impl Into<String>,
298        user_id: impl Into<String>,
299        expires_in: Duration,
300    ) -> FapiSessionBuilder {
301        let now = Utc::now();
302        FapiSessionBuilder {
303            session_id: session_id.into(),
304            client_id: client_id.into(),
305            user_id: user_id.into(),
306            created_at: now,
307            expires_at: now + expires_in,
308            dpop_proof: None,
309            cert_thumbprint: None,
310            request_jti: None,
311            scopes: Vec::new(),
312            metadata: HashMap::new(),
313        }
314    }
315}
316
317/// Builder for FAPI 2.0 Session
318pub struct FapiSessionBuilder {
319    session_id: String,
320    client_id: String,
321    user_id: String,
322    created_at: DateTime<Utc>,
323    expires_at: DateTime<Utc>,
324    dpop_proof: Option<String>,
325    cert_thumbprint: Option<String>,
326    request_jti: Option<String>,
327    scopes: Vec<String>,
328    metadata: HashMap<String, Value>,
329}
330
331impl FapiSessionBuilder {
332    /// Set the DPoP proof token.
333    pub fn dpop_proof(mut self, proof: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
334        self.dpop_proof = Some(proof.into());
335        self
336    }
337
338    /// Set the client certificate thumbprint for mTLS.
339    pub fn cert_thumbprint(mut self, thumbprint: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
340        self.cert_thumbprint = Some(thumbprint.into());
341        self
342    }
343
344    /// Set the request object JTI to prevent replay.
345    pub fn request_jti(mut self, jti: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
346        self.request_jti = Some(jti.into());
347        self
348    }
349
350    /// Add an authorized scope.
351    pub fn add_scope(mut self, scope: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
352        self.scopes.push(scope.into());
353        self
354    }
355
356    /// Add multiple authorized scopes.
357    pub fn add_scopes<I, S>(mut self, scopes: I) -> Self
358    where
359        I: IntoIterator<Item = S>,
360        S: Into<String>,
361    {
362        self.scopes.extend(scopes.into_iter().map(Into::into));
363        self
364    }
365
366    /// Add custom metadata to the session.
367    pub fn add_metadata(mut self, key: impl Into<String>, value: Value) -> Self {
368        self.metadata.insert(key.into(), value);
369        self
370    }
371
372    /// Build the FapiSession.
373    pub fn build(self) -> FapiSession {
374        FapiSession {
375            session_id: self.session_id,
376            client_id: self.client_id,
377            user_id: self.user_id,
378            created_at: self.created_at,
379            expires_at: self.expires_at,
380            dpop_proof: self.dpop_proof,
381            cert_thumbprint: self.cert_thumbprint,
382            request_jti: self.request_jti,
383            scopes: self.scopes,
384            metadata: self.metadata,
385        }
386    }
387}
388
389/// FAPI 2.0 Request Object Claims
390#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
391pub struct FapiRequestObject {
392    /// Issuer (client_id)
393    pub iss: String,
394
395    /// Audience (authorization server)
396    pub aud: String,
397
398    /// Issued at time
399    pub iat: i64,
400
401    /// Expiration time
402    pub exp: i64,
403
404    /// Not before time
405    pub nbf: Option<i64>,
406
407    /// JWT ID (unique identifier)
408    pub jti: String,
409
410    /// Response type
411    pub response_type: String,
412
413    /// Client ID
414    pub client_id: String,
415
416    /// Redirect URI
417    pub redirect_uri: String,
418
419    /// Scope
420    pub scope: String,
421
422    /// State
423    pub state: Option<String>,
424
425    /// Nonce (for OIDC)
426    pub nonce: Option<String>,
427
428    /// Code challenge (for PKCE)
429    pub code_challenge: Option<String>,
430
431    /// Code challenge method
432    pub code_challenge_method: Option<String>,
433
434    /// Additional claims
435    #[serde(flatten)]
436    pub additional_claims: HashMap<String, Value>,
437}
438
439/// FAPI 2.0 Authorization Response (JARM)
440#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
441pub struct FapiAuthorizationResponse {
442    /// Issuer (authorization server)
443    pub iss: String,
444
445    /// Audience (client_id)
446    pub aud: String,
447
448    /// Issued at time
449    pub iat: i64,
450
451    /// Expiration time
452    pub exp: i64,
453
454    /// Authorization code (if successful)
455    pub code: Option<String>,
456
457    /// State parameter
458    pub state: Option<String>,
459
460    /// Error code (if failed)
461    pub error: Option<String>,
462
463    /// Error description
464    pub error_description: Option<String>,
465
466    /// Additional response parameters
467    #[serde(flatten)]
468    pub additional_params: HashMap<String, Value>,
469}
470
471/// FAPI 2.0 Token Response
472#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
473pub struct FapiTokenResponse {
474    /// Access token
475    pub access_token: String,
476
477    /// Token type (always "DPoP" for FAPI 2.0)
478    pub token_type: String,
479
480    /// Expires in (seconds)
481    pub expires_in: i64,
482
483    /// Refresh token
484    pub refresh_token: Option<String>,
485
486    /// Scope
487    pub scope: Option<String>,
488
489    /// ID token (for OIDC)
490    pub id_token: Option<String>,
491
492    /// Certificate thumbprint confirmation
493    pub cnf: Option<Value>,
494}
495
496impl std::fmt::Debug for FapiTokenResponse {
497    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
498        let mut d = f.debug_struct("FapiTokenResponse");
499        d.field(
500            "access_token",
501            &crate::utils::redact::redacted(&self.access_token),
502        );
503        d.field("token_type", &self.token_type);
504        d.field("expires_in", &self.expires_in);
505        d.field(
506            "refresh_token",
507            &crate::utils::redact::redacted(&self.refresh_token),
508        );
509        d.field("scope", &self.scope);
510        d.field("id_token", &crate::utils::redact::redacted(&self.id_token));
511        d.field("cnf", &self.cnf);
512        d.finish()
513    }
514}
515
516impl FapiManager {
517    /// Create a new FAPI manager
518    pub fn new(
519        config: FapiConfig,
520        dpop_manager: Arc<DpopManager>,
521        mtls_manager: Arc<MutualTlsManager>,
522        par_manager: Arc<PARManager>,
523        private_key_jwt_manager: Arc<PrivateKeyJwtManager>,
524        jwt_validator: Arc<SecureJwtValidator>,
525    ) -> Self {
526        Self {
527            dpop_manager,
528            mtls_manager,
529            par_manager,
530            private_key_jwt_manager,
531            jwt_validator,
532            config,
533            sessions: Arc::new(RwLock::new(HashMap::new())),
534        }
535    }
536
537    /// Validate FAPI 2.0 authorization request
538    pub async fn validate_authorization_request(
539        &self,
540        request_object: &str,
541        client_cert: Option<&str>,
542        dpop_proof: Option<&str>,
543        request_uri: Option<&str>,
544    ) -> Result<FapiRequestObject> {
545        let claims = if let Some(uri) = request_uri {
546            // PAR workflow - validate request_uri and retrieve the request
547            if self.config.require_par {
548                // Use PAR manager to consume the pushed request
549                let par_request = self.par_manager.consume_request(uri).await.map_err(|e| {
550                    AuthError::InvalidRequest(format!("PAR request validation failed: {}", e))
551                })?;
552
553                tracing::info!(
554                    "FAPI PAR request consumed successfully for client: {}",
555                    par_request.client_id
556                );
557
558                // Convert PAR request to FAPI request object
559                let nonce = par_request.additional_params.get("nonce").cloned();
560                FapiRequestObject {
561                    iss: par_request.client_id.clone(),
562                    aud: self.config.issuer.clone(),
563                    iat: Utc::now().timestamp(),
564                    exp: Utc::now().timestamp() + 300, // 5 minutes
565                    nbf: Some(Utc::now().timestamp()),
566                    jti: uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
567                    response_type: par_request.response_type,
568                    client_id: par_request.client_id,
569                    redirect_uri: par_request.redirect_uri,
570                    scope: par_request.scope.unwrap_or_default(),
571                    state: par_request.state,
572                    nonce,
573                    code_challenge: par_request.code_challenge,
574                    code_challenge_method: par_request.code_challenge_method,
575                    additional_claims: par_request
576                        .additional_params
577                        .into_iter()
578                        .map(|(k, v)| (k, serde_json::Value::String(v)))
579                        .collect(),
580                }
581            } else {
582                return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(
583                    "request_uri provided but PAR not required".to_string(),
584                ));
585            }
586        } else {
587            // Standard request object validation
588            if self.config.require_par {
589                return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(
590                    "PAR is required but no request_uri provided".to_string(),
591                ));
592            }
593
594            // Validate request object JWT using enhanced validation
595            self.validate_request_object(request_object).await?
596        };
597
598        // Validate mTLS if required
599        if self.config.require_mtls {
600            let cert = client_cert.ok_or_else(|| {
601                AuthError::auth_method("mtls", "mTLS certificate required for FAPI 2.0")
602            })?;
603            let cert_bytes = decode_client_certificate(cert)?;
604            self.mtls_manager
605                .validate_client_certificate(&cert_bytes, &claims.client_id)
606                .await?;
607        }
608
609        // Validate DPoP if required
610        if self.config.require_dpop {
611            let proof = dpop_proof.ok_or_else(|| {
612                AuthError::auth_method("dpop", "DPoP proof required for FAPI 2.0")
613            })?;
614            self.dpop_manager
615                .validate_dpop_proof(
616                    proof,
617                    "POST",
618                    &format!("{}/authorize", self.config.issuer),
619                    None,
620                    None,
621                )
622                .await?;
623        }
624
625        // Validate request object claims
626        self.validate_request_claims(&claims).await?;
627
628        Ok(claims)
629    }
630
631    /// Validate request object JWT
632    async fn validate_request_object(&self, request_object: &str) -> Result<FapiRequestObject> {
633        // Use the SecureJwtValidator for enhanced security validation
634        let decoding_key = &self.config.public_key;
635
636        // Validate using SecureJwtValidator with enhanced security features
637        match self
638            .jwt_validator
639            .validate_token(request_object, decoding_key)
640        {
641            Ok(secure_claims) => {
642                // Decode JWT header to get algorithm
643                let header = jsonwebtoken::decode_header(request_object).map_err(|e| {
644                    AuthError::token(format!("Invalid request object header: {}", e))
645                })?;
646
647                // Validate algorithm requirement for FAPI
648                if !matches!(
649                    header.alg,
650                    Algorithm::RS256 | Algorithm::PS256 | Algorithm::ES256
651                ) {
652                    return Err(AuthError::token(
653                        "Request object must use RS256, PS256, or ES256".to_string(),
654                    ));
655                }
656
657                // Set up validation with the same algorithm for FAPI-specific claims
658                let mut validation = Validation::new(header.alg);
659                validation.set_audience(&[&self.config.issuer]);
660                validation.validate_exp = true;
661                validation.validate_nbf = true;
662
663                // Decode the FAPI request object structure
664                let token_data = jsonwebtoken::decode::<FapiRequestObject>(
665                    request_object,
666                    &self.config.public_key,
667                    &validation,
668                )
669                .map_err(|e| {
670                    AuthError::token(format!("Request object validation failed: {}", e))
671                })?;
672
673                let fapi_claims = token_data.claims;
674
675                // Use the validated secure claims for enhanced security checks
676                // Ensure the subject matches between secure validation and FAPI claims
677                if secure_claims.sub != fapi_claims.client_id {
678                    return Err(AuthError::token(
679                        "Subject mismatch between secure validation and FAPI claims".to_string(),
680                    ));
681                }
682
683                // Use secure claims issuer for additional validation
684                if secure_claims.iss != fapi_claims.iss {
685                    return Err(AuthError::token(
686                        "Issuer mismatch between secure validation and FAPI claims".to_string(),
687                    ));
688                }
689
690                // Validate expiry consistency
691                if secure_claims.exp != fapi_claims.exp {
692                    return Err(AuthError::token(
693                        "Expiry mismatch between secure validation and FAPI claims".to_string(),
694                    ));
695                }
696
697                // Additional FAPI validations using the validated claims
698                let now = Utc::now().timestamp();
699
700                // Check request object age
701                if now - fapi_claims.iat > self.config.max_request_age {
702                    return Err(AuthError::token("Request object too old".to_string()));
703                }
704
705                // Validate required claims
706                if fapi_claims.client_id.is_empty() {
707                    return Err(AuthError::token(
708                        "client_id required in request object".to_string(),
709                    ));
710                }
711
712                if fapi_claims.redirect_uri.is_empty() {
713                    return Err(AuthError::token(
714                        "redirect_uri required in request object".to_string(),
715                    ));
716                }
717
718                if fapi_claims.response_type.is_empty() {
719                    return Err(AuthError::token(
720                        "response_type required in request object".to_string(),
721                    ));
722                }
723
724                tracing::info!(
725                    "FAPI request object validated successfully with SecureJwtValidator for client: {}",
726                    fapi_claims.client_id
727                );
728
729                Ok(fapi_claims)
730            }
731            Err(e) => {
732                tracing::error!("SecureJwtValidator failed for FAPI request object: {}", e);
733                Err(AuthError::token(format!(
734                    "Enhanced JWT validation failed: {}",
735                    e
736                )))
737            }
738        }
739    }
740
741    /// Validate request object claims against FAPI requirements
742    async fn validate_request_claims(&self, claims: &FapiRequestObject) -> Result<()> {
743        // Validate response_type for FAPI 2.0
744        if !matches!(claims.response_type.as_str(), "code" | "code id_token") {
745            return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(
746                "FAPI 2.0 requires code or code id_token response type".to_string(),
747            ));
748        }
749
750        // Validate PKCE for public clients
751        if claims.code_challenge.is_none() {
752            return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(
753                "PKCE required for FAPI 2.0".to_string(),
754            ));
755        }
756
757        if let Some(method) = &claims.code_challenge_method {
758            if method != "S256" {
759                return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(
760                    "FAPI 2.0 requires S256 code challenge method".to_string(),
761                ));
762            }
763        } else {
764            return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(
765                "code_challenge_method required for FAPI 2.0".to_string(),
766            ));
767        }
768
769        Ok(())
770    }
771
772    /// Authenticate client using private key JWT (RFC 7523)
773    ///
774    /// The caller learns only that authentication failed: the detailed reasons (unknown client,
775    /// bad signature, wrong audience, replay, ...) are logged, never returned.
776    pub async fn authenticate_client_jwt(&self, client_assertion: &str) -> Result<String> {
777        const REFUSED: &str = "Client authentication failed";
778
779        // Use the private key JWT manager for authentication
780        let auth_result = match self
781            .private_key_jwt_manager
782            .authenticate_client(client_assertion)
783            .await
784        {
785            Ok(result) => result,
786            Err(e) => {
787                tracing::warn!("FAPI private key JWT assertion rejected: {}", e);
788                return Err(AuthError::auth_method("private_key_jwt", REFUSED));
789            }
790        };
791
792        if auth_result.authenticated {
793            tracing::info!(
794                "FAPI client authenticated successfully using private key JWT: {}",
795                auth_result.client_id
796            );
797            Ok(auth_result.client_id)
798        } else {
799            tracing::warn!(
800                "FAPI private key JWT authentication failed: {}",
801                auth_result.errors.join("; ")
802            );
803            Err(AuthError::auth_method("private_key_jwt", REFUSED))
804        }
805    }
806
807    /// Validate FAPI token request with enhanced security
808    pub async fn validate_token_request(
809        &self,
810        client_assertion: Option<&str>,
811        client_cert: Option<&str>,
812        dpop_proof: Option<&str>,
813        authorization_code: &str,
814    ) -> Result<String> {
815        // Client authentication - prefer private key JWT for FAPI 2.0
816        let client_id = if let Some(assertion) = client_assertion {
817            self.authenticate_client_jwt(assertion).await?
818        } else if self.config.require_mtls {
819            if let Some(cert) = client_cert {
820                let cert_bytes = decode_client_certificate(cert)?;
821
822                // Look the client up by the identity the certificate carries; the manager then
823                // verifies the chain AND that this certificate is bound to that client.
824                let client_id = self.extract_client_id_from_certificate(&cert_bytes).await?;
825
826                self.mtls_manager
827                    .validate_client_certificate(&cert_bytes, &client_id)
828                    .await?;
829
830                client_id.to_string()
831            } else {
832                return Err(AuthError::auth_method(
833                    "mtls",
834                    "Client certificate required for FAPI 2.0 token request",
835                ));
836            }
837        } else {
838            return Err(AuthError::auth_method(
839                "fapi",
840                "FAPI 2.0 requires either private_key_jwt or mTLS client authentication",
841            ));
842        };
843
844        // Validate DPoP if required
845        if self.config.require_dpop {
846            let proof = dpop_proof.ok_or_else(|| {
847                AuthError::auth_method("dpop", "DPoP proof required for FAPI 2.0 token request")
848            })?;
849            self.dpop_manager
850                .validate_dpop_proof(
851                    proof,
852                    "POST",
853                    &format!("{}/token", self.config.issuer),
854                    Some(authorization_code), // Include authorization code in DPoP validation
855                    None,
856                )
857                .await?;
858        }
859
860        Ok(client_id)
861    }
862
863    /// Generate FAPI 2.0 authorization response (JARM)
864    pub async fn generate_authorization_response(
865        &self,
866        client_id: &str,
867        code: Option<&str>,
868        state: Option<&str>,
869        error: Option<&str>,
870        error_description: Option<&str>,
871    ) -> Result<String> {
872        if !self.config.enable_jarm {
873            return Err(AuthError::Configuration {
874                message: "JARM not enabled".to_string(),
875                help: Some("Enable JARM in your configuration to use this feature".to_string()),
876                docs_url: Some("https://docs.auth-framework.com/fapi#jarm".to_string()),
877                source: None,
878                suggested_fix: Some("Set enable_jarm to true in your FAPIConfig".to_string()),
879            });
880        }
881
882        let now = Utc::now();
883        let exp = now + Duration::minutes(5); // Response expires in 5 minutes
884
885        let response = FapiAuthorizationResponse {
886            iss: self.config.issuer.clone(),
887            aud: client_id.to_string(),
888            iat: now.timestamp(),
889            exp: exp.timestamp(),
890            code: code.map(|c| c.to_string()),
891            state: state.map(|s| s.to_string()),
892            error: error.map(|e| e.to_string()),
893            error_description: error_description.map(|d| d.to_string()),
894            additional_params: HashMap::new(),
895        };
896
897        // Create JWT header
898        let header = Header::new(self.config.response_signing_algorithm);
899
900        // Sign the response
901        let token =
902            jsonwebtoken::encode(&header, &response, &self.config.private_key).map_err(|e| {
903                AuthError::TokenGeneration(format!("Failed to sign JARM response: {}", e))
904            })?;
905
906        Ok(token)
907    }
908
909    /// Generate FAPI 2.0 token response
910    pub async fn generate_token_response(
911        &self,
912        client_id: &str,
913        user_id: &str,
914        scopes: Vec<String>,
915        cert_thumbprint: Option<String>,
916        dpop_jkt: Option<String>,
917    ) -> Result<FapiTokenResponse> {
918        // Generate access token
919        let access_token = self
920            .generate_access_token(client_id, user_id, &scopes, &cert_thumbprint, &dpop_jkt)
921            .await?;
922
923        // Generate refresh token
924        let refresh_token = self.generate_refresh_token(client_id, user_id).await?;
925
926        // Build confirmation claim
927        let mut cnf = json!({});
928
929        if let Some(thumbprint) = cert_thumbprint {
930            cnf["x5t#S256"] = Value::String(thumbprint);
931        }
932
933        if let Some(jkt) = dpop_jkt {
934            cnf["jkt"] = Value::String(jkt);
935        }
936
937        let response = FapiTokenResponse {
938            access_token,
939            token_type: "DPoP".to_string(), // Always DPoP for FAPI 2.0
940            expires_in: 3600,               // 1 hour
941            refresh_token: Some(refresh_token),
942            scope: Some(scopes.join(" ")),
943            id_token: None, // ID token generated by OIDC layer when openid scope present
944            cnf: if cnf.as_object().is_none_or(|o| o.is_empty()) {
945                None
946            } else {
947                Some(cnf)
948            },
949        };
950
951        Ok(response)
952    }
953
954    /// Generate access token
955    async fn generate_access_token(
956        &self,
957        client_id: &str,
958        user_id: &str,
959        scopes: &[String],
960        cert_thumbprint: &Option<String>,
961        dpop_jkt: &Option<String>,
962    ) -> Result<String> {
963        let now = Utc::now();
964        let exp = now + Duration::hours(1);
965
966        let mut claims = json!({
967            "iss": self.config.issuer,
968            "aud": client_id,
969            "sub": user_id,
970            "iat": now.timestamp(),
971            "exp": exp.timestamp(),
972            "scope": scopes.join(" "),
973            "jti": Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
974        });
975
976        // Add confirmation claims
977        let mut cnf = json!({});
978
979        if let Some(thumbprint) = cert_thumbprint {
980            cnf["x5t#S256"] = Value::String(thumbprint.clone());
981        }
982
983        if let Some(jkt) = dpop_jkt {
984            cnf["jkt"] = Value::String(jkt.clone());
985        }
986
987        if !cnf.as_object().is_none_or(|o| o.is_empty()) {
988            claims["cnf"] = cnf;
989        }
990
991        // Create JWT header
992        let header = Header::new(Algorithm::RS256);
993
994        // Sign the token
995        let token =
996            jsonwebtoken::encode(&header, &claims, &self.config.private_key).map_err(|e| {
997                AuthError::TokenGeneration(format!("Failed to generate access token: {}", e))
998            })?;
999
1000        Ok(token)
1001    }
1002
1003    /// Generate refresh token
1004    async fn generate_refresh_token(&self, client_id: &str, user_id: &str) -> Result<String> {
1005        let now = Utc::now();
1006        let exp = now + Duration::days(30); // 30 day expiry
1007
1008        let claims = json!({
1009            "iss": self.config.issuer,
1010            "aud": client_id,
1011            "sub": user_id,
1012            "iat": now.timestamp(),
1013            "exp": exp.timestamp(),
1014            "typ": crate::security::secure_jwt::TYP_REFRESH_TOKEN,
1015            "jti": Uuid::new_v4().to_string(),
1016        });
1017
1018        // Create JWT header
1019        let header = Header::new(Algorithm::RS256);
1020
1021        // Sign the token
1022        let token =
1023            jsonwebtoken::encode(&header, &claims, &self.config.private_key).map_err(|e| {
1024                AuthError::TokenGeneration(format!("Failed to generate refresh token: {}", e))
1025            })?;
1026
1027        Ok(token)
1028    }
1029
1030    /// Create FAPI session
1031    pub async fn create_session(
1032        &self,
1033        client_id: &str,
1034        user_id: &str,
1035        scopes: Vec<String>,
1036        dpop_proof: Option<String>,
1037        cert_thumbprint: Option<String>,
1038        request_jti: Option<String>,
1039    ) -> Result<String> {
1040        let session_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
1041        let now = Utc::now();
1042        let expires_at = now + Duration::hours(24); // 24 hour session
1043
1044        let session = FapiSession {
1045            session_id: session_id.clone(),
1046            client_id: client_id.to_string(),
1047            user_id: user_id.to_string(),
1048            created_at: now,
1049            expires_at,
1050            dpop_proof,
1051            cert_thumbprint,
1052            request_jti,
1053            scopes,
1054            metadata: HashMap::new(),
1055        };
1056
1057        let mut sessions = self.sessions.write().await;
1058        sessions.insert(session_id.clone(), session);
1059
1060        Ok(session_id)
1061    }
1062
1063    /// Get FAPI session
1064    pub async fn get_session(&self, session_id: &str) -> Result<Option<FapiSession>> {
1065        let sessions = self.sessions.read().await;
1066        Ok(sessions.get(session_id).cloned())
1067    }
1068
1069    /// Validate FAPI session
1070    pub async fn validate_session(&self, session_id: &str) -> Result<FapiSession> {
1071        let session = self
1072            .get_session(session_id)
1073            .await?
1074            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Session not found".to_string()))?;
1075
1076        // Check expiration
1077        if Utc::now() > session.expires_at {
1078            return Err(AuthError::validation("Session expired".to_string()));
1079        }
1080
1081        Ok(session)
1082    }
1083
1084    /// Remove FAPI session
1085    pub async fn remove_session(&self, session_id: &str) -> Result<()> {
1086        let mut sessions = self.sessions.write().await;
1087        sessions.remove(session_id);
1088        Ok(())
1089    }
1090
1091    /// Audit log entry for FAPI compliance
1092    pub async fn audit_log(&self, event: &str, details: &Value) -> Result<()> {
1093        if self.config.enhanced_audit {
1094            // Implement proper audit logging for FAPI compliance
1095            // This should log to secure, tamper-evident storage
1096            // Format: ISO 8601 timestamp, event type, client details, user context
1097            let timestamp = chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339();
1098            let audit_entry = format!("[{}] FAPI AUDIT: {} - {}", timestamp, event, details);
1099
1100            // In production, write to secure audit log storage
1101            tracing::info!("{}", audit_entry);
1102        }
1103        Ok(())
1104    }
1105
1106    /// Extract client ID from certificate
1107    async fn extract_client_id_from_certificate(&self, cert_bytes: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
1108        client_id_from_certificate(cert_bytes)
1109    }
1110
1111    /// Validate FAPI 2.0 compliance of the current configuration.
1112    ///
1113    /// Returns a list of compliance violations. An empty list means the
1114    /// configuration is fully FAPI 2.0 compliant.
1115    pub fn check_compliance(&self) -> Vec<FapiComplianceViolation> {
1116        let mut violations = Vec::new();
1117
1118        if self.config.is_degraded {
1119            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1120                requirement: "crypto-keys".to_string(),
1121                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Critical,
1122                message: "RSA key pair not properly configured; all FAPI operations will fail"
1123                    .to_string(),
1124            });
1125        }
1126
1127        if !self.config.require_par {
1128            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1129                requirement: "par".to_string(),
1130                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Critical,
1131                message: "FAPI 2.0 Security Profile requires Pushed Authorization Requests"
1132                    .to_string(),
1133            });
1134        }
1135
1136        if !self.config.require_dpop {
1137            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1138                requirement: "sender-constraint".to_string(),
1139                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Warning,
1140                message: "DPoP is recommended for sender-constrained tokens".to_string(),
1141            });
1142        }
1143
1144        if !self.config.require_mtls {
1145            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1146                requirement: "sender-constraint".to_string(),
1147                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Warning,
1148                message: "mTLS is recommended for client authentication and token binding"
1149                    .to_string(),
1150            });
1151        }
1152
1153        if !self.config.require_dpop && !self.config.require_mtls {
1154            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1155                requirement: "sender-constraint".to_string(),
1156                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Critical,
1157                message:
1158                    "FAPI 2.0 requires at least one sender-constraining mechanism (DPoP or mTLS)"
1159                        .to_string(),
1160            });
1161        }
1162
1163        if !self.config.enable_jarm {
1164            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1165                requirement: "jarm".to_string(),
1166                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Warning,
1167                message: "JARM is recommended for authorization response integrity".to_string(),
1168            });
1169        }
1170
1171        if !self.config.enhanced_audit {
1172            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1173                requirement: "audit".to_string(),
1174                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Warning,
1175                message: "Enhanced audit logging is recommended for FAPI compliance".to_string(),
1176            });
1177        }
1178
1179        if !matches!(
1180            self.config.request_signing_algorithm,
1181            Algorithm::RS256 | Algorithm::PS256 | Algorithm::ES256
1182        ) {
1183            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1184                requirement: "algorithm".to_string(),
1185                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Critical,
1186                message: "Request signing must use RS256, PS256, or ES256".to_string(),
1187            });
1188        }
1189
1190        if self.config.max_request_age > 600 {
1191            violations.push(FapiComplianceViolation {
1192                requirement: "request-lifetime".to_string(),
1193                severity: FapiViolationSeverity::Warning,
1194                message: "Max request age exceeds recommended 10 minutes".to_string(),
1195            });
1196        }
1197
1198        violations
1199    }
1200
1201    /// Returns true if the configuration is fully FAPI 2.0 compliant (no critical violations).
1202    pub fn is_compliant(&self) -> bool {
1203        !self
1204            .check_compliance()
1205            .iter()
1206            .any(|v| matches!(v.severity, FapiViolationSeverity::Critical))
1207    }
1208
1209    /// Validate a sender-constrained access token at a resource server.
1210    ///
1211    /// Verifies that the token's `cnf` claim matches the presented proof
1212    /// (DPoP proof JKT or mTLS certificate thumbprint).
1213    pub async fn validate_sender_constrained_token(
1214        &self,
1215        access_token: &str,
1216        dpop_proof: Option<&str>,
1217        client_cert: Option<&str>,
1218        http_method: &str,
1219        http_uri: &str,
1220    ) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
1221        // Validate the token's signature and standard claims via SecureJwtValidator
1222        let token_data = self
1223            .jwt_validator
1224            .validate_token(access_token, &self.config.public_key)?;
1225
1226        // Decode the raw JWT payload to access the cnf claim which is not in SecureJwtClaims
1227        let header = jsonwebtoken::decode_header(access_token)
1228            .map_err(|e| AuthError::token(format!("Invalid token header: {}", e)))?;
1229        let mut validation = Validation::new(header.alg);
1230        validation.set_audience(&[&self.config.issuer]);
1231        validation.validate_exp = true;
1232        let raw_claims = jsonwebtoken::decode::<serde_json::Value>(
1233            access_token,
1234            &self.config.public_key,
1235            &validation,
1236        )
1237        .map_err(|e| AuthError::token(format!("Token decode failed: {}", e)))?;
1238
1239        // Extract cnf claim from the raw payload
1240        let cnf = raw_claims.claims.get("cnf").ok_or_else(|| {
1241            AuthError::token("Token is not sender-constrained (missing cnf claim)".to_string())
1242        })?;
1243
1244        // Validate DPoP binding if cnf contains jkt
1245        if let Some(expected_jkt) = cnf.get("jkt").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
1246            let proof = dpop_proof.ok_or_else(|| {
1247                AuthError::token(
1248                    "Token is DPoP-bound but no DPoP proof header provided".to_string(),
1249                )
1250            })?;
1251            self.dpop_manager
1252                .validate_dpop_proof(proof, http_method, http_uri, None, Some(expected_jkt))
1253                .await?;
1254        }
1255
1256        // Validate mTLS certificate binding if cnf contains x5t#S256
1257        if let Some(expected_thumbprint) = cnf.get("x5t#S256").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
1258            let cert = client_cert.ok_or_else(|| {
1259                AuthError::token(
1260                    "Token is certificate-bound but no client certificate provided".to_string(),
1261                )
1262            })?;
1263            // RFC 8705 x5t#S256: SHA-256 over the DER encoding of the presented certificate
1264            use base64::Engine;
1265            use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
1266            let cert_der = decode_client_certificate(cert)?;
1267            let presented_thumbprint =
1268                base64::engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(Sha256::digest(&cert_der));
1269            if !bool::from(subtle::ConstantTimeEq::ct_eq(
1270                presented_thumbprint.as_bytes(),
1271                expected_thumbprint.as_bytes(),
1272            )) {
1273                return Err(AuthError::token(
1274                    "Certificate thumbprint does not match token binding".to_string(),
1275                ));
1276            }
1277        }
1278
1279        // Return the validated token claims
1280        Ok(serde_json::json!({
1281            "sub": token_data.sub,
1282            "iss": token_data.iss,
1283            "exp": token_data.exp,
1284            "scope": token_data.scope,
1285        }))
1286    }
1287
1288    /// Validate a Rich Authorization Request (RFC 9396) authorization_details parameter.
1289    pub fn validate_authorization_details(
1290        &self,
1291        authorization_details: &[AuthorizationDetail],
1292    ) -> Result<()> {
1293        if authorization_details.is_empty() {
1294            return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(
1295                "authorization_details must not be empty".to_string(),
1296            ));
1297        }
1298
1299        for (i, detail) in authorization_details.iter().enumerate() {
1300            if detail.r#type.is_empty() {
1301                return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(format!(
1302                    "authorization_details[{}]: type is required",
1303                    i
1304                )));
1305            }
1306
1307            // Validate locations if present
1308            for location in &detail.locations {
1309                if !location.starts_with("https://") {
1310                    return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(format!(
1311                        "authorization_details[{}]: location must use HTTPS: {}",
1312                        i, location
1313                    )));
1314                }
1315            }
1316
1317            // Validate actions are non-empty strings
1318            for action in &detail.actions {
1319                if action.is_empty() {
1320                    return Err(AuthError::InvalidRequest(format!(
1321                        "authorization_details[{}]: empty action not allowed",
1322                        i
1323                    )));
1324                }
1325            }
1326        }
1327
1328        Ok(())
1329    }
1330}
1331
1332/// FAPI 2.0 compliance violation
1333#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
1334pub struct FapiComplianceViolation {
1335    /// Which FAPI requirement is violated
1336    pub requirement: String,
1337    /// Severity of the violation
1338    pub severity: FapiViolationSeverity,
1339    /// Human-readable description
1340    pub message: String,
1341}
1342
1343/// Severity of a compliance violation
1344#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
1345pub enum FapiViolationSeverity {
1346    /// Must be fixed for FAPI 2.0 compliance
1347    Critical,
1348    /// Recommended but not strictly required
1349    Warning,
1350}
1351
1352/// Rich Authorization Request detail (RFC 9396)
1353#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1354pub struct AuthorizationDetail {
1355    /// Type of authorization (e.g. "payment_initiation", "account_information")
1356    pub r#type: String,
1357
1358    /// Resource server locations this authorization applies to
1359    #[serde(default)]
1360    pub locations: Vec<String>,
1361
1362    /// Permitted actions (e.g. "read", "write", "execute")
1363    #[serde(default)]
1364    pub actions: Vec<String>,
1365
1366    /// Data types the client wants to access
1367    #[serde(default)]
1368    pub datatypes: Vec<String>,
1369
1370    /// Unique identifier for the authorization detail
1371    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
1372    pub identifier: Option<String>,
1373
1374    /// Additional fields specific to the authorization type
1375    #[serde(flatten)]
1376    pub additional_fields: HashMap<String, Value>,
1377}
1378
1379impl Default for FapiConfig {
1380    fn default() -> Self {
1381        // Load configuration from environment variables or use secure defaults
1382        let issuer =
1383            std::env::var("FAPI_ISSUER").unwrap_or_else(|_| "https://auth.example.com".to_string());
1384
1385        let mut is_degraded = false;
1386
1387        // Load private key from environment — FAPI *requires* asymmetric keys.
1388        // There is intentionally no insecure fallback; callers must either set
1389        // FAPI_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH or construct FapiConfig manually.
1390        let private_key = if let Ok(key_path) = std::env::var("FAPI_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH") {
1391            std::fs::read(&key_path)
1392                .map_err(|e| tracing::warn!("Failed to load private key from {}: {}", key_path, e))
1393                .and_then(|bytes| {
1394                    EncodingKey::from_rsa_pem(&bytes)
1395                        .map_err(|e| tracing::warn!("Invalid RSA key format: {}", e))
1396                })
1397                .unwrap_or_else(|_| {
1398                    tracing::error!(
1399                        "SECURITY CRITICAL: FAPI_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH is set but the key could not \
1400                         be loaded. FAPI REQUIRES an RSA private key for request/response signing. \
1401                         Using an ephemeral HMAC placeholder — ALL FAPI OPERATIONS WILL BE REJECTED \
1402                         until a valid RSA key is provided. Set FAPI_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH to a valid \
1403                         PEM-encoded RSA private key file."
1404                    );
1405                    is_degraded = true;
1406                    use ring::rand::{SecureRandom, SystemRandom};
1407                    let rng = SystemRandom::new();
1408                    let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
1409                    rng.fill(&mut bytes).expect("AuthFramework fatal: system CSPRNG unavailable — the operating system cannot provide cryptographic randomness");
1410                    EncodingKey::from_secret(&bytes)
1411                })
1412        } else {
1413            tracing::error!(
1414                "SECURITY CRITICAL: FAPI_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH not set. FAPI REQUIRES an RSA \
1415                 private key for request and response signing. Using an ephemeral HMAC \
1416                 placeholder — ALL FAPI OPERATIONS WILL BE REJECTED until a valid RSA key \
1417                 is provided. Set FAPI_PRIVATE_KEY_PATH to a PEM-encoded RSA private key file."
1418            );
1419            is_degraded = true;
1420            use ring::rand::{SecureRandom, SystemRandom};
1421            let rng = SystemRandom::new();
1422            let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
1423            rng.fill(&mut bytes).expect("AuthFramework fatal: system CSPRNG unavailable — the operating system cannot provide cryptographic randomness");
1424            EncodingKey::from_secret(&bytes)
1425        };
1426
1427        // Same treatment for the public key.
1428        let public_key = if let Ok(key_path) = std::env::var("FAPI_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH") {
1429            std::fs::read(&key_path)
1430                .map_err(|e| tracing::warn!("Failed to load public key from {}: {}", key_path, e))
1431                .and_then(|bytes| {
1432                    DecodingKey::from_rsa_pem(&bytes)
1433                        .map_err(|e| tracing::warn!("Invalid RSA public key format: {}", e))
1434                })
1435                .unwrap_or_else(|_| {
1436                    tracing::error!(
1437                        "SECURITY CRITICAL: FAPI_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH is set but the key could not \
1438                         be loaded. FAPI verification will not work correctly."
1439                    );
1440                    is_degraded = true;
1441                    use ring::rand::{SecureRandom, SystemRandom};
1442                    let rng = SystemRandom::new();
1443                    let mut secret = [0u8; 32];
1444                    rng.fill(&mut secret).expect("AuthFramework fatal: system CSPRNG unavailable — the operating system cannot provide cryptographic randomness");
1445                    DecodingKey::from_secret(&secret)
1446                })
1447        } else {
1448            tracing::error!(
1449                "SECURITY CRITICAL: FAPI_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH not set. FAPI verification will \
1450                 not work correctly. Set FAPI_PUBLIC_KEY_PATH to a PEM-encoded RSA public key file."
1451            );
1452            is_degraded = true;
1453            use ring::rand::{SecureRandom, SystemRandom};
1454            let rng = SystemRandom::new();
1455            let mut secret = [0u8; 32];
1456            rng.fill(&mut secret).expect("AuthFramework fatal: system CSPRNG unavailable — the operating system cannot provide cryptographic randomness");
1457            DecodingKey::from_secret(&secret)
1458        };
1459
1460        Self {
1461            issuer,
1462            request_signing_algorithm: Algorithm::RS256,
1463            response_signing_algorithm: Algorithm::RS256,
1464            private_key,
1465            public_key,
1466            max_request_age: 300, // 5 minutes
1467            require_dpop: true,
1468            require_mtls: true,
1469            require_par: true,
1470            enable_jarm: true,
1471            enhanced_audit: true,
1472            is_degraded,
1473        }
1474    }
1475}
1476
1477/// Decode a client certificate passed as text: PEM (`-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----`) or bare
1478/// base64 of the DER encoding. The text must come from the TLS handshake (or a proxy that
1479/// strips client-supplied copies), never from a header or body the client chooses. DER is binary, so the `&str` entry points of this module can
1480/// only ever receive an encoded form; hashing or parsing the text bytes themselves is wrong.
1481fn decode_client_certificate(input: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
1482    use base64::Engine;
1483    use base64::engine::general_purpose::{STANDARD, STANDARD_NO_PAD, URL_SAFE, URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
1484
1485    const BEGIN: &str = "-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----";
1486    const END: &str = "-----END CERTIFICATE-----";
1487    let bad = || {
1488        AuthError::auth_method(
1489            "mtls",
1490            "Client certificate must be PEM or base64-encoded DER",
1491        )
1492    };
1493
1494    let trimmed = input.trim();
1495    let body = if let Some(rest) = trimmed.strip_prefix(BEGIN) {
1496        let end = rest.find(END).ok_or_else(bad)?;
1497        // Exactly one certificate: nothing but whitespace may follow the END line.
1498        if !rest[end + END.len()..].trim().is_empty() {
1499            return Err(bad());
1500        }
1501        &rest[..end]
1502    } else {
1503        trimmed
1504    };
1505    let compact: String = body.chars().filter(|c| !c.is_whitespace()).collect();
1506    if compact.is_empty() {
1507        return Err(bad());
1508    }
1509    STANDARD
1510        .decode(&compact)
1511        .or_else(|_| STANDARD_NO_PAD.decode(&compact))
1512        .or_else(|_| URL_SAFE.decode(&compact))
1513        .or_else(|_| URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(&compact))
1514        .map_err(|_| bad())
1515}
1516
1517/// The client identity a certificate carries: its single subject CN, otherwise its single
1518/// DNS/URI subjectAltName. Parsed from the DER, never searched for as text in the raw bytes.
1519fn client_id_from_certificate(cert_der: &[u8]) -> Result<String> {
1520    use x509_parser::extensions::GeneralName;
1521
1522    let cert = match x509_parser::parse_x509_certificate(cert_der) {
1523        Ok(([], cert)) => cert,
1524        _ => {
1525            return Err(AuthError::auth_method(
1526                "mtls",
1527                "Invalid client certificate format",
1528            ));
1529        }
1530    };
1531
1532    let common_names: Vec<String> = cert
1533        .subject()
1534        .iter_common_name()
1535        .filter_map(|cn| cn.as_str().ok().map(str::to_string))
1536        .collect();
1537    if common_names.len() == 1 && !common_names[0].is_empty() {
1538        return Ok(common_names[0].clone());
1539    }
1540
1541    if let Ok(Some(san)) = cert.subject_alternative_name() {
1542        let names: Vec<String> = san
1543            .value
1544            .general_names
1545            .iter()
1546            .filter_map(|name| match name {
1547                GeneralName::DNSName(dns) => Some(dns.to_string()),
1548                GeneralName::URI(uri) => Some(uri.to_string()),
1549                _ => None,
1550            })
1551            .collect();
1552        if names.len() == 1 {
1553            return Ok(names[0].clone());
1554        }
1555    }
1556
1557    Err(AuthError::auth_method(
1558        "mtls",
1559        "Cannot derive a unique client id from the certificate (need one subject CN or one SAN)",
1560    ))
1561}
1562
1563#[cfg(test)]
1564mod tests {
1565    use super::*;
1566
1567    #[test]
1568    fn test_fapi_config_builder() {
1569        use ring::rand::{SecureRandom, SystemRandom};
1570        let rng = SystemRandom::new();
1571        let mut bytes = [0u8; 32];
1572        rng.fill(&mut bytes).unwrap();
1573        let private_key = EncodingKey::from_secret(&bytes);
1574        let public_key = DecodingKey::from_secret(&bytes);
1575
1576        let config = FapiConfig::builder("https://fapi.example.com", private_key, public_key)
1577            .request_signing_algorithm(Algorithm::ES256)
1578            .max_request_age(120)
1579            .require_dpop(false)
1580            .degraded()
1581            .build();
1582
1583        assert_eq!(config.issuer, "https://fapi.example.com");
1584        assert_eq!(config.request_signing_algorithm, Algorithm::ES256);
1585        assert_eq!(config.max_request_age, 120);
1586        assert!(!config.require_dpop);
1587        assert!(config.require_mtls); // default is true
1588        assert!(config.is_degraded);
1589    }
1590
1591    #[test]
1592    fn test_fapi_session_builder() {
1593        let session = FapiSession::builder(
1594            "sess_123",
1595            "client_456",
1596            "user_789",
1597            Duration::try_hours(1).unwrap(),
1598        )
1599        .dpop_proof("proof_abc")
1600        .add_scope("openid")
1601        .add_scopes(vec!["profile", "email"])
1602        .add_metadata("custom_flag", json!(true))
1603        .build();
1604
1605        assert_eq!(session.session_id, "sess_123");
1606        assert_eq!(session.client_id, "client_456");
1607        assert_eq!(session.user_id, "user_789");
1608        assert_eq!(session.dpop_proof.as_deref(), Some("proof_abc"));
1609        assert_eq!(session.scopes, vec!["openid", "profile", "email"]);
1610        assert_eq!(session.metadata["custom_flag"], true);
1611    }
1612
1613    #[tokio::test]
1614    async fn private_key_jwt_failures_do_not_tell_the_caller_why() {
1615        use crate::security::secure_jwt::SecureJwtConfig;
1616        use crate::server::jwt::private_key_jwt::ClientJwtConfig;
1617        use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
1618
1619        let validator = || SecureJwtValidator::new(SecureJwtConfig::default()).unwrap();
1620        let assertions = Arc::new(PrivateKeyJwtManager::new(validator()));
1621        let manager = FapiManager::new(
1622            FapiConfig::default(),
1623            Arc::new(DpopManager::new(validator())),
1624            Arc::new(MutualTlsManager::new()),
1625            Arc::new(PARManager::new(Arc::new(
1626                crate::storage::MemoryStorage::new(),
1627            ))),
1628            assertions.clone(),
1629            Arc::new(validator()),
1630        );
1631
1632        // A registered client with a real key.
1633        let key = rcgen::KeyPair::generate_for(&rcgen::PKCS_ECDSA_P256_SHA256).unwrap();
1634        let raw = key.public_key_raw();
1635        let point = &raw[raw.len() - 65..];
1636        let jwk = json!({
1637            "kty": "EC", "crv": "P-256",
1638            "x": URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&point[1..33]),
1639            "y": URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&point[33..65]),
1640        });
1641        assertions
1642            .register_client(
1643                ClientJwtConfig::builder("fapi-client", jwk)
1644                    .algorithms(vec![Algorithm::ES256])
1645                    .audience("https://auth.example.com/token")
1646                    .build(),
1647            )
1648            .await
1649            .unwrap();
1650        let encoding_key = EncodingKey::from_ec_pem(key.serialize_pem().as_bytes()).unwrap();
1651
1652        // Genuine assertion: authenticated.
1653        let good = assertions
1654            .create_client_assertion(
1655                "fapi-client",
1656                "https://auth.example.com/token",
1657                &encoding_key,
1658                Algorithm::ES256,
1659            )
1660            .unwrap();
1661        assert_eq!(
1662            manager.authenticate_client_jwt(&good).await.unwrap(),
1663            "fapi-client"
1664        );
1665
1666        // Each way to fail gives the same bare message: unknown client, wrong audience from the
1667        // real client (a reason that is only known after the signature verified), replay, junk.
1668        let wrong_audience = assertions
1669            .create_client_assertion(
1670                "fapi-client",
1671                "https://elsewhere.example/token",
1672                &encoding_key,
1673                Algorithm::ES256,
1674            )
1675            .unwrap();
1676        let unknown = assertions
1677            .create_client_assertion(
1678                "ghost",
1679                "https://auth.example.com/token",
1680                &encoding_key,
1681                Algorithm::ES256,
1682            )
1683            .unwrap();
1684        for (why, assertion) in [
1685            ("wrong audience", wrong_audience.as_str()),
1686            ("unknown client", unknown.as_str()),
1687            ("replay", good.as_str()),
1688            ("junk", "not-a-jwt"),
1689        ] {
1690            let message = manager
1691                .authenticate_client_jwt(assertion)
1692                .await
1693                .expect_err(why)
1694                .to_string();
1695            assert!(
1696                message.contains("Client authentication failed"),
1697                "{why}: {message}"
1698            );
1699            for leak in [
1700                "udience",
1701                "registered",
1702                "ignature",
1703                "replay",
1704                "JTI",
1705                "Algorithm",
1706                "expired",
1707            ] {
1708                assert!(
1709                    !message.contains(leak),
1710                    "{why}: {message:?} mentions {leak:?}"
1711                );
1712            }
1713        }
1714    }
1715
1716    #[tokio::test]
1717    async fn test_fapi_manager_creation() {
1718        // Comprehensive FAPI configuration validation
1719        let config = FapiConfig::default();
1720
1721        // Verify FAPI security requirements are enabled by default
1722        assert_eq!(config.issuer, "https://auth.example.com"); // Corrected expected value
1723        assert!(config.require_dpop);
1724        assert!(config.require_mtls);
1725        assert!(config.require_par);
1726        assert!(config.enable_jarm);
1727        assert!(config.enhanced_audit);
1728    }
1729
1730    #[tokio::test]
1731    async fn test_fapi_request_validation() {
1732        // Test request object validation according to FAPI requirements
1733        // This should validate JWT request objects, signatures, and claims
1734        let config = FapiConfig::default();
1735
1736        // Mock request object with required FAPI claims
1737        let request_object = r#"{"iss":"client_id","aud":"https://example.com","exp":9999999999,"nbf":1000000000,"iat":1000000000,"jti":"unique_id"}"#;
1738
1739        // SECURITY CRITICAL: Perform comprehensive JWT validation
1740        let validation_result = validate_fapi_request_object(request_object, &config);
1741        assert!(
1742            validation_result.is_ok(),
1743            "FAPI request object validation failed"
1744        );
1745
1746        // Ensure basic structure is valid but NEVER skip signature verification in production
1747        assert!(!request_object.is_empty());
1748    }
1749
1750    /// Validate FAPI request object with proper JWT verification
1751    fn validate_fapi_request_object(
1752        request_object: &str,
1753        _config: &FapiConfig,
1754    ) -> Result<(), String> {
1755        // Parse JSON structure
1756        let parsed: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(request_object)
1757            .map_err(|_| "Invalid JSON structure in request object")?;
1758
1759        // Validate required FAPI claims
1760        let required_claims = ["iss", "aud", "exp", "iat", "jti"];
1761        for claim in &required_claims {
1762            if parsed.get(claim).is_none() {
1763                return Err(format!("Missing required FAPI claim: {}", claim));
1764            }
1765        }
1766
1767        // Validate expiration
1768        if let Some(exp) = parsed.get("exp").and_then(|v| v.as_i64()) {
1769            let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
1770            if exp <= now {
1771                return Err("Request object has expired".to_string());
1772            }
1773        }
1774
1775        // In production: Verify JWT signature against client's public key
1776        // For testing: Accept if structure is valid
1777        Ok(())
1778    }
1779
1780    #[tokio::test]
1781    async fn test_fapi_response_generation() {
1782        // Test JARM (JWT Secured Authorization Response Mode) generation
1783        // This should create signed JWT responses for authorization responses
1784        let config = FapiConfig::default();
1785
1786        // Mock authorization response
1787        let auth_response = serde_json::json!({
1788            "code": "auth_code_123",
1789            "state": "client_state",
1790            "iss": config.issuer,
1791            "aud": "client_id",
1792            "exp": 9999999999i64
1793        });
1794
1795        // In real implementation, sign the response as a JWT
1796        assert!(auth_response["code"].is_string());
1797    }
1798
1799    #[tokio::test]
1800    async fn test_fapi_token_generation() {
1801        // Test FAPI-compliant token generation with DPoP and mTLS
1802        let config = FapiConfig::default();
1803
1804        // Mock FAPI token request with required security features
1805        let scopes = ["accounts".to_string(), "payments".to_string()];
1806        let client_id = "fapi_client_123";
1807        let user_id = "user_456";
1808        let cert_thumbprint = Some("sha256_cert_thumbprint".to_string());
1809
1810        // Verify FAPI-specific requirements would be enforced
1811        assert!(config.require_dpop);
1812        assert!(config.require_mtls);
1813        assert!(!scopes.is_empty());
1814        assert!(!client_id.is_empty());
1815        assert!(!user_id.is_empty());
1816        assert!(cert_thumbprint.is_some());
1817    }
1818
1819    #[tokio::test]
1820    async fn test_fapi_session_management() {
1821        // Test FAPI session management and security requirements
1822        let config = FapiConfig::default();
1823
1824        // Mock FAPI session with enhanced security
1825        let session_data = serde_json::json!({
1826            "client_id": "fapi_client",
1827            "user_id": "fapi_user",
1828            "scopes": ["accounts", "payments"],
1829            "mtls_cert": "client_certificate",
1830            "dpop_key": "client_dpop_key"
1831        });
1832
1833        // Verify session includes FAPI security elements
1834        assert!(session_data["mtls_cert"].is_string());
1835        assert!(session_data["dpop_key"].is_string());
1836        assert!(config.enhanced_audit);
1837    }
1838
1839    // ---- certificate input decoding and client-id derivation ----
1840
1841    fn test_cert(cn: &str, org: Option<&str>) -> rcgen::Certificate {
1842        let mut params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(Vec::<String>::new()).unwrap();
1843        let mut dn = rcgen::DistinguishedName::new();
1844        dn.push(rcgen::DnType::CommonName, cn);
1845        if let Some(org) = org {
1846            dn.push(rcgen::DnType::OrganizationName, org);
1847        }
1848        params.distinguished_name = dn;
1849        let key = rcgen::KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
1850        params.self_signed(&key).unwrap()
1851    }
1852
1853    #[test]
1854    fn decode_client_certificate_accepts_pem_and_base64_der() {
1855        use base64::Engine;
1856        let cert = test_cert("client-a", None);
1857        let der = cert.der().to_vec();
1858
1859        assert_eq!(decode_client_certificate(&cert.pem()).unwrap(), der);
1860        let b64 = base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD.encode(&der);
1861        assert_eq!(decode_client_certificate(&b64).unwrap(), der);
1862        let wrapped = format!("  {}\n{}  \n", &b64[..20], &b64[20..]);
1863        assert_eq!(decode_client_certificate(&wrapped).unwrap(), der);
1864    }
1865
1866    #[test]
1867    fn decode_client_certificate_rejects_garbage_and_extra_certificates() {
1868        let a = test_cert("client-a", None).pem();
1869        let b = test_cert("client-b", None).pem();
1870        assert!(decode_client_certificate("").is_err());
1871        assert!(decode_client_certificate("!!! not base64 !!!").is_err());
1872        assert!(decode_client_certificate("-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\nAAAA").is_err());
1873        // Two certificates in one value: refuse rather than silently using the first.
1874        assert!(decode_client_certificate(&format!("{a}{b}")).is_err());
1875    }
1876
1877    #[test]
1878    fn client_id_comes_from_the_parsed_subject_cn() {
1879        let cert = test_cert("client-a", None);
1880        assert_eq!(client_id_from_certificate(cert.der()).unwrap(), "client-a");
1881    }
1882
1883    #[test]
1884    fn client_id_is_not_found_by_searching_the_raw_bytes() {
1885        // Text that merely looks like "CN=..." inside another attribute (here Organization) is
1886        // not an identity: the id comes from the parsed subject.
1887        let cert = test_cert("real-client", Some("CN=victim-client,"));
1888        assert_eq!(
1889            client_id_from_certificate(cert.der()).unwrap(),
1890            "real-client"
1891        );
1892    }
1893
1894    #[test]
1895    fn client_id_needs_a_unique_identity() {
1896        // No CN and no SAN: there is nothing to derive, so no id is invented.
1897        let mut params = rcgen::CertificateParams::new(Vec::<String>::new()).unwrap();
1898        params.distinguished_name = rcgen::DistinguishedName::new(); // rcgen defaults to a CN
1899        let key = rcgen::KeyPair::generate().unwrap();
1900        let nameless = params.self_signed(&key).unwrap();
1901        assert!(client_id_from_certificate(nameless.der()).is_err());
1902        assert!(client_id_from_certificate(b"not a certificate").is_err());
1903    }
1904}