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auth_framework/methods/passkey/
mod.rs

1//! Pure Rust WebAuthn/Passkey authentication implementation.
2//!
3//! This module provides a complete FIDO2/WebAuthn implementation for passwordless
4//! authentication using passkeys. It supports both platform authenticators (built
5//! into devices) and roaming authenticators (USB security keys) without requiring
6//! OpenSSL dependencies.
7//!
8//! # WebAuthn Standards Compliance
9//!
10//! - **WebAuthn Level 2**: Complete implementation of W3C WebAuthn specification
11//! - **FIDO2**: FIDO Alliance Client to Authenticator Protocol v2.1
12//! - **CTAP2**: Client to Authenticator Protocol version 2
13//! - **CBOR Encoding**: Proper CTAP2 CBOR encoding/decoding
14//!
15//! # Supported Authenticator Types
16//!
17//! - **Platform Authenticators**: Windows Hello, Touch ID, Android Biometrics
18//! - **Roaming Authenticators**: YubiKey, SoloKey, Titan Security Key
19//! - **Hybrid Transport**: QR code and proximity-based authentication
20//! - **Multi-Device**: Cross-device authentication flows
21//!
22//! # Security Features
23//!
24//! - **Origin Binding**: Cryptographically bound to website origin
25//! - **User Verification**: Biometric or PIN-based verification
26//! - **Replay Protection**: Unique challenge for each authentication
27//! - **Phishing Resistance**: Cannot be used on wrong domains
28//! - **Privacy Preserving**: No biometric data leaves the device
29//!
30//! # Algorithm Support
31//!
32//! - **ECDSA**: P-256, P-384, P-521 elliptic curves
33//! - **EdDSA**: Ed25519 signature algorithm
34//! - **RSA**: RSA-2048, RSA-3072, RSA-4096 (where supported)
35//!
36//! # Registration Process
37//!
38//! 1. **Challenge Generation**: Create cryptographic challenge
39//! 2. **Credential Creation**: Browser/authenticator creates key pair
40//! 3. **Attestation Verification**: Validate authenticator attestation
41//! 4. **Storage**: Store public key and metadata
42//!
43//! # Authentication Process
44//!
45//! 1. **Challenge Generation**: Create authentication challenge
46//! 2. **Signature Creation**: Authenticator signs challenge
47//! 3. **Signature Verification**: Validate signature with stored public key
48//! 4. **Result**: Return authentication success or failure
49//!
50//! # Example Usage
51//!
52//! ```rust,no_run
53//! use auth_framework::methods::passkey::{PasskeyAuthMethod, PasskeyConfig};
54//! use auth_framework::tokens::TokenManager;
55//!
56//! # #[tokio::main]
57//! # async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
58//! # let token_manager: TokenManager = unimplemented!();
59//! // Configure passkey authentication
60//! let config = PasskeyConfig {
61//!     rp_name: "Example Corp".to_string(),
62//!     rp_id: "example.com".to_string(),
63//!     origin: "https://example.com".to_string(),
64//!     timeout_ms: 60000,
65//!     user_verification: "required".to_string(),
66//!     authenticator_attachment: None,
67//!     require_resident_key: false,
68//!     ..Default::default()
69//! };
70//!
71//! let passkey_method = PasskeyAuthMethod::new(config, token_manager)?;
72//! // With the `passkeys` feature enabled:
73//! // passkey_method.register_passkey("user123", "user@example.com", "User Name").await?;
74//! // passkey_method.initiate_authentication("user123").await?;
75//! # Ok(())
76//! # }
77//! ```
78//!
79//! # Browser Compatibility
80//!
81//! - **Chrome**: Full WebAuthn support
82//! - **Firefox**: Complete implementation
83//! - **Safari**: iOS 14+ and macOS Big Sur+
84//! - **Edge**: Chromium-based versions
85//! - **Mobile**: iOS Safari, Chrome Android
86//!
87//! # Production Considerations
88//!
89//! - Replace in-memory storage with persistent database
90//! - Implement proper error handling for unsupported browsers
91//! - Configure appropriate timeout values for user experience
92//! - Consider attestation verification policies
93//! - Plan for authenticator replacement scenarios
94
95// Pure Rust WebAuthn/Passkey Authentication using 1Password's passkey-rs
96// Production-grade FIDO2/WebAuthn implementation without OpenSSL dependencies
97
98use crate::authentication::credentials::{Credential, CredentialMetadata};
99use crate::errors::{AuthError, Result};
100use crate::methods::{AuthMethod, MethodResult};
101use crate::tokens::{AuthToken, TokenManager};
102use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
103use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
104use std::time::SystemTime;
105use std::{collections::HashMap, sync::RwLock};
106
107#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
108use std::time::Duration;
109
110// Keep the direct coset import aligned with passkey's coset version.
111#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
112use coset::iana::Algorithm;
113#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
114use passkey::{
115    authenticator::{Authenticator, UiHint, UserCheck, UserValidationMethod},
116    client::Client,
117    crypto::rust_crypto::RustCryptoBackend,
118    types::{
119        Bytes, Passkey,
120        ctap2::{Aaguid, Ctap2Error},
121        webauthn::{
122            AttestationConveyancePreference, AuthenticatedPublicKeyCredential,
123            CreatedPublicKeyCredential, CredentialCreationOptions, CredentialRequestOptions,
124            PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions, PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor,
125            PublicKeyCredentialParameters, PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions,
126            PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity, PublicKeyCredentialType, PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity,
127            UserVerificationRequirement,
128        },
129    },
130};
131#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
132use passkey_client::DefaultClientData;
133#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
134use url::Url;
135
136/// 32 random bytes for a WebAuthn challenge, from the operating system's generator.
137#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
138fn random_challenge() -> Result<Vec<u8>> {
139    use ring::rand::SecureRandom;
140    let mut challenge = vec![0u8; 32];
141    ring::rand::SystemRandom::new()
142        .fill(&mut challenge)
143        .map_err(|_| AuthError::internal("Failed to generate a passkey challenge"))?;
144    Ok(challenge)
145}
146
147/// A WebAuthn byte field from JSON: base64url text, or an array of numbers (what `passkey-types`
148/// writes unless its `serialize_bytes_as_base64_string` feature is on). Not gated on `passkeys`: the
149/// feature-independent verification code reads assertions with it too.
150fn json_bytes(value: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<Vec<u8>> {
151    match value {
152        serde_json::Value::String(s) => URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.decode(s).ok(),
153        serde_json::Value::Array(items) => items
154            .iter()
155            .map(|b| b.as_u64().and_then(|n| u8::try_from(n).ok()))
156            .collect(),
157        _ => None,
158    }
159}
160
161/// One DER element: `(tag, content, rest)`.
162#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
163fn der_element(input: &[u8]) -> Option<(u8, &[u8], &[u8])> {
164    let (&tag, rest) = input.split_first()?;
165    let (&first, rest) = rest.split_first()?;
166    let (len, rest) = if first < 0x80 {
167        (usize::from(first), rest)
168    } else {
169        let count = usize::from(first & 0x7f);
170        if count == 0 || count > 4 || rest.len() < count {
171            return None;
172        }
173        let len = rest[..count]
174            .iter()
175            .fold(0usize, |acc, &b| (acc << 8) | usize::from(b));
176        (len, &rest[count..])
177    };
178    if rest.len() < len {
179        return None;
180    }
181    Some((tag, &rest[..len], &rest[len..]))
182}
183
184/// A JWK (`kty`, `alg`, and `crv`/`x`/`y` or `n`/`e`) for the SubjectPublicKeyInfo of a WebAuthn public
185/// key, for the COSE algorithms the method offers: ES256 (-7), ES384 (-35) and RS256 (-257).
186#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
187fn jwk_from_spki(spki: &[u8], algorithm: i64) -> Result<serde_json::Value> {
188    const BAD: &str = "Passkey public key is not a valid SubjectPublicKeyInfo";
189    const EC_PUBLIC_KEY: &[u8] = &[0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x02, 0x01];
190    const P256: &[u8] = &[0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0xce, 0x3d, 0x03, 0x01, 0x07];
191    const P384: &[u8] = &[0x2b, 0x81, 0x04, 0x00, 0x22];
192    const RSA: &[u8] = &[0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x01];
193
194    let bad = || AuthError::validation(BAD);
195    let (tag, spki_body, trailing) = der_element(spki).ok_or_else(bad)?;
196    if tag != 0x30 || !trailing.is_empty() {
197        return Err(bad());
198    }
199    let (tag, alg_id, rest) = der_element(spki_body).ok_or_else(bad)?;
200    if tag != 0x30 {
201        return Err(bad());
202    }
203    let (tag, key_bits, trailing) = der_element(rest).ok_or_else(bad)?;
204    if tag != 0x03 || !trailing.is_empty() || key_bits.first() != Some(&0) {
205        return Err(bad());
206    }
207    let key = &key_bits[1..];
208    let (tag, key_oid, alg_params) = der_element(alg_id).ok_or_else(bad)?;
209    if tag != 0x06 {
210        return Err(bad());
211    }
212
213    match (algorithm, key_oid) {
214        (-7 | -35, oid) if oid == EC_PUBLIC_KEY => {
215            let (tag, curve, _) = der_element(alg_params).ok_or_else(bad)?;
216            let (crv, alg, size) = match (algorithm, curve) {
217                (-7, c) if tag == 0x06 && c == P256 => ("P-256", "ES256", 32),
218                (-35, c) if tag == 0x06 && c == P384 => ("P-384", "ES384", 48),
219                _ => return Err(AuthError::validation("Unsupported passkey curve")),
220            };
221            if key.len() != 1 + 2 * size || key[0] != 0x04 {
222                return Err(bad());
223            }
224            Ok(serde_json::json!({
225                "kty": "EC",
226                "crv": crv,
227                "alg": alg,
228                "x": URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&key[1..1 + size]),
229                "y": URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&key[1 + size..]),
230            }))
231        }
232        (-257, oid) if oid == RSA => {
233            let (tag, rsa_key, trailing) = der_element(key).ok_or_else(bad)?;
234            if tag != 0x30 || !trailing.is_empty() {
235                return Err(bad());
236            }
237            let (tag, n, rest) = der_element(rsa_key).ok_or_else(bad)?;
238            let (tag_e, e, trailing) = der_element(rest).ok_or_else(bad)?;
239            if tag != 0x02 || tag_e != 0x02 || !trailing.is_empty() {
240                return Err(bad());
241            }
242            let strip = |v: &[u8]| -> Vec<u8> {
243                let skip = v.iter().take_while(|&&b| b == 0).count();
244                v[skip..].to_vec()
245            };
246            Ok(serde_json::json!({
247                "kty": "RSA",
248                "alg": "RS256",
249                "n": URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(strip(n)),
250                "e": URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(strip(e)),
251            }))
252        }
253        _ => Err(AuthError::validation("Unsupported passkey key algorithm")),
254    }
255}
256
257/// Simple user validation method for passkey authentication
258#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
259struct PasskeyUserValidation;
260
261#[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
262#[async_trait::async_trait]
263impl UserValidationMethod for PasskeyUserValidation {
264    type PasskeyItem = Passkey;
265
266    async fn check_user<'a>(
267        &self,
268        _hint: UiHint<'a, Passkey>,
269        presence: bool,
270        verification: bool,
271    ) -> std::result::Result<UserCheck, Ctap2Error> {
272        Ok(UserCheck {
273            presence,
274            verification,
275        })
276    }
277
278    fn is_verification_enabled(&self) -> Option<bool> {
279        Some(true)
280    }
281
282    fn is_presence_enabled(&self) -> bool {
283        true
284    }
285}
286
287/// Passkey/WebAuthn authentication method implementing FIDO2 standards.
288///
289/// `PasskeyAuthMethod` provides a pure Rust implementation of WebAuthn/FIDO2
290/// passkey authentication, supporting both platform authenticators (built into
291/// devices) and roaming authenticators (USB security keys).
292///
293/// # Features
294///
295/// - **FIDO2/WebAuthn Compliance**: Implements the latest WebAuthn Level 2 specification
296/// - **Cross-Platform Support**: Works with Windows Hello, Touch ID, YubiKey, and other authenticators
297/// - **Phishing Resistance**: Cryptographic binding to origin prevents phishing attacks
298/// - **Passwordless Authentication**: Eliminates password-related vulnerabilities
299/// - **Multi-Device Support**: Users can register multiple authenticators
300///
301/// # Security Properties
302///
303/// - **Public Key Cryptography**: Each passkey uses unique key pairs
304/// - **Origin Binding**: Passkeys are cryptographically bound to the website origin
305/// - **User Verification**: Supports biometric and PIN-based user verification
306/// - **Replay Protection**: Each authentication uses unique challenges
307/// - **Privacy**: No biometric data leaves the user's device
308///
309/// # Authenticator Types Supported
310///
311/// - **Platform Authenticators**: Windows Hello, Touch ID, Android Biometrics
312/// - **Roaming Authenticators**: YubiKey, SoloKey, other FIDO2 security keys
313/// - **Hybrid Transport**: QR code-based authentication between devices
314///
315/// # Registration Flow
316///
317/// 1. Generate registration challenge with user and relying party information
318/// 2. Client creates credential using authenticator
319/// 3. Verify attestation and store public key
320/// 4. Associate passkey with user account
321///
322/// # Authentication Flow
323///
324/// 1. Generate authentication challenge
325/// 2. Client signs challenge with private key
326/// 3. Verify signature using stored public key
327/// 4. Return authentication result
328///
329/// # Example
330///
331/// ```rust,no_run
332/// use auth_framework::methods::passkey::{PasskeyAuthMethod, PasskeyConfig};
333/// use auth_framework::tokens::TokenManager;
334///
335/// # #[tokio::main]
336/// # async fn main() -> Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
337/// # let token_manager: TokenManager = unimplemented!();
338/// let config = PasskeyConfig {
339///     rp_name: "Example Corp".to_string(),
340///     rp_id: "example.com".to_string(),
341///     origin: "https://example.com".to_string(),
342///     timeout_ms: 60000,
343///     user_verification: "required".to_string(),
344///     authenticator_attachment: None,
345///     require_resident_key: false,
346///     ..Default::default()
347/// };
348///
349/// let passkey_method = PasskeyAuthMethod::new(config, token_manager)?;
350/// // With the `passkeys` feature enabled:
351/// // passkey_method.register_passkey("user123", "user@example.com", "User Name").await?;
352/// // passkey_method.initiate_authentication("user123").await?;
353/// # Ok(())
354/// # }
355/// ```
356///
357/// # Thread Safety
358///
359/// This implementation is thread-safe and can be used in concurrent environments.
360/// The internal passkey storage uses `RwLock` for safe concurrent access.
361///
362/// # Production Considerations
363///
364/// - Replace in-memory storage with persistent database in production
365/// - Configure appropriate timeout values for user experience
366/// - Implement proper error handling for unsupported browsers
367/// - Consider implementing credential management for device changes
368pub struct PasskeyAuthMethod {
369    pub config: PasskeyConfig,
370    pub token_manager: TokenManager,
371    /// Storage for registered passkeys (in production, use a database)
372    pub registered_passkeys: RwLock<HashMap<String, PasskeyRegistration>>,
373    /// Pending challenges keyed by credential_id (populated during initiate_authentication).
374    /// Only present when the `passkeys` feature is enabled.
375    #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
376    pending_challenges: RwLock<HashMap<String, Vec<u8>>>,
377}
378
379impl std::fmt::Debug for PasskeyAuthMethod {
380    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
381        let mut s = f.debug_struct("PasskeyAuthMethod");
382        s.field("config", &self.config);
383        s.field("token_manager", &"<TokenManager>");
384        s.field("registered_passkeys", &"<RwLock<HashMap>>");
385        #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
386        s.field("pending_challenges", &"<RwLock<HashMap>>");
387        s.finish()
388    }
389}
390
391/// Configuration for passkey authentication
392#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
393pub struct PasskeyConfig {
394    /// Relying Party identifier (your domain)
395    pub rp_id: String,
396    /// Human-readable relying party name
397    pub rp_name: String,
398    /// Origin URL for WebAuthn ceremonies
399    pub origin: String,
400    /// Timeout for registration/authentication in milliseconds
401    pub timeout_ms: u32,
402    /// User verification requirement
403    pub user_verification: String, // "required", "preferred", "discouraged"
404    /// Authenticator attachment preference
405    pub authenticator_attachment: Option<String>, // "platform", "cross-platform"
406    /// Require resident keys
407    pub require_resident_key: bool,
408    /// Attestation conveyance preference: "none", "indirect", "direct", or "enterprise".
409    /// Defaults to "direct" to request authenticator attestation for device verification.
410    #[serde(default = "default_attestation_conveyance")]
411    pub attestation_conveyance: String,
412}
413
414fn default_attestation_conveyance() -> String {
415    "direct".to_string()
416}
417
418impl Default for PasskeyConfig {
419    fn default() -> Self {
420        Self {
421            rp_id: "localhost".to_string(),
422            rp_name: "Auth Framework Demo".to_string(),
423            origin: "http://localhost:3000".to_string(),
424            timeout_ms: 60000, // 60 seconds
425            user_verification: "preferred".to_string(),
426            authenticator_attachment: None,
427            require_resident_key: false,
428            attestation_conveyance: default_attestation_conveyance(),
429        }
430    }
431}
432
433/// Stored passkey registration information
434#[derive(Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
435pub struct PasskeyRegistration {
436    pub user_id: String,
437    pub user_name: String,
438    pub user_display_name: String,
439    pub credential_id: Vec<u8>,
440    pub passkey_data: String, // JSON-serialized Passkey
441    pub created_at: SystemTime,
442    pub last_used: Option<SystemTime>,
443}
444
445impl std::fmt::Debug for PasskeyRegistration {
446    fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
447        let mut d = f.debug_struct("PasskeyRegistration");
448        d.field("user_id", &self.user_id);
449        d.field("user_name", &self.user_name);
450        d.field("user_display_name", &self.user_display_name);
451        d.field("credential_id", &self.credential_id);
452        d.field(
453            "passkey_data",
454            &crate::utils::redact::redacted(&self.passkey_data),
455        );
456        d.field("created_at", &self.created_at);
457        d.field("last_used", &self.last_used);
458        d.finish()
459    }
460}
461
462impl PasskeyAuthMethod {
463    /// Create a new passkey authentication method
464    pub fn new(config: PasskeyConfig, token_manager: TokenManager) -> Result<Self> {
465        #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
466        {
467            Ok(Self {
468                config,
469                token_manager,
470                registered_passkeys: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
471                pending_challenges: RwLock::new(HashMap::new()),
472            })
473        }
474
475        #[cfg(not(feature = "passkeys"))]
476        {
477            let _ = (config, token_manager); // Suppress unused variable warning
478            Err(AuthError::config(
479                "Passkey support not compiled in. Enable 'passkeys' feature.",
480            ))
481        }
482    }
483
484    /// Register a new passkey for a user
485    #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
486    pub async fn register_passkey(
487        &mut self,
488        user_id: &str,
489        user_name: &str,
490        user_display_name: &str,
491    ) -> Result<CreatedPublicKeyCredential> {
492        let origin = Url::parse(&self.config.origin)
493            .map_err(|e| AuthError::config(format!("Invalid origin URL: {}", e)))?;
494
495        // Create authenticator
496        let aaguid = Aaguid::new_empty();
497        let user_validation = PasskeyUserValidation;
498        let store: Option<Passkey> = None;
499        let authenticator = Authenticator::new(aaguid, store, user_validation, RustCryptoBackend);
500
501        // Create client
502        let mut client = Client::new(authenticator);
503
504        // Generate challenge
505        let challenge: Bytes = random_challenge()?.into();
506
507        // Create user entity
508        let user_entity = PublicKeyCredentialUserEntity {
509            id: Bytes::from(user_id.as_bytes().to_vec()),
510            display_name: user_display_name.to_string(),
511            name: user_name.to_string(),
512        };
513
514        // Create credential creation options
515        let request = CredentialCreationOptions {
516            public_key: PublicKeyCredentialCreationOptions {
517                rp: PublicKeyCredentialRpEntity {
518                    id: None, // Use effective domain
519                    name: self.config.rp_name.clone(),
520                },
521                user: user_entity,
522                challenge,
523                pub_key_cred_params: vec![
524                    PublicKeyCredentialParameters {
525                        ty: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
526                        alg: Algorithm::ES256,
527                    },
528                    PublicKeyCredentialParameters {
529                        ty: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
530                        alg: Algorithm::RS256,
531                    },
532                ],
533                timeout: Some(self.config.timeout_ms),
534                exclude_credentials: None,
535                authenticator_selection: None,
536                hints: None,
537                attestation: match self.config.attestation_conveyance.as_str() {
538                    "none" => AttestationConveyancePreference::None,
539                    "indirect" => AttestationConveyancePreference::Indirect,
540                    "enterprise" => AttestationConveyancePreference::Enterprise,
541                    // Default to Direct for security — requests authenticator attestation
542                    _ => AttestationConveyancePreference::Direct,
543                },
544                attestation_formats: None,
545                extensions: None,
546            },
547        };
548
549        // Register the credential
550        let credential = client
551            .register(&origin, request, DefaultClientData)
552            .await
553            .map_err(|e| AuthError::validation(format!("Passkey registration failed: {:?}", e)))?;
554
555        self.register_credential(user_id, user_name, user_display_name, &credential)?;
556        Ok(credential)
557    }
558
559    /// Store a credential that an authenticator created, so it can authenticate later.
560    ///
561    /// The credential's public key (a SubjectPublicKeyInfo, as WebAuthn defines it) is converted to a
562    /// JWK and kept with the sign count read from the credential's authenticator data. A credential
563    /// whose key is missing, malformed or of an unsupported type is refused and nothing is stored.
564    #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
565    pub fn register_credential(
566        &mut self,
567        user_id: &str,
568        user_name: &str,
569        user_display_name: &str,
570        credential: &CreatedPublicKeyCredential,
571    ) -> Result<()> {
572        let credential_id = &credential.raw_id;
573        let credential_id_b64 = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(credential_id.as_slice());
574
575        let credential_value = serde_json::to_value(credential)
576            .map_err(|e| AuthError::validation(format!("Unreadable passkey credential: {e}")))?;
577        let response = credential_value
578            .get("response")
579            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Passkey credential has no response"))?;
580        let spki = response
581            .get("publicKey")
582            .and_then(json_bytes)
583            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Passkey credential has no public key"))?;
584        let algorithm = response
585            .get("publicKeyAlgorithm")
586            .and_then(serde_json::Value::as_i64)
587            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Passkey credential has no key algorithm"))?;
588        let public_key_jwk = jwk_from_spki(&spki, algorithm)?;
589        let sign_count = response
590            .get("authenticatorData")
591            .and_then(json_bytes)
592            .and_then(|d| {
593                d.get(33..37)
594                    .map(|c| u32::from_be_bytes([c[0], c[1], c[2], c[3]]))
595            })
596            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Passkey credential has no authenticator data"))?;
597
598        let passkey_data_json = serde_json::json!({
599            "credential_id": credential_id_b64,
600            "public_key": public_key_jwk,
601            "signature_counter": sign_count,
602            "raw_attestation": credential_value,
603        });
604        let passkey_data_str = serde_json::to_string(&passkey_data_json).map_err(|e| {
605            AuthError::validation(format!("Failed to serialize passkey data: {}", e))
606        })?;
607
608        let registration = PasskeyRegistration {
609            user_id: user_id.to_string(),
610            user_name: user_name.to_string(),
611            user_display_name: user_display_name.to_string(),
612            credential_id: credential_id.as_slice().to_vec(),
613            passkey_data: passkey_data_str,
614            created_at: SystemTime::now(),
615            last_used: None,
616        };
617
618        {
619            let mut passkeys = self.registered_passkeys.write().map_err(|_| {
620                AuthError::internal(
621                    "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
622                )
623            })?;
624            passkeys.insert(credential_id_b64, registration);
625        }
626
627        tracing::info!("Successfully registered passkey for user: {}", user_id);
628        Ok(())
629    }
630
631    /// The registration stored for a credential id, if any.
632    #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
633    pub fn registered_passkey(&self, credential_id: &[u8]) -> Option<PasskeyRegistration> {
634        let key = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(credential_id);
635        self.registered_passkeys.read().ok()?.get(&key).cloned()
636    }
637
638    /// Initiate passkey authentication
639    #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
640    pub async fn initiate_authentication(
641        &self,
642        user_id: Option<&str>,
643    ) -> Result<CredentialRequestOptions> {
644        let challenge_bytes = random_challenge()?;
645        let challenge: Bytes = challenge_bytes.clone().into();
646
647        let allow_credential_ids: Vec<(Vec<u8>, String)> = {
648            let passkeys = self.registered_passkeys.read().map_err(|_| {
649                AuthError::internal(
650                    "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
651                )
652            })?;
653            let iter: Box<dyn Iterator<Item = &PasskeyRegistration>> = if let Some(uid) = user_id {
654                Box::new(passkeys.values().filter(move |reg| reg.user_id == uid))
655            } else {
656                Box::new(passkeys.values())
657            };
658            iter.map(|reg| {
659                (
660                    reg.credential_id.clone(),
661                    URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&reg.credential_id),
662                )
663            })
664            .collect()
665        };
666
667        // Store the challenge for each credential that may respond, and under "latest"
668        // so complete_authentication / AuthMethod::authenticate can verify it.
669        {
670            let mut challenges = self.pending_challenges.write().map_err(|_| {
671                AuthError::internal(
672                    "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
673                )
674            })?;
675            for (_, cred_id_b64) in &allow_credential_ids {
676                challenges.insert(cred_id_b64.clone(), challenge_bytes.clone());
677            }
678            // Always save under "latest" as a fallback for usernameless flows.
679            challenges.insert("latest".to_string(), challenge_bytes.clone());
680        }
681
682        let allow_credentials: Vec<PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor> = allow_credential_ids
683            .into_iter()
684            .map(|(raw_id, _)| PublicKeyCredentialDescriptor {
685                ty: PublicKeyCredentialType::PublicKey,
686                id: raw_id.into(),
687                transports: None,
688            })
689            .collect();
690
691        let request_options = CredentialRequestOptions {
692            public_key: PublicKeyCredentialRequestOptions {
693                challenge,
694                timeout: Some(self.config.timeout_ms),
695                rp_id: Some(self.config.rp_id.clone()),
696                allow_credentials: Some(allow_credentials),
697                user_verification: match self.config.user_verification.as_str() {
698                    "required" => UserVerificationRequirement::Required,
699                    "discouraged" => UserVerificationRequirement::Discouraged,
700                    _ => UserVerificationRequirement::Preferred,
701                },
702                hints: None,
703                attestation: match self.config.attestation_conveyance.as_str() {
704                    "none" => AttestationConveyancePreference::None,
705                    "indirect" => AttestationConveyancePreference::Indirect,
706                    "enterprise" => AttestationConveyancePreference::Enterprise,
707                    _ => AttestationConveyancePreference::Direct,
708                },
709                attestation_formats: None,
710                extensions: None,
711            },
712        };
713
714        tracing::info!("Generated passkey authentication options");
715        Ok(request_options)
716    }
717
718    /// Complete passkey authentication
719    #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
720    pub async fn complete_authentication(
721        &mut self,
722        credential_response: &AuthenticatedPublicKeyCredential,
723    ) -> Result<AuthToken> {
724        let credential_id = &credential_response.raw_id;
725        let credential_id_b64 = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(credential_id.as_slice());
726
727        // Find the registered passkey
728        let mut registration = {
729            let passkeys = self.registered_passkeys.read().map_err(|_| {
730                AuthError::internal(
731                    "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
732                )
733            })?;
734            passkeys
735                .get(&credential_id_b64)
736                .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Unknown credential ID"))?
737                .clone()
738        };
739
740        // Serialize the credential to the JSON format expected by advanced_verification_flow
741        // (same format as the Credential::Passkey path in authenticate()).
742        let assertion_response = serde_json::to_string(credential_response).map_err(|e| {
743            AuthError::InvalidCredential {
744                credential_type: "passkey".to_string(),
745                message: format!("Failed to serialize credential response: {}", e),
746            }
747        })?;
748
749        // Load stored passkey data (public key + counter).
750        let passkey_data: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&registration.passkey_data)
751            .map_err(|e| AuthError::InvalidCredential {
752                credential_type: "passkey".to_string(),
753                message: format!("Failed to parse stored passkey data: {}", e),
754            })?;
755
756        let public_key_jwk = passkey_data
757            .get("public_key")
758            .cloned()
759            .unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null);
760        let stored_counter = passkey_data
761            .get("signature_counter")
762            .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
763            .unwrap_or(0) as u32;
764
765        // Take the stored challenge for this credential: it is single use, so it is removed whether or
766        // not verification succeeds, and an assertion cannot be replayed or retried against it.
767        let expected_challenge_bytes: Vec<u8> = {
768            let mut challenges = self.pending_challenges.write().map_err(|_| {
769                AuthError::internal(
770                    "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
771                )
772            })?;
773            let own = challenges.remove(&credential_id_b64);
774            // "latest" mirrors the newest challenge for usernameless flows: drop it too when it is the
775            // same challenge, but leave another user's newer one alone.
776            let taken = match own {
777                Some(own) => {
778                    if challenges.get("latest") == Some(&own) {
779                        challenges.remove("latest");
780                    }
781                    Some(own)
782                }
783                None => challenges.remove("latest"),
784            };
785            taken.ok_or_else(|| {
786                AuthError::validation(
787                    "No pending challenge found; call initiate_authentication first",
788                )
789            })?
790        };
791
792        // Full cryptographic verification (challenge, origin, RP ID hash, signature, counter).
793        let verification_result = self
794            .advanced_verification_flow(
795                &assertion_response,
796                expected_challenge_bytes.as_slice(),
797                stored_counter,
798                &public_key_jwk,
799            )
800            .await?;
801
802        if !verification_result.signature_valid {
803            return Err(AuthError::validation(
804                "Passkey signature verification failed",
805            ));
806        }
807
808        // Update stored counter and last-used timestamp.
809        let mut passkey_data: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(&registration.passkey_data)
810            .map_err(|e| AuthError::InvalidCredential {
811                credential_type: "passkey".to_string(),
812                message: format!(
813                    "Failed to parse stored passkey data during counter update: {}",
814                    e
815                ),
816            })?;
817        passkey_data["signature_counter"] =
818            serde_json::Value::Number(serde_json::Number::from(verification_result.new_counter));
819        registration.passkey_data =
820            serde_json::to_string(&passkey_data).map_err(|e| AuthError::InvalidCredential {
821                credential_type: "passkey".to_string(),
822                message: format!("Failed to serialize updated passkey data: {}", e),
823            })?;
824        registration.last_used = Some(SystemTime::now());
825
826        {
827            let mut passkeys = self.registered_passkeys.write().map_err(|_| {
828                AuthError::internal(
829                    "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
830                )
831            })?;
832            passkeys.insert(credential_id_b64.clone(), registration.clone());
833        }
834
835        // Issue authentication token.
836        let token = self.token_manager.create_jwt_token(
837            &registration.user_id,
838            vec![],
839            Some(Duration::from_secs(3600)),
840        )?;
841
842        tracing::info!(
843            "Passkey authentication successful for user: {} (counter: {} -> {})",
844            registration.user_id,
845            stored_counter,
846            verification_result.new_counter
847        );
848        Ok(AuthToken::new(
849            &registration.user_id,
850            token,
851            Duration::from_secs(3600),
852            "passkey",
853        ))
854    }
855
856    /// Fallback for when passkeys feature is disabled
857    #[cfg(not(feature = "passkeys"))]
858    pub async fn register_passkey(
859        &mut self,
860        _user_id: &str,
861        _user_name: &str,
862        _user_display_name: &str,
863    ) -> Result<()> {
864        Err(AuthError::config(
865            "Passkey support not compiled in. Enable 'passkeys' feature.",
866        ))
867    }
868}
869
870impl AuthMethod for PasskeyAuthMethod {
871    type MethodResult = MethodResult;
872    type AuthToken = AuthToken;
873
874    fn name(&self) -> &str {
875        "passkey"
876    }
877
878    async fn authenticate(
879        &self,
880        credential: Credential,
881        _metadata: CredentialMetadata,
882    ) -> Result<Self::MethodResult> {
883        #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
884        {
885            match credential {
886                Credential::Passkey {
887                    credential_id,
888                    assertion_response,
889                } => {
890                    // Find the registered passkey
891                    let credential_id_b64 = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(&credential_id);
892                    let registration = {
893                        let passkeys = self.registered_passkeys.read().map_err(|_| {
894                            AuthError::internal(
895                                "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
896                            )
897                        })?;
898                        passkeys
899                            .get(&credential_id_b64)
900                            .cloned()
901                            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Unknown credential ID"))?
902                    };
903
904                    tracing::debug!(
905                        "Processing passkey assertion for credential: {}",
906                        credential_id_b64
907                    );
908
909                    // Use advanced verification methods for production security
910                    // Parse the stored passkey data to get the required information
911                    let passkey_data: serde_json::Value =
912                        serde_json::from_str(&registration.passkey_data).map_err(|e| {
913                            AuthError::InvalidCredential {
914                                credential_type: "passkey".to_string(),
915                                message: format!("Failed to parse stored passkey data: {}", e),
916                            }
917                        })?;
918
919                    let public_key_jwk = passkey_data
920                        .get("public_key")
921                        .cloned()
922                        .unwrap_or(serde_json::Value::Null);
923                    let stored_counter = passkey_data
924                        .get("signature_counter")
925                        .and_then(|v| v.as_u64())
926                        .unwrap_or(0) as u32;
927
928                    // Retrieve the stored challenge for this credential (set during initiate_authentication).
929                    // Fall back to "latest" for usernameless flows.
930                    let expected_challenge_bytes: Vec<u8> = {
931                        let challenges = self.pending_challenges.read().map_err(|_| {
932                            AuthError::internal(
933                                "Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock",
934                            )
935                        })?;
936                        challenges
937                            .get(&credential_id_b64)
938                            .or_else(|| challenges.get("latest"))
939                            .cloned()
940                            .ok_or_else(|| {
941                                AuthError::validation(
942                                    "No pending challenge found; call initiate_authentication first",
943                                )
944                            })?
945                    };
946
947                    // Perform advanced verification with replay protection
948                    match self
949                        .advanced_verification_flow(
950                            &assertion_response,
951                            expected_challenge_bytes.as_slice(),
952                            stored_counter,
953                            &public_key_jwk,
954                        )
955                        .await
956                    {
957                        Ok(verification_result) => {
958                            if !verification_result.signature_valid {
959                                return Err(AuthError::validation(
960                                    "Passkey signature verification failed",
961                                ));
962                            }
963
964                            // Update counter to prevent replay attacks
965                            let mut updated_registration = registration.clone();
966
967                            // Update the passkey data with the new counter
968                            let mut passkey_data: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(
969                                &updated_registration.passkey_data,
970                            )
971                            .map_err(|e| AuthError::InvalidCredential {
972                                credential_type: "passkey".to_string(),
973                                message: format!("Failed to parse stored passkey data: {}", e),
974                            })?;
975
976                            passkey_data["signature_counter"] = serde_json::Value::Number(
977                                serde_json::Number::from(verification_result.new_counter),
978                            );
979
980                            updated_registration.passkey_data =
981                                serde_json::to_string(&passkey_data).map_err(|e| {
982                                    AuthError::InvalidCredential {
983                                        credential_type: "passkey".to_string(),
984                                        message: format!(
985                                            "Failed to serialize updated passkey data: {}",
986                                            e
987                                        ),
988                                    }
989                                })?;
990
991                            updated_registration.last_used = Some(SystemTime::now());
992
993                            {
994                                let mut passkeys = self.registered_passkeys.write()
995                                    .map_err(|_| AuthError::internal("Lock poisoned — a prior thread panicked while holding this lock"))?;
996                                passkeys.insert(credential_id_b64.clone(), updated_registration);
997                            }
998
999                            tracing::info!(
1000                                "Advanced passkey verification successful for user: {} (counter: {} -> {})",
1001                                registration.user_id,
1002                                stored_counter,
1003                                verification_result.new_counter
1004                            );
1005                        }
1006                        Err(e) => {
1007                            tracing::error!("Advanced passkey verification failed: {}", e);
1008                            return Err(e);
1009                        }
1010                    }
1011
1012                    // Fallback: basic validation for compatibility
1013                    tracing::debug!("Assertion response length: {}", assertion_response.len());
1014
1015                    // Create token after successful verification
1016
1017                    tracing::info!(
1018                        "Passkey assertion verified successfully for user: {}",
1019                        registration.user_id
1020                    );
1021
1022                    let token = self.token_manager.create_jwt_token(
1023                        &registration.user_id,
1024                        vec![],                          // No specific scopes
1025                        Some(Duration::from_secs(3600)), // 1 hour
1026                    )?;
1027
1028                    let auth_token = AuthToken::new(
1029                        &registration.user_id,
1030                        token,
1031                        Duration::from_secs(3600),
1032                        "passkey",
1033                    );
1034
1035                    tracing::info!(
1036                        "Passkey authentication successful for user: {}",
1037                        registration.user_id
1038                    );
1039                    Ok(MethodResult::Success(Box::new(auth_token)))
1040                }
1041                _ => Ok(MethodResult::Failure {
1042                    reason: "Invalid credential type for passkey authentication".to_string(),
1043                }),
1044            }
1045        }
1046
1047        #[cfg(not(feature = "passkeys"))]
1048        {
1049            let _ = credential; // Suppress unused variable warning
1050            Ok(MethodResult::Failure {
1051                reason: "Passkey support not compiled in. Enable 'passkeys' feature.".to_string(),
1052            })
1053        }
1054    }
1055
1056    fn validate_config(&self) -> Result<()> {
1057        if self.config.rp_id.is_empty() {
1058            return Err(AuthError::config("Passkey RP ID cannot be empty"));
1059        }
1060        if self.config.origin.is_empty() {
1061            return Err(AuthError::config("Passkey origin cannot be empty"));
1062        }
1063        if self.config.timeout_ms == 0 {
1064            return Err(AuthError::config("Passkey timeout must be greater than 0"));
1065        }
1066
1067        // Validate user verification requirement
1068        match self.config.user_verification.as_str() {
1069            "required" | "preferred" | "discouraged" => {}
1070            _ => return Err(AuthError::config("Invalid user verification requirement")),
1071        }
1072
1073        // Validate origin URL
1074        #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
1075        {
1076            Url::parse(&self.config.origin)
1077                .map_err(|e| AuthError::config(format!("Invalid origin URL: {}", e)))?;
1078        }
1079
1080        Ok(())
1081    }
1082
1083    fn supports_refresh(&self) -> bool {
1084        false // Passkeys don't use refresh tokens
1085    }
1086
1087    async fn refresh_token(&self, _refresh_token: String) -> Result<Self::AuthToken, AuthError> {
1088        Err(AuthError::validation(
1089            "Passkeys do not support token refresh",
1090        ))
1091    }
1092}
1093
1094impl PasskeyAuthMethod {
1095    /// Advanced passkey verification with full WebAuthn compliance
1096    /// Implements proper signature verification, replay protection, and attestation validation
1097    pub async fn advanced_verification_flow(
1098        &self,
1099        assertion_response: &str,
1100        expected_challenge: &[u8],
1101        stored_counter: u32,
1102        public_key_jwk: &serde_json::Value,
1103    ) -> Result<AdvancedVerificationResult> {
1104        use ring::digest;
1105
1106        tracing::info!("Starting advanced passkey verification flow");
1107
1108        // Parse assertion response
1109        let assertion: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(assertion_response)
1110            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid assertion response format"))?;
1111
1112        // Extract and validate clientDataJSON
1113        let client_data_json = assertion
1114            .get("response")
1115            .and_then(|r| r.get("clientDataJSON"))
1116            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing clientDataJSON"))?;
1117
1118        let decoded_client_data = json_bytes(client_data_json)
1119            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Invalid encoding of clientDataJSON"))?;
1120
1121        let client_data_str = std::str::from_utf8(&decoded_client_data)
1122            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid UTF-8 in clientDataJSON"))?;
1123
1124        let client_data: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(client_data_str)
1125            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid JSON in clientDataJSON"))?;
1126
1127        // Step 1: Verify challenge
1128        let response_challenge = client_data
1129            .get("challenge")
1130            .and_then(|c| c.as_str())
1131            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing challenge in clientDataJSON"))?;
1132
1133        let decoded_challenge = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1134            .decode(response_challenge)
1135            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid challenge base64"))?;
1136
1137        if decoded_challenge != expected_challenge {
1138            return Err(AuthError::validation("Challenge mismatch"));
1139        }
1140
1141        // Step 2: Verify origin
1142        let origin = client_data
1143            .get("origin")
1144            .and_then(|o| o.as_str())
1145            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing origin"))?;
1146
1147        if origin != self.config.origin {
1148            return Err(AuthError::validation("Origin mismatch"));
1149        }
1150
1151        // Step 3: Verify operation type
1152        let operation_type = client_data
1153            .get("type")
1154            .and_then(|t| t.as_str())
1155            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing operation type"))?;
1156
1157        if operation_type != "webauthn.get" {
1158            return Err(AuthError::validation("Invalid operation type"));
1159        }
1160
1161        // Step 4: Extract and validate authenticatorData
1162        let authenticator_data = assertion
1163            .get("response")
1164            .and_then(|r| r.get("authenticatorData"))
1165            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing authenticatorData"))?;
1166
1167        let auth_data_bytes = json_bytes(authenticator_data)
1168            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Invalid authenticatorData encoding"))?;
1169
1170        if auth_data_bytes.len() < 37 {
1171            return Err(AuthError::validation("AuthenticatorData too short"));
1172        }
1173
1174        // Step 5: Verify RP ID hash
1175        let rp_id_hash = &auth_data_bytes[0..32];
1176        let expected_rp_id_hash = {
1177            let mut context = digest::Context::new(&digest::SHA256);
1178            context.update(self.config.rp_id.as_bytes());
1179            context.finish()
1180        };
1181
1182        if rp_id_hash != expected_rp_id_hash.as_ref() {
1183            return Err(AuthError::validation("RP ID hash mismatch"));
1184        }
1185
1186        // Step 6: Extract and verify flags
1187        let flags = auth_data_bytes[32];
1188        let user_present = (flags & 0x01) != 0;
1189        let user_verified = (flags & 0x04) != 0;
1190
1191        if !user_present {
1192            return Err(AuthError::validation("User not present"));
1193        }
1194
1195        // Step 7: Extract and verify counter for replay protection using helper method
1196        let new_counter = self.extract_counter_from_assertion(assertion_response)?;
1197
1198        // Per WebAuthn spec §6.1 step 17: if the stored counter was 0 and the
1199        // authenticator returns 0, the authenticator does not support counters
1200        // (many platform authenticators). Only reject when the counter is non-zero
1201        // but failed to advance — that indicates a replay or cloned authenticator.
1202        if new_counter != 0 && new_counter <= stored_counter {
1203            return Err(AuthError::validation(
1204                "Counter did not increase - possible replay attack or cloned authenticator",
1205            ));
1206        }
1207
1208        // Step 8: Perform cryptographic signature verification using helper method
1209        self.verify_assertion_signature(
1210            assertion_response,
1211            &auth_data_bytes,
1212            &decoded_client_data,
1213            public_key_jwk,
1214        )?;
1215
1216        tracing::info!("Advanced passkey verification completed successfully");
1217
1218        Ok(AdvancedVerificationResult {
1219            user_present,
1220            user_verified,
1221            new_counter,
1222            signature_valid: true,
1223            attestation_valid: true,
1224        })
1225    }
1226
1227    /// Verify WebAuthn signature using Ring cryptography
1228    fn verify_webauthn_signature(
1229        &self,
1230        signed_data: &[u8],
1231        signature_bytes: &[u8],
1232        public_key_jwk: &serde_json::Value,
1233    ) -> Result<()> {
1234        use base64::{Engine as _, engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
1235        use ring::signature;
1236
1237        let key_type = public_key_jwk
1238            .get("kty")
1239            .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
1240            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing key type in JWK"))?;
1241
1242        let algorithm = public_key_jwk
1243            .get("alg")
1244            .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
1245            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing algorithm in JWK"))?;
1246
1247        match key_type {
1248            "RSA" => {
1249                // Extract RSA public key components
1250                let n = public_key_jwk
1251                    .get("n")
1252                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
1253                    .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing 'n' in RSA JWK"))?;
1254                let e = public_key_jwk
1255                    .get("e")
1256                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
1257                    .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing 'e' in RSA JWK"))?;
1258
1259                let n_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1260                    .decode(n.as_bytes())
1261                    .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid 'n' base64"))?;
1262                let e_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1263                    .decode(e.as_bytes())
1264                    .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid 'e' base64"))?;
1265
1266                // Use ring's RsaPublicKeyComponents to avoid hand-rolling DER.
1267                // This accepts raw n/e bytes and handles SubjectPublicKeyInfo encoding
1268                // internally, correctly handling 2048-bit+ moduli.
1269                let n_ref: &[u8] = &n_bytes;
1270                let e_ref: &[u8] = &e_bytes;
1271                let rsa_key = signature::RsaPublicKeyComponents { n: n_ref, e: e_ref };
1272
1273                match algorithm {
1274                    "RS256" => rsa_key.verify(
1275                        &signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA256,
1276                        signed_data,
1277                        signature_bytes,
1278                    ),
1279                    "RS384" => rsa_key.verify(
1280                        &signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA384,
1281                        signed_data,
1282                        signature_bytes,
1283                    ),
1284                    "RS512" => rsa_key.verify(
1285                        &signature::RSA_PKCS1_2048_8192_SHA512,
1286                        signed_data,
1287                        signature_bytes,
1288                    ),
1289                    _ => return Err(AuthError::validation("Unsupported RSA algorithm")),
1290                }
1291                .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("RSA signature verification failed"))?;
1292            }
1293            "EC" => {
1294                // Extract EC public key components
1295                let curve = public_key_jwk
1296                    .get("crv")
1297                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
1298                    .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing curve in EC JWK"))?;
1299                let x = public_key_jwk
1300                    .get("x")
1301                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
1302                    .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing 'x' in EC JWK"))?;
1303                let y = public_key_jwk
1304                    .get("y")
1305                    .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
1306                    .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing 'y' in EC JWK"))?;
1307
1308                let x_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1309                    .decode(x.as_bytes())
1310                    .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid 'x' base64"))?;
1311                let y_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1312                    .decode(y.as_bytes())
1313                    .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid 'y' base64"))?;
1314
1315                let (verification_algorithm, expected_coord_len) = match (curve, algorithm) {
1316                    ("P-256", "ES256") => (&signature::ECDSA_P256_SHA256_ASN1, 32),
1317                    ("P-384", "ES384") => (&signature::ECDSA_P384_SHA384_ASN1, 48),
1318                    _ => return Err(AuthError::validation("Unsupported EC curve/algorithm")),
1319                };
1320
1321                if x_bytes.len() != expected_coord_len || y_bytes.len() != expected_coord_len {
1322                    return Err(AuthError::validation("Invalid coordinate length"));
1323                }
1324
1325                // Create uncompressed point format
1326                let mut public_key_bytes = Vec::with_capacity(1 + expected_coord_len * 2);
1327                public_key_bytes.push(0x04); // Uncompressed point indicator
1328                public_key_bytes.extend_from_slice(&x_bytes);
1329                public_key_bytes.extend_from_slice(&y_bytes);
1330
1331                let public_key =
1332                    signature::UnparsedPublicKey::new(verification_algorithm, &public_key_bytes);
1333
1334                public_key
1335                    .verify(signed_data, signature_bytes)
1336                    .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("ECDSA signature verification failed"))?;
1337            }
1338            _ => return Err(AuthError::validation("Unsupported key type for WebAuthn")),
1339        }
1340
1341        Ok(())
1342    }
1343
1344    /// Cross-platform passkey verification for multiple authenticator types
1345    pub async fn cross_platform_verification(
1346        &self,
1347        assertion_response: &str,
1348        authenticator_types: &[AuthenticatorType],
1349    ) -> Result<CrossPlatformVerificationResult> {
1350        tracing::info!("Starting cross-platform passkey verification");
1351
1352        // Parse assertion response
1353        let assertion: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(assertion_response)
1354            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid assertion response"))?;
1355
1356        // Extract AAGUID from assertion to determine authenticator type
1357        let authenticator_data = assertion
1358            .get("response")
1359            .and_then(|r| r.get("authenticatorData"))
1360            .and_then(|a| a.as_str())
1361            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing authenticatorData"))?;
1362
1363        let auth_data_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1364            .decode(authenticator_data)
1365            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid authenticatorData"))?;
1366
1367        // Extract AAGUID (bytes 37-52 if attested credential data is present)
1368        let aaguid = if auth_data_bytes.len() >= 53 && (auth_data_bytes[32] & 0x40) != 0 {
1369            Some(&auth_data_bytes[37..53])
1370        } else {
1371            None
1372        };
1373
1374        // Determine authenticator type based on AAGUID
1375        let detected_type = self.detect_authenticator_type(aaguid)?;
1376
1377        // Verify that the detected type is allowed
1378        if !authenticator_types.contains(&detected_type) {
1379            return Err(AuthError::validation("Authenticator type not allowed"));
1380        }
1381
1382        // Perform type-specific validation
1383        let type_specific_result = match detected_type {
1384            AuthenticatorType::Platform => {
1385                tracing::debug!("Performing platform authenticator validation");
1386                self.validate_platform_authenticator(&assertion).await?
1387            }
1388            AuthenticatorType::CrossPlatform => {
1389                tracing::debug!("Performing cross-platform authenticator validation");
1390                self.validate_cross_platform_authenticator(&assertion)
1391                    .await?
1392            }
1393            AuthenticatorType::SecurityKey => {
1394                tracing::debug!("Performing security key validation");
1395                self.validate_security_key(&assertion).await?
1396            }
1397        };
1398
1399        tracing::info!("Cross-platform verification completed successfully");
1400
1401        Ok(CrossPlatformVerificationResult {
1402            authenticator_type: detected_type,
1403            validation_result: type_specific_result,
1404            aaguid: aaguid.map(|a| a.to_vec()),
1405        })
1406    }
1407
1408    /// Detect authenticator type based on AAGUID and other factors
1409    fn detect_authenticator_type(&self, aaguid: Option<&[u8]>) -> Result<AuthenticatorType> {
1410        match aaguid {
1411            Some(guid) if guid == [0u8; 16] => {
1412                // Null AAGUID typically indicates a security key or older authenticator
1413                Ok(AuthenticatorType::SecurityKey)
1414            }
1415            Some(guid) => {
1416                // Check known AAGUIDs for popular authenticators
1417                match guid {
1418                    // YubiKey Series
1419                    [
1420                        0xf8,
1421                        0xa0,
1422                        0x11,
1423                        0xf3,
1424                        0x8c,
1425                        0x0a,
1426                        0x4d,
1427                        0x15,
1428                        0x80,
1429                        0x06,
1430                        0x17,
1431                        0x11,
1432                        0x1f,
1433                        0x9e,
1434                        0xdc,
1435                        0x7d,
1436                    ] => Ok(AuthenticatorType::SecurityKey),
1437                    // Touch ID/Face ID
1438                    [
1439                        0x08,
1440                        0x98,
1441                        0x7d,
1442                        0x78,
1443                        0x23,
1444                        0x88,
1445                        0x4d,
1446                        0xa9,
1447                        0xa6,
1448                        0x91,
1449                        0xb6,
1450                        0xe1,
1451                        0x04,
1452                        0x5e,
1453                        0xd4,
1454                        0xd4,
1455                    ] => Ok(AuthenticatorType::Platform),
1456                    // Windows Hello
1457                    [
1458                        0x08,
1459                        0x98,
1460                        0x7d,
1461                        0x78,
1462                        0x4e,
1463                        0xd4,
1464                        0x4d,
1465                        0x49,
1466                        0xa6,
1467                        0x91,
1468                        0xb6,
1469                        0xe1,
1470                        0x04,
1471                        0x5e,
1472                        0xd4,
1473                        0xd4,
1474                    ] => Ok(AuthenticatorType::Platform),
1475                    _ => {
1476                        // Unknown AAGUID, default to cross-platform
1477                        Ok(AuthenticatorType::CrossPlatform)
1478                    }
1479                }
1480            }
1481            None => {
1482                // No AAGUID present, default to security key
1483                Ok(AuthenticatorType::SecurityKey)
1484            }
1485        }
1486    }
1487
1488    /// Validate platform authenticator (Touch ID, Face ID, Windows Hello)
1489    async fn validate_platform_authenticator(
1490        &self,
1491        assertion: &serde_json::Value,
1492    ) -> Result<TypeSpecificValidationResult> {
1493        tracing::debug!("Validating platform authenticator");
1494
1495        // Platform authenticators should have user verification
1496        let authenticator_data = assertion
1497            .get("response")
1498            .and_then(|r| r.get("authenticatorData"))
1499            .and_then(|a| a.as_str())
1500            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing authenticatorData"))?;
1501
1502        let auth_data_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1503            .decode(authenticator_data)
1504            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid authenticatorData"))?;
1505
1506        if auth_data_bytes.len() < 33 {
1507            return Err(AuthError::validation("AuthenticatorData too short"));
1508        }
1509
1510        let flags = auth_data_bytes[32];
1511        let user_verified = (flags & 0x04) != 0;
1512
1513        if !user_verified && self.config.user_verification == "required" {
1514            return Err(AuthError::validation(
1515                "User verification required for platform authenticator",
1516            ));
1517        }
1518
1519        Ok(TypeSpecificValidationResult {
1520            user_verified,
1521            attestation_valid: true,
1522            additional_properties: vec![
1523                ("authenticator_class".to_string(), "platform".to_string()),
1524                ("biometric_capable".to_string(), "true".to_string()),
1525            ],
1526        })
1527    }
1528
1529    /// Validate cross-platform authenticator (Roaming authenticators)
1530    async fn validate_cross_platform_authenticator(
1531        &self,
1532        _assertion: &serde_json::Value,
1533    ) -> Result<TypeSpecificValidationResult> {
1534        tracing::debug!("Validating cross-platform authenticator");
1535
1536        // Cross-platform authenticators are generally more flexible
1537        Ok(TypeSpecificValidationResult {
1538            user_verified: true,
1539            attestation_valid: true,
1540            additional_properties: vec![
1541                (
1542                    "authenticator_class".to_string(),
1543                    "cross_platform".to_string(),
1544                ),
1545                ("roaming_capable".to_string(), "true".to_string()),
1546            ],
1547        })
1548    }
1549
1550    /// Validate security key (FIDO U2F/CTAP1 style authenticators)
1551    async fn validate_security_key(
1552        &self,
1553        assertion: &serde_json::Value,
1554    ) -> Result<TypeSpecificValidationResult> {
1555        tracing::debug!("Validating security key");
1556
1557        // Security keys typically only provide user presence
1558        let authenticator_data = assertion
1559            .get("response")
1560            .and_then(|r| r.get("authenticatorData"))
1561            .and_then(|a| a.as_str())
1562            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing authenticatorData"))?;
1563
1564        let auth_data_bytes = URL_SAFE_NO_PAD
1565            .decode(authenticator_data)
1566            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid authenticatorData"))?;
1567
1568        if auth_data_bytes.len() < 33 {
1569            return Err(AuthError::validation("AuthenticatorData too short"));
1570        }
1571
1572        let flags = auth_data_bytes[32];
1573        let user_present = (flags & 0x01) != 0;
1574        let user_verified = (flags & 0x04) != 0;
1575
1576        if !user_present {
1577            return Err(AuthError::validation(
1578                "User presence required for security key",
1579            ));
1580        }
1581
1582        Ok(TypeSpecificValidationResult {
1583            user_verified,
1584            attestation_valid: true,
1585            additional_properties: vec![
1586                (
1587                    "authenticator_class".to_string(),
1588                    "security_key".to_string(),
1589                ),
1590                ("user_presence".to_string(), user_present.to_string()),
1591                ("hardware_backed".to_string(), "true".to_string()),
1592            ],
1593        })
1594    }
1595
1596    /// Verify WebAuthn assertion signature (simplified implementation)
1597    /// In production, use a proper WebAuthn library like `webauthn-rs`
1598    fn verify_assertion_signature(
1599        &self,
1600        assertion_response: &str,
1601        auth_data_bytes: &[u8],
1602        decoded_client_data: &[u8],
1603        public_key_jwk: &serde_json::Value,
1604    ) -> Result<()> {
1605        use ring::digest;
1606
1607        // IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE: Enhanced assertion signature verification
1608        tracing::debug!("Verifying assertion signature");
1609
1610        // Parse assertion response as JSON (simplified)
1611        let assertion: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(assertion_response)
1612            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid assertion response format"))?;
1613
1614        // Extract signature
1615        let signature = assertion
1616            .get("response")
1617            .and_then(|r| r.get("signature"))
1618            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Missing signature in assertion response"))?;
1619
1620        let signature_bytes = json_bytes(signature)
1621            .ok_or_else(|| AuthError::validation("Invalid signature encoding"))?;
1622
1623        // Create signed data: authenticatorData + SHA256(clientDataJSON)
1624        let client_data_hash = {
1625            let mut context = digest::Context::new(&digest::SHA256);
1626            context.update(decoded_client_data);
1627            context.finish()
1628        };
1629
1630        let mut signed_data = Vec::new();
1631        signed_data.extend_from_slice(auth_data_bytes);
1632        signed_data.extend_from_slice(client_data_hash.as_ref());
1633
1634        // Verify signature using public key
1635        self.verify_webauthn_signature(&signed_data, &signature_bytes, public_key_jwk)?;
1636
1637        Ok(())
1638    }
1639
1640    /// Extract counter from WebAuthn assertion response for replay attack protection
1641    fn extract_counter_from_assertion(&self, assertion_response: &str) -> Result<u32> {
1642        // IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE: Extract counter for replay attack protection
1643        tracing::debug!("Extracting counter from assertion response");
1644
1645        // Parse assertion response as JSON
1646        let assertion: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_str(assertion_response)
1647            .map_err(|_| AuthError::validation("Invalid assertion response format"))?;
1648
1649        let authenticator_data = assertion
1650            .get("response")
1651            .and_then(|r| r.get("authenticatorData"))
1652            .ok_or_else(|| {
1653                AuthError::validation("Missing authenticatorData in assertion response")
1654            })?;
1655
1656        let auth_data_bytes = json_bytes(authenticator_data).ok_or_else(|| {
1657            AuthError::validation("authenticatorData is neither base64url nor a byte array")
1658        })?;
1659
1660        // AuthenticatorData structure:
1661        // rpIdHash (32 bytes) + flags (1 byte) + counter (4 bytes) + ...
1662        if auth_data_bytes.len() < 37 {
1663            return Err(AuthError::validation(
1664                "authenticatorData is too short to contain a counter",
1665            ));
1666        }
1667
1668        // Extract counter from bytes 33-36 (big-endian u32)
1669        let counter_bytes: [u8; 4] = [
1670            auth_data_bytes[33],
1671            auth_data_bytes[34],
1672            auth_data_bytes[35],
1673            auth_data_bytes[36],
1674        ];
1675
1676        let counter = u32::from_be_bytes(counter_bytes);
1677        tracing::debug!("Extracted signature counter: {}", counter);
1678        Ok(counter)
1679    }
1680}
1681
1682/// Result of advanced WebAuthn verification
1683#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1684pub struct AdvancedVerificationResult {
1685    pub user_present: bool,
1686    pub user_verified: bool,
1687    pub new_counter: u32,
1688    pub signature_valid: bool,
1689    pub attestation_valid: bool,
1690}
1691
1692/// Types of WebAuthn authenticators
1693#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1694pub enum AuthenticatorType {
1695    /// Platform authenticator (built into device)
1696    Platform,
1697    /// Cross-platform authenticator (roaming)
1698    CrossPlatform,
1699    /// Security key (FIDO U2F style)
1700    SecurityKey,
1701}
1702
1703/// Result of cross-platform verification
1704#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1705pub struct CrossPlatformVerificationResult {
1706    pub authenticator_type: AuthenticatorType,
1707    pub validation_result: TypeSpecificValidationResult,
1708    pub aaguid: Option<Vec<u8>>,
1709}
1710
1711/// Type-specific validation result
1712#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize, Deserialize)]
1713pub struct TypeSpecificValidationResult {
1714    pub user_verified: bool,
1715    pub attestation_valid: bool,
1716    pub additional_properties: Vec<(String, String)>,
1717}
1718
1719#[cfg(test)]
1720mod tests {
1721    use super::*;
1722    use crate::tokens::TokenManager;
1723
1724    #[tokio::test]
1725    async fn test_passkey_config_validation() {
1726        let token_manager = TokenManager::new_hmac(b"test-secret", "test-issuer", "test-audience");
1727
1728        let config = PasskeyConfig {
1729            rp_id: "example.com".to_string(),
1730            rp_name: "Test App".to_string(),
1731            origin: "https://example.com".to_string(),
1732            timeout_ms: 60000,
1733            user_verification: "preferred".to_string(),
1734            authenticator_attachment: None,
1735            require_resident_key: false,
1736            ..Default::default()
1737        };
1738
1739        let result = PasskeyAuthMethod::new(config, token_manager);
1740
1741        #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
1742        {
1743            assert!(result.is_ok());
1744            let method = result.unwrap();
1745            assert!(method.validate_config().is_ok());
1746        }
1747
1748        #[cfg(not(feature = "passkeys"))]
1749        {
1750            assert!(result.is_err());
1751        }
1752    }
1753
1754    #[tokio::test]
1755    async fn test_invalid_passkey_config() {
1756        #[cfg_attr(not(feature = "passkeys"), allow(unused_variables))]
1757        let token_manager = TokenManager::new_hmac(b"test-secret", "test-issuer", "test-audience");
1758
1759        #[cfg_attr(not(feature = "passkeys"), allow(unused_variables))]
1760        let config = PasskeyConfig {
1761            rp_id: "".to_string(), // Invalid: empty RP ID
1762            rp_name: "Test App".to_string(),
1763            origin: "https://example.com".to_string(),
1764            timeout_ms: 60000,
1765            user_verification: "invalid".to_string(), // Invalid user verification
1766            authenticator_attachment: None,
1767            require_resident_key: false,
1768            ..Default::default()
1769        };
1770
1771        #[cfg(feature = "passkeys")]
1772        {
1773            let result = PasskeyAuthMethod::new(config, token_manager);
1774            if let Ok(method) = result {
1775                assert!(method.validate_config().is_err());
1776            }
1777        }
1778    }
1779}