Skip to main content

auth_framework/api/
oauth2.rs

1//! OAuth 2.0 API Endpoints
2//!
3//! Handles OAuth 2.0 authorization code flow (RFC 6749), token exchange,
4//! token revocation (RFC 7009), and client metadata retrieval.
5
6use crate::api::{ApiResponse, ApiState, extract_bearer_token, validate_api_token};
7use crate::oauth2_server::AuthorizationRequest;
8// Re-export canonical types for consumers that imported them from api::oauth2
9pub use crate::oauth2_server::{
10    AuthorizationRequest as AuthorizeRequest, TokenRequest, TokenResponse,
11};
12use axum::{
13    Json,
14    extract::{Path, Query, State},
15    http::{HeaderMap, StatusCode},
16    response::{IntoResponse, Redirect},
17};
18use base64::{Engine, engine::general_purpose::URL_SAFE_NO_PAD};
19use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
20use sha2::{Digest, Sha256};
21use url::Url;
22use uuid::Uuid;
23
24/// Compare two redirect URIs using parsed URL normalization (RFC 6749 §3.1.2.3).
25///
26/// Normalization handles scheme/host case, default-port elision, and path
27/// normalization so that trivial textual differences don't cause mismatches.
28fn redirect_uri_matches(candidate: &str, registered: &str) -> bool {
29    match (Url::parse(candidate), Url::parse(registered)) {
30        (Ok(a), Ok(b)) => {
31            // RFC 6749 §3.1.2: redirect URIs MUST NOT contain a fragment component.
32            if a.fragment().is_some() || b.fragment().is_some() {
33                return false;
34            }
35
36            a.scheme() == b.scheme()
37                && a.host_str() == b.host_str()
38                && a.port_or_known_default() == b.port_or_known_default()
39                && a.path() == b.path()
40                && a.query() == b.query()
41        }
42        // If either side isn't a valid URL, fall back to exact string match
43        // so we don't silently accept garbage.
44        _ => candidate == registered,
45    }
46}
47
48/// OAuth error response per [RFC 6749 §5.2](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6749#section-5.2).
49///
50/// Use the constructor + chaining helpers to avoid specifying all four fields
51/// every time:
52///
53/// # Example
54/// ```rust
55/// use auth_framework::api::oauth2::OAuthError;
56///
57/// let err = OAuthError::new("invalid_request")
58///     .description("missing redirect_uri")
59///     .state("abc");
60/// assert_eq!(err.error, "invalid_request");
61/// assert_eq!(err.error_description.as_deref(), Some("missing redirect_uri"));
62/// ```
63#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
64pub struct OAuthError {
65    pub error: String,
66    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
67    pub error_description: Option<String>,
68    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
69    pub error_uri: Option<String>,
70    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
71    pub state: Option<String>,
72}
73
74impl OAuthError {
75    /// Create a new error with the given error code (e.g. `"invalid_request"`).
76    pub fn new(error: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
77        Self {
78            error: error.into(),
79            error_description: None,
80            error_uri: None,
81            state: None,
82        }
83    }
84
85    /// Set the human-readable error description.
86    pub fn description(mut self, desc: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
87        self.error_description = Some(desc.into());
88        self
89    }
90
91    /// Set the `state` parameter (echoed back from the authorization request).
92    pub fn state(mut self, state: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
93        self.state = Some(state.into());
94        self
95    }
96
97    /// Set the `state` parameter from an `Option`.
98    pub fn maybe_state(mut self, state: Option<String>) -> Self {
99        self.state = state;
100        self
101    }
102
103    /// Set the error URI pointing to a page with more information.
104    pub fn error_uri(mut self, uri: impl Into<String>) -> Self {
105        self.error_uri = Some(uri.into());
106        self
107    }
108}
109
110/// Registered OAuth 2.0 client metadata.
111///
112/// Stored in KV at `oauth2_client:{client_id}` and returned by
113/// [`get_client_info`].
114///
115/// # Example
116/// ```rust
117/// use auth_framework::api::oauth2::ClientInfo;
118///
119/// let info = ClientInfo {
120///     client_id: "abc".into(),
121///     name: "My App".into(),
122///     description: "A demo app".into(),
123///     redirect_uris: vec!["https://example.com/cb".into()],
124///     scopes: vec!["openid".into()],
125/// };
126/// assert_eq!(info.client_id, "abc");
127/// ```
128#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
129pub struct ClientInfo {
130    pub client_id: String,
131    pub name: String,
132    pub description: String,
133    pub redirect_uris: Vec<String>,
134    pub scopes: Vec<String>,
135}
136
137/// OAuth 2.0 token revocation request per [RFC 7009](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7009).
138///
139/// # Example
140/// ```rust
141/// use auth_framework::api::oauth2::RevokeRequest;
142///
143/// let req: RevokeRequest = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"token":"abc"}"#).unwrap();
144/// assert_eq!(req.token, "abc");
145/// assert!(req.token_type_hint.is_none());
146/// ```
147#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
148pub struct RevokeRequest {
149    pub token: String,
150    #[serde(default)]
151    pub token_type_hint: Option<String>, // "access_token" or "refresh_token"
152}
153
154/// OpenID Connect UserInfo response.
155///
156/// Contains claims about the authenticated user, filtered by the scopes
157/// granted to the access token.
158///
159/// # Example
160/// ```rust
161/// use auth_framework::api::oauth2::UserInfoResponse;
162///
163/// let info = UserInfoResponse {
164///     sub: "user-1".into(),
165///     name: Some("Alice".into()),
166///     email: None,
167///     picture: None,
168///     updated_at: None,
169/// };
170/// assert_eq!(info.sub, "user-1");
171/// ```
172#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
173pub struct UserInfoResponse {
174    pub sub: String,
175    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
176    pub name: Option<String>,
177    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
178    pub email: Option<String>,
179    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
180    pub picture: Option<String>,
181    #[serde(skip_serializing_if = "Option::is_none")]
182    pub updated_at: Option<i64>,
183}
184
185/// GET /oauth/authorize
186/// OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint — validates the client and redirect_uri, generates
187/// an authorization code, and redirects the user-agent back to the client (RFC 6749 §4.1.2).
188///
189/// SECURITY: The caller must supply their access token as `Authorization: Bearer <token>`.
190/// The authenticated user's identity is recorded in the authorization code so it can be
191/// used when the client exchanges the code for tokens.  Issuing codes without a verified
192/// user identity would allow any party that knows a valid client_id to obtain tokens.
193pub async fn authorize(
194    State(state): State<ApiState>,
195    headers: HeaderMap,
196    Query(params): Query<AuthorizationRequest>,
197) -> impl IntoResponse {
198    if params.response_type != "code" {
199        let error = OAuthError::new("unsupported_response_type")
200            .description("Only 'code' response type is supported")
201            .maybe_state(params.state);
202        return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(error)).into_response();
203    }
204
205    if params.client_id.is_empty() {
206        let error = OAuthError::new("invalid_request")
207            .description("client_id is required")
208            .maybe_state(params.state);
209        return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(error)).into_response();
210    }
211
212    if params.redirect_uri.is_empty() {
213        let error = OAuthError::new("invalid_request")
214            .description("redirect_uri is required")
215            .maybe_state(params.state);
216        return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(error)).into_response();
217    }
218
219    // SECURITY: Require the resource owner to be authenticated before issuing codes.
220    // The user must supply their Bearer access token.  Without this check, any caller
221    // that knows a registered client_id could obtain a code and exchange it for tokens.
222    let user_id = {
223        let token_str = match extract_bearer_token(&headers) {
224            Some(t) => t,
225            None => {
226                let error = OAuthError::new("unauthorized_client")
227                    .description(
228                        "User authentication required: supply your access token as \
229                         'Authorization: Bearer <token>'",
230                    )
231                    .maybe_state(params.state);
232                return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, Json(error)).into_response();
233            }
234        };
235        match validate_api_token(&state.auth_framework, &token_str).await {
236            Ok(auth_token) => auth_token.user_id,
237            Err(_) => {
238                let error = OAuthError::new("unauthorized_client")
239                    .description("Invalid or expired user access token")
240                    .maybe_state(params.state);
241                return (StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED, Json(error)).into_response();
242            }
243        }
244    };
245
246    // SECURITY: Validate client_id and verify the redirect_uri is pre-registered.
247    // Redirecting to an unregistered URI would let an attacker steal the authorization code.
248    let client_key = format!("oauth2_client:{}", params.client_id);
249    match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&client_key).await {
250        Ok(Some(data)) => {
251            let client_data: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&data).unwrap_or_default();
252            let registered_uris: Vec<String> = client_data["redirect_uris"]
253                .as_array()
254                .map(|arr| {
255                    arr.iter()
256                        .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from))
257                        .collect()
258                })
259                .unwrap_or_default();
260
261            if !registered_uris
262                .iter()
263                .any(|r| redirect_uri_matches(&params.redirect_uri, r))
264            {
265                tracing::warn!(
266                    client_id = %params.client_id,
267                    redirect_uri = %params.redirect_uri,
268                    "OAuth authorize: redirect_uri not registered for client"
269                );
270                let error = OAuthError::new("invalid_request")
271                    .description("redirect_uri is not registered for this client")
272                    .maybe_state(params.state);
273                return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(error)).into_response();
274            }
275
276            // S8: Public clients (no client_secret) MUST provide a PKCE code_challenge.
277            let is_public_client = client_data
278                .get("client_secret")
279                .and_then(|v| v.as_str())
280                .is_none_or(|s| s.is_empty());
281            if is_public_client && params.code_challenge.is_none() {
282                let error = OAuthError::new("invalid_request")
283                    .description("Public clients must use PKCE: code_challenge is required")
284                    .maybe_state(params.state);
285                return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(error)).into_response();
286            }
287        }
288        Ok(None) => {
289            tracing::warn!(client_id = %params.client_id, "OAuth authorize: unknown client_id");
290            let error = OAuthError::new("invalid_client")
291                .description("Unknown client_id")
292                .maybe_state(params.state);
293            return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(error)).into_response();
294        }
295        Err(e) => {
296            tracing::error!(
297                client_id = %params.client_id,
298                error = %e,
299                "OAuth authorize: storage error looking up client"
300            );
301            let error = OAuthError::new("server_error")
302                .description("Authorization server error")
303                .maybe_state(params.state);
304            return (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, Json(error)).into_response();
305        }
306    }
307
308    let auth_code = format!("ac_{}", uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string().replace("-", ""));
309
310    // RFC 8707: Validate resource indicators if present.
311    if let Some(ref resources) = params.resource
312        && let Err(e) =
313            crate::server::oauth::resource_indicators::validate_resource_indicators(resources)
314    {
315        let error = OAuthError::new("invalid_target")
316            .description(e.to_string())
317            .maybe_state(params.state);
318        return (StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST, Json(error)).into_response();
319    }
320
321    let code_data = serde_json::json!({
322        "client_id": params.client_id,
323        "redirect_uri": params.redirect_uri,
324        "scope": params.scope.clone().unwrap_or_else(|| "openid profile email".to_string()),
325        "state": params.state.clone(),
326        "code_challenge": params.code_challenge,
327        "code_challenge_method": params.code_challenge_method,
328        "user_id": user_id,
329        "resource": params.resource,
330        "created_at": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
331        "expires_at": (chrono::Utc::now() + chrono::Duration::minutes(10)).to_rfc3339(),
332        "used": false,
333    });
334
335    let storage_key = format!("oauth2_code:{}", auth_code);
336    let code_data_str = match serde_json::to_string(&code_data) {
337        Ok(s) => s,
338        Err(e) => {
339            tracing::error!("Failed to serialize OAuth authorization code data: {:?}", e);
340            let error =
341                OAuthError::new("server_error").description("Authorization server internal error");
342            return (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, Json(error)).into_response();
343        }
344    };
345
346    if let Err(e) = state
347        .auth_framework
348        .storage()
349        .store_kv(
350            &storage_key,
351            code_data_str.as_bytes(),
352            Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(600)),
353        )
354        .await
355    {
356        tracing::error!("Failed to store OAuth authorization code: {:?}", e);
357        let error = OAuthError::new("server_error")
358            .description("Authorization server error")
359            .maybe_state(params.state);
360        return (StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR, Json(error)).into_response();
361    }
362
363    // SECURITY: URL-encode the state value to prevent parameter injection.
364    // A raw state like "&extra=injected" would append unintended query parameters.
365    let encoded_state: Option<String> = params.state.as_deref().map(|st| {
366        st.bytes()
367            .flat_map(|b| {
368                if b.is_ascii_alphanumeric() || matches!(b, b'-' | b'_' | b'.' | b'~') {
369                    vec![b as char]
370                } else {
371                    format!("%{:02X}", b).chars().collect()
372                }
373            })
374            .collect()
375    });
376
377    let mut redirect_url = params.redirect_uri;
378    redirect_url.push_str(&format!("?code={}", auth_code));
379    if let Some(ref st) = encoded_state {
380        redirect_url.push_str(&format!("&state={}", st));
381    }
382
383    tracing::info!(
384        client_id = %params.client_id,
385        user_id = %user_id,
386        "OAuth authorization code issued"
387    );
388    Redirect::to(&redirect_url).into_response()
389}
390
391/// POST /oauth/token — exchange an authorization code or refresh token for
392/// an access token (RFC 6749 §4.1.3, §6).
393///
394/// Supported grant types:
395/// - `authorization_code` — requires `code`, `client_id`, and optionally `code_verifier`
396/// - `refresh_token` — requires `refresh_token`
397///
398/// # Example
399/// ```rust,ignore
400/// // POST /oauth/token {"grant_type":"authorization_code","code":"ac_...","client_id":"..."}
401/// let response = token(State(api_state), Json(token_request)).await;
402/// assert!(response.success);
403/// ```
404pub async fn token(
405    State(state): State<ApiState>,
406    Json(req): Json<TokenRequest>,
407) -> ApiResponse<TokenResponse> {
408    match req.grant_type.as_str() {
409        "authorization_code" => handle_authorization_code_grant(state, req).await,
410        "refresh_token" => handle_refresh_token_grant(state, req).await,
411        _ => ApiResponse::error_typed(
412            "unsupported_grant_type",
413            "Supported grant types: authorization_code, refresh_token",
414        ),
415    }
416}
417
418async fn handle_authorization_code_grant(
419    state: ApiState,
420    req: TokenRequest,
421) -> ApiResponse<TokenResponse> {
422    let code = match req.code {
423        Some(c) => c,
424        None => {
425            return ApiResponse::validation_error_typed(
426                "code is required for authorization_code grant",
427            );
428        }
429    };
430
431    let client_id = match req.client_id {
432        Some(c) => c,
433        None => return ApiResponse::validation_error_typed("client_id is required"),
434    };
435
436    // Defense-in-depth: Use a consumed marker to mitigate the non-atomic get+delete
437    // race condition (TOCTOU). If a concurrent request already marked the code as
438    // consumed, reject this request immediately.
439    let consumed_key = format!("oauth2_code_consumed:{}", code);
440    if let Ok(Some(_)) = state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&consumed_key).await {
441        return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "Authorization code already used");
442    }
443    // Mark code as consumed BEFORE reading it, narrowing the race window.
444    if let Err(e) = state
445        .auth_framework
446        .storage()
447        .store_kv(
448            &consumed_key,
449            b"1",
450            Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(600)),
451        )
452        .await
453    {
454        tracing::warn!("Failed to store code consumed marker: {:?}", e);
455    }
456
457    let storage_key = format!("oauth2_code:{}", code);
458    let code_data = match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&storage_key).await {
459        Ok(Some(data)) => match serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&data) {
460            Ok(json) => json,
461            Err(e) => {
462                tracing::error!("Failed to parse stored authorization code data: {:?}", e);
463                return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "Invalid authorization code");
464            }
465        },
466        Ok(None) => {
467            return ApiResponse::error_typed(
468                "invalid_grant",
469                "Authorization code not found or expired",
470            );
471        }
472        Err(e) => {
473            tracing::error!("Failed to retrieve authorization code: {:?}", e);
474            return ApiResponse::error_typed(
475                "server_error",
476                "Failed to validate authorization code",
477            );
478        }
479    };
480
481    // Immediately delete the code to prevent reuse (single-use enforcement).
482    if let Err(e) = state.auth_framework.storage().delete_kv(&storage_key).await {
483        tracing::error!("Failed to delete authorization code from storage: {:?}", e);
484        return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to process authorization code");
485    }
486
487    // Validate client_id matches
488    if code_data["client_id"].as_str() != Some(&client_id) {
489        return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "client_id mismatch");
490    }
491
492    // Validate redirect_uri if provided
493    if let Some(redirect_uri) = &req.redirect_uri {
494        let stored_uri = code_data["redirect_uri"].as_str().unwrap_or_default();
495        if !redirect_uri_matches(redirect_uri, stored_uri) {
496            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "redirect_uri mismatch");
497        }
498    }
499
500    // Check if PKCE was used in authorization - if so, code_verifier is required
501    let stored_challenge = code_data["code_challenge"].as_str();
502    let challenge_method = code_data["code_challenge_method"]
503        .as_str()
504        .unwrap_or("plain");
505
506    if let Some(stored) = stored_challenge {
507        // PKCE was used in authorization, so code_verifier is required
508        let code_verifier = match &req.code_verifier {
509            Some(verifier) => verifier,
510            None => {
511                return ApiResponse::error_typed(
512                    "invalid_request",
513                    "code_verifier is required when PKCE challenge was provided",
514                );
515            }
516        };
517
518        let computed_challenge = match challenge_method {
519            "S256" => {
520                let mut hasher = Sha256::new();
521                hasher.update(code_verifier.as_bytes());
522                URL_SAFE_NO_PAD.encode(hasher.finalize())
523            }
524            "plain" => code_verifier.clone(),
525            _ => {
526                return ApiResponse::error_typed(
527                    "invalid_request",
528                    "Unsupported code_challenge_method",
529                );
530            }
531        };
532
533        if computed_challenge != stored {
534            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "PKCE verification failed");
535        }
536    } else if req.code_verifier.is_some() {
537        // code_verifier provided but no challenge was used - this is suspicious
538        return ApiResponse::error_typed(
539            "invalid_request",
540            "code_verifier provided but no PKCE challenge was used in authorization",
541        );
542    } else if req.client_secret.is_none() {
543        // S8: Public clients (no client_secret) MUST use PKCE.
544        // If no code_challenge was stored and no client_secret is provided,
545        // the request is from an unauthenticated public client without PKCE.
546        return ApiResponse::error_typed(
547            "invalid_request",
548            "Public clients must use PKCE: provide code_challenge in authorization and code_verifier in token request",
549        );
550    }
551
552    // Code was already atomically deleted above (delete-first approach).
553    // No need to mark as used — the code is permanently consumed.
554
555    // RFC 8707: Validate resource indicators on the token request.
556    let authz_resources: Vec<String> = code_data["resource"]
557        .as_array()
558        .map(|arr| {
559            arr.iter()
560                .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from))
561                .collect()
562        })
563        .unwrap_or_default();
564
565    if let Some(ref token_resources) = req.resource {
566        if let Err(e) =
567            crate::server::oauth::resource_indicators::validate_resource_indicators(token_resources)
568        {
569            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_target", e.to_string());
570        }
571        if let Err(e) = crate::server::oauth::resource_indicators::validate_token_resource_subset(
572            token_resources,
573            &authz_resources,
574        ) {
575            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_target", e.to_string());
576        }
577    }
578
579    // Create access and refresh tokens
580    let scope = code_data["scope"]
581        .as_str()
582        .unwrap_or("openid profile email");
583    let scopes: Vec<String> = scope.split_whitespace().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect();
584
585    // Use the user_id that was recorded in the authorization code when the resource owner
586    // authenticated via the /oauth/authorize endpoint.  This ensures tokens are bound to the
587    // actual user rather than a fabricated identifier derived from the client_id.
588    let user_id = match code_data["user_id"].as_str() {
589        Some(uid) if !uid.is_empty() => uid.to_string(),
590        _ => {
591            tracing::error!("Authorization code missing user_id field");
592            return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Malformed authorization code");
593        }
594    };
595
596    let token = match state.auth_framework.token_manager().create_auth_token(
597        &user_id,
598        scopes.clone(),
599        "oauth2",
600        None,
601    ) {
602        Ok(token) => token,
603        Err(e) => {
604            tracing::error!("Failed to create access token: {:?}", e);
605            return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to create access token");
606        }
607    };
608
609    // Persist a storage-backed refresh token so the refresh grant can validate and rotate it.
610    let refresh_token_value = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string().replace("-", "");
611    let refresh_data = serde_json::json!({
612        "user_id": user_id,
613        "client_id": client_id,
614        "scopes": scope,
615    });
616    let refresh_key = format!("oauth2_refresh_token:{}", refresh_token_value);
617    if let Err(e) = state
618        .auth_framework
619        .storage()
620        .store_kv(
621            &refresh_key,
622            serde_json::to_string(&refresh_data)
623                .unwrap_or_default()
624                .as_bytes(),
625            Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30 * 24 * 3600)),
626        )
627        .await
628    {
629        tracing::warn!("Failed to store refresh token: {:?}", e);
630    }
631
632    let expires_in = (token.expires_at - token.issued_at).num_seconds().max(0) as u64;
633    let response = TokenResponse {
634        access_token: token.access_token,
635        token_type: "Bearer".to_string(),
636        expires_in,
637        refresh_token: Some(refresh_token_value),
638        scope: Some(scope.to_string()),
639        id_token: None,
640    };
641
642    tracing::info!("OAuth2 tokens issued for client: {}", client_id);
643    ApiResponse::success(response)
644}
645
646async fn handle_refresh_token_grant(
647    state: ApiState,
648    req: TokenRequest,
649) -> ApiResponse<TokenResponse> {
650    let refresh_token_str = match req.refresh_token {
651        Some(t) => t,
652        None => return ApiResponse::validation_error_typed("refresh_token is required"),
653    };
654
655    // A revoked refresh token must not mint new access tokens, regardless of
656    // whether its own storage entry has been deleted yet (see `revoke`). Fail
657    // closed on a storage error here -- matching the equivalent check in
658    // `api/auth.rs`'s refresh handler -- rather than treating "couldn't check"
659    // as "not revoked".
660    let revoked_key = format!("oauth2_revoked_token:{}", refresh_token_str);
661    match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&revoked_key).await {
662        Ok(Some(_)) => {
663            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "Refresh token has been revoked");
664        }
665        Ok(None) => {} // Not revoked -- proceed
666        Err(e) => {
667            tracing::error!("Refresh token revocation check failed: {:?}", e);
668            return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to validate refresh token");
669        }
670    }
671
672    // Defense-in-depth: Use a consumed marker to mitigate the non-atomic get+delete
673    // race condition. If a concurrent request already consumed this refresh token, reject.
674    let consumed_key = format!("oauth2_refresh_consumed:{}", refresh_token_str);
675    if let Ok(Some(_)) = state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&consumed_key).await {
676        return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "Refresh token already consumed");
677    }
678    if let Err(e) = state
679        .auth_framework
680        .storage()
681        .store_kv(
682            &consumed_key,
683            b"1",
684            Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(600)),
685        )
686        .await
687    {
688        tracing::warn!("Failed to store refresh consumed marker: {:?}", e);
689    }
690
691    // Validate the refresh token against persistent storage.
692    let refresh_key = format!("oauth2_refresh_token:{}", refresh_token_str);
693    let stored = match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&refresh_key).await {
694        Ok(Some(data)) => match serde_json::from_slice::<serde_json::Value>(&data) {
695            Ok(v) => v,
696            Err(_) => return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "Invalid refresh token"),
697        },
698        Ok(None) => {
699            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "Refresh token not found or expired");
700        }
701        Err(e) => {
702            tracing::error!("Failed to retrieve refresh token: {:?}", e);
703            return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to validate refresh token");
704        }
705    };
706
707    let user_id = match stored["user_id"].as_str() {
708        Some(u) => u.to_string(),
709        None => return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_grant", "Malformed refresh token data"),
710    };
711    let client_id = stored["client_id"].as_str().map(|s| s.to_string());
712    let scope = stored["scopes"]
713        .as_str()
714        .unwrap_or("openid profile email")
715        .to_string();
716    let scopes: Vec<String> = scope.split_whitespace().map(|s| s.to_string()).collect();
717
718    let token = match state
719        .auth_framework
720        .token_manager()
721        .create_auth_token(&user_id, scopes, "oauth2", None)
722    {
723        Ok(t) => t,
724        Err(e) => {
725            tracing::error!("Failed to create access token on refresh: {:?}", e);
726            return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to issue access token");
727        }
728    };
729
730    // Issue a new refresh token (rotation).
731    // Store the new token BEFORE deleting the old one to avoid data loss on failure.
732    let new_refresh_token = uuid::Uuid::new_v4().to_string().replace("-", "");
733    let new_refresh_data = serde_json::json!({
734        "user_id": user_id,
735        "client_id": client_id,
736        "scopes": scope,
737    });
738    let new_refresh_key = format!("oauth2_refresh_token:{}", new_refresh_token);
739    if let Err(e) = state
740        .auth_framework
741        .storage()
742        .store_kv(
743            &new_refresh_key,
744            serde_json::to_string(&new_refresh_data)
745                .unwrap_or_default()
746                .as_bytes(),
747            Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(30 * 24 * 3600)),
748        )
749        .await
750    {
751        tracing::error!("Failed to store new refresh token: {:?}", e);
752        return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to issue refresh token");
753    }
754
755    // Now that the new token is safely stored, delete the old one (single-use enforcement).
756    if let Err(e) = state.auth_framework.storage().delete_kv(&refresh_key).await {
757        tracing::warn!(
758            "Failed to delete old refresh token during rotation: {:?}",
759            e
760        );
761    }
762
763    let expires_in = (token.expires_at - token.issued_at).num_seconds().max(0) as u64;
764    let response = TokenResponse {
765        access_token: token.access_token,
766        token_type: "Bearer".to_string(),
767        expires_in,
768        refresh_token: Some(new_refresh_token),
769        scope: Some(scope),
770        id_token: None,
771    };
772
773    tracing::info!("OAuth2 token refreshed for user: {}", user_id);
774    ApiResponse::success(response)
775}
776
777/// POST /api/v1/oauth/revoke — revoke an access or refresh token.
778///
779/// Stores a revocation marker in KV (`oauth2_revoked_token:{token}`,
780/// TTL'd to the refresh token's own 30-day lifetime -- not just the 7
781/// days access-token revocation needs -- since this one marker has to
782/// outlive whichever token type was actually revoked) and, for JWT
783/// tokens, also stores a JTI-based marker (`revoked_token:{jti}`) so
784/// that all authenticated endpoints reject the token immediately. If
785/// the token is a refresh token, also deletes its `oauth2_refresh_token:`
786/// storage entry outright -- `handle_refresh_token_grant` also checks
787/// the revocation marker directly (failing closed on a storage error
788/// there), so revocation is effective for the marker's full TTL even if
789/// the delete itself fails.
790///
791/// # Example
792/// ```rust,ignore
793/// let resp = revoke(State(state), Json(RevokeRequest {
794///     token: "access_token_value".into(),
795///     token_type_hint: Some("access_token".into()),
796/// })).await;
797/// assert!(resp.success);
798/// ```
799pub async fn revoke(
800    State(state): State<ApiState>,
801    Json(req): Json<RevokeRequest>,
802) -> ApiResponse<serde_json::Value> {
803    // Store the revoked token in a blacklist for immediate invalidation.
804    // Key by the raw token value so the userinfo endpoint can check it too.
805    let revoked_token_key = format!("oauth2_revoked_token:{}", req.token);
806    let revoked_data = serde_json::json!({
807        "token": req.token,
808        "revoked_at": chrono::Utc::now().to_rfc3339(),
809        "token_type_hint": req.token_type_hint
810    });
811
812    if let Err(e) = state
813        .auth_framework
814        .storage()
815        .store_kv(
816            &revoked_token_key,
817            serde_json::to_string(&revoked_data)
818                .unwrap_or_default()
819                .as_bytes(),
820            // 30 days: must outlive the longest-lived token type this
821            // endpoint can revoke (the refresh token's own 30-day TTL),
822            // not just the 7 days an access token's JWT markers need --
823            // otherwise a revoked refresh token whose delete somehow
824            // failed would become usable again once this marker expired.
825            Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(86400 * 30)),
826        )
827        .await
828    {
829        tracing::error!("Failed to store revoked token: {:?}", e);
830        return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to revoke token");
831    }
832
833    // If this is a refresh token, delete its storage entry outright so it
834    // can no longer be used to mint new access tokens. A no-op (and not an
835    // error) if `req.token` isn't a refresh token at all -- the key simply
836    // won't exist.
837    let refresh_key = format!("oauth2_refresh_token:{}", req.token);
838    if let Err(e) = state.auth_framework.storage().delete_kv(&refresh_key).await {
839        tracing::warn!("Failed to delete refresh token on revoke: {:?}", e);
840    }
841
842    // If the token is a JWT, also store revoked_token:{jti} so the authentication
843    // middleware (validate_api_token in api/mod.rs) blocks it on all protected
844    // endpoints. Without this step, the revocation would only be visible to the
845    // userinfo endpoint, leaving all other authenticated routes unprotected.
846    if let Ok(claims) = state
847        .auth_framework
848        .token_manager()
849        .validate_jwt_token(&req.token)
850    {
851        let now = chrono::Utc::now().timestamp();
852        let remaining_secs = (claims.exp - now + 60).max(60) as u64;
853        let jti_key = format!("revoked_token:{}", claims.jti);
854        if let Err(e) = state
855            .auth_framework
856            .storage()
857            .store_kv(
858                &jti_key,
859                b"1",
860                Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(remaining_secs)),
861            )
862            .await
863        {
864            tracing::warn!("Failed to store JWT JTI revocation entry: {:?}", e);
865        } else {
866            tracing::info!("JWT token revoked via jti: {}", claims.jti);
867        }
868    }
869
870    tracing::info!(
871        "OAuth2 token revoked: {}",
872        &req.token[..10.min(req.token.len())]
873    );
874
875    ApiResponse::success(serde_json::json!({
876        "message": "Token revoked successfully"
877    }))
878}
879
880/// GET /api/v1/oauth/userinfo — return claims about the authenticated user.
881///
882/// The caller must supply a valid Bearer access token. If the token has been
883/// revoked, an `invalid_token` error is returned. Email is included only
884/// when the `email` scope is present in the token.
885///
886/// # Example
887/// ```rust,ignore
888/// // GET /api/v1/oauth/userinfo  Authorization: Bearer <token>
889/// let resp = userinfo(State(state), headers).await;
890/// assert_eq!(resp.data.unwrap().sub, "user-1");
891/// ```
892pub async fn userinfo(
893    State(state): State<ApiState>,
894    headers: HeaderMap,
895) -> ApiResponse<UserInfoResponse> {
896    // Extract and validate access token
897    let token = match extract_bearer_token(&headers) {
898        Some(t) => t,
899        None => {
900            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_token", "Authorization header required");
901        }
902    };
903
904    // Check if token is revoked first
905    let revoked_token_key = format!("oauth2_revoked_token:{}", token);
906    if let Ok(Some(_)) = state
907        .auth_framework
908        .storage()
909        .get_kv(&revoked_token_key)
910        .await
911    {
912        return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_token", "Token has been revoked");
913    }
914
915    // Validate the access token
916    let claims = match state
917        .auth_framework
918        .token_manager()
919        .validate_jwt_token(&token)
920    {
921        Ok(c) => c,
922        Err(_) => {
923            return ApiResponse::error_typed("invalid_token", "Access token is invalid");
924        }
925    };
926
927    // Get user profile
928    let user_profile = match state.auth_framework.get_user_profile(&claims.sub).await {
929        Ok(profile) => profile,
930        Err(e) => {
931            tracing::error!("Failed to get user profile: {:?}", e);
932            return ApiResponse::error_typed("server_error", "Failed to retrieve user information");
933        }
934    };
935
936    let userinfo = UserInfoResponse {
937        sub: claims.sub.clone(),
938        name: user_profile.username.clone(),
939        // Only include email if the token's scopes include "email"
940        email: if claims.scope.split_whitespace().any(|s| s == "email") {
941            user_profile.email.clone()
942        } else {
943            None
944        },
945        picture: user_profile.picture.clone(),
946        updated_at: Some(chrono::Utc::now().timestamp()),
947    };
948
949    tracing::info!("OAuth2 UserInfo requested for user: {}", claims.sub);
950    ApiResponse::success(userinfo)
951}
952
953/// GET /oauth/clients/{client_id} — return the stored metadata for a
954/// registered OAuth 2.0 client.
955///
956/// # Example
957/// ```rust,ignore
958/// let resp = get_client_info(State(state), Path("my-client-id".into())).await;
959/// ```
960pub async fn get_client_info(
961    State(state): State<ApiState>,
962    Path(client_id): Path<String>,
963) -> impl IntoResponse {
964    let client_key = format!("oauth2_client:{}", client_id);
965    match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&client_key).await {
966        Ok(Some(data)) => match serde_json::from_slice::<ClientInfo>(&data) {
967            Ok(client) => (
968                StatusCode::OK,
969                Json(serde_json::json!({ "success": true, "data": client })),
970            )
971                .into_response(),
972            Err(e) => {
973                tracing::error!(client_id = %client_id, error = %e, "Failed to deserialize client record");
974                (
975                    StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
976                    Json(serde_json::json!({
977                        "success": false,
978                        "error": "server_error",
979                        "message": "Failed to read client record"
980                    })),
981                )
982                    .into_response()
983            }
984        },
985        Ok(None) => (
986            StatusCode::NOT_FOUND,
987            Json(serde_json::json!({
988                "success": false,
989                "error": "invalid_client",
990                "message": "Unknown client_id"
991            })),
992        )
993            .into_response(),
994        Err(e) => {
995            tracing::error!(client_id = %client_id, error = %e, "Storage error looking up client");
996            (
997                StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
998                Json(serde_json::json!({
999                    "success": false,
1000                    "error": "server_error",
1001                    "message": "Authorization server error"
1002                })),
1003            )
1004                .into_response()
1005        }
1006    }
1007}
1008
1009// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1010// OpenID Connect Discovery (RFC 8414 / OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0)
1011// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1012
1013/// OpenID Connect Discovery endpoint (RFC 8414 / OpenID Connect Discovery 1.0).
1014///
1015/// Returns server authorization metadata so clients can auto-configure
1016/// (issuer, endpoints, supported grants, signing algorithms, etc.).
1017///
1018/// # Example
1019/// ```rust,ignore
1020/// // GET /.well-known/openid-configuration
1021/// let (status, Json(config)) = openid_configuration(State(state)).await;
1022/// assert_eq!(status, StatusCode::OK);
1023/// ```
1024pub async fn openid_configuration(State(state): State<ApiState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
1025    let issuer = {
1026        let configured = state.auth_framework.config().issuer.clone();
1027        if configured.is_empty() {
1028            "https://auth.example.com".to_string()
1029        } else {
1030            configured
1031        }
1032    };
1033
1034    let config = serde_json::json!({
1035        "issuer": issuer,
1036        "authorization_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/authorize", issuer),
1037        "token_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/token", issuer),
1038        "userinfo_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/userinfo", issuer),
1039        "revocation_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/revoke", issuer),
1040        "introspection_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/introspect", issuer),
1041        "jwks_uri": format!("{}/api/v1/.well-known/jwks.json", issuer),
1042        "end_session_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/end_session", issuer),
1043        "pushed_authorization_request_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/par", issuer),
1044        "registration_endpoint": format!("{}/api/v1/oauth/register", issuer),
1045        "response_types_supported": ["code"],
1046        "grant_types_supported": [
1047            "authorization_code",
1048            "refresh_token"
1049        ],
1050        "subject_types_supported": ["public"],
1051        "id_token_signing_alg_values_supported": ["HS256"],
1052        "token_endpoint_auth_methods_supported": [
1053            "client_secret_basic",
1054            "client_secret_post"
1055        ],
1056        "code_challenge_methods_supported": ["S256"],
1057        "scopes_supported": ["openid", "profile", "email"]
1058    });
1059
1060    (StatusCode::OK, Json(config))
1061}
1062
1063// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1064// JWKS endpoint (RFC 7517)
1065// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1066
1067/// JSON Web Key Set (JWKS) endpoint ([RFC 7517](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7517)).
1068///
1069/// Returns the public keys used to verify tokens. Currently returns an
1070/// empty key set because HS256 (symmetric) signing is used; clients
1071/// should use the introspection endpoint for token validation.
1072///
1073/// # Example
1074/// ```rust,ignore
1075/// // GET /.well-known/jwks.json
1076/// let (status, Json(jwks)) = jwks(State(state)).await;
1077/// assert!(jwks["keys"].as_array().unwrap().is_empty());
1078/// ```
1079pub async fn jwks(State(_state): State<ApiState>) -> impl IntoResponse {
1080    (StatusCode::OK, Json(serde_json::json!({ "keys": [] })))
1081}
1082
1083// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1084// OIDC RP-Initiated Logout (OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0)
1085// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1086
1087/// Request parameters for OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout.
1088///
1089/// # Example
1090/// ```rust
1091/// use auth_framework::api::oauth2::EndSessionRequest;
1092///
1093/// let req: EndSessionRequest = serde_json::from_str(
1094///     r#"{"id_token_hint":"eyJ...","state":"xyz"}"#
1095/// ).unwrap();
1096/// assert!(req.post_logout_redirect_uri.is_none());
1097/// ```
1098#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
1099pub struct EndSessionRequest {
1100    pub id_token_hint: Option<String>,
1101    pub post_logout_redirect_uri: Option<String>,
1102    pub state: Option<String>,
1103}
1104
1105/// OIDC RP-Initiated Logout (OpenID Connect RP-Initiated Logout 1.0).
1106///
1107/// Revokes the token from `id_token_hint` (if valid) and, when a
1108/// registered `post_logout_redirect_uri` is provided, redirects the
1109/// user-agent there.
1110///
1111/// # Example
1112/// ```rust,ignore
1113/// // GET /oauth/end_session?id_token_hint=eyJ...&state=xyz
1114/// let resp = end_session(State(state), Query(params)).await;
1115/// ```
1116pub async fn end_session(
1117    State(state): State<ApiState>,
1118    Query(params): Query<EndSessionRequest>,
1119) -> impl IntoResponse {
1120    // If an id_token_hint is provided, revoke it
1121    if let Some(ref token) = params.id_token_hint
1122        && let Ok(claims) = state
1123            .auth_framework
1124            .token_manager()
1125            .validate_jwt_token(token)
1126    {
1127        let revoked_key = format!("oauth2_revoked_token:{}", token);
1128        if let Err(e) = state
1129            .auth_framework
1130            .storage()
1131            .store_kv(
1132                &revoked_key,
1133                b"revoked",
1134                Some(std::time::Duration::from_secs(86400 * 7)),
1135            )
1136            .await
1137        {
1138            tracing::warn!("Failed to revoke token during OIDC end_session: {}", e);
1139        }
1140        tracing::info!("OIDC end_session: revoked token for user {}", claims.sub);
1141    }
1142
1143    // Redirect to post_logout_redirect_uri only if it matches a registered URI for the
1144    // client identified by id_token_hint.  Without this check an attacker could craft a
1145    // link that redirects users to an arbitrary URL (open redirect / phishing).
1146    if let Some(ref redirect_uri) = params.post_logout_redirect_uri {
1147        // Look up the client's registered redirect URIs via the id_token_hint's `azp` or `aud` claim.
1148        let allowed = if let Some(ref token) = params.id_token_hint {
1149            // Try to extract client_id from the token (azp > aud)
1150            let client_id = state
1151                .auth_framework
1152                .token_manager()
1153                .validate_jwt_token(token)
1154                .ok()
1155                .and_then(|claims| {
1156                    // client_id claim identifies the OAuth client
1157                    if let Some(ref cid) = claims.client_id
1158                        && !cid.is_empty()
1159                    {
1160                        return Some(cid.clone());
1161                    }
1162                    // Fallback: aud may contain the client_id
1163                    if !claims.aud.is_empty() {
1164                        Some(claims.aud.clone())
1165                    } else {
1166                        None
1167                    }
1168                });
1169            if let Some(cid) = client_id {
1170                let client_key = format!("oauth2_client:{}", cid);
1171                match state.auth_framework.storage().get_kv(&client_key).await {
1172                    Ok(Some(data)) => {
1173                        let client: serde_json::Value =
1174                            serde_json::from_slice(&data).unwrap_or_default();
1175                        let uris: Vec<String> = client["redirect_uris"]
1176                            .as_array()
1177                            .map(|a| {
1178                                a.iter()
1179                                    .filter_map(|v| v.as_str().map(String::from))
1180                                    .collect()
1181                            })
1182                            .unwrap_or_default();
1183                        uris.iter().any(|r| redirect_uri_matches(redirect_uri, r))
1184                    }
1185                    _ => false,
1186                }
1187            } else {
1188                false
1189            }
1190        } else {
1191            false
1192        };
1193
1194        if allowed {
1195            if let Ok(mut parsed) = Url::parse(redirect_uri) {
1196                if let Some(ref st) = params.state {
1197                    parsed.query_pairs_mut().append_pair("state", st);
1198                }
1199                return Redirect::to(parsed.as_str()).into_response();
1200            }
1201        } else {
1202            tracing::warn!(
1203                "end_session: post_logout_redirect_uri rejected — not registered for the client"
1204            );
1205        }
1206    }
1207
1208    // No redirect — return a simple JSON acknowledgement
1209    (
1210        StatusCode::OK,
1211        Json(serde_json::json!({ "status": "logged_out" })),
1212    )
1213        .into_response()
1214}
1215
1216// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1217// Dynamic Client Registration (RFC 7591)
1218// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1219
1220/// Dynamic client registration request per [RFC 7591](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591).
1221///
1222/// # Example
1223/// ```rust
1224/// use auth_framework::api::oauth2::ClientRegistrationRequest;
1225///
1226/// let req: ClientRegistrationRequest = serde_json::from_str(
1227///     r#"{"redirect_uris":["https://example.com/cb"]}"#
1228/// ).unwrap();
1229/// assert_eq!(req.redirect_uris.len(), 1);
1230/// ```
1231#[derive(Debug, Deserialize)]
1232pub struct ClientRegistrationRequest {
1233    pub redirect_uris: Vec<String>,
1234    #[serde(default)]
1235    pub client_name: Option<String>,
1236    #[serde(default)]
1237    pub token_endpoint_auth_method: Option<String>,
1238    #[serde(default)]
1239    pub grant_types: Option<Vec<String>>,
1240    #[serde(default)]
1241    pub response_types: Option<Vec<String>>,
1242    #[serde(default)]
1243    pub scope: Option<String>,
1244}
1245
1246/// POST /oauth/register — dynamically register a new OAuth 2.0 client
1247/// ([RFC 7591](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7591)).
1248///
1249/// Requires a valid Bearer token with `admin` role, or an Initial Access
1250/// Token stored in KV at `oauth2_initial_access_token`. Unauthenticated
1251/// callers are rejected to prevent resource exhaustion.
1252///
1253/// # Example
1254/// ```rust,ignore
1255/// let resp = register_client(
1256///     State(state),
1257///     headers,   // with Authorization: Bearer <admin-token>
1258///     Json(ClientRegistrationRequest {
1259///         redirect_uris: vec!["https://example.com/cb".into()],
1260///         client_name: Some("My App".into()),
1261///         ..Default::default()
1262///     }),
1263/// ).await;
1264/// ```
1265pub async fn register_client(
1266    State(state): State<ApiState>,
1267    headers: HeaderMap,
1268    Json(req): Json<ClientRegistrationRequest>,
1269) -> impl IntoResponse {
1270    // RFC 7591 §1.2: require authentication via Bearer token
1271    let token_str = match extract_bearer_token(&headers) {
1272        Some(t) => t,
1273        None => {
1274            return (
1275                StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED,
1276                Json(serde_json::json!({
1277                    "error": "invalid_token",
1278                    "error_description": "A valid Bearer token is required for dynamic client registration"
1279                })),
1280            )
1281                .into_response();
1282        }
1283    };
1284
1285    // Option 1: check if this is the pre-configured Initial Access Token
1286    let is_initial_access_token = match state
1287        .auth_framework
1288        .storage()
1289        .get_kv("oauth2_initial_access_token")
1290        .await
1291    {
1292        Ok(Some(stored)) => {
1293            let stored_str = String::from_utf8_lossy(&stored);
1294            subtle::ConstantTimeEq::ct_eq(token_str.as_bytes(), stored_str.trim().as_bytes()).into()
1295        }
1296        _ => false,
1297    };
1298
1299    // Option 2: validate as a normal JWT and check for admin role
1300    let is_admin = if !is_initial_access_token {
1301        match validate_api_token(&state.auth_framework, &token_str).await {
1302            Ok(auth_token) => auth_token.roles.contains("admin"),
1303            Err(_) => false,
1304        }
1305    } else {
1306        false
1307    };
1308
1309    if !is_initial_access_token && !is_admin {
1310        return (
1311            StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
1312            Json(serde_json::json!({
1313                "error": "insufficient_scope",
1314                "error_description": "Dynamic client registration requires admin privileges or a valid Initial Access Token"
1315            })),
1316        )
1317            .into_response();
1318    }
1319    // Validate all redirect_uris are well-formed URLs with safe schemes
1320    for uri in &req.redirect_uris {
1321        match Url::parse(uri) {
1322            Ok(parsed) => {
1323                match parsed.scheme() {
1324                    "https" => {}
1325                    "http" => {
1326                        // Allow plain HTTP only for loopback addresses (development)
1327                        if !matches!(parsed.host_str(), Some("localhost" | "127.0.0.1" | "[::1]")) {
1328                            return (
1329                                StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
1330                                Json(serde_json::json!({
1331                                    "error": "invalid_redirect_uri",
1332                                    "error_description": format!("Non-loopback HTTP redirect_uri not allowed: {}", uri)
1333                                })),
1334                            )
1335                                .into_response();
1336                        }
1337                    }
1338                    scheme => {
1339                        return (
1340                            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
1341                            Json(serde_json::json!({
1342                                "error": "invalid_redirect_uri",
1343                                "error_description": format!("Disallowed URI scheme '{}' in redirect_uri: {}", scheme, uri)
1344                            })),
1345                        )
1346                            .into_response();
1347                    }
1348                }
1349            }
1350            Err(_) => {
1351                return (
1352                    StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
1353                    Json(serde_json::json!({
1354                        "error": "invalid_redirect_uri",
1355                        "error_description": format!("Invalid redirect_uri: {}", uri)
1356                    })),
1357                )
1358                    .into_response();
1359            }
1360        }
1361    }
1362
1363    if req.redirect_uris.is_empty() {
1364        return (
1365            StatusCode::BAD_REQUEST,
1366            Json(serde_json::json!({
1367                "error": "invalid_client_metadata",
1368                "error_description": "At least one redirect_uri is required"
1369            })),
1370        )
1371            .into_response();
1372    }
1373
1374    let client_id = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
1375    let client_secret = Uuid::new_v4().to_string();
1376
1377    let client_data = serde_json::json!({
1378        "client_id": client_id,
1379        "client_secret": client_secret,
1380        "client_name": req.client_name,
1381        "redirect_uris": req.redirect_uris,
1382        "token_endpoint_auth_method": req.token_endpoint_auth_method.as_deref().unwrap_or("client_secret_basic"),
1383        "grant_types": req.grant_types.as_deref().unwrap_or(&["authorization_code".to_string()]),
1384        "response_types": req.response_types.as_deref().unwrap_or(&["code".to_string()]),
1385        "scope": req.scope.as_deref().unwrap_or("openid"),
1386    });
1387
1388    let key = format!("oauth2_client:{}", client_id);
1389    if let Err(e) = state
1390        .auth_framework
1391        .storage()
1392        .store_kv(&key, client_data.to_string().as_bytes(), None)
1393        .await
1394    {
1395        tracing::error!("Failed to store client registration: {}", e);
1396        return (
1397            StatusCode::INTERNAL_SERVER_ERROR,
1398            Json(serde_json::json!({
1399                "error": "server_error",
1400                "error_description": "Failed to register client"
1401            })),
1402        )
1403            .into_response();
1404    }
1405
1406    tracing::info!("Dynamic client registered: client_id={}", client_id);
1407
1408    (
1409        StatusCode::CREATED,
1410        Json(serde_json::json!({
1411            "client_id": client_id,
1412            "client_secret": client_secret,
1413            "client_name": req.client_name,
1414            "redirect_uris": req.redirect_uris,
1415            "token_endpoint_auth_method": req.token_endpoint_auth_method.as_deref().unwrap_or("client_secret_basic"),
1416            "grant_types": req.grant_types.as_deref().unwrap_or(&["authorization_code".to_string()]),
1417            "response_types": req.response_types.as_deref().unwrap_or(&["code".to_string()]),
1418            "scope": req.scope.as_deref().unwrap_or("openid"),
1419        })),
1420    )
1421        .into_response()
1422}
1423
1424// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1425// /users/me — alias for the authenticated user's profile
1426// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1427
1428/// GET /users/me — returns the authenticated user's profile.
1429///
1430/// Convenience alias that delegates to [`userinfo`].
1431///
1432/// # Example
1433/// ```rust,ignore
1434/// // GET /users/me  Authorization: Bearer <token>
1435/// let resp = users_me(state, headers).await;
1436/// ```
1437pub async fn users_me(state: State<ApiState>, headers: HeaderMap) -> impl IntoResponse {
1438    // Delegate to the existing userinfo handler
1439    userinfo(state, headers).await
1440}