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Crate arachne_security

Crate arachne_security 

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Portable workspace security owner. No ATAK, transport or payload types. Legacy hosts persist encrypted snapshots; trusted native adapters can persist separate secret-bearing records in an authenticated encrypted store.

Structs§

AdmissionAttempt
One authenticated admission request waiting for the owner transition. The request bytes are the idempotency material; transport metadata does not define whether two attempts are the same.
AdmissionAuthorization
Public proof of an ordinary-member invitation and its exact redemption. No bearer private key is carried here. Fields are untrusted until verified.
AdmissionQueue
Bounded owner-side intake. Cryptographic commits remain serialized by the caller, while unrelated attempts can wait without blocking intake.
AdmissionReply
Exact response retained with the group transition. A retry must reuse these bytes.
ApplicationMessage
Authenticated origin, not necessarily the immediate transport peer.
AuthenticatedObject
Invitation
Reusable bearer authorization. Never log or publish its secret token. Receiving it via a trusted human/application channel establishes the initial workspace trust root; self-consistent signatures alone do not identify a person.
InvitationControl
JoinProof
Tracks a branch from a trusted checkpoint. This does not settle competing branches, authenticate a real-world group name, or establish MLS membership.
MemberIdentity
MemberProfile
Workspace-scoped identity and chosen local display name. Names are not credentials.
MembershipVerifier
Incrementally verifies exact membership transitions from a trusted checkpoint. Holds the current public roster, not a lifetime log or secret group keys. The caller retains the checkpoint and accepted transitions for durable replay; verification does not persist them, establish membership, or resolve forks.
MemoryReport
Bytes held by one workspace’s state, by part. Diagnostic only: it counts payload bytes, not allocator overhead.
PendingJoin
PreparedAdmission
Provisional membership transition. The host must atomically retain the new workspace AND response/history before adopting it or sending these messages.
PreparedAdmissionBatch
One MLS transition for a bounded set of independently authenticated joins. Each retained reply points at the same commit and Welcome.
PreparedManagement
Provisional local change. Save the returned workspace before adopting it or distributing the commit; the original owner is unchanged.
PreparedWorkspaceName
PreparedWorkspaceNameCheckpoint
RecoveryCutoffRequest
Locally generated request for a current publisher index head. A fresh nonce binds the response to this exchange; it is not a durable coverage cursor.
RecoveryRequest
A locally established request, not values copied from an untrusted offer. The caller supplies a canonical selection digest and obtains the exclusive/inclusive range from its durable delivery cursor/index.
RemovedMembership
An accepted removal’s local metadata. Verified management reception or the sole member ending a workspace can create this value; it exposes no active Workspace operations.
StorageKey
Derived storage key has a distinct cryptographic purpose from endpoint TLS. Root material is supplied by the host’s protected credential store.
ValidatedAdmission
VerifiedRecoveryOffer
Authenticated offer for exactly one request. Still not proof that the author’s own retained index is complete/honest, nor permission to release plaintext.
Workspace
Owns cryptographic state without exposing OpenMLS objects. Secret-bearing storage records are restricted to the trusted native persistence seam.

Enums§

AdmissionAssessment
AdmissionEnqueue
AdmissionQueueError
ManagementAction
One authenticated membership or invitation-management intent.
MembershipAuthorization
Authorization for one exact membership transition. Tags cannot substitute for checking the signed MLS commit against its parent state.
PreparedManagementUpdate
One provisional receiver result. Hosts must persist the matching variant before adoption, and must never configure data delivery from Removed.

Constants§

HISTORY_CHUNK_STEPS
Transitions one chunk of a join history carries. A branch longer than this is verified chunk by chunk: rollover adds a chunk, it never widens one, so no single request, reply page or StageJoin call ever carries more steps than it always did.
INVITATION_APPROVAL_REQUIRED
INVITATION_AUTOMATIC_APPROVAL_REQUIRED
INVITATION_DISABLED
INVITATION_EXPIRED
MAX_ADMISSION_BATCH
MAX_ADMISSION_QUEUE_BYTES
MAX_ADMISSION_QUEUE_ITEMS
MAX_APPLICATION_CIPHERTEXT
MAX_APPLICATION_CONTEXT
MAX_APPLICATION_PAYLOAD
MAX_JOIN_HISTORY_BYTES
Bytes a joiner will accept across a whole paged history exchange, including pages it has not yet verified. A reachable but hostile member must not be able to grow a pending join’s memory one page at a time.
MAX_JOIN_HISTORY_STEPS
Transitions a joiner will replay from one pinned invitation checkpoint.
MAX_MEMBER_PROFILE
MAX_RECOVERY_PACKETS
MAX_SEALED_BUNDLE
MAX_SEALED_REMOVAL
MAX_SEALED_WORKSPACE
MAX_WELCOME
MAX_WORKSPACE_ATTACHMENT
MAX_WORKSPACE_NAME_CHECKPOINT
MAX_WORKSPACE_NAME_RECORD

Functions§

validate_workspace_name

Type Aliases§

SecurityRecords