alien_core/

sandbox_image.rs

//! What a sandbox image must carry for the agent to serve, and the Dockerfile text carrying it.
//!
//! Two kinds of image exist and neither is built the way the other is. AWS renders one per
//! deployment onto a customer-supplied base image; GCP builds static images in CI. Nothing at build
//! time reads the other side, and a value that disagrees is invisible until a session fails: an
//! agent listening on a port no caller dials, or an exec into a uid the image never created.
//!
//! So the values live here once and both kinds render the block that carries them from this
//! module. The same holds for the default sandbox base both kinds start from: its toolchain is
//! listed here once, and a probe reads that list rather than restating it. The Dockerfiles and the
//! tool list are committed as generated text because CI builds them with `docker build` and probes
//! them from a shell, neither of which can call a Rust function.

/// Path the agent binary is installed at inside every sandbox image.
///
/// An image that installs one path and entrypoints another exits before it serves, and the
/// session times out on connect.
pub const AGENT_PATH: &str = "/usr/local/bin/alien-sandbox-agent";

/// Port the agent serves unless the platform pins another.
///
/// Defined once because two independent copies are a runtime-only failure: the image build places
/// the agent on one port and the client dials the other, and nothing catches it until a sandbox
/// hangs. AWS scopes its endpoint token to an explicit port set, so this cannot be discovered.
pub const AGENT_PORT: u16 = 8971;

/// Mode of the agent binary, owned by `0:0` so the exec uid cannot rewrite its supervisor.
pub const AGENT_MODE: u32 = 0o755;

/// Name of the exec identity's passwd and group entries.
pub const EXEC_USER: &str = "sandbox";

/// Mode of the session root, which the exec uid owns.
pub const SESSION_ROOT_MODE: u32 = 0o700;

/// `RUST_LOG` for a GCP image, which the agent needs set before it logs anything.
pub const GCP_AGENT_LOG_FILTER: &str = "info";

/// How an image ends, and the isolation that ending permits.
///
/// One value rather than two, because `ALIEN_SANDBOX_ISOLATION` and the trailing `USER` describe
/// the same decision from opposite sides: an image that asks for `uid-split` under a non-root
/// `USER` has no privilege left to drop with, and every exec in it fails.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Isolation {
    /// The agent starts as root and drops to the exec uid before every spawn, so a command can
    /// never rewrite its own supervisor. The image declares no `USER`.
    UidSplit,
    /// The agent starts as the exec uid and supervises commands under it, which is all a runtime
    /// that refuses a root image can offer. The image ends `USER <uid>:<uid>`.
    Platform,
}

impl Isolation {
    /// The `ALIEN_SANDBOX_ISOLATION` value the agent parses.
    pub fn env_value(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::UidSplit => "uid-split",
            Self::Platform => "platform",
        }
    }
}

/// How the agent decides a caller may be served.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub enum Authorization {
    /// The connection is the proof. The agent serves an uncapabilitied request only from a socket
    /// peer it cannot trace back to the exec uid, which keeps the supervised command out.
    Transport,
    /// The caller presents a signed token, which is what a network anything can reach requires.
    Capability,
}

impl Authorization {
    /// The `ALIEN_SANDBOX_AUTHORIZATION` value the agent parses.
    pub fn env_value(self) -> &'static str {
        match self {
            Self::Transport => "transport",
            Self::Capability => "capability",
        }
    }
}

/// The values an image must carry for the agent to run in it.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SandboxImage {
    /// Uid the supervised command runs as, resolved from a non-root base USER or the default.
    pub exec_uid: u32,
    /// Primary gid from the base USER, which may differ from its uid.
    pub exec_gid: u32,
    /// Writable session directory. Image-owned directories may also be writable on VM backends.
    pub session_root: &'static str,
    /// Port the agent serves, both its own protocol and any lifecycle hooks.
    pub port: u16,
    pub authorization: Authorization,
    pub isolation: Isolation,
}

impl SandboxImage {
    /// Gid the supervised command runs as.
    pub fn exec_gid(&self) -> u32 {
        self.exec_gid
    }

    /// The agent's configuration contract as `(name, value)` pairs, in the order the `ENV` block
    /// lists them.
    pub fn contract_env_vars(&self) -> [(&'static str, String); 6] {
        [
            ("ALIEN_SANDBOX_ROOT", self.session_root.to_string()),
            ("ALIEN_SANDBOX_PORT", self.port.to_string()),
            (
                "ALIEN_SANDBOX_AUTHORIZATION",
                self.authorization.env_value().to_string(),
            ),
            ("ALIEN_SANDBOX_EXEC_UID", self.exec_uid.to_string()),
            ("ALIEN_SANDBOX_EXEC_GID", self.exec_gid().to_string()),
            (
                "ALIEN_SANDBOX_ISOLATION",
                self.isolation.env_value().to_string(),
            ),
        ]
    }

    /// The `uid:gid` the image runs as, or `None` when it declares no user and starts as root.
    /// Why the gid is explicit is in the `USER` comment [`entrypoint`] renders.
    pub fn user(&self) -> Option<String> {
        match self.isolation {
            Isolation::UidSplit => None,
            Isolation::Platform => Some(format!("{}:{}", self.exec_uid, self.exec_gid())),
        }
    }

    /// The port the image exposes, as an OCI `ExposedPorts` key.
    pub fn exposed_port(&self) -> String {
        format!("{}/tcp", self.port)
    }

    /// The exec identity's `/etc/passwd` line, without a trailing newline.
    pub fn passwd_entry(&self) -> String {
        format!(
            "{EXEC_USER}:x:{uid}:{gid}::{root}:/sbin/nologin",
            uid = self.exec_uid,
            gid = self.exec_gid(),
            root = self.session_root,
        )
    }

    /// The exec identity's `/etc/group` line, without a trailing newline.
    pub fn group_entry(&self) -> String {
        format!("{EXEC_USER}:x:{gid}:", gid = self.exec_gid())
    }
}

/// The Lambda MicroVM image, rendered per deployment onto a customer base image.
///
/// The agent runs as root so it can drop to [`SandboxImage::exec_uid`] before every spawn; inside
/// a MicroVM that is contained by hardware virtualisation, which is the tenant boundary. A
/// shared-kernel backend must give the agent `CAP_SETUID` instead of root.
pub const AWS_MICROVM: SandboxImage = SandboxImage {
    exec_uid: 60000,
    exec_gid: 60000,
    session_root: "/sandbox",
    port: AGENT_PORT,
    authorization: Authorization::Transport,
    isolation: Isolation::UidSplit,
};

/// The GCP Agent Platform image, built once in CI and run with nothing layered on top.
///
/// 1000 is the conventional first non-root uid, chosen over the 60000 [`AWS_MICROVM`] uses because
/// that value was never tried against Agent Platform. One uid covers the agent and the commands it
/// supervises: Agent Platform refuses an image that requires root, so there is no second uid to
/// drop to.
///
/// Agent Platform is only known to serve 8080, on the image and on the declared template port
/// alike, and whether it honours a declared port or assumes 8080 has never been established.
/// 8080 is right under either answer; any other number is right under only one.
pub const GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM: SandboxImage = SandboxImage {
    exec_uid: 1000,
    exec_gid: 1000,
    session_root: "/sandbox",
    port: 8080,
    authorization: Authorization::Transport,
    isolation: Isolation::Platform,
};

/// Every variable a GCP Agent Platform image sets: the contract, then `RUST_LOG`.
pub fn gcp_agent_platform_env() -> Vec<(&'static str, String)> {
    let mut env = GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM.contract_env_vars().to_vec();
    env.push(("RUST_LOG", GCP_AGENT_LOG_FILTER.to_string()));
    env
}

/// The image every default sandbox builds on, by index digest so both architectures are pinned.
///
/// Bumped by hand, then regenerated: Renovate skips the generated Dockerfiles and does not read
/// this file.
pub const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_BASE_IMAGE: &str = "public.ecr.aws/docker/library/buildpack-deps:26.04@sha256:159ea382e6fb39e62480ee932113f885f7bd787cd4895fc4dc71aebb175077fd";

/// The image uv and uvx are copied out of, by index digest.
pub const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_UV_IMAGE: &str = "ghcr.io/astral-sh/uv:0.12.21@sha256:a7aed3216253ee804de3e2d8afa5073baa1a177335345d43845cd4165e43b711";

/// A tool the default sandbox base ships, and the command that shows it runs.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq, Eq)]
pub struct SandboxTool {
    /// The Ubuntu archive package it comes from, or `None` for one copied out of
    /// [`DEFAULT_SANDBOX_UV_IMAGE`].
    pub package: Option<&'static str>,
    /// Prints the tool's version and exits zero.
    pub version_command: &'static str,
}

/// The toolchain of the default sandbox base, and the one list its probes read.
///
/// Every tool lands in `/usr/bin` or `/usr/local/bin`: a supervised command gets a fixed `PATH`
/// and never the image's `ENV`, so a tool anywhere else is invisible to it.
pub const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_TOOLS: &[SandboxTool] = &[
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("nftables"),
        version_command: "/usr/sbin/nft --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("iptables"),
        version_command: "iptables-nft --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("nodejs"),
        version_command: "node --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("npm"),
        version_command: "npm --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("ripgrep"),
        version_command: "rg --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("jq"),
        version_command: "jq --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("zip"),
        version_command: "zip -v",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("less"),
        version_command: "less --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("nano"),
        version_command: "nano --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("vim-tiny"),
        version_command: "vim.tiny --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: Some("htop"),
        version_command: "htop --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: None,
        version_command: "uv --version",
    },
    SandboxTool {
        package: None,
        version_command: "uvx --version",
    },
];

/// The `RUN` step creating the exec identity and the session root it owns.
pub fn identity_setup(image: &SandboxImage) -> String {
    format!(
        r#"RUN test ! -L /etc/passwd && test ! -L /etc/group && test ! -L {root} \
 && touch /etc/passwd /etc/group \
 && chown 0:0 /etc/passwd /etc/group && chmod 0644 /etc/passwd /etc/group \
 && (awk -F: '$3 == {uid} {{ found=1 }} END {{ exit !found }}' /etc/passwd || printf '{passwd}\n' >> /etc/passwd) \
 && (awk -F: '$3 == {gid} {{ found=1 }} END {{ exit !found }}' /etc/group || printf '{group}\n' >> /etc/group) \
 && mkdir -p {root} \
 && chown {uid}:{gid} {root} \
 && chmod {SESSION_ROOT_MODE:04o} {root}"#,
        passwd = image.passwd_entry(),
        group = image.group_entry(),
        root = image.session_root,
        uid = image.exec_uid,
        gid = image.exec_gid(),
    )
}

/// The `ENV` block carrying the agent's configuration contract.
pub fn contract_env(image: &SandboxImage) -> String {
    let vars: Vec<String> = image
        .contract_env_vars()
        .iter()
        .map(|(name, value)| format!("{name}={value}"))
        .collect();
    format!("ENV {}", vars.join(" \\\n    "))
}

/// `EXPOSE`, the image's ending, and the `ENTRYPOINT`.
pub fn entrypoint(image: &SandboxImage) -> String {
    let ending = match image.user() {
        None => String::new(),
        Some(user) => format!(
            "# Explicit gid so a runtime that does not read /etc/passwd cannot start the agent in \
             group 0, which\n# makes the exec drop a privilege crossing whose setgroups needs a \
             CAP_SETGID this image lacks, so\n# every exec fails.\nUSER {user}\n"
        ),
    };
    format!(
        "EXPOSE {port}\n{ending}ENTRYPOINT [\"{AGENT_PATH}\"]",
        port = image.exposed_port()
    )
}

/// Path of the committed minimal wolfi GCP Dockerfile, relative to the repository root.
#[cfg(test)]
const GCP_DOCKERFILE: &str = "docker/Dockerfile.alien-sandbox-agent";

/// Path of the committed default GCP sandbox Dockerfile, relative to the repository root.
#[cfg(test)]
const GCP_DEFAULT_DOCKERFILE: &str = "docker/Dockerfile.alien-sandbox-gcp";

/// Path of the committed default sandbox base Dockerfile, relative to the repository root.
#[cfg(test)]
const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_DOCKERFILE: &str = "docker/Dockerfile.alien-sandbox-default";

/// Path of the committed tool list a probe of the default sandbox base reads.
#[cfg(test)]
const DEFAULT_SANDBOX_TOOLS_FILE: &str = "docker/sandbox-default-tools.txt";

/// Set to regenerate every committed file this module renders instead of comparing against them.
/// Named for the agent Dockerfile; every generated header prints the name, so a rename rewrites all.
#[cfg(test)]
const SANDBOX_FILES_UPDATE: &str = "UPDATE_SANDBOX_AGENT_DOCKERFILE";

/// Renders [`DEFAULT_SANDBOX_DOCKERFILE`], the tools-only base every default sandbox builds on.
#[cfg(test)]
fn default_sandbox_dockerfile() -> String {
    let packages: Vec<&str> = DEFAULT_SANDBOX_TOOLS
        .iter()
        .filter_map(|tool| tool.package)
        .collect();
    format!(
        r#"# Generated by `cargo test -p alien-core --lib sandbox_image`. Do not edit by hand.
# Regenerate with {SANDBOX_FILES_UPDATE}=1 in front of that command.
#
# Multi-arch tools-only base for the default sandbox images, with no agent. An image that runs the
# agent adds it and its own ending on top, and a runtime with no in-guest agent runs this as is,
# so it declares no USER, ENTRYPOINT or ENV.

FROM {DEFAULT_SANDBOX_BASE_IMAGE}

# No version pins: the -updates and -security pockets supersede a pinned version and the arm64
# ports lag behind, so a pin breaks the build. The published digest is what fixes the versions.
RUN apt-get update \
 && DEBIAN_FRONTEND=noninteractive apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends \
      {packages} \
 && rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*

COPY --from={DEFAULT_SANDBOX_UV_IMAGE} /uv /uvx /usr/local/bin/
"#,
        packages = packages.join(" "),
    )
}

/// Renders [`DEFAULT_SANDBOX_TOOLS_FILE`], one version command per line.
#[cfg(test)]
fn default_sandbox_tools_list() -> String {
    let mut list = format!(
        "# Generated by `cargo test -p alien-core --lib sandbox_image`. Do not edit by hand.
# Regenerate with {SANDBOX_FILES_UPDATE}=1 in front of that command.
#
# One command per tool the default sandbox base ships; each prints a version and exits zero.
"
    );
    for tool in DEFAULT_SANDBOX_TOOLS {
        list.push_str(tool.version_command);
        list.push('\n');
    }
    list
}

/// Where a GCP image's final stage starts.
#[cfg(test)]
enum GcpBase {
    Image(&'static str),
    /// A build-arg with no default, which whoever builds the image must pass.
    BuildArg(&'static str),
}

/// Renders [`GCP_DOCKERFILE`], the minimal wolfi image.
#[cfg(test)]
fn gcp_agent_platform_dockerfile() -> String {
    gcp_dockerfile(
        "Multi-arch build for the alien-sandbox-agent Docker image",
        GcpBase::Image("docker.io/chainguard/wolfi-base:latest"),
        "# git is for the sandboxed command, not the agent, and pulls 24 transitive packages. That cost
# lands here because this image is the sandbox, with no customer base image underneath to carry it.
RUN apk add --no-cache git",
    )
}

/// Renders [`GCP_DEFAULT_DOCKERFILE`], the default GCP sandbox image: the agent on the default
/// sandbox base ([`DEFAULT_SANDBOX_DOCKERFILE`]), which whoever builds it passes by digest.
#[cfg(test)]
fn gcp_default_sandbox_dockerfile() -> String {
    assert_eq!(
        GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM.exec_uid, 1000,
        "the userdel below exists only because Ubuntu's own user holds the exec uid"
    );
    gcp_dockerfile(
        "Multi-arch build for the default GCP sandbox image: the default sandbox base plus the agent",
        GcpBase::BuildArg("SANDBOX_DEFAULT_BASE"),
        "# Ubuntu ships `ubuntu` at uid 1000. Appending a second entry for that uid leaves `id` and every
# tool resolving it to `ubuntu`, so the exec user would not be `sandbox`.
RUN userdel --remove ubuntu",
    )
}

/// Renders a GCP Dockerfile onto `base`, with `base_setup` run as root before the agent lands.
///
/// Everything outside the shared block is here because it is true of the GCP images alone: the
/// `binary-selector` stage, which exists because the release workflow builds one manifest for two
/// architectures from binaries cross-compiled outside Docker; and `RUST_LOG`, which the agent's own
/// `EnvFilter` needs before it will emit anything.
#[cfg(test)]
fn gcp_dockerfile(title: &str, base: GcpBase, base_setup: &str) -> String {
    let image = &GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM;
    // An ARG read by a FROM must precede the first FROM, or it is scoped to a stage and empty.
    // BuildKit reads a parser directive only on the first lines, before any other comment.
    let (directive, base_arg, base) = match base {
        GcpBase::Image(reference) => (String::new(), String::new(), reference.to_string()),
        GcpBase::BuildArg(name) => (
            "# check=skip=InvalidDefaultArgInFrom\n".to_string(),
            format!(
                "# No default: the base's digest exists only once it is built, so whoever builds \
                 this image\n# passes it. The check directive on line 1 is for this.\nARG {name}\n\n"
            ),
            format!("${{{name}}}"),
        ),
    };
    format!(
        r#"{directive}# Generated by `cargo test -p alien-core --lib sandbox_image`. Do not edit by hand.
# Regenerate with {SANDBOX_FILES_UPDATE}=1 in front of that command.
#
# {title}
# Run directly as the GCP Agent Platform sandbox; nothing layers on top of it

{base_arg}FROM docker.io/chainguard/wolfi-base:latest AS binary-selector

COPY target/aarch64-unknown-linux-musl/release/alien-sandbox-agent /tmp/alien-sandbox-agent-aarch64
COPY target/x86_64-unknown-linux-musl/release/alien-sandbox-agent /tmp/alien-sandbox-agent-x86_64

ARG TARGETARCH
RUN case "$TARGETARCH" in \
       amd64)  cp /tmp/alien-sandbox-agent-x86_64 /tmp/alien-sandbox-agent ;; \
       arm64)  cp /tmp/alien-sandbox-agent-aarch64 /tmp/alien-sandbox-agent ;; \
       *)      echo "unsupported TARGETARCH '$TARGETARCH'" >&2; exit 1 ;; \
    esac

FROM {base}

{base_setup}

# Root-owned and unwritable by uid {exec_uid}: the supervised command runs under that uid and must not
# be able to rewrite its own supervisor.
COPY --from=binary-selector --chown=0:0 --chmod={AGENT_MODE:04o} \
     /tmp/alien-sandbox-agent {AGENT_PATH}

# Numeric ids and a plain append rather than adduser, which differs across base distributions.
# Linux runs a process under a uid with no passwd entry, but tooling inside the sandbox reads one.
{identity}

# The template carries no env, so the contract lives here, and none of it is optional. transport
# serves an uncapabilitied request only from a socket `peer::transport_may_serve` cannot trace
# back to the exec uid, and the agent refuses the mode where /proc/net/tcp is unreadable.
{env}

# The release build resolves tracing-subscriber once across every package it names, and five of
# them ask for env-filter, so the agent's fmt::init() has an EnvFilter under it. Unset, that
# filter discards the startup warning saying this image serves requests without a capability.
ENV RUST_LOG={GCP_AGENT_LOG_FILTER}

{entrypoint}
"#,
        exec_uid = image.exec_uid,
        identity = identity_setup(image),
        env = contract_env(image),
        entrypoint = entrypoint(image),
    )
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    fn committed_path(relative: &str) -> std::path::PathBuf {
        std::path::PathBuf::from(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"))
            .join("../..")
            .join(relative)
    }

    /// Where two texts first part, in terms a reader can act on. `assert_eq!` on a whole
    /// Dockerfile prints two escaped blobs and says nothing about which line moved.
    fn first_difference(committed: &str, rendered: &str) -> String {
        for (index, (left, right)) in committed.lines().zip(rendered.lines()).enumerate() {
            if left != right {
                let line = index + 1;
                return format!("line {line}: committed {left:?}, contract renders {right:?}");
            }
        }
        format!(
            "committed has {} lines, the contract renders {}",
            committed.lines().count(),
            rendered.lines().count()
        )
    }

    /// The whole file, not chosen properties. A mutation this comparison cannot see is one that
    /// leaves the bytes alone, and there is no such mutation.
    #[test]
    fn the_committed_gcp_dockerfiles_are_what_the_contract_renders() {
        for (file, rendered) in [
            (GCP_DOCKERFILE, gcp_agent_platform_dockerfile()),
            (GCP_DEFAULT_DOCKERFILE, gcp_default_sandbox_dockerfile()),
            (DEFAULT_SANDBOX_DOCKERFILE, default_sandbox_dockerfile()),
            (DEFAULT_SANDBOX_TOOLS_FILE, default_sandbox_tools_list()),
        ] {
            let path = committed_path(file);

            if std::env::var_os(SANDBOX_FILES_UPDATE).is_some() {
                std::fs::write(&path, &rendered)
                    .unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{} must be writable: {error}", path.display()));
                continue;
            }

            let committed = std::fs::read_to_string(&path)
                .unwrap_or_else(|error| panic!("{} must be readable: {error}", path.display()));
            assert!(
                committed == rendered,
                "{file} has drifted from the contract it is rendered from.\n\
                 {}\n\
                 Regenerate it: {SANDBOX_FILES_UPDATE}=1 cargo test -p alien-core --lib sandbox_image",
                first_difference(&committed, &rendered)
            );
        }
    }

    /// An image built without a Dockerfile carries what the CI images carry, so the env the
    /// accessor hands out is read back from the committed file rather than restated.
    #[test]
    fn the_gcp_env_accessor_is_every_env_the_committed_dockerfile_sets() {
        let committed = std::fs::read_to_string(committed_path(GCP_DEFAULT_DOCKERFILE)).unwrap();
        let mut set = Vec::new();
        let mut in_env = false;
        for line in committed.lines() {
            let line = line.trim();
            let rest = match line.strip_prefix("ENV ") {
                Some(rest) => rest,
                None if in_env => line,
                None => continue,
            };
            in_env = rest.ends_with('\\');
            for pair in rest.trim_end_matches('\\').split_whitespace() {
                let (name, value) = pair.split_once('=').expect("ENV name=value");
                set.push((name.to_string(), value.to_string()));
            }
        }
        let accessor: Vec<(String, String)> = gcp_agent_platform_env()
            .into_iter()
            .map(|(name, value)| (name.to_string(), value))
            .collect();
        assert_eq!(accessor, set);
    }

    /// Every consumer derives these, so nothing else compares them against a number. The
    /// setup emitters tell the agent which uid to drop to; if that stops matching the uid the
    /// image creates, the sandbox starts and every exec fails.
    #[test]
    fn the_two_images_carry_the_identities_their_stacks_were_built_against() {
        assert_eq!(AWS_MICROVM.port, 8971);
        assert_eq!(AWS_MICROVM.exec_uid, 60000);
        assert_eq!(AWS_MICROVM.session_root, "/sandbox");
        assert_eq!(GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM.port, 8080);
        assert_eq!(GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM.exec_uid, 1000);
        assert_eq!(GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM.session_root, "/sandbox");
        for image in [&AWS_MICROVM, &GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM] {
            assert_ne!(image.exec_uid, 0, "the exec uid must never be root");
        }
    }

    /// The ending an image declares and the isolation it claims come off one value, so they
    /// cannot disagree. The AWS half is rendered at run time and reaches no committed file, which
    /// is why the whole-file comparison above covers only the GCP side of it.
    #[test]
    fn the_ending_an_image_declares_follows_its_isolation() {
        assert!(!entrypoint(&AWS_MICROVM).contains("USER "));
        assert!(contract_env(&AWS_MICROVM).contains("ALIEN_SANDBOX_ISOLATION=uid-split"));
        assert!(entrypoint(&GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM).contains("\nUSER 1000:1000\n"));
        assert!(contract_env(&GCP_AGENT_PLATFORM).contains("ALIEN_SANDBOX_ISOLATION=platform"));
    }
}

/// Root-owned metadata copied from the base image at bundle creation, never from an exec caller.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Default, serde::Serialize, serde::Deserialize)]
#[serde(rename_all = "camelCase", deny_unknown_fields)]
pub struct SandboxImageCommand {
    /// OCI Entrypoint followed by Cmd; empty means there is no image command.
    pub command: Vec<String>,
    /// Image environment only, before runtime authorization and provider variables are added.
    pub env: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, String>,
    /// OCI WorkingDir, or / if the image does not declare one.
    pub working_directory: String,
}

/// Installed outside the command-writable session directory.
pub const IMAGE_COMMAND_PATH: &str = "/opt/alien/image-command.json";