1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 926 927 928 929 930 931 932 933 934 935 936 937 938 939 940 941 942 943 944 945 946 947 948 949 950 951 952 953 954 955 956 957 958 959 960 961 962 963 964 965 966 967 968 969 970 971 972 973 974 975 976 977 978 979 980 981 982 983 984 985 986 987 988 989 990 991 992 993 994 995 996 997 998 999 1000 1001 1002 1003 1004 1005 1006 1007 1008 1009 1010 1011 1012 1013 1014 1015 1016 1017 1018 1019 1020 1021 1022 1023 1024 1025 1026 1027 1028 1029 1030 1031 1032 1033 1034 1035 1036 1037 1038 1039 1040 1041 1042 1043 1044 1045 1046 1047 1048 1049 1050 1051 1052 1053 1054 1055 1056 1057 1058 1059 1060 1061 1062 1063 1064 1065 1066 1067 1068 1069 1070 1071 1072 1073 1074 1075 1076 1077 1078 1079 1080 1081 1082 1083 1084 1085 1086 1087 1088 1089 1090 1091 1092 1093 1094 1095 1096 1097 1098 1099 1100 1101 1102 1103 1104 1105 1106 1107 1108 1109 1110 1111 1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1117 1118 1119 1120 1121 1122 1123 1124 1125 1126 1127 1128 1129 1130 1131 1132 1133 1134 1135 1136 1137 1138 1139 1140 1141 1142 1143 1144 1145 1146 1147 1148 1149 1150 1151 1152 1153 1154 1155 1156 1157 1158 1159 1160 1161 1162 1163 1164 1165 1166 1167 1168 1169 1170 1171 1172 1173 1174 1175 1176 1177 1178 1179 1180 1181 1182 1183 1184 1185 1186 1187 1188 1189 1190 1191 1192 1193 1194 1195 1196 1197 1198 1199 1200 1201 1202 1203 1204 1205 1206 1207 1208 1209 1210 1211 1212 1213 1214 1215 1216 1217 1218 1219 1220 1221 1222 1223 1224 1225 1226 1227 1228 1229 1230 1231 1232 1233 1234 1235 1236 1237 1238 1239 1240 1241 1242 1243 1244 1245 1246 1247 1248 1249 1250 1251 1252 1253 1254 1255 1256 1257 1258 1259 1260 1261 1262 1263 1264 1265 1266 1267 1268 1269 1270 1271 1272 1273 1274 1275 1276 1277 1278 1279 1280 1281 1282 1283 1284 1285 1286 1287 1288 1289 1290 1291 1292 1293 1294 1295 1296 1297 1298 1299 1300 1301 1302 1303 1304 1305 1306 1307 1308 1309 1310 1311 1312 1313 1314 1315 1316 1317 1318 1319 1320 1321 1322 1323 1324 1325 1326 1327 1328 1329 1330 1331 1332 1333 1334 1335 1336 1337 1338 1339 1340 1341 1342 1343 1344 1345 1346 1347 1348 1349 1350 1351 1352 1353 1354 1355 1356 1357 1358 1359 1360 1361 1362 1363 1364 1365 1366 1367 1368 1369 1370 1371 1372 1373 1374 1375 1376 1377 1378 1379 1380 1381 1382 1383 1384 1385 1386 1387 1388 1389 1390 1391 1392 1393 1394 1395 1396 1397 1398 1399 1400 1401 1402 1403 1404 1405 1406 1407 1408 1409 1410 1411 1412 1413 1414 1415 1416 1417 1418 1419 1420 1421 1422 1423 1424 1425 1426 1427 1428 1429 1430 1431 1432 1433 1434 1435 1436 1437 1438 1439 1440 1441 1442 1443 1444 1445 1446 1447 1448 1449 1450 1451 1452 1453 1454 1455 1456 1457 1458 1459 1460 1461 1462 1463 1464 1465 1466 1467 1468 1469 1470 1471 1472 1473 1474 1475 1476 1477 1478 1479 1480 1481 1482 1483 1484 1485 1486 1487 1488 1489 1490 1491 1492 1493 1494 1495 1496 1497 1498 1499 1500 1501 1502 1503 1504 1505 1506 1507 1508 1509 1510 1511 1512 1513 1514 1515 1516 1517 1518 1519 1520 1521 1522 1523 1524 1525 1526 1527 1528 1529 1530 1531 1532 1533 1534 1535 1536 1537 1538 1539 1540 1541 1542 1543 1544 1545 1546 1547 1548 1549 1550 1551 1552 1553 1554 1555 1556 1557 1558 1559 1560 1561 1562 1563 1564 1565 1566 1567 1568 1569 1570 1571 1572 1573 1574 1575 1576 1577 1578 1579 1580 1581 1582 1583 1584 1585 1586 1587 1588 1589 1590 1591 1592 1593 1594 1595 1596 1597 1598 1599 1600 1601 1602 1603 1604 1605 1606 1607 1608 1609 1610 1611 1612 1613 1614 1615 1616 1617 1618 1619 1620 1621 1622 1623 1624 1625 1626 1627 1628 1629 1630 1631 1632 1633 1634 1635 1636 1637 1638 1639 1640 1641 1642 1643 1644 1645 1646 1647 1648 1649 1650 1651 1652 1653 1654 1655 1656 1657 1658 1659 1660 1661 1662 1663 1664 1665 1666 1667 1668 1669 1670 1671 1672 1673 1674 1675 1676 1677 1678 1679 1680 1681 1682 1683 1684 1685 1686 1687 1688 1689 1690 1691 1692 1693 1694 1695 1696 1697 1698 1699 1700 1701 1702 1703 1704 1705 1706 1707 1708 1709 1710 1711 1712 1713 1714 1715 1716 1717 1718 1719 1720 1721 1722 1723 1724 1725 1726 1727 1728 1729 1730 1731 1732 1733 1734 1735 1736 1737 1738 1739 1740 1741 1742 1743 1744 1745 1746 1747 1748 1749 1750 1751 1752 1753 1754 1755 1756 1757 1758 1759 1760 1761 1762 1763 1764 1765 1766 1767 1768 1769 1770 1771 1772 1773 1774 1775 1776 1777 1778 1779 1780 1781 1782 1783 1784 1785 1786 1787 1788 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 1794 1795 1796 1797 1798 1799 1800 1801 1802 1803 1804 1805 1806 1807 1808 1809 1810 1811 1812 1813 1814 1815 1816 1817 1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824 1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832 1833 1834 1835 1836 1837 1838 1839 1840 1841 1842 1843 1844 1845 1846 1847 1848 1849 1850 1851 1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858 1859 1860 1861 1862 1863 1864 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 1881 1882 1883 1884 1885 1886 1887 1888 1889 1890 1891 1892 1893 1894 1895 1896 1897 1898 1899 1900 1901 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913 1914 1915 1916 1917 1918 1919 1920 1921 1922 1923 1924 1925 1926 1927 1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970
//! Key-related functionality. //! //! # Data Types //! //! The main data type is the [`Key`] enum. This enum abstracts away //! the differences between the key formats (the deprecated [version //! 3], the current [version 4], and the proposed [version 5] //! formats). Nevertheless, some functionality remains format //! specific. For instance, the `Key` enum doesn't provide a //! mechanism to generate keys. This functionality depends on the //! format. //! //! This version of Sequoia only supports version 4 keys ([`Key4`]). //! However, future versions may include limited support for version 3 //! keys to allow working with archived messages, and we intend to add //! support for version 5 keys once the new version of the //! specification has been finalized. //! //! OpenPGP specifies four different types of keys: [public keys], //! [secret keys], [public subkeys], and [secret subkeys]. These are //! all represented by the `Key` enum and the `Key4` struct using //! marker types. We use marker types rather than an enum, to better //! exploit the type checking. For instance, type-specific methods //! like [`Key::secret`] are only exposed for those types that //! actually support them. See the documentation for [`Key`] for an //! explanation of how the markers work. //! //! The [`SecretKeyMaterial`] data type allows working with secret key //! material directly. This enum has two variants: [`Unencrypted`], //! and [`Encrypted`]. It is not normally necessary to use this data //! structure directly. The primary functionality that is of interest //! to most users is decrypting secret key material. This is usually //! more conveniently done using [`Key::decrypt_secret`]. //! //! [`Key`]: ../enum.Key.html //! [`Key4`]: struct.Key4.html //! [version 3]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1991#section-6.6 //! [version 4]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.2 //! [version 5]: https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-09.html#name-public-key-packet-formats //! [public keys]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.1.1 //! [secret keys]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.1.3 //! [public subkeys]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.1.2 //! [secret subkeys]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.1.4 //! [`Key::secret`]: ../enum.Key.html#method.secret //! [`SecretKeyMaterial`]: enum.SecretKeyMaterial.html //! [`Unencrypted`]: struct.Unencrypted.html //! [`Encrypted`]: struct.Encrypted.html //! [`Key::decrypt_secret`]: ../enum.Key.html#method.decrypt_secret //! //! # Key Creation //! //! Use [`Key4::generate_rsa`] or [`Key4::generate_ecc`] to create a //! new key. //! //! Existing key material can be turned into an OpenPGP key using //! [`Key4::import_public_cv25519`], [`Key4::import_public_ed25519`], //! [`Key4::import_public_rsa`], [`Key4::import_secret_cv25519`], //! [`Key4::import_secret_ed25519`], and [`Key4::import_secret_rsa`]. //! //! Whether you create a new key or import existing key material, you //! still need to create a binding signature, and, for signing keys, a //! back signature for the key to be usable. //! //! [`Key4::generate_rsa`]: struct.Key4.html#method.generate_rsa //! [`Key4::generate_ecc`]: struct.Key4.html#method.generate_ecc //! [`Key4::import_public_cv25519`]: struct.Key4.html#method.import_public_cv25519 //! [`Key4::import_public_ed25519`]: struct.Key4.html#method.import_public_ed25519 //! [`Key4::import_public_rsa`]: struct.Key4.html#method.import_public_rsa //! [`Key4::import_secret_cv25519`]: struct.Key4.html#method.import_secret_cv25519 //! [`Key4::import_secret_ed25519`]: struct.Key4.html#method.import_secret_ed25519 //! [`Key4::import_secret_rsa`]: struct.Key4.html#method.import_secret_rsa //! //! # In-Memory Protection of Secret Key Material //! //! Whether the secret key material is protected on disk or not, //! Sequoia encrypts unencrypted secret key material ([`Unencrypted`]) //! while it is memory. This helps protect against [heartbleed]-style //! attacks where a buffer over-read allows an attacker to read from //! the process's address space. This protection is less important //! for Rust programs, which are memory safe. However, it is //! essential when Sequoia is used via its FFI. //! //! See [`crypto::mem::Encrypted`] for details. //! //! [`Unencrypted`]: struct.Unencrypted.html //! [heartbleed]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed //! [`crypto::mem::Encrypted`]: ../../crypto/mem/struct.Encrypted.html use std::fmt; use std::cmp::Ordering; use std::convert::TryInto; use std::time; #[cfg(test)] use quickcheck::{Arbitrary, Gen}; use crate::Error; use crate::cert::prelude::*; use crate::crypto::{self, mem, mpi, hash::Hash}; use crate::packet; use crate::packet::prelude::*; use crate::PublicKeyAlgorithm; use crate::SymmetricAlgorithm; use crate::HashAlgorithm; use crate::types::{Curve, Timestamp}; use crate::crypto::S2K; use crate::Result; use crate::crypto::Password; use crate::KeyID; use crate::Fingerprint; use crate::KeyHandle; mod conversions; /// A marker trait that captures whether a `Key` definitely contains /// secret key material. /// /// A [`Key`] can be treated as if it only has public key material /// ([`key::PublicParts`]) or also has secret key material /// ([`key::SecretParts`]). For those cases where the type /// information needs to be erased (e.g., interfaces like /// [`Cert::keys`]), we provide the [`key::UnspecifiedParts`] marker. /// /// Even if a `Key` does not have the `SecretKey` marker, it may still /// have secret key material. But, it will generally act as if it /// didn't. In particular, when serializing a `Key` without the /// `SecretKey` marker, secret key material will be ignored. See the /// documentation for [`Key`] for a demonstration of this behavior. /// /// [`Cert::keys`]: ../../cert/struct.Cert.html#method.keys /// [`Key`]: ../enum.Key.html /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`]: struct.UnspecifiedParts.html pub trait KeyParts: fmt::Debug { /// Converts a key with unspecified parts into this kind of key. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. /// /// Converting a key with [`key::PublicParts`] or /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`] will always succeed. However, /// converting a key to one with [`key::SecretParts`] only /// succeeds if the key actually contains secret key material. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`]: struct.UnspecifiedParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html /// /// # Examples /// /// For a less construed example, refer to the [source code]: /// /// [source code]: https://gitlab.com/search?search=convert_key&project_id=4469613&search_code=true&repository_ref=master /// /// ``` /// use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// use openpgp::Result; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// use openpgp::packet::prelude::*; /// /// fn f<P>(cert: &Cert, mut key: Key<P, key::UnspecifiedRole>) /// -> Result<Key<P, key::UnspecifiedRole>> /// where P: key::KeyParts /// { /// // ... /// /// # let criterium = true; /// if criterium { /// // Cert::primary_key's return type is concrete /// // (Key<key::PublicParts, key::PrimaryRole>). We need to /// // convert it to the generic type Key<P, key::UnspecifiedRole>. /// // First, we "downcast" it to have unspecified parts and an /// // unspecified role, then we use a method defined by the /// // generic type to perform the conversion to the generic /// // type P. /// key = P::convert_key( /// cert.primary_key().key().clone() /// .parts_into_unspecified() /// .role_into_unspecified())?; /// } /// # else { unreachable!() } /// /// // ... /// /// Ok(key) /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # f(&cert, cert.primary_key().key().clone().role_into_unspecified()).unwrap(); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn convert_key<R: KeyRole>(key: Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<Key<Self, R>> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key reference with unspecified parts into this kind /// of key reference. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. /// /// Converting a key with [`key::PublicParts`] or /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`] will always succeed. However, /// converting a key to one with [`key::SecretParts`] only /// succeeds if the key actually contains secret key material. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`]: struct.UnspecifiedParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html fn convert_key_ref<R: KeyRole>(key: &Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&Key<Self, R>> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key bundle with unspecified parts into this kind of /// key bundle. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. /// /// Converting a key bundle with [`key::PublicParts`] or /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`] will always succeed. However, /// converting a key bundle to one with [`key::SecretParts`] only /// succeeds if the key bundle actually contains secret key /// material. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`]: struct.UnspecifiedParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html fn convert_bundle<R: KeyRole>(bundle: KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<KeyBundle<Self, R>> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key bundle reference with unspecified parts into /// this kind of key bundle reference. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. /// /// Converting a key bundle with [`key::PublicParts`] or /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`] will always succeed. However, /// converting a key bundle to one with [`key::SecretParts`] only /// succeeds if the key bundle actually contains secret key /// material. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`]: struct.UnspecifiedParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html fn convert_bundle_ref<R: KeyRole>(bundle: &KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&KeyBundle<Self, R>> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key amalgamation with unspecified parts into this /// kind of key amalgamation. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. /// /// Converting a key amalgamation with [`key::PublicParts`] or /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`] will always succeed. However, /// converting a key amalgamation to one with [`key::SecretParts`] /// only succeeds if the key amalgamation actually contains secret /// key material. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`]: struct.UnspecifiedParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html fn convert_key_amalgamation<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<Self, R>>> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key amalgamation reference with unspecified parts /// into this kind of key amalgamation reference. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. /// /// Converting a key amalgamation with [`key::PublicParts`] or /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`] will always succeed. However, /// converting a key amalgamation to one with [`key::SecretParts`] /// only succeeds if the key amalgamation actually contains secret /// key material. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::UnspecifiedParts`]: struct.UnspecifiedParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html fn convert_key_amalgamation_ref<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: &'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<&'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<Self, R>>> where Self: Sized; } /// A marker trait that captures a `Key`'s role. /// /// A [`Key`] can either be a primary key ([`key::PrimaryRole`]) or a /// subordinate key ([`key::SubordinateRole`]). For those cases where /// the type information needs to be erased (e.g., interfaces like /// [`Cert::keys`]), we provide the [`key::UnspecifiedRole`] marker. /// /// [`Key`]: ../enum.Key.html /// [`key::PrimaryRole`]: struct.PrimaryRole.html /// [`key::SubordinateRole`]: struct.SubordinateRole.html /// [`Cert::keys`]: ../../cert/struct.Cert.html#method.keys /// [`key::UnspecifiedRole`]: struct.UnspecifiedRole.html pub trait KeyRole: fmt::Debug { /// Converts a key with an unspecified role into this kind of key. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. /// /// # Examples /// /// ``` /// use sequoia_openpgp as openpgp; /// use openpgp::Result; /// # use openpgp::cert::prelude::*; /// use openpgp::packet::prelude::*; /// /// fn f<R>(cert: &Cert, mut key: Key<key::UnspecifiedParts, R>) /// -> Result<Key<key::UnspecifiedParts, R>> /// where R: key::KeyRole /// { /// // ... /// /// # let criterium = true; /// if criterium { /// // Cert::primary_key's return type is concrete /// // (Key<key::PublicParts, key::PrimaryRole>). We need to /// // convert it to the generic type Key<key::UnspecifiedParts, R>. /// // First, we "downcast" it to have unspecified parts and an /// // unspecified role, then we use a method defined by the /// // generic type to perform the conversion to the generic /// // type R. /// key = R::convert_key( /// cert.primary_key().key().clone() /// .parts_into_unspecified() /// .role_into_unspecified()); /// } /// # else { unreachable!() } /// /// // ... /// /// Ok(key) /// } /// # fn main() -> openpgp::Result<()> { /// # let (cert, _) = /// # CertBuilder::general_purpose(None, Some("alice@example.org")) /// # .generate()?; /// # f(&cert, cert.primary_key().key().clone().parts_into_unspecified()).unwrap(); /// # Ok(()) /// # } /// ``` fn convert_key<P: KeyParts>(key: Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> Key<P, Self> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key reference with an unspecified role into this /// kind of key reference. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. fn convert_key_ref<P: KeyParts>(key: &Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &Key<P, Self> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key bundle with an unspecified role into this kind /// of key bundle. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. fn convert_bundle<P: KeyParts>(bundle: KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> KeyBundle<P, Self> where Self: Sized; /// Converts a key bundle reference with an unspecified role into /// this kind of key bundle reference. /// /// This function is helpful when you need to convert a concrete /// type into a generic type. Using `From` works, but requires /// adding a type bound to the generic type, which is ugly and /// invasive. fn convert_bundle_ref<P: KeyParts>(bundle: &KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &KeyBundle<P, Self> where Self: Sized; } /// A marker that indicates that a `Key` should be treated like a /// public key. /// /// Note: this doesn't indicate whether the data structure contains /// secret key material; it indicates whether any secret key material /// should be ignored. For instance, when exporting a key with the /// `PublicParts` marker, secret key material will *not* be exported. /// See the documentation for [`Key`] for a demonstration. /// /// Refer to [`KeyParts`] for details. /// /// [`Key`]: ../enum.Key.html /// [`KeyParts`]: trait.KeyParts.html #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] pub struct PublicParts; impl KeyParts for PublicParts { fn convert_key<R: KeyRole>(key: Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<Key<Self, R>> { Ok(key.into()) } fn convert_key_ref<R: KeyRole>(key: &Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&Key<Self, R>> { Ok(key.into()) } fn convert_bundle<R: KeyRole>(bundle: KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<KeyBundle<Self, R>> { Ok(bundle.into()) } fn convert_bundle_ref<R: KeyRole>(bundle: &KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&KeyBundle<Self, R>> { Ok(bundle.into()) } fn convert_key_amalgamation<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<Self, R>>> { Ok(ka.into()) } fn convert_key_amalgamation_ref<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: &'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<&'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<Self, R>>> { Ok(ka.into()) } } /// A marker that indicates that a `Key` should be treated like a /// secret key. /// /// Unlike the [`key::PublicParts`] marker, this marker asserts that /// the [`Key`] contains secret key material. Because secret key /// material is not protected by the self-signature, there is no /// indication that the secret key material is actually valid. /// /// Refer to [`KeyParts`] for details. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`Key`]: ../enum.Key.html /// [`KeyParts`]: trait.KeyParts.html #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] pub struct SecretParts; impl KeyParts for SecretParts { fn convert_key<R: KeyRole>(key: Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<Key<Self, R>>{ key.try_into() } fn convert_key_ref<R: KeyRole>(key: &Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&Key<Self, R>> { key.try_into() } fn convert_bundle<R: KeyRole>(bundle: KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<KeyBundle<Self, R>> { bundle.try_into() } fn convert_bundle_ref<R: KeyRole>(bundle: &KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&KeyBundle<Self, R>> { bundle.try_into() } fn convert_key_amalgamation<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<Self, R>>> { ka.try_into() } fn convert_key_amalgamation_ref<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: &'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<&'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<Self, R>>> { ka.try_into() } } /// A marker that indicates that a `Key`'s parts are unspecified. /// /// Neither public key-specific nor secret key-specific operations are /// allowed on these types of keys. For instance, it is not possible /// to export a key with the `UnspecifiedParts` marker, because it is /// unclear how to treat any secret key material. To export such a /// key, you need to first change the marker to [`key::PublicParts`] /// or [`key::SecretParts`]. /// /// This marker is used when it is necessary to erase the type. For /// instance, we need to do this when mixing [`Key`]s with different /// markers in the same collection. See [`Cert::keys`] for an /// example. /// /// Refer to [`KeyParts`] for details. /// /// [`key::PublicParts`]: struct.PublicParts.html /// [`key::SecretParts`]: struct.SecretParts.html /// [`KeyParts`]: trait.KeyParts.html /// [`Key`]: ../enum.Key.html /// [`Cert::keys`]: ../../struct.Cert.html#method.keys #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] pub struct UnspecifiedParts; impl KeyParts for UnspecifiedParts { fn convert_key<R: KeyRole>(key: Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<Key<Self, R>> { Ok(key) } fn convert_key_ref<R: KeyRole>(key: &Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&Key<Self, R>> { Ok(key) } fn convert_bundle<R: KeyRole>(bundle: KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<KeyBundle<Self, R>> { Ok(bundle) } fn convert_bundle_ref<R: KeyRole>(bundle: &KeyBundle<UnspecifiedParts, R>) -> Result<&KeyBundle<Self, R>> { Ok(bundle) } fn convert_key_amalgamation<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>> { Ok(ka.into()) } fn convert_key_amalgamation_ref<'a, R: KeyRole>( ka: &'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<UnspecifiedParts, R>>) -> Result<&'a ComponentAmalgamation<'a, Key<Self, R>>> { Ok(ka.into()) } } /// A marker that indicates the `Key` should be treated like a primary key. /// /// Refer to [`KeyRole`] for details. /// /// [`KeyRole`]: trait.KeyRole.html #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] pub struct PrimaryRole; impl KeyRole for PrimaryRole { fn convert_key<P: KeyParts>(key: Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> Key<P, Self> { key.into() } fn convert_key_ref<P: KeyParts>(key: &Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &Key<P, Self> { key.into() } fn convert_bundle<P: KeyParts>(bundle: KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> KeyBundle<P, Self> { bundle.into() } fn convert_bundle_ref<P: KeyParts>(bundle: &KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &KeyBundle<P, Self> { bundle.into() } } /// A marker that indicates the `Key` should treated like a subkey. /// /// Refer to [`KeyRole`] for details. /// /// [`KeyRole`]: trait.KeyRole.html #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] pub struct SubordinateRole; impl KeyRole for SubordinateRole { fn convert_key<P: KeyParts>(key: Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> Key<P, Self> { key.into() } fn convert_key_ref<P: KeyParts>(key: &Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &Key<P, Self> { key.into() } fn convert_bundle<P: KeyParts>(bundle: KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> KeyBundle<P, Self> { bundle.into() } fn convert_bundle_ref<P: KeyParts>(bundle: &KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &KeyBundle<P, Self> { bundle.into() } } /// A marker that indicates the `Key`'s role is unspecified. /// /// Neither primary key-specific nor subkey-specific operations are /// allowed. To perform those operations, the marker first has to be /// changed to either [`key::PrimaryRole`] or /// [`key::SubordinateRole`], as appropriate. /// /// Refer to [`KeyRole`] for details. /// /// [`key::PrimaryRole`]: struct.PrimaryRole.html /// [`key::SubordinateRole`]: struct.SubordinateRole.html /// [`KeyRole`]: trait.KeyRole.html #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] pub struct UnspecifiedRole; impl KeyRole for UnspecifiedRole { fn convert_key<P: KeyParts>(key: Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> Key<P, Self> { key } fn convert_key_ref<P: KeyParts>(key: &Key<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &Key<P, Self> { key } fn convert_bundle<P: KeyParts>(bundle: KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> KeyBundle<P, Self> { bundle } fn convert_bundle_ref<P: KeyParts>(bundle: &KeyBundle<P, UnspecifiedRole>) -> &KeyBundle<P, Self> { bundle } } /// A Public Key. pub(crate) type PublicKey = Key<PublicParts, PrimaryRole>; /// A Public Subkey. pub(crate) type PublicSubkey = Key<PublicParts, SubordinateRole>; /// A Secret Key. pub(crate) type SecretKey = Key<SecretParts, PrimaryRole>; /// A Secret Subkey. pub(crate) type SecretSubkey = Key<SecretParts, SubordinateRole>; /// A key with public parts, and an unspecified role /// (`UnspecifiedRole`). #[allow(dead_code)] pub(crate) type UnspecifiedPublic = Key<PublicParts, UnspecifiedRole>; /// A key with secret parts, and an unspecified role /// (`UnspecifiedRole`). pub(crate) type UnspecifiedSecret = Key<SecretParts, UnspecifiedRole>; /// A primary key with unspecified parts (`UnspecifiedParts`). #[allow(dead_code)] pub(crate) type UnspecifiedPrimary = Key<UnspecifiedParts, PrimaryRole>; /// A subkey key with unspecified parts (`UnspecifiedParts`). #[allow(dead_code)] pub(crate) type UnspecifiedSecondary = Key<UnspecifiedParts, SubordinateRole>; /// A key whose parts and role are unspecified /// (`UnspecifiedParts`, `UnspecifiedRole`). #[allow(dead_code)] pub(crate) type UnspecifiedKey = Key<UnspecifiedParts, UnspecifiedRole>; /// Holds a public key, public subkey, private key or private subkey /// packet. /// /// Use [`Key4::generate_rsa`] or [`Key4::generate_ecc`] to create a /// new key. /// /// Existing key material can be turned into an OpenPGP key using /// [`Key4::with_secret`], [`Key4::import_public_cv25519`], /// [`Key4::import_public_ed25519`], [`Key4::import_public_rsa`], /// [`Key4::import_secret_cv25519`], [`Key4::import_secret_ed25519`], /// and [`Key4::import_secret_rsa`]. /// /// Whether you create a new key or import existing key material, you /// still need to create a binding signature, and, for signing keys, a /// back signature before integrating the key into a certificate. /// /// Normally, you won't directly use `Key4`, but [`Key`], which is a /// relatively thin wrapper around `Key4`. /// /// See [Section 5.5 of RFC 4880] and [the documentation for `Key`] /// for more details. /// /// [`Key4::with_secret`]: #method.with_secret /// [`Key4::generate_rsa`]: #method.generate_rsa /// [`Key4::generate_ecc`]: #method.generate_ecc /// [`Key4::import_public_cv25519`]: #method.import_public_cv25519 /// [`Key4::import_public_ed25519`]: #method.import_public_ed25519 /// [`Key4::import_public_rsa`]: #method.import_public_rsa /// [`Key4::import_secret_cv25519`]: #method.import_secret_cv25519 /// [`Key4::import_secret_ed25519`]: #method.import_secret_ed25519 /// [`Key4::import_secret_rsa`]: #method.import_secret_rsa /// [Section 5.5 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5 /// [the documentation for `Key`]: ../enum.Key.html /// [`Key`]: ../enum.Key.html #[derive(Clone)] pub struct Key4<P, R> where P: KeyParts, R: KeyRole { /// CTB packet header fields. pub(crate) common: packet::Common, /// When the key was created. creation_time: Timestamp, /// Public key algorithm of this signature. pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm, /// Public key MPIs. mpis: mpi::PublicKey, /// Optional secret part of the key. secret: Option<SecretKeyMaterial>, p: std::marker::PhantomData<P>, r: std::marker::PhantomData<R>, } impl<P: KeyParts, R: KeyRole> PartialEq for Key4<P, R> { fn eq(&self, other: &Key4<P, R>) -> bool { self.creation_time == other.creation_time && self.pk_algo == other.pk_algo && self.mpis == other.mpis && self.secret == other.secret } } impl<P: KeyParts, R: KeyRole> Eq for Key4<P, R> {} impl<P: KeyParts, R: KeyRole> std::hash::Hash for Key4<P, R> { fn hash<H: std::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) { std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.creation_time, state); std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.pk_algo, state); std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.mpis, state); std::hash::Hash::hash(&self.secret, state); } } impl<P, R> fmt::Debug for Key4<P, R> where P: key::KeyParts, R: key::KeyRole, { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { f.debug_struct("Key4") .field("fingerprint", &self.fingerprint()) .field("creation_time", &self.creation_time) .field("pk_algo", &self.pk_algo) .field("mpis", &self.mpis) .field("secret", &self.secret) .finish() } } impl<P, R> fmt::Display for Key4<P, R> where P: key::KeyParts, R: key::KeyRole, { fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result { write!(f, "{}", self.fingerprint()) } } impl<P, R> Key4<P, R> where P: key::KeyParts, R: key::KeyRole, { /// Compares the public bits of two keys. /// /// This returns `Ordering::Equal` if the public MPIs, creation /// time, and algorithm of the two `Key4`s match. This does not /// consider the packets' encodings, packets' tags or their secret /// key material. pub fn public_cmp<PB, RB>(&self, b: &Key4<PB, RB>) -> Ordering where PB: key::KeyParts, RB: key::KeyRole, { match self.mpis.cmp(&b.mpis) { Ordering::Equal => (), o => return o, } match self.creation_time.cmp(&b.creation_time) { Ordering::Equal => (), o => return o, } self.pk_algo.cmp(&b.pk_algo) } /// Tests whether two keys are equal modulo their secret key /// material. /// /// This returns true if the public MPIs, creation time and /// algorithm of the two `Key4`s match. This does not consider /// the packets' encodings, packets' tags or their secret key /// material. pub fn public_eq<PB, RB>(&self, b: &Key4<PB, RB>) -> bool where PB: key::KeyParts, RB: key::KeyRole, { self.public_cmp(b) == Ordering::Equal } } impl<R> Key4<key::PublicParts, R> where R: key::KeyRole, { /// Creates an OpenPGP public key from the specified key material. pub fn new<T>(creation_time: T, pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm, mpis: mpi::PublicKey) -> Result<Self> where T: Into<time::SystemTime> { Ok(Key4 { common: Default::default(), creation_time: creation_time.into().try_into()?, pk_algo, mpis, secret: None, p: std::marker::PhantomData, r: std::marker::PhantomData, }) } /// Creates an OpenPGP public key packet from existing X25519 key /// material. /// /// The ECDH key will use hash algorithm `hash` and symmetric /// algorithm `sym`. If one or both are `None` secure defaults /// will be used. The key will have its creation date set to /// `ctime` or the current time if `None` is given. pub fn import_public_cv25519<H, S, T>(public_key: &[u8], hash: H, sym: S, ctime: T) -> Result<Self> where H: Into<Option<HashAlgorithm>>, S: Into<Option<SymmetricAlgorithm>>, T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>> { let mut point = Vec::from(public_key); point.insert(0, 0x40); Self::new( ctime.into().unwrap_or_else(time::SystemTime::now), PublicKeyAlgorithm::ECDH, mpi::PublicKey::ECDH { curve: Curve::Cv25519, hash: hash.into().unwrap_or(HashAlgorithm::SHA512), sym: sym.into().unwrap_or(SymmetricAlgorithm::AES256), q: mpi::MPI::new(&point), }) } /// Creates an OpenPGP public key packet from existing Ed25519 key /// material. /// /// The ECDH key will use hash algorithm `hash` and symmetric /// algorithm `sym`. If one or both are `None` secure defaults /// will be used. The key will have its creation date set to /// `ctime` or the current time if `None` is given. pub fn import_public_ed25519<T>(public_key: &[u8], ctime: T) -> Result<Self> where T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>> { let mut point = Vec::from(public_key); point.insert(0, 0x40); Self::new( ctime.into().unwrap_or_else(time::SystemTime::now), PublicKeyAlgorithm::EdDSA, mpi::PublicKey::EdDSA { curve: Curve::Ed25519, q: mpi::MPI::new(&point), }) } /// Creates an OpenPGP public key packet from existing RSA key /// material. /// /// The RSA key will use the public exponent `e` and the modulo /// `n`. The key will have its creation date set to `ctime` or the /// current time if `None` is given. pub fn import_public_rsa<T>(e: &[u8], n: &[u8], ctime: T) -> Result<Self> where T: Into<Option<time::SystemTime>> { Self::new( ctime.into().unwrap_or_else(time::SystemTime::now), PublicKeyAlgorithm::RSAEncryptSign, mpi::PublicKey::RSA { e: mpi::MPI::new(e), n: mpi::MPI::new(n), }) } } impl<R> Key4<SecretParts, R> where R: key::KeyRole, { /// Creates an OpenPGP key packet from the specified secret key /// material. pub fn with_secret<T>(creation_time: T, pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm, mpis: mpi::PublicKey, secret: SecretKeyMaterial) -> Result<Self> where T: Into<time::SystemTime> { Ok(Key4 { common: Default::default(), creation_time: creation_time.into().try_into()?, pk_algo, mpis, secret: Some(secret), p: std::marker::PhantomData, r: std::marker::PhantomData, }) } } impl<P, R> Key4<P, R> where P: key::KeyParts, R: key::KeyRole, { /// Gets the `Key`'s creation time. pub fn creation_time(&self) -> time::SystemTime { self.creation_time.into() } /// Sets the `Key`'s creation time. /// /// `timestamp` is converted to OpenPGP's internal format, /// [`Timestamp`]: a 32-bit quantity containing the number of /// seconds since the Unix epoch. /// /// `timestamp` is silently rounded to match the internal /// resolution. An error is returned if `timestamp` is out of /// range. /// /// [`Timestamp`]: ../../types/struct.Timestamp.html pub fn set_creation_time<T>(&mut self, timestamp: T) -> Result<time::SystemTime> where T: Into<time::SystemTime> { Ok(std::mem::replace(&mut self.creation_time, timestamp.into().try_into()?) .into()) } /// Gets the public key algorithm. pub fn pk_algo(&self) -> PublicKeyAlgorithm { self.pk_algo } /// Sets the public key algorithm. /// /// Returns the old public key algorithm. pub fn set_pk_algo(&mut self, pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm) -> PublicKeyAlgorithm { ::std::mem::replace(&mut self.pk_algo, pk_algo) } /// Returns a reference to the `Key`'s MPIs. pub fn mpis(&self) -> &mpi::PublicKey { &self.mpis } /// Returns a mutable reference to the `Key`'s MPIs. pub fn mpis_mut(&mut self) -> &mut mpi::PublicKey { &mut self.mpis } /// Sets the `Key`'s MPIs. /// /// This function returns the old MPIs, if any. pub fn set_mpis(&mut self, mpis: mpi::PublicKey) -> mpi::PublicKey { ::std::mem::replace(&mut self.mpis, mpis) } /// Returns whether the `Key` contains secret key material. pub fn has_secret(&self) -> bool { self.secret.is_some() } /// Returns whether the `Key` contains unencrypted secret key /// material. /// /// This returns false if the `Key` doesn't contain any secret key /// material. pub fn has_unencrypted_secret(&self) -> bool { match self.secret { Some(SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted { .. }) => true, _ => false, } } /// Returns `Key`'s secret key material, if any. pub fn optional_secret(&self) -> Option<&SecretKeyMaterial> { self.secret.as_ref() } /// Computes and returns the `Key`'s `Fingerprint` and returns it as /// a `KeyHandle`. /// /// See [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]. /// /// [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-12.2 pub fn key_handle(&self) -> KeyHandle { self.fingerprint().into() } /// Computes and returns the `Key`'s `Fingerprint`. /// /// See [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]. /// /// [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-12.2 pub fn fingerprint(&self) -> Fingerprint { let mut h = HashAlgorithm::SHA1.context().unwrap(); self.hash(&mut h); let mut digest = vec![0u8; h.digest_size()]; h.digest(&mut digest); Fingerprint::from_bytes(digest.as_slice()) } /// Computes and returns the `Key`'s `Key ID`. /// /// See [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]. /// /// [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-12.2 pub fn keyid(&self) -> KeyID { self.fingerprint().into() } } macro_rules! impl_common_secret_functions { ($t: ident) => { /// Secret key material handling. impl<R> Key4<$t, R> where R: key::KeyRole, { /// Takes the `Key`'s `SecretKeyMaterial`, if any. pub fn take_secret(mut self) -> (Key4<PublicParts, R>, Option<SecretKeyMaterial>) { let old = std::mem::replace(&mut self.secret, None); (self.parts_into_public(), old) } /// Adds the secret key material to the `Key`, returning /// the old secret key material, if any. pub fn add_secret(mut self, secret: SecretKeyMaterial) -> (Key4<SecretParts, R>, Option<SecretKeyMaterial>) { let old = std::mem::replace(&mut self.secret, Some(secret)); (self.parts_into_secret().expect("secret just set"), old) } } } } impl_common_secret_functions!(PublicParts); impl_common_secret_functions!(UnspecifiedParts); /// Secret key handling. impl<R> Key4<SecretParts, R> where R: key::KeyRole, { /// Gets the `Key`'s `SecretKeyMaterial`. pub fn secret(&self) -> &SecretKeyMaterial { self.secret.as_ref().expect("has secret") } /// Gets a mutable reference to the `Key`'s `SecretKeyMaterial`. pub fn secret_mut(&mut self) -> &mut SecretKeyMaterial { self.secret.as_mut().expect("has secret") } /// Takes the `Key`'s `SecretKeyMaterial`. pub fn take_secret(mut self) -> (Key4<PublicParts, R>, SecretKeyMaterial) { let old = std::mem::replace(&mut self.secret, None); (self.parts_into_public(), old.expect("Key<SecretParts, _> has a secret key material")) } /// Adds `SecretKeyMaterial` to the `Key`. /// /// This function returns the old secret key material, if any. pub fn add_secret(mut self, secret: SecretKeyMaterial) -> (Key4<SecretParts, R>, SecretKeyMaterial) { let old = std::mem::replace(&mut self.secret, Some(secret)); (self.parts_into_secret().expect("secret just set"), old.expect("Key<SecretParts, _> has a secret key material")) } /// Decrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// In OpenPGP, secret key material can be [protected with a /// password]. The password is usually hardened using a [KDF]. /// /// Refer to the documentation of [`Key::decrypt_secret`] for /// details. /// /// This function returns an error if the secret key material is /// not encrypted or the password is incorrect. /// /// [protected with a password]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.3 /// [KDF]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-3.7 /// [`Key::decrypt_secret`]: ../enum.Key.html#method.decrypt_secret pub fn decrypt_secret(mut self, password: &Password) -> Result<Self> { let pk_algo = self.pk_algo; self.secret_mut().decrypt_in_place(pk_algo, password)?; Ok(self) } /// Encrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// In OpenPGP, secret key material can be [protected with a /// password]. The password is usually hardened using a [KDF]. /// /// Refer to the documentation of [`Key::encrypt_secret`] for /// details. /// /// This returns an error if the secret key material is already /// encrypted. /// /// [protected with a password]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.5.3 /// [KDF]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-3.7 /// [`Key::encrypt_secret`]: ../enum.Key.html#method.encrypt_secret pub fn encrypt_secret(mut self, password: &Password) -> Result<Key4<SecretParts, R>> { self.secret_mut().encrypt_in_place(password)?; Ok(self) } } impl<P, R> From<Key4<P, R>> for super::Key<P, R> where P: key::KeyParts, R: key::KeyRole, { fn from(p: Key4<P, R>) -> Self { super::Key::V4(p) } } /// Holds secret key material. /// /// This type allows postponing the decryption of the secret key /// material until it is actually needed. /// /// If the secret key material is not encrypted with a password, then /// we encrypt it in memory. This helps protect against /// [heartbleed]-style attacks where a buffer over-read allows an /// attacker to read from the process's address space. This /// protection is less important for Rust programs, which are memory /// safe. However, it is essential when Sequoia is used via its FFI. /// /// See [`crypto::mem::Encrypted`] for details. /// /// [`Unencrypted`]: struct.Unencrypted.html /// [heartbleed]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed /// [`crypto::mem::Encrypted`]: ../../crypto/mem/struct.Encrypted.html #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone, Debug)] pub enum SecretKeyMaterial { /// Unencrypted secret key. Can be used as-is. Unencrypted(Unencrypted), /// The secret key is encrypted with a password. Encrypted(Encrypted), } impl From<mpi::SecretKeyMaterial> for SecretKeyMaterial { fn from(mpis: mpi::SecretKeyMaterial) -> Self { SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted(mpis.into()) } } impl From<Unencrypted> for SecretKeyMaterial { fn from(key: Unencrypted) -> Self { SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted(key) } } impl From<Encrypted> for SecretKeyMaterial { fn from(key: Encrypted) -> Self { SecretKeyMaterial::Encrypted(key) } } impl SecretKeyMaterial { /// Decrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// The `SecretKeyMaterial` type does not know what kind of key it /// contains. So, in order to know how many MPIs to parse, the /// public key algorithm needs to be provided explicitly. /// /// This returns an error if the secret key material is not /// encrypted or the password is incorrect. pub fn decrypt(mut self, pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm, password: &Password) -> Result<Self> { self.decrypt_in_place(pk_algo, password)?; Ok(self) } /// Decrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// The `SecretKeyMaterial` type does not know what kind of key it /// contains. So, in order to know how many MPIs to parse, the /// public key algorithm needs to be provided explicitly. /// /// This returns an error if the secret key material is not /// encrypted or the password is incorrect. pub fn decrypt_in_place(&mut self, pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm, password: &Password) -> Result<()> { match self { SecretKeyMaterial::Encrypted(e) => { *self = e.decrypt(pk_algo, password)?.into(); Ok(()) } SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted(_) => Err(Error::InvalidArgument( "secret key is not encrypted".into()).into()), } } /// Encrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// This returns an error if the secret key material is encrypted. /// /// See [`Unencrypted::encrypt`] for details. /// /// [`Unencrypted::encrypt`]: struct.Unencrypted.html#encrypt pub fn encrypt(mut self, password: &Password) -> Result<Self> { self.encrypt_in_place(password)?; Ok(self) } /// Encrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// This returns an error if the secret key material is encrypted. /// /// See [`Unencrypted::encrypt`] for details. /// /// [`Unencrypted::encrypt`]: struct.Unencrypted.html#encrypt pub fn encrypt_in_place(&mut self, password: &Password) -> Result<()> { match self { SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted(ref u) => { *self = SecretKeyMaterial::Encrypted( u.encrypt(password)?.into()); Ok(()) } SecretKeyMaterial::Encrypted(_) => Err(Error::InvalidArgument( "secret key is encrypted".into()).into()), } } /// Returns whether the secret key material is encrypted. pub fn is_encrypted(&self) -> bool { match self { SecretKeyMaterial::Encrypted(_) => true, SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted(_) => false, } } } /// Unencrypted secret key material. /// /// This data structure is used by the [`SecretKeyMaterial`] enum. /// /// Unlike an [`Encrypted`] key, this key an be used as-is. /// /// The secret key is encrypted in memory and only decrypted on /// demand. This helps protect against [heartbleed]-style /// attacks where a buffer over-read allows an attacker to read from /// the process's address space. This protection is less important /// for Rust programs, which are memory safe. However, it is /// essential when Sequoia is used via its FFI. /// /// See [`crypto::mem::Encrypted`] for details. /// /// [`SecretKeyMaterial`]: enum.SecretKeyMaterial.html /// [`Encrypted`]: struct.Encrypted.html /// [heartbleed]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heartbleed /// [`crypto::mem::Encrypted`]: ../../crypto/mem/struct.Encrypted.html // Note: PartialEq, Eq, and Hash on mem::Encrypted does the right // thing. #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Hash)] pub struct Unencrypted { /// MPIs of the secret key. mpis: mem::Encrypted, } impl From<mpi::SecretKeyMaterial> for Unencrypted { fn from(mpis: mpi::SecretKeyMaterial) -> Self { use crate::serialize::Marshal; let mut plaintext = Vec::new(); // We need to store the type. plaintext.push( mpis.algo().unwrap_or(PublicKeyAlgorithm::Unknown(0)).into()); mpis.serialize(&mut plaintext) .expect("MPI serialization to vec failed"); Unencrypted { mpis: mem::Encrypted::new(plaintext.into()), } } } impl Unencrypted { /// Maps the given function over the secret. pub fn map<F, T>(&self, mut fun: F) -> T where F: FnMut(&mpi::SecretKeyMaterial) -> T { self.mpis.map(|plaintext| { let algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm = plaintext[0].into(); let mpis = mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::parse(algo, &plaintext[1..]) .expect("Decrypted secret key is malformed"); fun(&mpis) }) } /// Encrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// This encrypts the secret key material using an [AES 256] key /// derived from the `password` using the default [`S2K`] scheme. /// /// [AES 256]: ../../types/enum.SymmetricAlgorithm.html#variant.AES256 /// [`S2K`]: ../../crypto/enum.S2K.html pub fn encrypt(&self, password: &Password) -> Result<Encrypted> { use std::io::Write; use crate::crypto::symmetric::Encryptor; let s2k = S2K::default(); let algo = SymmetricAlgorithm::AES256; let key = s2k.derive_key(password, algo.key_size()?)?; // Ciphertext is preceded by a random block. let mut trash = vec![0u8; algo.block_size()?]; crypto::random(&mut trash); let checksum = Default::default(); let mut esk = Vec::new(); { let mut encryptor = Encryptor::new(algo, &key, &mut esk)?; encryptor.write_all(&trash)?; self.map(|mpis| mpis.serialize_with_checksum(&mut encryptor, checksum))?; } Ok(Encrypted::new(s2k, algo, Some(checksum), esk.into_boxed_slice())) } } /// Secret key material encrypted with a password. /// /// This data structure is used by the [`SecretKeyMaterial`] enum. /// /// [`SecretKeyMaterial`]: enum.SecretKeyMaterial.html #[derive(Clone, Debug)] pub struct Encrypted { /// Key derivation mechanism to use. s2k: S2K, /// Symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the secret key material. algo: SymmetricAlgorithm, /// Checksum method. checksum: Option<mpi::SecretKeyChecksum>, /// Encrypted MPIs prefixed with the IV. /// /// If we recognized the S2K object during parsing, we can /// successfully parse the data into S2K, IV, and ciphertext. /// However, if we do not recognize the S2K type, we do not know /// how large its parameters are, so we cannot cleanly parse it, /// and have to accept that the S2K's body bleeds into the rest of /// the data. ciphertext: std::result::Result<Box<[u8]>, // IV + ciphertext. Box<[u8]>>, // S2K body + IV + ciphertext. } // Because the S2K and ciphertext cannot be cleanly separated at parse // time, we need to carefully compare and hash encrypted key packets. impl PartialEq for Encrypted { fn eq(&self, other: &Encrypted) -> bool { self.algo == other.algo // Treat S2K and ciphertext as opaque blob. && { // XXX: This would be nicer without the allocations. use crate::serialize::MarshalInto; let mut a = self.s2k.to_vec().unwrap(); let mut b = other.s2k.to_vec().unwrap(); a.extend_from_slice(self.raw_ciphertext()); b.extend_from_slice(other.raw_ciphertext()); a == b } } } impl Eq for Encrypted {} impl std::hash::Hash for Encrypted { fn hash<H: std::hash::Hasher>(&self, state: &mut H) { self.algo.hash(state); // Treat S2K and ciphertext as opaque blob. // XXX: This would be nicer without the allocations. use crate::serialize::MarshalInto; let mut a = self.s2k.to_vec().unwrap(); a.extend_from_slice(self.raw_ciphertext()); a.hash(state); } } impl Encrypted { /// Creates a new encrypted key object. pub fn new(s2k: S2K, algo: SymmetricAlgorithm, checksum: Option<mpi::SecretKeyChecksum>, ciphertext: Box<[u8]>) -> Self { Self::new_raw(s2k, algo, checksum, Ok(ciphertext)) } /// Creates a new encrypted key object. pub(crate) fn new_raw(s2k: S2K, algo: SymmetricAlgorithm, checksum: Option<mpi::SecretKeyChecksum>, ciphertext: std::result::Result<Box<[u8]>, Box<[u8]>>) -> Self { Encrypted { s2k, algo, checksum, ciphertext } } /// Returns the key derivation mechanism. pub fn s2k(&self) -> &S2K { &self.s2k } /// Returns the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the secret /// key material. pub fn algo(&self) -> SymmetricAlgorithm { self.algo } /// Returns the checksum method used to protect the encrypted /// secret key material, if any. pub fn checksum(&self) -> Option<mpi::SecretKeyChecksum> { self.checksum } /// Returns the encrypted secret key material. /// /// If the [`S2K`] mechanism is not supported by Sequoia, this /// function will fail. Note that the information is not lost, /// but stored in the packet. If the packet is serialized again, /// it is written out. /// /// [`S2K`]: ../../crypto/enum.S2K.html pub fn ciphertext(&self) -> Result<&[u8]> { self.ciphertext .as_ref() .map(|ciphertext| &ciphertext[..]) .map_err(|_| Error::MalformedPacket( format!("Unknown S2K: {:?}", self.s2k)).into()) } /// Returns the encrypted secret key material, possibly including /// the body of the S2K object. pub(crate) fn raw_ciphertext(&self) -> &[u8] { match self.ciphertext.as_ref() { Ok(ciphertext) => &ciphertext[..], Err(s2k_ciphertext) => &s2k_ciphertext[..], } } /// Decrypts the secret key material using `password`. /// /// The `Encrypted` key does not know what kind of key it is, so /// the public key algorithm is needed to parse the correct number /// of MPIs. pub fn decrypt(&self, pk_algo: PublicKeyAlgorithm, password: &Password) -> Result<Unencrypted> { use std::io::{Cursor, Read}; use crate::crypto::symmetric::Decryptor; let key = self.s2k.derive_key(password, self.algo.key_size()?)?; let cur = Cursor::new(self.ciphertext()?); let mut dec = Decryptor::new(self.algo, &key, cur)?; // Consume the first block. let mut trash = vec![0u8; self.algo.block_size()?]; dec.read_exact(&mut trash)?; mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::parse_with_checksum( pk_algo, &mut dec, self.checksum.unwrap_or_default()) .map(|m| m.into()) } } #[cfg(test)] impl<P, R> Arbitrary for super::Key<P, R> where P: KeyParts, P: Clone, R: KeyRole, R: Clone, Key4<P, R>: Arbitrary, { fn arbitrary<G: Gen>(g: &mut G) -> Self { Key4::arbitrary(g).into() } } #[cfg(test)] impl Arbitrary for Key4<PublicParts, UnspecifiedRole> { fn arbitrary<G: Gen>(g: &mut G) -> Self { let mpis = mpi::PublicKey::arbitrary(g); Key4 { common: Arbitrary::arbitrary(g), creation_time: Arbitrary::arbitrary(g), pk_algo: mpis.algo() .expect("mpi::PublicKey::arbitrary only uses known algos"), mpis, secret: None, p: std::marker::PhantomData, r: std::marker::PhantomData, } } } #[cfg(test)] impl Arbitrary for Key4<SecretParts, UnspecifiedRole> { fn arbitrary<G: Gen>(g: &mut G) -> Self { use rand::Rng; use PublicKeyAlgorithm::*; use mpi::MPI; let key = Key4::arbitrary(g); let mut secret: SecretKeyMaterial = match key.pk_algo() { RSAEncryptSign => mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::RSA { d: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), p: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), q: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), u: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), }, DSA => mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::DSA { x: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), }, ElGamalEncrypt => mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::ElGamal { x: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), }, EdDSA => mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::EdDSA { scalar: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), }, ECDSA => mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::ECDSA { scalar: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), }, ECDH => mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::ECDH { scalar: MPI::arbitrary(g).into(), }, _ => unreachable!("only valid algos, normalizes to these values"), }.into(); if g.gen() { secret.encrypt_in_place(&Password::from(Vec::arbitrary(g))) .unwrap(); } Key4::<PublicParts, UnspecifiedRole>::add_secret(key, secret).0 } } #[cfg(test)] mod tests { use crate::packet::Key; use crate::Cert; use crate::packet::pkesk::PKESK3; use crate::packet::key; use crate::packet::key::SecretKeyMaterial; use crate::packet::Packet; use super::*; use crate::PacketPile; use crate::serialize::Serialize; use crate::parse::Parse; #[test] fn encrypted_rsa_key() { let cert = Cert::from_bytes( crate::tests::key("testy-new-encrypted-with-123.pgp")).unwrap(); let mut pair = cert.primary_key().key().clone(); let pk_algo = pair.pk_algo(); let secret = pair.secret.as_mut().unwrap(); assert!(secret.is_encrypted()); secret.decrypt_in_place(pk_algo, &"123".into()).unwrap(); assert!(!secret.is_encrypted()); match secret { SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted(ref u) => u.map(|mpis| match mpis { mpi::SecretKeyMaterial::RSA { .. } => (), _ => panic!(), }), _ => panic!(), } } #[test] fn eq() { use crate::types::Curve::*; for curve in vec![NistP256, NistP384, NistP521] { let sign_key : Key4<_, key::UnspecifiedRole> = Key4::generate_ecc(true, curve.clone()).unwrap(); let enc_key : Key4<_, key::UnspecifiedRole> = Key4::generate_ecc(false, curve).unwrap(); let sign_clone = sign_key.clone(); let enc_clone = enc_key.clone(); assert_eq!(sign_key, sign_clone); assert_eq!(enc_key, enc_clone); } for bits in vec![1024, 2048, 3072, 4096] { let key : Key4<_, key::UnspecifiedRole> = Key4::generate_rsa(bits).unwrap(); let clone = key.clone(); assert_eq!(key, clone); } } #[test] fn roundtrip() { use crate::types::Curve::*; let keys = vec![NistP256, NistP384, NistP521].into_iter().flat_map(|cv| { let sign_key : Key4<key::SecretParts, key::PrimaryRole> = Key4::generate_ecc(true, cv.clone()).unwrap(); let enc_key = Key4::generate_ecc(false, cv).unwrap(); vec![sign_key, enc_key] }).chain(vec![1024, 2048, 3072, 4096].into_iter().map(|b| { Key4::generate_rsa(b).unwrap() })); for key in keys { let mut b = Vec::new(); Packet::SecretKey(key.clone().into()).serialize(&mut b).unwrap(); let pp = PacketPile::from_bytes(&b).unwrap(); if let Some(Packet::SecretKey(Key::V4(ref parsed_key))) = pp.path_ref(&[0]) { assert_eq!(key.creation_time, parsed_key.creation_time); assert_eq!(key.pk_algo, parsed_key.pk_algo); assert_eq!(key.mpis, parsed_key.mpis); assert_eq!(key.secret, parsed_key.secret); assert_eq!(&key, parsed_key); } else { panic!("bad packet: {:?}", pp.path_ref(&[0])); } let mut b = Vec::new(); let pk4 : Key4<PublicParts, PrimaryRole> = key.clone().into(); Packet::PublicKey(pk4.into()).serialize(&mut b).unwrap(); let pp = PacketPile::from_bytes(&b).unwrap(); if let Some(Packet::PublicKey(Key::V4(ref parsed_key))) = pp.path_ref(&[0]) { assert!(! parsed_key.has_secret()); let key = key.take_secret().0; assert_eq!(&key, parsed_key); } else { panic!("bad packet: {:?}", pp.path_ref(&[0])); } } } #[test] fn encryption_roundtrip() { use crate::crypto::SessionKey; use crate::types::Curve::*; let keys = vec![NistP256, NistP384, NistP521].into_iter().map(|cv| { Key4::generate_ecc(false, cv).unwrap() }).chain(vec![1024, 2048, 3072, 4096].into_iter().map(|b| { Key4::generate_rsa(b).unwrap() })); for key in keys.into_iter() { let key: Key<key::SecretParts, key::UnspecifiedRole> = key.into(); let mut keypair = key.clone().into_keypair().unwrap(); let cipher = SymmetricAlgorithm::AES256; let sk = SessionKey::new(cipher.key_size().unwrap()); let pkesk = PKESK3::for_recipient(cipher, &sk, &key).unwrap(); let (cipher_, sk_) = pkesk.decrypt(&mut keypair, None).unwrap(); assert_eq!(cipher, cipher_); assert_eq!(sk, sk_); let (cipher_, sk_) = pkesk.decrypt(&mut keypair, Some(cipher)).unwrap(); assert_eq!(cipher, cipher_); assert_eq!(sk, sk_); } } #[test] fn secret_encryption_roundtrip() { use crate::types::Curve::*; let keys = vec![NistP256, NistP384, NistP521].into_iter().map(|cv| { let k : Key4<key::SecretParts, key::PrimaryRole> = Key4::generate_ecc(false, cv).unwrap(); k }).chain(vec![1024, 2048, 3072, 4096].into_iter().map(|b| { Key4::generate_rsa(b).unwrap() })); for key in keys { assert!(! key.secret().is_encrypted()); let password = Password::from("foobarbaz"); let mut encrypted_key = key.clone(); encrypted_key.secret_mut().encrypt_in_place(&password).unwrap(); assert!(encrypted_key.secret().is_encrypted()); encrypted_key.secret_mut() .decrypt_in_place(key.pk_algo, &password).unwrap(); assert!(! key.secret().is_encrypted()); assert_eq!(key, encrypted_key); assert_eq!(key.secret(), encrypted_key.secret()); } } #[test] fn import_cv25519() { use crate::crypto::{ecdh, mem, SessionKey}; use self::mpi::{MPI, Ciphertext}; // X25519 key let ctime = time::UNIX_EPOCH + time::Duration::new(0x5c487129, 0); let public = b"\xed\x59\x0a\x15\x08\x95\xe9\x92\xd2\x2c\x14\x01\xb3\xe9\x3b\x7f\xff\xe6\x6f\x22\x65\xec\x69\xd9\xb8\xda\x24\x2c\x64\x84\x44\x11"; let key : Key<_, key::UnspecifiedRole> = Key4::import_public_cv25519(&public[..], HashAlgorithm::SHA256, SymmetricAlgorithm::AES128, ctime).unwrap().into(); // PKESK let eph_pubkey = MPI::new(&b"\x40\xda\x1c\x69\xc4\xe3\xb6\x9c\x6e\xd4\xc6\x69\x6c\x89\xc7\x09\xe9\xf8\x6a\xf1\xe3\x8d\xb6\xaa\xb5\xf7\x29\xae\xa6\xe7\xdd\xfe\x38"[..]); let ciphertext = Ciphertext::ECDH{ e: eph_pubkey.clone(), key: Vec::from(&b"\x45\x8b\xd8\x4d\x88\xb3\xd2\x16\xb6\xc2\x3b\x99\x33\xd1\x23\x4b\x10\x15\x8e\x04\x16\xc5\x7c\x94\x88\xf6\x63\xf2\x68\x37\x08\x66\xfd\x5a\x7b\x40\x58\x21\x6b\x2c\xc0\xf4\xdc\x91\xd3\x48\xed\xc1"[..]).into_boxed_slice() }; let shared_sec: mem::Protected = b"\x44\x0C\x99\x27\xF7\xD6\x1E\xAD\xD1\x1E\x9E\xC8\x22\x2C\x5D\x43\xCE\xB0\xE5\x45\x94\xEC\xAF\x67\xD9\x35\x1D\xA1\xA3\xA8\x10\x0B"[..].into(); // Session key let dek = b"\x09\x0D\xDC\x40\xC5\x71\x51\x88\xAC\xBD\x45\x56\xD4\x2A\xDF\x77\xCD\xF4\x82\xA2\x1B\x8F\x2E\x48\x3B\xCA\xBF\xD3\xE8\x6D\x0A\x7C\xDF\x10\xe6"; let sk = SessionKey::from(Vec::from(&dek[..])); // Expected let got_enc = ecdh::encrypt_wrap(&key.parts_into_public(), &sk, eph_pubkey, &shared_sec) .unwrap(); assert_eq!(ciphertext, got_enc); } #[test] fn import_cv25519_sec() { use crate::crypto::ecdh; use self::mpi::{MPI, Ciphertext}; // X25519 key let ctime = time::UNIX_EPOCH + time::Duration::new(0x5c487129, 0); let public = b"\xed\x59\x0a\x15\x08\x95\xe9\x92\xd2\x2c\x14\x01\xb3\xe9\x3b\x7f\xff\xe6\x6f\x22\x65\xec\x69\xd9\xb8\xda\x24\x2c\x64\x84\x44\x11"; let secret = b"\xa0\x27\x13\x99\xc9\xe3\x2e\xd2\x47\xf6\xd6\x63\x9d\xe6\xec\xcb\x57\x0b\x92\xbb\x17\xfe\xb8\xf1\xc4\x1f\x06\x7c\x55\xfc\xdd\x58"; let key: Key<_, UnspecifiedRole> = Key4::import_secret_cv25519(&secret[..], HashAlgorithm::SHA256, SymmetricAlgorithm::AES128, ctime).unwrap().into(); match key.mpis { self::mpi::PublicKey::ECDH{ ref q,.. } => assert_eq!(&q.value()[1..], &public[..]), _ => unreachable!(), } // PKESK let eph_pubkey: &[u8; 33] = b"\x40\xda\x1c\x69\xc4\xe3\xb6\x9c\x6e\xd4\xc6\x69\x6c\x89\xc7\x09\xe9\xf8\x6a\xf1\xe3\x8d\xb6\xaa\xb5\xf7\x29\xae\xa6\xe7\xdd\xfe\x38"; let ciphertext = Ciphertext::ECDH{ e: MPI::new(&eph_pubkey[..]), key: Vec::from(&b"\x45\x8b\xd8\x4d\x88\xb3\xd2\x16\xb6\xc2\x3b\x99\x33\xd1\x23\x4b\x10\x15\x8e\x04\x16\xc5\x7c\x94\x88\xf6\x63\xf2\x68\x37\x08\x66\xfd\x5a\x7b\x40\x58\x21\x6b\x2c\xc0\xf4\xdc\x91\xd3\x48\xed\xc1"[..]).into_boxed_slice() }; // Session key let dek = b"\x09\x0D\xDC\x40\xC5\x71\x51\x88\xAC\xBD\x45\x56\xD4\x2A\xDF\x77\xCD\xF4\x82\xA2\x1B\x8F\x2E\x48\x3B\xCA\xBF\xD3\xE8\x6D\x0A\x7C\xDF\x10\xe6"; let key = key.parts_into_public(); let got_dek = match key.optional_secret() { Some(SecretKeyMaterial::Unencrypted(ref u)) => u.map(|mpis| { ecdh::decrypt(&key, mpis, &ciphertext) .unwrap() }), _ => unreachable!(), }; assert_eq!(&dek[..], &got_dek[..]); } #[test] fn import_rsa() { use crate::crypto::SessionKey; use self::mpi::{MPI, Ciphertext}; // RSA key let ctime = time::UNIX_EPOCH + time::Duration::new(1548950502, 0); let d = b"\x14\xC4\x3A\x0C\x3A\x79\xA4\xF7\x63\x0D\x89\x93\x63\x8B\x56\x9C\x29\x2E\xCD\xCF\xBF\xB0\xEC\x66\x52\xC3\x70\x1B\x19\x21\x73\xDE\x8B\xAC\x0E\xF2\xE1\x28\x42\x66\x56\x55\x00\x3B\xFD\x50\xC4\x7C\xBC\x9D\xEB\x7D\xF4\x81\xFC\xC3\xBF\xF7\xFF\xD0\x41\x3E\x50\x3B\x5F\x5D\x5F\x56\x67\x5E\x00\xCE\xA4\x53\xB8\x59\xA0\x40\xC8\x96\x6D\x12\x09\x27\xBE\x1D\xF1\xC2\x68\xFC\xF0\x14\xD6\x52\x77\x07\xC8\x12\x36\x9C\x9A\x5C\xAF\x43\xCC\x95\x20\xBB\x0A\x44\x94\xDD\xB4\x4F\x45\x4E\x3A\x1A\x30\x0D\x66\x40\xAC\x68\xE8\xB0\xFD\xCD\x6C\x6B\x6C\xB5\xF7\xE4\x36\x95\xC2\x96\x98\xFD\xCA\x39\x6C\x1A\x2E\x55\xAD\xB6\xE0\xF8\x2C\xFF\xBC\xD3\x32\x15\x52\x39\xB3\x92\x35\xDB\x8B\x68\xAF\x2D\x4A\x6E\x64\xB8\x28\x63\xC4\x24\x94\x2D\xA9\xDB\x93\x56\xE3\xBC\xD0\xB6\x38\x84\x04\xA4\xC6\x18\x48\xFE\xB2\xF8\xE1\x60\x37\x52\x96\x41\xA5\x79\xF6\x3D\xB7\x2A\x71\x5B\x7A\x75\xBF\x7F\xA2\x5A\xC8\xA1\x38\xF2\x5A\xBD\x14\xFC\xAF\xB4\x54\x83\xA4\xBD\x49\xA2\x8B\x91\xB0\xE0\x4A\x1B\x21\x54\x07\x19\x70\x64\x7C\x3E\x9F\x8D\x8B\xE4\x70\xD1\xE7\xBE\x4E\x5C\xCE\xF1"; let p = b"\xC8\x32\xD1\x17\x41\x4D\x8F\x37\x09\x18\x32\x4C\x4C\xF4\xA2\x15\x27\x43\x3D\xBB\xB5\xF6\x1F\xCF\xD2\xE4\x43\x61\x07\x0E\x9E\x35\x1F\x0A\x5D\xFB\x3A\x45\x74\x61\x73\x73\x7B\x5F\x1F\x87\xFB\x54\x8D\xA8\x85\x3E\xB0\xB7\xC7\xF5\xC9\x13\x99\x8D\x40\xE6\xA6\xD0\x71\x3A\xE3\x2D\x4A\xC3\xA3\xFF\xF7\x72\x82\x14\x52\xA4\xBA\x63\x0E\x17\xCA\xCA\x18\xC4\x3A\x40\x79\xF1\x86\xB3\x10\x4B\x9F\xB2\xAE\x2E\x13\x38\x8D\x2C\xF9\x88\x4C\x25\x53\xEF\xF9\xD1\x8B\x1A\x7C\xE7\xF6\x4B\x73\x51\x31\xFA\x44\x1D\x36\x65\x71\xDA\xFC\x6F"; let q = b"\xCC\x30\xE9\xCC\xCB\x31\x28\xB5\x90\xFF\x06\x62\x42\x5B\x24\x0E\x00\xFE\xE2\x37\xC4\xAC\xBB\x3B\x8F\xF2\x0E\x3F\x78\xCF\x6B\x7C\xE8\x75\x57\x7C\x15\x9D\x1A\x66\xF2\x0A\xE5\xD3\x0B\xE7\x40\xF7\xE7\x00\xB6\x86\xB5\xD9\x20\x67\xE0\x4A\xC0\x90\xA4\x13\x4D\xC9\xB0\x12\xC5\xCD\x4C\xEB\xA1\x91\x2D\x43\x58\x6E\xB6\x75\xA0\x93\xF0\x5B\xC5\x31\xCA\xB7\xC6\x22\x0C\xD3\xEC\x84\xC5\x91\xA1\x5F\x2C\x8E\x07\x5D\xA1\x98\x67\xC5\x7A\x58\x16\x71\x3D\xED\x91\x03\x0D\xD4\x25\x07\x89\x9B\x33\x98\xA3\x70\xD9\xE7\xC8\x17\xA3\xD9"; let key: key::SecretKey = Key4::import_secret_rsa(&d[..], &p[..], &q[..], ctime) .unwrap().into(); // PKESK let c = b"\x8A\x1A\xD4\x82\x91\x6B\xBF\xA1\x65\xD3\x82\x8C\x97\xAB\xD0\x91\xE4\xB4\xC4\x9D\x08\xD8\x8B\xB7\xE6\x13\x3F\x6F\x52\x14\xED\xC4\x77\xB7\x31\x00\xC1\x43\xF9\x62\x53\xBF\x21\x21\x52\x74\x35\xD8\xC7\xA2\x11\x89\xA5\xD5\x21\x98\x6D\x3C\x9F\xF0\xED\xDB\xD7\x0F\xAC\x3C\x15\x25\x34\x52\xC7\x7C\x82\x07\x5A\x99\xC1\xC6\xF6\xF2\x6D\x46\xC8\x56\x59\xE7\xC6\x34\x0C\xCA\x37\x70\xB4\x97\xDA\x18\x14\xC4\x03\x0A\xCB\xE5\x0C\x41\x43\x61\xBA\x32\xB6\x9A\xF3\xDF\x0C\xB0\xCE\xBD\xFE\x72\x6C\xCC\xC1\xE8\xF0\x05\x97\x61\xEA\x30\x10\xB9\x43\xC4\x9A\x41\xED\x72\x27\xA4\xD5\xE7\x08\x41\x6C\x57\x80\xF3\x64\xF0\x45\x70\x27\x36\xBD\x64\x59\x74\xCF\xCD\x39\xE6\xEB\x7C\x62\xC8\x38\x23\xF8\x4C\xB7\x30\x9F\xF1\x40\x4A\xE9\x72\x66\x99\xF7\x2A\x47\x1C\xE7\x12\x20\x58\xBA\x87\x00\xB8\xFC\x54\xBC\xA5\x1D\x7D\x8B\x50\xA4\x4B\xB3\xD7\x44\xC7\x68\x5E\x2D\xBB\xE9\x6E\xC4\xD0\x31\xB0\xD0\xB6\x02\xD1\x74\x6B\xC9\x3D\x19\x32\x3B\xF1\x0E\x74\xF6\x12\x13\xE6\x40\x8F\xA6\x97\xAD\x83\xB0\x84\xD6\xD9\xE5\x25\x8E\x57\x0B\x7A\x7B\xD0\x5C\x29\x96\xED\x29\xED"; let ciphertext = Ciphertext::RSA{ c: MPI::new(&c[..]), }; let pkesk = PKESK3::new(key.keyid(), PublicKeyAlgorithm::RSAEncryptSign, ciphertext).unwrap(); // Session key let dek = b"\xA5\x58\x3A\x04\x35\x8B\xC7\x3F\x4A\xEF\x0C\x5A\xEB\xED\x59\xCA\xFD\x96\xB5\x32\x23\x26\x0C\x91\x78\xD1\x31\x12\xF0\x41\x42\x9D"; let sk = SessionKey::from(Vec::from(&dek[..])); // Expected let mut decryptor = key.into_keypair().unwrap(); let got_sk = pkesk.decrypt(&mut decryptor, None).unwrap(); assert_eq!(got_sk.1, sk); } #[test] fn import_ed25519() { use crate::types::SignatureType; use crate::packet::signature::Signature4; use crate::packet::signature::subpacket::{ Subpacket, SubpacketValue, SubpacketArea}; // Ed25519 key let ctime = time::UNIX_EPOCH + time::Duration::new(1548249630, 0); let q = b"\x57\x15\x45\x1B\x68\xA5\x13\xA2\x20\x0F\x71\x9D\xE3\x05\x3B\xED\xA2\x21\xDE\x61\x5A\xF5\x67\x45\xBB\x97\x99\x43\x53\x59\x7C\x3F"; let key: key::PublicKey = Key4::import_public_ed25519(q, ctime).unwrap().into(); let mut hashed = SubpacketArea::default(); let mut unhashed = SubpacketArea::default(); let fpr = "D81A 5DC0 DEBF EE5F 9AC8 20EB 6769 5DB9 920D 4FAC" .parse().unwrap(); let kid = "6769 5DB9 920D 4FAC".parse().unwrap(); let ctime = 1549460479.into(); let r = b"\x5A\xF9\xC7\x42\x70\x24\x73\xFF\x7F\x27\xF9\x20\x9D\x20\x0F\xE3\x8F\x71\x3C\x5F\x97\xFD\x60\x80\x39\x29\xC2\x14\xFD\xC2\x4D\x70"; let s = b"\x6E\x68\x74\x11\x72\xF4\x9C\xE1\x99\x99\x1F\x67\xFC\x3A\x68\x33\xF9\x3F\x3A\xB9\x1A\xA5\x72\x4E\x78\xD4\x81\xCB\x7B\xA5\xE5\x0A"; hashed.add(Subpacket::new(SubpacketValue::IssuerFingerprint(fpr), false).unwrap()).unwrap(); hashed.add(Subpacket::new(SubpacketValue::SignatureCreationTime(ctime), false).unwrap()).unwrap(); unhashed.add(Subpacket::new(SubpacketValue::Issuer(kid), false).unwrap()).unwrap(); eprintln!("fpr: {}", key.fingerprint()); let sig = Signature4::new(SignatureType::Binary, PublicKeyAlgorithm::EdDSA, HashAlgorithm::SHA256, hashed, unhashed, [0xa7,0x19], mpi::Signature::EdDSA{ r: mpi::MPI::new(r), s: mpi::MPI::new(s) }); let mut sig: Signature = sig.into(); sig.verify_message(&key, b"Hello, World\n").unwrap(); } #[test] fn fingerprint_test() { let pile = PacketPile::from_bytes(crate::tests::key("public-key.gpg")).unwrap(); // The blob contains a public key and a three subkeys. let mut pki = 0; let mut ski = 0; let pks = [ "8F17 7771 18A3 3DDA 9BA4 8E62 AACB 3243 6300 52D9" ]; let sks = [ "C03F A641 1B03 AE12 5764 6118 7223 B566 78E0 2528", "50E6 D924 308D BF22 3CFB 510A C2B8 1905 6C65 2598", "2DC5 0AB5 5BE2 F3B0 4C2D 2CF8 A350 6AFB 820A BD08"]; for p in pile.descendants() { if let &Packet::PublicKey(ref p) = p { let fp = p.fingerprint().to_string(); // eprintln!("PK: {:?}", fp); assert!(pki < pks.len()); assert_eq!(fp, pks[pki]); pki += 1; } if let &Packet::PublicSubkey(ref p) = p { let fp = p.fingerprint().to_string(); // eprintln!("SK: {:?}", fp); assert!(ski < sks.len()); assert_eq!(fp, sks[ski]); ski += 1; } } assert!(pki == pks.len() && ski == sks.len()); } #[test] fn encrypt_huge_plaintext() -> Result<()> { let sk = crate::crypto::SessionKey::new(256); let rsa2k: Key<SecretParts, UnspecifiedRole> = Key4::generate_rsa(2048)?.into(); assert!(destructures_to!( crate::Error::InvalidArgument(_) = rsa2k.encrypt(&sk).unwrap_err().downcast().unwrap())); let cv25519: Key<SecretParts, UnspecifiedRole> = Key4::generate_ecc(false, Curve::Cv25519)?.into(); assert!(destructures_to!( crate::Error::InvalidArgument(_) = cv25519.encrypt(&sk).unwrap_err().downcast().unwrap())); Ok(()) } }