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//! OpenPGP data types and associated machinery. //! //! This crate aims to provide a complete implementation of OpenPGP as //! defined by [RFC 4880] as well as several extensions (e.g., [RFC //! 6637], which describes ECC cryptography for OpenPGP, and [RFC //! 4880bis], the draft of the next OpenPGP standard). This includes //! support for unbuffered message processing. //! //! A few features that the OpenPGP community considers to be //! deprecated (e.g., version 3 compatibility) have been left out as //! well as support for functionality that we consider to be not only //! completely useless, but also dangerous (e.g., support for //! [unhashed signature subpackets]). We have also updated some //! OpenPGP defaults to avoid foot guns (e.g., this crate does not //! fallback to IDEA, but instead assumes all OpenPGP implementations //! understand AES). If some functionality is missing, please file a //! bug report. //! //! A non-goal of this crate is support for any sort of high-level, //! bolted-on functionality. For instance, [RFC 4880] does not define //! trust models, such as the web of trust, direct trust, or TOFU. //! Neither does this crate. [RFC 4880] does provide some mechanisms //! for creating trust models (specifically, UserID certifications), //! and this crate does expose those mechanisms. //! //! We also try hard to avoid dictating how OpenPGP should be used. //! This doesn't mean that we don't have opinions about how OpenPGP //! should be used in a number of common scenarios (for instance, //! message validation). But, in this crate, we refrain from //! expressing those opinions; we expose an opinionated, high-level //! interface in the [sequoia-core] and related crates. In our //! opinion, you should generally use those crates instead of this //! one. //! //! [RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880 //! [RFC 6637]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6637 //! [RFC 4880bis]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-openpgp-rfc4880bis-05 //! [unhashed signature subpackets]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5.2.3.2 //! [sequoia-core]: ../sequoia_core #![warn(missing_docs)] extern crate lalrpop_util; #[macro_use] extern crate failure; extern crate buffered_reader; extern crate memsec; extern crate nettle; #[cfg(feature = "compression-deflate")] extern crate flate2; #[cfg(feature = "compression-bzip2")] extern crate bzip2; #[cfg(test)] #[macro_use] extern crate quickcheck; #[cfg(not(test))] extern crate quickcheck; extern crate rand; #[macro_use] extern crate lazy_static; extern crate idna; #[macro_use] mod macros; // On debug builds, Vec<u8>::truncate is very, very slow. For // instance, running the decrypt_test_stream test takes 51 seconds on // my (Neal's) computer using Vec<u8>::truncate and <0.1 seconds using // `unsafe { v.set_len(len); }`. // // The issue is that the compiler calls drop on every element that is // dropped, even though a u8 doesn't have a drop implementation. The // compiler optimizes this away at high optimization levels, but those // levels make debugging harder. fn vec_truncate(v: &mut Vec<u8>, len: usize) { if cfg!(debug_assertions) { if len < v.len() { unsafe { v.set_len(len); } } } else { v.truncate(len); } } /// Like `drop(Vec<u8>::drain(..prefix_len))`, but fast in debug /// builds. fn vec_drain_prefix(v: &mut Vec<u8>, prefix_len: usize) { if cfg!(debug_assertions) { // Panic like v.drain(..prefix_len). assert!(prefix_len <= v.len(), "prefix len {} > vector len {}", prefix_len, v.len()); let new_len = v.len() - prefix_len; unsafe { std::ptr::copy(v[prefix_len..].as_ptr(), v[..].as_mut_ptr(), new_len); } vec_truncate(v, new_len); } else { v.drain(..prefix_len); } } // Like assert!, but checks a pattern. // // assert_match!(Some(_) = x); // // Note: For modules to see this macro, we need to define it before we // declare the modules. #[allow(unused_macros)] macro_rules! assert_match { ( $error: pat = $expr:expr, $fmt:expr, $($pargs:expr),* ) => { let x = $expr; if let $error = x { /* Pass. */ } else { let extra = format!($fmt, $($pargs),*); panic!("Expected {}, got {:?}{}{}", stringify!($error), x, if $fmt.len() > 0 { ": " } else { "." }, extra); } }; ( $error: pat = $expr: expr, $fmt:expr ) => { assert_match!($error = $expr, $fmt, ); }; ( $error: pat = $expr: expr ) => { assert_match!($error = $expr, ""); }; } #[macro_use] pub mod armor; pub mod fmt; pub mod crypto; pub mod packet; use crate::packet::{Container, key}; pub mod parse; pub mod cert; pub use cert::Cert; pub mod serialize; mod packet_pile; pub mod message; pub mod types; use crate::types::{ PublicKeyAlgorithm, SymmetricAlgorithm, HashAlgorithm, SignatureType, }; mod fingerprint; mod keyid; mod keyhandle; pub use keyhandle::KeyHandle; pub mod policy; pub(crate) mod utils; #[cfg(test)] mod tests; /// Returns a timestamp for the tests. /// /// The time is chosen to that the subkeys in /// openpgp/tests/data/keys/neal.pgp are not expired. #[cfg(test)] fn frozen_time() -> std::time::SystemTime { crate::types::Timestamp::from(1554542220 - 1).into() } /// Crate result specialization. pub type Result<T> = ::std::result::Result<T, failure::Error>; #[derive(Fail, Debug, Clone)] /// Errors returned by this module. /// /// Note: This enum cannot be exhaustively matched to allow future /// extensions. pub enum Error { /// Invalid argument. #[fail(display = "Invalid argument: {}", _0)] InvalidArgument(String), /// Invalid operation. #[fail(display = "Invalid operation: {}", _0)] InvalidOperation(String), /// A malformed packet. #[fail(display = "Malformed packet: {}", _0)] MalformedPacket(String), /// Packet size exceeds the configured limit. #[fail(display = "{} Packet ({} bytes) exceeds limit of {} bytes", _0, _1, _2)] PacketTooLarge(packet::Tag, u32, u32), /// Unsupported packet type. #[fail(display = "Unsupported packet type. Tag: {}", _0)] UnsupportedPacketType(packet::Tag), /// Unsupported hash algorithm identifier. #[fail(display = "Unsupported hash algorithm: {}", _0)] UnsupportedHashAlgorithm(HashAlgorithm), /// Unsupported public key algorithm identifier. #[fail(display = "Unsupported public key algorithm: {}", _0)] UnsupportedPublicKeyAlgorithm(PublicKeyAlgorithm), /// Unsupported elliptic curve ASN.1 OID. #[fail(display = "Unsupported elliptic curve: {}", _0)] UnsupportedEllipticCurve(types::Curve), /// Unsupported symmetric key algorithm. #[fail(display = "Unsupported symmetric algorithm: {}", _0)] UnsupportedSymmetricAlgorithm(SymmetricAlgorithm), /// Unsupported AEAD algorithm. #[fail(display = "Unsupported AEAD algorithm: {}", _0)] UnsupportedAEADAlgorithm(types::AEADAlgorithm), /// Unsupported Compression algorithm. #[fail(display = "Unsupported Compression algorithm: {}", _0)] UnsupportedCompressionAlgorithm(types::CompressionAlgorithm), /// Unsupported signature type. #[fail(display = "Unsupported signature type: {}", _0)] UnsupportedSignatureType(SignatureType), /// Invalid password. #[fail(display = "Invalid password")] InvalidPassword, /// Invalid session key. #[fail(display = "Invalid session key: {}", _0)] InvalidSessionKey(String), /// Missing session key. #[fail(display = "Missing session key: {}", _0)] MissingSessionKey(String), /// Malformed MPI. #[fail(display = "Malformed MPI: {}", _0)] MalformedMPI(String), /// Bad signature. #[fail(display = "Bad signature: {}", _0)] BadSignature(String), /// Message has been manipulated. #[fail(display = "Message has been manipulated")] ManipulatedMessage, /// Malformed message. #[fail(display = "Malformed Message: {}", _0)] MalformedMessage(String), /// Malformed certificate. #[fail(display = "Malformed Cert: {}", _0)] MalformedCert(String), /// Unsupported Cert. /// /// This usually occurs, because the primary key is in an /// unsupported format. In particular, Sequoia does not support /// version 3 keys. #[fail(display = "Unsupported Cert: {}", _0)] UnsupportedCert(String), /// Index out of range. #[fail(display = "Index out of range")] IndexOutOfRange, /// Expired. #[fail(display = "Expired on {:?}", _0)] Expired(std::time::SystemTime), /// Not yet live. #[fail(display = "Not live until {:?}", _0)] NotYetLive(std::time::SystemTime), /// No binding signature. #[fail(display = "No binding signature at time {:?}", _0)] NoBindingSignature(std::time::SystemTime), /// Invalid key. #[fail(display = "Invalid key: {:?}", _0)] InvalidKey(String), /// This marks this enum as non-exhaustive. Do not use this /// variant. #[doc(hidden)] #[fail(display = "__Nonexhaustive")] __Nonexhaustive, } /// The OpenPGP packets that Sequoia understands. /// /// The different OpenPGP packets are detailed in [Section 5 of RFC 4880]. /// /// The `Unknown` packet allows Sequoia to deal with packets that it /// doesn't understand. The `Unknown` packet is basically a binary /// blob that includes the packet's tag. /// /// The unknown packet is also used for packets that are understood, /// but use unsupported options. For instance, when the packet parser /// encounters a compressed data packet with an unknown compression /// algorithm, it returns the packet in an `Unknown` packet rather /// than a `CompressedData` packet. /// /// [Section 5 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-5 /// /// Note: This enum cannot be exhaustively matched to allow future /// extensions. #[derive(Debug)] #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, Hash, Clone)] pub enum Packet { /// Unknown packet. Unknown(packet::Unknown), /// Signature packet. Signature(packet::Signature), /// One pass signature packet. OnePassSig(packet::OnePassSig), /// Public key packet. PublicKey(packet::key::PublicKey), /// Public subkey packet. PublicSubkey(packet::key::PublicSubkey), /// Public/Secret key pair. SecretKey(packet::key::SecretKey), /// Public/Secret subkey pair. SecretSubkey(packet::key::SecretSubkey), /// Marker packet. Marker(packet::Marker), /// Trust packet. Trust(packet::Trust), /// User ID packet. UserID(packet::UserID), /// User attribute packet. UserAttribute(packet::UserAttribute), /// Literal data packet. Literal(packet::Literal), /// Compressed literal data packet. CompressedData(packet::CompressedData), /// Public key encrypted data packet. PKESK(packet::PKESK), /// Symmetric key encrypted data packet. SKESK(packet::SKESK), /// Symmetric key encrypted, integrity protected data packet. SEIP(packet::SEIP), /// Modification detection code packet. MDC(packet::MDC), /// AEAD Encrypted Data Packet. AED(packet::AED), /// This marks this enum as non-exhaustive. Do not use this /// variant. #[doc(hidden)] __Nonexhaustive, } impl Packet { /// Returns the `Packet's` corresponding OpenPGP tag. /// /// Tags are explained in [Section 4.3 of RFC 4880]. /// /// [Section 4.3 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-4.3 pub fn tag(&self) -> packet::Tag { use crate::packet::Tag; match self { &Packet::Unknown(ref packet) => packet.tag(), &Packet::Signature(_) => Tag::Signature, &Packet::OnePassSig(_) => Tag::OnePassSig, &Packet::PublicKey(_) => Tag::PublicKey, &Packet::PublicSubkey(_) => Tag::PublicSubkey, &Packet::SecretKey(_) => Tag::SecretKey, &Packet::SecretSubkey(_) => Tag::SecretSubkey, &Packet::Marker(_) => Tag::Marker, &Packet::Trust(_) => Tag::Trust, &Packet::UserID(_) => Tag::UserID, &Packet::UserAttribute(_) => Tag::UserAttribute, &Packet::Literal(_) => Tag::Literal, &Packet::CompressedData(_) => Tag::CompressedData, &Packet::PKESK(_) => Tag::PKESK, &Packet::SKESK(_) => Tag::SKESK, &Packet::SEIP(_) => Tag::SEIP, &Packet::MDC(_) => Tag::MDC, &Packet::AED(_) => Tag::AED, Packet::__Nonexhaustive => unreachable!(), } } /// Returns the parsed `Packet's` corresponding OpenPGP tag. /// /// Returns the packets tag, but only if it was successfully /// parsed into the corresponding packet type. If e.g. a /// Signature Packet uses some unsupported methods, it is parsed /// into an `Packet::Unknown`. `tag()` returns `Tag::Signature`, /// whereas `kind()` returns `None`. pub fn kind(&self) -> Option<packet::Tag> { use crate::packet::Tag; match self { &Packet::Unknown(_) => None, &Packet::Signature(_) => Some(Tag::Signature), &Packet::OnePassSig(_) => Some(Tag::OnePassSig), &Packet::PublicKey(_) => Some(Tag::PublicKey), &Packet::PublicSubkey(_) => Some(Tag::PublicSubkey), &Packet::SecretKey(_) => Some(Tag::SecretKey), &Packet::SecretSubkey(_) => Some(Tag::SecretSubkey), &Packet::Marker(_) => Some(Tag::Marker), &Packet::Trust(_) => Some(Tag::Trust), &Packet::UserID(_) => Some(Tag::UserID), &Packet::UserAttribute(_) => Some(Tag::UserAttribute), &Packet::Literal(_) => Some(Tag::Literal), &Packet::CompressedData(_) => Some(Tag::CompressedData), &Packet::PKESK(_) => Some(Tag::PKESK), &Packet::SKESK(_) => Some(Tag::SKESK), &Packet::SEIP(_) => Some(Tag::SEIP), &Packet::MDC(_) => Some(Tag::MDC), &Packet::AED(_) => Some(Tag::AED), Packet::__Nonexhaustive => unreachable!(), } } } /// A `PacketPile` holds a deserialized sequence of OpenPGP messages. /// /// To deserialize an OpenPGP usage, use either [`PacketParser`], /// [`PacketPileParser`], or [`PacketPile::from_file`] (or related /// routines). /// /// Normally, you'll want to convert the `PacketPile` to a Cert or a /// `Message`. /// /// [`PacketParser`]: parse/struct.PacketParser.html /// [`PacketPileParser`]: parse/struct.PacketPileParser.html /// [`PacketPile::from_file`]: struct.PacketPile.html#method.from_file #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)] pub struct PacketPile { /// At the top level, we have a sequence of packets, which may be /// containers. top_level: Container, } /// An OpenPGP message. /// /// An OpenPGP message is a structured sequence of OpenPGP packets. /// Basically, it's an optionally encrypted, optionally signed literal /// data packet. The exact structure is defined in [Section 11.3 of RFC /// 4880]. /// /// [Section 11.3 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-11.3 #[derive(PartialEq)] pub struct Message { /// A message is just a validated packet pile. pile: PacketPile, } /// Holds a fingerprint. /// /// A fingerprint uniquely identifies a public key. For more details /// about how a fingerprint is generated, see [Section 12.2 of RFC /// 4880]. /// /// [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-12.2 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Clone, Hash)] pub enum Fingerprint { /// 20 byte SHA-1 hash. V4([u8;20]), /// Used for holding fingerprints that we don't understand. For /// instance, we don't grok v3 fingerprints. And, it is possible /// that the Issuer subpacket contains the wrong number of bytes. Invalid(Box<[u8]>) } /// Holds a KeyID. /// /// A KeyID is a fingerprint fragment. It identifies a public key, /// but is easy to forge. For more details about how a KeyID is /// generated, see [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]. /// /// [Section 12.2 of RFC 4880]: https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4880#section-12.2 #[derive(PartialEq, Eq, PartialOrd, Ord, Clone, Hash)] pub enum KeyID { /// Lower 8 byte SHA-1 hash. V4([u8;8]), /// Used for holding fingerprints that we don't understand. For /// instance, we don't grok v3 fingerprints. And, it is possible /// that the Issuer subpacket contains the wrong number of bytes. Invalid(Box<[u8]>) } /// The revocation status. #[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)] pub enum RevocationStatus<'a> { /// The key is definitely revoked. /// /// The relevant self-revocations are returned. Revoked(Vec<&'a packet::Signature>), /// There is a revocation certificate from a possible designated /// revoker. CouldBe(Vec<&'a packet::Signature>), /// The key does not appear to be revoked. /// /// An attacker could still have performed a DoS, which prevents /// us from seeing the revocation certificate. NotAsFarAsWeKnow, }